University of Pennsylvania Press Is Collaborating With JSTOR To Digitize, Preserve and Extend Access To Journal of The History of Ideas

Killing God, Liberating the "Subject": Nietzsche and Post-God Freedom
Author(s): Michael Lackey

Source: Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 60, No. 4 (Oct., 1999), pp. 737-754
Published by: University of Pennsylvania Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3654117
Accessed: 13-01-2016 00:13 UTC
REFERENCES
Linked references are available on JSTOR for this article:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3654117?seq=1&cid=pdf-reference#references_tab_contents
You may need to log in to JSTOR to access the linked references.
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/
info/about/policies/terms.jsp
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content
in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.
For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
University of Pennsylvania Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Journal of the
History of Ideas.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 209.175.73.10 on Wed, 13 Jan 2016 00:13:07 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Killing God, Liberating the
"Subject": Nietzsche and
Post-God Freedom
Michael Lackey
I.
Indeed,we philosophersand"freespirits"feel, when we hearthe news

that "the old god is dead," as if a new dawn shone on us; our heart
overflows with gratitude,amazement,premonitions,expectations.
After God's death, if Michel Foucault is to be believed, the death of the

subjectfollowed quite naturally.But how, one might ask, did that fateful event
of God's death necessarily lead to the demise of that most noble animal?An-
swering this question is crucial, for once we understandhow, for Nietzsche,
God's existence and His metaphoricalparticipationin the creationof humanity
are most destructiveof what is most vital within the human,then we will see
how, in killing God and His crown of creation,Nietzsche does not become the
quintessentialnihilist;rather,he becomes,to his mind,the firstsanevoice crying
in the intellectualwilderness:makeway the coming of a new human,a "subject"
which can only become a "self" when it paradoxicallylearnsto overcome its
very constructed"self."Nietzsche's logic thereforeruns as follows: so long as
God exists, a subject which overcomes itself cannot come into being; for as
RichardSchachtrightly notes, the God-hypothesisserves as a supportfor the
traditionalsubject-hypothesisin Nietzsche's writings.So to producea self-over-
coming subjectNietzsche must firstkill whathe considersthatstodgy old tyrant
of the soul. But this raises the questionof how one goes aboutdoing away with
I The
Gay Science (hereaftercited in text as GS) tr. WalterKaufmann(New York, 1974),
? 343. I would like to thank members from my session at the 51st Annual Kentucky Foreign
Language Conference and also Daniel Breazeale. This essay is taken from the second chapter
of my dissertation,Killing God, A Labor of Love: Post-God Intimacy in Nietzsche and Woolf.
737
of theHistoryof Ideas,Inc.
1999byJournal
Copyright
738 Michael Lackey
God. In Twilightof theIdols Nietzsche gives his readera puzzlinganswerto this

questionwhen he says thathe fearsthat"we are not gettingrid of God because
we still believe in grammar"("Reason,"5).2Given Nietzsche's logic, to kill off
God he needs to eliminatebelief in grammar,andonce God is dead,he can then
do away with the subject.In what follows I will show how Nietzsche tries to
eliminateGod andthe traditionalsubjectthroughhis extendedanalysisof what
it means to "believe in grammar."
II.
If thereis today still no lack of those who do not know how indecentit
is to "believe"-or a sign of decadence, of a brokenwill to live-well,
they will know it tomorrow.3
To understandwhat it means to believe in grammar,it is best to note how

Nietzsche contrastsbelief and freedom. More starkly,we could say that for
Nietzsche to have faithmeans,necessarily,to lack freedom;or to be free means,
necessarily,to reject faith. Nietzsche makes this clear in the fifth book of GS
when he says: "Oncea humanbeing reachesthe fundamentalconvictionthathe
mustbe commanded,he becomes 'a believer.'Conversely,one couldconceive of
such a pleasureandpower of self determination,such afreedomof the will that
the spiritwould take leave of all faith and every wish for certainty,being prac-
ticed in maintaininghimself on insubstantialropesandpossibilitiesanddancing
evennearabysses"(? 347). I isolatethispassagenotin orderto outlineNietzsche's
criticism of belief but ratherto understandhow Nietzsche defines freedomby
contrastingit with belief. Such an analysisof course begs the questionhow it is
possiblethatbelief necessarilyprecludesfreedom.Intuitively,it would seem that
belief and freedomentail no contradiction.For instance,given two choices, to
believe in God or not to believe in God, I exercise my freedomin choosing one
belief over the other.With this example, it would seem that belief necessarily
presupposesfreedom. So how is it thatNietzsche concludes that freedomand
belief areirreconcilable?
ThatNietzsche considersfaith obscene is clear when he tells us in AC that
belief of any kind is a "sign of decadence" (? 50) which leads to "self-alien-
ation"(? 54). In fact he goes so far as to claim that faith is actually"slaveryin
a higher sense" (? 54). To see why belief implies slavery we must first under-
stand what Nietzsche means by faith. While the standardview suggests that
faithis the belief in thingsunseen,Nietzsche frequentlydiscusses faithin terms
of language. For instance, in Human,All TooHumanhe says that "[b]elief in
2
Twilightof the Idols (hereaftercited in text as TI), tr. R.J. Hollingdale(New York, 1990).
3TheAnti-Christ(hereaftercited in text as AC), tr. R. J. Hollingdale (New York, 1990),
50.
Nietzsche and Post-God Freedom 739
freedomof will-that is to say in identical facts and in isolated facts-has in

languageits constantevangelistandadvocate"(II. "Wanderer,"1).4InBeyond
Good and Evil, he chastises philosophersfor theirchildish relianceon faith in
grammar:"Shouldn'tphilosophersbe permittedto rise above faithin grammar?
All due respect for governesses-but hasn't the time come for philosophy to
renounce the faith of governesses?"(? 34)5 Nietzsche makes this point more
emphaticallyin TIwhen he claims that"we are not getting rid of God because
we still believe in grammar."This is, to be sure, a puzzling claim. To kill off
God, which is certainlya high priorityfor Nietzsche, we firstneed to eliminate
belief in grammar.But what is the logical connectionbetweenbelief in God and
belief in grammar?Asked anotherway, how will eliminatingbelief in grammar
get rid of belief in God?To answerthese questions,it is importantto show how
the use of languagefor Nietzsche presupposesan act of faith.
It was duringhis middleperiod,when he wroteHHthat Nietzsche beganto
formulatemost precisely how language entails belief.6For middle Nietzsche
languageforces its users to give the lie to "reality"because words necessarily
misrepresenttheirreferent.To show how this is the case Nietzscheconsidersthe
notionof the will. As a word,the will suggests thata clearlydemarcatedfaculty
exists withina humanbeing, but for Nietzsche, to believe in the existence of the
will is to presupposethat "every individualaction is isolate and indivisible"
(II. "Wanderer," 11).A passagefromhis Notebooksbringsthispointinto sharper
focus:" 'Thinking,'as epistemologistsconceive it, simplydoes not occur,"says
Nietzsche, "it is a quite arbitraryfiction, arrivedat by selecting one element
from the process and eliminatingall the rest, an artificialarrangementfor the
purpose of intelligibility"(WP ? 477).7 According to this view, pure thinking
4
Human,All TooHuman:A Bookfor Free Spirits (hereaftercited in text as HH), tr. R. J.
Hollingdale (Cambridge, 1996).
5Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future (hereaftercited in text as
BGE), tr. WalterKaufmann(New York, 1966).
6 You will note that I distinguish Nietzsche's
early (1869-76), middle (1877-86) and late
(1886-88) writings.This is importantbecause the unfortunatetrendin Nietzsche studies, started
perhaps by Arthur Danto, has been to read Nietzsche as if there is no development in his
thinking:"No one of them [Nietzsche's books] presupposesan acquaintancewith any other ...
his writings may be read in prettymuch any order,without this greatly impedingthe compre-
hension of his ideas" (19). Of course, there are many different possibilities for establishing
divisions in Nietzsche's works. JulianYoung,Nietzsche s PhilosophyofArt (Cambridge,1992),
for instance, divides the works into 'four main periods," but his periodizationis based on
"Nietzsche'sthoughtaboutart"(1). Because I focus more on language,my divisions are slightly
different. Like MaudemarieClark, Nietzsche on Truthand Philosophy (Cambridge, 1990), I
divide Nietzsche's work into three periods, and I argue, like Clark,thatNietzsche "progressed
toward and finally arrivedat a coherent and defensible position in the works of his final two
years" (1).
7 When discussing materialfrom Nietzsche's Notebooks, I will use Kaufmann'stransla-
tion of The ill to Power (hereafter cited in text as WP) tr. WalterKaufmann(New York,
1968). There are obvious problems with using this material, first and foremost being the fact
740 Michael Lackey
implies an internalactivity which is separatefrom feeling, imagining, and re-

membering;but Nietzsche does not thinkthat such a pure activity actuallyoc-
curs, because there is no direct one-to-one correspondencebetween the word
thinking(or willing) and some clearly demarcatedfaculty.To the contrary,he
arguesthatthe world is composed of"a continuous,homogeneous,undivided,
indivisibleflowing"(a flowingcorrespondence ideal),andthatit is through"words
andconcepts [that]we arestill continuallymisled into imaginingthingsas being
simplerthan they are, separatefrom one another,indivisible, each existing in
and for itself" (II. "Wanderer,"11). So when we use a word like thinking or
willing, we must take on faiththatsuch a facultyexists, because the world, as a
continuousflux, gives us no justificationfor reducingphenomenato an atomis-
tic fact. Nietzsche thereforeconcludes:"Theword andthe conceptarethe most
manifest groundfor our belief in this isolation of groupsof actions:we do not
only designatethingswith them,we thinkoriginallythatthroughthemwe grasp
the true in things"(II. "Wanderer,"11).
Given Nietzsche's view of the world as a continuousflux, we are therefore
accordeda limited freedomwith regardto language.For example, to name an
"innerfact,"such as the will, we could follow Kantor Schopenhauer,or if we
were really ambitious,we could constructour own version of the will, because
thereis no such thing as the will-in-itself. It is the languagewhich forces people
to believe in the will, but if we understandthat the world is composed of a
continuous,indivisibleflowing, thenwe arenot obligedto acceptany particular
person's definition as partand parcel of a final vocabulary.So once we recog-
nize thatourconceptof the will represents,not the will-in-itself but a particular
person'sdefinitionof the will, thenwe can liberateourselves frombelief in this
will. But notice that Nietzsche's middle-periodfree spirit is only accorded a
limited freedomin this instance,because languageusers are still boundby the
flowing correspondenceideal (a prediscursivereferent,which possesses a nam-
able, albeit flowing nature);for no matterhow much free spiritsliberatethem-
selves fromotherpeople's discourses,they only have a limited freedomto stray
from the continuousflux. This implies thatthe apparent/realworld distinction
remainsintactin Nietzsche's middleperiod.
If laterNietzsche were to assumea morecompletefreedom,the only way to
do so would be to eliminatethe correspondenceideal altogether,andthis is pre-
that Nietzsche never sanctioned their publication. In Philosophy and Truth:Selections for
Nietzsche'sNotebooks of the Early 1870's (New Jersey, 1979), Daniel Breazeale makes, to my
mind, the most sober recommendationsfor using materialsfrom the Notebooks: "Quotations
from and referencesto Nietzsche's unpublishedwritings should always be identified as such....
When views expressed in the Nachlass seem to conflict with views encounteredin Nietzsche's
publishedwritings, mention must be made of this conflict.... Priorityshould always be given to
published over unpublishedremarks on the same topic" (xiv). In my work, I will only use
materialfrom The Willto Power to clarify unclearpoints in the publishedworks.
cisely what he does in his last two years of writing.8While early and middle
Nietzsche challengedthe conventionalbelief thatwordscorrespondto an atom-
istic fact in the world, he did not question in either period the existence of a
correspondenceideal.It is for this reasonthathe could still speakof"the essence
of things"("Truthand Lies," 86-87).9 in his early writings and of what things
really are (GS ? 58) in his middle period. But as soon as he entirelyabandoned
his belief in a correspondenceideal, Nietzsche was finally readyto declarethat
"withthe real world we have also abolished the apparentworld " (TI, "How"
? 6). To understandthe full significanceofNietzsche's rejectionof the apparent/
real world distinction,we must look closely at the lies which, for Nietzsche,
constitutelanguage.In explainingNietzsche's view of language,I will makeuse
of Ferdinandde Saussure'ssignifier/signified/referent distinction.'0ForSaussure,
the signifieris eitherthe spokenwordor the symbolon the page, the signifiedthe
meaning,andthe referentthe actualobjectto which the sign (signifierandsigni-
fied) refers. The standardCratylianview of language holds that language is
derivedfromthe essence of things (an encoded,prediscursivereferent).In other
words thereis a naturalrelationshipbetween the sign and its referent.Because
Nietzsche relied on a correspondenceideal as late as 1886, the ideal of the con-
tinuous-flux-in-itself,we can say thathis languagetheorywas still tetheredto a
referent,thoughhe modifies this Cratylianview by rejectinga directone-to-one
correspondence,a move which accordslanguageusersa limitedamountof free-
dom to signify the referent.When Nietzsche abolishes the real/apparentworld
distinction,however,he finallyliberateslanguagefromthe correspondenceideal
(continuous-flux-in-itself)altogether.
To liberatethe sign from the referent,Nietzsche distinguishesan innocent
from a willful lie. In a tirade against priest, theologian, and church, he says:
"one mustknow today thata theologian, a priest, a pope does not merely errin
every sentence he speaks, he lies-that he is no longer free to lie 'innocently,'
8 In her
extremely informativebook, The Beginnings of Nietzschea Theory of Language
(Berlin, 1988), ClaudiaCrawfordclaims that Nietzsche abandonsthe correspondenceideal as
early as 1873 (219), but this reading is, to my mind, unconvincing,because Nietzsche says in
the "Truthand Lies" essay that it is throughmusic thatwe can have knowledge of "the essence
of things"(86-87), a view which indicates thatNietzsche had not yet abandonedthe correspon-
dence ideal altogether.In fact, as late as 1878 Nietzsche still holds that it is possible that"there
could be a metaphysicalworld"(HH, 1.9), though he no longer believes thatmusic can give us
access to this world: "In itself, no music is profound or significant, it does not speak of the
'will' or of the 'thing in itself' " (HH, 1.215). Of the studies outlining the radical implications
of Nietzsche's view of language, SarahKofman's Nietzsche and Metaphor,tr. Duncan Large
(Stanford, 1993) is still one of the most persuasive,though her analysis is not entirely convinc-
ing because she does not consider Nietzsche's effort to liberatelanguage from the correspon-
dence ideal and because she tends to reify unconscious activity for Nietzsche. In what follows,
I will argue that Nietzsche abandonsthe correspondenceideal just after he completed BGE.
9 "OnTruthand Lies in a Nonmoral Sense," in Philosophy and Truth,tr. Daniel Breazeale
(New Jersey, 1979).
10See Course in General
Linguistics, tr. Wade Baskin (New York, 1959).
742 MichaelLackey
outof 'ignorance.'Thepriestknowsas well as everyonethatthereis no longer

any 'God,'any 'sinner,'any 'redeemer'-that'freewill,' 'moralworld-order'
arelies-intellectualseriousness, theprofoundself-overcoming of theintellect,
no longerpermitsanyonenot to knowaboutthesethings"(? 38). Nietzsche
suggeststhatthe innocentlie is acceptablewhereasthewillfulone is not.The
innocentlie, whichwe can also call the signified,Nietzschedescribesin the
"TruthandLies"essay.Sincetruthis a verbalillusionwhichthe community
acceptsforthesakeof communication, thentruthis technicallyanagreedupon
lie, butthislie is necessaryforpeopleto functionin society.It is thereforean
innocentlie, becausepeoplewho lie in thisway cando so withgoodintent-
simplyto communicate.
Thewillfullie,however,Nietzscheconsidersinexcusable, mainlybecauseit
is the lyingestof all lies, pawningitself off as the truestof all truths.In his
" 'Reason'in Philosophy"sectionof TI,Nietzscheexplainswhy thislie is so
reprehensible: philosophers "putthatwhichcomesat theend-unfortunately!
forit oughtnotto comeat all!-the 'highestconcepts,'thatis to say themost
general,theemptiestconcepts,thelastfumesof evaporating reality,at thebe-
ginningas thebeginning"(? 4). ToNietzsche'smind,if we accepthis analysis
of truthin the "TruthandLies"essay,thennamingan objectfor the sakeof
communication is aninnocentlie, a necessaryfictionwhichthecommunity cre-
ates forthe sakeof survival.To generatethe next level of discourse,a meta-
discourse,however,we mustsqueezeoutof or abstractfrominnocentlies the
willfullie."Suchmetadiscourses, Nietzscheclaims,makea conceptual mummy
outof thehuman,becausemetaphysicsdefinesrealityas beingratherthanbe-
coming.Themetaphysician's logic, therefore,concludes:"Whatis, does not
become; what becomes,is not....Now they all believe,even to the pointof
despair,inthatwhichis"(TI, "Reason" ? 1).Ironically, thesehighestconcepts,
"thelast fumesof evaporating reality,"arethe leasttrustworthy, accordingto
Nietzsche,becausetheyareemptyabstractlies whicharecreatedoutof more
innocentconcretelies.Yet,it is theleasttrustworthy lie whichphilosophers use
tojudgeinnocentlies,orin otherwords,thewillfullie is placedatthebeginning
asthebeginningof verification, whenin factit shouldbe,according toNietzsche,
the lastandmostuntrustworthy instrument of analysis(EH,"Preface" ? 2).12
Havingexposedthe"last,thinnest,emptiest"conceptof Godandmetaphysics
asthebrainsick fancy"ofmorbid cobweb-spinners" (TI,"Reason" ? 4),Nietzsche
feelsjustifiedin sayingthatthepriestknowsthatthereis no God,nometaphys-
ics, no absoluteTruth.ThePlatonicIdea,theChristiansoul,theKantianthing
in itself-these areall lies whichpretendto be morerealandmoretruethan
innocentlies;butforNietzsche,theyareonlywillfullies derivedfrominnocent
" It is generallyacceptedthatNietzschehadonly a superficialdefinitionof metaphysics
(see MichelHaar,NietzscheandMetaphysics, tr.MichaelGendre,"Preface").
12
EcceHomo(hereaftercitedin text as EH),tr.WalterKaufmann (NewYork,1989).
lies, andwhen people believe them, they do not believe in an Idea, a soul or the
thing in itself; rather,they believe, whetherthey know it or not, in Plato'swill to
power, the Christian'swill to power and Kant'swill to power.
Therefore,to believe in the willful lie, at least two acts of faith in grammar
are required.First, one must believe that a word correspondsto the object it
names, a linguistic act which presupposes the existence of a pre-encoded,
prediscursivereferentwhich is waitingto be named.Second,one mustbelieve in
a metadiscoursewhich holds moreverificationalweight thanthe simplenaming
process. Because Nietzsche rejectsboth of these premises,his willful lie could
be called the lie to the secondpower,the lie which lies aboutthe innocentlie but
then pawns itself off as absolute Truth.'3In other words the willful lie is the
lyingest of all lies which calls itself the truestof all truths.But most importantly,
the seductivepower of the willful lie lies in its abilityto conceal from language
users that it is a lie, that it is a verbal seductionwhich requiresan act of faith;
andhavingenchantedindividuals,metaphysicianscanthenuse the willful, meta-
physical lie to criticizeNietzsche's claim thattruthis an illusion, thatit is a lie.
Given Nietzsche's analysisof languageas an act of faith,we could then say
thatfor laterNietzsche, the willful lie, whateverits pretensionsto absolutetruth,
can only assumemeaningin the realmof the signified,becausethe construction
of metaphysicalmeaning is squeezed out of innocent lies and not abstracted
froma preencoded,prediscursivemetaphysicalreality.Therefore,if metaphysi-
cians decide to use metaphysicaltruthsto challengeNietzsche's claim thattruth
is an illusion, then they do so only from the standpointof the lyingest of lies
pretendingto be the truestof truths.To escape Nietzsche's criticism of meta-
physics as the lie to the second power,metaphysicianswould have to show that
metaphysicsinhabitsa preencoded,prediscursiverealm of meaning, and then
they would have to show us how we could access this realmof meaning.Such a
realm, of course, would limit the freedom of the signifier. But according to
Nietzsche, such a world does not even exist: "But Heraclituswill always be
rightin this, thatbeing is an emptyfiction.The 'apparent'world is the only one:
the 'real'world has only been lyinglyadded " (TI, "Reason,"2). We can there-
fore traceNietzsche's logic: unless metaphysicianscan overcomethe language
barrier,they have no reason to accept on faith the existence of a pre-encoded,
prediscursivemetaphysicalreality, a reality which would determine in large
measurehow muchfreedomwe have in namingtheworld.By placingmetaphys-
ics in the realm of the signified, Nietzsche thereforedivests it of its absolute
authority.
We arenow in a position to understandwhy Nietzsche consideredfaithand
freedompolaropposites. Believers cannotdeterminethemselves because they
13Giventhe modelthatI haveset
up here,the followingmaximfromTImakesperfect
sense:"'All truthis simple.'Is thatnot a compoundlie?"("Maxims" ? 4). Sincethe claimis
a putativemetaphysical claim,it is a lie to thesecondpower,or a compoundlie.
744 Michael Lackey
are determinedby otherpeople. Nietzsche makes this point most clearly in AC

when he says of the believer, "The man of faith, the 'believer' of every sort is
necessarily a dependentman-such as cannot out of himself posit ends at all.
The 'believer' does not belong to himself,he can be only a means, he has to be
used, he needs someonewho will use him"(? 54). Self-determination,certainly
a very Kantiannotion of freedom,is the cornerstoneof Nietzsche's freedomas
well; yet, while Kantconsidersfreedomfreedomfromimpulse(Neigung)or the
freedom to legislate to one's self the moral law (the CategoricalImperative),
Nietzsche construesfreedomprimarilyas a linguistic act.
So long as individualsaccept other people's languagegames as final vo-
cabularies,they are determinedby others. In one of his most pointed maxims
from TI,Nietzsche brilliantlyarticulateswhat is at stake when individualsac-
cept anotherperson'svocabularyas definitive.Nietzsche claims:"Hewho does
not know how to put his will into things at least puts a meaninginto them:that
is, he believes thereis a will in them already(principleof 'belief ')" (18). Read-
ers of The Worldas Will and Representation will immediately recognize
Nietzsche's playfulreworkingof the Schopenhauerianwill. If for Schopenhauer
the will is synonymouswith Kant'sthing in itself or Plato'sIdea,then in know-
ing the will humansknow the thing in itself. But for Nietzsche, free individuals
put theirwill into things,whereasbelievers see in things a will. This passage is
trickybecauseit functionson two levels. On the one hand,seeing a will in things
is a typical Schopenhauerianway of viewing the world, for all the world is will
which objectifiesitself at variousgradationsof being. Given this interpretation,
Schopenhauerwould be a dependent,believer type who believes thata will al-
ready exists in things. But there is anotherway of readingthis passage which
casts Schopenhauerin a positive light. Since Schopenhauerdid not accept the
Kantiannotion of the will, since he reconstitutedthe will accordingto his own
philosophy,he does indeedputhis will into things;andfor those of us who have
been seduced by his philosophy, for the believers in other words, we believe
there is a will in things, specifically the Schopenhauerianwill. This passage,
then, criticizes and pays homage to Schopenhauerby suggesting that his will
reflectsin no way the thingin itself butratherSchopenhauer'sphilosophicalwill
to power.But in specifically criticizing Schopenhauer'swill, the putativething
in itself, Nietzsche suggeststhatthingsarenot tetheredto some correspondence
ideal but ratheronly to anotherperson's will to power.
If Nietzsche's analysis of language is right, then why is it that so many
peopleresisthis claimthattruthis an illusion?Thetypicalobjectionto Nietzsche's
work, which has become cliche especially among anti-Nietzscheans,runs as
follows: if a trueassertionis false, thenNietzsche's positionis reducedto absur-
dity, because his statementitself pretendsto be a true assertion.To accept this
critique,however,one must accept the willful lie as the truestof all truths.And
yet, though God, metaphysicsand the correspondenceideal are nothing more
than lies to the second power, accordingto Nietzsche, they exercise over lan-
guage such an overwhelmingforce thatlanguageuserscannotescapetheircriti-
cal assessment.It is for this reasonthatNietzsche namesthe supposedtruestof
all truthsthe lyingest of all lies, for Nietzsche realizesthatin dealing with God
and metaphysics, it is not enough simply to outline the radical leaps of faith
which arenecessaryfor individualsto believe in them;he mustalso divest these
idols of their sacredaura,an aurawhich functionsto legitimatethem. In other
words the problemis one of emotions and not of logic. By divestingthe willful
lie of its emotionalhold over us, therefore,Nietzsche could remove the sacred
veil frommetaphysicsandGod, a veil which preventslanguageusers from see-
ing thatthey are lies to the second powerpretendingto be absolutetruths.Hav-
ing strippedaway the veil, having divested language of its emotional control
over languageusers, we could then get rid of God.
III.
We have to learn to thinkdifferently-in orderat last, perhapsvery late

on, to attaineven more:tofeel differently.14
Here we must move more cautiously if we are to understandthe subtle,

clever rhetoricalstrategiesNietzsche uses to divest his audienceof its emotional
investmentin metaphysicsand God. ThatNietzsche takes considerablenote of
his audience as he craftshis argumentsand style is obvious when we consider
Zarathustra'sinteractionwith the hunchbackin the "OfRedemption"section of
ThusSpoke Zarathustra.'sAfter Zarathustradiscoursesat length on the nature
of a post-Godredemption,the hunchbackasks him:" 'Butwhy does Zarathustra
speak to us differentlythanto his disciples?' " Zarathustrareplies: " 'What is
surprisingin that?One may well speak in a hunchbackedmannerto a hunch-
back' " (163). To speak in a hunchbackedmannerto a hunchbackcould mean
thatwe should speak at an eighth gradelevel to eighthgraders,but this reading
is unconvincing,becauseNietzsche purposelychose a deformedfigureto high-
lightthe figure'sdeformity.InEH, Nietzsche repeatsover andover againhow ill
anddeformedhumanityis ("Wise,"1, 2, "Clever,"10, "Destiny,"8), so when he
discusseshis mission as a writer,it always revolves aroundrestoringhumanity's
healthand form:"I turnedmy will to health,to life, into a philosophy"("Wise"
2). Specifically, when referringto his greatestcreation,Zarathustra,Nietzsche
clearly defines Zarathustra'smission: "Inanotherpassage he [Zarathustra]de-
14
Daybreak: Thoughtson the Prejudices of Morality (hereaftercited in text as D) tr. R. J.
Hollingdale (Cambridge, 1997) ? 103.
'5 Thus Spoke Zarathustra(hereaftercited in text as Z), tr. R. J. Hollingdale (New York,
1969).
746 Michael Lackey
fines as strictlyas possible what alone 'man' can be for him-not an object of
love or,worse, pity-Zarathustra has masteredthe great nausea over man,too:
man is for him an un-form,a material,an ugly stone thatneeds a sculptor"(EH,
"Thus,"8). Havingbecome sick anddeformed,humanshave embracedGod and
metaphysics,and so to restoretheirhealth,Zarathustramust cultivatea writing
style which will enable him to sculpt a healthy,whole form out of the human
"un-form"which he now only knows as "anugly stone."
But what exactly is the natureof humanity'sdeformity?In EH, Nietzsche
answersthis questiondirectly:"Whatmankindhas so far consideredseriously
have not even been realitiesbut mere imaginings-more strictlyspeaking,lies
promptedby the bad instincts of sick naturesthat were harmfulin the most
profoundsense-all theseconcepts,'God,' 'soul,' 'virtue,''sin,' 'beyond,''truth,'
'eternallife' " ("Clever,"10). The "badinstinctsof sick natures"have prompted
individualsto believe the most harmfulof lies, which meansthatto heal human-
ity Nietzsche and Zarathustramust heal the instincts. To be sure, healing in-
stincts sounds ratherodd, for instinctsare generallyregardedas a natural,es-
sential featureof an individual'sbiology; but for Nietzsche, they are "accumu-
latedfromgenerationto generation"untiltheybecome"domineering,unreason-
able, and intractable"(GS ? 361). This view of the instincts differs very little
fromhis understandingof feelings, which is why Nietzsche cautionshis readers
to trustneitherfeelings nor instincts:
Trustyour feelings!-But feelings arenothingfinal or original;behind

feelings therestandjudgmentsand evaluationswhich we inheritin the
formof feelings(inclinations,aversions).Totrustone's feelings-means
to give moreobedienceto one's grandfatherandgrandmotherandtheir
grandparentsthanto the gods which are in us: ourreasonandourexpe-
rience (D ? 35).
In brief, we inheritour feelings and instinctsfrom our ancestorsand since our

ancestorswere emotionally and instinctuallydisfigured(which we know be-
cause they believed in God and metaphysics),we have inheritedtheir bad in-
stincts and sick feelings, even if we no longer accept theirideas: "thoughtsare
not hereditary,only feelings" (D ? 30).16This means thatwhen Zarathustrade-
cides to restorehumanity'shealth,healingits feelings andinstinctsis the highest
priority.17
16
In The Gay Science, Nietzsche suggests thatinstinctsand feelings are one and the same:
"Wherethe feeling finds expression 'Now this has been proved and I am done with it,' it is
generally the ancestorin the blood and instinct of the scholar who approvesfrom his point of
view 'the finished job'; the faith in a proof is merely a symptom of what in a hard-working
family has for ages been considered 'good workmanship'" (? 348).
17For Nietzsche, only for people of knowledge are the instincts healthy and whole: "The
body purifies itself throughknowledge; experimentingwith knowledge it elevates itself; to the
discerningman all instincts are holy" (Z, I. "Of the Bestowing of Virtue").
ThatNietzsche focuses on feelings morethanthinkingmakesperfectsense,

especially if we understandthat it is feelings and not logic or thinking,which
promptbelief in God andmetaphysics,accordingto Nietzsche. To illustratethe
degree to which feelings, one's putativeneeds in this instance, exert supreme
authorityover a person, Nietzsche says in GS, "For this is how man is: An
articleof faithcouldbe refutedbeforehim a thousandtimes-if he neededit, he
would considerit 'true'again andagain, in accordancewith thatfamous 'proof
of strength'of which the Bible speaks"(? 347). Logic, reason,rigorousargu-
mentation-none of these have enoughforceto overturnone's feeling of need, a
need for metaphysics,a need for God, and so to deconstructa person's faithin
God or metaphysics,logic or reasonis simply useless.
BecauseNietzscherealizedhow fruitlessit was to use logical argumentation
to divest individualsof faith,he resortedto rhetoricaldevices whichwouldwork
on a person's emotions instead. This explains why Nietzsche's writings from
1886 to 1888 were so blisteringwith regardto God andmetaphysics-in the last
few years of writing, he called God "an indelicacy against us thinkers"(EH
"Clever"? 1), "acontradictionof life" (AC ? 18), and"thegreatestobjectionto
existence so far"(EH, "Clever"? 3, TI, "Four"? 8). Though Nietzsche may
very well have believed thatGod was such a conceptualmonstrosity,his over-
blown rhetoriccertainlyseems out of place in a philosophicaltext. But this is
precisely the point. If logic and reason find their local habitationand place in
philosophyand if belief in metaphysicsand God are acts of emotionandnot of
thinking,thenlogic andreasoncannotserve a useful purposein disclosingwhat
actuallyis involved in believing in metaphysicsand God. Furthermore,even if
Nietzsche could successfully refutethe believer's position, the believer would
continue to believe regardless,because it is emotions which dominatethe hu-
man, especiallywhen it comes to sacredidols. So Nietzsche turnedto a rhetoric
of mockery and war,because it is throughthese two rhetoricaldevices thathe
felt thathe couldjolt his readersinto emotional awarenessand therebyrestore
theirhealth.
This explainswhy Nietzsche glorifieswar in the "Foreword"of TI,for as he
claims, it is in inflictingwoundsthatthe spiritgrows:"increscuntanimi,virescit
volnerevirtus."18 While warmay cause suffering,it also has a "curativepower,"
and this is what leads to the growthof the spirit,so thatwhen Nietzsche claims
thathis "littlebook is a grand declarationof war,"he is calling attentionto the
medicinal power of his rhetoricof violence, a rhetoricwhich promises to lay
waste all the sacred idols which threatenthe growth and health of the human
"spirit."But laying waste these idols is certainto be a painful affair for those
who have long been nourishedon the truthsof metaphysicsand God and have
therebyformeddeep and lasting attachmentsto them. ForNietzsche, however,
thoughsounding-outandthen smashingthese idols is sureto wound, suchpain
18
LikeAlexanderNehemas,Nietzsche:Lifeas Literature (Cambridge,1985),I agreethat
whenNietzscherefersto war,he is discussinga war"notby fightingbutby writing"(231).
748 Michael Lackey
will set the stage for a healingof the spiritwhich could not occuras long as these
dehumanizingidols continuedto tyrannizethe spirit.Nietzschearticulatesclearly
what he hopes to accomplishthroughhis declarationof war in his "Moralityas
Nature"section:"Thereis a time with all passionswhen they aremerefatalities,
when they drag their victim down with the weight of their folly-and a later,
very much latertime when they areweddedwith the spirit,when they are 'spiri-
tualized' " (TI ? 1). For Nietzsche belief in God and metaphysicsnecessarily
degradesthe passions, and so to "spiritualize,beautify, deify" human desire,
killing God and metaphysics is his only alternative.No doubt smashingthese
sacredidols is certainto wound believers, but the end goal more thanjustifies
the pain, for throughthis war, humanswill then experiencewithin themselves
the union of passions and "spirit";in otherwords, killing God andmetaphysics
will lead to the spiritualizationof humandesire for Nietzsche.
If Nietzsche's books are declarationsof war,then Zarathustra'srhetoricof
mockeryis a successful battlefieldtactic, for as he claims, "my mockeryblew
away moulderedwords"(Z, "Seven,"2). Bearin mindNietzsche's goal in wag-
ing his war: to sound-out and then destroy the sacred idols which cannot be
extirpatedthroughlogic or reason.Since, accordingto Nietzsche, rationalargu-
ment is ineffective and since belief in these idols continuesto dog the "human
spirit,"Zarathustrahas no alternativebutto use the brutallanguageof mockery
in orderto blow away the moulderedwords of metaphysicsand God, and it is
such mockerywhich is omnipresentin Nietzsche's writings.Take,for instance,
Nietzsche's treatmentof the pessimists anddecadentsin TI.As the life-affirmer
par excellence, Nietzsche rejects in toto any philosophy which does not em-
bracelife in the here andnow. In fact, so objectionabledoes he find life-denying
philosophies that he urges pessimists and decadentsto commit suicide; for as
emotional and psychological invalids, these life-hatersare nothing more than
parasiteson society ("Expeditions"? 36). But does Nietzsche reallywantpessi-
mists anddecadentsto commitsuicide?The italicizedtitle for the sectionreads:
"Amoral code for physicians," a title which indicatesthathealing is the goal.
To effect healing,however,Nietzsche holds up to ourview whatthe pessimist's
philosophyentails and thenurges the pessimist to follow throughwith this phi-
losophy to its logical conclusion.
Finally,a piece of advice for messieursthe pessimists and otherdeca-

dents. We have no power to preventourselves being born,but we can
rectify this error-for it is sometimes an error.When one does away
with oneself one does the most estimable thing possible: one thereby
almostdeservesto live.
If life is so bad that we must negate it, if it is such an erroras the pessimists
considerit to be, thenNietzsche urgesthe life-hatersto correctthe error,because
pessimism"provesitself only by the self-negationof messieursthe pessimists."
But if pessimists actually take arms against their pessimistic sea of troubles,
then they are almost worthy of living, since killing themselves affirms life by
removing "an objection from life." Yet to be so committedto life that one is
willing to remove a parasiticobjectionto life is a supremeaffirmationof life,
andthis explainswhy the pessimists would become worthyof life throughtheir
suicide. The implicationis thatthe pessimists secretlylove life, for in removing
an objectionto existence, they contributeto the fundof life, andso to be consis-
tent, Nietzsche urges them to follow throughwith their covert life-affirming
philosophy.In essence Nietzsche trapsthe pessimists, exhortingthemto follow
theirmouldering,life-negatingphilosophiesto theirlogical conclusions,butthen
showinghow such a developmentof logic necessarilyleads to a radicalaffirma-
tion of life. To be sure, naming pessimism the absolute negation of life is an
overstatementon Nietzsche's part,but that is precisely the emotionalpoint of
this section. Tojolt his pessimistic readersinto an emotional,life-affrming rec-
ognition,Nietzsche spits contempton these morbidobjectionsto existence, for
in mocking "any sort of 'life' spent in renunciation,"Nietzsche hopes to blow
away the pessimists' moulderingwords and then lead them to the ultimatelife-
affirmingphilosophy.
But of all the objections to existence, Nietzsche considers God the most
objectionable,because,unless we can do away with God, we arenever going to
be able to get rid of metaphysicsor otherworldlyphilosophies;for as Nietzsche
says: "The authorityof the law is establishedby the thesis: God gave it, the
ancestorslived it" (AC ? 57). So to do away with God, Nietzsche resorts to a
brutalrhetoricof mockery,referringto "Godas [a] spider,"which has "degener-
ated to the contradictionof life" (AC ? 18).19To call God a spider,to refer to
God's creatorsas "morbidcobweb spinners"(TI,"Reason,"4), to say that"[l]ife
is at an end where the 'kingdom of God' begins" (TI, "Morality,"4)-such
rhetoric is obviously not calculated to communicate innocent lies. Rather,
Nietzsche uses his most overblown mockery,as he did with the pessimists, in
order to effect an emotional reversal in his readers,jolting them out of their
hatredof existence into a profoundaffirmationof life. In otherwordshis goal is
emotionalrecognitionthroughmockeryandnot rationalenlightenmentthrough
logical argumentation.
IV.
That no one is any longer made accountable,that the kind of being

manifestedcannotbe tracedto a causa prima, thatthe world is a unity
neitheras sensoriumnor as "spirit,"this alone is the great liberation.
(TI, "Four"? 8)
'9Kofman intelligently discusses the function of Nietzsche's spidermetaphor,though she

does not consider the rhetoricalpower of calling God a spider (Nietzsche and Metaphor, 69-
73).
750 Michael Lackey
Having exposed metaphysicsand God as lies to the second power derived

from innocent lies and having used a violent rhetoricof mockery and war to
liberateindividualsemotionallyfromtheirbondageto thesesacredidols,Nietzsche
is now readyto claim that"consciousness,""ego,""spirit,"and even the cher-
ished "will"are nothingmore than fictions createdby the lordly rulersof lan-
guage. Such is the radicalthesis Nietzsche endorsesin TIand the fifth book of
GS, an idea which anticipatedand perhapsgave birthto Lacan'stheoryof the
mirrorstage, Heidegger's"thinking"of the Open,Foucault'serasureof human-
ity, and Butler's subversionsof genderand sex. But what allowed Nietzsche to
claim that consciousness and the ego were nothingmore thanthe offspringof
language?The answerto this question lies in Nietzsche's abandonmentof the
correspondenceideal.Whereasthe preencodedreferentonce stoodbeforeus like
a sacred hieroglyph,harboringancient truths,safeguardinggodly wisdom, it
now standsforNietzscheshroudedin an a-discursivesilence, neitherwelcoming
nor repulsing,but indifferentto humans,language,and truth.This means that
humansareno longerheld accountableto a prediscursive,metaphysicalreality,
whether it is the middle Nietzsche's continuous-flux-in-itself or the early
Wittgenstein'slogical formof the world.This is so becausethe directionalityof
linguistic dependencehas been effectively reversed-it is not the preencoded
referentwhich limits the linguistic sign but ratherthe originarylanguageusers
who, in fixing the semanticcoordinatesof language,coerce languageusers to
see andexperiencethe worldas they deem fit: "Thelordlyrightof giving names
extends so farthatone should allow oneself to conceive the origin of language
itself as an expressionof poweron the partof the rulers:they say 'this is this and
this,' they seal every thingandevent with a sound,as it were, takepossession of
it" (GM, I.2).20 As soon as these lordly rulers name an object, the language
communityis held accountableto theirlanguagegame,so if an individualwishes
to experiencefreedomin the contextof Nietzsche'sphilosophy,thispersonwould
have to liberate him or herself from the semantic coordinatesof the rulers'
originaryname.
Accordingto this view of language,time-honoredwords like "conscious-
ness,""will,""ego,"and"spirit"no longersignify somethingessentialaboutthe
human;on the contrary,lordly rulers, throughtheir linguistic will to power,
project"innerfacts"into the human,"innerfacts"which languageusers have
come to acceptas a human'snature.In paragraph354 of GS,Nietzsche outlines
the linguisticgenesis of a conceptlike "consciousness."As the most endangered
of all animals,humanswere forcedto turnto languagein orderto survive,for in
developing languagehumansconstructeda complex communicationnetwork
which empoweredthem to outsmartother,more threateningbeasts. Solely as a
On the GenealogyofMorals (hereaftercited in text as GM), tr. WalterKaufmann(New

20
York, 1989).
utilitariandevice for survival, language served "as a bridge between human

beings," but in building these bridges, concepts like consciousness also came
intobeing:"thedevelopmentof languageandthe developmentof consciousness
... go handin hand."Given this view, consciousnessis not an essentialfeatureof
the human,for Nietzsche's "ideais ... thatconsciousnessdoes not reallybelong
to man's individual existence but ratherto his social or herd nature;that, as
follows from this, it has developed subtletyonly insofaras this is requiredby
socialorherdutility."NoticeNietzsche'sreferenceto "herdutility"here.Granted,
developingwordslike consciousnessservesan instrumental purpose,yet to think
that the word signifies a stable ontological structureis to presupposethat a
preencodedreferentialworld exists. But as we have alreadyseen, Nietzsche
denies the existence of such a world, so that when humansaccept the word,
consciousness,they know not an essential structureof humannaturebut a "sur-
face- and sign-world."To accept this "surface-and sign-world"as a reflection
of the real world,however,is to accept something"shallow,thin,relativelystu-
pid, general, sign, herd signal." In other words to believe that someone else's
verbalwill to poweris the realthingis to be a herdanimal(callingbelieversherd
animalsis Nietzsche's attemptto jolt individualsout of theirpassive acceptance
of otherpeople's languagegames as a reflectionof reality),since it is herdutility
which accountsfor the genesis of language.
ThoughNietzsche is very criticalof the "herdanimal,"he does have a few
sharpwords for those lordly rulersof languageas well. For instance,in a blis-
tering tiradeagainst Wagner,Nietzsche calls his formerfrienda decadentbe-
causeWagneruses his greattalentandartas a way of seducinghis audienceinto
acceptinghis aestheticword as the final word. In contrastto Nietzsche's goal,
which is to liberateindividualsfrom the tyrannyof the word, Wagnerexploits
the vulnerabilityof the weak-willed"herdanimal,"a verbalseductionwhich has
the unfortunateeffect of pushingback "thevibrationand exuberanceof life ...
into the smallest forms"(CW? 7).21Of the decadent'sstyle, Nietzsche says:
What is the sign of every literary decadence?That life no longer

dwells in the whole. The word becomes sovereignand leaps out of the
sentence,the sentencereachesout andobscuresthe meaningof thepage,
the page gains life at the expenseof the whole-the whole is no longera
whole. (CW ? 7)22
21
The Case of Wagner(hereaftercited in text as CW), tr. WalterKaufmann(New York,
1967).
22
To my mind, Walter Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist
(Princeton, 1974) misinterpretsthis passage when he claims it describes Nietzsche's writing
style. That Nietzsche claimed that he was infected by decadence is true, but Nietzsche also
claims that he, unlike Wagner,recognized and fought against his decadence (72-76).
752 Michael Lackey
Notice how the decadent'sword becomes "sovereign,"creating"paralysis,ar-

duousness,torpidityor hostility and chaos."For Nietzsche a seductive, intoxi-
cating rhetoricshouldlead individualsto a self-overcomingfreedomandnot to
a debilitating dependence on anotherperson's will to power. In other words
Nietzsche wantsto deconstructthe sovereigntyof all words, includinghis own,
so thatindividualswill become creatorsthemselves-they will puttheirwill into
things, ratherthanseeing in things a will. Nietzsche's goal, then, is to lead indi-
viduals to an awarenessof the seductivepower of language,a power which can
ultimately destroy "human"vitality; the decadents,on the contrary,use their
seductiverhetoricof redemptionto capitalizeon the weak-willedpopulace.23
This leads us back to Nietzsche's concept of freedom:"They are far from
being free spirits:for they still have faith in truth"(GM, 111.24).The "herd
animal"accepts languageas true, so this personhas no capacity for puttinghis
or her will into language-"principle of belief " (TI, "Maxims"? 18). In other
words the "herdanimal"accepts the lordly ruler's will to linguistic power as
true,andsucha belief consequentlydiveststhisindividualof any sense of agency.
This explains Nietzsche's devastatingcondemnationof faith (GS ? 347, GM,
111.24,TI,"Reason"? 5, AC ? 54). Tobe free, godless anti-metaphysiciansmust
first abolish belief in the real/apparentworld distinction and then expose the
degree to which languageis sheerly a manifestationof the lordly rulers'verbal
will to power. But that is not all. Nietzsche's free spiritsmust then createtheir
own languageby puttinginto languagetheirown "will"to power.This clarifies
why Nietzsche's Ubermenschis both a destroyeranda creatorat the same time.
But let us considerthe implicationsofNietzsche's view of consciousnessas
a mere"surface-andsign-world."If consciousnessis nothingmorethana lordly
ruler'swill to power,then in coming to know our "selves"as beings with con-
sciousness, we know,not ourown "natures,"but someone else's will to power,a
will which has gainedascendancyin us throughlanguage.Given this view of the
"subject,"the desireto know oneself is simplymisplacedaccordingto Nietzsche,
because the "subject's"being in a post-subjectage is forever becoming itself
only when it overcomesitself as constructed.But to exist in a languagecommu-
nity is to be subjectedinto existence throughlanguage,so thatthe subjectcan
never experiencea final momentof coming to be.24This is the point Nietzsche
makes so forcefully in GM:"Weare unknownto ourselves, we men of knowl-
edge-and with good reason.We have never soughtourselves.... So we arenec-
essarily strangersto ourselves, for the law 'Each is furthest from himself'
23In the last section of the "Preface"to EH, Nietzsche states the nature of his goal by
contrastinghimself with the typical "worldredeemer"type: "Now I bid you lose me and find
yourselves; and only whenyou have all denied me will I returnto you."
24 For a brilliant discussion of the complexities of this process of being subjected into
existence, see Judith Butler's The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection (Stanford,
1997), 1-30, 83-105.
applies to all eternity-we are not "men of knowledge" with respect to our-
selves" ("Preface,"1). To know oneself there must be a stable identity to be
known,butpeople of knowledge know thatthereis no core subject,and so they
do not waste their time in pursuitof some phantomself. On the contrary,the
goal is to discover how one has been constructedby other people's wills to
power,because it is in understandinghow one has been constructedthata per-
son can begin the process of overcoming one's currentlyconstructedself. But
bear in mind:the process of self-overcomingnever ends in a final construction
of self.
To be sure,this readingundoesthe traditionalsubjectentirely,butwhile this
may be the occasion for pessimism and despairfor many,it was the sourceof a
liberatingjoy forNietzsche:"torealizein oneself the eternaljoy ofbecoming-
thatjoy which also encompassesjoy in destruction"(TI, "Ancients"? 5). The
logic guiding Nietzsche's comment here runs as follows: there is a joy in de-
stroying the sacred idols of God and metaphysics, for it liberatesthe human
from otherpeople's wills to power, wills that pretendto representthe thing in
itself. WithGod deadandthe old subjectgone, humanscan thenconstructa new
subject.But no, we must now abandonthe concept of"subjectivity"altogether.
What,then,does thatleave us?A "subjective"projectinganda subsequentdecon-
struction,a never-endingprocess of self-overcoming.In a stunninglyinsightful
passage, Nietzsche intimateswhy the process of self-overcomingcan never be
complete: "Butall of us have, unconsciously,involuntarilyin our bodies, val-
ues, words, formulas,moralitiesof opposite descent-we are, physiologically
considered,false" (CW, "Epilogue").Wills to power, effectively concealed in
the guise of language and values, insidiously work their way into our bodies,
encoding us, whether we know it or not, so that we become the involuntary
carriersof otherpeople's verbalprojections.Becausewe carryinsideof us those
things which are not descendedfrom us but opposite of/from ourselves, we do
not or cannot possess ourselves; rather,we are possessed, a situationwhich
rendersusphysiologicallyfalse. Significantly,being physiologicallyfalse is not
the weakenedconditionof the unreflectingmasses butratheran inevitableplight
which all people must experience-it is unconscious and involuntary.There-
fore, being physiologically true is a conceptualimpossibility.In other words,
given ourlinguisticcontext,to escape the lordlyrulers'wills to poweris simply
unrealistic, and so our battle is destined to be a life long endeavor.But for
Nietzsche, in killing God, the deathof metaphysicswill logically follow, andthis
will free individualsto cast a deconstructiveglance at theirlinguisticallygener-
ated"selves,"a glance which opens up the possibility for a potentialreconstitu-
tion of"self." But since our"subjective"reconstitutionwill occurin andthrough
language,we will neverbe able to know whetherwe have evadedotherpeople's
verbalwills to power. In otherwords, our "subjective"reprojectionsmay very
well be "subject"to other,more subtle wills to power which lurk deep in the
754 Michael Lackey
bowelsof language.YetforNietzsche,thisis no causefordespair,butrather,an

occasionforunbridledjoy, forin killingGodandmetaphysics, he has set into
motionthecreativeself-overcoming of"self" whichwill empowerindividuals
to expandthe bordersof whatwas onceknownas thehuman.Now we know
whyNietzscheso passionatelydesiredtokillGod;itwastheonlywayto freethe
"human" fromtheHuman,a freedomwhichcouldempower toachieve
individuals
somethingmuchmorenoble,muchhealthier,muchmorealive,perhapseven
somethingiibermenschlich.
Universityof St. Thomas.

University of Pennsylvania Press Is Collaborating With JSTOR To Digitize, Preserve and Extend Access To Journal of The History of Ideas

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

University of Pennsylvania Press Is Collaborating With JSTOR To Digitize, Preserve and Extend Access To Journal of The History of Ideas

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Killing God, Liberating the "Subject": Nietzsche and Post-God Freedom

Author(s): Michael Lackey

You may need to log in to JSTOR to access the linked references.

Indeed,we philosophersand"freespirits"feel, when we hearthe news

After God's death, if Michel Foucault is to be believed, the death of the

God. In Twilightof theIdols Nietzsche gives his readera puzzlinganswerto this

To understandwhat it means to believe in grammar,it is best to note how

freedomof will-that is to say in identical facts and in isolated facts-has in

implies an internalactivity which is separatefrom feeling, imagining, and re-

outof 'ignorance.'Thepriestknowsas well as everyonethatthereis no longer

are determinedby otherpeople. Nietzsche makes this point most clearly in AC

We have to learn to thinkdifferently-in orderat last, perhapsvery late

Here we must move more cautiously if we are to understandthe subtle,

Trustyour feelings!-But feelings arenothingfinal or original;behind

In brief, we inheritour feelings and instinctsfrom our ancestorsand since our

ThatNietzsche focuses on feelings morethanthinkingmakesperfectsense,

Finally,a piece of advice for messieursthe pessimists and otherdeca-

That no one is any longer made accountable,that the kind of being

'9Kofman intelligently discusses the function of Nietzsche's spidermetaphor,though she

Having exposed metaphysicsand God as lies to the second power derived

On the GenealogyofMorals (hereaftercited in text as GM), tr. WalterKaufmann(New

utilitariandevice for survival, language served "as a bridge between human

What is the sign of every literary decadence?That life no longer

Notice how the decadent'sword becomes "sovereign,"creating"paralysis,ar-

bowelsof language.YetforNietzsche,thisis no causefordespair,butrather,an

Universityof St. Thomas.

You might also like