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Sheryllyne Nacario

RAPE (ART. 266-A – 266-D)

Ricalde V. People, G.R. No. 211002, 751 PHIL 793-821

FACTS
On January 30, 2002, XXX requested his mother to pick up Ricalde at McDonald's Bel-Air, Sta. Rosa at past 8:00
p.m. Ricalde, then 31 years old, 10 is a distant relative and textmate of XXX, then 10 years old. After dinner, XXX's
mother told Ricalde to spend the night at their house as it was late. He slept on the sofa while XXX slept on the
living room floor. It was around 2:00 a.m. when XXX awoke as "he felt pain in his anus and stomach and something
inserted in his anus." He saw that Ricalde "fondled his penis." When Ricalde returned to the sofa, XXX ran toward
his mother's room to tell her what happened. He also told his mother that Ricalde played with his sexual organ.
XXX's mother armed herself with a knife for self-defense when she confronted Ricalde about the incident, but he
remained silent. She asked him to leave. Dr. Roy Camarillo examined XXX and found no signs of recent trauma in
his anal orifice that was also "NEGATIVE for spermatozoa."

ISSUE
Was the accused's guilt established beyond reasonable doubt despite lack of findings of anal trauma?
What is the proper penalty?

RULING
Yes. A medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape inasmuch as the victim's
testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict the accused of the crime." In any case, the medico-legal testified
on the sphincter's flexibility the anus controlling the bowel movement, it exhibits a certain flexibility such that it
can resist any object inserted and that area is very vascular, it is rich in blood supply, such that any injuries would
be healed in 24 hours or less than 24 hours. XXX's "straightforward, unequivocal and convincing testimony"
sufficiently proved that petitioner committed an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into XXX's anal orifice.
There was no showing of ill motive on the part of XXX to falsely accuse petitioner. In People v. Chingh, the
accused was charged with rape "for inserting his fingers and afterwards his penis into the private part of his minor
victim. This court modified the penalty imposed for rape through sexual assault to the penalty provided in Article
III, Section 5 (b) of Republic Act No. 7610, discussing as follows: "It is undisputed that at the time of the
commission of the sexual abuse [on minor under 12 for acts of lasciviousness] calls for the application of R.A. No.
7610, or "The Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act." The Court is
not unmindful to the fact that the accused who commits acts of lasciviousness under Article 366, in relation to
Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, suffers the more severe penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium
period than the one who commits Rape Through Sexual Assault, which is merely punishable by prision mayor. This
is undeniably unfair to the child victim. To be sure, it was not the intention of the framers of R.A. No. 8353 to
have disallowed the applicability of R.A. No. 7610 to sexual abuses committed to children. For rape through
sexual assault under Article 266-A, paragraph 2, accused-appellant Richard Ricalde is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years, ten (10) months and twenty-one (21) days of reclusion temporal, as
minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal, as maximum. He is
ordered to pay the victim civil indemnity in the amount of P30,000.00 and moral damages likewise in the amount
of P30,000.00, both with interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this judgment until
fully paid.
Sheryllyne Nacario
Illegal Possession of Firearms – RA 8294 (1998)

Evangelista v. People, G.R. No. 163267, 620 SCRA 134

FACTS
Petitiopner accused came from Luwanda, Angola where he was employed as a seaman at Oil International Limited.
He is charged with illegal possession of one 9mm Jericho Pistol, Israel with one magazine; one 9mm Israel
Submachine gun with two magazines; and nineteen 9mm bullets.
Version of the Prosecution: In the morning of January 30, 1996, Maximo Acierto, Jr. (Acierto), a Customs Police at
NAIA was informed by his superior that accused would be arriving from Dubai bringing with him firearms. Together
with Agents Cuymo and Fuentabella, he proceeded to the tube area where they were introduced to Acierto.
Accused said they were bought in Angola. Acierto was summoned to the cockpit by the pilot, Capt. Edwin Nadurata
(Capt. Nadurata), where the firearms and ammunitions were turned over to him.
During the investigation, petitioner admitted before Special Agent Apolonio Bustos (Bustos) that he bought the
subject items in Angola but the same were confiscated by the Dubai authorities, which turned over the same to a
PAL personnel in Dubai. Bustos verified from the Bureau of Customs, but his effort yielded no record to show that
the firearms were legally purchased. Bustos admitted that petitioner was not assisted by counsel. SPO4 Federico
Bondoc, Jr. (SPO4 Bondoc) of the PNP and representative of the FEO, issued a certification that he is not a
licensed/registered firearm holder.
Version of the Accused: On January 28, 1996, while at the airport in Dubai, Arab policemen suddenly accosted him
and brought him to their headquarters where he saw guns on top of a table. The Arabs maltreated him and forced
him to admit ownership of the guns. PAL Station Manager Umayaw came and talked to the policemen in Arabian
dialect. Umayaw told him that he will only be released if he admits ownership of the guns. Upon arrival at the
NAIA, he was arrested by the Customs police and he was made to sign a Customs Declaration Form without
reading its contents.

ISSUE: Is the accused guilty of illegal possession of firearms due to constructive possession?

RULING
Yes. The two essential elements were met: (1) the existence of the subject firearm; and (1) the accused who
possessed does not have a license. As held in People v. Dela Rosa, the kind of possession punishable under PD
1866 is one where the accused possessed a firearm either physically or constructively with animus possidendi or
intention to possess the same. At the hearing, the defense counsel stipulated that the subject firearms and
ammunitions were confiscated from appellant and the same were given to PAL Station Manager Nilo Umayaw
who, in turn, turned over the same to Capt. Edwin Nadurata. Such stipulation of fact is binding on appellant, for
the acts of a lawyer in the defense of a case are the acts of his client. Granting that Nilo Umayaw was merely told
by the Dubai authorities that the firearms and ammunitions were found in the luggage of appellant and that
Umayaw had no personal knowledge thereof, however, appellant's signature on the Customs Declaration Form,
which contains the entry "2 PISTOL guns SENT SURRENDER TO PHILIPPINE AIRLINE," proves that he was the one
who brought the guns to Manila. While appellant claims that he signed the Customs Declaration Form without
reading it because of his excitement, however, he does not claim that he was coerced or persuaded in affixing his
signature thereon. In fact, appellant admitted that it was only after he signed the Customs Declaration Form that
he was brought to the ground floor of NAIA for investigation. Consequently, appellant was in constructive
possession of the subject firearms. The accomplishment by petitioner of the Customs Declaration Form upon his
arrival at the NAIA is very clear evidence that he was already in possession of the subject firearms in the
Philippines. Republic Act (RA) No. 8294 took effect on June 6, 1997 or after the commission of the crime on
January 30, 1996. However, since it is advantageous to the petitioner, it should be given retrospective application
insofar as the penalty is concerned. The penalty of imprisonment of six years and one day to eight years and to pay
a fine of P30,000.00 is AFFIRMED.
Sheryllyne Nacario
Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention (Art. 267)

People v. Mittu, G.R. No. 109939, 388 PHIL 779-793

FACTS
On August 31, 1992, around 7:45 a.m., four-year-old Vik Ramjit Singh (Vikvik) and his fifteen-year old nursemaid,
Mary Jane (Fanny or Pane) Cona, both of Kaloocan City, were on their way to the Infant Jesus School at Asuncion
Street, Morning Breeze, where Vikvik was a nursery student. While Vikvik and Pane were walking in front of a
Catholic church, appellant Mittu(sari-sari store owner) suddenly grabbed them, saying, "Halika, punta kayo sa
bahay," and then loaded in tricylcle driven by co-accused Gervacio Solidad, ice cream vendor/driver. During their 2-
day captivity in Muntinlupa, they were brought to a public market where Mittu made Vikvik talk to his father on
the telephone. Vikvik, whom appellant Mittu threatened to leave behind in the market if he told anyone that she
was the one who took them, was only able to say, "Papa, kunin mo kami rito." From Muntinlupa, Vikvik and Mary
Jane were taken to Novaliches, where each one was hidden in separate houses. The Singh spouses received a
telephone call from an unidentified male caller who told them, "Your son is here." The caller told them not to
report the matter to the police. The following day, the Singh spouses received another call from the same person
who this time demanded P100,000.00 for the release of their son. On the morning of September 3, 1992, the Singh
spouses went to the NBI and sought its help to rescue their son and his "yaya." NBI Assistant Director Atty.
Liongson, instructed them to wait for another call from the abductors and arrange for the payment of the ransom
money. In Barrio Fiesta Restaurant along EDSA, Kaloocan City, Mittu demanded for the whole amount of the
ransom money, but Dan Waht Singh replied, "Cannot be, you give me my son." But Mittu refused to turn-over the
kidnap victims unless half of the ransom money was given to her. Mr. Singh could do nothing else but accede to
the demand and gave P50,000.00 to Mittu who, after receiving the money, went out of the restaurant. Around
9:00 o'clock in the evening, Mary Jane or "Pane," the little boy's "yaya," went inside the restaurant. When Mr.
Singh saw her, he went out, directly towards a taxicab in which he saw inside his son Vikvik with appellants Mittu
and Solidad. The two appellants then let the boy out of the taxi and gave him to Mr. Singh. The NBI agents then
arrested the appellants.

ISSUE: Is the appellant guilty of the crime of Kidnapping qualified by demand for ransom?

RULING
Yes. The trial court is in a better position to decide the question of credibility, having seen and heard the witnesses
themselves and observed their behavior and manner of testifying. The 4-year-old boy and his nursemaid testified
on the circumstances of the kidnapping, and corroborated by the testimonies of the Singh spouses and the NBI
agents who entrapped appellants. Categorical, consistent and positive identification, without any ill motive on the
part of the eyewitness, prevails over unconvincing alibi and unsubstantiated denials. Without evidence that the
NBI falsely testified, we shall presume regularity in their performance of official duties. In Mittu’s Sworn Statement,
she admitted that she kidnapped the boy because she wanted to take revenge on the Singh spouses for having her
husband, deported in 1991. Familiarity with the victims or their families has never rendered the commission of the
crime impossible or improbable, but has in fact at times even facilitated its commission. The elements of
kidnapping were proven by the prosecution: First, appellants are private individuals. Second, they kidnapped or
detained the victims in Muntinlupa and then transferred them to Novaliches, Quezon City . Third, the act of
detention or kidnapping was illegal. Fourth, in the commission of the offense, the persons kidnapped were both
minors, Vik Ramjit being 4 years old, and the nursemaid, being 15 years old. The kidnapping was qualified by the
demand for ransom. Mittu argues that the failure of the prosecution to identify the ransom money in court is
tantamount to the prosecution's failure to prove the corpus delicti of the crime. The corpus delicti in the crime of
kidnapping for ransom does not pertain to the ransom money itself. Corpus delicti is the fact of the commission of
the crime which may be proved by the testimony of the witnesses who saw it. The death penalty could not be
imposed because the kidnapping for ransom took place on August 31, 1992, prior to the reimposition of the death
penalty. Hence, the proper penalty is the penalty next lower in degree which is reclusion perpetua, an indivisible
penalty.

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