THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 207041, November 09, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE OFFICE OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR, DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, ROXAS CITY, Petitioner, v. JESUS A. ARROJADO, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), dated September 8, 2011 and April 18, 2013, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 04540. The assailed
Decision affirmed the Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 16, dated July 2, 2009 and July 23,
2009 in Criminal Case No. C-75-09, while the questioned Resolution denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.

The pertinent factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:

In an Information dated March 23, 2009, herein respondent was charged with the crime of murder by the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Roxas City, Capiz.  The case was docketed as Criminal case No. C-75-09 and was raffled off to Branch 16
of the Regional Trial COurt of Roxas City, Iloilo (RTC of Roxas City).

On June 16, 2009, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss3 the Information fiked against him on the ground that the
investigating prosecutor who filed the said Information failed to indicate therein the number and date of issue of her
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Certificate of Compliance, as required by Bar Matter No. 1922 (B.M. No.
1922) which was promulgated by this Court via an En Banc Resolution dated June 3, 2008.4

Herein petitioner filed its Comment/Opposition5 to respondent's Motion to Dismiss contending that: (1) the Information
sought to be dismissed is sufficient in form and substance; (2) the lack of proof of MCLE compliance by the prosecutor
who prepared and signed the Information should not prejudice the interest of the State in filing charges against persons
who have violated the law; and (3) and administrative edict cannot prevail over substantive or precedural law, by imposing
additional requirements for the sufficiency of a criminal information.

On July 2, 2009, the RTC of Roxas City issued an Order6 dismissing the subject Information without prejudice. respondent
filed a Motion for Reconsideration.7 but the trial court denied it in its Order8 dated July 23, 2009

Respondent then filed a petition for certiorari and/or mandamus with the CA assailing the July 2, 2009 and July 23, 2009
Orders of the RTC of Roxas City.

In its presently assailed Decision, the CA denied respondent's petition and affirmed the questioned RTC Orders. 
Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied by the CA in its disputed Resolution.

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari raising a sole Assignment of Error, to wit:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE FAILURE OF THE INVESTIGATING
PROSECUTOR TO INDICATE HER MCLE COMPLIANCE NUMBER AND DATE OF ISSUANCE THEREOF IN THE
INFORMATION AGAINST RESPONDENT JESUS A. ARROJADO WARRANTED THE DISMISSAL OF THE SAME.9

Petitioner contends that: (1) the term "pleadings" as used in B.M. No. 1922 does not include criminal Informations filed in
court; (2) the failure of the investigating prosecutor to indicate in the Information the number and date of issue of her
MCLE Certificate of Compliance is a mere formal defect and is not a valid ground to dismiss the subject Information which
is otherwise complete in form and substance.

The petition lacks merit.

Pertinent portions of B.M. No. 1922, provide as follows:

The Court further Resolved, upon the recommendation of the Committee on Legal Education and Bar Matters, to
REQUIRE practicing members of the bar to INDICATE in all pleadings filed before the courts or quasi-judicial
bodies, the number and date of issue of their MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of Exemption, as may be
applicable, for the immediately preceding compliance period. Failure to disclose the required information would cause the
dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings from the records.

Section 1, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court, as amended, defines pleadings as the written statements of the respective claims
and defenses of the parties submitted to the court for appropriate judgment. Among the pleadings enumerated under
Section 2 thereof are the complaint and the answer in a civil suit. On the other hand, under Section 4, Rule 110 of the
same Rules, an information is defined as an accusation in writing charging a person with an offense, subscribed by the
prosecutor and filed with the court. In accordance with the above definitions, it is clear that an information is a pleading
since the allegations therein, which charge a person with an offense, is basically the same as a complaint in a civil action
which alleges a plaintiffs cause or cause of action. In this respect, the Court quotes with approval the ruling of the CA on
the matter, to wit:

xxxx

[A]n information is, for all intents and purposes, considered an initiatory pleading because it is a written statement that
contains the cause of action of a party, which in criminal cases is the State as represented by the prosecutor, against the
accused. Like a pleading, the Information is also filed in court for appropriate judgment. Undoubtedly then, an Information
falls squarely within the ambit of Bar Matter No. 1922, in relation to Bar Matter 850.11

Even under the rules of criminal procedure of the United States, upon which our rules of criminal procedure were
patterned, an information is considered a pleading. Thus, Rule 12(a), Title IV of the United States Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, states that: "[t]he pleadings in a criminal proceeding are the indictment, the information, and the pleas
of not guilty, guilty, and nolo contendere." Thus, the Supreme Court of Washington held that:

An information is a pleading. It is the formal statement on the part of the state of the facts constituting the offense which
the defendant is accused of committing. In other words, it is the plain and concise statement of the facts constituting the
cause of action. It bears the same relation to a criminal action that a complaint does to a civil action; and, when verified,
its object is not to satisfy the court or jury that the defendant is guilty, nor is it for the purpose of evidence which is to be
weighed and passed upon, but is only to inform the defendant of the precise acts or omissions with which he is accused,
the truth of which is to be determined thereafter by direct and positive evidence upon a trial, where the defendant is
brought face to face with the witnesses.12

In a similar manner, the Supreme Court of Illinois ruled that "[a]n indictment in a criminal case is a pleading, since it
accomplishes the same purpose as a declaration in a civil suit, pleading by allegation the cause of action in law against [a]
defendant."13

As to petitioner's contention that the failure of the investigating prosecutor to indicate in the subject Information the
number and date of issue of her MCLE Certificate of Compliance is a mere formal defect and is not a valid ground to
dismiss such Information, suffice it to state that B.M. No. 1922 categorically provides that "[f]ailure to disclose the required
information would cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings from the records." In this regard,
petitioner must be reminded that it assailed the trial court's dismissal of the subject Information via a special civil action
for certiorari filed with the CA. The writ of certiorari is directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions that acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.14 Grave
abuse of discretion means such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.15 To justify the issuance of the writ of certiorari, the abuse of discretion must be grave, as when the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross
as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all, in
contemplation of law, as to be equivalent to having acted without jurisdiction.16 Since the trial court's dismissal of the
subject Information was based on a clear and categorical provision of a rule issued by this Court, the court a quo could
not have committed a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment nor did it exercise its discretion in an arbitrary or
despotic manner. Thus, the CA did not commit error in dismissing petitioner's petition for certiorari.
In harping on its contention that the ends of justice would be best served if the criminal case would be allowed to proceed
in order to determine the innocence or culpability of the ciccused, petitioner sounds as if the dismissal of the Information
left the prosecution with no other recourse or remedy so as to irreversibly jeopardize the interests of the State and the
private offended party. On the contrary, the Court agrees with the CA that the dismissal of the Information, without
prejudice, did not leave the prosecution without any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy. To avoid undue delay in
the disposition of the subject criminal case and to uphold the parties' respective rights to a speedy disposition of their
case, the prosecution, mindful of its duty not only to prosecute offenders but more importantly to do justice, could have
simply re-filed the Information containing the required number and date of issue of the investigating prosecutor's MCLE
Certificate of Compliance, instead of resorting to the filing of various petitions in court to stubbornly insist on its position
and question the trial court's dismissal of the subject Information, thereby wasting its time and effort and the State's
resources.

The Court is neither persuaded by petitioner's invocation of the principle on liberal construction of procedural rules by
arguing that such liberal construction "may be invoked in situations where there may be some excusable formal deficiency
or error in a pleading, provided that the same does not subvert the essence of the proceeding and connotes at least a
reasonable attempt at compliance with the Rules." The prosecution has never shown any reasonable attempt at
compliance with the rule enunciated under B.M. No. 1922. Even when the motion for reconsideration of the RTC Order
dismissing the subject Information was filed, the required number and date of issue of the investigating prosecutor's
MCLE Certificate of Compliance was still not included nor indicated. Thus, in the instant case, absent valid and compelling
reasons, the requested leniency and liberality in the observance of procedural rules appear to be an afterthought, hence,
cannot be granted.

In any event, to avoid inordinate delays in the disposition of cases brought about by a counsel's failure to indicate in his or
her pleadings the number and date of issue of his or her MCLE Certificate of Compliance, this Court issued an En Bane
Resolution, dated January 14, 2014 which amended B.M. No. 1922 by repealing the phrase "Failure to disclose the
required information would cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings from the records" and
replacing it with "Failure to disclose the required information would subject the counsel to appropriate penalty and
disciplinary action." Thus, under the amendatory Resolution, the failure of a lawyer to indicate in his or her pleadings the
number and date of issue of his or her MCLE Certificate of Compliance will no longer result in the dismissal of the case
and expunction of the pleadings from the records. Nonetheless, such failure will subject the lawyer to the prescribed fine
and/or disciplinary action.

In light of the above amendment, while the same was not yet in effect at the time that the subject Information was filed,
the more prudent and practical thing that the trial court should have done in the first place, so as to avoid delay in the
disposition of the case, was not to dismiss the Information but to simply require the investigating prosecutor to indicate
therein the number and date of issue of her MCLE Certificate of Compliance.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated September 8,
2011 and April 18, 2013, respectively, in CA-G.R. SPNo. 04540 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED
 EN BANC

A.C. No. 12318 (Formerly CBD Case No. 16-4972), October 15, 2019

ATTY. FRANCIS V. GUSTILO, COMPLAINANT, V. ATTY. ESTEFANO H. DE LA CRUZ, RESPONDENT

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This administrative case stems from the complaint-affidavit filed by Atty. Francis V. Gustilo (complainant) in the
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) seeking to disbar Atty. Estefano H. De
La Cruz (respondent) for his non-compliance with the requirements of the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE)
program, and for knowingly using a false MCLE compliance number in his pleadings.1

Antecedents

The respective versions of the parties as summarized by the CBD-IBP are as follows:

STATEMENT OF THE COMPLAINT:

Complainant alleges that Respondent is the lawyer for Spouses Melchor and Malyn Macian, who were the respondents in
an ejectment case filed by Complainant's clients. During the trial of the case before the Metropolitan Trial Court in Makati,
Respondent allegedly used a non-existent MCLE Compliance number (IV-001565). On appeal of the ejectment case,
Respondent allegedly used again a fictitious MCLE Compliance number when he filed a Memorandum of Appeal.

Further, Complainant alleges that the Respondent used MCLE Compliance IV Number 001565 and that, in reality,
Respondent used the number assigned to Atty. Ariel Osabel Labra who was issued MCLE Compliance No. 0015654.

To prove the charge, Complainant attached a Certification from the MCLE Office certifying that ATTY. ESTEPANO
HILVANO DELA CRUZ has no compliance/exemption for the Second Compliance, Third Compliance Period, Fourth
Compliance Period, and Fifth Compliance Period. He also attached copies of the pages (showing Respondent's MCLE
Compliance number as 001565) of a Manifestation and Compliance and Memorandum on Appeal. Lastly, Complainant
attached a copy of a Manifestation and Motion filed by Respondent where Respondent indicated his MCLE Number as
001565.

RESPONDENT'S DEFENSES:

Respondent [claimed] that he is possibly exempted from the MCLE requirements. He explains that Section 5 of B.M. No.
850, October 2, 2001, cites the following as exempted from the MCLE requirement: a. The Executive - x xx Chief State
IBP Investigating Commissioner, and Assistant Secretaries of the Department of Justice; x xx f. Local Government -
Governors and mayor [x] x x" because he served as Assistant City IBP Investigating Commission of the Office of the City
IBP Investigating Commissioner for Makati City, National Prosecution Service of the Department of Justice and retired
from government service on July 18,2015, he may file a request for exemption from compliance.2

IBP's Report and Recommendation

In his Report and Recommendation,3 the Investigating Commissioner of the CBD found that the respondent had falsely
indicated a non-existent MCLE compliance number on more than one occasion when he filed his pleadings in the
ejectment case, thereby committing an evident violation of Canon 1, Canon 7, and Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for one year.4

The Investigating Commissioner observed that not only did the respondent not disclose the required MCLE information in
his pleadings but he also knowingly violated the MCLE requirements by not attending the second to fifth compliance
periods, and by indicating a false MCLE compliance number to make it appear that he had been MCLE compliant.5

On December 7, 2017, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Investigating Commissioner's Report and
Recommendation.6
Issue

Is the respondent guilty of violating Canon 1, Canon 7 and Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he:
(1) used a non-existent MCLE compliance number in the pleadings that he filed; and (2) failed to submit proof of his
compliance for the second, third, fourth and fifth compliance periods?

Ruling of the Court

The Court affirms the findings of the Investigating Commissioner of the CBD as adopted and approved by the IBP Board
of Governors, but modifies the recommended penalty.

Bar Matter No. 1922 (entitled Re: Recommendation of the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Board to
Indicate in All Pleadings Filed with the Courts the Counsel's MCLE Certificate of Compliance and Certificate of
Exemption), as amended on January 14, 2014, expressly directs attorneys to indicate their MCLE certificate of
compliance or certificate of exemption in all the pleadings they file in the courts. The requirement ensures that the practice
of the law profession is reserved only for those who have complied with the recognized mechanism for "keep[ing] abreast
with law and jurisprudence, maintain[ing] the ethics of the profession, and enhanc[ing] the standards of the practice of
law."7 "This requirement is not a mere frivolity," according to Intestate Estate of Jose Uy v. Maghari III:8

x x x To willfully disregard it is, thus, to willfully disregard mechanisms put in place to facilitate integrity, competence, and
credibility in legal practice; it is to betray apathy for the ideals of the legal profession and demonstrates how one is
wanting of the standards for admission to and continuing inclusion in the bar. Worse, to not only willfully disregard them
but to feign compliance only, in truth, to make a mockery of them reveals a dire, wretched, and utter lack of respect for the
profession that one brandishes.9

Under the circumstances, the Investigating Commissioner correctly found the respondent to have acted in manifest bad
faith, dishonesty, and deceit.10 The respondent had willfully contravened the requirement under B.M. No. 1922 by
concealing his non-compliance with the use of the fictitious MCLE compliance number in his pleadings in the ejectment
case. He had not also met the MCLE requirements corresponding to the second, third, fourth and fifth compliance periods.
His actuations were designed to mislead the courts, his client and his colleagues in the profession, as well as all other
persons who might have trusted in his representation of his compliance.11

We note that the respondent did not refute the charge against him.12 Instead, he misrepresented that he would be seeking
his exemption from the requirement based on his having served as Assistant City IBP Investigating Commissioner for
Makati City, his having worked in the National Prosecution Service of the Department of Justice, and his having retired
from government service on July 18, 2015. At best, his misrepresentations were another occasion for him to mislead, for
he did not thereby show any honest effort to explain or to justify his non-compliance and concealment of his deficient
status in the MCLE program. To be sure, he did not present any certificate or other acceptable proof to substantiate his
proposed exemption.

The respondent was definitely guilty of violating Canon 1, Canon 7 and Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which state:

CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and for legal
processes.

CANON 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of
the integrated bar.

CANON 10 — A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.

Pursuant to B.M. No. 1922, as amended, any attorney who fails to indicate in the pleadings filed in court the MCLE
certificate of compliance or certificate of exemption may be subject to appropriate penalty and disciplinary action, like a
fine of P2,000.00 for the first offense, P3,000.00 for the second offense, and P4,000.00 for the third offense; and, in
addition to the fine, he may be listed as a delinquent member of the Integrated Bar, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 13 of B.M.
No. 850 and its implementing rules and regulations; and he shall be discharged from the case and the client/s shall be
allowed to secure the services of a new attorney with the concomitant right to demand the return of fees already paid to
the noncompliant attorney.

The severity of the penalty imposed on non-compliant attorneys depends on the circumstances obtaining in the case.
In Arnado v. Adaza,13 the respondent attorney was suspended from the practice of law for a period of six months for non-
compliance with the MCLE requirements for the first, second, third, and fourth compliance periods. In the cited ruling
in Intestate Estate of Jose Uy v. Maghari III,14 the penalty was suspension from the practice of law for two years for
deliberately using a false IBP official receipt number, professional tax receipt number, Roll of Attorneys number, and
MCLE compliance, and for using another lawyer's details seven times. In Mapalad, Sr. v. Echanez,15 the attorney was
disbarred for using a false MCLE compliance number in his pleadings, and for disobeying legal orders, taking into
consideration that he had already been sanctioned twice in other cases.

Herein, the IBP Board of Governors recommended the respondent's suspension from the practice of law for one year. Yet,
the recommendation was incompatible with the grossness of the respondent's actuations which amounted to dishonesty
and deception. He had thereby committed not only a brazen disregard of the clear requirements of B.M. No. 1922 but also
deceived the trial court, his client, and the general public, including his professional colleagues, on his status of good
standing in the Integrated Bar.

Taking all the circumstances herein into account, the Court declares that the proper penalty to be imposed on the
respondent is disbarment, take effect upon notice of this decision. This extreme penalty is fully called for in view of the
serious affront that the respondent displayed towards the Supreme Court no less in disregarding the objectives of the
MCLE program adopted under B.M. No. 1922, and of the cavalier foisting of his concealment on the courts, his clients and
the public in general, including his colleagues in the Integrated Bar. Disbarment is in accord with Section 27, Rule 38 of
the Rules of Court, which provides:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. — A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, x x x or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to
practice. x x x (Bold underscoring supplied for emphasis)

The actuations of the respondent deserved to be severely punished in order to foster respect towards the Supreme Court,
and to enhance fealty to the Rule of Law. He made himself totally unworthy of the title of attorney and of the privilege and
standing of a member of the law profession in this country. We should be intolerant of his kind, for we have no place for
individuals like him who openly abuse the privilege of membership in the law profession for all the devious and dubious
reasons. Although they may escape notice at times, we must keep on reminding him and all others similarly disposed that
the time for reckoning may be long in coming at times but it will be decisive and unforgiving when it does. This, because
all members of the Philippine Bar shall remain as such only when they genuinely and sincerely value good conduct and
ethical behavior. As we noted in Barrios v. Martinez:16

Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant; and for
him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override the laws, to trample them underfoot and to ignore the very bands of
society, argues recreancy to his position and office and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate and dangerous
elements of the body politic.

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and DECLARES respondent ATTY. ESTEFANO H. DE LA CRUZ to have violated

Canon 1, Canon 7, and Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility through his unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful
conduct; DISBARS him effective upon receipt of this decision; and ORDERS his name to be stricken off the Roll of
Attorneys.

Let a copy of this decision be attached to the respondent's personal records in the Office of the Bar Confidant.

Furnish a copy of this decision to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its information and guidance; and the Office of
the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

Bar Matter No. 139 October 11, 1984

RE: ELMO S. ABAD, 1978 Successful Bar Examinee, ATTY. PROCOPIO S. BELTRAN, JR., President of the
Philippine Trial Lawyers Association. Inc., complainant, vs. ELMO S. ABAD, respondent.

ABAD SANTOS, J.:

On March 28, 1983, this Court held respondent ELMO S. ABAD in contempt of court for unauthorized practice of law and
he was fined P500.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case he failed to pay the fine. (121 SCRA 217.) He paid the fine.

On May 5, 1983, Atty. Procopio S. Beltran, Jr., the complainant, filed a MOTION TO CIRCULARIZE TO ALL METRO
MANILA COURTS THE FACT THAT ELMO S. ABAD IS NOT AUTHORIZED TO PRACTICE LAW.

Asked to comment on the Motion, Mr. Abad opposed it. He denied the allegations in the Motion that he had been
practicing law even after our Decision of March 28, 1983.

Because the Motion and the Opposition raised a question of fact, in Our resolution of April 10, 1984, We directed "the
Clerk of Court to conduct an investigation in the premises and submit a report thereon with appropriate recommendation."

In a comprehensive and well-documented Report which is hereby made a part of this Resolution, the Clerk of Court
concluded:

The aforesaid documentary and testimonial evidence, as well as the above report of the NBI, have clearly proved that
respondent Abad is still practicing law despite the decision of this Court of March 28, 1983.

The Clerk of Court makes the following recommendations:

a. imposed a fine of P2,000.00 payable within ten (10) days from receipt of this resolution or an imprisonment of twenty
(20) days in case of non-payment thereof, with warning of drastic disciplinary action of imprisonment in case of any further
practice of law after receipt of this resolution; and

b. debarred from admission to the Philippine Bar until such time that the Court finds him fit to become such a member.

It is further recommended that a circular be issued to all courts in the Philippines through the Office of the Court
Administrator that respondent Elmo S. Abad has not been admitted to the Philippine Bar and is therefore not authorized to
practice law.

We find the Report to be in order and its recommendations to be well-taken. However, the latter are not sufficiently
adequate in dealing with the improper activities of the respondent.

The Report has found as a fact, over the denials of the respondent under oath, that he signed Exhibits B, C, and D, and
that he made appearances in Metro Manila courts. This aspect opens the respondent to a charge for perjury.

The Report also reveals that Atty. Ruben A. Jacobe collaborated with the respondent as counsels for Antonio S. Maravilla
one of the accused in Criminal Case Nos. 26084, 26085 and 26086 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. (Exhibit
D.) Atty. Jacobe should be called to account for his association with the respondent.

WHEREFORE, Elmo S. Abad is hereby ordered to pay a fine of P12,000.00 within ten (10) days from notice, failing which
he shall be imprisoned for twenty (20) days. He is also warned that if he persists in the unauthorized practice of law he
shall be dealt with more severely.

The Court Administrator is directed to circularize all courts in the country that the respondent has not been authorized to
practice law. A copy of the circular should be sent to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

The Clerk of Court is directed to file with the City Fiscal of Manila an appropriate complaint for false testimony against the
respondent.
Finally, Atty. Ruben A. Jacobe is required to explain within ten (10) days from notice why he should not be disciplined for
collaborating and associating in the practice of the law with the respondent who is not a member of the bar.

SO ORDERED.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

RE: Bar Matter No. 139 —

Elmo S. Abad, 1978 Successful
Bar Examinees

This report is submitted in compliance with the resolution of April 10, 1984.

In the En Banc decision of March 28, 1983 in the above-entitled case, the Court found respondent Elmo S. Abad, who
passed the 1978 Bar examinations but has not been admitted to the Philippine Bar, in contempt of Court for illegal
practice of law, and imposed upon him a fine of P500.00. Respondent paid the fine on May 2, 1983.

On May 5, 1983 complainant filed a motion to circularize to all Metro Manila courts the fact that respondent is not
authorized to practice law. The Court in its resolution of May 26, 1983 required respondent to comment on the said
motion. Respondent filed "Opposition to Motion and Manifestation" which was noted in the resolution of June 30, 1983.

The complainant on March 14, 1984 reiterated his motion to circularize to all Metro Manila courts that respondent is not
authorized to practice law, with prayer that the latter be punished with greater severity. He stated that "Mr. Abad is still
practicing law as evidenced by the fact that last December 8, 1983 at about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Mr. Abad
appeared before the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 100 located at the 11th Floor, City
Hall, Quezon City presided by the Honorable Judge Jorge C. Macli-ing that Mr. Abad appeared as counsel for a certain
Caroline T. Velez in Criminal Case Nos. 26084, 26085 and 26086 entitled People of the Philippines vs. Maravilla, et al.
Mr. Abad even cited in the pleading his Professional Tax Receipt to prove that he is a licensed legal practitioner which
is utterly false. Mr. Abad gave his address as Ruben A. Jacobe & Associates, Ground Floor, ADC Building, Ayala Avenue,
Makati, Metro Manila."

Respondent filed an "Opposition to Motion" denying the complainant's allegation, to wit:

4. ... respondent is not presenting himself to the general public as a Practicing Lawyer like what Atty. Procopio S. Beltran
insists to the Honorable Court;

5. That this motion is motivated by Atty. Beltran's personal desire to inflict malice and oppression upon the respondent
who even until now does not accede to the terms and conditions of the former in connection with several cases filed
against him by the said Atty. Beltran;

6. Respondent respectfully submits that Atty. Beltran is trying his very best to harass the respondent under the guise of
conducting a Crusade personally with the end in view that respondent submit to his ill-desires and veiled threats and
finally come into terms with him.

In the hearings conducted by the undersigned, to prove the allegations in his motion, complainant presented the records
in Criminal Cases Nos. 26084, 26085 and 26086, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Antonio S. Maravilla, Jr., et al." of
Branch 100, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, which were brought to this Court and Identified by Atty. Candido A.
Domingo, Clerk of Court of said trial court, and marked by the undersigned as the following exhibits:

1. Transcript of stenographic notes taken down during the initial trial of the aforesaid criminal cases on December 8, 1983,
at 1:30 in the afternoon (Exhibit "A") where it is stated that Atty. Elmo Abad was counsel for Juan del Gallego III (Exhibit
"A-1");

2. Urgent motion for withdrawal from custody of motor vehicle filed for Caroline T. Velez by Elmo Abad (Exhibit "B") with
his name and signature appearing therein as counsel for the said movant (E exhibit "B-1");
3. Page 4 of aforesaid motion (Exhibit "C") with the name and signature of Elmo Abad appearing therein as submitting the
aforesaid motion for consideration of the trial court (Exhibit "C-1");

4. Urgent motion for deferment of arraignment and trial filed for accused Antonio S. Maravilla, assisted by counsel Ruben
A. Jacobe with Elmo Abad (Exhibit "D"), with the names and signatures of Elmo Abad and Ruben A. Jacobe appearing as
counsel for the accused movant Antonio S. Maravilla (Exhibit "D-1");

5. Also page 3 of the aforesaid motion for deferment of arraignment and trial where the name and signature of Elmo Abad,
together with those of Ruben A. Jacobe, appear as submitting the aforesaid motion for the consideration and approval of
the trial court (Exhibit "D-2"); and

6. Order of Judge Jorge C. Macli-ing dated July 26, 1983 Exhibit "E") wherein on page 1 thereof appears the statement
that the urgent motion for deferment of arraignment and trial and the urgent motion for withdrawal from court of motor
vehicle were filed by "Atty. Elmo Abad (Exhibit "E-1").

Complainant also presented Exhibit "F", his letter to the branch Clerk of Court, Branch 100, Regional Trial Court, Quezon
City requesting for certification that Mr. Abad had appeared as counsel for a certain Ma. Caroline T. Velez in the case
entitled People vs. Maravilla, et al., with Exhibit "F-1" to indicate that said Clerk of Court was the addressee of the said
letter.

After the original of the above records were presented to and marked as exhibits by the Investigator, the same were
xeroxed and the xerox copies were certified by Atty. Candido Domingo, Clerk of Court of Branch 100, Regional Trial
Court, Quezon City.

Complainant also testified that on December 8, 1983 he was at the 11th floor of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court
NCJR, Branch 100, Quezon City and saw respondent Abad pass by in coat and tie and because he knew that Mr. Abad is
a respondent in a case before the Supreme Court and had been declared as a non-lawyer in its decision of March 28,
1983, he (complainant) got curious and followed respondent and saw the latter enter the sala of Branch 100 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City; that he saw him there and after about twenty minutes when he went back to the
same sala, he saw respondent in the place of the said court where the lawyers were supposed to be seated; that some
days after, he went back to the said sala and inspected the records of the criminal cases numbered 26084, 26085 and
26086,* which are the subject matters of the certification of the Clerk of Court, Atty. Domingo, before the Investigator
(TSN, May 26, 1984, pp. 24-26).

Mrs. Eufrocina B. Ison the Court Reporter who took down and transcribed the stenographic notes of the proceedings in
the afternoon of December 8, 1983 in the said criminal cases in the aforesaid trial court, appeared before the undersigned
Investigator and positively Identified respondent Elmo Abad as the Atty. Elmo Abad who appeared as counsel for Juan del
Gallego III in the aforesaid proceedings that afternoon of December 8, 1983 (pp. 1 & 2, TSN, May 11, 1984). She
furthermore testified that she has no reason to be interested in this case in Identifying respondent Abad as the one who
appeared in said court on said afternoon of December 8, 1983 (pp. 19-20, TSN, May 11, 1984).

Respondent, when asked about the aforesaid motions, Exhibits "B" and "D", and the signatures therein, denied that he
filed the same and that the signatures therein are his. He also denied that he appeared in the hearing in the afternoon of
December 8, 1983 in the said trial court. According to him, he was in Batangas at the time. He also testified that the only
explanation he could give regarding the signatures in the aforesaid exhibits is that the same could have been effected by
Atty. Beltran to show the Supreme Court that he (respondent) was still illegally practicing law.

In connection with his defense, he filed —

(1) a motion to present the video tape to show his whereabouts at the time of the said hearing in the afternoon of
December 8, 1983 in Branch 100, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City; and

(2) a motion that his signature in the aforesaid motions filed in the said trial court in said criminal cases be compared with
his genuine signature.
The Investigator orally denied respondent's motion to present the video tape for the reason that the matter intended to be
proved thereby, that is the time of day, cannot be accurately determined from the film as the same could be doctored by
lighting effects (p. 16, TSN, May 11, 1984).

As to the motion for examination and analysis of respondent's signature, the Investigator, to afford respondent full
opportunity to prove his defense, sought the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation to compare respondent's
signature in the aforesaid exhibits with the signatures appearing in the pleadings that he filed in the Supreme Court, which
latter signature he admits as genuine and as his own.

On August 7, 1984, the National Bureau of Investigation submitted its report regarding the questioned signatures of
respondent. Quoted hereunder are its findings and conclusion:

Findings: Comparative examination of the specimens, under magnification and stereoscopic microscope, with the aid of
photographic enlargements, reveals that there exist fundamental, significant similarities in writing characteristics and
Identifying details between the questioned and the standard signatures ELMO S. ABAD, such as in:

1. Structural formation of the elements of the signatures

2. Proportion characteristics

3. Movement impulses

4. Direction of strokes

5. Manner of execution which is free, spontaneous and coordinated.

CONCLUSION: The questioned and the standard signatures ELMO S. ABAD were written by one and the same person.

The aforesaid documentary and testimonial evidence, as well as the above report of the NBI, have clearly proved that
respondent Abad is still practicing law despite the decision of this Court of March 28, 1983.

Moreover, the Investigator, thru the Office of the Court Administrator, requested the Metro Manila courts to inform said
Office if a certain Atty. Elmo Abad is appearing or has appeared in their courts. In response to said query, the Branch
Clerk of Court, Branch XCIV, Quezon City sent to the undersigned certified xerox copies of the following that showed that
Elmo Abad is appearing in Civil Case No. 36501: **

Certified True

Xerox Copies of

Court Record filed

For Whom & signed by Elmo

Case No. Title Court as Counsel Abad

36501 Merian Estimada RTC For Defendant 1. Motion for

vs. May N. Avila NCJR & Third Party reconsideration

Br. XCIV Plaintiff dated Aug. 29,

Q.C. 1983 signed by

Elmo Abad

2. Transcript of

hearing of

above motion in
 the morning

(9:00 A.M.) on

September 22,

1983 shows his

appearance for

said party.

3. Minutes of said

hearing signed

by Elmo Abad
There was likewise received a certification dated May 9, 1984 from the Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court,
National Capital Judicial Region, Pasig, Branch CLIII, stating that Elmo Abad y Sanchez is appearing before said court as
accused in Criminal Case No. 50651, *** entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Atty. Elmo Abad y Sanchez" for Qualified
Theft (Carnapping).

The actuations of respondent as shown from the foregoing constitute contempt of court that should be punished more
severely considering his temerity in still continuing the practice of law despite the decision of March 28, 1983.

It is thus respectfully recommended that respondent be:

a. imposed a fine of P2,000.00 payable within ten (10) days from receipt of this resolution or an imprisonment of twenty
(20) days in case of non-payment thereof, with warning of drastic disciplinary action of imprisonment in case of any further
practice of law after receipt of this resolution; and

b. debarred from admission to the Philippine Bar until such time that the Court finds him fit to become such a member.

It is further recommended that a circular be issued to all courts in the Philippines through the Office of the Court
Administrator that respondent Elmo S. Abad has not been admitted to the Philippine Bar, and is therefore not authorized
to practice law.

Respectfully submitted:

(SGD.) GLORIA C. PARAS

Clerk of Court

Respondent fined P2,000.00.

 THIRD DIVISION

 A.M. No. SDC-97-2-P February 24, 1997

SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant, vs. ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court VI, Shari'a District Court, Marawi City,
respondent.

NARVASA, C.J.:

Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or coordinator) of E.B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of
Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th
Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City, They were classmates, and used to be friends.

It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments by Alauya of one of the
housing units belonging to the above mentioned firm (hereafter, simply Villarosa & Co.); and in connection therewith, a
housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).

Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa &
Co. advising of the termination of his contract with the company. He wrote:

. . I am formally and officially withdrawing from and notifying you of my intent to terminate the Contract/Agreement entered
into between me and your company, as represented by your Sales Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, of your
company's branch office here in Cagayan de Oro City, on the grounds that my consent was vitiated by gross
misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the aforesaid sales agent which made said
contract void ab initio. Said sales agent acting in bad faith perpetrated such illegal and unauthorized acts which made said
contract an Onerous Contract prejudicial to my rights and interests. He then proceeded to expound in considerable detail
and quite acerbic language on the "grounds which could evidence the bad faith. deceit, fraud, misrepresentation,
dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the unscrupulous sales agent . . .;" and closed with the plea that Villarosa & Co.
"agree for the mutual rescission of our contract, even as I inform you that I categorically state on record that I am
terminating the contract . . . I hope I do not have to resort to any legal action before said onerous and manipulated
contract against my interest be annulled. I was actually fooled by your sales agent, hence the need to annul the
controversial contract."

Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of Villarosa & Co. at San Pedro, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. The
envelope containing it, and which actually went through the post, bore no stamps. Instead at the right hand corner above
the description of the addressee, the words, "Free Postage - PD 26," had been typed.

On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also wrote to Mr. Fermin T. Arzaga, Vice-President, Credit & Collection
Group of the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) at Salcedo Village, Makati City, repudiating as
fraudulent and void his contract with Villarosa & Co.; and asking for cancellation of his housing loan in connection
therewith, which was payable from salary deductions at the rate of P4,338.00 a month. Among other things, he said:

. . . (T)hrough this written notice, I am terminating, as I hereby annul, cancel, rescind and voided, the "manipulated
contract" entered into between me and the E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd., as represented by its sales
agent/coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, who maliciously and fraudulently manipulated said contract and unlawfully secured
and pursued the housing loan without my authority and against my will. Thus, the contract itself is deemed to be void ab
initio in view of the attending circumstances, that my consent was vitiated by misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, dishonesty,
and abuse of confidence; and that there was no meeting of the minds between me and the swindling sales agent who
concealed the real facts from me.

And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in some detail what he took to be the anomalous actuations of Sophia
Alawi.

Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC, dated February 21, 1996, April 15, 1996, and May 3, 1996,
in all of which, for the same reasons already cited, he insisted on the cancellation of his housing loan and discontinuance
of deductions from his salary on account thereof. a He also wrote on January 18, 1996 to Ms. Corazon M. Ordoñez, Head
of the Fiscal Management & Budget Office, and to the Chief, Finance Division, both of this Court, to stop deductions from
his salary in relation to the loan in question, again asserting the anomalous manner by which he was allegedly duped into
entering into the contracts by "the scheming sales agent." b

The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to the Supreme Court requesting it to stop deductions on Alauya's
UHLP loan "effective May 1996." and began negotiating with Villarosa & Co. " for the buy-back of . . . (Alauya's) mortgage.
and . . the refund of . . (his) payments." c

On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15, 1995, Sophia Alawi filed with this Court a verified
complaint dated January 25, 1996 — to which she appended a copy of the letter, and of the above mentioned envelope
bearing the typewritten words, "Free Postage - PD 26."1 In that complaint, she accused Alauya of:

1. "Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance and evident bad faith;"

2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and established reputation;"

3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage . . .;" and

4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the Philippine Bar may properly use.

She deplored Alauya's references to her as "unscrupulous swindler, forger, manipulator, etc." without "even a bit of
evidence to cloth (sic) his allegations with the essence of truth," denouncing his imputations as irresponsible, "all
concoctions, lies, baseless and coupled with manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," and asserting that all her dealings
with Alauya had been regular and completely transparent. She closed with the plea that Alauya "be dismissed from the
senice, or be appropriately desciplined (sic) . . ."

The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint, Conformably with established usage that notices of
resolutions emanate from the corresponding Office of the Clerk of Court, the notice of resolution in this case was signed
by Atty. Alfredo P. Marasigan, Assistant Division Clerk of Court.2

Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment"3 in which he questioned the authority of Atty. Marasigan to require an
explanation of him, this power pertaining, according to him, not to "a mere Asst. Div. Clerk of Court investigating an
Executive Clerk of Court." but only to the District Judge, the Court Administrator or the Chief Justice, and voiced the
suspicion that the Resolution was the result of a "strong link" between Ms. Alawi and Atty. Marasigan's office. He also
averred that the complaint had no factual basis; Alawi was envious of him for being not only "the Executive Clerk of Court
and ex-officio Provincial Sheriff and District Registrar." but also "a scion of a Royal Family . . ."4

In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in much less aggressive, even obsequious tones,5 Alauya
requested the former to give him a copy of the complaint in order that he might comment thereon.6 He stated that his acts
as clerk of court were done in good faith and within the confines of the law; and that Sophia Alawi, as sales agent of
Villarosa & Co. had, by falsifying his signature, fraudulently bound him to a housing loan contract entailing monthly
deductions of P4,333.10 from his salary.

And in his comment thereafter submitted under date of June 5, 1996, Alauya contended that it was he who had suffered
"undue injury, mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering," considering that in six
months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary.7 He declared that there was no basis for the complaint;
in communicating with Villarosa & Co. he had merely acted in defense of his rights. He denied any abuse of the franking
privilege, saying that he gave P20.00 plus transportation fare to a subordinate whom he entrusted with the mailing of
certain letters; that the words: "Free Postage - PD 26," were typewritten on the envelope by some other person, an
averment corroborated by the affidavit of Absamen C. Domocao, Clerk IV (subscribed and sworn to before respondent
himself, and attached to the comment as Annex J);8 and as far as he knew, his subordinate mailed the letters with the use
of the money he had given for postage, and if those letters were indeed mixed with the official mail of the court, this had
occurred inadvertently and because of an honest mistake.9

Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically synonymous" with "Counsellors-at-law." a
title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title of "attorney" because "counsellor" is
often mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal" or the Maranao term "consial," connoting a local legislator beholden to the
mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.
He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that what he did "is expected of any man unduly prejudiced and
injured." 10 He claims he was manipulated into reposing his trust in Alawi, a classmate and friend. 11 He was induced to
sign a blank contract on Alawi's assurance that she would show the completed document to him later for correction, but
she had since avoided him; despite "numerous letters and follow-ups" he still does not know where the property — subject
of his supposed agreement with Alawi's principal, Villarosa & Co. — is situated; 12 He says Alawi somehow got his GSIS
policy from his wife, and although she promised to return it the next day, she did not do so until after several months. He
also claims that in connection with his contract with Villarosa & Co., Alawi forged his signature on such pertinent
documents as those regarding the down payment, clearance, lay-out, receipt of the key of the house, salary deduction,
none of which he ever saw. 13

Averring in fine that his acts in question were done without malice, Alauya prays for the dismissal of the complaint for lack
of merit, it consisting of "fallacious, malicious and baseless allegations." and complainant Alawi having come to the Court
with unclean hands, her complicity in the fraudulent housing loan being apparent and demonstrable.

It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) letters to Assistant Clerk of Court Marasigan (dated April 19, 1996 and
April 22, 1996), and his two (2) earlier letters both dated December 15, 1996 — all of which he signed as "Atty. Ashary M.
Alauya" — in his Comment of June 5, 1996, he does not use the title but refers to himself as "DATU ASHARY M.
ALAUYA."

The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation. 14

The first accusation against Alauya is that in his aforesaid letters, he made "malicious and libelous charges (against Alawi)
with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance and evident bad faith, resulting in "undue injury to (her) and blemishing
her honor and established reputation." In those letters, Alauya had written inter alia that:

1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question "by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and
abuse of confidence;"

2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated . . . illegal and unauthorized acts . . . prejudicial to . . (his) rights and interests;"

3) Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and "swindling") sales agent" who had fooled him by "deceit, fraud, misrepresentation,
dishonesty and abuse of confidence;" and

4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the contract with Villarosa & Co., and unlawfully secured and
pursued the housing loan without . . (his) authority and against . . (his) will," and "concealed the real facts . . ."

Alauya's defense essentially is that in making these statements, he was merely acting in defense of his rights, and doing
only what "is expected of any man unduly prejudiced and injured," who had suffered "mental anguish, sleepless nights,
wounded feelings and untold financial suffering, considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted
from his salary. 15

The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA 6713) inter alia enunciates the State
policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service. 16 Section 4 of the Code
commands that "(p)ublic officials and employees . . at all times respect the rights of others, and . . refrain from doing acts
contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public interest." 17 More than
once has this Court emphasized that "the conduct and behavior of every official and employee of an agency involved in
the administration of justice, from the presiding judge to the most junior clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy
burden of responsibility. Their conduct must at all times be characterized by, among others, strict propriety and decorum
so as to earn and keep the respect of the public for the judiciary." 18

Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals, good customs or public policy, or respect for the rights
of others, to couch denunciations of acts believed — however sincerely — to be deceitful, fraudulent or malicious, in
excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent language. Alauya is evidently convinced that he has a right of action against
Sophia Alawi. The law requires that he exercise that right with propriety, without malice or vindictiveness, or undue harm
to anyone; in a manner consistent with good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, supra; or otherwise stated,
that he "act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith." 19 Righteous indignation, or vindication of right cannot justify resort to vituperative language, or downright name-
calling. As a member of the Shari'a Bar and an officer of a Court, Alawi is subject to a standard of conduct more stringent
than for most other government workers. As a man of the law, he may not use language which is abusive, offensive,
scandalous, menacing, or otherwise improper. 20 As a judicial employee, it is expected that he accord respect for the
person and the rights of others at all times, and that his every act and word should be characterized by prudence,
restraint, courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation from these salutary norms might perhaps be mitigated, but cannot be
excused, by his strongly held conviction that he had been grievously wronged.

As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion to declare that persons who pass
the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a
courts. 21 While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may
both be considered "counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is
an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law
and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain
members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.

Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law, " because in his region, there are
pejorative connotations to the term, or it is confusingly similar to that given to local legislators. The ratiocination, valid or
not, is of no moment. His disinclination to use the title of "counsellor" does not warrant his use of the title of attorney.

Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the franking privilege, 22 the record contains no evidence
adequately establishing the accusation.

WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the use of excessively intemperate, insulting
or virulent language, i.e., language unbecoming a judicial officer, and for usurping the title of attorney; and he is warned
that any similar or other impropriety or misconduct in the future will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

B. M. No. 1154             June 8, 2004

IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE HARON S. MELING IN THE 2002 BAR
EXAMINATIONS AND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE SHARI’A BAR, ATTY.
FROILAN R. MELENDREZ, petitioner.

RESOLUTION

TINGA, J.:

The Court is here confronted with a Petition that seeks twin reliefs, one of which is ripe while the other has been rendered
moot by a supervening event.

The antecedents follow.

On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) a Petition1 to
disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations and to impose on him the appropriate
disciplinary penalty as a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar.

In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002 Bar Examinations that he
has three (3) pending criminal cases before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Cotabato City, namely: Criminal
Cases Noa. 15685 and 15686, both for Grave Oral Defamation, and Criminal Case No. 15687 for Less Serious Physical
Injuries.

The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which occurred on May 21, 2001, when Meling allegedly uttered
defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in front of media practitioners and other people. Meling also purportedly
attacked and hit the face of Melendrez’ wife causing the injuries to the latter.

Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title "Attorney" in his communications, as Secretary to the
Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a member of the Bar. Attached to the Petition is an indorsement
letter which shows that Meling used the appellation and appears on its face to have been received by the Sangguniang
Panglungsod of Cotabato City on November 27, 2001.

Pursuant to this Court’s R E S O L U T I O N2 dated December 3, 2002, Meling filed his Answer with the OBC.

In his Answer,3 Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases filed against him by Melendrez because retired
Judge Corocoy Moson, their former professor, advised him to settle his misunderstanding with Melendrez. Believing in
good faith that the case would be settled because the said Judge has moral ascendancy over them, he being their former
professor in the College of Law, Meling considered the three cases that actually arose from a single incident and involving
the same parties as "closed and terminated." Moreover, Meling denies the charges and adds that the acts complained of
do not involve moral turpitude.

As regards the use of the title "Attorney," Meling admits that some of his communications really contained the word
"Attorney" as they were, according to him, typed by the office clerk.

In its Report and Recommendation4 dated December 8, 2003, the OBC disposed of the charge of non-disclosure against
Meling in this wise:

The reasons of Meling in not disclosing the criminal cases filed against him in his petition to take the Bar Examinations are
ludicrous. He should have known that only the court of competent jurisdiction can dismiss cases, not a retired judge nor a
law professor. In fact, the cases filed against Meling are still pending. Furthermore, granting arguendo that these cases
were already dismissed, he is still required to disclose the same for the Court to ascertain his good moral character.
Petitions to take the Bar Examinations are made under oath, and should not be taken lightly by an applicant.

The merit of the cases against Meling is not material in this case. What matters is his act of concealing them which
constitutes dishonesty.
In Bar Matter 1209, the Court stated, thus:

It has been held that good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from good reputation or from the
opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is known. Moral
character is not a subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality. The standard of personal and
professional integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it merely enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal law.
Good moral character includes at least common honesty.

The non-disclosure of Meling of the criminal cases filed against him makes him also answerable under Rule 7.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which states that "a lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false
statement or suppressing a material fact in connection with his application for admission to the bar."5

As regards Meling’s use of the title "Attorney", the OBC had this to say:

Anent the issue of the use of the appellation "Attorney" in his letters, the explanation of Meling is not acceptable. Aware
that he is not a member of the Bar, there was no valid reason why he signed as "attorney" whoever may have typed the
letters.

Although there is no showing that Meling is engaged in the practice of law, the fact is, he is signing his communications as
"Atty. Haron S. Meling" knowing fully well that he is not entitled thereto. As held by the Court in Bar Matter 1209, the
unauthorized use of the appellation "attorney" may render a person liable for indirect contempt of court.6

Consequently, the OBC recommended that Meling not be allowed to take the Lawyer’s Oath and sign the Roll of
Attorneys in the event that he passes the Bar Examinations. Further, it recommended that Meling’s membership in the
Shari’a Bar be suspended until further orders from the Court.7

We fully concur with the findings and recommendation of the OBC. Meling, however, did not pass the 2003 Bar
Examinations. This renders the Petition, insofar as it seeks to prevent Meling from taking the Lawyer’s Oath and signing
the Roll of Attorneys, moot and academic.

On the other hand, the prayer in the same Petition for the Court to impose the appropriate sanctions upon him as a
member of the Shari’a Bar is ripe for resolution and has to be acted upon.

Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Shari’a Court, is not a matter of right but merely a privilege bestowed
upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also known to possess good moral character.8 The
requirement of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law, its continued
possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law.9

The standard form issued in connection with the application to take the 2002 Bar Examinations requires the applicant to
aver that he or she "has not been charged with any act or omission punishable by law, rule or regulation before a fiscal,
judge, officer or administrative body, or indicted for, or accused or convicted by any court or tribunal of, any offense or
crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there any pending case or charge against him/her." Despite the declaration required
by the form, Meling did not reveal that he has three pending criminal cases. His deliberate silence constitutes
concealment, done under oath at that.

The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to determine whether there is satisfactory evidence of good moral
character of the applicant.10 The nature of whatever cases are pending against the applicant would aid the Court in
determining whether he is endowed with the moral fitness demanded of a lawyer. By concealing the existence of such
cases, the applicant then flunks the test of fitness even if the cases are ultimately proven to be unwarranted or insufficient
to impugn or affect the good moral character of the applicant.

Meling’s concealment of the fact that there are three (3) pending criminal cases against him speaks of his lack of the
requisite good moral character and results in the forfeiture of the privilege bestowed upon him as a member of the Shari’a
Bar.

Moreover, his use of the appellation "Attorney", knowing fully well that he is not entitled to its use, cannot go unchecked.
In Alawi v. Alauya,11 the Court had the occasion to discuss the impropriety of the use of the title "Attorney" by members of
the Shari’a Bar who are not likewise members of the Philippine Bar. The respondent therein, an executive clerk of court of
the 4th Judicial Shari’a District in Marawi City, used the title "Attorney" in several correspondence in connection with the
rescission of a contract entered into by him in his private capacity. The Court declared that:

…persons who pass the Shari’a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence, may only practice law
before Shari’a courts. While one who has been admitted to the Shari’a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the
Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counselors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional
capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary
degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this
jurisdiction.12

The judiciary has no place for dishonest officers of the court, such as Meling in this case. The solemn task of
administering justice demands that those who are privileged to be part of service therein, from the highest official to the
lowliest employee, must not only be competent and dedicated, but likewise live and practice the virtues of honesty and
integrity. Anything short of this standard would diminish the public's faith in the Judiciary and constitutes infidelity to the
constitutional tenet that a public office is a public trust.

In Leda v. Tabang, supra, the respondent concealed the fact of his marriage in his application to take the Bar
examinations and made conflicting submissions before the Court. As a result, we found the respondent grossly unfit and
unworthy to continue in the practice of law and suspended him therefrom until further orders from the Court.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted insofar as it seeks the imposition of appropriate sanctions upon Haron S. Meling as
a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar. Accordingly, the membership of Haron S. Meling in the Philippine Shari’a Bar is
hereby SUSPENDED until further orders from the Court, the suspension to take effect immediately. Insofar as
the Petition seeks to prevent Haron S. Meling from taking the Lawyer’s Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys as a
member of the Philippine Bar, the same is DISMISSED for having become moot and academic.

Copies of this Decision shall be circulated to all the Shari’a Courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.