J Indian Philos (2011) 39:479–501

DOI 10.1007/s10781-011-9143-y

Can One Prove that Something Exists Beyond

Consciousness? A Śaiva Criticism of the Sautrāntika
Inference of External Objects
Isabelle Ratié

Published online: 7 June 2011

Ó Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011

Abstract This article examines how the Kashmiri non-dualistic Śaiva philoso-
phers Utpaladeva (tenth century) and Abhinavagupta (10th–11th centuries) present
and criticize a theory expounded by certain Buddhist philosophers, identified by the
two Śaiva authors as Sautrāntikas. According to this theory, no entity external to
consciousness can ever be perceived since perceived objects are nothing but internal
aspects (ākāra) of consciousness. Nonetheless we must infer the existence of
external entities so as to account for the fact that consciousness is aware of a variety
of objects: just as a mirror takes on a variegated appearance only by reflecting a
multiplicity of objects that remain external to it, in the same way, phenomenal
variety can be explained only by assuming the existence of various objects external
to consciousness. In Īsvarapratyabhijñākārikās I, 5, 8–9 and their commentaries,
Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta endeavour to criticize this theory, which challenges
their own idealistic principles: according to them, the Sautrāntikas’ inference is
neither legitimate nor even possible. The passage is particularly telling as regards
the strategy developed by Pratyabhijñā philosophers with respect to their Buddhist
opponents: they make use of certain arguments propounded by Dharmakı̄rti in
defense of Vijñānavāda in order to criticize the Sautrāntikas’ inference, but they
also exploit this discussion to underline the superiority of their idealism over that of
the Vijñānavādins.

Keywords Utpaladeva
Abhinavagupta
Pratyabhijñā
Vijñānavāda

Sautrāntika
Consciousness

I. Ratié (&)
Institut für Indologie und Zentralasien wissenschaften, Schillerstraße 6, 04109 Leipzig, Germany
e-mail: isabelle.ratie@gmail.com

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480 I. Ratié

Introduction—Why Prove (or Refute) Externalism?

This article is an attempt to understand how two Śaiva philosophers, Utpaladeva

and Abhinavagupta,1 have answered the question: can one prove that objects
exist outside of consciousness? At first sight though, this question hardly seems
relevant: why should we undertake to prove (or refute) the existence of objects
outside of consciousness? When perceiving an object, we experience the presence
of an entity immediately acknowledged as distinct from our consciousness; ob-
jects of perception are apprehended as external to the subject who becomes aware
of them. There are nonetheless circumstances in which we do not consider our
awareness of objects as the genuine experience of an external reality: thus when
dreaming, we are aware of objects apprehended as external to us, and yet, when
we wake up, we judge that these objects were in fact various internal forms in
which our consciousness was manifesting itself. Similarly, according to the
Buddhist Vijñānavādins, all perceived objects are mere aspects (ākāra)2 that
consciousness takes on, and since consciousness only manifests objects by
manifesting itself in the form of objects, we can never have access to a reality
that would be genuinely external: whatever we perceive is nothing but con-
sciousness taking the form of a particular object of perception. The Vijñānavā-
dins conclude from this that nothing exists independently of consciousness, and
this conclusion appeals to Utpaladeva, since his main goal is to justify philo-
sophically the idea, already dogmatically asserted in some Śaiva scriptures, that
nothing exists apart from a single, omnipotent and all-encompassing conscious-
ness called Śiva. Utpaladeva thus makes use of arguments already put forward by
some Vijñānavādins so as to refute various theories (whether Buddhist or
Brahmanical) according to which perception is consciousness’s direct encounter
with an external object;3 but he also has to confront another, more subtle—and

1
Utpaladeva (fl. c. 925–975) is the author of the ĪPK, on which he himself wrote two commentaries: a
Vr: tti and an almost entirely lost Vivr: ti. Abhinavagupta (fl. c. 975–1025) wrote the ĪPV, a brilliant
synthesis of Utpaladeva’s auto-commentaries, and the ĪPVV, which mostly comments on Utpaladeva’s
Vivr: ti. The text of the ĪPV quoted here is that of the KSTS edition, but several manuscripts (and the
Bhāskarı̄ edition) are also quoted within brackets whenever an emendation is proposed (‘‘p.n.p.’’ means
‘‘the passage is not preserved in...’’).
2
On the distinction between theories according to which consciousness takes on aspects (sākāravāda)
and theories according to which it is devoid of aspects (nirākāravāda), see e.g. Hattori (1968, p. 98); on
the Pratyabhijñā philosophers’ position in this debate, see Ratié (2010a).
3
See Ratié (2010a).

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Śaiva Criticism of a Sautrāntika Inference 481

less easily refutable—kind of externalism4 that Abhinavagupta attributes to the

Buddhist Sautrāntikas.5 According to this theory, although we can never have
any direct access to external objects (because whatever we perceive ultimately
amounts to an internal aspect of consciousness), we must nonetheless infer the
existence of an external reality in order to account for the variety of con-
sciousness’s aspects. Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta consider that this inference
of an external reality is neither legitimate nor even possible, and the present
article examines their refutation of inferential externalism while evaluating the
originality of their criticism: in what measure does it depart from the arguments
already formulated by the Vijñānavādins?

The Śaiva Presentation of the Sautrāntikas’ Thesis

The Sautrāntika portrayed by Utpaladeva shares with the Vijñānavādins the opinion
that we cannot step outside of consciousness so as to experience external reality
independently of consciousness, since we only experience what consciousness
manifests:6 the external object remains in itself absolutely inaccessible to per-
4
By ‘‘externalism’’ I mean any theory according to which consciousness’s objects are related (through a
relation of identity or causality) to something considered as external to consciousness. The editors of this
special issue of the journal rightly pointed out to me that the word yields a different meaning in some
discussions related to analytical philosophy, ethics or semantics, and they fear that my use of this term
here might lead to some confusion on the reader’s part. However, ‘‘externalism’’ is understood differently
according to whether it is used in the context of analytical philosophy, ethics or semantics; and considered
in its broadest sense (i.e. a sense that can be found in such various contexts as analytical philosophy,
semantics, ethics, psychology, history and philosophy of art, etc.), the word can apply to any kind of
theory that explains a given event as (at least partly) determined by external factors, however this
determination (and externality) may be understood. It therefore seems to me that it offers the least
unsatisfactory translation of the Sanskrit bāhyārthavāda (‘‘the doctrine [according to which] the object is
external’’) while enabling us to avoid some more seriously misleading terms such as ‘‘realism’’ (the
opposition realism/idealism could hardly apply to Indian philosophy, since a number of Indian ‘‘ideal-
isms,’’ including that of the Pratyabhijñā, consider the phenomenal world as perfectly real).
5
See e.g. ĪPVV, vol. I, p. 170: nanu sautrāntikāh: sam : vidi nı̄lādipratibimbam upayanti. ‘‘But the Sau-
trāntikas acknowledge that there is a reflection (pratibimba) of [objects] such as blue, etc., in conscious-
ness!’’ Although the term ‘‘Sautrāntika’’ is often used by late doxographers and modern scholars to refer to
one of the four representative schools of Indian Buddhism, little is known as regards the Sautrāntikas’
identity and beliefs. See Kritzer 2003a, b and Kritzer (2005, pp. XXVI–XXX): the term seems to appear first in
the Abhidharmakośabhās: ya, and Vasubandhu seems to be ‘‘inserting Yogācāra ideas into the Abhidhar-
makośabhās: ya under the guise of the Sautrāntika’’ (Kritzer 2005, p. XXVIII). Having shown that ‘‘there is a
close relation between Vasubandhu’s Sautrāntika ideas and the Yogācārabhūmi’’ (Ibid., pp. XXVIII–XXIX),
Kritzer concludes (Ibid., p. XXX) that ‘‘in the Abhidharmakośabhās: ya Vasubandhu uses the term Sautrāntika
to designate positions in the Yogācārabhūmi that he prefers to those of orthodox Sarvāstivāda. [. . .]
Vasubandhu [. . .] adjusts the traditional Sarvāstivādin abhidharma so that it no longer conflicts with the
central theories of Yogācāra [. . .]. Attributing an opinion to a Sautrāntika may simply be Vasubandhu’s way
of claiming that it is based on a more valid interpretation of sūtra than its Sarvāstivādin counterpart.’’ The
evolution of the meaning of the term between Vasubandhu and Dharmakı̄rti (and his commentators) is still
obscure; however, by the time the Pratyabhijñā philosophers were writing, the Sautrāntikas were considered
to hold a philosophical system of their own, and one that was opposed to the Yogācāra/Vijñānavāda. On the
sources of this Śaiva description of the Sautrāntikas’ position, see below, fn. 10.
6
Cf. Arnold (2008), who considers that in fact, the expression ‘‘epistemic idealism’’ used for instance by
J. Dunne to qualify Dharmakı̄rti’s Vijñānavāda (see e.g. Dunne 2004, p. 59 ff.) equally applies to the
Sautrāntikas.

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ception, because perception is the mere awareness of an aspect (ākāra) that con-
sciousness bears.7 Nonetheless, contrary to the Vijñānavādins, the Sautrāntika
refuses to draw from this the conclusion that there is no such thing as an external
reality. He points out that we are aware of a multiplicity of objects and that there
must be a cause for this phenomenal variety. The Vijñānavādins consider that this
cause is a mechanism of residual traces similar to that which, left by previous
experiences in a dreamer’s cognitive series, produces the variety of objects expe-
rienced in a dream;8 but the Sautrāntika argues that this cannot be the case, since
either these impregnations (vāsanā) are distinct from consciousness – but then they
are external entities, so that the Vijñānavāda is an externalism in disguise; or they
are not distinct from consciousness, in which case their variety is inexplicable, so
that they cannot account for consciousness’s variety of aspects.9
The Sautrāntika depicted by the Pratyabhijñā philosophers10 concludes from this
that just as a mirror can bear a multiplicity of appearances by reflecting a multiplicity that
is external to it, in the same way, consciousness, which is in itself undifferentiated,11

7
Cf. Hattori (1968, p. 98).
8
See Ratié (2010a).
9
See ĪPK I, 5, 4–5 and their commentaries (quoted and translated in Ratié 2010a).
10
This description of the Sautrāntikas’ position apparently originates from Buddhist sources that Utp-
aladeva and Abhinavagupta present as belonging to the Vijñānavāda (such as Dharmakı̄rti’s works, and
_
possibly Śankaranandana’s works, which Abhinavagupta often quotes: see Ratié (2010a), fn. 28 and 29),
but also from Brahmanical sources (such as the NM, which Abhinavagupta sometimes seems to para-
phrase in these discussions: see e.g. Ratié 2010a, fn. 66). Later Brahmanical doxographies present this
theory as the core of the Sautrāntikas’ doctrine (see e.g. SDS, p. 19, which mentions the Sautrāntikas as
the proponents of the ‘‘inferability of the external object’’ bāhyārthānumeyatva).
11
See ĪPV, vol. I, p. 165: iha bodhas tāvad abhinnah: , prakāśamātram eva hy asya paramārthah: ,
prakāśādhikam
: yadi *nı̄lam asya rūpam [Bhāskarı̄, J, S1: nı̄lasya rūpam KSTS, L, P, S2, SOAS; p.n.p. D],
tarhi tad aprakāśarūpam iti na prakāśeta. atha tathāprakāśatvam evāsya rūpam, pı̄taprakāśah: katham :
syāt? athāpi kramikanı̄lapı̄tādiprakāśarūpam eva tasya rūpam, nı̄lādyābhāsaśūnyo’ham iti prakāśah:
svāpādyavasthāsu na syāt. tasmāt prakāśah: prakāśa eva, an: umātram api na rūpāntaram asyāstı̄ty abh-
inno bodhah: . ‘‘[– The Sautrāntika:] In this world, undoubtedly, consciousness is undifferentiated (abh-
inna), for its real nature is nothing but pure manifestation (prakāśamātra). [For] if [consciousness] had
‘blue’ as its form, [and if this form were] distinct from manifestation, then, since this form would not be
manifestation, it would not be manifested! But if [one said, rather,] that the form of [consciousness] is
simply the fact that it is manifest thus, [as ‘blue’], how could there be a manifestation of yellow[, and not
only of blue]? And even if [one said that] the form of [consciousness] consists precisely in the successive
manifestation of blue, yellow, etc., the manifestation [that can be formulated as] ‘I am devoid of the
manifestations of blue, etc.’ would not occur in such states as sleep, etc. As a consequence, manifestation
is nothing but manifestation (prakāśah: prakāśa eva): it possesses no other form, however minute.
Consciousness is therefore undifferentiated.’’ (Concerning the emendation above, the Bhāskarı̄ edition
bears the KSTS reading, but Bhāskarakan: :tha obviously had the J and S1 reading; see Bhāskarı̄, vol. I, p.
210: asya – bodhasya).

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must reflect an external multiplicity:12 although external objects can never be per-
ceived, they must be inferred in order to explain phenomenal variety.13 And just as, in
the case of the mirror, there is a correspondence of forms between reflected objects and

12
See ĪPK I, 5, 4: tattadā kasmikābhāso bāhyam : ced anumāpayet / na hy abhinnasya bodhasya vi-
citrābhāsahetutā // ‘‘If [a Sautrāntika objected that] the manifestation of this or that [particular object],
which is [apparently] devoid of any cause, must lead [us] to infer an external [objective reality], because
consciousness, [in itself] undifferentiated, cannot be the cause of [its] various manifestations...’’ Cf. ĪPV,
vol. I, pp. 166–167: tasya cābhinnasya kadācin nı̄lābhāsatā kadācit pı̄tābhāsateti ye vicitrābhāsās tatra
kāran: atvam : hi yasmān nopapannam hetāv abhinne kāryabhedasyāsam : bhavāt, tasmāt sa sa vici-
tranı̄lapı̄tādirūpa ākasmiko’jñātapratyaks: asiddhahetukah: san bāhyam : vijñānagatapratibimbātmaka-
svasvabhāvasam : pādakam aucityavaśān nijarūpasadr: śam: kramopanipatadrūpabahutarabhedātmakam :
jñānāt sarvathā pr: thagbhūtam anumāpayatı̄ti sam : bhāvayate bāhyārthavādı̄. ‘‘And [consciousness,]
which is undifferentiated, cannot be the cause of the ‘various manifestations’—i.e., [it cannot be the
cause] of the fact that it is sometimes manifestation of blue, sometimes manifestation of yellow, [etc.];
because when a cause is undifferentiated, there cannot be any difference in [its] effect. For this reason, the
[manifestation] that is ‘such and such’—[i.e.,] that consists in various [objects] such as blue, yellow,
etc.—, [and] that is ‘[apparently] devoid of cause’—[i.e., we] do not know any cause of it that would be
established through perception – leads to infer ‘an external (bāhya) [objective reality]’; [i.e., phenomenal
variety leads to inferring the existence of an entity] which causes [the appearance of] its own nature in the
form of a reflection (pratibimba) within consciousness; [this entity] is similar to its own form [reflected in
consciousness]—because it is appropriate [that a reflected object should resemble its reflection]–, it
consists in many differences, the forms of which occur successively, [and] it is completely distinct from
consciousness. Such is the hypothesis formulated by the externalist.’’ Cf. the presentation of the
Sautrāntikas’ thesis in NM (K), p. 300 (see Ratié 2010a, fn. 17).
13
See ĪPV, vol. I, p. 164: tatra prakāśasyāvicitrasya kramen: a vicitratākāran: am : pratibimbātmakam;
tatpratibimbasajātı̄yam : yat tad eva nı̄lādirūpam
: bāhyam, tac ca yady apy anumeyam, tathāpı̄dam : nı̄lam
iti pratyaks: en: ādhyavasāyād adhyavasāyaprān: itatvāc ca pramān: asthiteh: pratyaks: avyapadeśyam: *bha-
vis: yatı̄ti [SOAS: bhavis: yati KSTS, Bhāskarı̄, J, L, P, D, S1, S2] bāhyārthavādikathitam *idam : hetvan-
taram [conj.: iti hetvantaram KSTS, Bhāskarı̄, J, L, P, D, S1, SOAS: idam iti hetvantaram S2]
anumı̄yamānam : bāhyarūpam āśan_kyamānatvena darśayati. ‘‘[Utpaladeva] is now presenting this other
[possible] cause [for phenomenal variety] as an objection—namely, an external [reality] (bāhya) that is
inferred (anumı̄yamāna), [and] that is thus presented by the externalist: ‘in that regard, the cause of the
fact that the manifesting consciousness (prakāśa) possesses a variety [appearing] in a certain order
[although it is in itself] devoid of variety is a reflection (pratibimba). The [reflected] double of this
reflection is precisely the external [object] that has as its form blue, etc.; and although this [external
object] is [only] an object of inference, it can nonetheless be called an object of perception, because of the
determination (adhyavasāya) as an object of perception [that takes the form] ‘this is blue’, and because
the establishment of [perception as] a means of knowledge depends on this determination’.’’ The end of
the passage is an allusion to the Buddhist theory according to which in order to become expressible (and
therefore useful in the practical world), the raw sensation of a singular presence must be determined
(adhyavasita), i.e., conceptually transformed (so as to be grasped as ‘‘the perception of blue’’ for instance)
through a process of exclusion of all perceptions of what is not blue: only thus does perception become
strictly speaking a means of knowledge (see e.g. NBT: , pp. 83–85, cf. Ratié 2010b, fn. 7). Abhinavagupta
alludes to this theory e.g. in ĪPV, vol. I, p. 213: bauddhair apy adhyavasāyāpeks: am : prakāsasya
prāmān: yam : vadadbhir... ‘‘And the Buddhists too, who say that the manifestation [that is perception] is a
means of knowledge insofar as it depends on a determination (adhyavasāya)...’’ In the Sautrāntikas’
perspective, this theory implies that perception can rightly be said to be the perception of external objects
(although in fact it presents nothing but an internal aspect of consciousness) because it is determined as
such, and because without this determination, perception would be useless in the vyavahāra.

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their reflections, in the same way, to each phenomenon must correspond a distinct form
outside of consciousness.14

The First Assault on the Sautrāntika’s Inference: An Inferred Cause

Must Have Been Previously Perceived

Utpaladeva’s criticism begins thus:

anumānam anābhātapūrve naives: :tam...15
No inference can be admitted as regards that which has never been manifested
previously.
The goal of an inference is to establish the existence of an unperceived object, and if
we did perceive that object, we would have no need to infer it; however inference
necessarily regards an object that has already been perceived. Thus in order to infer
that there is a fire on a mountain seen in the distance from the smoke floating above it,
we must have had previous experiences of both smoke and fire, because according to
Dharmakı̄rti’s explanation of causality (which Utpaladeva adopts),16 the very notion
of causality arises from five ‘‘perceptions and non-perceptions’’ (pratyaks: ānup-
alambha): when we perceive fire, smoke, imperceptible so far, is then perceived; when
we do not perceive fire, we do not perceive smoke either.17 Without this set of

14
See ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 89: vijñānāntarvartı̄ nı̄lādyākārah: sadr: śam arpakam apeks: ate pratibimbatvād
darpan: apratibimbavad. ‘‘The aspect (ākāra) of blue, etc., that resides within consciousness requires
something that projects [it] (arpaka) [and is] similar (sadr: śa) [to it], because it is a reflection (prat-
ibimba), just as a reflection in a mirror [requires an external cause projecting it and similar to it].’’ On the
term arpaka, cf. e.g. PV Pratyaks: apariccheda 247b–d, which formulates thus the Sautrāntika doctrine
(see Eltschinger 2009, p. 201): grāhyatām : viduh: / hetutvam eva yuktijñā jñānākārārpan: aks: amam //
‘‘Those who are versed in reasoning consider that to be an object consists in being a cause capable of
projecting (arpan: a) an aspect (ākāra) onto consciousness.’’
15
ĪPK I, 5, 8a.
16
This adoption (typical of the Pratyabhijñā’s strategy regarding Buddhist logic: cf. Torella 1992) aims
at showing that Dharmakı̄rti’s explanation of causality makes sense only if consciousness is a unitary
enduring subject (and not, as the Buddhists contend, a series of discrete momentary cognitions). See ĪPK
I, 7, 4: pratyaks: ānupalambhānām
: tattadbhinnām : śapātinām / kāryakāran: atāsiddhihetutaikapramātr: jā //
‘‘Perceptions and non-perceptions (pratyaks: ānupalambha), which [respectively] concern [only] this or
that aspect distinct [from the relation of cause and effect], are the cause of the establishment of the
relation of cause and effect [only] thanks to the single unitary subject.’’
17
See e.g. HB, p. 4 (cf. Lasic 1999): idam asyopalambha upalabdhilaks: an: aprāptam : prāg anupalabdham
upalabhyate, satsv apy anyes: u hetus: v asyābhāve na bhavatı̄ti yas tadbhāve bhāvas tadabhāve’bhāvaś ca
pratyaks: ānupalambhasādhanah: kāryakāran: abhāvas tasya siddhih: . ‘‘The relation of cause and effect
[between A and B], that is, the presence [of B] when A is present, and the absence [of B] when A is
absent, the establishment of which is made thanks to perception and non-perception (pratyaks: ānup-
alambha), is established thus: when there is a perception of A, B, for which the conditions of perception
are fulfilled, [and] which was not perceived until then, is perceived; [whereas] even when some other
causes [of B] are present, when A is absent, [B] is not present [either].’’ Abhinavagupta, following a
number of Buddhist commentators, understands that the relation of cause and effect is established through
a set of five experiences comprising two perceptions and three non-perceptions (see e.g. ĪPVV, vol. II, p.
345: pratyaks: advayam anupalambhatrayam : ceti pratyaks: ānupalambhapañcakam, ‘‘five perceptions and
non-perceptions—that is, two perceptions, and three non-perceptions’’), but other commentators have
understood Dharmakı̄rti’s text differently (see Inami 1999).

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Śaiva Criticism of a Sautrāntika Inference 485

experiences, we could not consider smoke as a logical reason for inferring fire as its
cause; and accordingly, in order to infer an external object as the cause of this or that
particular cognition, we need to perceive the external object in itself, independently of
the object’s cognition—but precisely, such a perception is impossible:

dhūmāgnyor anupalambhāv agner upalambho dhūmasyānupalambho’gnyup-

alambhād uktād *anantaram eva [conj.: eva KSTS] dhūmasyopalambha ity
evam : pratyaks: advayenānupalambhatrayen: a ca sakrd eva kāryakāran: atā
vyavasthāpyate. tatrāpy anupalambho’py anyopalambha  eveti pratyaks: a-
vyāpārād *eva kāran: atā [corr.: evākāran: atā KSTS] vyavasthāpyate bhāvas-
iddheh: . na ca bāhyo’rthah: pratyaks: a iti tena saha kasyacid api na
18
kāryakāran: abhāvasiddhir iti tasminn anumeye na jñānam : kāryahetuh: .

The relation of cause and effect is immediately established thanks to two

perceptions and three non-perceptions, thus: the two non-perceptions of smoke
and fire, the perception of fire, the non-perception of smoke, and immediately
after the [already] mentioned perception of fire, the perception of smoke. Even
if [causality is partly established through non-perceptions,] since even non-
perception is [in fact] nothing but the perception of some other [entity], it is
thanks to the sole activity of perception that causality is established, because
of the establishment of the presence [of this or that entity]. And since the
external object is not an object of perception, one cannot establish any causal
relation between this [external object] and anything else; as a consequence, the
cognition [of this or that object] is not the reason [consisting in] an effect
(kāryahetu) as regards this [external object] that must be inferred.
One cannot infer from the experience of an effect the existence of a cause
external to consciousness, because no causal relation can be established without
having recourse to a set of experiences which, by definition, cannot involve an
external object. Besides, the Sautrāntika’s model of the mirror is inadequate, be-
cause in the case of the mirror, the reflected object and its reflection are not strictly
speaking in a relation of cause and effect,19 but also, more importantly, because in
the case of the mirror, we can perceive both the external object and its reflection in
the mirror, so that we can at least determine a relation of similarity (tulyatā)
between the reflected object and its reflection; whereas we can never perceive the
external object in itself. Determining any relation (be it of mere similarity) between

18
IPVV, vol. II, p. 160.
19
ĪPVV, vol. II, pp. 158–159: samarpyasamarpakatā ca darpan: agajayos tulyakālakr: taiva. tata eva na
pāramārthikah: kāryakāran: abhāvo’yam api tu bimbapratibimbavyavahārah: . ‘‘Moreover, the mirror and
the elephant [reflected in it] become [respectively] that onto which [a form] is projected and that which
projects [a form] exactly at the same time; for this very reason, it is not a real relation of cause and effect,
[which implies the cause’s anteriority], but only the mundane experience of a reflected object and its
reflection (bimbapratibimbavyavahāra).’’

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an external object and a cognition is therefore perfectly impossible: the mirror

model is irrelevant as regards consciousness.20
So far the reasoning is very similar to that of the Vijñānavādins; thus the famous
Dharmakı̄rtian argument of the sahopalambhaniyama (‘‘the necessity of being
perceived together [for the object and its cognition]’’)21 enables the Vijñānavādins
to demonstrate that any attempt to infer an external object is vain, because the
impossibility of experiencing the external object independently of cognition pre-
cludes the establishment of any relation (be it of causality or of mere similarity)
between the external object and the cognition.22

The Sautrāntika’s Riposte: The Argument of the Sense Organs

The Sautrāntika then puts forward a new argument:

nanu bhavatu pratyaks: ato drs: :te’numāne sam
: katheyam
: sāmānyato drs: :te tu kim
:

vaks: yasi yathārthopalabdhyendriyānumāne? 23 

Fine—let us accept this speech [of yours] as regards an inference with respect
to what has been apprehended through a direct perception (pratyaks: ato drs: :ta).

However, in the case of an [inference] with respect to what has been appre-
hended through a generality (sāmānyato drs: :ta), what will you say—for in-
stance, in the case of the inference of thesense organs (indriya) from the
perception of their object?
Indeed, we usually infer entities that have been previously perceived; but the
Sautrāntika is here pointing out that this is not always the case. Thus Indian phi-
losophers consider that our sense organs (indriya) are inferred whereas we never
perceive them as such. This does not mean that we must infer the existence of our
eyes, for instance—for we can observe these elements of our body (even though
indirectly, in a mirror), touch them, etc. Nor does it mean that we should infer our

20
See ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 159: darpan: apratibimbe hi bimbam apy upalabdham iti niścitam : sādr: śyamātre;
iha tu bimbasya nāmāpi nāvagatam iti katham etattulyatā bhavet? ‘‘For in the case of the reflection
(pratibimba) in a mirror, the reflected object (bimba) is also perceived; as a consequence, it is determined
[as being a reflected object] from the point of view of the mere resemblance [with the reflection]; whereas
in the case [of the external object and the cognition, we] do not grasp anything that would belong to the
reflected object (bimba). Therefore how could there be any similarity of this [imperceptible external
object with the cognition]?’’
21
See PVin I, 54a (quoted in ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 78, see Ratié 2010a): sahopalambhaniyamād abhedo
nı̄lataddhiyoh: . ‘‘Because of the necessity [for blue and the cognition of blue] to be perceived together,
there is no difference between blue and the cognition of blue.’’
22
For similar reasonings attributed to Vijñānavādins in Naiyāyika and Mı̄mām
: saka texts, see Ratié
(2010a, fn. 22).
23
ĪPV, vol. I, pp. 187–188.

123
Śaiva Criticism of a Sautrāntika Inference 487

visual faculty, because this faculty is self-evident: to see is to know that one sees.24
But why is the eye ordinarily considered as the instrument thanks to which we can
see? For an eye never sees itself seeing: although we can perceive our eyes, ears,
nose, skin and tongue, their instrumentality in perception remains imperceptible to
us. According to Buddhist as well as Brahmanical philosophers, this instrumentality
must be inferred: in order to explain the fact that we are perceiving, we must assume
the existence of some imperceptible entities (whether they are conceived as atoms
or as rays, and whether they are thought to enter in contact with their object or
not)25 residing inside what we ordinarily consider as our visual organs, and con-
stituting the real instruments of perception—the real sense organs.
However this inference does not establish the existence of an object that would
have been directly (pratyaks: ato) perceived at some point in the past, since the
indriya-s are by nature imperceptible: it only establishes the existence of an object
apprehended in a general way (sāmānyato). Thus, when witnessing various actions,
we apprehend the invariable concomitance between these actions and the instru-
ments thanks to which they are exerted; and from the generality or the universal
(sāmānya) of instrumentality (karan: atā) thus grasped, we become capable of
inferring the sense organs—that is, we assume by analogy26 that we possess some
imperceptible instruments having a causal role in the act of perceiving.27
The Sautrāntika portrayed by Abhinavagupta thus explains:
tena ca yady api vyāptir na gr: hı̄tā, tathāpi kāryavyatireken: eti kādācitkatayā
yad idam: kāryam
: nı̄lābhāsam
: vijñānam : tat tathābhūtam adhikam : hetum : vinā
nopapadyata ity evam : niyamavato vyatirekāt sāmānyamukhenāpy anvayah:
sidhyaty eva.28

24
This is the reason why I did not translate indriya as ‘‘sense faculty’’ or ‘‘capacity;’’ the indriya of sight
is not the power of seeing (for that power is self-revealed). Eli Franco has rightly pointed out to me that
the term ‘‘organ’’ might be misleading insofar as the indriya of sight for instance is more than what we
usually consider as the visual organ (i.e., the visible body parts called ‘‘eyes’’). But provided that one
keeps in mind that etymologically, an organ is a bodily ‘‘instrument,’’ and that sense organs are not
limited to the perceptible body parts called ‘‘eye,’’ ‘‘ear,’’ etc., it seems to me that this latter translation
remains the least unsatisfactory, given that the indriya-s are the karan: a-s of perception (see e.g. NM, vol.
I, p. 348, quoted below, fn. 27).
25
See Preisendanz (1989), particularly pp. 147–149.
26
See Nenniger (1994).
27
Cf. NM, vol. I, p. 348: sāmānyato dr: s: :tam: tu yatra sam : bandhakāle’pi lin_gisvarūpam apratyaks: am
:
nityaparoks: am eva sāmānyato vyāptigrahan: ād anumı̄yate, yathā śabdādyupalabdhyā śrotrādi karan: am.
indriyān: ām atı̄ndriyatvān na kadācit pratyaks: agamyatvam. atha ca cchedanādikriyān: ām : paraśvadhādi-
karan: apūrvakatvena vyāptigrahan: āc chabdādyupalabdhikriyān: ām : karan: apūrvakatvam anumı̄yate. ‘‘As
for the [inferred object] that is apprehended through a generality (sāmānyato dr: s: :ta), it possesses an
inferential mark, [but] it is not directly perceived, [i.e.,] it is always imperceptible, even at the time of the
relation [between the inferred object and its inferential mark; and it is] inferred from a generality
(sāmānyato) thanks to the apprehension of an invariable concomitance—for instance, an instrument
(karan: a) such as the hearing organ [is inferred] thanks to the perception of words, etc. Because sense organs
(indriya) are [themselves] beyond [the realm of] sense organs (atı̄ndriya), [they] can never be directly
apprehended. And yet, because there is an apprehension of the invariable concomitance of such actions as
cutting with the fact of being preceded by instruments such as an axe for instance, the fact that actions such
as sound perception must be preceded by some instruments, [i.e., sense organs,] is inferred.’’
28
ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 161.

123
488 I. Ratié

And even though the invariable concomitance [between the cognition] and this
[external object] is not grasped through the [five experiences that enable us to
establish a causal relation,] nevertheless, [it is grasped] because of the absence
of the effect [if the cause is absent] (kāryavyatireka): the effect that is the
cognition having the aspect ‘‘blue,’’ which [only exists] occasionally, cannot
logically take place without a cause distinct [from the effect and] that is, like
[the effect, occasional]. The positive concomitance (anvaya) is [therefore]
perfectly established, albeit through a generality (sāmānya) [and not through a
direct perception], from the negative concomitance (vyatireka) that implies the
necessity [just expounded].
When inferring that a hill is on fire from the smoke seen above it, we identify the
inferred fire with previously witnessed fires, whereas when inferring the existence of
the instruments thanks to which we perceive, we do not identify the inferred cause with
some particular entity perceived in the past: we assume the existence of this cause in a
general way, as an entity only particularized by its being distinct from its effect (i.e.,
perception), because if we did not assume its existence, we could not account for the
fact of perception. In the same way, we must account for the fact that consciousness is
not eternally the consciousness of blue for instance: phenomenal variety exists, and
since it is not caused by the nature of consciousness, which is in itself undifferentiated,
we must assume the existence of an imperceptible cause conceived in a general way as
distinct from the cognition of this or that object, i.e., the external object.

Utpaladeva’s Answer: In the Case of the Sense Organs, Causality

is Directly Perceived

Utpaladeva could reply by arguing, as Dharmakı̄rti does, that there is another possible
explanation for phenomenal variety—namely, the theory of impregnations (vāsanā).29
However this argument would be irrelevant here, since the Śaiva philosopher has
already shown (in the guise of a Sautrāntika) that impregnations cannot cause con-
sciousness’s diversity. Utpaladeva therefore makes the following answer:

29
See PVin I, 58d (cf. Krasser 2004, pp. 142–143): ... bāhyasiddhih: syād vyatirekatah: // ‘‘The external
[object] could be established through the absence [of a certain effect if a certain cause is absent] (vyatireka),’’
and the auto-commentary ad loc. (p. 43): satsu samarthes: v anyes: u hetus: u jñānakāryānis: pattih:
kāran: āntaravaikalyam : sūcayati. sa bāhyo’rthah: syād yady atra kaścid upādānaviśes: ābhāvakr tam
: kāryavy-
atirekam 
: na brūyāt. ‘‘When all the other causes capable [of producing a cognition] are present, the non-arising
of the effect which is the cognition indicates that some other cause is missing; and this [missing cause] could
be the external object, if in this regard, somebody [—i.e., a Vijñānavādin—] did not explain that the absence
of this effect is due to the absence of the particular material cause [which is a particular impregnation].’’
Abhinavagupta quotes this passage (see ĪPVV, vol. II, pp. 128–129) and obviously considers it as a refutation
of the Sautrāntikas’ contention that the external object must be established through kāryavyatireka. In the NM,
the Vijñānavādin, who quotes this verse (see NM(K), p. 300), also shows that the Sautrāntika’s theory is not
compelling since the mechanism of residual traces can also account for phenomenal variety. See NM (K),
p. 298: svacchatvāj jñānasya kālus: yam anyakr: tam iti cet, avidyāvāsanākr: tam : tad bhavis: yati. ‘‘If [the
opponent says] that because consciousness is [in itself] limpid, the fact that it is stained [by phenomenal
diversity] must be produced by something else, [we Vijñānavādins answer that] this can [also] be produced by
the impregnations (vāsanā) [produced by/responsible for] nescience.’’

123
Śaiva Criticism of a Sautrāntika Inference 489

... indriyam / ābhātam eva bı̄jāder ābhāsād dhetuvastunah: // ābhāsah: punar

ābhāsād bāhyasyāsı̄t katham
: cana / arthasya naiva tenāsya siddhir nāpy
anumānatah: //30

[Before being inferred,] the sense organs have indeed been manifested through
the manifestation of a real entity which is a cause, such as, for instance, a seed,
[which is the cause of a sprout,] but the manifestation of an object external to
manifestation could not occur in any way. Therefore there can be no estab-
lishment of this [external object]—not even through an inference.
When inferring the existence of our sense organs, we only infer a cause in
general capable of explaining the fact that we perceive, and Abhinavagupta explains
that this general feature of ‘‘causality’’ (kāran: atā) by which the inferred object is
characterized is directly perceived:
ucyate tatrāpi vikalpena yathā so’rthah: spr: śyate tathānumeya iti sthitih: . vik-
alpaś ca nendriyādikam artham : kenacit *sam : niveśaviśes: ādinā viśes: ātmanā
[Bhāskarı̄, J, P, S1, S2, SOAS: sam : niveśaviśes : ātmanā KSTS, L; p.n.p. D]
sprśaty api tu kim : cid upalabdheh : kāran : am ity amunā svabhāvena, sa ca

svabhāvah kāran atālaks an ah pratyaks agr hı̄ta eva. 31
: : : : : :

[To the Sautrāntika’s objection, Utpaladeva] replies: even in that case [where we
infer an object grasped through a generality (sāmānyato drs: :ta),] it is established
that the inferred object must be such as any object grasped  through a concept
(vikalpa); but a concept does not grasp its object—such as the sense organs for
instance—as having some particular nature comprising a particular configura-
tion, etc.; rather, [it grasps it] as this nature [only]: ‘it is some cause of per-
ception’—and this nature, characterized by causality [only,] is indeed grasped
through a direct perception (pratyaks: a).
The latter statement is somewhat surprising: how can causality be directly per-
ceived, as we perceive blue or yellow?
According to the Buddhist logicians, we are aware of the causality of fire with
respect to smoke thanks to a series of perceptions and non-perceptions. However
these experiences only produce the awareness that a particular fire is the cause of the
particular smoke seen above the mountain; so where does the general notion of
causality come from? One could consider that it is inductively formed from the
particular past experiences of the seed and sprout, of the threads and cloth, etc.
According to the Pratyabhijñā philosophers though, this is not the way we acquire
the sāmānya of causality, because if this general notion were not first known in
some way, the process of generalization would remain impossible: the term ‘‘cause’’
would remain inextricably attached to the sole particular entities perceived by us.32
30
ĪPK, 5, 8b-9.
31
ĪPV, vol. I, p. 188.
32
Cf. ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 156 : anyathaikatra bı̄je kāran: aśabdah: sam
: ketito na mr: tpin: d: ādau sam
: ketito
bhavet. ‘‘If it were not the case, the word ‘cause’ would be associated by convention to one [single entity
such as] the seed: it could not be associated by convention to a lump of clay for instance[, although the
latter is a cause with respect to the pot].’’

123
490 I. Ratié

The synthesis through which, gathering the various perceptions of fire and smoke
mentioned by Dharmakı̄rti, we are capable of saying ‘‘fire is the cause of smoke’’ is
possible because each of these perceptions already contains in some way the notion
of causality. Thus, according to Utpaladeva, any particular entity (svalaks: an: a) is in
fact the singular combination of a multiplicity of elementary phenomena (ābhā-
sa)33 which ‘‘behave like generalities’’ (sāmānyāyamāna).34 This particular fire
seen here and now is therefore a unique synthesis of elementary phenomena: time,
place, existence, fire in general, which in turn can be analyzed into a series of
general features, including the fact of being the cause of smoke.
The Buddhists could object that this analysis is a conceptual activity posterior to
perception; but according to Utpaladeva, the very fact that we are capable of such an
analysis shows that these various elements are already present, albeit in an implicit
form, in the pure sensation preceding the verbal analysis. As a consequence, these
general aspects—which include causality—are not a secondary and purely artificial
construction, contrary to what Dharmakı̄rti claims: they are the ultimate elements of
perception and any particular object of perception is made of their synthesis.35
This theory of perception enables Utpaladeva to state that causality in general has
already been grasped in countless perceptions (as a component of perceived fires,
seeds, etc.),36 so that the sense organs too, although imperceptible as such, are
nonetheless perceived in some way, insofar as they are inferred as a ‘‘cause
in general’’ already perceived in innumerable everyday experiences.37
Abhinavagupta concludes:
tasmāt kāran: atvābhāsasāmānyam
: pūrvapratyaks: asvı̄krtam. tatas tatra yuktam
:
vikalpanam.38 

Therefore [the subject] has appropriated the generality (sāmānya) of the

phenomenon ‘‘causality’’ through direct perception before [inferring the
existence of the sense organs]; so in this case, the conceptual construction is
correct.
The Sautrāntika wrongly assumes that in the case of the sense organs, the inferred
object has never been perceived (so that it is all right to infer an external object by
33
See ĪPK II, 3, 7 and their commentaries, quoted and translated in Ratié (2010b, fn. 36).
34
See ĪPK II, 3, 2cd and its commentaries (quoted and translated in Ratié 2010b, fn. 35). This verse is
explicitly mentioned by Abhinavagupta in his explanation of Utpaladeva’s criticism of the Sautrāntika’s
inference (in ĪPV, vol. I, pp. 188–189).
35
See Torella (1992, pp. 332–333); (2002, fn. 3, pp. 89–90).
36
See ĪPV, vol. I, pp. 189–190: iti kāran: ābhāso viśes: aśūnyah: parigr: hı̄ta eva bı̄jād an_kura iti pratı̄tau.
yad yasya niyamam anuvidhatte’vyatiriktam : tat tasya kāryam iti pratighat:am : mr: ttikādirūpasya hetut-
advanmātrasyābhāsāt. ‘‘As a consequence, in the case of the cognition ‘the sprout comes from the seed’,
the phenomenon of cause (kāran: ābhāsa) devoid of particularities (viśes: aśūnya) has already been entirely
grasped [in the form] ‘that which invariably receives its restriction from [something] is the effect of that
[thing]’, because in each pot, something that is merely [particularized as] possessing this [generality] of
cause (hetutadvanmātra) is manifest in the form of clay, etc.’’
37
See Vr tti, p. 22: indriyam apy anumı̄yate kim
: cinmātram
: nimittam
: tac ca bı̄jādyābhāsād ābhāsitam eva.
 sense organs are inferred as a mere something (kimcinmātra) that is a cause, and this has
‘‘Even the :
necessarily been manifested [previously] thanks to the manifestation of the seed, etc.’’
38
ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 156.

123
Śaiva Criticism of a Sautrāntika Inference 491

definition impossible to perceive): in fact, the object of the sense organs’ inference,
causality in general, is already known through perception.

Is Utpaladeva Providing an Argument Against His Own Theory?

This strategy is very risky though; for the argument could be used just as well in
favour of the Sautrāntika’s thesis. Thus according to Utpaladeva, the inference of
the sense organs is valid, although nobody has ever perceived the indriya-s, because
it regards a ‘‘cause in general’’ of perception, which is a component of countless
perceived objects; but then why not consider that accordingly, the inference of the
external object is valid, because it regards the ‘‘cause in general’’ of phenomenal
diversity? Utpaladeva’s reasoning apparently legitimates the externalist’s inference
instead of refuting it.
Although this problem is not clearly stated in the Vrtti or the ĪPV, Utpaladeva and
Abhinavagupta were perfectly well aware of it. Thus,commenting on Utpaladeva’s
lost Vivr: ti, Abhinavagupta explains:
yadi tāvad adhikam: hetumātram : sādhyate tat kāpilābhyupagatasam : vinmātra-
svabhāvādhikam: sam: vidaiśvaryam icchātmakam urarı̄kr: tam eva kāran: atayā
svātantryam: nāmeti siddham : sādhitam
: syāt. athāpi sam: vidbāhyatāviśis: :tam
:
tadadhikam : sādhyate. tad anupapannam : , sam: vidbāhyasya svapne’py anā-
bhātasya vikalpyatvāyogād anumeyatānupapannā yatah: .39
If, on the one hand, [the Sautrāntika’s inference] establishes a mere cause
(hetumātra) that is [simply] distinct [from the other perceived causes of
phenomenal variety,] then here is what [this inference] should ‘‘establish:’’ the
sovereignty (aiśvarya) of consciousness, which is distinct from the nature that
the followers of Kapila [the founder of Sām : khya] attribute to pure con-
sciousness (sam: vinmātra), [and] which consists in will (icchā)—[i.e.,] what is
called freedom (svātantrya) must necessarily be acknowledged as the cause
[of phenomenal variety]. If, on the other hand, [the Sautrāntika says] that [his
inference] establishes [a cause] that is particularized (viśis: :ta) by externality
with respect to consciousness (sam : vidbāhyatā), [that is to say, a cause] which
is distinct from [consciousness]—this is impossible; because that which is
external to consciousness, [i.e.], that which has never been been manifested,
even in a dream, cannot be inferred, since it cannot be conceptualized.
There is an essential difference between the sense organs’ inference and the
external object’s inference. In the first case, one infers, from the fact of visual
perception for instance, a cause in general that is distinct from the other causes of
perception (i.e. light and the perceived visual form).40 In the second case, however,

39
ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 161.
40
See ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 155: indriyādr: s::taprabhr: ti na kenacid vises: arūpen: ānumı̄yate’pi tu sāmānyena
dr: s::tarūpālokādhikam
: kim
: cit kāran: am iti. ‘‘An [entity] such as the imperceptible entity that is a sense
organ is not inferred in any particular form (vises: arūpa); rather, [it is inferred] as a generality (sāmānya),
in the form: ‘it is some cause that is distinct from the perceived form and light’.’’

123
492 I. Ratié

the cause inferred is not conceived as a cause in general, since it is particularized

(visis: :ta) by externality: the Sautrāntika does not claim to infer just any cause, but
rather, a cause that possesses the singular property of being external to con-
sciousness.
Admittedly, any inferred cause is thus subjected to some kind of particulari-
zation: we infer the existence of the seed that causes a sprout as being distinct
from the other causes contributing to its production, such as water or earth—or
the clay that causes a pot, as being distinct from the potter’s stick or wheel;41 or
the sense organ causing perception, as being distinct from the perceived form
or light. In the case of the external object though, the Sautrāntika does not infer
from the cognition bearing differentiated aspects (sākāra) a cause in general that
would simply be distinct from a pure consciousness devoid of aspects (nirākāra);
for if that were the case, he would infer the sole freedom (svātantrya) of
consciousness as the cause of phenomenal variety (thus agreeing with the
Pratyabhijñā philosophers’ main thesis),42 since this creative spontaneity at the
heart of any conscious state is distinct from the passive, undifferentiated mani-
festation that the Sautrāntika describes as the normal state of consciousness.43
But the Sautrāntika refuses to identify the cause to be inferred with conscious-
ness’s spontaneity: he wants to infer a cause distinct from consciousness itself.
This additional particularization44 dooms the Sautrāntika’s inference to failure,
because one cannot picture an entity distinct from consciousness, even through
the wildest act of imagination (‘‘even in a dream,’’ says Abhinavagupta): the
objects of our concepts are general features that have been extracted from some
previous perception, but there can be no perception of what is by nature abso-
lutely alien to consciousness—so that there can be no concept of the external

41
Cf. ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 155:tatra mr: jjalayoh: sam : nihitayor abhavann an_kurah: , sa hi sati bı̄je bhavan,
dan: d: acakrayoh: sator asan ghat:ah: , sati mr: tpin: d: e bhavan, tadadhikabı̄jahetukas tadadhikamr: tpin: d: ahetuka
iti kramen: a pratyaks: ānupalambhajo niścayo jāyate. ‘‘In this regard, the certainty produced by the per-
ceptions and non-perceptions (pratyaks: ānupalambha) arises progressively in the form ‘when earth and
water are present, the sprout does not exist; for [only] when the seed [too] exists does the [sprout] exist;
when the [potter’s] stick and wheel are present, the pot does not exist; [for only] when the clay lump [too]
exists does the [pot] exist. [Therefore the sprout] has as its cause the seed, which is distinct from [earth
and water]; [and] the [pot] has as its cause the clay lump, which is distinct from [the potter’s stick and
wheel]’.’’
42
On this thesis, see e.g. Ratié (2010a).
43
Abhinavagupta points out here that insofar as the Sautrāntika considers that consciousness is in itself
undifferentiated, he agrees with certain Brahmanical conceptions of consciousness (such as the Sām :-
khya’s) presenting it as the passive and undifferentiated mirror of an ontologically independent reality.
Utpaladeva refutes this conception in a famous verse: see ĪPK I, 5, 11 (cf. e.g. Alper 1987; Torella 2002,
p.118; and Ratié 2007, fn. 59, pp. 339–340), which shows that consciousness, far from passively
reflecting its objects, actively becomes aware of itself, and that this dynamic grasp (vimarśa) is the very
essence of manifestation.
44
See ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 165: kāran: atāsāmānyapr: s: :the bāhyatātmakam : :tan_kayitavyam.
: viśes: an: āntaram
‘‘[If we follow the Sautrāntika’s reasoning,] another particularity (viśes: an: āntara), namely, externality
(bāhyatā), must be cut on the back of the generality of causality!’’

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Śaiva Criticism of a Sautrāntika Inference 493

object. Thus in the ĪPV, Abhinavagupta, after explaining how the sense organs
can be inferred, adds:
ābhāsād bāhyah: punar anābhāsarūpah: , sa cābhāsata iti vipratis: iddham.
anābhāse ca nāsti vikalparūpasyānumānasya vyāpārah: .45

However, an [entity] external to manifestation consists in a non-manifestation

(anābhāsa), and it is absolutely impossible that it may be manifest! And there
is no inferential activity—[since] an inference has as its nature a concept
(vikalpa)—as regards a non-manifestation.

The Ambiguity of the Concept of Externality (bāhyatā)

Nevertheless Utpaladeva’s opponent refuses to concede defeat, and in the ĪPVV, he

formulates a new objection:
grāmād darpan: ād gr: hād dehāt sam
: vedanād bāhyam iti *bāhyatāsāmānyam
[conj.: bāhyatah: sāmānyam KSTS]46 ekam, tac ca grhād bāhyam iti pratı̄tau
siddham. tataś ca samarpakam 
: *darpan: ād iva bāhyam : [conj.: dar-
pan: ādibāhyam
: KSTS] sam
: vedanād api setsyati kramikābhāsavaicitryād
dhetoh: .47
It is one [and the same] generality of externality (bāhyatāsāmānya) [that is
present in these various cognitions:] ‘‘[this is] external (bāhya) to the village,
to the mirror, to the house, to the body, to consciousness;’’ and this [generality
of externality] is established in the [mere] experience ‘‘[this is] external to the
house.’’ And as a consequence, just as [one can establish the existence of
something] external to the mirror [and] projecting [its particular form] onto it,
one can also establish [the existence of something external] to consciousness,
for the reason that is the diversity of successive phenomena [experienced by
any conscious being].
The Sautrāntika is arguing that according to Utpaladeva’s own theory of per-
ception, conceptualizing the external object is no problem at all: just as we perceive
causality (kāran: atā) as a general feature present in countless perceptions, in the
same way, we must perceive the general feature of externality (bāhyatā) in our
everyday experiences—when seeing a pot outside a house for instance; Utpaladeva
must acknowledge that just like causality, externality is part of our perceptual

45
ĪPV, vol. I, p. 190.
46
Cf. the long marginal annotation in the SOAS manuscript of the ĪPV (folio 119, upper right
corner) which quotes this sentence (cf. also fn. 248 in the KSTS edition of the ĪPV, vol. I, p. 190,
almost identical to this marginal annotation): grāmād darpan: ād gr: hāt sam
: vedanād bāhyam iti
bāhyatāsāmānyam ekam
: ...
47
ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 165.

123
494 I. Ratié

world, so that we can rightly infer the existence of an object particularized by its
externality to consciousness.48
Abhinavagupta thus sums up the answer given by Utpaladeva to this objection in
his lost Vivr: ti:
nedam : bāhyatvam : ghat:asya grāmāc ca sam : vedanāc caikam. sam : vedanād
bāhyam : hy asam : vedanarūpam : , na tu gr
: hād bāhyam agr
: harūpam. evam: sati hi
gr: haikadeśah: kut:yādir gr: hāntarvarty api ca ghat:ādir gr: habāhyah: syāt; na
caivam. gr: hasam : nikr: s: :tam
: ca yadvad bāhyam : gr: hāt, na tadvad eva
sam : vedanāt tasyāmūrtasya sam: nikars: ādideśavyavahāryatvābhāvāt. tatah:
*śabdasāmya-[conj.: śabdasāmānya- KSTS]49 mātren: edam : sādhyam ekam:
pratibhāti.50

The externality (bāhyatva) of the pot is not one [whether it be considered] with
respect to the village or with respect to consciousness; for that which is
external to consciousness consists in that which is not consciousness
(asam: vedanarūpa), whereas that which is external to the house does not
consist in that which is not a house! For if that were the case, a particular
element of the house—such as a wall for instance—or a pot for example,
although it is situated inside the house, should be external to the house, [since
they are not the house itself]; and it is not so. And whereas that which is

48
Cf. fn. 248 in the KSTS edition of the ĪPV, vol. I, p. 190 (reproducing a text similar to the marginal
annotation mentioned above, fn. 46): tathā cātra pūrvavyavasthā sphut:am eva dr: śyate, yathā
caks: urādiviśes: aparihāren: a *bı̄jādyanubhavāt [conj.: yathā vā bı̄jādyanubhavāt KSTS; yathā bı̄jādya-
nubhavāt SOAS] kāran: atāsāmānyam [conj.: kāran: asāmānyam KSTS, SOAS] anubhūtam evoktam, tathā
śarı̄rād gr: hād grāmāder vā bāhyasyānubhavād bāhyatvam api sāmānyenānubhūtam eva, jñānaviśes: en: a
bāhyatvānanubhavoktau vā caks: urāder api kāran: aviśes: asyānanubhūtapūrvatvān na syād anumānam : tat
katham : nānumānasya vyāpāra ity uktih: . ‘‘This is [the Sautrāntika’s] discourse: ‘And in the same way [as
in the case of the sense organs], in this case [too], one sees very obviously that [externality] is already
established: just as[, in the case of the sense organs’ inference, Utpaladeva] has said that the generality of
causality (kāran: atāsāmānya) has been experienced without taking into account the particularities of the
organ of vision, etc., through the experience of the seed and [other perceived causes], exactly in the same
way, [in the case of the external object’s inference,] externality (bāhyatva) too is indeed experienced as a
generality (sāmānya) thanks to the experience of [this or that particular object that is] external to the
body, the house or the village; alternatively, if [Utpaladeva] answers that there is no experience of
externality thanks to a particular cognition, [then,] since the particular cause that is the organ of vision for
instance has not been previously experienced either, there cannot be any inference [of the sense organs
either]; therefore why wouldn’t the inference apply [in the case of the external object as well as in the
case of the sense organs]?’’
49
Cf. the parallel passage in the ĪPV (vol. I, p. 190) quoted below. One could rather consider that it is the
text of the two editions of the ĪPV that is corrupted. However all the consulted ĪPV manuscripts (J, L, P,
S1, S2, SOAS; p.n.p. D) bear the KSTS and Bhāskarı̄ reading; and the context seems to require this
conjecture, since śabdasāmānya would make sense if Abhinavagupta said that the generality of exter-
nality (bāhyatāsāmānya) is a generality that is only verbal; but he states that this generality of externality
appears to have a unity only thanks to something else. Besides, śabdasāmya is found elsewhere in the
ĪPVV, e.g. vol. III, p. 194: nanu tatra ghat:ān_kurādau śabdasāmyamātram : . ‘‘[—An objector:] But in
the case [that you are invoking,] there is only a verbal similarity (śabdasāmya) between the pot and the
sprout for instance, [which are both called ‘effects’, but are different insofar as the first is the product of a
conscious intention].’’ Cf. also PV Pramān: asiddhipariccheda 12, quoted below. Admittedly, Dignāga
deals with śabdasāmānya, but in a different context (see Pind 1991).
50
ĪPVV, vol. II, p. 165.

123
Śaiva Criticism of a Sautrāntika Inference 495

external to the house is next to (sam : nikrs: :ta) the house, it is absolutely not the
case as regards that which is [external]  to consciousness, because of the
impossibility for [consciousness]—which is devoid of any material form
(mūrta)—of having any spatial relation whatsoever such as proximity
(sam
: nikars: a). Therefore this [externality] that must be established appears to
be one only thanks to a verbal similarity (śabdasāmya).
The same argument is found in the ĪPV (although in a condensed form, and
without the objection to which it responds):
grāmagr: hād astu yad bāhyam : tad agrāmādirūpam : nocyate pratyekam :
vāt:ānūpakut:yatulāder bāhyatvaprasan_gād api tu *tatsam : nikr: s: :tam [J, L, P, S1,
51
S2, SOAS : sam : nikr: s: :tam KSTS: tatsam
: nikat:am
: Bhāskarı̄; p.n.p. D].
When one acknowledges that something is external to the village or the house, one
does not mean that this [thing] consists in that which is not the village or the
[house]; for [if it were the case,] there would follow respectively the externality of
the graden and the river [with respect to the village, whereas in fact they are in the
village,] or of the wall and a beam in the roof structure, [whereas in fact they are in
the house], etc. Rather, [we say that something is external to the house or the village
when we mean] that it is next to it (sannikr: s: :ta).
Utpaladeva’s answer to the Sautrāntika’s last objection consists in pointing out
the fundamental ambiguity of the term ‘‘externality.’’ Thus when we talk about an
object external to consciousness, we mean an object ‘‘the nature of which is not
consciousness’’—in this case, externality means non-identity: an object is said to be
external to consciousness if it is considered as alien to consciousness; whereas when
we say ‘‘the pot is external to the house,’’ we do not mean that the pot is not the
house (just as when we say that the pot is inside the house, we do not mean that the
pot has the house as its nature): in this case, we don’t have in mind a pure and
simple otherness, but a spatial relation of proximity—and such a relation cannot
apply to consciousness, since consciousness is not a material form, a body situated
in space.
So it is a mere verbal similarity or homonymy (śabdasāmya) that enables us to
talk about an object external to consciousness, and, as Abhinavagupta specifies,52
not a vastusāmya, a similarity regarding the real entities denoted by the word: while
the generality ‘‘externality’’ that we experience is a certain relation between two
entities that are both manifest as spatially determined, the externality mentioned by
the Sautrāntika is a pure otherness between two radically different entities, one of
which is absolutely unmanifest, whereas the other is the manifesting consciousness
itself—and we never experience such a relation.

51
ĪPV, vol. I, p. 190.
52
See ĪPV, vol. I, p. 190, quoted below.

123
496 I. Ratié

What Differentiates the Pratyabhijñā’s Criticism from the Vijñānavādins’?

This notion of śabdasāmya is probably borrowed from Dharmakı̄rti, who states (albeit
in a very different context)53 that an inference is invalid if it rests on a reason that only
has a verbal similarity (śabdasāmya) with something that could be a valid reason,
whereas the real entities (vastu) designated by the same expression are different:
vastubhede prasiddhasya śabdasāmyād abhedinah: / na yuktānumitih:
pān: d: udravyād iva hutāśane //54

The inference of [something] well known is not right [when it occurs] on

account of [something else] that [seems to have] no difference [with a valid
reason] due to a [mere] verbal similarity (śabdasāmya), whereas [in fact] there
is a difference as regards the real entities (vastu) [designated by the same
words]—for instance, [the inference] of fire on account of [the presence of] a
white substance [is not right, since smoke and snow, while being both called
‘‘white substances,’’ are different].
And that the Pratyabhijñā philosophers are alluding here to Dharmakı̄rti’s notion
of śabdasāmya seems to be confirmed by the way Abhinavagupta concludes the
whole discussion in the ĪPV:
tasmād grāmabāhyam ābhāsabāhyam iti ca śabdasāmyamātram etan na vas-
tusāmyam. evam : ye vikalpe vastu nābhātı̄ti manyante tes: ām api tāvad
anumānavikalpo na bāhya upapannah: . asmābhis tūpapāditam adhyavasāyasyāpy
ābhāsamānavis: ayatvam : bhrāntitve cāvasāyasyeti sūtre. tenānumānavi-
kalpātmanāpi prakāśena yady anāvis: :to nı̄lādir arthas tan nānumita eva syāt.
athāvis: :ta eva, tarhi prāg ivārtho’prakāśah: syād iti nyāyena prakāśamātras-
vabhāva eva, na bāhyah: . tena bāhye sādhye yat kim : cit pramān: am ānı̄yate, tad
abāhyatām eva pratyuta *sādhayati [Bhāskarı̄, J: prasādhayati KSTS, L, P, S1,
S2, SOAS; p.n.p. D], iti viruddham eva.55

Therefore [the expressions] ‘‘external to the village’’ and ‘‘external to mani-

festation’’ only have a verbal similarity (śabdasāmya) [and] not a similarity as
regards the real entities (vastusāmya); thus, even for those who consider that
no real entity (vastu) is manifest in a concept, in any case, the concept
[established through an] inference cannot concern [something] that is external
[to consciousness]. As for us, we have [already] demonstrated in verse [I, 3, 5,
which begins with] ‘‘and if determination were erroneous...,’’ that even
determination (adhyavasāya) has an object that is being manifest. As a con-
sequence, if an object such as blue, etc., is not pervaded by the manifesting
consciousness (prakāśa), even in the form of a concept [established through
an] inference, then it cannot be inferred at all. But if [the opponent replies] that
[this external object to be inferred] is indeed pervaded [by the manifesting
53
See Krasser (1999).
54
PV Pram an: asiddhipariccheda 12.
55
ĪPV, vol. I, pp. 190–191.

123
Śaiva Criticism of a Sautrāntika Inference 497

consciousness], then, according to the principle [formulated by Utpaladeva in

verse I, 5, 2, which begins with] ‘‘the object would remain devoid of mani-
festation (prakāśa), just as before...’’, [since] its nature is necessarily nothing
but the manifesting consciousness, it is not an external [object]! Therefore
whichever means of knowledge [we may] use as regards the external [object]
that [we are] trying to establish, on the contrary, it is the non-externality
(abāhyatā) [of this object with respect to consciousness] that this [means of
knowledge] establishes; it is therefore necessarily contradicted [as soon as it
applies to the external object].
Abhinavagupta first notices that because there is only a verbal similarity between
the externality that we can witness and externality with respect to consciousness,
‘‘even for those who consider that no real entity is manifest in a concept’’—that is,
even for Dharmakı̄rti’s followers, and not only for the Śaivas—the Sautrāntika’s
inference cannot be valid, since Dharmakı̄rti himself acknowledges that an infer-
ence is invalid if it rests on a mere śabdasāmya.
However, in the same passage, Abhinavagupta also underlines a crucial differ-
ence between Dharmakı̄rtian and Śaiva epistemologies—56 namely, the fact that
the Śaivas refuse the Buddhist logicians’ dichotomy between perception understood
as the immediate revelation of a singular real entity (vastu) and concepts understood
as the artificial construction of a generality: according to Utpaladeva, the general
feature that a concept makes known is also a real entity present in any immediate
perception—and conversely, at the very moment of conceptualization, this general
feature must be immediately manifested in some way.57 As a consequence, in the
Pratyabhijñā system, whatever is external to consciousness not only cannot be
proved to exist, but cannot be thought about at all, even in a purely abstract and
conceptual way, because whenever we try to think about an external object, as
Abhinavagupta remarks here, this object is bound to be pervaded by the con-
sciousness that manifests it.

56
Cf. Bhāskarı̄, vol. I, p. 234: nanu bauddhair vikalpasya vastvasam : sparśa evoktas tvayā tu tenaiva
sarvam : sādhyata iti kim etad ? ‘‘But the Buddhists state that a concept has absolutely no immediate
relationship (sam: sparśa) with a real entity (vastu), whereas you [consider that] everything is established
through this [immediate relationship with a real entity]—what about this [difference]?’’
57
See ĪPK I, 3, 5 (to which Abhinavagupta alludes in the passage just quoted): bhrāntitve cāvasāyasya
na jad: ād vis: ayasthitih: / tato’jād: ye nijollekhanis: :thān nārthasthitis tatah: // ‘‘And if determination were an
illusion (bhrānti), this [illusion], which would be insentient (jad: a) [with respect to the object], could not
produce the establishment of the object; [and] if [the Buddhist opponent replies that determination] is
sentient, [since according to him, it is sentient only as regards itself and its representation (ullekha)], it is
confined to itself and its representation, [so that] it cannot [either] lead to the establishment of the object.’’
To sum up, according to Abhinavagupta, Utpaladeva is targeting the Buddhist logicians’ notion of
determination (adhyavasāya, i.e., the conceptual thought that determines the ineffable content of a
perception as being this or that); and his goal is to show that determination cannot be a mere error and yet
enable us to deal with objects in our mundane experiences: the ‘‘establishment of the object, [i.e.,] the
power of transforming [an object] into an object for mundane activity’’ (vis: ayasya vyavasthāpanam :
vyavahāryatvasam : pādanasāmarthyam, ĪPV, vol. I, p. 103) implies that the object is somehow being
manifested not only when it is perceived, but also at the very moment of its conceptualization, and this
manifestation cannot be reduced to an illusory phenomenon.

123
498 I. Ratié

Abhinavagupta’s final remarks thus suggest that because in Dharmakı̄rti’s sys-

tem, ultimately, concepts never concern a real entity, Dharmakı̄rti cannot really
make sense of the distinction (to which he nonetheless has recourse) between
śabdasāmya and vastusāmya:58 while this entire discussion is intertwined with
Dharmakı̄rtian concepts that Utpaladeva appropriates, Abhinavagupta’s conclusion
hints that only the Śaiva system can fully explain why it is impossible even to form
the concept of an external reality, because only the Śaiva system can give its full
meaning to the Dharmakı̄rtian distinction between a verbal and a genuine similarity.

Conclusion—What Does Utpaladeva’s Refutation Prove?

When refuting the Sautrāntika’s contention that external objects can be inferred,
Utpaladeva obviously borrows much from Dharmakı̄rti’s conceptual arsenal: the
argument according to which any kāryahetu inference must rest on a set of per-
ceptions belongs to the Buddhist logician; so does the distinction between śab-
dasāmya and vastusāmya with which Utpaladeva eventually defeats his opponent.
But Utpaladeva also presents his system as the only one capable of challenging the
Sautrāntikas’ argument that some inferences (such as that of the sense organs) do
not rest on any perception. Not only does the Pratyabhijñā system justify this type of
sāmānyato drs: :ta inference thanks to its theory of perception; it also explains why
 cannot be proved to exist through such an inference, by demon-
external objects
strating the impossibility not only of perceiving, but also of conceptualizing any
external reality: the Sautrāntika can talk about the external object thanks to a
‘‘verbal similarity,’’ but his words remain inexorably empty, because he is incapable
of actually forming such a concept. And Abhinavagupta points out that this
impossibility can be justified only in the Pratyabhijñā system: Dharmakı̄rti, who
considers all conceptual thought as purely artificial, paradoxically leaves open the
possibility for a speculative externalism that concedes the impossibility of per-
ceiving the external object but claims to build its concept; in contrast, according to
Utpaladeva, any conceptualized object must somehow be manifest to the con-
sciousness that conceptualizes it, so that speculation is limited by an impassable
boundary: the impossibility to even think about an object external to thought.
Abhinavagupta concludes that whatever the means chosen to demonstrate the
existence of the external object, it can only establish the object’s ‘‘non-externality’’
(abāhyatā), because all means of knowledge, be they perception or inference, must

58
One could suspect that Abhinavagupta is being unfair here, since Dharmakı̄rti does account for some
kind of link between the objects of (some) concepts and real singular entities (see Katsura 1991, p. 143
and Tillemans forthcoming on this causal approach of apoha according to which concepts are causally
conditioned by residual traces left by some direct perceptions of singulars), and causal efficiency (art-
hakriyā) could be considered as the basis of the śabdasāmya/vastusāmya distinction: one could argue that
in Dharmakı̄rti’s system, a concept rests on a vastusāmya only when the various particulars subsumed
within it have the same arthakriyā (whereas fire and snow, although both conceptualized as ‘‘white
substances,’’ do not have the same efficiency). Nevertheless, according to Dharmakı̄rti’s principles, the
vastusāmya which supposedly legitimates the use of a concept is also the fictitious product of a process of
mental exclusion, since real entities, being absolutely singular, cannot have anything in common (even a
similar efficiency), so that ultimately, all similarities seem bound to be merely verbal.

123
Śaiva Criticism of a Sautrāntika Inference 499

transform their object into an object for consciousness. But what does this ‘‘non-
externality’’ mean? Admittedly, Utpaladeva seems to achieve much less than he
hopes to: instead of proving that there are no external objects, he only proves that
one cannot prove the existence of external objects. And yet, obviously he does not
consider that his reasoning might lead to some kind of scepticism: he does not
merely conclude that we cannot know whether there is something outside of con-
sciousness, but rather, that nothing is external to consciousness. One might suspect
that he is thus confusing (consciously or not) a mere epistemological restriction with
an ontological negation. But one might also consider that Utpaladeva does not even
envisage scepticism as an option, because scepticism would still entail the spatial
representation of consciousness, the inadequacy of which he has pointed out: stating
that we do not know whether there is something outside of consciousness or not
would still amount to postulating some kind of empty space outside of conscious-
ness that might be filled (or not) with some external entities. From this point of
view, one of the most interesting aspects of Utpaladeva’s strategy in this discussion
is the fact that he claims to demonstrate that there is nothing outside of con-
sciousness not merely by pointing out the impossibility of knowing what is external
to consciousness, but rather, by questioning the very meaning of the distinction
between externality and internality with respect to consciousness.

Acknowledgement I would like to thank Alexis Sanderson, who kindly invited me to read the ĪPV in
Oxford in 2005 and to whose vast erudition the following pages owe so much; Alex Watson, who
attended some of these readings, for then pointing out a problem that this article attempts to solve; Tom
Tillemans, for sharing some unpublished works of his on apoha; the organizers of the 14th World
Sanskrit Conference, where I presented an earlier version of this paper, and the editors of this special
issue, Shoryu Katsura, Mark Siderits and Kiyotaka Yoshimizu, who read this paper with great care and
made many helpful suggestions. I am also very much indebted to Raffaele Torella, whose remarkable
works on the Pratyabhijñā system have been a constant help in understanding Utpaladeva and
Abhinavagupta’s texts, and to Vincent Eltschinger, whose friendly and attentive reading of this paper led
to many improvements. Mistakes, of course, are mine.

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