Class Moot V Year

SIDE: PETITIONERS
POINTS OF CONTENTION
THAT THE DEFENDENTS ARE LIABLE FOR CHEATING, CRIMINAL BREACH OF TRUST, CRIMINAL
CONSPIRACY AND FORGERY UNDER SECTION 420, 406, 120-B, 467 AND 468 OF THE INDIAN PENAL
CODE.
THAT THE DEFENDANTS COMMITED A CRIMINAL BREACH OF TRUST UNDER SECTION 406 OF IPC
It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the Defendants are liable for the criminal
breach of trust under Section 406 of the IPC. The defendants misappropriated their position when they
were entrusted with the property and hence committing the offence of Criminal Breach of trust (A) and
the prosecution is not obliged to prove the precise mode of conversion,
misappropriation or misapplication. (B)
(A) THE DEFENDENTS COMMITTED CRIMINAL BREACH OF TRUST

Section 405 which defines ‘criminal breach of trust’ and speaks of a person being in
any manner entrusted with property. It contemplates the creation of a relationship
whereby the owner of property makes it over to another person to be retained by
him until a certain contingency arises or to be disposed of by him on the happening
of a certain event. The person who transfers possession of the property to the
second party still remains the legal owner of the property and the person in whose
favour possession is so transferred has only the custody of the property to be kept
or disposed of by him for the benefit of the other party. 1
Before criminal breach of trust is established it must be shown that the person
charged has been entrusted with property or with dominion over the property. 2
The Court noted that in the commission of the offence of criminal breach of
trust, two distinct parts are involved. The first consists of the creation of an
obligation in relation to the property over which dominion or control is acquired by
the accused. The second is a misappropriation or dealing with the property
dishonestly and contrary to the terms of the obligation created. 3
In the present case, Anirudh Vyas paid 35 lakhs for the plot and was the lawful owner of the
plot, however the registration of the plot was not done. During this time, Rajesh Parmar as well as the
Prajapati Builders misappropriated the land by not disclosing the disputed status of the land and hence
acting in contrary to the terms of obligation created.
(B) THE INFERENCE OF MISSAPROPRIATION IS ENOUGH

To establish a charge of criminal breach of trust, the prosecution is not obliged
to prove the precise mode of conversion, misappropriation or misapplication by
the accused of the property entrusted to him or over which he has dominion.
1
Jaswantrai Manilal Akhaney v. State of Bombay [AIR 1956 SC 575 : 1956 SCR 483 : 1956 Cri LJ 1116 : 26 Com Cas
340]
2
Bhuban Mohan Rana v. Surendra Mohan Das [ILR (1952) 2 Cal 23]
3
Onkar Nath Mishra v. State (NCT of Delhi) [(2008) 2 SCC 561 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 507]
The principal ingredient of the offence being dishonest misappropriation or
conversion which may not ordinarily be a matter of direct proof, entrustment of
property and failure in breach of an obligation to account for the property
entrusted, if proved, may in the light of other circumstances, justifiably lead to
an inference of dishonest misappropriation or conversion. When the person is
unable to account or renders an explanation for his failure to account which is
untrue, an inference of misappropriation with dishonest intent may readily be
made.4
In the present case, dishonest missapropriation can be made out by the fact
that the defendants did not disclose the disputed status of the land.
This extract is taken from Harihar Prasad Dubey v. Tulsi Das Mundhra, (1980) 4
SCC 120 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 931 at page 121
2. In our opinion neither of them was a valid ground for quashing the
proceeding and the learned Judge was in error in thinking that continuance of the
proceeding would be an abuse of the process of the Court. The two grounds are
really one — that in the absence of statutory rules there could be no offence under
Section 406 of the Penal Code, 1860. This Court in explained that:
When
4
Jaikrishnadas Manohardas Desai v. State of Bombay [AIR 1960 SC 889]
The appellant also relies on a decision of the Madhya Pradesh High
Court: Akharbhai Nazarali v. Md. Hussain Bhai [AIR 1961 MP 37 : (1961) 1 Cri LJ 266 :
(1960) 2 LLJ 664 : (1960-61) 19 FJR 171] . This was a case under the Employees'
Provident Funds Act. The following observation occurs onp. 39 of the Report:
“It may be that the deduction and retention of the employees' contribution is
a trust created by virtue of that very fact, or by virtue of a provision in statute or
statutory rule. But even apart from the latter, the mere fact of telling the
employees that it is their contribution to the provident fund scheme and then
making a deduction or recovery and retaining it, constitutes the offence of
criminal breach of trust.”
This extract is taken from Debabrata Gupta v. S.K. Ghosh, (1970) 1 SCC 521 : 1970
SCC (Cri) 221 at page 523
11. In order to accede to the contention it has to be established first that the
dispute is only between the partners and secondly it does not relate to any special
entrustment of property which constitutes one of the basic ingredients of an
offence under Section 406 of the Penal Code, 1860. This Court in Patel
case approved the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Bhuban Mohan
Rana v. Surendra Mohan Das [ILR (1952) 2 Cal 23] and said that before criminal
breach of trust is established it must be shown that the person charged has been
entrusted with property or with dominion over the property. In other words, the
offence of criminal breach of trust under Section 406 of the Indian Penal Code is
not in respect of property belonging to the partnership but is an offence committed
by the person in respect of property which has been specially entrusted to such a
person and which be holds in a fiduciary capacity.
This extract is taken from Debabrata Gupta v. S.K. Ghosh, (1970) 1 SCC 521 : 1970
12. In the present case, the appellant denies that there was any special
entrustment of any property or that he was holding any property in a fiduciary
capacity. It is neither possible nor desirable to express any opinion on the merits of
such a plea. It is not possible to do so because the facts are not in possession of the
court and furthermore the facts cannot be before the court without proper
investigation and enquiry. It is not desirable to do so because if any such opinion be
expressed it may prejudice or embarrass either party
This extract is taken from R. Venkatkrishnan v. CBI, (2009) 11 SCC 737 : (2010) 1
144
145. In Jaikrishnadas Manohardas Desai v. State of Bombay [AIR 1960 SC 889] , this
Court observed: (AIR p. 891, para 4)
“4. … to establish a charge of criminal breach of trust, the prosecution is not
obliged to prove the precise mode of conversion, misappropriation or
misapplication by the accused of the property entrusted to him or over which he
has dominion. The principal ingredient of the offence being dishonest
misappropriation or conversion which may not ordinarily be a matter of direct
proof, entrustment of property and failure in breach of an obligation to account
for the property entrusted, if proved, may in the light of other circumstances,
justifiably lead to an inference of dishonest misappropriation or conversion.
Conviction of a person for the offence of criminal breach of trust may not, in all
cases, be founded merely on his failure to account for the property entrusted to
him, or over which he has dominion, even when a duty to account is imposed
upon him, but where he is unable to account or renders an explanation for his
failure to account which is untrue, an inference of misappropriation with
dishonest intent may readily be made.”
149. In Ram Narayan Popli [(2003) 3 SCC 641 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 869] this Court
stated the law, thus: (SCC p. 786, para 361)
“361. To constitute an offence of criminal breach of trust, there must be an
entrustment, there must be misappropriation or conversion to one's own use,
or use in violation of a legal direction or of any legal contract; and the
misappropriation or conversion or disposal must be with a dishonest intention.
When a person allows others to misappropriate the money entrusted to him,
that amounts to a criminal breach of trust as defined by Section 405. The section
is relatable to property in a positive part and a negative part. The positive part
deals with criminal misappropriation or conversion of the property and the
negative part consists of dishonestly using or disposing of the property in
violation of any direction and of law or any contract touching the discharge of
trust.”
.
THAT THE DEFENDANTS ARE LIABLE FOR CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY UNDER SECION
120-B OF 1PC
It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the defendants rare liable for criminal
conspiracy under Section 120-B as all the members of the conspiracy agreed to do an illegal act, thus
ulfilling the essentials of the crime.(A) also, this can be clearly proved by the circumstantial evidence
available.(B)
Like most crimes, criminal conspiracy requires an act (actus reus) and an
accompanying mental state (mens rea). The agreement constitutes the act, and the
intention to achieve the unlawful objective of that agreement constitutes the
required mental state.5
Criminal conspiracy in terms of Section 120-B of the Code is an independent
offence. It is punishable separately. It is an agreement to do or cause to be done an
illegal act or an act which is not illegal but by illegal means then even if nothing
further is done, the agreement would give rise to a criminal conspiracy. 6
5
Firozuddin Basheeruddin v. State of Kerala, (2001) 7 SCC 596 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1341 at page 606
6
R. Venkatkrishnan v. CBI, (2009) 11 SCC 737 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 164 at page 767
(A) ALL THE ESSENTIALS ARE FULFILLED
The elements of a criminal conspiracy have been stated to be: (a) an object to be
accomplished, (b) a plan or scheme embodying means to accomplish that object, (c)
an agreement or understanding between two or more of the accused persons
whereby, they become definitely committed to cooperate for the accomplishment
of the object by the means embodied in the agreement, or by any effectual means,
and (d) in the jurisdiction where the statute required an overt act. 7
It was further held that for an offence under Section 120-B IPC, the prosecution
need not necessarily prove that the conspirators expressly agreed to do or cause to
be done the illegal act, the agreement may be proved by necessary implication. 8
In the present case, the defendants agreed to dishonestly concealand misrepresent the
actual status of the land from Anirudh Vyas and thereby committed the offence of Criminal Conspiracy.
(B) CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IS ENOUGH

No doubt, in the case of conspiracy there cannot be any direct evidence. The
ingredients of offence are that there should be an agreement between persons
who are alleged to conspire and the said agreement should be for doing an illegal
act or for doing by illegal means an act which itself may not be illegal. Therefore,
the essence of criminal conspiracy is an agreement to do an illegal act and such an
agreement can be proved either by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence or
by both, and it is a matter of common experience that direct evidence to prove
conspiracy is rarely available. Therefore, the circumstances proved before, during
and after the occurrence have to be considered to decide about the complicity of
the accused.9
In the present case, the circumstantial evidence is the agreement concluded on 27-
7-2005 with Anirudh Vyas for the sale of plot no.32 when Rajesh Parmar as well as the Prajapati Builders
were clearly aware about the disputed status of the land. Hence, committed the offence of Criminal
Conspiracy.
7
Ram Narayan Popli v. CBI, (2003) 3 SCC 641 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 869 at page 779
8
Mohd. Usman Mohd. Hussain Maniyar v. State of Maharashtra [(1981) 2 SCC 443 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 477]
9
This extract is taken from Rajender v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2019) 10 SCC 623 :
(2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 63 : 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1387 at page 630
10. . This means that the chain formed must unerringly point towards the guilt
of the accused and not leave any missing links for the accused to escape from the
clutches of law. Further, with respect to conspiracy, it is trite law that the existence
of three elements must be shown—a criminal object, a plan or a scheme
embodying means to accomplish that object, and an agreement or understanding
between two or more people to cooperate for the accomplishment of such object.
This extract is taken from Rajender v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2019) 10 SCC 623 :
17. However, as regards the charge of conspiracy, we do not find that the
conduct of Sharda Jain (A-1) and Rajender (A-5) constitutes a criminal conspiracy to
murder the deceased. Strangely, the High Court has observed that the prosecution
has proven that Sharda Jain was complicit in such a conspiracy. However, on a
closer reading of the impugned judgment [Rakesh Kumar v. State, 2009 SCC OnLine
Del 2609 : (2009) 163 DLT 658] , we find that the High Court has not assigned any
appropriate reasoning for arriving at this conclusion. Merely observing that it has
been proven that A-1 and A-5 were complicit in a conspiracy to murder the
deceased is insufficient to conclude the existence of such a conspiracy. As
mentioned supra, three essential elements must be shown — a criminal object, a
plan or scheme embodying means to accomplish that object, and an agreement
between two or more persons to cooperate for the accomplishment of such object.
Admittedly, the incorporation of Section 10 to the Evidence Act, 1872, suggests that
proof of a criminal conspiracy by direct evidence is not easy to get. While we
acknowledge this constraint, we do not find any discussion by the High Court on
what circumstances indicate the existence of the essential elements of a criminal
conspiracy in the instant case. On going through the entire material on record, we
find that a criminal conspiracy has not been proved in the instant case. Thus, the
charge against Sharda Jain (A-1) and Rajender (A-5) under Section 120-B IPC for
conspiring to murder the deceased cannot be sustained. Be that as it may, we find
that their acts have been done in pursuance of a common intention and attract
Section 34 IPC.
74. The courts, however, while drawing an inference from the materials brought
on record to arrive at a finding as to whether the charges of the criminal conspiracy
have been proved or not, must always bear in mind that a conspiracy is hatched in
secrecy and it is, thus, difficult, if not impossible, to obtain direct evidence to
establish the same. The manner and circumstances in which the offences have
been committed and the level of involvement of the accused persons therein are
relevant factors. For the said purpose, it is necessary to prove that the propounders
had expressly agreed to or caused to be done the illegal act but it may also be
proved otherwise by adduction of circumstantial evidence and/or by necessary
implication. (See Mohd. Usman Mohammad Hussain Maniyar v. State of
Maharashtra [(1981) 2 SCC 443 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 477] .)
77. In some cases, intent of unlawful use being made of the goods or services in
question may be inferred from the knowledge itself. This Court in State of
Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa [State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa, (1996) 4
SCC 659 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 820] opined that it is not necessary for the prosecution to
establish that a particular unlawful use was intended, so long as the goods or
services in question could not be put to any lawful use, stating: (SCC p. 668, para 24)
“24. … to establish a charge of conspiracy knowledge about indulgence in
either an illegal act or a legal act by illegal means is necessary. In some
cases, intent of unlawful use being made of the goods or services in question
may be inferred from the knowledge itself. This apart, the prosecution has not
to establish that a particular unlawful use was intended, so long as the goods or
service in question could not be put to any lawful use. Finally, when the ultimate
offence consists of a chain of actions, it would not be necessary for the
prosecution to establish, to bring home the charge of conspiracy, that each of
the conspirators had the knowledge of what the collaborator would do, so long
as it is known that the collaborator would put the goods or service to an
unlawful use.”
(emphasis in original)
(See also K.R. Purushothaman v. State of Kerala [(2005) 12 SCC 631 : (2006) 1 SCC (Cri)
686] .)
78. We may also notice a decision of this Court being State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot
Sandhu [(2005) 11 SCC 600 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1715] , commonly known as Parliament
Attack case, wherein upon taking note of various earlier decisions of this Court, it
was opined that as conspiracy is mostly proved by circumstantial evidence, usually
both the existence of conspiracy and its objects have to be inferred from the
circumstances and the conduct of the accused, stating: (SCC p. 691, para 101)
“101. One more principle which deserves notice is that the cumulative effect
of the proved circumstances should be taken into account in determining the
guilt of the accused rather than adopting an isolated approach to each of the
circumstances. Of course, each one of the circumstances should be proved
beyond reasonable doubt. Lastly, in regard to the appreciation of evidence
relating to the conspiracy, the Court must take care to see that the acts or
conduct of the parties must be conscious and clear enough to infer their
concurrence as to the common design and its execution.”
80. Recently, in Yogesh v. State of Maharashtra [(2008) 10 SCC 394 : (2009) 1 SCC
(Cri) 51 : (2008) 6 Scale 469] , a Division Bench of this Court held: (SCC p. 402, para
25)
“25. Thus, it is manifest that the meeting of minds of two or more persons for
doing an illegal act or an act by illegal means is sine qua non of the criminal
conspiracy but it may not be possible to prove the agreement between them by
direct proof. Nevertheless, existence of the conspiracy and its objective can be
inferred from the surrounding circumstances and the conduct of the accused.
But the incriminating circumstances must form a chain of events from which a
conclusion about the guilt of the accused could be drawn. It is well settled that
an offence of conspiracy is a substantive offence and renders the mere
agreement to commit an offence punishable, even if an offence does not take
place pursuant to the illegal agreement.”
79. In Ram Narayan Popli [(2003) 3 SCC 641 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 869] this Court noted:
(SCC p. 778, para 342)
“342. … Law making conspiracy a crime is designed to curb immoderate
power to do mischief which is gained by a combination of the means. The
encouragement and support which co-conspirators give to one another
rendering enterprises possible which, if left to individual effort, would have been
impossible, furnish the ground for visiting conspirators and abettors with
condign punishment.”
(See also Esher Singh v. State of A.P. [(2004) 11 SCC 585 : 2004 SCC (Cri) Supp 113] )
81. A conspiracy may further be a general one and a separate one. A smaller
conspiracy may be a part of a larger conspiracy. It may develop in successive
stages. (Nirmal Singh Kahlon v. State of Punjab [(2009) 1 SCC 441 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri)
523 : (2008) 14 Scale 639] ) New techniques may be invented and new means may
be devised for advancement of common plan. For the said purpose, conduct of the
parties would also be relevant.
This extract is taken from Ram Narayan Popli v. CBI, (2003) 3 SCC 641 : 2003 SCC
(Cri) 869 at page 778
342. It would be appropriate to deal with the question of conspiracy. Section
120-B IPC is the provision which provides for punishment for criminal conspiracy.
Definition of “criminal conspiracy” given in Section 120-A reads as follows:
“120-A. When two or more persons agree to do, or cause to be done,—
(1) an illegal act, or
(2) an act which is not illegal by illegal means, such an agreement is
designated a criminal conspiracy:
Provided that no agreement except an agreement to commit an offence shall
amount to a criminal conspiracy unless some act besides the agreement is done
by one or more parties to such agreement in pursuance thereof.”
. Law making conspiracy a crime is designed to curb immoderate power to do
mischief which is gained by a combination of the means. The encouragement and
support which co-conspirators give to one another rendering enterprises possible
which, if left to individual effort, would have been impossible, furnish the ground
for visiting conspirators and abettors with condign punishment. The conspiracy is
held to be continued and renewed as to all its members wherever and whenever
any member of the conspiracy acts in furtherance of the common design.
(See: American Jurisprudence, Vol. II, Sec. 23, p. 559.) For an offence punishable
under Section 120-B, the prosecution need not necessarily prove that the
perpetrators expressly agree to do or cause to be done illegal act; the agreement
may be proved by necessary implication. Offence of criminal conspiracy has its
foundation in an agreement to commit an offence. A conspiracy consists not merely
in the intention of two or more, but in the agreement of two or more to do an
unlawful act by unlawful means. So long as such a design rests in intention only, it
is not indictable. When two agree to carry it into effect, the very plot is an act in
itself, and an act of each of the parties, promise against promise, actus contra
actum, capable of being enforced, if lawful, punishable if for a criminal object or for
use of criminal means.
344. In Halsbury's Laws of England (vide 4th Edn., Vol. 11, p. 44, para 58), the
English law as to conspiracy has been stated thus:
“58. Conspiracy consists in the agreement of two or more persons to do an
unlawful act, or to do a lawful act by unlawful means. It is an indictable offence
at common law, the punishment for which is imprisonment or fine or both in the
discretion of the court.
The essence of the offence of conspiracy is the fact of combination by
agreement. The agreement may be express or implied, or in part express and in
part implied. The conspiracy arises and the offence is committed as soon as the
agreement is made; and the offence continues to be committed so long as the
combination persists, that is until the conspiratorial agreement is terminated by
completion of its performance or by abandonment or frustration or however it
may be. The actus reus in a conspiracy is the agreement to execute the illegal
conduct, not the execution of it. It is not enough that two or more persons
pursued the same unlawful object at the same time or in the same place; it is
necessary to show a meeting of minds, a consensus to effect an unlawful
purpose. It is not, however, necessary that each conspirator should have been in
communication with every other.”
345. There is no difference between the mode of proof of the offence of
conspiracy and that of any other offence. It can be established by direct or
circumstantial evidence. [See: Bhagwan Swarup Lal Bishan Lal v. State of
Maharashtra [AIR 1965 SC 682 : (1965) 1 Cri LJ 608] (AIR at p. 686).]
346. It was held that the expression “in reference to their common intention” in
Section 10 is very comprehensive and it appears to have been designedly used to
give it a wider scope than the words “in furtherance of” in the English law; with the
result, anything said, done or written by a co-conspirator, after the conspiracy was
formed, will be evidence against the other before he entered the field of conspiracy
or after he left it. Anything said, done or written is a relevant fact only.
“… ‘as against each of the persons believed to be so conspiring as well for the
purpose of proving the existence of the conspiracy as for the purpose of
showing that any such person was a party to it’. … In short, the section can be
analysed as follows: (1) There shall be a prima facie evidence affording a
reasonable ground for a court to believe that two or more persons are members
of a conspiracy; (2) if the said condition is fulfilled, anything said, done or written
by any one of them in reference to their common intention will be evidence
against the other; (3) anything said, done or written by him should have been
said, done or written by him after the intention was formed by any one of them;
(4) it would also be relevant for the said purpose against another who entered
the conspiracy whether it was said, done or written before he entered the
conspiracy or after he left it; and (5) it can only be used against a co-conspirator
and not in his favour.” (AIR p. 687, para 8)
We are aware of the fact that direct independent evidence of criminal conspiracy is
generally not available and its existence is a matter of inference. The inferences are
normally deduced from acts of parties in pursuance of a purpose in common
between the conspirators. This Court in V.C. Shukla v. State (Delhi Admn.) [(1980) 2
SCC 665 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 561] held that to prove criminal conspiracy, there must be
evidence, direct or circumstantial, to show that there was an agreement between
two or more persons to commit an offence. There must be a meeting of minds
resulting in ultimate decision taken by the conspirators regarding the commission
of an offence and where the factum of conspiracy is sought to be inferred from
circumstances, the prosecution has to show that the circumstances give rise to a
conclusive or irresistible inference of an agreement between two or more persons
to commit an offence. As in all other criminal offences, the prosecution has to
discharge its onus of proving the case against the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. The circumstances in a case, when taken together on their face value, should
indicate the meeting of minds between the conspirators for the intended object of
committing an illegal act or an act which is not illegal, by illegal means. A few bits
here and a few bits there on which the prosecution relies cannot be held to be
adequate for connecting the accused with the commission of the crime of criminal
conspiracy. It has to be shown that all means adopted and illegal acts done were in
furtherance of the object of conspiracy hatched. The circumstances relied for the
purposes of drawing an inference should be prior in time than the actual
commission of the offence in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy.
347. Privacy and secrecy are more characteristics of a conspiracy, than of a loud
discussion in an elevated place open to public view. Direct evidence in proof of a
conspiracy is seldom available; offence of conspiracy can be proved by either direct
or circumstantial evidence. It is not always possible to give affirmative evidence
about the date of the formation of the criminal conspiracy, about the persons who
took part in the formation of the conspiracy, about the object which the objectors
set before themselves as the object of conspiracy, and about the manner in which
the object of conspiracy is to be carried out, all this is necessarily a matter of
inference.
348. The provisions of Sections 120-A and 120-B IPC have brought the law of
conspiracy in India in line with the English law by making the overt act unessential
when the conspiracy is to commit any punishable offence. The English law on this
matter is well settled. Russell on Crime (12th Edn., Vol. I., p. 202) may be usefully
noted:
“The gist of the offence of conspiracy then lies, not in doing the act, or
effecting the purpose for which the conspiracy is formed, nor in attempting to
do them, nor in inciting others to do them, but in the forming of the scheme or
agreement between the parties, agreement is essential. Mere knowledge, or
even discussion, of the plan is not, per se, enough.”
351. As noted above, the essential ingredient of the offence of criminal
conspiracy is the agreement to commit an offence. In a case where the agreement
is for accomplishment of an act which by itself constitutes an offence, then in that
event no overt act is necessary to be proved by the prosecution because in such a
situation, criminal conspiracy is established by proving such an agreement. Where
the conspiracy alleged is with regard to commission of a serious crime of the nature
as contemplated in Section 120-B read with the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section
120-A, then in that event mere proof of an agreement between the accused for
commission of such a crime alone is enough to bring about a conviction under
Section 120-B and the proof of any overt act by the accused or by any one of them
would not be necessary. The provisions, in such a situation, do not require that
each and every person who is a party to the conspiracy must do some overt act
towards the fulfilment of the object of conspiracy, the essential ingredient being an
agreement between the conspirators to commit the crime and if these
requirements and ingredients are established, the act would fall within the
trappings of the provisions contained in Section 120-B. (See: Suresh Chandra
Bahri v. State of Bihar [1995 Supp (1) SCC 80 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 60 : AIR 1994 SC 2420] .)
352. The conspiracies are not hatched in the open, by their nature, they are
secretly planned, they can be proved even by circumstantial evidence, the lack of
direct evidence relating to conspiracy has no consequence. (See: E.K.
Chandrasenan v. State of Kerala [(1995) 2 SCC 99 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 329 : AIR 1995 SC
1066] .)
353. In Kehar Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.) [(1988) 3 SCC 609 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 711 :
AIR 1988 SC 1883] (AIR at p. 1954), this Court observed: (SCC pp. 732-33, para 275)
“275. Generally, a conspiracy is hatched in secrecy and it may be difficult to
adduce direct evidence of the same. The prosecution will often rely on evidence
of acts of various parties to infer that they were done in reference to their
common intention. The prosecution will also more often rely upon
circumstantial evidence. The conspiracy can be undoubtedly proved by such
evidence direct or circumstantial. But the court must enquire whether the two
persons are independently pursuing the same end or they have come together
to the pursuit of the unlawful object. The former does not render them
conspirators, but the latter does. It is, however, essential that the offence of
conspiracy requires some kind of physical manifestation of agreement. The
express agreement, however, need not be proved. Nor actual meeting of two
persons is necessary. Nor it is necessary to prove the actual words of
communication. The evidence as to transmission of thoughts sharing the
unlawful design may be sufficient.”
“Conspiracy can be proved by circumstances and other materials.” (See: State
of Bihar v. Paramhans Yadav [1986 Pat LJR 688 (HC)] .)
“[T]o establish a charge of conspiracy knowledge about indulgence in either
an illegal act or a legal act by illegal means is necessary. In some cases, intent of
unlawful use being made of the goods or services in question may be inferred
from the knowledge itself. This apart, the prosecution has not to establish that
a particular unlawful use was intended, so long as the goods or service in
question could not be put to any lawful use. Finally, when the ultimate offence
consists of a chain of actions, it would not be necessary for the prosecution to
establish, to bring home the charge of conspiracy, that each of the conspirators
had the knowledge of what the collaborator would do, so long as it is known
that the collaborator would put the goods or service to an unlawful use.”
(See: State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath Thapa [(1996) 4 SCC 659 : 1996 SCC (Cri)
820 : JT (1996) 4 SC 615] , SCC p. 668, para 24.)
344. In Halsbury's Laws of England (vide 4th Edn., Vol. 11, p. 44, para 58), the
English law as to conspiracy has been stated thus:
“58. Conspiracy consists in the agreement of two or more persons to do an
unlawful act, or to do a lawful act by unlawful means. It is an indictable offence
at common law, the punishment for which is imprisonment or fine or both in the
discretion of the court.
The essence of the offence of conspiracy is the fact of combination by
agreement. The agreement may be express or implied, or in part express and in
part implied. The conspiracy arises and the offence is committed as soon as the
agreement is made; and the offence continues to be committed so long as the
combination persists, that is until the conspiratorial agreement is terminated by
completion of its performance or by abandonment or frustration or however it
may be. The actus reus in a conspiracy is the agreement to execute the illegal
conduct, not the execution of it. It is not enough that two or more persons
pursued the same unlawful object at the same time or in the same place; it is
necessary to show a meeting of minds, a consensus to effect an unlawful
purpose. It is not, however, necessary that each conspirator should have been in
communication with every other.”
345. There is no difference between the mode of proof of the offence of
conspiracy and that of any other offence. It can be established by direct or
circumstantial evidence. [See: Bhagwan Swarup Lal Bishan Lal v. State of
Maharashtra [AIR 1965 SC 682 : (1965) 1 Cri LJ 608] (AIR at p. 686).]
346. It was held that the expression “in reference to their common intention” in
Section 10 is very comprehensive and it appears to have been designedly used to
give it a wider scope than the words “in furtherance of” in the English law; with the
result, anything said, done or written by a co-conspirator, after the conspiracy was
formed, will be evidence against the other before he entered the field of conspiracy
or after he left it. Anything said, done or written is a relevant fact only.
“… ‘as against each of the persons believed to be so conspiring as well for the
purpose of proving the existence of the conspiracy as for the purpose of
showing that any such person was a party to it’. … In short, the section can be
analysed as follows: (1) There shall be a prima facie evidence affording a
reasonable ground for a court to believe that two or more persons are members
of a conspiracy; (2) if the said condition is fulfilled, anything said, done or written
by any one of them in reference to their common intention will be evidence
against the other; (3) anything said, done or written by him should have been
said, done or written by him after the intention was formed by any one of them;
(4) it would also be relevant for the said purpose against another who entered
the conspiracy whether it was said, done or written before he entered the
conspiracy or after he left it; and (5) it can only be used against a co-conspirator
and not in his favour.” (AIR p. 687, para 8)
We are aware of the fact that direct independent evidence of criminal conspiracy is
generally not available and its existence is a matter of inference. The inferences are
normally deduced from acts of parties in pursuance of a purpose in common
between the conspirators. This Court in V.C. Shukla v. State (Delhi Admn.) [(1980) 2
SCC 665 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 561] held that to prove criminal conspiracy, there must be
evidence, direct or circumstantial, to show that there was an agreement between
two or more persons to commit an offence. There must be a meeting of minds
resulting in ultimate decision taken by the conspirators regarding the commission
of an offence and where the factum of conspiracy is sought to be inferred from
circumstances, the prosecution has to show that the circumstances give rise to a
conclusive or irresistible inference of an agreement between two or more persons
to commit an offence. As in all other criminal offences, the prosecution has to
discharge its onus of proving the case against the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. The circumstances in a case, when taken together on their face value, should
indicate the meeting of minds between the conspirators for the intended object of
committing an illegal act or an act which is not illegal, by illegal means. A few bits
here and a few bits there on which the prosecution relies cannot be held to be
adequate for connecting the accused with the commission of the crime of criminal
conspiracy. It has to be shown that all means adopted and illegal acts done were in
furtherance of the object of conspiracy hatched. The circumstances relied for the
purposes of drawing an inference should be prior in time than the actual
commission of the offence in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy.
347. Privacy and secrecy are more characteristics of a conspiracy, than of a loud
discussion in an elevated place open to public view. Direct evidence in proof of a
conspiracy is seldom available; offence of conspiracy can be proved by either direct
or circumstantial evidence. It is not always possible to give affirmative evidence
about the date of the formation of the criminal conspiracy, about the persons who
took part in the formation of the conspiracy, about the object which the objectors
set before themselves as the object of conspiracy, and about the manner in which
the object of conspiracy is to be carried out, all this is necessarily a matter of
inference.
348. The provisions of Sections 120-A and 120-B IPC have brought the law of
conspiracy in India in line with the English law by making the overt act unessential
when the conspiracy is to commit any punishable offence. The English law on this
matter is well settled. Russell on Crime (12th Edn., Vol. I., p. 202) may be usefully
noted:
“The gist of the offence of conspiracy then lies, not in doing the act, or
effecting the purpose for which the conspiracy is formed, nor in attempting to
do them, nor in inciting others to do them, but in the forming of the scheme or
agreement between the parties, agreement is essential. Mere knowledge, or
even discussion, of the plan is not, per se, enough.”
355. I may usefully refer to Ajay Aggarwal v. Union of India [(1993) 3 SCC 609 :
1993 SCC (Cri) 961 : JT (1993) 3 SC 203] . It was held: (SCC p. 617, paras 8-9)
“8. … It is not necessary that each conspirator must know all the details of the
scheme nor be a participant at every stage. It is necessary that they should
agree for design or object of the conspiracy. Conspiracy is conceived as having
three elements: (1) agreement; (2) between two or more persons by whom the
agreement is effected; and (3) a criminal object, which may be either the
ultimate aim of the agreement, or may constitute the means, or one of the
means by which that aim is to be accomplished. It is immaterial whether this is
found in the ultimate objects. The common law definition of ‘criminal conspiracy’
was stated first by Lord Denman in Jones case [R. v. Jones, 1832 B & Ad 345 : 110
ER 485] that an indictment for conspiracy must ‘charge a conspiracy to do an
unlawful act by unlawful means’ and was elaborated by Willies, J. on behalf of
the Judges while referring the question to the House of Lords
in Mulcahy v. R. [(1868) 3 HL 306] and the House of Lords in unanimous decision
reiterated in Quinn v. Leathem [1901 AC 495 : 85 LT 289 : (1900-03) All ER Rep 1
(HL)] :
‘A conspiracy consists not merely in the intention of two or more, but in
the agreement of two or more, to do an unlawful act, or to do a lawful act by
unlawful means. So long as such a design rests in intention only, it is not
indictable. When two agree to carry it into effect, the very plot is an act in
itself, and the act of each of the parties, promise against promise, actus
contra actum, capable of being enforced, if lawful; and punishable if for a
criminal object, or for the use of criminal means.’
9. This Court in E.G. Barsay v. State of Bombay [AIR 1961 SC 1762 : (1961) 2 Cri
LJ 828] held:
‘The gist of the offence is an agreement to break the law. The parties to
such an agreement will be guilty of criminal conspiracy, though the illegal act
agreed to be done has not been done. So too, it is an ingredient of the
offence that all the parties should agree to do a single illegal act. It may
comprise the commission of a number of acts. Under Section 43 of the Penal
Code, 1860, an act would be illegal if it is an offence or if it is prohibited by
law.’
In Yash Pal Mittal v. State of Punjab [(1977) 4 SCC 540 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 5] the rule
was laid as follows: (SCC p. 543, para 9)
‘… The very agreement, concert or league is the ingredient of the offence.
It is not necessary that all the conspirators must know each and every detail
of the conspiracy as long as they are co-participators in the main object of
the conspiracy. There may be so many devices and techniques adopted to
achieve the common goal of the conspiracy and there may be division of
performances in the chain of actions with one object to achieve the real end
of which every collaborator must be aware and in which each one of them
must be interested. There must be unity of object or purpose but there may
be plurality of means sometimes even unknown to one another, amongst the
conspirators. In achieving the goal several offences may be committed by
some of the conspirators even unknown to the others. The only relevant
factor is that all means adopted and illegal acts done must be and purported
to be in furtherance of the object of the conspiracy even though there may
be sometimes misfire or overshooting by some of the conspirators.’
In the face of modern organised crime, complex business arrangements in

restraint of trade, and subversive political activity, conspiracy law has witnessed
expansion in many forms. Conspiracy criminalizes an agreement to commit a
crime. All conspirators are liable for crimes committed in furtherance of the
conspiracy by any member of the group, regardless of whether liability would be
established by the law of complicity. To put it differently, the law punishes conduct
that threatens to produce the harm, as well as conduct that has actually produced
it. Contrary to the usual rule that an attempt to commit a crime merges with the
completed offence, conspirators may be tried and punished for both the conspiracy
and the completed crime. The rationale of conspiracy is that the required objective
manifestation of disposition to criminality is provided by the act of agreement.
Conspiracy is a clandestine activity. Persons generally do not form illegal covenants
openly. In the interests of security, a person may carry out his part of a conspiracy
without even being informed of the identity of his co-conspirators. Since an
agreement of this kind can rarely be shown by direct proof, it must be inferred
from circumstantial evidence of cooperation between the accused. What people do
is, of course, evidence of what lies in their minds. To convict a person of conspiracy,
the prosecution must show that he agreed with others that together they would
accomplish the unlawful object of the conspiracy.
THAT THE DEFENDANTS ARE LIABLE UNDER SECTION 467 & 468 FOR FORGERY
FORGERY
It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the defendants are liable for Forgery in the
above stated Sections.
The definition of the offence of forgery declares the offence to be completed when
a false document or false part of a document is made with specified intention. The
questions are (i) is the document false, (ii) is it made by the accused, and (iii) is it
made with an intent to defraud. If at all the questions are answered in the
affirmative, the accused is guilty.10
In the present case, the possession letter given to Anirudh Vyas was false, and made by the
accused and the intention was to dishonestly concealed the disputed status of land. Hence, committing
the offence of forgery.
10
This extract is taken from Chatt Ram v. State of Haryana, (1980) 1 SCC 460 : 1980
14. There were two crucial questions which had to be considered before the
appellant Chatt Ram could be convicted of the offences with which he was charged.
With regard to the charge under Section 467, Penal Code, 1860, it was to be
determined whether Chatt Ram had participated in any manner in the act of forging
the ticket (Ex. P-3). Similarly regarding the offence under Section 471, Penal Code,
1860, it was necessary to consider whether the prosecution had established by
adducing cogent and convincing evidence that Chatt Ram, appellant knew or had
reason to believe the ticket (Ex. P-3) to be a forged document when he presented it
before the Treasury Officer and later before the Director to claim special prize on
the basis thereof. Proof of this factual ingredient was essential for conviction of the
appellant for an offence under Section 471, of the Penal Code. The High Court does
not appear to have concentrated on these crucial issues of fact.
This extract is taken from Parminder Kaur v. State of U.P., (2010) 1 SCC 322 :
(2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 782 at page 331
31. The next section is Section 468 IPC which reads as under:
“468. Forgery for purpose of cheating.—Whoever commits forgery, intending
that the document or electronic record forged shall be used for the purpose of
cheating, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.”
This is the aggravated form of forgery which is punishable under Section 465 and is
defined under Section 464 IPC.
This extract is taken from Parminder Kaur v. State of U.P., (2010) 1 SCC 322 :
(2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 782 at page 331
32. Section 464 speaks of making a false document. The section reads as under:
“464. Making a false document.—A person is said to make a false document or
false electronic record—
First.—Who dishonestly or fraudulently—
(a) makes, signs, seals or executes a document or part of a document;
(b) makes or transmits any electronic record or part of any electronic
record;
(c) affixes any digital signature on any electronic record;
(d) makes any mark denoting the execution of a document or the
authenticity of the digital signature,
with the intention of causing it to be believed that such document or part of a
document, electronic record or digital signature was made, signed, sealed,
executed, transmitted or affixed by or by the authority of a person by whom or
by whose authority he knows that it was not made, signed, sealed, executed or
affixed; or
Secondly.—Who, without lawful authority, dishonestly or fraudulently, by
cancellation or otherwise, alters a document or an electronic record in any
material part thereof, after it has been made, executed or affixed with digital
signature either by himself or by any other person, whether such person be
living or dead at the time of such alteration; or
Thirdly.—Who dishonestly or fraudulently causes any person to sign, seal,
execute or alter a document or an electronic record or to affix his digital
signature on any electronic record knowing that such person by reason of
unsoundness of mind or intoxication cannot, or that by reason of deception
practised upon him, he does not know the contents of the document or
electronic record or the nature of the alteration.”
Shyamal Roy .…. Petitioner
v.
The State of West Bengal & Anr. .…. Respondents
Therefore, in order to bring home the charge under Section 468 of the Penal Code, 1860 it is necessary
to establish that the impugned deed was forged or that the petitioner has manufactured a false deed
in order to cheat the opposite party no. 2.
367. Section 467 relates to forgery of such documents as valuable securities and
of other documents mentioned.
368. Section 468 deals with forgery for the purpose of cheating. The offence is
complete as soon as there was forgery with a particular intent.
369. Section 471 deals with using as genuine a forged document. For the
purpose of convicting an accused under Section 467 read with Section 471 IPC, it
has to be shown that an accused either knew or has reason to believe that the
document was forged.
370. Section 463 defines forgery and Section 464 deals with making a false
statement. Section 463 reads as follows:
“463. Forgery.—Whoever makes any false documents or false electronic
record or part of a document or electronic record, with intent to cause damage
or injury, to the public or to any person, or to support any claim or title, or to
cause any person to part with property, or to enter into any express or implied
contract, or with intent to commit fraud or that fraud may be committed,
commits forgery.”
371. In order to constitute forgery, the first essential is that the accused should
have made a false document. The false document must be made with an intent to
cause damage or injury to the public or to any class of public or to any community.
372. The expression “intent to defraud” implies conduct coupled with an
intention to deceive or thereby to cause injury. In other words, defraud involves
two conceptions, namely, the deceit and injury to the person deceived, that is
infringement of some legal right possessed by him but not necessarily deprivation
of property. The term “forgery” as used in the statute is used in its ordinary and
popular acceptation.
375. The intent to commit forgery involves an intent to cause injury. A person
makes a false document who dishonestly or fraudulently signs with an intent or
cause to believe that the document was signed by a person whom he knows it was
not signed.
376. A false description makes a document of forgery when it is found that the
accused by giving such false description intended to make out or wanted it to
believe that it was not he that was executing the document but another person.
This extract is taken from Indian Bank v. Satyam Fibres (India) (P) Ltd., (1996) 5
SCC 550 at page 564
31. The Privy Council in Satish Chandra Chatterji v. Kumar Satish Kantha Roy [AIR
1923 PC 73 : (1923-24) 28 CWN 327] laid down as under:
“Charges of fraud and collusion like those contained in the plaint in this case
must, no doubt, be proved by those who make them — proved by established
facts or inferences legitimately drawn from those facts taken together as a
whole. Suspicions and surmises and conjecture are not permissible substitutes
for those facts or those inferences, but that by no means requires that every
puzzling artifice or contrivance resorted to by one accused of fraud must
necessarily be completely unravelled and cleared up and made plain before a
verdict can be properly found against him. If this were not so, many a clever and
dextrous knave would escape.”
This extract is taken from Indian Bank v. Satyam Fibres (India) (P) Ltd., (1996) 5
SCC 550 at page 564
30. Forgery and fraud are essentially matters of evidence which could be proved
as a fact by direct evidence or by inferences drawn from proved facts.
THAT THE DOCTRINE OF LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION WILL NOT APPLY
It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the doctrines of legitimate
expectation will not be applicable in this case.
The defendants are merely relying on an anticipation and cannot amount to a right
in the court of law.(A) Also, the acquisition of the land by the government serves a
greater public interest.(B) Moreover, it has been stated by the Courts that the
doctrine of plays no role when the appropriate authority is empowered to take a
decision by an executive policy or under law.(C)
The doctrine of legitimate expectation is founded on the concept of fairness and

arise out of natural justice. 11
The doctrine of legitimate expectation is not a legal right. It is an expectation of a

benefit, relief or remedy, that may ordinarily flow from a promise or established
practice. The term “established practice” refers to a regular, consistent, predictable
and certain conduct, process or activity of the decision-making authority. It is a
concept fashioned by the courts, for judicial review of administrative action. 12
(A) LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION IS DIFFERENT FROM ANTICIPATION
A note of caution sounded in the Supreme Court case which is worth noticing and
also very relevant to the present case. The Court observed that legitimate
expectation was different from anticipation and granting relief on mere
disappointment of expectation would be too nebulous a ground for setting aside a
public exercise by law.13 Such expectation should be justifiable, legitimate and
protectable.14
In the present case, the defendants argue that in the light of inordinate delay in
acquisition of land by the Government is a mere anticipation and not a legitimate expectation.
“The legitimacy of an expectation can be inferred only if it is founded on the sanction of

law or custom or an established procedure followed in regular and natural sequence.
Again it is distinguishable from a genuine expectation. Such expectation should be
justifiably legitimate and protectable. Every such legitimate expectation does not by itself
11
Monnet Ispat & Energy Ltd. v. Union of India, (2012) 11 SCC 1 : 2012 SCC OnLine SC 558 at page 106
12
Ram Pravesh Singh v. State of Bihar, (2006) 8 SCC 381 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 1986 at page 390
13
Bannari Amman Sugars Ltd. [(2005) 1 SCC 625]
14
fructify into a right and therefore it does not amount to a right in the conventional
sense.”15
(B) GREATER PUBLIC INTEREST

It is most humbly submitted before this Hon’ble High Court that the protection of
legitimate expectation does not require the fulfilment of the expectation where
an overriding public interest requires otherwise. In other words, personal
benefit must give way to public interest and the doctrine of legitimate
expectation would not be invoked which could block public interest for private
benefit.16
In the present case, the Government’s subsidised housing scheme for Government employees
serves a greater public good than the development of a residential society by the defendants.
‘To strike down the exercise of administrative power solely on the ground of avoiding the
disappointment of the legitimate expectations of an individual would be to set the courts
adrift on a featureless sea of pragmatism. Moreover, the notion of a legitimate
expectation (falling short of a legal right) is too nebulous to form a basis for invalidating
the exercise of a power when its exercise otherwise accords with law.’17
(C) THE AUTHORITY HAS THE POWER TO TAKE THE DECISION

“The doctrine of legitimate expectation plays no role when the appropriate
authority is empowered to take a decision by an executive policy or under law. The
court leaves the authority to decide its full range of choice within the executive or
legislative power.
Hence, it would be open to the Government to evolve the new schemes. The High
Court, therefore, concluded that the Government is not barred by the promises or
legitimate expectations from evolving new policy in the impugned notification.” 18
In the present case the Municipal Corporation of Ghaziabad has the authority to tae the decision
and hence the court cannot interfere with the matter.
15
Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corpn. [(1993) 3 SCC 499
16
17
Attorney General for New South Wales case [Attorney General for New South Wales v. Quin, 1990 HCA 21 :
(1990) 64 ALJR 327 (Aust)]
18
P.T.R. Exports (Madras) (P) Ltd. v. Union of India [(1996) 5 SCC 268]
Moreover, the doctrine of legitimate expectation based on established practice
can be invoked only by someone who has dealings or transactions or negotiations
with an authority, on which such established practice has a bearing, or by someone
who has a recognised legal relationship with the authority. A total stranger
unconnected with the authority or a person who had no previous dealings with the
authority and who has not entered into any transaction or negotiations with the
authority, cannot invoke the doctrine of legitimate expectation, merely on the
ground that the authority has a general obligation to act fairly. 19
19
Ram Pravesh Singh v. State of Bihar, (2006) 8 SCC 381 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 1986 at page 390
CHEATING
Cheating section 420
This extract is taken from Samir Sahay v. State of U.P., (2018) 14 SCC 233 :
19. Again in Dalip Kaur v. Jagnar Singh [Dalip Kaur v. Jagnar Singh, (2009) 14 SCC
696 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 223] , this Court noticed the ingredients of Section 420 IPC.
In paras 9 to 11 the following was stated: (SCC pp. 699-700)
“9. The ingredients of Section 420 of the Penal Code are:
‘(i) Deception of any persons;
(ii) Fraudulently or dishonestly inducing any person to deliver any
property; or
(iii) To consent that any person shall retain any property and finally
intentionally inducing that person to do or omit to do anything which he
would not do or omit.’
This extract is taken from Samir Sahay v. State of U.P., (2018) 14 SCC 233 :
18. According to Section 415 IPC, the inducement must be fraudulent and
dishonest which depends upon the intention of the accused at the time of
inducement. This Court had occasion to consider Sections 415 and 420 IPC
in Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar [Hridaya Ranjan Prasad
Verma v. State of Bihar, (2000) 4 SCC 168 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 786] . This Court after
noticing the provisions of Sections 415 and 420 IPC stated the following in paras 14
and 15: (SCC pp. 176-77)
“14. On a reading of the section it is manifest that in the definition there are
set forth two separate classes of acts which the person deceived may be
induced to do. In the first place he may be induced fraudulently or dishonestly
to deliver any property to any person. The second class of acts set forth in the
section is the doing or omitting to do anything which the person deceived would
not do or omit to do if he were not so deceived. In the first class of cases the
inducing must be fraudulent or dishonest. In the second class of acts, the
inducing must be intentional but not fraudulent or dishonest.
15.
There cannot furthermore be any doubt that the High Court would exercise
its inherent jurisdiction only when one or the other propositions of law, as laid
down in R. Kalyani v. Janak C. Mehta [R. Kalyani v. Janak C. Mehta, (2009) 1 SCC 516
: (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 567] is attracted, which are as under: (SCC p. 523, para 15)
‘(1) The High Court ordinarily would not exercise its inherent jurisdiction
to quash a criminal proceeding and, in particular, a first information report
unless the allegations contained therein, even if given face value and taken to
be correct in their entirety, disclosed no cognizable offence.
(2) For the said purpose the Court, save and except in very exceptional
circumstances, would not look to any document relied upon by the defence.
(3) Such a power should be exercised very sparingly. If the allegations
made in the FIR disclose commission of an offence, the Court shall not go
beyond the same and pass an order in favour of the accused to hold absence
of any mens rea or actus reus.
(4) If the allegation discloses a civil dispute, the same by itself may not be
a ground to hold that the criminal proceedings should not be allowed to
continue.’”
This extract is taken from Devender Kumar Singla v. Baldev Krishan Singla, (2005)
9 SCC 15 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1185 at page 20
9. On the proved facts it is seen that a cheque was handed over to the
complainant and in the receipt it was stated that the shares have been received.
The High Court has referred to this factual position and drawn a conclusion that the
receipt (Ext. PW 3/B) which was admittedly executed by accused Devender clearly
states that the shares had been transferred. The mere fact that the cheque was
filled in by the complainant is not sufficient to take away the effect of the statement
in the receipt. The plea that it was an advance receipt does not appear to have been
even agitated before the courts below.
This extract is taken from Devender Kumar Singla v. Baldev Krishan Singla, (2005)
9 SCC 15 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1185 at page 21
10. Significantly, there was no suggestion to the complainant (PW 3) that the
shares had not been delivered.
THAT THE LAND CONSTITUTED “PROPERTY” UNDER SECTION 420
This extract is taken from Ishwarlal Girdharilal Parekh v. State of Maharashtra,

(1969) 1 SCR 193 : AIR 1969 SC 40 : (1968) 70 ITR 95 : 1969 Cri LJ 271
12. “Movable property” is defined, in Section 22 IPC; “Document” and
“valuable security” are defined in Sections 29 and 30 IPC, respectively. Under the
scheme of the Income Tax Act, it is clear that the assessment order determines
the total income of the assessee, and the tax payable, on the basis of such
assessment. The assessment order has to be served, on the assessee. The tax is
demanded, by the issue of a notice, under Section 29; but the tax demanded, is
on the basis of the assessment order, communicated to an assessee. The
communicated order of assessment, received by an assessee, is in our opinion,
“property”, since it is of great importance, to an assessee, as containing a
computation, of his total assessable income and, as a determination, of his tax
liability. In our view, the word “property”, occurring in Section 420 IPC, does not
necessarily mean that the thing, of which a delivery is dishonestly desired by the
person who cheats, must have a money value or a market value, in the hand of
the person cheated. Even if the thing has no money value, in the hand of the
person cheated, but becomes a thing of value, in the hand of the person, who
may get possession of it, as a result of the cheating practised by him, it would
still fall within the connotation of the term ‘property’, in Section 420 IPC.
The above view in Palanitkar case [(2002) 1 SCC 241 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 129] was
referred to and followed in Rashmi Jain v. State of U.P. [(2014) 13 SCC 553 : (2014) 5
SCC (Cri) 751]
This extract is taken from ARCI v. Nimra Cerglass Technics (P) Ltd., (2016) 1 SCC
348 : (2016) 1 SCC (Cri) 269 : 2015 SCC OnLine SC 834 at page 356
15. The essential ingredients to attract Section 420 IPC are: (i) cheating; (ii)
dishonest inducement to deliver property or to make, alter or destroy any valuable
security or anything which is sealed or signed or is capable of being converted into
a valuable security; and (iii) mens rea of the accused at the time of making the
inducement. The making of a false representation is one of the essential
ingredients to constitute the offence of cheating under Section 420 IPC. In order to
bring a case for the offence of cheating, it is not merely sufficient to prove that a
false representation had been made, but, it is further necessary to prove that the
representation was false to the knowledge of the accused and was made in order
to deceive the complainant.
The distinction between mere breach of contract and the cheating would
depend upon the intention of the accused at the time of alleged inducement. If it is
established that the intention of the accused was dishonest at the very time when
he made a promise and entered into a transaction with the complainant to part
with his property or money, then the liability is criminal and the accused is guilty of
the offence of cheating. On the other hand, if all that is established is that a
representation made by the accused has subsequently not been kept, criminal
liability cannot be foisted on the accused and the only right which the complainant
acquires is the remedy for breach of contract in a civil court. Mere breach of
contract cannot give rise to criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or
dishonest intention is shown at the beginning of the transaction. In S.W.
Palanitkar v. State of Bihar [(2002) 1 SCC 241 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 129] , this Court held as
under: (SCC p. 250, para 21)
“21. … In order to constitute an offence of cheating, the intention to deceive
should be in existence at the time when the inducement was made. It is
necessary to show that a person had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the
time of making the promise, to say that he committed an act of cheating. A mere
failure to keep up promise subsequently cannot be presumed as an act leading
to cheating.”
The above view in Palanitkar case [(2002) 1 SCC 241 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 129] was
referred to and followed in Rashmi Jain v. State of U.P. [(2014) 13 SCC 553 : (2014) 5
SCC (Cri) 751]
If a denial of legitimate expectation in a given case amounts to denial of right

guaranteed or is arbitrary, discriminatory, unfair or biased, gross abuse of power or
violation of principles of natural justice, the same can be questioned on the well-
known grounds attracting Article 14 but a claim based on mere legitimate
expectation without anything more cannot ipso facto give a right to invoke these
principles.
ABUSE OF POWER
In Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corpn.20, the Supreme Court had an
occasion to consider the nature, scope and applicability of the doctrine of legitimate
expectation and held that a decision denying a legitimate expectation based on
such grounds does not qualify for interference unless in a given case, the decision
or action taken amounts to an abuse of power.
20
[(1993) 3 SCC 499]
But, however, the relevance of application of the said doctrine is as to whether the
expectation was legitimate. Such legitimate expectation was also required to be
determined keeping in view the larger public interest. Claimants' perceptions would
not be relevant therefor. The State actions indisputably must be fair and
reasonable. Non-arbitrariness on its part is a significant facet in the field of good
governance. The discretion conferred upon the State yet again cannot be exercised
whimsically or capriciously. But where a change in the policy decision is valid in law,
any action taken pursuant thereto or in furtherance thereof, cannot be
invalidated.21
It can be one of the grounds to consider but the court must lift the veil and
see whether the decision is violative of these principles warranting interference.
It depends very much on the facts and the recognised general principles of
administrative law applicable to such facts and the concept of legitimate
expectation which is the latest recruit to a long list of concepts fashioned by the
courts for the review of administrative action, must be restricted to the general
legal limitations applicable and binding the manner of the future exercise of
administrative power in a particular case. It follows that the concept of
legitimate expectation is ‘not the key which unlocks the treasury of natural
justice and it ought not to unlock the gates which shuts the court out of review
on the merits’, particularly when the element of speculation and uncertainty is
inherent in that very concept. As cautioned in Attorney General for New South
Wales case [Attorney General for New South Wales v. Quin, 1990 HCA 21 : (1990) 64
ALJR 327 (Aust)] the courts should restrain themselves and restrict such claims
duly to the legal limitations. It is a well-meant caution. Otherwise a resourceful
litigant having vested interests in contracts, licences, etc. can successfully
21
Kuldeep Singh v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi, (2006) 5 SCC 702 at page 712
indulge in getting welfare activities mandated by directive principles thwarted to
further his own interests. The caution, particularly in the changing scenario,
becomes all the more important.”
While observing as above, the Court observed that legitimacy of an expectation
could be inferred only if it was founded on the sanction of law or custom or an
established procedure followed in regular and natural sequence. Every such
legitimate expectation does not by itself fructify into a right and, therefore, it does
not amount to a right in the conventional sense.
This extract is taken from Monnet Ispat & Energy Ltd. v. Union of India, (2012) 11
SCC 1 : 2012 SCC OnLine SC 558 at page 109
The doctrine of legitimate expectation had been judicially recognised. 22 It
operates in the domain of public law and in an appropriate case, constitutes a
substantive and enforceable right.23
Indisputably, the said doctrine is a source of procedural or substantive right.

(See R. v. North and East Devon Health Authority, ex p Coughlan [2001 QB 213] .)
. The expectation should be legitimate, that is, reasonable, logical and valid.
Any expectation which is based on sporadic or casual or random acts, or which
is unreasonable, illogical or invalid cannot be a legitimate expectation.
Therefore the limitation is extremely confined and if the according of natural justice
does not condition the exercise of the power, the concept of legitimate expectation
can have no role to play and the court must not usurp the discretion of the public
authority which is empowered to take the decisions under law and the court is
expected to apply an objective standard which leaves to the deciding authority the
full range of choice which the legislature is presumed to have intended. Even in a
22
M.P. Oil Extraction v. State of M.P. [(1997) 7 SCC 592] this Court considered an earlier decision in Hindustan
Development Corpn. [(1993) 3 SCC 499] and in para 44 (p. 612)
23
J.P. Bansal v. State of Rajasthan [(2003) 5 SCC 134 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 605]
case where the decision is left entirely to the discretion of the deciding authority
without any such legal bounds and if the decision is taken fairly and objectively, the
court will not interfere on the ground of procedural fairness to a person whose
interest based on legitimate expectation might be affected.
CASE VERY SIMILAR TO THE PROP NOT ON SCC

This extract is taken from Dilbag Rai v. State of Haryana, (2019) 16 SCC 736 :
D.Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.— Leave granted. This appeal arises from a judgment and
order dated 11-2-2016 [Rajinder Kaur v. State of Haryana, 2016 SCC OnLine P&H
19306] passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana. By the impugned
judgment, the High Court has quashed the proceedings arising out of FIR No. 210
dated 21-6-2014 registered under Sections 406, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 506 of the
Penal Code, 1860 (the Penal Code) at Police Station Shahabad, District Kurukshetra.
2. The complainant is in appeal in these proceedings. The case of the appellant
is that on 1-12-2011, the accused, who is impleaded as Respondent 2, entered into
an agreement to sell a property admeasuring 8 marlas situated at Patti Jhabran,
behind Lucky Colony, Shahabad, District Kurukshetra. An amount of Rs 10 lakhs is
said to have been paid at the time of execution of the agreement to sell. The
complaint states that though the agreement recites that possession of the property
was handed over, as a matter of fact, the possession was not transferred.
3. Since the accused did not proceed to complete the transaction, the appellant
on 30-1-2014 filed an application before the Superintendent of Police, District
Kurukshetra for registration of a complaint and for taking action against
Respondent 2 and her husband Gurcharan Singh.
4. The case was referred to the Economic Crime Cell, Kurukshetra. On enquiry,
the Economic Crime Cell submitted its report dated 4-3-2014 concluding that the
dispute was of a civil nature. The appellant thereafter filed an application under
Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) and on the direction of the
Illaqa/Duty Magistrate, Kurukshetra, FIR No. 210 was registered on 21-6-2014 at
Police Station Shahabad Markanda, District Kurukshetra.
5. The accused filed an application being CRM-M No. 35679 of 2014 before the
High Court for quashing the FIR on the ground that the dispute was of a civil nature.
During the course of the investigation, the statement of the owner of the plot was
recorded on 27-10-2014 to the effect that the plot in fact belongs to his wife Sushila.
6. Eventually after investigation, a charge-sheet under Section 173 CrPC was
submitted by the investigating officer on 20-11-2014 for offences under Sections
406 and 420 of the Penal Code. Charges have been framed on 11-12-2014. The trial
commenced and five prosecution witnesses were examined. The High Court by its
impugned order dated 11-2-2016 [Rajinder Kaur v. State of Haryana, 2016 SCC
OnLine P&H 19306] , quashed the proceedings arising out of the FIR on the ground
that on a plain reading of the FIR, the complainant had failed to make out any
criminal intent on the part of the accused.
7. Assailing the judgment of the High Court, it has been submitted on behalf of
the appellant that the High Court had manifestly erred in exercising its jurisdiction
under Section 482 CrPC at this stage particularly when after due investigation, the
charge-sheet has been filed and charges have been framed. Moreover, it has also
been submitted that a criminal intent emerges from the fact that though the
property did not stand in the name of the accused it was sought to be sold and in
pursuance of the transaction, the appellant was made to part with valuable
consideration.
8. On 29-6-2016 [Dilbag Rai v. State of Haryana, 2016 SCC OnLine SC 1784] ,
notice was issued in these proceedings. The office report indicates that service of
notice is complete on Respondent 2. Despite service, none has appeared for
Respondent 2.
9. The High Court was persuaded to quash the criminal proceedings purely on
the basis that the FIR indicated that the vendor had refused to execute the sale
deed. On this basis, the High Court held that there is no element of cheating and on
reading of the FIR, the complainant had failed to make out any criminal intent on
the part of the accused.
10. In arriving at this conclusion, the High Court, as would appear from the
narration of facts earlier, has lost sight of crucial aspects which have emerged
during the course of the investigation. The case of the complainant, it must be
noted, is that though the accused did not have title to the property, she had dealt
with the property and it was on that basis that the complainant was induced to part
with valuable consideration. Whether these allegations are true or otherwise is a
matter of trial. The High Court, in our view, was not justified in taking recourse to its
power under Section 482 CrPC to quash the proceedings.

Class Moot V Year

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Class Moot V Year

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

SIDE: PETITIONERS

(A) THE DEFENDENTS COMMITTED CRIMINAL BREACH OF TRUST

(B) THE INFERENCE OF MISSAPROPRIATION IS ENOUGH

(B) CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IS ENOUGH

In the face of modern organised crime, complex business arrangements in

Shyamal Roy .…. Petitioner

The State of West Bengal & Anr. .…. Respondents

The doctrine of legitimate expectation is founded on the concept of fairness and

The doctrine of legitimate expectation is not a legal right. It is an expectation of a

(A) LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION IS DIFFERENT FROM ANTICIPATION

“The legitimacy of an expectation can be inferred only if it is founded on the sanction of

(B) GREATER PUBLIC INTEREST

(C) THE AUTHORITY HAS THE POWER TO TAKE THE DECISION

THAT THE LAND CONSTITUTED “PROPERTY” UNDER SECTION 420

This extract is taken from Ishwarlal Girdharilal Parekh v. State of Maharashtra,

If a denial of legitimate expectation in a given case amounts to denial of right

Indisputably, the said doctrine is a source of procedural or substantive right.

CASE VERY SIMILAR TO THE PROP NOT ON SCC

You might also like