Knowledge of Language: Its Nature, Origin, and Use Noam Chomsky CONVERGENCE A Series Founded, Planned, and Edited by Ruth Nanda Anshen a __ PRAEGER PRAEGER SPECIAL STUDIES * PRAEGER SCIENTIFIC New York * Westport. Connecticut. © * London,itrary of Congr Caalopng ie Pebbea ‘Chomsty, Noam. owdge of langage. (Conversa) Bboy p. Inch ins T Lanuage an languages. 1 The, 1 Serie: Converence Praeper Pubes) Plosesie9is MIO Asana ISHN 0.750005. ISBN OTSI76-4 bk) ‘copyit © 1986 Wy Noam Chomsty (© 1981 aod 1582 by Ruh Nands Amen Al rights served, No potion of ths book maybe reproduced, by any proces or tec, iho the ‘pres wren coeent of te publ, Library of Corres Caatog Card Naber: 85.1224 eat phe i 1986 er Publier 52 Fit Avenue, New York, NY 10175 ‘Ndivsion of Greenrood Pres, Ie Prned inthe United Ses of America e ‘The paper wot in this book complies withthe Permanent Paper Standard sued bythe Nao Information Standards (Organization (239 48-1589), CONVERGENCE A Series Founded, Planned, and Edited by Ruth Nanda Anshen Board of Editors Sir Fred Hoyle Sir Bernard Lovell Adolph Lowe Joseph Needham LI. Rabi William Richardson Jonas Salk Lewis Thomas C.N. Yang,Contents Convergence Ruth Nanda Anshen xi The Mobius Strip R.N.AL xxiif Preface xxv 1. Knowledge of Language asa Foeus of Inquiry Concepts of Language 1 3, Facing Plato's Problem 51 4. Questions about Rules 221 5. Noteson Orwell's Problem 276 References 288 Index 297 About the Author $09 About the Founder of This Series 311Convergence Ruth Nanda Anshen There is no use tryin impossible things.” ‘daresay you haven'thad mich practic," sad the Queen, “When [was your age. Talways did it fr half an hour a day Why, sometimes I've believed as many as ix impossible things before breakfast. “Thiscommitment isan inherent past of human natureand an aspect of our creativity, Each advance of science brings increased comprehension and appreciation of the nature, meaning, and wonder of the creative forces that move the cosmos:and erated man. Such openness and confidence ead 10 faith in hereality of posubility andl eventually tothe following ‘auth: "The mystery of the universe sits comprehensibilit. ‘When Finstein uttered that challenging statement, hecould have been speaking about our relationship with the universe TThe old division of the Earth and the Cosmos into objective processes in space and timeand mindin which they are mirrored is no longer a suitable satting point for understanding the univers, Science, or ourselves, Science now begins to focus on the convergence of man and natute, on the framework which rakes ws, as living beings, dependent parts of nature and simultaneously makes nature the object of our thoughts and Actions. Scientists can nolonger contont the universe as objec. tiveobservers. Science recognizes the participation of man with the universe. Speaking quantitatively, dhe universe is largely indifferent wo what happens in man. Speaking qualitatively, nothing: happens in man that does not have a bearing on the sid Alle; “one can't believeclements which consticute the universe. This gives cosmic sig- bilicance tothe person, ‘Nevertheless, all facts are not born free and equal. There exists a hierarchy of factsin relation toa hierarchy ol values. To, fatrangethetacts rightly, todifferentiatetheimportant from the trivial, co see their bearing in telation to each other and 10 cvaluational criteria requires a judgment whieh is intitiveas ‘wellasempirical. Weneed meaning in addition o information. Accuracy isnot the same as truth. ‘Our hope is o overcome the cultural tubs in which we have been living, The scientific method, the tehniqueof ance Iyzing, explaining. and dassifying, has demonstrated its inher cnt limitations. They arise because by its intervention, seience presumes toalter and fashion the object ofits investigation. In reality, method and object can no longer be separated. ‘The ‘outworn Cartesian, scientific worldview has eased to bescien- tific in the most profound sense of the word, for a common hond links us all—man, animal, plant, and galaxy—in che ‘unitary principle of all eality. or theself without the universe isempyy "This universeof which we human beings are particles may bie defined asa living, dynamic process of unfolding. Ics a breathing universe, its respiration being only one of the many rhythms of its life. Is evolution itself. Although what we ‘observe may sem to bea community of separate, independent ‘units, in actuality dese units are made up of subunits, each ‘witha feo tsown, and thesubunits constitatesmaller living entities. Ato level in thehierarchy of natureisindependencea reality, For that which lives and constitutes matte, whether ‘organic or inorganic, is dependent on discrete entities that, gathered together, form aggregates of new units which imeract jn support of one another and become an unfolding event, i ‘constant motion, with ever increasing coraplexityand inteicacy of their organization, ‘Ate there goals in evolution? Orate there only disceraible ppatierns? Certainly theresa law of evolution by which we can explain the emergence of forms capable of activities which are indeed novel. Examples may be said to be the origin of ie, the emergence of individual consciousness, and theappearance of language, hope ofthe concemed authors in Convergence is that ‘hey will show that evolution and development areinterchange- able and that the entire system of the interweaving of man, ature, and the universe constitutes a living totality. Ma is searching, for his legitimate place in this unity, this cosmic Scheme of things. ‘The meaning of this cosmic scheme—i indeed we can impose meaning on the mystery and majesty af nnature—and the extent to which we can assume responsibility initas uniquely intelligent beings, are supreme questions for ‘which this Series seeks an answer revitably, coward the end of a historical period, when thought and custom have petrified into rigidity and when the clahorate machinery of civilization opposes and represses out more noble qualities ie stirs again beneath the hard surface Nevertheles,thisattempttodeline the purposeof Convergence issetforeh with profound uepidation. Weare living ina period lofextreme darkness. Thete is moral atrophy, destructiveradia tion within us, as we watch the collapse of values hitherto cherished—but now betrayed. We seem to be lace to face with anapocalypticdestiny, Theanomie, the chaos, surrounding os producesan almost lethal distintegration of the person, aswell as ecological and demographic disaster. Our situation is des perate. And there is no glossing over the deep and unresolved tragedy that fills our lives, Seience now begins to question its premises and tells us noc only what is, but what ought tobe; prescribingin addition to describing the realities of lie, recom: eiling order and hierarchy. My introduction to Convergenceis not tobe construed asa prefatory essay to each individual volume, These few pages Attempt to set forth the general aim and purpose of this Series. is my hope that this statement will provide he reader with a new orientation in his thinking, one more specifically defined by these scholars who have been invited to participate in this intellectual, spiritual, and moral endeavor so desperately nected in our time. These scholars recognize the televanee of the nondiscursiveexperience of life which the discursive, analytical ‘method alone is unable vo convey. ‘The authors invited to Convergence Seriesacknowledgea structural Kinship between subject and object, between living And nonliving matte, the immanence of the past energizingsv (- KNOWLEDGE OF LANGUAGE the present and thus bestowing a promise for the future. This kinship has longgbeen sensed and experienced by mystics. Saint Francis of Assis desribed with extraordinary beauty the «ruth tac the more we know about nature, is unity with al if, the more we realize that weare one family, summoned toacknow! fege the intimacy of our familial tes with the universe. Atone time we were so anthtopomorphicas toexchudeas inferior such other aspects of our relatives as animals, plants, galaxies, or bother specieseven inorganic matter, This only exposed our provineialism, Then we believed there were borders beyond fwhich we could not, must not, trespass. These frontiers have hnever existed. Now we ate beginning to recognize, even take pride in, our neighbors in the Cosmos. ‘Human thought has been formed through centuries of ‘man’s consciousness, by perceptions and meanings that relate ts to nature, The smallest living entity, be ita molecule or a particle, ist the same time presentin the structure ofthe Earth And all its inhabitants, whether human or manifesting them- selves in the multiplicity of other forms of life, “Today we are beginning to open ourselves to this evolved experience of consciousness. We keenly realize hat man has intervened in the evolutionary proces. The futreis contingent not completely prescribed, except forthe immediate necesity to evaluate in order to live a lite of integrity. The specific gravity of the burden of change has moved from genetic to cultural evolution, Genetic evolution itself has aken millions ‘ol years; cultura evolution isa child of no more than twenty oF thirty thousand years. What willbe the future of our evolution- ty course? Wil ibe cyclical in the classical sense? Will it be Tinear in the modern sense? Yet we know that the laws of mature se not linear. Certainly, life is mote than mere endless repeti tion. We must restore the importance of rach moment, each deed. Thisisimponsible ifthe fatureis nothingbuta mechanical ‘extrapolation ofthe past, Dignity becomes possible only with choice. The choice is ours. ‘Tn this light, evolution shows man arisen by a creative power inherent in the universe, The immense ancenstral effort, that has borne man invests hisn with a cosmic responsibility Michelangelo's image of Adam created at God's command becomes a more intelligent symbol of man’s position in the CONVERGENCE / = World than does a description of man as chance aggregate of atonis of cells. Each successive stage of emergence is more comprehensive, more meaningful, more fulfilling, and more converging, than the last. Yet a higher faculty must always ‘opesate through the levels thatare below it. The higher faculty ‘must enlist the laws controling the lotr levelsintheservice of hhigher principles, and the lower level which enables the higher fone to operate through it will always Limit dhe scope ofthese lperations, even menacing them with possible failure. All our higher endeavors must work through our lower forms and ate necessarily exposed thereby to corruption. We may thus recog hlze the cormic tots of tragedy snd ovr fallible human condi- tion, Language itll asthe power of universal, isthe hasie expression of mas abilityto transcend his environment and 10 teangmute wagedy into a moral and spiritual wiumph, “This relationship, this convergence, ofthe higher with the lowerappliesagain whenan upper level, suchasconseiousness ‘or reedon, endeavors to veach beyond islt.I'no higher level can be accounted for by the operation ofa lower level, then n0 felfor of outs can be uly creative in thesense of establishing a higher principle not intrinsic o our initial condition. And establishing sucha principles whatall greatat great thought ‘and great action must aim at This is indeed how these efforts Ihave bul up the heritagein which out lives continue 1 grow. Has man’s intelligence broken throtugh the Tits of his, own powers? Yer and no. Inventive efforts can never fully Sccaunt for their success, but the story of man's evolution testifies toa creative power that goes beyond that which wecan account for in ourselves, This power can make us surpass Durselves, We exercise some of iti the simple act of acquiring Knovledgeand holding tobe tue. For, indoingso, westrive for intellectual control over things outside ourselves, in spite of ‘ourmanifestincapacity to justify thishope. Thegreatestetfors ff the human mind amount ta no more han this. Allsuch acs {impose an obligation to strive for the ostensibly impossible, representing man’s search for the fultillment of those ideals ‘whieh, for the moment, seem to be beyond his reach. For the good of @ moral act is inherent im the act itll and has che power to ennoble the person who performs i Without this ‘moral ingredient dete is cotruption.ssi! RNOWLEDGE OF LANGUAGE ‘The origins of one person can he envisaged by acing that person's family tee all the way back to the primeval specks of| protoplasm in which his fist origins lie. The history of the family tree converges with everything that has contributed co the making ofa human being. This segment of evolution ison 4 par with the history of a fertilized egg developing into a mature person, or the history afa plant growing trom a seed; i includes everrthing that caused that person. or that plant, or thhatanimal,or even that stain. agalaxy,cocome intoexistenc. Natural selection plays no part in the evolution of a single hhuman being. Weda not include inthe mechanism of growth the possible adversities whieh did not befall it and hence did nnot prevents. Thesame principle of development holds forthe evolution ofa single human being: nothing isgained in under- Standing this evolution by considering the adverse chances ‘which might bave prevented i, In our search fora reasonable cosmic view, we torn in the firs place to common understanding, Science largely relies for ite subject matterona common knowledgeo! things. Concepts of lite and death, plant and animal, heath and sickness, youth fandage, mindand body, machine and technical processes. and ‘ther inumierableand equally important thingsare commonly known. All these concepts apply to complex entities, whose ‘eality i called into question by a theory of knowledge which Claims thatthe entire universe should ultimately be represented {nal its aspects by the physical laws governing the inanimate substrate of nature, “Teebnological inevitability" hasalienated Our relationship with nature, with work, with other human beings. with ourselves, udgment, decision, and freedom of choice, in other words Knowledge which contains a moral imperative, cannot be ordered inthe form chat some echnolog- ical scientists believe, For thete is no mechanical ordering, m9 exhaustive se of permistations or combinations thatcan perform the task, The power which man hasachieved through technol- bey has been transformed into spiritual and moral impotence Without the insight into the natute of being, more important than dovng, the soul of man is imperiled. And those self transcendent ens that ultimately confer dignity. meaning and identity on man and his life constiute the only final values ‘worth pursuing. The pollution of consciousnessis heresul of CONVERGENCE © nit rere technological eltciency. In addition, the authors inthis Series recognize that the computer in ise can process information—not meaning, Thus we secon the stageof life no ‘oral actors, oly anonymous events ‘Our new theory of knovledge, as theauthorsin this Series ‘uy todemonstrate, rejects this claim and restores our respect for the immense range of common knowledge acquited by our experience of convergence. Starting from here, we sketch out ‘our cosmic perspective by exploring the wider implications of the fact that all knowledge is acquired and possessel by rela tonship, coaleseense, convergence We identify a person’s phsiognomy by depending on our awareness of features that we are unable to specify, and this lamouunts to a convergence i the features of a person for che purpose of comprehending their joint meaning. We are also Ableto readin the features and behavior ofa person the presence ‘of moods, che gleam of intelligence, the response to animals or sunset ora fugue by Bach, the signs of sanity, human respon "bility, and experience, Ata lower level, we comprehend by a Similar mechanism the body ofa person and understand the functions of the physiological mechanism. We know that even physical theories constitute inthis way the procestes of inn. inate nature. Such ate the vatious levels of knowledge acquired and possessed by the experience of convergence "The authors in this Series grasp the truth that these levels. forma hierarchy of comprehensive entities. Inorganic matters comprehended by physical laws the mechanism of physiology fs built on these lass and enlists them in its service. Then, che intelligent behavior ofa person relies on the healthy functions ff the body and, finally, moral responsibility relies on the faculties of intelligence directing moral acs ‘Werealize how the operations of machines, and of mecha- nisms in general, rely on the laws of physics but cannot be explained. or accounted for. by these laws. In a hierarchic Sequence of comprehensive eves, cach higher level srelated the levels below it in the same way as the operations of a machine are related to the particulars, obeying the Laws of physics. We cannot explain he operations of an upper level in ferms of the particulars on which its operations rey. Each higher level of sntegration represents, im this sense highersii | RNOWLEDGE OF LANGUAGE level of existence, not completely accountable by the levels below it yet including these lower levels implicitly Tn a hierarchic sequence of comprehensive levels exch, Diigher evel is known to us by relying on our awareness of the particularson the level below i. Weare conscious each level by imternatizing its particulars and mentally performing the integration that constitutes it, This ts how all experience, a5 well asall knowledge. is based on convergence, and thisis how theconsecutive stages of convergence forma continuoustransi- tion from the understanding of the inorganic, cheinanimate, 0 the comprehension af man's moral responsibility and pattic pation in the totality, the organismic whole, of all reality. The Sciences ofthe subject-object relationship thus pass impercep: tibly into the metascienoe of theconvergence af the subject and object imtertelationship, mutually altering each other. From the minimum of convergence, exercised in a physical observa tion, wemove withouta break tothe maximum al convergence, Which is otal commitment. "The last of life, for which the first was made, is yet to come.” Thus, Convergence has summoned the warid’s most concerned! thinkers (0 rediscover the experience of feeling, a3 well as of thought. The consergence of all forms of reality plesides over the possible falillment of elCawarencss—not the isolated, alienated self, but rather the participation im the life process with other lives and other forms of ie. Convergence isa cosmic force and may possess berating powers allowing man to become what he is, capable of freedom, juste, love ‘Thus man experiences the meaning of grace ‘further aim of this Series is not, nor could it be, ta disparage science. Theauthors themselves ate adequate witness to this fac. Actually, in viewing the role of science, one arrives ata much more modest judgment of is function in our whole body of knowledge. Original knowledge was probably not acquired by us in the active sense; most of it mast have been Biven to us im the same mysterious way we received ous con: sciousness. Av to.content and useless, scientific knowledge isan inlinitesimal fraction ol natural knowledge. Nevertheless, itisknowledge whose structure sendawed with beast because its abstractions satisfy our urge for specific knowledge much, ‘more fully than does natural knowledge, and we are justly proud of scientific knowledge because we can call it our own ‘reation, Ht wach us clear thinkiog, and the extent 0 whieh ‘lear thinking helps us to order our sensations is a marvel ‘which fills the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and atve, Seience now begins to include the realm of homan, ‘alues,lesteven the memory of what it means to be human be Forgotten. Ie Lact, ie may well be that science has veached the [mits of the nowableand may now be required to recognize its inability to penetate into the caprice and the mystery of the soul ofthe atom, ‘Organization and energy are always with us, wherever we look, onal levels, At the level of the tom organization becomes indistinguishable from form. from order. from whatever the forces ave that held the spinning groups of ultimate particles together in theirappatent solidity” And now that we are at the atomic level, we find that modern physics has recognized that these ultimate parties are primarily electrical charges, and that mass is thereforea manifestation of energy. Thishasolten tbeen aisinterpteted by idealists ax meaning that matter has somehow been magicked away as if by a conjuror’s wand. But hhotbing could be mote untrue. It is impossible to transform, ‘mater imo spist just by making it dhin. Bishop Berkeley's views admit of no refatation but cury no conviction neverthe- less: However, something has happened to matter Iteas only separated from form because it scented too simple. Now we fealize that, and this is a revolutionary change; we cannot separate tem, We are now summoned to cease speaking of Form and Mauer and begin to consider the convergence of Organization and Energs. For the laegest molecule we know and the smallest living parties we know overlap. Sueh a ‘cooperation, even though far down at the molecular level, fannot hut remind uso the voluntary cooperation of individual yhuman beings in maintaining patterns of society at levels of ‘organization fr higher. The asks of Energy and Organization inthe making ofthe universe and ourselves ate far from ended ‘No individual destiny can be separated from the destiny of the wniverse, Allred Nordh Whitehead fas stated that every event.every step ot processin the universe, involves hoth effec ‘yom past situationsand the anticipation of fature potentialities, [Basic for thin doctrine is the assumption thatthe course of theuniverse results from a multiple and never-ending complex of steps developing out of one anther. Thus, in spite of all evidence othe contrary, weconclnde that thereisa continuing, land permanent energy of that which is not only man but all lile, For not an atom stirs in matter, organicand inorganic, that does not have its cunning duplicate in rand. Ane aich in the ‘convergence of life with al its multiple mansfestations crates Its ovwn verification ‘We are concerned in this Series with the unitary structure ofall nature. Atthe boginning, as weseein Hesiod's Theogony land in the Book of Genesis, there was a primal unity. a state of| fusion in which, later all elements beconve separated but then ‘merge again. However, ostof this unity thereemterge throtagh separation, partsof opponite elements. These opposites intersect fr reunite. in meteoric phenomena or in individual living things. Yet, in spite of the immense diversity of creation, a profound underlying convergence exists in all nature, And che principle of the comervasion of energy simply signifies that there is a something that remains constant Whatever fresh notionsof the world may be given us by foture experiments, | fre certain beforehand that something remains vmchanged ‘which we may call energy. We now do not say that the [aw of| ratte springs from the invariability of God, but with that curious mixture of arrogance and burmlity which scientists hhave earned to pat in place of theological terminology, we sty snstead that the law of conservation i the physical expression fot the lements by which nate makes itselusiderstod by Ws. ‘The universes our home. There isno other universe than. the universe ofall life including the mind of man, che merging of life with life. Our consciousness is evolving, the primordial principleof he unfolding of that which isimplied orcontained small matter and spit. We ask: Will the central mystery af the cosmos, aswell as man’sawarenessofand participation init, be ‘unveiled, although forever receding, asymptotically? Shall we periaps be able to see all things, great and small, glittering ‘with new light and reborn meaning, ancient but now again relevant in an iconic image whieh is telated to our own time and experience? ‘The cosmic significance of his panorama isrevealed when ‘weconsideritas the stages of an evolution that has achieved the CONVERGENCE | i se of man and his consciousness. This isthe new plateau on vehi we now sand, Iemay seem obvious tha the eiceession of changes. sustained through a thousand million yeats, which have transformed microscopic specks of protoplasm into the human race, has brought forth, in so doing, a higher and altogether novel kind of being capable of compassion, wander, beauty and ruth although each form isas precious, as sacred, astheother. The interdependence of everything with everything else in the txaity of being includes participation of nature in history and demands a participation of the universe. “The future brings us nothing, gives us nothing: ics we ‘who in order to build ithave to give iteverything, ou very life But to be able to give, one has to possess: and we possess no other lif, no living sap, than the treasures stored up from the ppastand digested, assimilated. and created afresh by us. Likeall Jnuman activities, thelaw of growth, of evolution, of convergence Atay its vigor frou a wadition which does not die. At this point, however, we must remember that che law of growth, of evolution, has both a creative nid a tragic nature ‘This we recognize as a degenerative process, ay devolution. Whether itis the growth of a human soul of the growth of a living cel or of the universe, we are confronted not only with fulfillment bur with sacrifice, with increase and decrease, with ‘entichmentand diminution, Choice and decision are necessary for growth and each choice, each decision, excludes certain potentaliies, certain potential realities. Bu since these unac- twalized realities are part of us they possessarightand command dol their own. They must avenge themselves fr theit exclusion ‘rom existence. They may petishand with themall the potential powers of theis existence, their creativity. Or they may not patish but zemain unqiickened within us, sepressd, lurking, ‘ominous, swift to invadeinsomtediaguised formn our lle process, nnotasa dynamic, creative, converging power, butasa necrotic, pathiofogical force. I the diminishing and the predatory pro: «esses co-mingle, atrophy and even death in every category of life ensue. But if we possess the maturity and the wisdom t0| accept the necessity of choice, of decision, or onder and hierarchy, the inalienable right of teedom and astonoray, hen, inspite of is aged, its exclusiveness, the Law of growth endows us ‘with greatness anda new moval dimension.aii | KNOWLEDGE OF LANGUAGE Convergence is committed 10 the search for the deeper seanings of science, philosophy, la, morality, history, tech ‘nology, in fact all the disesplines in a trane-tisexplinary fame of reference. This Series aimsto expose theerror in that form of| Science which ereates an cnrecontcilable dichotomy between theabserverand the participant, thereby destroying he unique: ness of each discipline by neutralizing it, For in the end we ‘would know everything hut wnderstend nothing, not being ‘motivated by concern for any question, This Sexes fare aims ocxamine relentlessly the ultimate premiseson which workin the respective fields of knowledge rests and to break trough from these ito the universal principles whiichare the very basis ‘ofall specialist information, More concretely, there are issues ‘which wait to be examined in relation to, for example, the philosophiea and moral meanings of the inodels of modern physics, the question ofthe purely physico-chemical processes tersus the postulate ofthe itredueibiltyof life in biology. For there is basi correlation of clementsin nature, of which man is a part, which cannat be separated, which compose each other, which converge, and alter each other mutually. Certain mysteries are now Known 10 us: the mystery, in part, ol theuniverseand the mystery ofthe mind have been ina Sense revealed out ofthe heart of datkness. Mind and matter, mind and brain, have converged; space time, and motion are reconciled; man, consciousness, ané the universe ate untied ‘nee the atom ina star iste aameas the atom in man, Wate Ihomevard bound beeause we have accepted on convergence swith the Cosmos, We have reconciled observer and participant For at ast we know that time and space are modes by which we think, but not conditions in which we live and have our being. Religion and seence meld; reason and feeling merge in iutoal respect for each other, nourishing each other, deepening, ‘vickening, and ensiching out experiences of the life process. We have heeded the haunting voice in the Whislwind, The Mébius Strip ‘Thesymbol found on thecover ofeach volumein Conver: agence is the visual image of comvergencethe subject of this Series. Its a mathematical mystery deriving fts name from ‘Augustus Mobius, a German mathematician who lived from 1790 co 1858. The topological probleta sill mains unsolved mathematically ‘The Mobius Suip has only one continuous surface, in contrast to a cylindrical step, which hae two surfaces—the Inside and the outside. An examination will reveal that che Suip, having one continuous edge, produces one ting, twice the ciscunlerence ofthe original Sti with one half of» twist init, which eventually converges with ste Since the midile ofthe last century, mathematicians have increasingly reused to accept a “solution” to mathematical problem as “obviously tue.” for the “solution” often then becomes che problem, For example, itis certainly obvious that every piece of paper has two sides inthe sense that an insect ‘aaviling on one side could not reach the other side without ‘passing around an edge or boring a hole through the paper. Obsious—but false! ‘The Mibius Strip, im fact, presents only one mono- dimensional, ontinuousring hating no inside, no outside, n0 beginning, no end. Converging with ise i syimboliees the structural kidship, the intimate relationship betwee subject and object, matter and energy, demonstrating the eor of any attempco bifurcate the observer and participant, the universe and man, inca two. snote systems of sealty. All alli unity Tam indebted to Fay Zetlin, Artisein-Resident at Old Dominion University in Virginia, who sensed the principle of convergence, of emergent uanscendence, in the analogue of the ‘Mobius Suip. This symbol may be suid to erytallize my ownviv | KNOWLEDGE OF LANGUAGE continuingand expanding explorations into thenitary struc tune ofall reality. Fay Zetlin’s drawing of the Mobius Strip constitutes the visval image of this elfort to emphasize the experience of convergence RNA, Preface For many years, I have been intaigued by two problems concerning human knowledge. The firs is the problem of ‘explaining how weean know so much givensharwehasesuch- [inited evidence. The second isthe problem of explaining how ‘ve ran know 20 lite, given that we have so much evidence “The frst problem wemighteall “Plato's problem.” thesecond, ‘Orwell's problem,” an analogue in the domain ol social and political Ile of what might be called "Freud's problem. The essence of Plato’ problem was well expressed by Bertrand Russell in bislater work when he raised the question: “Flow comes it that human beings, whose contacts with the world are brief and personal and limited are nevertheless able to know as much as they do know?" In certain domains of thought and understanding. our knowledge is vast in scope, highly specific and richly articulated in character, and in large -measure shared with others who have similar backgrounds and experience. Thesame is trucofsystems of belie and expectation, ‘modes of interpretation and integation of experience, and more generally what we may call “cognitive systems.” only parts of which qualify as actual knowledge. The problem that arises when we consider the matter with a litle cae is one of ‘poverty of the stimulus.” Although our cognitive systems surely reflect our experience in some manner, a cael spelt cation of the properties of these systems on one hand and ofthe experience that somehow led t their Formation on the other, shows that the wo are separated by a considerable ap, in facta chasm, The problem is eo account for the specificity and the richness ofthe cognitivesystems tbat arisen the individual on thebasis ofthe limited information available. Cognitivesstems| result from the interaction of experience and the organism's method of constructingand dealing with it, including analytic ‘mechanisms and the intrinsic determinants of maturation and ‘cognitive rowth, The problem, then, istodetermine the innateenddowaent that serves to bridge the gap between experience and knowledge stiained—or cognitive systems. ateained, abstracting from the uce-requisement for knowledge and generalizing toothersysteans that involve belit, understanding, interpeetation, and perhaps more “The study of human language is particularly interesting inthis regard. Inthe first place, isa tuuespecies property and ‘onecentral ohuman thought ad understanding, Furihermose, Intherase of language we can proceed rather ar toward charac teriring the system ol knowledgeattained —knowledge of En Tish, of Japanese, ete.—and determining the evidence tha 8 _availableto the child who gained tis knovledge; wealso have ‘wide range of evidence availableabout the vatiety of attainable ‘ystems, We aretha in good position to aseertain the natare of the biological endowment that eonsttwtes the bua la ‘guage faculty," the innate component ofthe mind brain that Yields knowledge of language when presented with linguistic experience. that converts experience to a ssstem of knowledge. “Much of the interest ofthe study of language, in my opi: ion, liesin the fact that itoffersan approach to Plato's problem ina domain that is velatively well circumscribed and open to inspection andinquirs,andat the same time deeply integrated inhuman lifeand thought. If wecan discover something about the principles that enter into the construction ofthis particular cognitive system, the principles ofthe language laculy, weean progress toward a solution for at east one special and quite Important case of Plato's problem. We can then ask whether these principles generalize w other eases, o if not, whether an approach that meets with a degre of explanatory suceessin the case of human language canat least serveasa suggestive model forsimilar inquiries in other cognitivedomains. My own belief is that the principles do not generalize, tha they are in crucial respects specific to the language faculty, but chat the approach ray indeed be suggestive elsewhere, both in is achievements and their apparent boundaries. The following chapters are primarily concerned with the question of whar we may be able to Tearn about Plato's problem irom the study of human lan- iEuage and how this stady finds is place in the more general Inquiry into cognitive systems, their character, and development. ‘Chapters 1, 2, and 4 are concerned primarily with general and conceptual istes, Chapter 3, which is considerably more tec nical (particularly sections 348,344, and3.5.2), introduces and Aevelops some ideas that Ligure prominently in curtent research, whe has taken a rather new tur in the pase few years, Plato's problem. then, is to explain how we know so ‘much, given that the evidence available to us is 30 sparse ‘Orwell sproblem is toexplain why we know and understand so Tile, even though the evidence available t us is so rich, Like ‘many other iwentietb-centary intellectals, Orwell as i= pressed with the ability of itaitarian systems to instil beliefs that are firmly held and widely aecepted although they ate completely without foundation and olten plainly at variance ‘with obvious facts about the world around us. The problem is far broader, as the history of religious dogma sullies 1o show To solve Orwells problem see must discover the institational aniother factors thar block insightand understanding incucial teas of ou lives and ask why they ate elective In the modern era, the cut of state worship has frequently taken on the character of earlier forms of religious faith, not tony in totalitarian stats. inthe latter, the mechanisms used to Induce passivity and conformism are relatively anspareat Ultimately, some format volenceemployed or threatened under highly visible centralized control, Buc thinkihas been amply demonstrated that in democratic societies where violence is rately used to ensure obedience, Orwell's problem nevertheless arises. Thousands of pages of detailed documentation have ‘demonstrated beyond any reasonable doubs that in thew societies to, the doctrines ofthe state religion ae firmly implanted and ‘widely believed, in utter defiance of plain fact, particularly by the intelligentsia who construct and propagate these doctrines, {hose who take on thetask of "manufacture of consent" (Walter Lippman) or “engineering of consent” (Edward Bernays), ‘ask that many have regarded as essential in societies that can no longer impose conformity and obedience by violence. Such \demonstations, whatever thei force, have esentially2r0 effect fn the mainstream of respectable intellectual life because the sate religion naturally exeludes investigation or understanding ff the actual functioning of dominant insttstions on the Orwellian principle that Ignorance is Strength, This ease of Orwell's problem is considerably more chal leniging than the one that is usually considered—by Orwell Iimselt, in paruicular—beeause the mechanisms are movesubtle and complex. For obvious reasons, it salso afar more important cae fr citizens of the democratic societies, and we ‘ean therefore predict from the principles ofthe sate religion ‘hae it wil rarely be investigated and thatthe occasional viola tion of the rsles will not be welcouned with great enthusiasm. Thad originally intended to include here a detailed inves: tigation of Orwell's problem, concentrating on the woreinter ‘sting and more importante cave of the democraticsoceties, but decided againstitforseveral reasons, one being hat the character fof inquiry into these wa problems isso different. In thecase ol Plato's problem, the questions ultimately belong to the sciences although many concepial questionsarise, including some that have long been troublesome in one or another foe The problems o discover explanatory principles, often hilen and abstract, to make some sense of phenomena that seem on ‘he surlace chaotic, discordant, lackingany meaningful pater. The study of Orvell's problem is quite different. The patterns that lie behind the most important phenomena of political, economic, and saci lile are not very ditlienlt to. discern, although tmuch effort is devoted toward obscuring the fact nd theexplanation for what will be observed by those who ean free themeelses trom the doctrines the faith ishadly profound or difficult to discover or comprehend. The study of Orwell’ ‘problem, then, is primarily a matter of accumulating evidence And examples to illustrate what showld be fairly obvious 10a tational observer even on superficial inspection, to establish the conclusion that power and privilege function much as any rational mind woutd expect, and to exhibit the mechanisms that operate to yield the results that we observe. Furthermore, the evidence and examples accumulated and the principles tunder which they fall will, virtually by definition, be intel ligble, misconstrued, distorted dismissed, or otherwise rendered irrelevant, however powerful ue case that is made with regard tothehighly systematic behavior of thestateand other dominant instiations, including the ideological institutions, The cor rectness ofthe (not patticularly profound) thesis it attempts 10 verify and establish virtually guarantees the pointlessness of the effort, in this eave. have discussed these matters elsewhere and expect to do 0 again, but the context of an inguity into the nature of language is perhaps not the appropriate place, despite the PREFACE / win ‘widespread belief, which T personally share only in part, that rmjsuse or contol of language sa eenral feature ol the problem. Thave, however, included a briet appendix touching on the ‘question, a revised version ofan anile thatappeared in Cambio (Spain)? which I expect to publish in an extended and docu- mented version elsewhere. Plato's problem isdeep and intellectually exciting: Orwell's problem, in contrast, seems to me much less so. But unless we an come to understand Orwell's problem and to recognize is Significance in ourown sodal and culuural lle, and to overcome its thechances are slim that the hurnan species will survive ong, ‘ough todiscover theanswer to Plato's problem or others that challenge the intellect and the imagination NoTes Josep Aout and Keane Slieamongobe6 South Ead, 197 with Edwand'S. Herman) Powers New Cold War New {York Pumtbeon, 182, The aie Tina South Eo oston, 188) and ‘rote knight Powerade Mandan Nettort Cosson: Sout Eo 18) — eS i it She There Quay, al. onsiningKnowledge of Language1 Knowledge of Language as a Focus of Inquiry “The study of language has along and rich history extend ing oser thousands of years. This study has frequently been understood as an inquiry into the nature of mind and thought fon the assumption that “languages are the est misror ofthe human rind” (Leibnig). common conception wasthat“with respect 10 its substance grammar is one and the sanie inal, Tanguages, though it dots vary accidentally” (Roger Bacon) The invariant "substance" was olten taken to be the mind and its acts: particular languages use various mechanisms—some ooted in human veason, othersarbiuaty andadventitious—for {eexpression of thought, which ia constant across languages (One leading eighteenth century rational grammarian delined general grammar” asa deductive science concerned with "the fumutable and general principles of spoken or writen Lan guage” and their consequences itis “prior to all languages, Deeause its principles “are the same as those that direct human reason in its intellectual operations” (Beauzée). Thus, “the science of language does nor diler at all trom rhe science of thought” "Particular grammat” is nota ue “science” in the sense ofthis rationalist tradition because iis not based solely ‘on universal necessary laws: itis an “art” of technique that shows how given languages realize the general principles of ‘human reason. as John Stuart Mill later expressed the same leading idea, "The principles and rules of grammar ate the means by which the forms of language are made to correspond With the universal forms of ought. The sracture ot every Sentence is a lesson in logic.” Others, particularly duting the2) KNOWLEDGE OF LANGUAGE -Romanticperiod, argue shat she naturesnd content of thought ate determined im part by the devices made available for is expression in particular languages. These devices may include contributions of individual genius that affect the “characte fof a language, enriching its means of expression and the thoughts expressed without affecting its “form.” its sound system and rules of word and sentence formation (Humbotdo. ‘With regard to theacquisitionof knowledge, itwas widely held thatthe mind is not "so much to be filled therewith from without, ikea vessel, as 40 be kindled and avaked” (Ralph Gudworth);" The grovth of knovledge.. [rather tesembes) the growth of Fruit, hovsever external causes may in some Agree cooperate it is the internal vigour, and virtue of thetre, that mustripenthe juices to their just maturity” Janes Hares). Applied to language, this essentially Platonistic conception ‘wolild suggest shat knowledge ofa particular language grows and mavures along a course that isin part intrinsically deter- ‘mined, with moditications reflecting observed usage. rather i the manner ofthe visual sysem or other bodily “organs” that develop longa course determined by genetic instructions under the triggering and shaping efecs of envitonmental factors. With the exception of the relativism of the Romantics, such ideas were generally regarded with much disapproval in| the mainstream of linguistic esearch by the late nineteenth ‘century andon through the 1950s In part chisatctude developed lander the impact of rather narrosely construed empivicsm land Inter behaviorist and operationalist doctrine, In part, it resulted from the quitereal and impressive successes of historical and descriptive stidies conducted within narrower compas, specifically, the discovery of "sound laws" that provided much understanding ofthe history of languages and thei relation- ships. In part twas a natural consequence ofthe investigation fof a ranch sicher variety of languages than were Known 0 ‘arlier scholars, languages that appeared toviolate many ofthe Allegedly a prion caneeptions of theealier rationalist tration ® Altera century of general neglect or abloguy, ideas resembling thoseo the earlier nadition reemerged (intially, with vetually rnoaveareness of historical antecedents) in the mid-1950s, with the development of what came to be called “generative _srammar" again, reviving long-lapsed and largely forgotten tradition. ANOWLEDGE OF LANGUAGE AS A FOCUS OF INQUIRY ‘The generative grammar of a particular language (where “generative means nothing more than “explicit isa theory Uhat is concerned with the form and meaning of expressions of this Ianguage. One can imagine many different kinds of approach to such questions, many points of view that might be adopted in dealing with them. Generative grammar limics itsel{tocerein elements this larger picture Iisstandpointis that of individual psychology. Tis concerned with those aspects of form and meaning that are determined by the “language faculty.” which is understood to be a particular component of the human mind, The natuse of this faculty is the subject matter ofa general theory of linguistic structure that aims to discover the framework of principles and elements common (0 attainable human languages: this theory is now often called universal grammar” (UG), adapting a tradicional term toa ew contest of inquisy. UG may be regarded as a cuaracteri tion of the genetically determined language faculty. One may think of this faculty as a “language acquisition device,” an innate component of the burnan mind that yields a particular language through interaction with presented experience, @ device that converts experience into a system of knowledge attained: knowledge of one or another language ‘Thestudy of generative grammar represented a significant shift of focus in theapproach to problems of language. Put in thesimplest terms, tbe elaborated below, the shittof focus as fom behavior or the products of behavior to states of the rmind/brain that enter into behavior. It one chooses to locus attention on this latter topic, the central concern Becomes Knowledge of language: its natu, origias, and use ‘The three basic questions that aris, then, are these: 2 0 () What constcutes knowledge of language Gi) How is knowledge of language acquired (Gi) How is knowledge of language put to use? The answer to the Lirst question is given by a particular generative grammar, a theory concerned with the sate of the ‘ind brain of the petson who knows & particular language. ‘The answer to the second is given by a specification of UG along with an account of the ways in which its prineiples interact with experience toyielda particular language; UGisa ‘theory ofthe “intial state“ of the language faculty. prios oany1) ANOWLEDGE OF LANGUAGE linguistic experience. The answer to the third question would bea theory of how the knowledge of language utisined enters Into the expression of thought and the understanding pe sented specimens of language, and derivacively, sno comm ‘cation and other special usev of language. So far, this is nothing more than the outline of research program that takes up classical questions thst had been put ‘side for many years Asjustdescribd, i should not be arc Iatly controversial, since it merely expresinan interest certain problems and offers preliminary analysis of how ther might beconfronted, although asisoftentheease the initial formula tion ofa problem may prove to be far-reaching i ss implicae tions, and ultimately controversial sits developed Some elements of this pieture may appear to be more controversial than they really are. Consider. for example, the {dea that thereisa language faculty. component ofthe mind brain that vields knowledge of language given presented ‘experience. [tis not at issue that humans atain knowledge of English, Japanese, and so forth, while rack, bitds, or apes do rot under the same (or indeed any) conditions. Theres, then, some property of the mind brain that difterentiates humans from rocks, birds, orapes. Is thisa distinct “language faculty" with specific structure and properties, or as some believe sit the cate that humans acquire language merely by applying seneralized learning mechanisms of some sort, pethaps with sreater efficiency or scope than other organisms? These are not topics for speculation or a priori reasoning but for empirical inquiry. and it is clear enough how to proceed: namely, by facing the questions of (1. We try to determine what is the systemot knowledge that has been attained and what properties ‘must be attributed to the inital sate of the mind’ brain to Account for its attainment, Insofar as these properties are language-specific, either individually or in the way they are organized and composed, chere is a distinct language faculty Generative grammar is sometimes refered to 48 a theory, advocated by this or that person. In fat, iis not a theory any ‘more than chemistry isa theory. Generative grammar sa topic, ‘which one may or may not choose to stud Ofcourse, ane can adopt a point of view from which chemistry disappears as discipline (perhaps it sall done by angel wit mirgors). Ty this sense, decision to study chemistry does stake otta postion on KNOWLEDGE OF LANGUAGE AS.4 FOCUS OF INQUIRY | 3 ‘matters of fact. Similarly. one may argue that the topic of ‘generative grammar does not exist although itis hard to see hhow to make this position minimally plausible. Within the study of generative grammar there have been many changes and differences of opinion, often reversion to ideas that had been abandoned and were later seconstructed ina different light Evidently shisisa healthy phentowienon indicating that thedisciplinesalive, although itissometimes, odd, regarded ssaserious deficiency sign that something s wrong with the basic approach. I will review some of these changes as we proceed. Inthe mid-1950s, certain proposals wereadvanced ast the form that answers t the questions of (1) might take, and a research program was inaugurated 10 investigate dheadequacy ‘ofthese proposalsand toshaxpen and apply them, This program vwas one of the strands that led to the development of the cognitive sciences in the contempatary sense, shaving with ther approaches the heiet that certain aspectsof themind brain can beuselully construed an the model ol computationalsystems ff rules chat form and modily representations, and that are put tose in interpretation and action, Front its origin (or with a longer perspective, one might say “itsteinearnation”) about 30 years ago, the study ol generative grammar was undertaken ‘withaneyeto gaining some insight into the natereand origins ff systems of knowledge, belief, and understanding more broadly. in the hope that these general questions could be iMluminated by a detailed investigation of the special case of hhoman language “This research programa has since been running its course longa number of diferent paths. Lill beconceried hete with fonly one of these, with the problems it faced and the steps that were taken in am effort o deal with thea, During the past 5-6 years, these eforts have converged ina somewhat unexpected ‘vay, yielding a vather different conception of the nature of Janguage nds mental representation, one that offers interest ing answvers to range of empirical questions and opens a ‘riety of new ones ta inquiry whilesuggestinga rethinking of the character of othes. This is what accounts for an unmistak able sense of energy amd anticipation-—and aso uncertauty— whieh isteminiscent of the period when thestady of generative ‘grammar inthe modern sense was initiated about 30 years ago,6 © KNOWLEDGE OF LavGeace Some ofthe warknow being done is quitedlferent in character {rom what had previously been possibleas well as considerably broader in empisical scope, and itmay beta results ola rather new kindare within reach, orat least within sight. woud like to ty 10 explain why this may be so, beginning with some remarks about goals, achievements, ard failures of the past years. To avoid misunderstanding: Tam not speaking hereabout all ofthe stdy of language but rather of generative grammar And even here Twill nt attempt anything Like eal history of| the course of research but rather will givea somevshat idealized picture that is in part clearer i retrospect than i wae a the fhme. Furthermore, what [am describing has represented a ‘minority postion throughout, and probably stil does, although jn my view its the coneet ane. A number of different current approaches share properties ofthe sort discussed here and may be imertranslatable toa considerableextent{ will notconsider this important topicliereand willalso make no elfort to survey the range of ideas, often contlicaing, that fall within the partic ‘ular tensdeney that Ill seuss seat isnow sometimes called ‘government-binding (GB) theory want to consider, then, two major conceptual shifts, one that inaugurated the contemporary study of generative gram- ‘mar, anda second, mare lacory-interal that is now in process And that offerssomenew perspectiveson traditional problems 2 Traditional and stucturalist grammar did not deal with ‘he questions of (1), he former because ofits implicit reiance fn he unanalyzed intelligence ofthe reader, the later hecanse fof its nartowness of scope. The concerns of traditional and igenerative grammar ar, in a certain sense, complementary a {good traditional or pedagogical grammar provides ull list of xeeptions regular verbs, tc). paradigmsand samples of regu lar constructions, and observations at various levels of detail and generality about the (orm and meaning ol expressions. But it does not examine the question of how the teader of the ‘grammar uses such information toaeain the knowledget hats tused to lorm and interpret new expressions, or the question of| the nature and elements of this knowledge: essentially che ‘questions of (1), above. Withaut oo much exaggeration, one Could describe such a grammar as astuctired and organized version of the data presented toa child learning a language, KNOWLEDGE OF LANGUAGE 45.4 FOCUS OF INQUIRY | 7 ‘with some general commentary and often insightful obsersa- tions. Generative grammar, in contrast, concerned primarily with the intelligence of the reader, the principles procedutes Though tobeat toattain ull iowledge ota language, Struct alist theories, both in the European and American taditions, {id concern themselves with analytic procedures for deriving, aspects of grammar fram data, as n the procedural theories of Nikolay Trubetskoy, Zellig Haris, Bernard Bloch, and others, but primarily in theareas of phondlogy and morphology. The procedures suggested were seriously inadequate and in any ‘vent could not possibly be understood fand were not intended) to provide an answer to question (li), even in the narrower domains where most work was concentrated. Nor was there an effort to determine what was involved in offering a compre hensive account of the knowledge of the speaker hearer. ‘As soon as these questions were squarely faced, a wide range of new phenomena were discovered, including quite simple ones that had passed unnoticed, and severe problems ‘rose tha had previously been ignored or seriously misunder- Stood. standard belief $0 years ago was that language acquis- tion isa case of “overlearning.” Language was regarded as a habit system, one that was assumed o be much overdetermined by available evidence, Production and interpretation of new forms was taken to be a suaightforward matter of analogy. posing no problemsof principle. Attention tothe questions of (0) quickly reveals thatexacty the opposite isthe case: language poses ina sharp and clear form what has sometimes been called Plato's problem,” the problem of “poverty of stimulus,” of accounting fr the richness, complexity, and specificity of shared knowledge, given the limitations of the data available. This dlflerence of perception concerning where the problem lies— ‘ovetlearning or poverty of evidence —rellets very clearly the effect of the shift of focus that inaugurated thestudy of generative grammar, ‘A great many examples have been given over the years to iulustrate what clearly isthe Fundamental probleny-the problem Of poverty of evidence A familiar example is the structore ‘dependence of rues, the fat that without instruction oF direct evidence, children unerringly use computationally complex Sructure-dependent rules rather than computationally simple rules that involve only the predicate “leftmost” in a linear8) RNOWLEDGE OF LANGUAGE sequence of words “Ta take some other examples, to which we ‘will return, consider sentences (2)=(7) 1 wonder wha [the men expected to see them) @ [the men expected to se them} @ Jobn ate an apple a Jobn ate o Jol is too stubborn to talk to Bill, 6 John is too stubborn to talk to a oth (2) and (3} include the clause Bounded by brackets, but ‘nly in (2) may the pronoun then be referential dependent on the antecedent the mien; in (3) the promoun fs understood 36 referring in some manner indicated in the situational oF dis. course context, but not tothe men. Numerous facts ofthis sor, falling under what is now generally called “binding theory areknown without elevancexperience to differentiate theca Such facts pose a serious problem that was not recognired in carler work: Hove does every eid know, tnerringly, osntespret the clause differently inthe ewo cases? And why does no peda- sgogic grammar have to drave the learner's attention to such Facts (which were, fact, nticed only quite recently, im the couse of the study of explicit rule systems im generative grammar Turning toexamples(}-(7),semtence(S) means that John ate something or other, a face that one might explain om the basis ofa simple inductive procedure: ae takes an abject, a8 (4), and ifthe objects missing, i is understood 3s abierary. Applying thesanie inductive procedure to 6) and(7)-itshould lye that (7) means that John i so stubborn that he (Joh) sll nottalk o.somearbitrary person, on the analogy af (6), But the meaning i. in Tact. quite different: namely. shat John is so stubbors that some arbiteaty person won't alk to him John). Again, this is known without training or televant evidence “The situations. infact, more complex. Although plausible, the inductive procedure suggested forthe relatively staight- forward examples (1}-(3) does not seem correct, As note by Howard Lisnik, the word eat has a somewhat dlfcent aneaning in is intransitive usage. something like dine. One can say "John ate his shoe.” but "John ate” cannot be understood 10 include dhiscave. The observation i general lor such cass. The KNOWLEDGE OF LANGUAGE 4S 4 FOCUS OF INQUIRY | 9 intransitive forms differ from normal intransitives in other respect; for example, we ean forin “the dancing bear” (corres: ponding to “the beas that dances”), but not “the eating man’ {corresponding to theman who eats") Such facts pose further problems of poverty of stimulus, ‘Children do notmake errorsaboutthe interpretation ofsuch sentences a8 (6)-(7) pasta certain stage of development, and it they did, theenvors would largely beuncorrectable, tis doubtful thateven the mostcompendiows traditional or teaching grammar notes such simple factsas thos illustrated in (2)=(7),and such ‘observations le far beyond the domain of structural geammats, Avwide variety of examples of this sor immediately come (0 Attention when one laces the questions formated i (), Knowledge of language is often characterized asa practical ability to speak and understand, o that questions (Ii) nd (Ii) are closely related, pethaps identified. Ordinary usage makes 2 ‘much sharper disinetion between the two questions, and is Hghtiodoso. Two people may share exactly the sameknowledge of language but diller markedly in thei ability 10 pu this Knowledge to use. Ability to use language may improve or decline without any change in knowledge. This ability may also be impaited, selectively or in general, with no loss of knowledge, a fact chat would become clear if injury leading 10 impairment recedes and lost ability is recovered. Many such considerations support the commonsense assumption that knowledge cannot be properly described a a practical ability Furthermore, even if this view could somehow be maintained, iu would leave open al of the serious questions. Thus, what is thenatureol the “practical ability” manilested in our interpre: tation a thesentenees(2)~(2), how ist properly described, and Now isi acquired? Otten its Hot immediately obvious what our knowledge of language entails in particular cases, a Tact lustated even wih short and sinaple sentences sch as 18)-00) his wile loves her husband 6 Johin is too clever to expect us to catch Bill @ Jon is too clever to expect us to cath (19) In the cae of (8), it eakes some thought to determine whether Fis can be relerentially dependent om her feushand it her isWw) KNOWLEDGE OF LANGUAGE dependent on his sife—that i, i the reerence of ether he oF seis not somehow contextually indicated” Examples (9) nd (10) are im fac, analogons to 6}and(7.respeatively, butagain, intakes some thought ta discoser that (10) meansthat John iss clever that am arbitrary person cannot expect ns catch him (John), although it ts clear ar once that it does not mean that John isso clever that he John} cannot catch some axbiteaty person, on the analogy of (9) (and (1), (3). Our abilities seem Timited somichowe in sel cases and there are las more complex ‘ones) bt it would make ite sense to speak o ou knowledge fof language a “limited” in any comparable way Suppose we insist on speaking of knowledge of langwage asa practical ability to speak and understand. Then normal tisage must he revised in numerows cases such as chose just discussed. Suppose that Jones takes a public speaking course land improves his aby to speak and understand without any change in his knowledge of English, a we word describe the situation in normal usage. We must now revise this common: Senseuisageand say. rather, that Joneshas improved hivabilty, rouse isability;tospeak and understand: similar wanslations are required in the other canes. But the two accutrences of ‘ability in this description are hardly more than homonyms Ability; is ability in the normal sense of the word: it cam improse ar decline, can he inadequate to determine consequen cevol knowledge, and so. Ability however, remains stable while our ability 10 use te changes, and wee have this kind of ‘abidity” even when we are unable to detect what it entails in concrete cases. In short, the neologisen "ability," i invested ‘with all dhe properties ot knowledge, Nore that there are cases ‘when we do speak of abilities thar we cannot pur to use: for example, the ease of swimmers ho cannot svn beeause tele Ihands are tied, although they reain the ability to swim. The rises im question are not of this sort, however The purpose ol theattempt reduce knowledgeto ability {s, presumably, to avoid problematic features that seem imhere inthe concept af knowledge. co show that these can be ‘explained in dispositional or other terms move closely related toacnial behavior (whether this possible even inthe case of| ability, the normal sense, isanather question) Butnothing of the sot is achieved by this departure fom ordinary usage: the ANOWLEDGE OF LANGUAGE 4S 4 FOCUS OF INQUIRY 1 problems remain, exactly as before, naw embedded in termino- logical confusion. The task al detesmining the nature of our knorsledge ability), and accounting fr its origins and use remains exactly as challenging as belore, despite the termino- Togical innovations ‘Other examples similar to(8)~( 10) raise further questions Consider the following sentences: John is too stubborn to expect anyone to talk (11) will John is too stubborn to visit anyone who talked (12) Bill Suppose wedeleteBill rom (11)and (12). yielding (18)and(M4), respectively John is oo stubborn to expect anyone to lkto (13) John is t00 stubborn to visit anyone who talked to (14) Sentence(1) igstructually analogous to(10), andis understood jn the same manner: it means that John is so stubborn that a1 anbiuary person would notexpectanyone to talk o him (John. "Byanalogy,” then, we wouldexpecr sentence( 1) to mean that John is so stubborn that an arbitrary person would not visi anyone who talked 10 him (John), But it does not have that meanings in Lact, 8 gibberish, Here we have a double failure fofanalogy. Sentence 14) isnotunderstood “on theanalogy" of (€), (6). (6), (9). and (12) (hencesmean ing that Jobn isso ubboun that he John) sould not visit anyone who talked «0 some arbitrary person), nor is it understood “on the analogy" of (7, (10), and (13) rather, a has no interpretation at a. And while {he status of (11), (12), and (14) is immediately obvious it takes some thought or preparation toxee that (3) as the interpreta ton itdoes have, and thus ta determine the consequences of our Lnosedge inthis case. “Again, these are facts that we know, however lificue it may be to determine that our system of knoveledge has these cconsequenees, We know thes facts without instruction or evenHf) KNOWLEDGE OF LAvGUAGE ditect evidence, snrely withont correction ol error by thespecel community. Tt ottld be absurd to ry to teach seh facts 38 these a people learning English as a second language, just 3* rho one taught them to 1s oF even presented us with evidence that could yield this knowledge by any generally reliable procedute. This is knowledge without grotnds, wihiout good Teasons or suppott by reliable procedures im any general or Domhervise seh sense ofthese notions. Were we to insist that Knovledge sea kind of ability, we would have to clam thac we tack the ability to understand “Jatin isto stubborn t talk to asmeaning "John isto stubborn 10 talk w someone or other" fon the analogy of “John atean apple —"John ate"), andthae Wwe lack theability to understand (14) on the analogy of “John ate an apple” —"Joha ate” (a that it means that John is too ‘Stubborn to visit anvone who talked 0 someone or ather)oran fe analogy of "John is too stubbora to talk 10." with the inversion strategy” that we somehow use in this case (50 that (14) means that John is 100 stubborn for someone or ose to visitamyone who talked to him, Job). But these would be odd ‘latins, say the leas, These arenot ailuses ot ability. Iris mot that we are 190 weak, or lack some special skill that could be Acquired. We ate perfectly capable of associating the sentence 1}, for example, with either of the to meanings that would be provided "by analogy” (or others) but we know that these are not the associations that aur knowledge of the language provides; ability is one hing, knowledge something quite di ferent, The system of knowledge that has somehow developed in out minds has certain cansequeners, not others it relates ‘oundand meaningandassigns sructoral properties to physical events i certain was, not others. Tt seems that there fy litle hope in accounting for out knovledgerin terms of sch ideas as inalogy. induction, associ ation, reliable procedures, good reasons, and justification in any generally weet sense, or in terms of "generalized learning mechanisms” (ifsuch exist), And itseems that weshould follow hhormal usage in distinguishing clearly between knowledge and ability to use that knowledge. We should, so it appears think of knowledge of language as. certain state ofthe mind brain, a relatively stable element in transitory mental states ‘once it isattained. furthermore, ayastate of somedistingwishable KNOWLEDGE OF LANGUAGE 48,1 FOCUS OF INQUIRY faculty of the mind—the language faculty —with its specie propertics, suuctuze, and organization, one “module” of the rnin NOTES 1. Onsheseand many other discussions primati inheseven- teent-nineicenth centuries, se Chomsky 1986). For discussion of ‘oe utinerpetation ofthis wonks ce Bracke (196), 2. The alleged «priori workin his adit Bas often been exaggerated See Chowsks (1055) and mote recent wotk (or 5. The aaition, in dhis ase, is diferent one. repented in ins unt advanced form inthe early works ofthe Indian gramarians 2,00 yeatsago. See Kipasky (1982) A moder counter pats Bloont Field 1939), which was zadialy dllerent a characte rom the work olehepeviodand inconsistent with bison theories ol language and feained vival without inlluenee or even awatenen dete Bloomlieht' eat prestige “LSee Newser (1940) for on€ view of the history of this peti prior tthe second major conceptual shift-and orsomte more Pesonat comments the sntoduetion to Chomsky L075 somes Abbreviated version of 3 1936 revision of 2 1959 manuscript, bath “unpisted, Soe Lightfoot 1982) and Hornsiin and Lghloo (1981) for discussion ol the general backgrounds for much aren work td Rison 1981) foram nttoductio tothe werk that le othe second onceptual shits. Se Chom 1) fora move technical presentation Sf soe of the deus sha entered into this conceptual stand va Riensaij and Williams (1985) for an inoductory soy of this “Although basically adopting this pointot view. WY. Quine, homer arguedthat therein ser sever, ac, insuperble problem of underdeteminationalfeciagallaspetvol language nd gramma, Sadho psychology more generally (Quine 19M 1972) donot ‘ink tat be veceede in showing that some nove orm olde teinaey alles the ty of language besond the normal under dter. ‘ination of theory by eidenee: Bs on formulations ofthe hes Tauthermore involve internal inconsistency (ae Chontaky, 1973, 1901) Ther seems uo reason on theseztouaul then to dating linguists or psschology in principle trom dhe natoral scenes in acenndance with what Hockney 11975) calls Quine's “burcaionthesis" A similar conclusion is reached by Putnam (1981) in his abarionmen of metapitsical ellen on Quinesa grounds. Hisstep ilo abandons the bilureavon thesis, although im the opposite tirection pirical stud ol thie question with 3-5-eat-old chile 7. The seaction wo sich phenomena. also unnoticed ntl teers, agai iustrates the diffrence of outlogk of titra descripsive and generative grammar, For some acttoners ofthe tone they are oberved, ithe ankwer—nothing ee is necessty or the latter the satement fh faces pes the problem besved Ch [Ney (196), parila hn prstemen about the“ pecliae sew of tamer [at] unnecessarily comptiatesche whole matter by seks iiganexplanation fr the aces Nove thatthe tsnquestion ight ‘or wrong fe, bt rather of opi of ings 1 neaty work uch face weretsed wo morivateananalescof intransitive such a ent 3 derived from corespondiag transtives by {system of ordered rules tat excluded the sted caver 4 ‘Ghomaky (1952 ‘0 On siructutes ofthis type, and problems of binding theory snore generally, se Haggenbothaen (10843) among much other Work 10. SeeFosior (1988) Butt istoonartow toregardhe’ language sodle"asan input system in Fodor's sense, Henly because sted Pere by addingan “ourpt stem,” bu pain thm eed {othe input syste, we do not expecta petwn to speak onls English andunderstand only Japanese. That the input ann spar sy ten iusteach accesa inedeytom ofknotledge. Thelaiter however isa ental sytem which havescntal problems ol meayt.afact hat brings heemite ptr into ston, Fardhermore eve rade as an input sysem. the Language male does not appear to ave the reverts of rapidity of secre that For dincasen, ay idiated by (414, Notealso thateven if Fodor isright ia beliesing tha there's 4 sharp distinction berwern odes im his sense and "ae rest” ‘whieh holistic several respects itdoes nt follow that theese invmstrueire. tn fac, his seems highly unlikely, ty ease of the “epistemic boundednex” that he tots, Many other questions sre concerning Fodor sary intriguing discussion ol thee ste, 2 Concepts of Language 21 THE COMMONSENSE CONCEPT AND DEPARTURES FROM IT Let us urn nove to the questions of (1) of Chapter. To begin with, Jet us distinguish the intuitive. pretheoretic com- monsense notion of language from various technical concepts that have been proposed with the intent of developing am eventual science of language. Let ns call the latter "scientific approaches” o language, with an eye directed more towatd possible future than a present reality, some might argue, The Scientificapproaches, [believe without exception, depart kom the commonsense notion in several ways; these departares also allet the concepts of knowledge or understanding of language vise of language, rule of language, rule-guided Linguistic Jochavior, and others, Inthe irs place, hecommonsense notion of language bas 1 crucial sociopolitical dimension. We speak of Chinese "a language.” although the various “Chinese dialects” are as diverse asthe several Romance languages. We speak of Ditch and German as wo separate languages, although somedialets ff German ate very close wo dialects that we call "Dutch" and arenot mutually intelligible with others that wecall "German. A standard remark in introductory linguistics courses is that a language isa dialect with an army and a navy (attributed £0 Max Weinreich), That any coherent account can be given of language” in this sense is doubtful surely, none fae been offered or even seriously attempted. Rather, all scientilic approaches have simply abandoned these elements of what is called “language” in common usage!6 / KNOWLEDGE OF LANGUAGE ‘Thecommonsense notionalse hasa normativeteleological element that is eliminated from scieniic approaches. do not refer here to prescriptive grammar but to sonnething else, Con: sider the way we deseribea child oraforeigne learning English Wehaveno way ofretersing directly to what thst person kiow kis not English, nor sit some other language tht resembles English. We do not for example, say that the person has a perfect knowledge of some language L,sinilar to Englist but still different trom it, What we ay is that the child o foreigner hasa “partial knowledge of English,” oris “on hisor her way” toward acquiring knowledge al English, and i they reach the ‘goal they will then know English, Whether or noca coherent Account can be given af this aspect ofthe commonsense ter nology, it does not seem to be one that has any role in an eventual science of language. I willfollow standard practicein disregarding theseaspects of the commonsense notions of language and the associated notions of rle-following and sofort, although the departare should beoted, anon may ask whether iisentrey wnocent ‘Modern linguistics commonly avoided theve questions by consideringan idealized speech community” that isinternals consistent in its Linguistic practice * For Leonard Bloomfield forexample.a languageis “thetotlity of uterancesthat can be sade in a speech community.” regarded 49 homogeneous (Bloomfield, 1928 1957). In other scientitic approaches, the same assuenption enters in one of another form, exphiitly oF {acity, in identification of the abject af inquiry. Noattemp is made o caper or formulateany concept with the sociopolitical oF normative-eleogieal aspects of informal wsage ofthe tern language.” The same is Inve of approaches that understand language to bea social product in accordance with the Sass ‘ean concept of “langue. (Of rouse, itisuusderscood tha speech communities in the Bloomnfilaian senie—that is, colletions of individuals with thesame speech behavior" —do nocexisinthereal world, Eaeh individual has acquired language in the course of complex social interactions with people who vary i the ways in whieh they speak and interpret what they hear and in the internal representations that inderlie their ase of language, Structural linguists abstracted from these facts in its attempts at teary construction; we also absraet from these fats in posing ques tions (1) of Chapter 1, considering only the as presented with uniform experience in an ideal Bloomfiel speech communtiy with io diaTac diversity and no variation among speakers. Weshouldaiso makenoteota more subtle theory-internal assumption: The language of the liypothesized speech com- tunity, apart om bring uniform, is taken to bea "pase inslance ol UG in a sense that must be made precise, and 10 which we will eturn. We exclude, for example speech com tunity of uniform speakers, each of whom speaksa mixture of Russian and French (say, an idealized version of the nine: guage of such a speech community would not he “pute” inthe elevane sense, because st would not represent asingle set choices among the ‘options permitted by UG bucrather would include "contradic: tory" choices for certain of these options. Questions 1} of Chapter |, then, aise initially under these iealations, and esauneisttue,inellet, other approaches tolanguage, although the fact isolten not explicitly recognied dnd miay even sometimes be denied ‘The logitimacy of these idealizations has sometimes been ‘questioned, but on dubious grounds." Indeed, they seem ini pensable. Surely thete is some property of mind P that would ‘ables person toacquivea language under conditions ot pure fd unitorin experience, and ssrely P (characterized by UG) i Dut (o use under the real conditions of language acquisition. ‘To deny these assumpuions would he bizare indeed: It would bbe to clan either that Language can be learned only under buman Flanguage, one attainable by the language faculty UG now is construed asthe theory of human Fanguages, 4 system of conditions deriving from the human biological ‘endowment that identifies the Elanguages that are humanly accesible under normal conditions, These are the Flanguages [Lech that R(H, L) may be tz lor norma Hi, under normal conditions). ‘Of course, theres no guarantee that this way of approach ing the problems of (1) in Chapter 1 is the corect one. This approach may «urn out to be thoroughly misguided, even ii Achieves substantial suecess—just asa sheory of valence, ete. might have waned out tobe completely off the rack, despite ts substantial succes in mineteenthcentury chemistry. eisalways reasonable wo consider altemative approaches, if they can be21 | KNOWLEDGE OF LANGUAGE devised and this wil emain true no matter what successes are Sschieved. The situation docs not sein diferent in principle from what se find in other areas of empirical inquiry. will suggest directly that in certain fundamental respects early ideas about -language were misguided and should be replaced by a rather different conception, although one formulated in the same general framework, The reasons, however, donat derive Thom any incoherence or flaw in the general approach but rather from empiical considerations of description and expla 24 THE SHIFT OF FOCUS FROM E-LANGUAGE. TO LLANGUAGE 241 On the Reasons lor the Shift of Focus In Chapter, wesaw thatthe study of generative grarnmar shifted the focus of attention trom acteal or potential behavior and the products of behavior to the system of knovledge that “underlies the ase and understanding of language, and more tdeeply, to the innate endowment that makes it possible for Inumans o attain such knowledge. The shile in focus was from the study of F-language to the study of Flanguage, from the study of language regarded as an externalized object 10 he Study of the system of knowledge of language artained and nally represented in the mind brain. A generative grammar is nota st ol statements about externaized objectsconstracted insome manner. Rather, i purports to depictexactly what one Knows when one knows a language: that is, what has heer learned, as supplemented by innate principles. UG isacharac- terization of these innate, biologically determined principles, which constitute one component of the human anind—the language faculty ‘With this shift of focus, weat once ace the questions (1) of CChapter 1. In the earliest work, the answer to (Ji) was taken t9 be that knovsledge of language is Knowledge of a cerain rule system: the answer to (Ii). that this knowledge arises trom an initial state Soiat converts experience toa "steady s3te" Sy ‘which incorporates an language. Acquisition of language i then, a matter of adding to one’s store of rules, oF modifying this system, as new data are processed. Question (Iii) breaks down ino two pats:a "perception problem” anda “production ception problem would be dealt with by onstruction of a patser that incorporates the rules of the language slong with other elements certain organization of memory and acress(perhapsa deterministicpushdowen st ucture ‘with butler ofa certain size see Mareus, 1980), certain heuristics sand so forth. A parser should not map expressions iato che Structures in theway that theseare associated bythe Language Forexampl.a parser should fal tedosoin thecaseo so-called ‘gazden-path sentences”! ot sentences that ovetload memory [orlelt-ioright pass, ishould minor tedificulties experienced wvith sentences such as (8)~(14) of Chapter Land so forth. The prodvction problem is considerably more obscure: we will Fearn 10 that “The E-language that was the object of study in most of twaditional or stacturalist gramatar ot behavioral psychology is now regarded as an epiphenomenon at best. Its status is similar to tha of other dex vate objects, say. the set of shying pails which isalsodetermined bythe -languagethatconstitutes thesystem of knowledge auained, One might argue that the slats ofthe E-language s considerably moreabscute than that fof the se of shyuning pair, since the later is determined in a faisly detnite way by the Flanguage whereas the bounds of E-language can be set one way or another. depending on some xathat arbitrary devisions as to what it should include. Summarizing, then, we have the lllowing general picture The language faculty isa distinct system Of the inind brain, ‘vith an initial state Sy common tothe species (Wa very close first approsimation, apart tom pathology. etc) andapparently ‘unique toitin essential respects ® Given approptiateesperienee, this faculty passes trom the state Sy to some relatively stable steady state, which then undergoes only peripheral motes tion (say, acquiting new vocabulary items). The attained sate Incorpotates:in -language\atis the sate ol having orknosing ‘3 particular language, UG is the theory of Sq: particular ‘grammars are theuriesof various -languages. The -anguages that can be attained with Sp fixed and experience varying are theattainable human languages, whereby “language” weroRNOWLEDGE OF LINGU mean Flanguage. The steady state has two components that can hedisinguished analytially. however, they may bemerged nd interwined: a component that is speciic to the Language jnquestion and the contribution ofthe initial state, The former comtittes whats Tearned "if thisistheappropriate concept to employ in accounting forthe transition from the initial (0 the mature sate ofthe langage Faculty: it may well not he. The system of knowledge attained—the Tlanguage— assigns a slatas to every relevant physical event, sav. every oul wave Some aresentences with adefinite meaning (ter figurative, or whatever). Some are intelligible with, perhaps. a Aelinite meaning, but are ill-formed in one way or another (the child seems sleeping”: "to whom did you wonder what. ssive®" insome dialects "who do you wonder to whom gave the hook?” inall dialect) Souneare well formed but anintelligible Somesre assigned a phonetic representation butna more they are identified as possible sentences al sone language, but noe rine, Some are mere noise. There are many possbilitis, Dit- ferent languages will assign stars differently in each ofthese andother categories, Thenotion af E-langnagehasno place in this picture, There is no issie of correctness with regard {0 E-tanguages, however characterized, because E-languages are mere aritacts, We can define “E-language” in one way oF another oF not at all, since the cancepe appears to play no tole inthe theory of langage “The shitt of focus rom E-to Flanguage, reviving and smodilying mich oer traditions, was very much in onder. The technical concept ol E-hinguageisa dubiousoneinat least respects. In the fist place, as just observed, languages a this sense ate not real-world objects but are artificial. somewhat rbitrary.and perhaps not very interesting constructs. In com trast, she seady state of knowledge attaised and the initial state Spare real elements of particalar mind brains, aspects of the physical world, where we understand mental states and repre- entation: to be physically encoded in some manner. The E language is abstracted directly as a component of the slate attained. Statements about Flanguage, about the steady state, land about the initial state Spare ire of false statements about Something real and definite, about actual sates ofthe mind CONCEPTS OF LANGUAGE» & brain and their components (under the idealizations already discussed). UG and theories of Flanguages, universal and pa ticular grammars, are on a par with scientific theories in other domains; theories of E-languages, i sensible at all, have some titferent and more obscure status because there is no come sponding eal-world object. Linguistics, conceived asthe study fof Flanguage and Sp, becomes par of psychology, ultimately biology. Lingwistis will be incorporated within the natural sciences insolar as mechanisms are discovered that have the properties revealed in these more abstract studies: indeed, one ‘Would expect that these studies will bea necessary step toward serious investigation of mechanisms." To put i differently Elanguage, however consuuued, is further removed. from mechanisms than language, ata higher order of abstraction. Correspondingly, the concept raises 2 host of new problems, and it s not at all clear whether they are worth addressing ot ‘uying t solve, given the artificial nature of the construct and lis appatent sselessness forthe theory of language. "The shift of focus is also, arguably, a shilt ward the ‘commonsense notion of language, Thsmatter is less important than the move toward realism andalso much less clea, because, smote all of these approaches deviate from thecommonsense ‘oneept in cetain respects. But itseems that when we peak ofa ‘person as knowing a language, we do not mean that he or she knows an infinite set of sentences, or sound-meaning pairs taken in extension, orasetofacts or behaviors;rather, what we ‘mean is thatthe person knows what makes sound anda ‘elatetooneanother in specificway, what makes then Te Were isaruleof English thatobjectsfollow verbs, asdistinet from the tule of Japanese that verbs follow objects, we are not saving, ‘at this i a rue of some sec of sentences or behaviors, but sather that itisarue ofa system of ules, English, an -language. The rules ofthe language ate not rules of some i formal objects at potential actions but are rales that form or constiute the language, like Articles oft rules of chess (nota set of moves, bul game, particular rule28 | KNOWLEDGE OF LANGH'AGE system), OF the various trchnical notions that have been devel ‘pedin the study of language, theenncept of Language seems ‘loser ta the commonsense notion than othess. The shift of perspective from the technical concept E- language tothe echnical concept Flanguage iakenas the abject, fof inquiry is therefore a shift toward realism in two respects foward the study ofa rel abject rather than an artical com: Struct, and toward the study of ehat we really mean by "a Tangwage’ of “knowledge of language” in informal usage (again, abstracting from sociopolitical and normativeteleo- logical factors (Of these two considerations, the Lirst isthe clearer ana more impostant Is not ta be expected thatthe concepts that are appropriate for the description and understanding of some System of the physical world (say, [langage and Sy) will include the sometimes similar concepts of normal discourse justas the physicists concepts of energy or massare not those of| Drdinary usage. Furthermore, many questions arise about che tusage of the intuitive eoneepts that have no obvious velevance| totheinquity intothenarureaf thereal objects, Llanguageand Sp. Suppose, for example, that a Martian with aquite different Kindot ind brain wereto produceand to mdestand sentences fof English as we do, but as investigation would show. using. ‘quite different elements and rles—say, without words, the Smallest nits being memorized phrases, and with 2 rotally illerent rule system and UG. Would we then say that the Martian is speaking the same langwage? Within what limits ‘would we say this? Similar questions arise as 10 whether an antfiial system is exhibiting some form of intelligence ot dunderstanding. These iav he reasonable questions concerning the intuitive concepts of languge and the ike in colloquial lusage, but its not clear that they have much beating on the inguiry into the real-world objects, Flanguage and the initial state So" ‘Theconeeptual shift fom E-language to language from Ihehavior and its products 10 the system of knowledge chat enters into behavior, was in part obseared by accidents of| Publishing history, andexpository passages taken ou ofcontext Ihave given rie to occasional misunderstanding, Some ques- tionable terrainological decisions also comtibuted co misin- CONCEPTS OF LANGUAGE | 28 derstanding. In dhe hterature of generative grammar, the erm language” has regularly been used fo E-languagein thesense ‘ofasetaf well-lormed sentences. mote of lessalong the Lines of Bloomfields detinition of “language” asa “totality of utteran- ces." The term "grammar" seas then used with systematic Subiguity to reer to what we have here called “language dnd alo o the linguist’ stheory of theT-Language:thesamme was teue ofthe term UG, introduced later with the samesystematic anbiguity,relerring to Sy and the theory of Sp. Because the focus of attention was on Hlanguage. E-language being a derivative and largely avilicial constsuct, wend the paradox fecal situation that in work devoted to language, the tera" guage” barely appears. In my 1965 book aspects of the Theory of Syntax. tor example. there sno eur for “language’ in the Index, but many enties under “grasnmar,” generally refering, to Flanguage, It yond have been preterable to use the term “language in something closer to the intuitive sense of snforial usage thats, wo use the wera “Language’ asa technical term in place of “(generative) grammar” (in the sense of Llanguage) while adopting some echnical erm perhaps “E-language” for what ‘wascalled language.” Thetera(gencrative) grammar” would then have naturally been used forthe linguists theory ofthe (L-) language. along the lines of the preceding discussion. Much ‘confusion might have been spared in his way. Tauspec that the Aebate in past years over the alleged problents concerning the coneepis grammar and knowledge of grammar may i part be twaced o these unfortunate terminological choices. which ein forced inappropriate analogies othe formal sciences and gave rigeto the etroneousidca thatthe stad of gramimat poses new. complex, and perhaps intractable plosophical issues com: pated with dhe stay of language. “The misleading choice of terms was, in part, ahistorical accident Thestady of generative grammar developed trom the ontluence of wo intellectual traditions traditional and ste turalist grammar, and the stady of formal systeris, Although there are iuportane precursors as noc until the wi 19 tae these intellectual eurtents aly merged, as ideas adapted from the study of loramal ssstems came wo he applied to the tar move complex systems of natural language in somethingM0) KNOWLEDGE OF LaNGwAcE approaching their acual richness, and in subsequent years, Their actsal varity, thus making it posstle.seally or the bist time, to give some substance to Humboldr’s aphorism that language involves the infinite use of finite means," the "finite means” being those that constiute the Flange. But the study of formal languages was misleading inthis regard, When weatudy, say, thelanguageot arithmetic, wemay take it to be a “given” abstract object: an infinite lass of sentences in some given notation, Certain expressions in this notation are well-formed sentences, others ate not. And of the twellformed sentences, some express arithmetical truths, some donot. A "grammar for sich a system is simply some set of rules that specifies exactly the wellformied sentences. fn this ‘cise, there i no further question ofthe correct choice of gram: mar, and there is no tut or falsity to the mater af choosing among such grammars. Much the same is true of alternative ‘axiomatizations, although in this case we know that none of them will cape exactly the truths I is e459 10 se how one might take over from the study of formal anguages the idea thatthe “Langage” is somehowe given a aset of sentences oF sentence-meaning pait, while the grammars some character: zation ofthis infinite set of objects, hence, it might be thought, construct that may be selected one way oF another depending fon convenience or other extrancaus concerns. The move is fonderstandable, but misguided, and it has engendered much pointless ciacussion and conuoversy Recall Quine’s conclusion, cited above (p. 20), that itis senseles to take ome gramunat rather than another tobe “core if they ate extensionally equivalent, and Lewis's doubts that there isany way "to make objective sense of theassertion that # ‘grammar G isused bya population P whereas another graminat which generates the same languageas G, isnot." Itisquite true that for every E-language, however we choose ta define this notion, dhereare many grammars (.e., many grammars, ach of ‘which isa theory ofa particular Flanguage that, under some convention that one has adopted, determines this E-languagc. Buc this is a matter of no consequence. In the case of some {formal system, say avithinetic (presumably the model in mind see ansume the class of wellformed formulas in some novation tobe "given," andweselect the “grammar” (therulesof founa CONCEPTS OF LANGUAGE | $1 JF Language isnot “given.” Whatis ue nite aay afdaia on the basis of Which the child's mind (incorporating Sy) constructs an T- Janguage that assigns a status to every expression, and that we ‘may think of as generating some E-language under one or another stipulated convention (or we may dispense with this apparently supertluous step. What is given tthe linguist are Finite astays of data oun varlousspeech communities, including ‘much data not vaslable to thelanguage learner, the basis of ‘whieh the linguist wil attempt ta discover the natareof Spand ofthe particular Languages atained. The account presented bby Quine, Lewis. and others has the story backwards: E> Tanguages are not given, but are devivative, more remote [ro dtaand rom mechanisms than Llanguages and the grammes Uiatare theories ol Fanguages; the choice of E-language there fore raises shot of new and additional problems beyond those ‘comected with grammar and language. Whether itis worth ‘whileaddressing or attempting to olve these problems is otat allcleas, because the concept of E-language, however costed, appeatsto have no significance. The belie! that E-languageis fairly clea notion whereas Fanguage or graromar raises serious, perhaps intracable philosophical problems, is quite mistaken. Just the opposite is rue. There are numerous problems con: ‘erning the notions Llanguage and grammar, but not the ones raised in these discussions should be noted that familiar characteriations of “lan: guage” as «code or a game point correctly toward F-language, ‘ot the artiticial construct F-langusge. A code is nota set of Fepresentations but rather a speciticsy stem ofsules that assigns Coded representations to message representations. Two codes rauy be uillerent, although exteasionally identical im the rmessage-code pairings that they provide. Similarly, a game s fot set of moves but rather the rule system that underlies them. The Saussurean concept of langue, although far too narrow in conception, might be interpreted as appropriate in thistespect-Thesameis:rucof Quine’s definition ala language 44s3°“complexol present dispositions o verbal behavior” smsofar 4s i focahes om somie internal state rather than E-langwage, although iis unacceprable for other reasons: Thus, ovo indi- ‘duals who speak he same language may differ radically ia32 |. RNOILEDGE OF LANGUAGE their dispositions to verbal behavior, and if dispositions are characterized in terms of probabilicy of response winder given ‘conditions, then iis impossible to identify languages in these terms; and again, the fundamental question of the we and understanding of new sentences lett withoueany explanation. Pethaps the clearest account is Jespersen’s in terms of the ‘notion of srueture” that guides ihe speaker “in framing ser tenes of his own..." these being “free expressions ‘As we have seen, these ideas became the focus fin the study of generative grammar, although not without controversy. Saussurean structralism had placed Jespersen’s dobsereation about "Feeexpressions” outside ofthe cope ofthe ‘ual of language structar, of Sanssute’s langue. Bloomfield (1938) held that when a speaker produces speech forms that he thas not heard, “we say that he utters them o7 the analogy of similar forms which he has heard," position later adopted by Quine. CF. Hocker, and thefev others who even attempted 10 deal with the problem. This idea is not wrong but rather i ‘acwoustatl uke concept of analogy is spelled outin a way that explains why certain “analogies” are somehow valid whereas thers are not, a task shat requitesaraccaly dilterent approach tothe whale question, Why, for example, ate sentences (6) and (7) of Chapter I (p. 8) not understood “on the analogy” of (1), land (5)? Why is sentence (14) not understood “on the analogy” ‘fany of the earlier examples, n fact given no interpretation at all? We can give substance to the proposal by explaining “analogy” in terms of Flanguage,asystem of rulesand prine piles that assigns representations of form and meaning to lin- [uisticexpressions, but ather way odo so has been proposed: and sith this necessary revision in the proposal, it becomes ‘lear that “analogy” is simply an inappropriate concept in the first place. Thave heen freely using various commonsense notions such as “knowledge,” “ralefollowing,” and so lovth inthis fecount, Variousquestions have heen raised about the legitimacy fl this usage. Twill put thesequestions off for now returning to ‘hem ia Chapter 4, but meanwhile continuing tose the et ms Think the usage here is reasonably in accord with common usage, bur nothing of great moment it stake, and one could induce technical terms for our purpose, giving ther the teaning requited for this discussion Sometimes it as been suggested that knowledge of lan- sage should be understood on the analogy of knovledge of Shithmetcaridhmetic being lakes to bean abstract Platonic entity thatexissapartfrorvany medal stmctues isnot in Question here that there docs exist what we have called an inernalied language (described by what Thomas Bevr calls “"apeychogrammar’ and that itis a problem of dhe natural sciences to discover it. What is claimed is that apart froma Particular languages, theressomethingelseadditional. what ‘ne might call "Panguages” (P-English, P-Japanes, et) existing ina Platonic heaven alongside of arithmetic and (per bape) se theory, and thats person who we say knows English smay not, in fact, have complete knowledge of P-English, ot, need, say not know iat all. Similarly, he best dhory ofthe Tanguage, of what this person actually knows might not be the beat thcory of what is selected on some grounds to be PeEnglish Theanalogytoarithmeticis however, quiteunpersuasve In the case of arithmetic, there fat least a certain nit plausibility toa Platonstic ew isola as the uth of ai Toctic ate what they ate independent of any fats of individual prschology ad weseem totiscover theses somewhat in the way that we discover facts aboute psa would, Inthe ‘eo! language, however, the coresponding poston i wholly ‘without merit There sno inital plausibility tothe dea that part trom the withs of grammar concerning the Flanguage and the auths of UG-coneeruing Sy there isan additonal ‘domain of fact about Planguage, independent of any psycho: logical sates of indisiduals Knowing everthing abot the rind brain.a Platenistwouldargue, westll have no bess fr detente rus of arithmetic or set theory bu there is not the slightest reason to suppose thar there are truths of language that would sil escape out grasp. Of course one cin construct abstract enfin at wil, and see cam decide 0 call Some of them “English” or “Japanese” and to deline“linguis: tis as the study of dese absuact objects and thus not par of the natural cence, which are concerned with such endl 35