Republic of the 

Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
 
EN BANC
 
 
THE CIVIL SERVICE                                       G.R. No. 187858
COMMISSION,
                                    Petitioner,                      Present:
                                                                       
                                                                 CORONA, C.J.,     
                                                                 CARPIO,
                                                                 VELASCO, JR.,
                                                                 LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
                                                                 BRION,
                                                                     PERALTA,
                 - versus -                                 BERSAMIN,
                                                                 DEL CASTILLO,*
                                                                 ABAD,**
                                                                 VILLARAMA, JR.,
                                                                 PEREZ,
                                                                     MENDOZA,** and
                                        SERENO, JJ.
                                          
                                                               Promulgated:                  
RICHARD G. CRUZ,
                        Respondent.                   AUGUST 9, 2011         
    x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
                                                                                               
DECISION
 
BRION, J.:
 
This petition for review on certiorari assails the decision[1] and the
resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 105410.  These
assailed CA rulings reversed and set aside the ruling of the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) in Resolution No. 080305[3] that denied respondent Richard G.
Cruz’s prayer for the award of back salaries as a result of his reinstatement to his
former position. 
 
THE FACTS
 
          The respondent, Storekeeper A of the City of Malolos Water District
(CMWD), was charged with grave misconduct and dishonesty by CMWD General
Manager (GM) Nicasio Reyes.  He allegedly uttered a false, malicious and
damaging statement (Masasamang tao ang mga BOD at General Manager) against
GM Reyes and the rest of the CMWD Board of Directors (Board); four of the
respondent’s subordinates allegedly witnessed the utterance. The dishonesty
charge, in turn, stemmed from the respondent’s act of claiming overtime pay
despite his failure to log in and out in the computerized daily time record for three
working days.
 
          The respondent denied the charges against him. On the charge of grave
misconduct, he stressed that three of the four witnesses already retracted their
statements against him. On the charge of dishonesty, he asserted that he never
failed to log in and log out. He reasoned that the lack of record was caused by
technical computer problems. The respondent submitted documents showing that
he rendered overtime work on the three days that the CMWD questioned.
 
          GM Reyes preventively suspended the respondent for 15 days. Before the
expiration of his preventive suspension, however, GM Reyes, with the approval of
the CMWD Board, found the respondent guilty of grave misconduct and
dishonesty, and dismissed him from the service.[4]
 
 CSC RULING
 
          The respondent elevated the findings of the CMWD and his dismissal to the
CSC, which absolved him of the two charges and ordered his reinstatement.  In
CSC Resolution No. 080305, the CSC found no factual basis to support the charges
of grave misconduct and dishonesty.
 
In ruling that the respondent was not liable for grave misconduct, the CSC
held:
 
Cruz was adjudged guilty of grave misconduct for his alleged utterance of such
maligning statements, “MASASAMANG TAO ANG MGA BOD AT GENERAL
MANAGER”. However, such utterance, even if it were true, does not constitute a
flagrant disregard of rule or was actuated by corrupt motive. To the mind of the
Commission, it was a mere expression of disgust over the management style of
the GM and the Board of Directors, especially when due notice is taken of the fact
that the latter officials were charged with the Ombudsman for various anomalous
transactions.[5]
 
In ruling that the charge of dishonesty had no factual basis, the CSC
declared:
 
            Based on the records of the case, the Commission is not swayed that the
failure of Cruz to record his attendance on April 21 and 22, 2007 and May 5,
2007, while claiming overtime pay therefor, amounts to dishonesty. Cruz duly
submitted evidence showing his actual rendition of work on those days. The
residents of the place where he worked attested to his presence thereat on the days
in question.[6]
         
The CSC, however, found the respondent liable for violation of reasonable
office rules for his failure to log in and log out. It imposed on him the penalty of
reprimand but did not order the payment of back salaries.
         
The CMWD and the respondent separately filed motions for reconsideration
against the CSC ruling.  CMWD questioned the CSC’s findings and the
respondent’s reinstatement. The respondent, for his part, claimed that he is entitled
to back salaries in light of his exoneration from the charges of grave misconduct
and dishonesty. The CSC denied both motions.
 
Both the CMWD and the respondent elevated the CSC ruling to the
CA via separate petitions for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.  The CA
dismissed the CMWD’s petition and this ruling has lapsed to finality. [7]  Hence, the
issue of reinstatement is now a settled matter. As outlined below, the CA ruled in
the respondent’s favor on the issue of back salaries. This ruling is the subject of the
present petition with us. 
 
CA RULING
 
Applying the ruling in Bangalisan v. Hon. CA,[8] the CA found merit in the
respondent’s appeal and awarded him back salaries from the time he was dismissed
up to his actual reinstatement. The CA reasoned out that CSC Resolution No.
080305 totally exonerated the respondent from the charges laid against him. The
CA considered the charge of dishonesty successfully refuted as the respondent
showed that he performed overtime service.  The CA thereby rejected the CSC’s
contention that the charge of dishonesty had been merely downgraded to a lesser
offense; the CA saw the finding in CSC Resolution No. 080305 to be for an
offense (failing to properly record his attendance) entirely different from the
dishonesty charge because their factual bases are different. Thus, to the CA, CSC
Resolution No. 080305 did not wholly restore the respondent’s rights as an
exonerated employee as it failed to order the payment of his back salaries.  The CA
denied the CSC’s motion for reconsideration.
 
ISSUE
 
WHETHER OR NOT [THE] RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO BACK
SALARIES AFTER THE CSC ORDERED HIS REINSTATEMENT TO HIS
FORMER POSITION, CONSONANT WITH THE CSC RULING THAT HE
 WAS GUILTY ONLY OF VIOLATION OF REASONABLE OFFICE
RULES AND REGULATIONS.[9]
 
 
CSC’s position
         
          The CSC submits that the CA erred in applying the ruling in Bangalisan,
requiring as a condition for entitlement to back salaries that the government
employee be found innocent of the charge and that the suspension be unjustified.
CSC Resolution No. 080305 did not fully exculpate the respondent but found him
liable for a lesser offense. Likewise, the respondent’s preventive suspension
pending appeal was justified because he was not exonerated.   
 
          The CSC also submits that the factual considerations in Bangalisan are
entirely different from the circumstances of the present case. In Bangalisan, the
employee, Rodolfo Mariano, a public school teacher, was charged with grave
misconduct for allegedly participating, together with his fellow teachers, in an
illegal mass action. He was ordered exonerated from the misconduct charge
because of proof that he did not actually participate in the mass action, but was
absent from work for another reason. Although the employee was found liable for
violation of office rules and regulations, he was considered totally exonerated
because his infraction stemmed from an act entirely different (his failure to file a
leave of absence) from the act that was the basis of the grave misconduct charge
(the unjustified abandonment of classes to the prejudice of the students).
         
The CSC argues that in the present case, the charge of dishonesty and the
infraction committed by the respondentstemmed from a single act – his failure to
properly record his attendance. Thus, the respondent cannot be considered totally
exonerated; the charge of dishonesty was merely downgraded to a violation of
reasonable office rules and regulations.
 
          Accordingly, the CSC posits that the case should have been decided
according to our rulings in Jacinto v. CA[10] and De la Cruz v. CA[11] where we held
the award of back salaries to be inappropriate because the teachers involved were
not fully exonerated from the charges laid against them.
 
The respondent’s position
 
          The respondent maintains that he is entitled to reinstatement and back
salaries because CSC Resolution No. 080305 exonerated him from the charges laid
against him; for the purpose of entitlement to back salaries, what should control is
his exoneration from the charges leveled against him by the CMWD. That the
respondent was found liable for a violation different from that originally charged is
immaterial for purposes of the back salary issue.
 
          The respondent also asserts that the Bangalisan ruling squarely applies since
the CSC formally admitted in its Comment to CMWD’s petition for review before
the CA that the penalty of reprimand is not a reduced penalty for the penalty of
dismissal imposable for grave misconduct and dishonesty.[12]
 
THE COURT’S RULING
 
          We deny the petition for lack of merit.    
 
The issue of entitlement to back salaries, for the period of suspension
pending appeal,[13] of a government employee who had been dismissed but was
subsequently exonerated is settled in our jurisdiction. The Court’s starting point for
this outcome is the “no work-no pay” principle – public officials are only entitled
to compensation if they render service.  We have excepted from this general
principle and awarded back salaries even for unworked days to illegally dismissed
or unjustly suspended employees based on the constitutional provision that “no
officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for
cause provided by law”;[14] to deny these employees their back salaries amounts to
unwarranted punishment after they have been exonerated from the charge that led
to their dismissal or suspension.[15]
 
The present legal basis for an award of back salaries is Section 47, Book V
of the Administrative Code of 1987.
 
Section 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. – x x x.
 
(4) An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory, and in case the
penalty is suspension or removal, the respondent shall beconsidered as having
been under preventive suspension during the pendency of the appeal in the event
he wins an appeal. (italics ours)
 
 
This provision, however, on its face, does not support a claim for back salaries
since it does not expressly provide for back salaries during this period; our
established rulings hold that back salaries may not be awarded for the period
of preventive suspension[16] as the law itself authorizes its imposition so that its
legality is beyond question.
 
To resolve the seeming conflict, the Court crafted two conditions before an
employee may be entitled to back salaries: a)the employee must be found innocent
of the charges and b) his suspension must be unjustified.[17] The reasoning behind
these conditions runs this way: although an employee is considered under
preventive suspension during the pendency of a successful appeal, the law itself
only authorizes preventive suspension for a fixed period; hence, his suspension
beyond this fixed period is unjustified and must be compensated.
         
          The CSC’s rigid and mechanical application of these two conditions may
have resulted from a misreading of our rulings on the matter; hence, a look at our
jurisprudence appears in order.
 
Basis for award of back salaries
 
 
The Court had the occasion to rule on the issue of entitlement to back
salaries as early as 1941,[18] when Section 260 of the Revised Administrative Code
of 1917 (RAC)[19] was the governing law. The Court held that a government
employee, who was suspended from work pending final action on his
administrative case, is not entitled to back salaries where he was ultimately
removed due to the valid appointment of his successor.  No exoneration or
reinstatement, of course, was directly involved in this case; thus, the question of
back salaries after exoneration and reinstatement did not directly arise.  The Court,
however, made the general statement that:
 
As a general proposition, a public official is not entitled to any compensation
if he has not rendered any service, and the justification for the payment of
salary during the period of suspension is that the suspension was
unjustified or that the official was innocent. Hence, the requirement that, to
entitle to payment of salary during suspension, there must be either reinstatement
of the suspended person or exoneration if death should render reinstatement
impossible.[20] (emphasis and underscoring ours)
 
 
In Austria v. Auditor General,[21] a high school principal, who was penalized
with demotion, claimed payment of back salaries from the time of his suspension
until his appointment to the lower position to which he was demoted. He argued
that his later appointment even if only to a lower position of classroom teacher
amounted to a reinstatement under Section 260 of the RAC. The Court denied his
claim, explaining that the reinstatement under Section 260 of the RAC refers to the
same position from which the subordinate officer or employee was suspended and,
therefore, does not include demotional appointments. The word “reinstatement”
was apparently equated to exoneration. 
 
 In the 1961 case of Gonzales v. Hon. Hernandez, etc. and
Fojas  interpreting the same provision, the Court first laid down the requisites for
[22]

entitlement to back salaries.  Said the Court:     

 
A perusal of the decisions of this Court[23] x x x show[s] that back salaries are
ordered paid to an officer or an employee only if he is exonerated of the
charge against him and his suspension or dismissal is found and declared to
be illegal. In the case at bar, [the employee] was not completely exonerated,
because although the decision of the Commissioner of Civil Service [ordering
separation from service] was modified and [the employee] was allowed to be
reinstated, the decision [imposed upon the employee the penalty of two months
suspension without pay]. [emphasis and underscoring ours]
 
 
Obviously, no exoneration actually resulted and no back salary was due; the
liability for the offense charged remained, but a lesser penalty was imposed.
 
In Villamor, et al. v. Hon. Lacson, et al.,[24] the City Mayor ordered the
dismissal from the service of city employees after finding them guilty as charged.
On appeal, however, the decision was modified by considering “the suspension of
over one year x x x, already suffered x x x [to be] sufficient punishment”[25] and by
ordering their immediate reinstatement to the service. The employees thereupon
claimed that under Section 695 of the RAC, the punishment of suspension without
pay cannot exceed two (2) months. Since the period they were not allowed to work
until their reinstatement exceeded two months, they should be entitled to back
salaries corresponding to the period in excess of two months. In denying the
employees’ claim for back salaries, the Court held:
 
The fallacy of [the employees’] argument springs from their assumption that the
modified decision had converted the penalty to that of suspension. The modified
decision connotes that although dismissal or resignation would be the proper
penalty, the separation from work for the period until their reinstatement, would
be deemed sufficient. Said decision did not, in the least, insinuate that suspension
should have been the penalty.
 
x x x [T]he modified decision did not exonerate the petitioners. x x x
And even if we consider the punishment as suspension, before a public official or
employee is entitled to payment of salaries withheld, it should be shown that the
 suspension was unjustified or that the employee was innocent of the charges
proffered against him.[26]  
 
 
On the whole, these rulings left the application of the conditions for the
award of back salaries far from clear. Jurisprudence did not strictly observe the
requirements earlier enunciated in Gonzales as under subsequent rulings, the
innocence of the employee alone served as basis for the award of back salaries.
 
The innocence of the employee as sole basis for
an award of back salaries  
 
 
In Tan v. Gimenez, etc., and Aguilar, etc.,[27] we ruled that the payment of
back salary to a government employee, who was illegally removed from office
because of his eventual exoneration on appeal, is merely incidental to the ordered
reinstatement.   
 
Tan was subsequently reiterated in Tañala v. Legaspi, et al.,[28] a case
involving an employee who was administratively dismissed from the service
following his conviction in the criminal case arising from the same facts as in the
administrative case. On appeal, however, he was acquitted of the criminal charge
and was ultimately ordered reinstated by the Office of the President. Failing to
secure his actual reinstatement, he filed a mandamus petition to compel his
superiors to reinstate him and to pay his back salaries from the date of his
suspension to the date of his actual reinstatement. We found merit in his plea and
held: 
 
 
[The employee] had been acquitted of the criminal charges x x x, and the
President had reversed the decision x x x in the administrative case which ordered
his separation from the service, and the President had ordered his reinstatement to
his position, it results that the suspension and the separation from the service of
the [employee] were thereby considered illegal. x x x.
 
 x x x [In this case,] by virtue of [the President’s order of reinstatement],
[the employee’s] suspension and separation from the service x x x was thereby
declared illegal, so that for all intents and purposes he must be considered as not
having been separated from his office. The lower court has correctly held that the
[employee] is entitled to back salaries.[29]
 
The Tañala ruling was reiterated in Cristobal v. Melchor,[30] Tan, Jr.  v.
Office of the President,[31] De Guzman v. CSC[32] and Del Castillo v. CSC[33] - cases
involving government employees who were dismissed after being found
administratively liable, but who were subsequently exonerated on appeal.
 
In Garcia v. Chairman Commission on Audit,[34] the Court held that – where
the employee, who was dismissed after being found administratively liable for
dishonesty, was acquitted on a finding of innocence in the criminal case (for
qualified theft) based on the same acts for which he was dismissed – the executive
pardon granted him in the administrative case (in light of his prior acquittal)
entitled him to back salaries from the time of his illegal dismissal up to his actual
reinstatement.
 
The above situation should be distinguished from the case of an employee
who was dismissed from the service after conviction of a crime and who was
ordered reinstated after being granted pardon. We held that he was not entitled to
back salaries since he was not illegally dismissed nor acquitted of the charge
against him.[35] 
 
Incidentally, under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,[36] if the public
official or employee is acquitted of the criminal charge/s specified in the law, he is
entitled to reinstatement and the back salaries withheld during his
suspension, unlessin the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed
against him.
 
In Tan, Jr. v. Office of the President,[37] the Court clarified that the silence of
Section 42 (Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending Administrative
Investigation) of the Civil Service Decree[38] on the payment of back salaries,
unlike its predecessor,[39] is no reason to deny back salaries to a dismissed civil
servant who was ultimately exonerated.          
 
Section 42 of P.D. No. 807, however, is really not in point x x x [as] it
does not cover dismissed civil servants who are ultimately exonerated and ordered
reinstated to their former or equivalent positions. The rule in the latter instance,
just as we have said starting with the case of Cristobal vs. Melchor is that when "a
government official or employee in the classified civil service had been illegally
dismissed, and his reinstatement had later been ordered, for all legal purposes he
is considered as not having left his office, so that he is entitled to all the rights and
privileges that accrue to him by virtue of the office that he held."[40]
 
 
          These cited cases illustrate that a black and white observance of the
requisites in Gonzales is not required at all times. The common thread in these
cases is either the employee’s complete exoneration of the administrative charge
against him (i.e., the employee is not found guilty of any other offense), or the
employee’s acquittal of the criminal charge based on his innocence. If the case
presented falls on either of these instances, the conditions laid down
in Gonzales become the two sides of the same coin; the requirement that the
suspension must be unjustified is automatically subsumed in the other requirement
of exoneration.
 
Illegal suspension as sole basis for an award of
back salaries
 
 
By requiring the concurrence of the two conditions, Gonzales apparently
made a distinction between exoneration and unjustified suspension/dismissal. This
distinction runs counter to the notion that if an employee is exonerated, the
exoneration automatically makes an employee’s suspension unjustified. However,
in Abellera v. City of Baguio, et al.,[41] the Court had the occasion to illustrate the
independent character of these two conditions so that the mere illegality of an
employee’s suspension could serve as basis for an award of back salaries.
  
Abellera, a cashier in the Baguio City Treasurer’s Office, was ordered
dismissed from the service after being found guilty of dishonesty and gross
negligence. Even before the period to appeal expired, the City of Baguio dismissed
him from the service. On appeal, however, the penalty imposed on him was
reduced “to two months suspension, without pay” although the appealed decision
was affirmed “in all other respects.”
 
When the issue of Abellera’s entitlement to back salaries reached the Court,
we considered the illegality of Abellera’s suspension - i.e., from the time he was
dismissed up to the time of his actual reinstatement – to be a sufficient ground to
award him back salaries.
 
The rule on payment of back salaries during the period of suspension of a
member of the civil service who is subsequently ordered reinstated, is already
settled in this jurisdiction. Such payment of salaries corresponding to the period
when an employee is not allowed to work may be decreed not only if he is found
innocent of the charges which caused his suspension (Sec. 35, RA 2260), but also
when the suspension is unjustified.
 
In the present case, upon receipt of the [Civil Service Commissioner’s]
decision x x x finding [Abellera] guilty, but even before the period to appeal had
expired, [the Baguio City officials] dismissed [Abellera] from the service and
another one was appointed to replace him.[Abellera’s] separation x x x before
the decision of the Civil Service Commissioner had become final was
evidently premature.[The Baguio City officials] should have realized that
[Abellera] still had the right to appeal the Commissioner's decision to the Civil
Service Board of Appeals within a specified period, and the possibility of that
decision being reversed or modified.[42] As it did happen on such appeal x x x the
penalty imposed by the Commissioner was reduced x x x to only 2 months
suspension. And yet, by [the Baguio City officials’] action, [Abellera] was
deprived of work for more than 2 years. Clearly, Abellera’s second suspension
from office [i.e., from the time he was dismissed up to his actual
reinstatement] was unjustified, and the payment of the salaries corresponding
to said period is, consequently, proper.[43]  (emphases and underscoring ours)
 
 
The import of the Abellera ruling was explained by the Court in the
subsequent case of Yarcia v. City of Baguio[44] that involved substantially similar
facts. The Court clarified that the award of back salaries in Abellera was based on
the premature execution of the decision (ordering the employee’s dismissal from
the service), resulting in the employee’s unjustified “second suspension.” Under
the then Civil Service Rules, the Commissioner of Civil Service had the discretion
to order the immediate execution of his decision in administrative cases “in the
interest of public service.” Unlike in Abellera, this discretion was exercised
in Yarcia; consequently, the employee’s separation from the service pending his
appeal “remained valid and effective until it was set aside and modified with the
imposition of the lesser penalty.”[45]
 
The unjustified “second suspension” mentioned in Abellera actually refers to
the period when the employee was dismissed from the service up to the time of his
actual reinstatement. Under our present legal landscape, this period refers to
“suspension pending appeal.”[46]  
 
In Miranda v. Commission on Audit,[47] the Court again had the occasion to
consider the illegality of the suspension of the employee as a separate ground to
award back salaries. Following the filing of several administrative charges against
him, Engr. Lamberto Miranda was “preventively” suspended from June 2,
1978 to May 7, 1986. He was reinstated on May 22, 1986. On October 7, 1986, the
administrative case against him was finally dismissed “for lack of evidence.”
When his claim for back salaries (from the time he was “preventively” suspended
up to his actual reinstatement) was denied by the Commission on Audit, he brought
a certiorari petition with this Court.
 
In granting the petition, the Court ruled that since the law[48] limits the
duration of preventive suspension to a fixed period, Engr. Miranda’s suspension
for almost eight (8) years is “unreasonable and unjustified.” Additionally, the
Court observed that the dropping of the administrative case against Engr. Miranda
for lack of evidence “is even an eloquent manifestation that the suspension is
unjustified.”[49] The Court held:
 
This being so, Engineer Miranda is entitled to backwages during the period of his
suspension as it is already settled in this jurisdiction that a government official or
employee is entitled to backwages not only if he is exonerated in the
 administrative case but also when the suspension is unjustified.[50]  (emphases
and underscoring ours)
 
 
Jurisprudential definition of exoneration
 
The mere reduction of the penalty on appeal does not entitle a government
employee to back salaries if he was not exonerated of the charge against him. This
is the Court’s teaching in City Mayor of Zamboanga v. CA.[51] In this case, the
employee was initially found guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct and was
given the penalty of dismissal by the City Mayor of Zamboanga. On appeal,
however, the CA limited the employee’s guilt to improper conduct and
correspondingly reduced the penalty to “six-months suspension without pay with a
stern warning that repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more
severely."[52] The CA also awarded him “full backwages.”[53]
 
We held that the CA erred in awarding back salaries by reiterating the
principle that back salaries may be ordered paid to an officer or employee only if
he is exonerated of the charge against him and his suspension or dismissal is found
and declared to be illegal.[54]
 
The Court had the occasion to explain what constitutes “exoneration”
in Bangalisan v. Hon. CA,[55] the respondent’s cited case.  In this case, the
Secretary of Education found the public school teachers guilty as charged and
imposed on them the penalty of dismissal. On appeal, the CSC affirmed the
Secretary’s ruling but reduced the penalty imposed to suspension without pay.
However, the CSC found one of the teachers (Mariano) guilty only of violation of
reasonable office rules and regulations, and only penalized her with reprimand.
None of the petitioning public school teachers were awarded back salaries.
 
On appeal to this Court, we awarded back salaries to Mariano. We explained
that since the factual premise of the administrative charges against him - i.e., his
alleged participation in the illegal mass actions, and his suspension - was amply
rebutted, then Mariano was in effect exonerated of the charges against him and
was, thus, entitled to back salaries for the period of his suspension pending
appeal.  
 
With respect to petitioner Rodolfo Mariano, payment of his back wages is
in order. A reading of the resolution of the [CSC] will show that he was
exonerated of the charges which formed the basis for his suspension. The
Secretary of the DECS charged him with and he was later found guilty of grave
misconduct x x x [and] conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service x x x
for his participation in the mass actions x x x. It was his alleged participation in
the mass actions that was the basis of his preventive suspension and, later, his
dismissal from the service.
 
However, the [CSC], in the questioned resolution, made [the] finding that
Mariano was not involved in the "mass actions" but was absent because he was in
Ilocos Sur to attend the wake and interment of his grandmother. Although the
CSC imposed upon him the penalty of reprimand, the same was for his violation
of reasonable office rules and regulations because he failed to inform the school
or his intended absence and neither did he file an application for leave covering
such absences.
 
                        x x x x
 
However, with regard to the other petitioners, the payment of their back
wages must be denied. Although the penalty imposed on them was only
suspension, they were not completely exonerated of the charges against them. The
CSC made specific findings that, unlike petitioner Mariano, they indeed
participated in the mass actions. It will be noted that it was their participation in
the mass actions that was the very basis of the charges against them and their
subsequent suspension.[56]
 
 
Bangalisan clearly laid down the principle that if the exoneration of the
employee is relative (as distinguished from complete exoneration), an inquiry into
the factual premise of the offense charged and of the offense committed must be
made.  If the administrative offense found to have been actually committed is of
lesser gravity than the offense charged, the employee cannot be considered
exonerated if the factual premise for the imposition of the lesser penalty remains
the same.  The employee found guilty of a lesser offense may only be entitled to
back salaries when the offense actually committed does not carry the penalty of
more than one month suspension or dismissal.[57]  
 
Bangalisan reiterated that the payment of back salaries, during the period of
suspension of a member of the civil service who is subsequently ordered reinstated,
may be decreed only if the employee is found innocent of the charges which
caused the suspension and when the suspension is unjustified. This
pronouncement was re-echoed in Jacinto v. CA,[58] De la Cruz v. CA,[59] and Hon.
Gloria v. CA.[60] Taking off from Bangalisan, the Court in De la Cruz categorically
stated:
 
The issue of whether back wages may be awarded to teachers ordered
reinstated to the service after the dismissal orders x x x were commuted by the
CSC to six (6) months suspension is already settled.
 
In Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals, we resolved the issue in the negative
on the ground that the teachers were neither exonerated nor unjustifiably
suspended, two (2) circumstances necessary for the grant of back wages in
administrative disciplinary cases.[61]
 
 
In Hon. Gloria, involving the same factual situation as Bangalisan, the CA
awarded the public school teachers back salaries - for the period beyond the
allowable period of preventive suspension - since they were ultimately exonerated.
In affirming the CA, the Court
distinguished preventive suspension from suspension pending appeal for the
purpose of determining the extent of an employee’s entitlement to back salaries.
The Court ruled that under Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292, there are two kinds of
preventive suspension of civil service employees who are charged with offenses
punishable by removal or suspension: (i) preventive suspension pending
investigation[62] and (ii) preventive suspension pending appeal;[63]  compensation is
due only for the period of preventive suspension pending appeal should the
employee be ultimately exonerated.[64] Citing Floyd R. Mechem's A Treatise on the
Law of Public Offices and Officers,[65] Hon. Gloria ruled:
  
Thus, it is not enough that an employee is exonerated of the charges
against him. In addition, his suspension must be unjustified. The case
of Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals itself similarly states that "payment of salaries
corresponding to the period [1] when an employee is not allowed to work may be
decreed if he is found innocent of the charges which caused his
suspension and [2] when the suspension is unjustified.”[66]  (emphases and
underscoring ours)
 
 
          A careful reading of these cases would reveal that a strict observance of the
second condition for an award of back salaries becomes important only if the
employee is not totally innocent of any administrative infraction. As previously
discussed, where the employee is completely exonerated of the
administrative  charge  or acquitted in the criminal case arising from the same facts
based on a finding of innocence, the second requirement becomes subsumed in the
first. Otherwise, a determination of the act/s and offense/s actually committed and
of the corresponding penalty imposed has to be made. 
 
Unjustified suspension
 
 
On the suspension/dismissal aspect, this second condition is met upon a
showing that the separation from office is not warranted under the circumstances
because the government employee gave no cause for suspension or dismissal. This
squarely applies in cases where the government employee did not commit the
offense charged, punishable by suspension or dismissal (total exoneration); or the
government employee is found guilty of another offense for an act different from
that for which he was charged.
 
Bangalisan, Jacinto and De la Cruz illustrate
the application of the two conditions
 
 
          Both the CA and the respondent applied Bangalisan to justify the award of
back salaries.  The CSC argues against this position with the claim that the rulings
in Jacinto and De la Cruz, not Bangalisan, should apply.  After due consideration,
we see no reason why the cited rulings and their application should be pitted
against one another; they essentially espouse the same conclusions after applying
the two conditions for the payment of back salaries.
 
Bangalisan, Jacinto and De la Cruz all stemmed from the illegal mass
actions of public school teachers in Metro Manila in 1990. The teachers were
charged with grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, and gross violation of civil
service law, rules and regulations, among others. The then Secretary of Education
found them guilty and dismissed them from the service.  The CSC, on appeal,
ordered the teachers reinstated, but withheld the grant of their back salaries. The
CSC found the teachers liable for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service and imposed on them the penalty of suspension. The CSC reasoned that
since the teachers were not totally exculpated from the charge (but were found
guilty of a lesser offense), they could not be awarded back salaries.
 
When these cases reached the Court, the issue of the teachers’ entitlement to
back salaries was raised. The teachers claimed that they were entitled to back
salaries from the time of their dismissal or suspension until their reinstatement,
arguing that they were totally exonerated from the charges since they were found
guilty only of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
 
Under this factual backdrop, we applied the two conditions and
distinguished between the teachers who were absent from their respective classes
because they participated in the illegal mass action, on one hand, and the teachers
who were absent for some other reason, on the other hand.
 
 With respect to the teachers who participated in the illegal mass actions, we
ruled that they were not entitled to back salaries since they were not exonerated.
We explained that liability for a lesser offense, carrying a penalty less than
dismissal, is not equivalent to exoneration. On the second condition, we ruled that
their suspension is not unjustified since they have given a ground for their
suspension – i.e., the unjustified abandonment of their classes to the prejudice of
their students, the very factual premise of the administrative charges against them –
for which they were suspended.
 
With respect to the teachers who were away from their classes but did not
participate in the illegal strike, the Court awarded them back salaries, considering
that:  first, they did not commit the act for which they were dismissed and
suspended; and second, they were found guilty of another offense, i.e., violation of
reasonable office rules and regulations which is not penalized with suspension or
dismissal. The Court ruled that these teachers were totally exonerated of the
charge, and found their dismissal and suspension likewise unjustified since the
offense they were found to have committed only merited the imposition of the
penalty of reprimand.
 
These cases show the Court’s consistent stand in determining the propriety
of the award of back salaries. The government employees must not only be found
innocent of the charges; their suspension must likewise be shown to be unjustified.
 
The Present Case
 
We find that the CA was correct in awarding the respondent his back salaries
during the period he was suspended from work, following his dismissal until his
reinstatement to his former position. The records show that the charges of grave
misconduct and dishonesty against him were not substantiated. As the CSC found,
there was no corrupt motive showing malice on the part of the respondent in
making the complained utterance. Likewise, the CSC found that the charge of
dishonesty was well refuted by the respondent’s evidence showing that he rendered
overtime work on the days in question.
 
          We fully respect the factual findings of the CSC especially since the CA
affirmed these factual findings. However, on the legal issue of the respondent’s
entitlement to back salaries, we are fully in accord with the CA’s conclusion that
the two conditions to justify the award of back salaries exist in the present case.
 
The first condition was met since the offense which the respondent was
found guilty of (violation of reasonable rules and regulations) stemmed from an act
(failure to log in and log out) different from the act of dishonesty
(claiming overtime pay despite his failure to render overtime work) that he was
charged with.  
 
The second condition was met as the respondent’s committed offense merits
neither dismissal from the service nor suspension (for more than one month), but
only reprimand. 
         
In sum, the respondent is entitled to back salaries from the time he was
dismissed by the CMWD until his reinstatement to his former position - i.e., for the
period of his preventive suspension pending appeal. For the period of his
preventive suspension pending investigation, the respondent is not entitled to any
back salaries per our ruling in Hon. Gloria.[67]
 
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. Costs against the
petitioner.
 
          SO ORDERED.
 
 
 
                                                                    ARTURO D. BRION
                                                                       Associate Justice
 
WE  CONCUR:
 
 
 
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
 
 
 
 
 
ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
   
   
   
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
   
   
  (no part)
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
   
   
(on leave)  
ROBERTO A. ABAD MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
   
   
  (on leave)
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ   JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
 Associate Justice                  Associate Justice
                          
   
                                          
 MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice
 
 
CERTIFICATION
 
          Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
 
 
 
                                                                   RENATO C. CORONA
                                                                             Chief Justice
 
 

*
               No part.
**
             On official leave.
[1]
               Penned by Associate Justice (now Supreme Court Associate Justice) Mariano C. del Castillo, and
concurred in by Associate Justices Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa (ret.) and Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr.; dated February
20, 2009.  Rollo, pp. 32-43.
[2]
               Dated May 8, 2009; id. at 44-45.
[3]
               Penned by Commissioner Mary Ann Z. Fernandez-Mendoza; id. at 250-258.
[4]
               CMWD Memorandum No. 31-07 dated June 6, 2007; id. at 60.
[5]
               Id. at 72-73.
[6]
               Id. at 73.
[7]
               Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 104704, entitled “The City of Malolos Water District v. Civil Service
Commission and Richard G. Cruz.” The CA Decision promulgated on June 25, 2010 became final and executory on
July 29, 2010, per Entry of Judgment dated January 10, 2011.
[8]
               342 Phil. 586 (1997).
[9]
               Rollo, p. 21.
[10]
             346 Phil. 656 (1997).
[11]
             364 Phil. 786 (1999).
[12]
             Rollo, p. 282.
[13]
             Hon. Gloria v. CA, 365 Phil. 744 (1999).
[14]
             This provision uniformly exists in the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
[15]
             Tan v. Gimenez, etc., and Aguilar, etc., 107 Phil. 17 (1960).
[16]
             Hon. Gloria v. CA, supra note 13.
[17]
             Bangalisan v. CA, supra note 8.
[18]
             Reyes v. Hernandez, 71 Phil. 397 (1941).
[19]
             Section 260 of the RAC reads:
Payment of salary accruing pending suspension. – When the chief of a Bureau or Office
suspends a subordinate officer or employee from duty, the person suspended shall not receive pay
during suspension unless the Department Head shall so order; but upon subsequent reinstatement
of the suspended person or upon his exoneration, if death should render reinstatement impossible,
 any salary so withheld shall be paid, but without prejudice to the application of the disciplinary
provisions of section six hundred and ninety-five hereof.
[20]
             Reyes v. Hernandez, supra note 18, at 398. 
[21]
             No. L-21918, January 24, 1967, 19 SCRA 79.
[22]
             112 Phil. 160, 166 (1961).
[23]
             Gonzales v. Hernandez, ibid., did not specify the cases it relied upon for its pronouncement. A survey of
prior jurisprudence, however, reveals the following as bases:Reyes v. Hernandez, supra note 18; Batungbakal v.
National Development Company, 93 Phil. 182 (1953); National Rice and Corn Corp. v.  NARIC Workers’ Union, 98
Phil. 563 (1956); Tabora v. Montelibano, et al., 98 Phil. 800 (1956); and Tan v. Gimenez, etc., and Aguilar, etc.,
supra note 15.
[24]
             120 Phil. 1213 (1964).
[25]
             Id. at 1215.
[26]
             Id. at 1218-1219.
[27]
             Supra note 15.
[28]
             121 Phil. 541 (1965).
[29]
             Id. at 551-553.
[30]
             189 Phil. 658 (1980).
[31]
             G.R. No. 110936, February 4, 1994, 229 SCRA 677.
[32]
             G.R. No. 101105, March 11, 1994, 231 SCRA 169. The illegality of the dismissal in this case resulted
from the invalidity of the reorganization that authorized the employee’s dismissal. 
[33]
             343 Phil. 734 (1997).
[34]
             G.R. No. 75025, September 14, 1993, 226 SCRA 356, 362-363.
[35]
             Sabello v. Department of Education, Culture and Sports, 259 Phil. 1109, 1114 (1989).
[36]
             Section 13 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 reads:
Suspension and loss of benefits. — Any incumbent public officer against whom any
criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or
property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and
mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office.  Should he be convicted
by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is
acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to
receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed
against him.
[37]
             Supra note 31.
[38]
             Section 42 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 807 reads:
Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending Administrative Investigation. When the
administrative case against the officer of employee under preventive suspension is not finally
decided by the disciplining authority within the period of ninety (90) days after the date of
suspension of the respondent who is not a presidential appointee, the respondent shall be
automatically reinstated in the service: Provided, That when the delay in the disposition of the case
is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, the period of delay shall not be
counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided. 
[39]
             R.A. No. 2260 or Civil Service Act of 1959. Section 35 of R.A. No. 2260 reads:
Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending Administrative Investigation. When the
administrative case against the officer or employee under preventive suspension is not finally
decided by the Commissioner of Civil Service within the period of sixty (60) days after the date of
suspension of the respondent, the respondent shall be reinstated in the service. If the respondent
officer or employee is exonerated, he shall be restored to his position with full pay for the period
of suspension. (italics ours)
[40]
             Tan, Jr. v. Office of the President, supra note 31, at 679.
[41]
             No. L-23957, March 18, 1967, 19 SCRA 600.
[42]
             Under Section 28 of the Civil Service Rules implementing R.A. No. 2260 (Civil Service Act of 1959), the
Commissioner of Civil Service has the discretion to order the immediate execution of his  decision in administrative
cases (J. Barredo’s Dissent in Yarcia v. City of Baguio, etc., 144 Phil. 351 [1970]).
[43]
             See Neeland v. Villanueva, Jr., A.M. No. P-99-1316, August 31, 2001, 364 SCRA 204, 217, where the
Court awarded back salaries to a Clerk of Court and Ex-officioProvincial Sheriff, whom the Court ordered dismissed
from the service for gross misconduct. The resolution of dismissal was immediately implemented. On
reconsideration, however, the Court found him guilty of simple neglect of duty and imposed on him only the penalty
of fine. In granting his subsequent request for back salaries from the time of his dismissal until his reinstatement, the
Court considered, among others, the prematurity of the immediate execution of the resolution of dismissal as basis
for the award. 
[44]
             Supra note 42.
[45]
             Citing Villamor, et al. v. Hon. Lacson, et al., supra note 24, which was also cited in Sales v. Mathay, Sr.,
etc., et al., 214 Phil. 153 (1984).
[46]
             See Bautista v. Peralta, No. L-21967, September 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 223, where the Court considered the
“second suspension” mentioned in Abellera v. City of Baguio, et al., supra note 41, as a “preventive suspension.” At
the time, R.A. No. 2260 allows the payment of back salaries for the entire period of suspension in the event of
exoneration. At present, there is a clear legal distinction between preventive suspension (i.e., suspension pending
investigation) and suspension pending appeal. 
[47]
             G.R. No. 84613, August 16, 1991, 200 SCRA 657.
[48]
             Section 35 of R.A. No. 2260 and Section 42 of P.D. No. 807.
[49]
             Miranda v. Commission on Audit, supra note 47, at 662.
[50]
             Ibid.
[51]
             G.R. No. 80270, February 27, 1990, 182 SCRA 785.
[52]
             Id. at 788.
[53]
             Ibid.
[54]
             The Court also relied on Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 337 which required that an employee must
be exonerated of the charges in order that he may be paid his back salaries. See also Yarcia v. City of
Baguio, supra note 42, where the Court held that the mere reduction, on appeal, of the penalty imposed (from
dismissal to a fine of six months pay), without however exonerating the employee from the charge (of dishonesty)
against him, does not entitle him to back salaries.
[55]
             Supra note 8.
[56]
             Id. at 598-599.
[57]
             If the proper penalty imposable for the offense actually committed does not exceed one month, then there
would have been no occasion for a suspension pending appeal since a decision imposing the penalty of suspension
for not more than thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days salary is final and not subject to appeal.
(See Book V, Section 47, par. 2 of Executive Order No. 292; Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No.
7, Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, dated April 10, 1990, as amended by Administrative Order
No. 17 dated September 15, 2003 which took effect on November 19, 2003.)
[58]
             Supra note 10.
[59]
             Supra note 11.
[60]
             Supra note 13.
[61]
             De la Cruz v. CA, supra note 11, at 797.
[62]
             Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Section 51 of E.O. No. 292.
[63]
             Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Section 47(4) of E.O. No. 292.
[64]
             The Court ruled that the absence of a provision in P.D. No. 807 and later in E.O. No. 292 allowing the
payment of back salaries during the period of preventive suspension, unlike in Act No. 2711 and R.A. No. 2260,
evidences a legislative intent to disallow payment of back salaries for the period of preventive suspension regardless
of the employee’s exoneration. But the payment of back salaries per se, that is, without regard to the duration of the
payment, has been consistently recognized.     
[65]
             §864. Officer not entitled to Salary during Suspension from Office. - An officer who has been lawfully
suspended from his office is not entitled to compensation for the period during which he was so suspended, even
though it be subsequently determined that the cause for which he was suspended was insufficient. The reason given
is "that salary and perquisites are the reward of express or implied services, and therefore cannot belong to one who
could not lawfully perform such services.
[66]
             Hon. Gloria v. CA, supra note 13, at 762.
[67]
             The preventive suspension pending the investigation of the charges is not imposed as a penalty but only to
enable the disciplining authority to conduct an unhampered investigation; the preventive suspension in this regard is
a necessary sacrifice, which holding a public office requires.
  
 
SECOND DIVISION
 
 
RE: FALSIFICATION OF                       A.M. No. P-05-2086     
DAILY TIME RECORDS OF                  (Formerly OCA IPI No. 05-
OF MARIA FE P. BROOKS,                             9-583-RTC)
COURT INTERPRETER,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,                  Present:
QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 69,
and ANDRIA  FORTEZA-                                 PUNO, J., Chairman,
CRISOSTOMO,           CLERK III,                            AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,                           CALLEJO, SR.,
MANILA, BRANCH 39.                                     TINGA, and
CHICO-NAZARIO,* JJ.
 
                                                                   Promulgated:
October 20, 2005
x--------------------------------------------------x
                  
DECISION
 
 
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
 
         
The instant administrative matter has its roots in the 1st Indorsement dated
April 6, 2005 of Assistant Court Administrator Antonio M. Dujua, referring to
Atty. Perseveranda L. Ricon, Clerk of Court V, Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Manila, Branch 39, for comment the photocopies of the October 2003 Daily Time
Records of Maria Fe P. Brooks and Andria Forteza-Crisostomo which appeared to
have been tampered.
 
 In her Comment (by way of a 2nd Indorsement dated April 26, 2005), Atty.
Ricon stated, thus:
It is Standard Operating Procedure in our office that at the end of each
month, staffs will submit to the undersigned their respective DTRs. Undersigned
would check if what was stated in the DTR tallied with the Log Book where the
staffs log their arrivals and departures. If it does, then the undersigned affixes her
signature to each DTR.  The same was done in this particular month of October
2003, and after which the undersigned instructed her Utility Worker, Mr. Eduardo
Flores, to submit the same to the Leave Section. When undersigned affixed her
signature in the DTR of Ms. Brooks and Ms. Crisostomo, there were no erasures
or tampering so to speak except that of Ms. Brooks where I put my initial below
the first line of arrival since it did not tally with the Log Book and so with the
succeeding entries (please refer to the Log Book for the month of October 2003
hereto attached, where the erasures or alleged tampering on Ms. Brooks’ DTR
tallied with the entries therein, meaning there was no tampering or change of
entries in the Log Book and the DTR). The DTRs were clean and I was surprised
to see the attached xerox copies of the DTR of Ms. Crisostomo where there are
legible erasures and tampering done. I presumed that the erasures/tampering were
done after I had signed said DTRs.
 
 
The respective explanations of Andria Forteza-Crisostomo and Maria Fe
Brooks were, likewise, attached to the said Comment.
 
Andria Forteza-Crisostomo admitted having made some alterations on her
October 2003 Daily Time Record. She explained that at that time, she was in her
first trimester of pregnancy, which made her body weak due to the heavy workload
she was handling. Her travel to and from Bulacan gave her great stress, and she
was afraid that she might get suspended from the office if she would thrice be
marked tardy in one month. She was apprehensive about losing her job since her
family was dependent on her. She sincerely apologized for what she did and
manifested that she would accept whatever punishment would be meted against
her. She also vowed never to do such act or other similar acts again.
 
 For her part, Maria Fe P. Brooks acknowledged the changes of entries made
in her daily time record, particularly on October 1, 3, and 8, 2003. She explained
that she was scheduled to transfer to her new workstation at the RTC of Quezon
City, Branch 69 on October 14, 2003. Thus, the day before, she was very busy
winding up her workload which could not be left undone. When she presented her
daily time record to the Branch Clerk of Court for signature, she was made to
double check if the entries tallied with the attendance logbook of the office. After
doing so, she found out that some of the entries made were erroneous and
proceeded to correct the same by using correction fluid. She stressed that these
corrections were made known to the Branch Clerk of Court before she affixed her
signature on the bottom portion of her daily time record. She further averred that
the erasures were made in good faith, without any slightest interest of dishonesty,
and only to reflect the true and correct entries.
 
In its Report dated September 7, 2005, the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) made the following evaluation and recommendation:
 
EVALUATION: Andria Forteza-Crisostomo admitted having falsified
her Daily Time Record for the month of October 2003. Under the Civil Service
Rules, falsification of an official document such as the Daily Time Record is
considered a grave offense and penalized with dismissal from the service for the
first offense. Moreover, under item II of Administrative Circular No. 2-99 issued
on 15 January 1999, Re:Strict Observance of Working Hours and Disciplinary
Action for Absenteeism and Tardiness
 
Absenteeism and tardiness, even if such do not qualify as
“habitual” or “frequent” under Civil Service Commission Memorandum
Circular No. 04, Series of 1991, shall be dealt with severely, and any
falsification of daily time records to cover up for such absenteeism
and/or tardiness shall constitute gross dishonesty or serious misconduct.
 
As the Court explained in Mirano vs. Saavedra, A.M. No. P-89-383,
August 4, 1993:
 
 Public service requires utmost integrity and strictest
discipline. A public servant must exhibit at all times the highest
sense of honesty and integrity. The administration of justice is a
sacred task. By the very nature of their duties and responsibilities,
all those involved in it must faithfully adhere to hold inviolate, and
invigorate the principle [of solemnity] enshrined in the 1987
Constitution that a public office is a public trust; and all public
officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the
people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty
and efficiency. The conduct and behavior of everyone connected
with an office charged with the dispensation of justice, from the
presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, should be circumscribed with
the heavy burden of responsibility. Their conduct, at all times,
must not only be characterized by propriety and decorum, but
above all else, must be above suspicion. Indeed, every employee of
the judiciary should be an example of integrity, uprightness and
honesty.
 
In several instances, the Court refrained from imposing the extreme
penalty of dismissal where the erring employees have not been previously
charged administratively. Prior to this, Andria Forteza-Crisostomo has not been
charged with an administrative offense. It was also noted that she readily
acknowledged her offense, offered her most sincere apologies and promises to
reform her ways. These factors may be considered to mitigate the penalty that
may be imposed on her.
 
Anent the matter concerning Maria Fe Brooks, Atty. Ricon stated in her
comment that “there was no tampering or change of entries in the Log Book and
the DTR.” Thus, the case against Maria Fe Brooks should be dismissed.
 
In Reyes-Domingo vs. Morales, we merely imposed a penalty of fine to a
Branch Clerk of Court who was found guilty of dishonesty in not reflecting the
correct time in his Daily Time Record. We perceive no cogent reason why we
cannot take the same benevolent stance in this case.
 
RECOMMENDATION: Respectfully submitted for the consideration of
the Honorable Court that:
 
1)      The case against Maria Fe Brooks be DISMISSED:
 
2)      This be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter against
Andria Forteza-Crisostomo, Clerk III, RTC, Branch 39, Manila; and as a regular
administrative matter;
 
 3)      Andria Forteza-Crisostomo be SUSPENDED for three (3) months
without pay with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
offense will warrant a more severe penalty.
 

The findings of the OCA are well-taken.

The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees (Republic Act No. 6713) enunciates the state’s policy of promoting a
high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service. And no
other office in the government service exacts a greater demand for moral
righteousness and uprightness from an employee than in the Judiciary. [1]  We
have repeatedly emphasized that the conduct of court personnel, from the
presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, must always be beyond reproach and must
be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility as to let them be free
from any suspicion that may taint the judiciary. The Court condemns and would
never countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of all those involved
in the administration of justice, which would violate the norm of public
accountability and diminish or even just tend to diminish the faith of the people in
the Judiciary.[2]
 
Falsification of daily time records amounts to dishonesty; dishonesty, being
in the nature of a grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the
service with forfeiture of retirement benefits except accrued leave credits, and
perpetual disqualification for reemployment in government service.[3] Indeed,
dishonesty has no place in the Judiciary.[4] However, such an extreme penalty
cannot be inflicted on an erring employee, especially so in cases where there exist
mitigating circumstances which could alleviate his or her culpability.[5] In this case,
since respondent Andria Forteza-Crisostomo readily acknowledged her offense,
apologized and promised to reform her ways, and considering further that this is
her first offense, the Court finds that the penalty of three months’ suspension from
the service will suffice.[6]
 

WHEREFORE, finding the explanation of Maria Fe P. Brooks satisfactory, the

complaint against her is DISMISSED.
 

Respondent Andria Forteza-Crisostomo is found GUILTY of falsification of

official document and dishonesty. She is hereby SUSPENDED for three (3) months
without pay, and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar
offense shall be dealt with more severely.
 
SO ORDERED.
     
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. 
                                                                             Associate Justice
 
 
WE CONCUR:
 
 
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairman
 
 
 
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ                    DANTE O. TINGA
               Associate Justice                                              Associate Justice
 
 
 
On leave
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
       Associate Justice

*
 On leave.
[1]
 Civil Service Commission v. Sta. Ana, A.M. No. OCA-01-5, 1 August 2002, 386 SCRA 1.
[2]
 Ibid.
[3]
 Office of the Court Administrator v. Magno,  A.M. No. P-00-1419, 17 October 2001, 367 SCRA 312.
[4]
 Cabanatan v. Molina,  A.M.  No. P-01-1520, 21 November 2001, 370 SCRA 16.
[5]
 Office of the Court Administrator v. Sirios, A.M. No. P-02-1659, 28 August 2003, 410 SCRA 35.
[6]
 Ibid.

 
Republic of the Philippines
 Supreme Court
Manila
 
 
FIRST DIVISION
 
 
FALSIFICATION OF DAILY   A.M.  No.  P-10-2784
TIME RECORDS OF MA. (Formerly A.M. No. 05-3-138-RTC)
EMCISA A. BENEDICTOS,  
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER Present:
I, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,  
MALOLOS CITY, CORONA, C.J.,
BULACAN                        Chairperson,     
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
 
Promulgated:
 
October 19, 2011
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
 
 
DECISION
 
 
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
 
 
Before the Court is an administrative complaint charging Ma. Emcisa A.
Benedictos (Benedictos), Administrative Officer I, Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC), Malolos City, Bulacan, with dishonesty for
falsifying her Daily Time Records (DTRs)/bundy cards.  
 
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) sent a telegram[1] dated
November 5, 2004 requesting Executive Judge Guillermo Agloro of the RTC,
OCC, Malolos City, Bulacan, to instruct Benedictos to submit her DTRs/bundy
cards for September and October 2004 within five days, otherwise, the OCA would
recommend the withholding of Benedictos’s salaries. 
 
Benedictos submitted her bundy cards for August, October, and November
2004, which the OCA referred to Atty. Emmanuel L. Ortega (Atty. Ortega), Clerk
of Court VII, RTC, Malolos City, Bulacan, for verification of his signatures
appearing thereon.  In a letter[2] dated January 13, 2005 to the OCA, Atty. Ortega
reported that only his signature on Benedictos’s bundy card for November 2004
was true and genuine; and he disowned his purported signatures on Benedictos’s
bundy cards for August and October 2004. 
 
On March 8, 2005, the OCA required Benedictos to file her comment on
Atty. Ortega’s letter within 10 days from notice,[3] however, Benedictos failed to
comply.  
 
In a Resolution dated June 29, 2005, the Court withheld Benedictos’s
salaries and benefits until she submitted her DTRs/bundy cards for September
2004.
 
On February 6, 2006, the OCA again instructed Benedictos to file her
comment on Atty. Ortega’s letter within 10 days from notice,[4] but Benedictos still
failed to do so.
Consequently, in a Resolution[5] dated June 25, 2007, the Court directed
Benedictos (1) to show cause why she should not be administratively dealt with for
refusing to submit her comment despite the two directives from the OCA; and (2)
to submit the required comment within five days from notice, otherwise the Court
shall take the necessary action against her and decide the administrative complaint
on the basis of the record on hand.
 
When Benedictos failed once more to file a comment, the Court issued a
Resolution[6] on March 26, 2008 ordering Benedictos to pay a fine
of P1,000.00.  Yet, Benedictos did not pay the fine nor submitted her comment on
Atty. Ortega’s letter.
 
 Finally, in a Resolution[7] dated August 17, 2009, the Court deemed
Benedictos to have waived her right to file a comment on Atty. Ortega’s
letter.  The Court already referred the case against Benedictos to the OCA for
evaluation, report, and recommendation.
 
The OCA submitted its Report[8] on October 15, 2009 with the following
recommendations:
 
Foregoing considered, we respectfully recommend for the consideration of the
Honorable Court:
 
1.      that the instant case be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter;
 
2.      that respondent Ma. E[m]cisa A. Benedictos, Administrative Officer I,
Regional Trial Court, Office of the Clerk of Court, Malolos City, Bulacan be
found GUILTY of Dishonesty; and
 
3.      that considering that this is respondent’s first administrative offense, the
minimum penalty of SUSPENSION for six (6) months and one (1) day,
effective immediately, be meted upon her.[9]
 
 
          On March 1, 2010, the Court re-docketed the case as a regular administrative
matter and required the parties to manifest[10] within 10 days from notice if they
were willing to submit the matter for resolution based on the pleadings filed. Since
both parties failed to submit such manifestations, they were considered to have
waived their rights to file the same and the case was submitted for deliberation
based on the pleadings filed.
 
As found by the OCA, Benedictos is guilty of dishonesty for falsifying her
DTRs/bundy cards.
 
In his letter dated January 13, 2005, Atty. Ortega categorically stated that his
purported signatures appearing on Benedictos’s bundy cards for August and
October 2004 were not his.  Conspicuously, despite the seriousness of the charge
against her, Benedictos failed to comply with the repeated directives of the OCA
and this Court for her to file a comment.   
 
          Benedictos’s silence on a principal charge against her is admission,
especially considering that she was given ample opportunity to deny the same.
[11]
  Benedictos’s refusal to face the charges against her head-on is contrary to the
principle in criminal law that the first impulse of an innocent person, when accused
of wrongdoing, is to express his or her innocence at the first opportune time.[12] 
 
          Moreover, as a result of its own analytical study of the evidence on record,
the Court is convinced that Atty. Ortega’s signatures appearing on Benedictos’s
bundy cards for August and October 2004 were indeed forged.  The marked
differences between Atty. Ortega’s purported signatures on Benedictos’s bundy
cards for August and October 2004, on one hand, and Atty. Ortega’s admitted
genuine signatures on Benedictos’s bundy cards for September and November
2004, on the other, are easily discernible even to the naked eye. 
         
          In determining the appropriate penalty, the Court deems Benedictos’s
falsification of her bundy cards tantamount to dishonesty.  This Court has defined
dishonesty as the “(d)isposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud;
untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in
principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive
or betray.”[13]  Dishonesty, being in the nature of a grave offense, carries the
extreme penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits
except accrued leave credits, and perpetual disqualification for reemployment in
government service.[14] 
         
          However, in several administrative cases, the Court refrained from imposing
the actual penalties in the presence of mitigating factors.     There were several
cases,[15] particularly involving dishonesty, in which the Court meted a penalty
lower than dismissal because of the existence of mitigating circumstances.  
 
          In Re: Ting and Esmerio,[16] the Court did not impose the  severe penalty of
dismissal because the respondents acknowledged their infractions, demonstrated
remorse, and had dedicated long years of service to the judiciary.  Instead, the
Court imposed the penalty of suspension for six months on Ting, and the forfeiture
of Esmerio’s salary equivalent to six months on account of the latter’s retirement.
         
          The Court similarly imposed in Re: Failure of Jose Dante E. Guerrero to
Register his Time In and Out in the Chronolog Time Recorder Machine on Several
Dates[17] the penalty of six months suspension on an employee found guilty of
dishonesty for falsifying his time record.  The Court took into account as
mitigating circumstances Guererro’s good performance rating, 13 years of
satisfactory service in the judiciary, and his acknowledgment of and remorse for
his infractions.
         
          The compassion extended by the Court in the aforementioned cases was not
without legal basis.  Section 53, Rule IV of the Revised Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service,[18] grants the disciplining authority the
discretion to consider mitigating circumstances in the imposition of the proper
penalty. 
         
          In the case at bar, this is Benedictos’s first administrative case in her 19
years in government service, for which six months suspension is already sufficient
penalty.
 
          Additionally, the Court bears in mind Benedictos’s failure to submit her
comment, which constitutes clear and willful disrespect, not just for the OCA, but
also for the Court, which exercises direct administrative supervision over trial
court officers and employees through the former.  In fact, it can be said that
Benedictos’s non-compliance with the OCA directives is tantamount to
insubordination to the Court itself.[19]  Benedictos also directly demonstrated her
disrespect to the Court by ignoring its Resolutions dated June 25, 2007 (ordering
her to show cause for her failure to comply with the OCA directives and to file her
comment) and March 26, 2008 (ordering her to pay a fine of P1,000.00 for her
continuous failure to file a comment).
 
A resolution of the Supreme Court should not be construed as a mere
request, and should be complied with promptly and completely.  Such failure to
comply accordingly betrays not only a recalcitrant streak in character, but also
disrespect for the Court’s lawful order and directive.[20]  This contumacious
conduct of refusing to abide by the lawful directives issued by the Court has
likewise been considered as an utter lack of interest to remain with, if not contempt
of, the system.[21]  Benedictos’s insolence is further aggravated by the fact that she
is an employee of the Judiciary, who, more than an ordinary citizen, should be
aware of her duty to obey the orders and processes of the Supreme Court without
delay.[22] 
         
          For her non-compliance with the show cause order and nonpayment of the
fine imposed upon her in the Supreme Court Resolutions dated June 25, 2007 and
March 26, 2008, respectively, Benedictos is ordered to pay an additional fine
of P2,000.00, in addition to the original fine of P1,000.00.      
 
          WHEREFORE, the Court finds Ma. Emcisa Benedictos GUILTY of
dishonesty and imposes upon her the penalty ofSUSPENSION for six (6) months,
effective immediately.  The Court further orders Benedictos to pay a FINE in the
total amount of P3,000.00 for her failure to comply with the Resolutions dated
June 25, 2007 and March 26, 2008.  Finally, the Court issues a stern warning to
Benedictos that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more
severely.
 
SO ORDERED.
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
                         Associate Justice
 
 
 
 
WE CONCUR:

 
 
 
 
 RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
   
   
   
   
   
   
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
 
 
 
         
 
 

[1]
               Rollo, p. 15.
[2]
               Id. at 3.
[3]
               Id. at 8.
[4]
               Id. at 9.
[5]
               Id. at 19.
[6]
               Id. at 23.
[7]
               Id. at 30.
[8]
               Id. at 32-35.
[9]
               Id. at 35.
[10]
             Id. at 37.
[11]
             Donton v. Loria. 519 Phil. 212, 217 (2006).      
[12]
             Report on the Financial Audit Conducted at the Municipal Trial Courts of Bani, Alaminos and Lingayen
in Pangasinan, 462 Phil. 535, 543 (2003).  
[13]
             Re: Administrative Case for Dishonesty Against Elizabeth Ting, Court Secretary I & Angelita C. Esmerio,
Clerk III, Office of the Division Clerk of Court, Third Division, 502 Phil. 264, 277 (2005).
[14]
             Office of the Court Administrator v. Magno, 419 Phil. 593, 602 (2001); Sec. 22(a), Rule XIV of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987), as
amended by CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19, s. 1999.
[15]
             Concerned Employee v. Valentin, 498 Phil. 347, 352 (2005); Dipolog v. Montealto, A.M. No. P-04-190,
November 23, 2004, 443 SCRA 465, 478; Re:  Alleged Tampering of the Daily Time Records (DTR) of
Sherry B. Cervantes, Court Stenographer III, Branch 18, Regional Trial Court, Manila, A.M. No. 03-8-
463-RTC, May 20, 2004, 428 SCRA 572, 576; Office of the Court Administrator v. Sirios, 457 Phil. 42, 48-
49 (2003); Reyes-Domingo v. Morales, 396 Phil. 150, 164-165 (2000).   
[16]
             Re: Administrative Case for Dishonesty Against Elizabeth Ting, Court Secretary I & Angelita C. Esmerio,
Clerk III, Office of the Division Clerk of Court, Third Division, supra note 13 at 280-281.   
[17]
             521 Phil. 482, 497-499 (2006).
[18]
             CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19, s. 1999.
[19]
             Tan v. Sermonia, A.M. No. P-08-2436, August 4, 2009, 595 SCRA 1, 13.
[20]
             Tugot v. Judge Coliflores, 467 Phil. 391, 402-403 (2004).  
[21]
             Parane v. Reloza, A.M. No. MTJ-92-718, November 7, 1994, 238 SCRA 1, 4.   
[22]
             Tan v. Sermonia, supra note 19 at 14.

THIRD DIVISION

OFFICE OF THE COURT   A.M. No. P-05-2023

ADMINISTRATOR,
(Formerly OCA IPI No. 04-10-641-RTC)

Complainant,    

Present:

     

  QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

- versus - CARPIO,

CARPIO MORALES, and

TINGA, JJ.

ANALIZA F. BRETA    
(Court Stenographer), FERDINAND  
S. REYES (Process Server) and
 
EDUARDO M. FLORES (Court Aide),
all of the REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,  
BRANCH 39,MANILA,
Promulgated:
                             Respondents.
 

March 6, 2006

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - -x

RESOLUTION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This administrative matter stemmed from the 1st Indorsement

dated December 9, 2003 of Deputy Court Administrator Christopher O. Lock
referring to Atty. Perseveranda L. Ricon, Clerk of Court V, Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, Branch 39, for comment and recommendation regarding the
photocopies of the Daily Time Records (DTR) for the month of October 2003 of
Ms. Analiza F. Breta, Eduardo M. Flores, and Ferdinand S. Reyes[1] which appeared
to have been tampered.

In her Comment,[2] Atty. Ricon stated that when she submitted the Daily

Time Records of the employees for the month of October 2003 to the Leave
Division of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), there were neither
erasures nor corrections.  She explained that at the end of every month she
checks the DTRs of every employee against the entries in their
logbook.  Whenever there was a discrepancy, she corrects them and she initials in
the corrections made.  Atty. Ricon further explained that she required the
employees concerned to explain the tampering.  Attached to her Comment were
the respective explanations of Analiza F. Breta, Eduardo M. Flores, and Ferdinand
S. Reyes.

 
 Analiza F. Breta admitted she made alterations on her DTR for October
2003. She explained that at that time, her housemaid had left her, her mother
who was suffering from rheumatism had to watch over her two children (one
aged 3 and another only 1 year old), and she had no one do the household
chores.  She went to work late because she had to do some household chores
before going to work.  She apologized, promised not to tamper with her DTR
again, and manifested that she would accept whatever punishment would be
meted her.

Eduardo M. Flores explained that on October 2003, his wife was

hospitalized after a cancer operation and there were days when after office hours,
he would go to the hospital to attend to his wife.  He stayed there until the
following morning that was why he was tardy in coming to the office the following
day.

Ferdinand S. Reyes denied altering his DTR for October 2003.  He claimed
that his DTR appeared to have alterations because when he copied the entries
from the logbook, he overlooked some items and corrected them. He averred
that he wasn’t wearing his eyeglasses then.  He insists that the entries in his DTR
were correct.

The Office of the Court Administrator, in its Report dated May 4, 2005,

made the following findings:  (1) Breta’s admission of her culpability mitigated her
offense.  (2) Flores’ explanation was insufficient to excuse him from liability but
could also be considered as a mitigating circumstance.  (3) Reyes’ explanation was
disproved by Atty. Ricon in her 2nd Indorsement that the DTR for October had no
erasures when she submitted them to the Leave Division of the OCA.

The OCA found Analiza F. Breta, Eduardo M. Flores, and Ferdinand S. Reyes
guilty of dishonesty for falsification of their DTRs but added that since it was their
first administrative offense and Breta admitted and apologized, the OCA reduced
their penalties.  It recommended that Breta be fined P5,000.  Flores and Reyes
were recommended for suspension without pay for thirty days, and all three be
sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with
more severely.

We agree with the OCA’s recommendations.

Public service requires utmost integrity and strictest discipline and all public
officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people; serve
them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.

Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 2-99 provides that absenteeism

and tardiness even if such is not habitual or frequent shall be dealt with severely,
and any falsification of daily time records to cover up for such absenteeism or
tardiness shall constitute gross dishonesty or serious misconduct.[3]  Dishonesty,
being in the nature of grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from
the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits except accrued leave credits,
and perpetual disqualification for reemployment in government service.
[4]
  However, such an extreme penalty can not be imposed upon an erring
employee, especially so in cases where there exist mitigating circumstances which
could alleviate his or her culpability.[5]

Breta has shown humility and remorse in readily admitting her misconduct,

and indeed this is her first offense.  We find that the penalty of P5,000 fine is
sufficient.[6]  Respondent Flores also admitted making alterations in his
DTR.  Reyes denied tampering with his DTR.  Regrettably, Flores’ reason was
unconvincing, clearly contradicted by Atty. Ricon’s testimony.  We find Flores and
Reyes guilty of the same offense.  But their offenses are mitigated by their being
first offenders.  Thus, Flores and Reyes shall each be meted three (3) months
suspension from office without pay.

 
 We note that respondents Breta[7] and Reyes[8] manifested that the days
that are subject of this administrative case were considered vacation leave
without pay in accordance with Section 50 of the CSC Memorandum Circular No.
41, s. 1998, Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules on Leave.  They stated that they should
be deemed to have already restituted the corresponding amounts.  However,
such restitution of cash accountabilities is distinct and does not excuse an erring
employee from administrative liability.[9]  The Court condemns and would never
countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of those involved in the
administration of justice, which would violate the norm of public accountability
and diminish, or even just tend to diminish, the faith of the people in the
Judiciary.[10]

WHEREFORE, respondents Analiza F. Breta, Eduardo M. Flores, and

Ferdinand S. Reyes are found GUILTY of dishonesty for falsification of their Daily
Time Records. Analiza F. Breta is FINED P5,000, while respondents Flores and
Reyes are each SUSPENDED for three (3) months without pay.  All the
respondents are STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar
offense shall be dealt with more severely.

         

          SO ORDERED.
 

                                                          LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING

                                                                                          Associate Justice

                                                                            

 
WE CONCUR:
 
 

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
 

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES                      DANTE O. TINGA

     Associate Justice                                          Associate Justice

 

[1]
       Also referred to as Fernando Santos Reyes in some parts of the records.
[2]
       Rollo, p. 2.
[3]
       Par. II, Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 2-99.
[4]
       Office of the Court Administrator v. Magno, A.M. No. P-00-1419, 17 October 2001, 367 SCRA 312, 319.
[5]
       Office of the Court Administrator v. Sirios, A.M. No. P-02-1659, 28 August 2003, 410 SCRA 35, 39.
[6]
       How v. Ruiz, A.M. No. P-05-1932, 15 February 2005, 451 SCRA 320, 329.
[7]
       Rollo, pp. 29-30.
[8]
       Id. at 23-24.
[9]
       Office of the Court Administrator v. Galo. A.M. No. P-93-989, 21 September 1999, 314 SCRA 705, 710-711.
[10]
     Re: Falsification of Daily Time Records of Maria Fe P. Brooks, Court Interpreter, RTC, Br. 69, Quezon City
and Andria Forteza-Crisostomo, Clerk III, RTC, Br. 39, Manila, A.M. No. P-05-2086, October 20, 2005, p. 5.

Republic of the Philippines

 Supreme Court

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

   
A.M. No. P-09-2602 (Formerly
Atty. JONNA M. ESCABARTE,Judge
A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2583-P)
BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA, SOTERA  
JAVIER, LETICIA AGBAYANI, NELLY
CHAVEZ, CLAIRE GERERO, JOSEFINO    
ORTIZ, ANA RAMOS and EDGAR  
VILLAR,  all of the RTC, Branch 275, Las
Piñas City,                                    

                           Complainants,  
       
-         versus    -  
   
Ms. LOIDA MARCELINA J. GENABE,  
Legal Researcher, RTC, Branch  275, Las  
Piñas City,                                       
 
                                  Respondent.
 
x------------------------------------------x  
 
 
 
Ms. LOIDA MARCELINA J. GENABE, (Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 08-
2792-RTJ)
                              Complainant,  
   

                  -    versus      -  

   

Judge BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA, Atty.  

JONNA M. ESCABARTE, SOTERA
   Present:
JAVIER, LETICIA AGBAYANI, NELLY
CHAVEZ, CLAIRE GERERO, JOSEFINO  
ORTIZ, ANA RAMOS and EDGAR
        CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson,
VILLAR,  all of the RTC, Branch  275, Las
Piñas City,         BRION,

                                   Respondents.         BERSAMIN,  

        VILLARAMA, JR., and

        SERENO, JJ.

    Promulgated:

      

   December 1, 2010

x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
 

DECISION
 

 
BRION, J.:
  
 

        For resolution are the present consolidated administrative complaints

involving the presiding judge and the staff of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 275, Las Piñas City.  The first, A.M. OCA IPI No. 07-2583-P, stemmed from
a letter-petition, dated March 12, 2007,[1] filed by the court’s staff, led by Atty.
Jonna M. Escabarte, Branch Clerk of Court, praying that Ms. Loida Marcelina J.
Genabe, Legal Researcher of the same court, be placed under preventive
suspension.  The second, A.M. OCA IPI No. 08-2792-RTJ, involves Genabe’s
countercharges of (1) acts of oppression and malversation of funds against Judge
Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, and (2) dishonesty and falsification of daily time records
(DTRs) against Escabarte; Leticia B. Agbayani, Court Stenographer; Claire Layco-
Gerero, Court Stenographer; Ana Dalore-Ramos, Court Stenographer; Josefino R.
Ortiz, Sheriff; Sotera T. Javier, Court Interpreter; Edgar F. Villar, Clerk; and Nelly R.
Chavez, Utility Aide.[2]
 
The Antecedents
 
The material facts are summarized below.
 
The letter-petition of the staff of the RTC, Branch 275, Las Piñas City, is the
offshoot of the order, dated December 21, 2006,[3] of Judge Maceda suspending
Genabe for 30 days for neglect of duty.  Escabarte and her group alleged that
Genabe continued to render service despite her 30-day suspension by Judge
Maceda and the judge’s recommendation, contained in his investigation, report and
recommendation (IRRC), dated January 18, 2007,
[4]
  submitted  to  the  Office  of  the  Court Administrator  (OCA),  that
Genabe be preventively suspended and, thereafter, dismissed from the service.
 
 According to the judge, he issued the order after Genabe became unruly and
highly combative during the staff meeting in his chambers on November 29, 2006,
shouting disrespectfully to him, “hindi na ko kailangan karinyo karinyohin pa
ninyo  x x  x  ang kakapal nyo  x  x  x  hindi kagalang galang,”[5] and disrupting the
meeting; Genabe’s outburst was a reaction to Escabarte’s  memorandum dated
November  20, 2006,[6] citing her for neglectfully leaving for Baguio City on
November 16, 2006, to attend the convention of legal researchers, without
finishing her assigned task to summarize the statement of facts of a criminal case
set for promulgation on November 21, 2006 (Criminal Case Nos. 03-0059 to 03-
0063).
 
The IRRC, on the other hand, came about when Judge Maceda, at his own
initiative, conducted an investigation of Genabe for attending the convention with
an unfinished assigned task and for conduct unbecoming, pursuant to Rule 135 of
the Rules of Court, Circular No. 30-91 dated September 30, 1991, and the ruling
in Aguirre v. Baltazar.[7]
 
In support of their petition, Escabarte and the others alleged that Genabe
continued to bully the staff of Branch 275, causing trouble and conflict in the
office, as validated by the following incidents:
 
1.     On December 27, 2006, Genabe, allegedly without provocation, shouted
defamatory accusations at Agbayani, court stenographer, thus, “Ang
galing mo Lety, sinabi mo na tinapos mo yung Marvilla case, ang galing
mo.  Feeling lawyer ka kasi, bakit di ka magduty
na  lang,  stenographer  ka, magsteno ka  na lang, ang galing mo, feeling
lawyer ka talaga.  Nagbebenta ka ng kaso, tirador ka ng Judge.  Sige
high blood din ka, mamatay ka sana sa high blood mo.”[8]  Apparently,
Genabe was blaming Agbayani for her suspension.  Genabe’s derogatory
statements allegedly echoed along the court’s hallway and were heard by
several court employees who executed affidavits regarding the incident.
 
Agbayani filed a criminal complaint for grave oral defamation against
Genabe, and Prosecutor Carlo DL Monzon recommended the filing of an
information against Genabe.
 
2.     Escabarte filed a report, dated February 20, 2007, for Judge Maceda
saying that Genabe, in apparent dissatisfaction of the low performance
rating for the 2nd semester of 2006 she got from Escabarte, accused her
and the other members of the court’s staff of conspiring against her and
falsifying their DTRs.
 
3.     In a police blotter dated March 8, 2007, it appeared that Genabe
allegedly called Gerero, court stenographer, “pinakamandaraya sa
Branch na ito.”[9] Previously, Genabe was also quoted saying, “Hindi ka
in sa Branch na ito kapag hindi ka mandaraya.”[10]
  
In her Comment dated May 28, 2007,[11] Genabe denied the complainants’
allegation that there was no provocation when she allegedly insulted Agbayani in
December 2006; she just asked Agbayani why she claimed to have finished the
bulk of the summary of facts of the criminal cases when she had almost finished
the task before she left for Baguio City; and the alleged offensive remarks she
made against Agbayani were work-related and based on her honest assessment of
the situation.
 
Genabe admitted that she protested the performance rating she obtained
from Escabarte for July 2006 to December 2006 and claimed that it must have
been caused by her being observant and vocal about office decorum and practices
and which must have drawn the ire of Atty. Escabarte.
 
Genabe likewise denied that she verbally abused Gerero, saying that Gerero
must have found out that she knew Gerero leaves during office hours to attend her
classes at the Perpetual University.  
 
In a turnaround, Genabe accused the court staff of having their bundy cards
punched in and out “on-time” by just one employee, as confirmed by the monthly
attendance record of the employees.  She alleged that she actually witnessed court
interpreter Javier punch the DTRs of several employees; yet, despite the false
entries in the DTRs, Escabarte certified the correctness of the DTRs; Judge
Maceda himself had no way of knowing the anomalous practice as he himself
reports for work only at two o’clock in the afternoon daily.
 
Finally, Genabe claimed that Judge Maceda treated her oppressively to drive
her out of her employment in the judiciary and to get even with her on account of
her intolerance of the anomalous practices prevailing in the court.  She narrated
that Judge Maceda would insult her during staff meetings and, on numerous
occasions, even demanded that she resign from office; Judge Maceda’s alter ego,
Agbayani, had been securing the signatures of court and non-court employees of
Las Piñas City to substantiate the complaints against her, thus isolating her and
rendering her inutile since no work had been assigned to her from the time she
reported back for work.
 
 Further, Genabe accused Judge Maceda of malversation when the judge
allegedly diverted to other purposes the court’s training budget for 2006, obtained
from the Las Piñas City government, as there had been no seminar/training had
been conducted.
  
 
The Comments of Escabarte and the Other Personnel of RTC Branch
275, Las Piñas City
 
In compliance with the Court’s Resolution of January 16, 2008,[12] the
respondent members of the staff of the RTC, Branch 275, Las Piñas City, in A.M.
OCA IPI No. 08-2792-RTJ, filed their individual comments on Genabe’s charges
of dishonesty and falsification of DTRs.[13]  They all denied Genabe’s accusations
and characterized her as an officemate with a volatile personality and who picks
quarrels with the other personnel of the court and even non-court employees.
 
Specifically, they denied the charge of falsifying their DTRs.  If it was true
that Genabe had knowledge of the anomaly as early as two weeks after she
commenced employment with the court, they wondered why it took her so long to
divulge it and why she did not report the practice to Judge Maceda.  In any event,
they maintained that no evidence had been adduced establishing their involvement
in the alleged anomaly.
 
Judge Maceda’s Comment
 
On February 26, 2008, Judge Maceda filed his Comment[14] to Genabe’s
counter-charge against him.  He even expressed surprise about it because he was
not a party to the staff’s complaint against her.  He explained that he merely
conducted an inquiry into the staff’s letter-complaint, dated January 2, 2005,
[15]
 praying that Genabe’s lateral transfer be denied and that she be required to
resign and seek employment elsewhere.  The staff then charged Genabe for
dereliction of duty and for some attitude problem, particularly her quarrelsome
behavior that, according to the staff, needed psychiatric treatment.
 
Judge Maceda pointed out that his inquiry adverted to Genabe’s 30-day
suspension (for a light offense) in his order, dated December 21, 2006,[16] pursuant
to SC Circular No. 30-91, which provides that the presiding judge of a particular
branch, as the “head of office,” retains the disciplining authority over his own
personnel.  He argued that Genabe had no basis in claiming that her suspension
was “oppressive,” for it was supported with facts.
 
As to Genabe’s performance rating which offended her, Judge Maceda
explained that her poor performance may be excused once or twice, but beyond
that, she deserved a stern lecture or even scolding which is not “verbal abuse” per
se.  He claimed Genabe already had, at the time, three low ratings.
 
Judge Maceda withheld comment on the intramurals among his staff, saying
that the matter was between Genabe and the other court personnel and, therefore,
Genabe’s “quarrelsome behavior” was better told by the members of the staff
themselves.
 
With respect to Genabe’s malversation charge, Judge Maceda argued that no
irregularity intervened in the handling of the training fund provided to the RTC,
Branch 275 by the Las Piñas City as it was extended as a financial assistance to the
court that needed no liquidation; the Las Piñas City itself had not asked for a
liquidation and the sums given for the personal expenses of the recipients is not an
accountable judicial fund.
 
The OCA Report/Recommendation
 
          On November 6, 2008, the OCA submitted a Memorandum/Report [17] on the
present administrative matters.  It recommended the following: (1)
Genabe  be  found  guilty  of  conduct  prejudicial  to  the best interest of the
service and conduct unbecoming of a court employee and be fined in an amount
equivalent to one month’s salary; (2) Judge Maceda be reminded to strictly comply
with A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, with a warning against a similar violation in the future;
and (3) the charge against Escabarte, Agbayani, Chavez, Gerero, Ortiz, Ramos and
Villar be dismissed for lack of merit.
 
The Court’s Ruling
 
    We find the OCA recommendations well-founded.
 
First. Genabe ought to be disciplined.  Although she had already been
sanctioned by Judge Maceda for neglect of duty with a 30-day suspension (for the
November 29, 2006 incident),[18] we cannot close our eyes to her work ethic and
quarrelsome deportment in office as shown by the December 27, 2006 incident
involving her and Agbayani.  As abundantly demonstrated by the staff of the RTC,
Branch 275, Las Piñas City, she had the habit of hurling “invectives” at her
superiors and co-employees who displeased her and whom she suspected of having
caused her suspension.  The OCA itself found the unsavory and defamatory
remarks  Genabe threw at her officemates to have been made in a fit of anger, the
product of uncontrolled rage and passionate outburst of emotions, unavoidably
creating an unwholesome atmosphere in the court.  It is no surprise then that the
court staff urged Judge Maceda to deny Genabe’s lateral transfer and to ask her to
resign and seek employment elsewhere.
 
Without doubt, Genabe’s negative attitude and penchant for using offensive
language can only prejudice the best interest of the service, not to mention that
they constitute conduct unbecoming a court employee.  It is well to remind Genabe
that “the conduct and behavior of everyone connected with  x  x  x  the
dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the x  x  x lowliest
clerk  x  x  x  must be characterized with propriety and decorum,[19] as Genabe’s
attitude goes against the principles of public service. Also, every “official and
employee of an agency involved in the administration of justice, like the Court of
Appeals, from the Presiding Justice to the most junior clerk, should be
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility.
 
Second. We agree with the OCA observations that while the act of Judge
Maceda in disciplining Genabe with a 30-day suspension is “not oppressive,
capricious or despotic, that is, without color of law or reason, or without
supporting facts,”[20]he still had no authority to directly discipline her under the
terms of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC,[21] which provides:
 
          CHAPTER VIII. Administrative Discipline.
SECTION 1. Disciplinary jurisdiction over light offenses. – The Executive
Judge shall have the authority to act upon and investigate administrative
complaints involving light offenses as defined under the Civil Service Law and
Rules (Administrative Code of 1987), and the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees (Republic Act No. 6713), where the
penalty is reprimand, suspension for not more than thirty (30) days, or a fine not
exceeding thirty (30) days’ salary, and as classified in pertinent Civil Service
resolutions or issuances, filed by (a) a judge against a court employee, except
lawyers, who both work in the same station within the Executive Judge’s area of
supervision; or (b) a court employee against another court employee, except
lawyers, who both work in the same station within the Executive Judge’s area of
supervision;
 
In the preceding instances, the Executive Judge shall conduct the
necessary inquiry and submit to the Office of the Court Administrator the results
thereof with a recommendation as to the action to be taken thereon, including the
penalty to be imposed, if any, within thirty (30) days from termination of said
inquiry.  At his/her discretion, the Executive Judge may delegate the investigation
of complaints involving light offenses to any of the Presiding Judges or court
officials within his/her area of administrative supervision.
 
  Under these terms, Judge Maceda’s order of December 21, 2006 was clearly
out of line.  But while the Judge overstepped the limits of his authority, we see no
reason not to ratify his action in light of its obvious merits.  Thus, the 30-day
suspension he imposed should stand but he should be warned against a repetition
of the direct action he took.
 
On the matter of the Judge’s handling of the Subic seminar fund in
September 2006, provided by the Las Piñas City, we agree with the OCA that the
judge cannot not be held liable.  Nevertheless, in view of the nature of the fund
(which required no liquidation and is not an accountable judicial fund), we believe
that the Judge should have taken steps – such as the informing the court staff or
filing of a report with the OCA – on how the fund was handled.  This
precautionary move would have placed the Judge above any suspicion of
impropriety.  We stress that “Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all their activities.”[22]
 
Third. We likewise agree with the OCA recommendation that the charge of
dishonesty and the charge of falsification against Escabarte and the other members
of the staff be dismissed.  We quote with approval the OCA finding on this point,
thus –
 
Under Section 23, par. (f), Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing
Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws,
falsification of official documents is punishable with dismissal from the service
even for the first offense.  Complainant Genabe’s allegation, however, fell short
of being supported with substantial evidence to hold her officemates-respondents
administratively liable for falsification of their Daily Time
Records.  Complainant’s averments, unsupported by substantial evidence, remain
bare and unsubstantiated allegations.  Well-settled is the rule in this jurisdiction
that, in the resolution of complaints, reliance should not be reposed on the
weakness of the defense, answer or comment but on the strength of the evidence
adduced by the complainant.
 
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Loida Marcelina J. Genabe, Legal
Researcher, RTC, Branch 275, City of Las Piñas, is
declared GUILTY  of conduct prejudicial  to the best interest of the service and
conduct unbecoming of a court employee; is ordered to pay a  FINE equivalent to
her  one  month’s salary; and is WARNED that  a similar violation in the future
shall be dealt with more severely.
 Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda is WARNED against a similar violation in
the future of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, and is advised to avoid any appearance of
impropriety in the handling of financial assistance from the local government.
 
The charges of dishonesty and falsification of public documents in A.M.
OCA IPI No. 08-2792-RTJ against Jonna M. Escabarte, Leticia Agbayani, Nelly
Chavez, Josefino Ortiz, Claire Gerero, Sotera Javier, Ana Ramos and Edgar Villar
are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
 
          SO ORDERED.
        

                                                                

ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

 
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice

Chairperson

   

   
   
   
  LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Associate Justice

[1]
  Rollo, pp. 230-232.
[2]
  Id. at 260-266; contained in Genabe’s Comment dated May 28, 2007.
[3]
  Id. at 11-13; A.M. No. 07-2-93-RTC (re-docketed as P-07-2320).
[4]
  Id. at 14-25.
[5]
  Id. at 11.
[6]
  Id. at 34.
[7]
  A.M. No. P-05-1957, February 7, 2005, 450 SCRA 518.
[8]
  Rollo, p. 2.
[9]
  Ibid.
[10]
 Ibid.
[11]
 Supra note 2.
[12]
 Id. at 315-316.
[13]
 Id. at 583-602 (Agbayani); pp. 624-633 (Ramos); pp. 654-658 (Chavez); pp. 659-663 (Villar); pp. 664-670
(Ortiz); pp. 670-672 (Gerero); pp. 691-695 (Javier); pp. 705-713 (Escabarte).
[14]
 Id. at 373-381.
[15]
 Id. at 382-383; Annex “A,” Judge Maceda’s Comment.
[16]
 Supra note 3.
[17]
 Id. at 731-735.
[18]
 Supra note 3.
[19]
 Almacha v. Payumo, A.M. No. P-05-2010, June 8, 2007, 524 SCRA 34, 40.
[20]
 Rollo, p. 733.
[21]
 Guidelines on the Selection and Appointment of Executive Judges and Defining Their Powers, Prerogatives and
Duties, approved on January 27, 2004 and took effect on February 15, 2004.
[22]
 New Code of Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, Canon 4
 THIRD DIVISION
 

 
 

AN ANONYMOUS COMPLAINT    A.M. No.  P-05-1970

AGAINST ATTY. PORTIA DIESTA,
   (Formerly A.M.OCA I.P.I. No. 04-1962-P)
BRANCH CLERK OF COURT,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,   
BRANCH 263, PASIG CITY and
LUZ SANTOS-TACLA, CLERK III,     Present:
SAME COURT.        
                                      
        CARPIO MORALES, J.,
 
                        Chairperson,
 
         BRION,
                
         BERSAMIN,

         VILLARAMA, JR., and

         SERENO, JJ.

    

     Promulgated:

         May 30, 2011

x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x  

   
               
RESOLUTION
   

BRION, J.:  

We resolve in this Resolution the complaint against Atty. Portia Flores-

Diesta, Branch Clerk of Court, and Luz Santos-Tacla, Clerk III, of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 263 (Branch 263), Pasig City. 

Background Facts

On April 20, 2004, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received an

undated anonymous letter complaint[1] against Atty. Diesta and Tacla alleging
dishonesty, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and violation of
Republic Act No. 3019 (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).

In the letter, the anonymous writer charged Atty. Diesta of not reporting for
work on time, of collecting commissioner’s fees for ex parte hearings, of not
subjecting to raffle the publication of cases and judicial notices, and of illegally
practicing law by appearing in court for his practitioner-father.  Tacla, on the
other hand, was charged of being tardy and  being frequently absent, of falsifying
her entry in the attendance logbook and on her daily time record, and of acting as
“runner” for Atty. Diesta. The supporting documents were attached to the letter-
complaint.    
  

The OCA required Atty. Diesta and Tacla to comment on this letter.[2]  Atty.
Diesta filed her comment on August 9, 2004,[3] while Tacla filed her comment
on August 10, 2004.[4]   Both Atty. Diesta and Tacla denied the allegations.  

The OCA, after a review of the respondents’ comments and the result of its
discreet investigation, recommended that the case be redocketed as a regular
administrative matter and referred the case to the Executive Judge of the Pasig
City RTC for investigation, report and recommendation. On January 31, 2005, the
Court issued a Resolution adopting the OCA recommendation.[5]

Pasig City RTC Executive Judge Edwin A. Villasor conducted several

hearings.  He summoned the two respondents, the staff of Branch 263, and Atty.
Jaime del Rosario who was alleged to have been asked by Atty. Diesta for a
commissioner’s fee. The two respondents (represented by their lawyers) and the
court staff testified before Judge Villasor and were duly cross-examined. Atty. Del
Rosario failed to appear.

In his October 19, 2005 exhaustive report to the OCA,[6] Judge Villasor

summarized the allegations against Atty. Diesta, as follows:
 

(1)  always late in reporting for work, left the office early, and could
not complete the whole week without being absent;

(2)  tolerated the infractions of the Clerk In-Charge of Criminal Cases

who was allegedly the “runner” when there were transactions
concerning bonds and publications;
 (3)  publication of cases or judicial notices were not raffled, but,
instead, were assigned to “the Courier”;

(4) appeared in cases, particularly in Quezon City and in San Mateo,

Rizal, for her practitioner-father; and

(5) asked for a commissioner’s fee according to a Private Practitioner,

Atty. del Rosario.

Judge Villasor reported that Atty. Diesta lost the attendance logbook of Branch
263 covering the dates relevant to the charges against her and Tacla, that she
asked for a commissioner’s fee from Atty. Del Rosario, and that she was amenable
to receiving “token” amounts from lawyers. 

He summarized the allegations against Tacla as follows:

 

(1) that she was the “runner” of the Branch Clerk of Court when
there were transactions concerning bonds and publications entered
into by the former;

(2) that her name did not appear in the attendance logbook, which
meant that she did not report for work, but her DTR showed that she
reported for work on the days concerned; and

(3) that in the entry of September 2, 2003, she cheated on her time.
 

He found that Tacla falsified her entries in the attendance logbook.

 
 Since the complaint was the first one for both Atty. Diesta and Tacla, Judge
Villasor recommended that Atty. Diesta be reprimanded and admonished to
exercise care in securing the attendance logbook and in performing her other
official duties, and that Tacla be warned to be more careful in making entries in
the official attendance logbook. 

The OCA Report/Recommendation

The OCA submitted its Report, dated February 10, 2006,[7] with the

following findings:
 

Atty. Diesta denied that she was late or absent and alleged that she did not
record her time of arrival to or departure from the office because she was not
required to do so.  She admitted that the attendance logbook of Branch 263 for
the period of September 2003 to September 2004 is missing.  She  admitted that
she had custody of the logbook and that she kept it in the filing cabinet behind
her desk; it remained missing despite efforts to find it. The OCA found that the
loss of the attendance logbook while in Atty. Diesta’s custody was an indication
that she was careless in her duty to keep it safe.

The OCA noted the statement of Lourdes Puzon, Clerk III in charge of civil
cases.  Ms. Puzon claimed that when there was a need for publication, she
prepared an order for signature by the pairing judge of Branch 263 and after the
order was signed, she submitted it to Atty. Diesta.  Ms. Puzon claimed that after
her submission of the signed order, she had no more knowledge on how the
publication was done.  Atty. Diesta contradicted this claim and maintained that
after she received the signed order with the record of cases for publication, she
gave it to the clerk-in-charge.  She then presumed that the clerk would forward it
to the Office of the Clerk of Court. According to the OCA, Atty. Diesta had the
responsibility and duty as branch clerk of court to furnish the Office of the Clerk of
Court with a copy of the signed order, citing Sections 10 and 11 of 
 A.M. No. 01-1-07-SC.[8]  The OCA also verified the records of the Office of
the Clerk of Court and found that Branch 263 had not submitted for raffle any
judicial notice or announcement for publication.[9] The OCA found that Atty.
Diesta violated A.M. No. 01-1-07-SC.

The OCA also stated that Ms. Puzon confirmed Atty. Del Rosario’s
manifestation before Judge Isagani Geronimo of Branch 263 that Atty. Del Rosario
asked that the case be heard before the court, although it was set for ex
parte hearing, because Atty. Diesta was charging him an amount that he could not
justify to his client. This incident was corroborated by Julie Ann Berosil, former
court interpreter of Branch 263.[10]  An OCA investigator who interviewed Atty. Del
Rosario also confirmed that the latter offered to pay Atty. Diesta P1,500.00
instead of the P3,500.00 that she was asking for.[11]  Atty. Diesta, on the other
hand, asserted that the matter involving Atty. Del Rosario was an isolated one and
had already been resolved.

On the alleged “token” voluntarily given by lawyers, Atty. Diesta admitted

in her July 18, 2005 comment that “In fact, when lawyers ask about the
‘commissioner’s fee,’” they are simply told that [its] collection x x x is prohibited.
Even the stenographers concerned have repeatedly stressed this information to
the lawyers.  It cannot be denied though that there are lawyers who insist that it
is but a ‘token’ and that they have set aside a budget for the same.  In these
instances, the matter is left to the discretion of the lawyer concerned.  But,
whatever amount is handed out, it is strictly VOLUNTARILY given and in no way
was anyone ever forced, coerced or intimidated to make payments in exchange
for the reception of their evidence.”[12]  The OCA, finding these statements
disturbing, said: “As frontliners in the administration and dispensation of justice,
respondent Diesta is duty bound to uphold the integrity of the court.  She should
avoid the practice of accepting or tolerating such tokens, as it will deteriorate (sic)
the entire judiciary’s integrity.”[13]   

On the matter of Tacla’s alleged cheating on her time record, the OCA
reported Tacla’s claim that she did not intend to cheat on her entries in the
attendance logbook and that her watch stopped causing her to indicate the wrong
time of her arrival onSeptember 2, 2003.[14]  She also maintained that she was not
gallivanting during the times she was out of the office but was actually doing
official work. She also denied that she was Atty. Diesta’s “runner.”  The OCA found
that Tacla’s explanation that she was out on official business when her name did
not appear in the attendance logbook was a disregard of the directive to faithfully
accomplish the attendance logbook.

According to the OCA, public servants must at all times exhibit the highest
sense of honesty and integrity, and their conduct must be above suspicion and
characterized by propriety and decorum. The OCA recommended that Atty. Diesta
and Tacla be reprimanded, with a stern warning that a commission of similar acts
in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

The Court’s Ruling

Ample evidence is on record to support the OCA’s finding of Atty. Diesta

and Tacla’s culpability. 

On the charges against Atty. Diesta, we note the affidavit of Lourdes Puzon:
[15]
  

5.  With respect to the allegations of a certain Atty. Jaime Del Rosario, I,

together with the interpreter Julie Ann Berosil and two (2) Stenographers, Ms. Erlinda
Verga and Fannie Magtibay were present.  During the hearing wherein Atty. Del Rosario
appeared as counsel for a certain civil case, he manifested before Hon. Judge Isagani A.
Geronimo that his case is set for ex-parte presentation before the Branch Clerk of Court
but he wanted his case to be heard before the Court because according to him, Atty.
Diesta was charging him for a substantial amount.

Atty. Diesta also admitted that the attendance logbook was missing and that she
had the duty as Branch Clerk of Court to keep it in her custody.[16]  The Joint
Manifestation[17] of seven (7) members of the court staff reads:
 
We, Loralei R. Victoria, Erlinda M. Verga, Fannie A. Magtibay, Lourdes Soriano,
Sherwin Sansano, Alfonso Pe Benito, Jr., and Sotero Matias, all of legal ages and
staffmembers of Branch 263, Regional Trial Court, Pasig City, jointly manifest to the
Honorable Court that:

1)  All logbooks containing entries of our arrival in and departure from the office are
being kept in the filing cabinet of our office;

2)  When the “anonymous complaint” was received by our Branch Clerk of Court
sometime in July 2004, she asked for the logbook containing the entries pertinent to the
complaint.  However, the said logbook was not in the filing cabinet anymore;

3)  Despite efforts to locate the logbook, the same could no longer be found.

We are executing this joint manifestation for the information of the Honorable
Court.

 
There is also sufficient evidence to support the charges that Atty. Diesta asked for
commissioner’s fee from Atty. Del Rosario and that the publications of judicial
notices in Branch 263 were not submitted for raffle.

Tacla’s logbook entries for September 1, 8, 16, 22 and 29, 2003,[18] and the
entries on her daily time record for the month of September 2003[19] were
markedly different. The deviations were noted by an OCA investigator who
checked the records of the OCA Leave Division.[20]

          The Revised Manual for Clerks of Court provides:

 
1.2  Attendance Records (Memo, Circular No. 4, June 15, 1973)

1.2.1. Registry Book –Each Court shall provide itself with a registry book with which
to indicate the time in coming to and leaving the office of its personnel.

1.2.2  Daily Time Record (CS Form 48) – In addition, each personnel must be
required to accomplish CS Form 48.  The time appearing in Form 48 should
tally with the time recorded in the registry book.

                  Clerks of Court are not required to keep daily time records of their
attendance, in lieu thereof, the said officials are required to submit a
certification of service within the period under pain of having their salaries
withheld (Ruling of the Commissioner of Civil Service, 1st Indorsement,
November 7, 1970, re: proper interpretation of Civil Service Rule XV, Sec. 4.)

1.2.3. The Clerks of Court are held responsible for the custody and reliability of the
time recorded in the registry book.  These daily time records (Form 48) must
be duly certified by the Judge or the Clerk of Court before they are sent to the
proper authorities. (Underlining supplied)

 
          Section 23, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive
Order No. 292[21] provides that administrative offenses are classified into grave,
less grave and light, depending on the gravity of the nature of the act complained
of.  The less grave offenses of simple neglect of duty and of simple misconduct
carry the penalty of suspension for one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6)
months for the first offense.

We agree with the OCA finding that both Atty. Diesta and Tacla are guilty of
the charges against them.  However, we do not agree with the OCA
recommendation that Atty. Diesta and Tacla be only reprimanded with stern
warning that commission of similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.  Both are guilty of less grave offenses and must be meted the
corresponding penalties. Atty. Diesta is guilty of simple neglect of duty for losing
the attendance logbook, and she is also guilty of simple misconduct for asking for
a commissioner’s fee and for failing to have the publication of official notices
raffled.  She should be suspended for three (3) months.  Tacla, who is guilty of
simple misconduct for not faithfully accomplishing her daily time record, should
be suspended for one (1) month and one (1) day.

          WHEREFORE, premises considered, Atty. Portia Diesta, Branch Clerk of

Court, Regional Trial Court, Pasig City, Branch 263, is hereby SUSPENDED from the
service for THREE (3) months without pay, with a STERN WARNING that a
commission of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.  Luz Santos-Tacla, Clerk III, Regional Trial Court, Pasig City, Branch 263,
is SUSPENDED from the service for ONE (1) month and ONE (1) day without pay,
with aSTERN WARNING that a commission of the same or similar acts in the
future shall be dealt with more severely.

 
          SO ORDERED.
 

ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

 
 

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

Chairperson

   

   

   

   

   

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

 Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Associate Justice

[1]
 Rollo, pp. 6-9.
[2]
 Id. at 33-34.
[3]
 Id. at 35-41.
[4]
 Id. at 81-84.
[5]
 Id. at 91.
[6]
 Id. at 557-586.
[7]
 Id. at 595-600.
[8]
 “Guidelines in the accreditation of newspapers and periodicals seeking to publish judicial and legal notices and
other similar announcements and in the raffle thereof.”  Section 10 provides: “All notices, announcements and
advertisements x x x shall be distributed for publication to accredited newspapers or periodicals by raffle.  No such
notices, announcements and advertisements may be assigned for publication without being raffled.”  Section 11
provides: “Orders issued by judges in cases that require publication of any notice or notices shall include a directive
to the Branch Clerk of Court instructing the latter to furnish the Office of the Clerk of Court with a copy of the order
so that such notice may be published in accordance with the provisions of P.D. No. 1079.”
[9]
 Rollo, p. 89.
[10]
 Id. at 481-483.
[11]
 Id. at 89.
[12]
 Id. at 117.
[13]
 Id. at 599.
[14]
 Id. at 20.
[15]
 Id. at 145-146.
[16]
 Id. at 500-503.
[17]
 Id. at 339.
[18]
 Id. at 10, 13, 15, 18, and 20.
[19]
 Id. at 29.
[20]
 Id. at 89.
[21]
 Sec. 23. Administrative offenses with its (sic) corresponding penalties are classified into grave, less grave, and
light, depending on the gravity of its (sic) nature and effect of said acts on the government service.
 xxx
The following are less grave offenses with its (sic) corresponding penalties:
(a) Simple Neglect of Duty
1st Offense – Suspension for one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months. . .
(b) Simple Misconduct
1st Offense – Suspension for one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months. . .
 
 

Manila RTC Clerk Suspended for Falsifying DTR

Posted: January 26, 2006

By Raymund G. Martelino
The Supreme Court recently suspended Andria Forteza-Crisostomo, Clerk III of the Manila Regional Trial Court,
Branch 39 for three months for falsifying her daily time record (DTR). She was warned that a repetition of the same
offense would be dealt with more severely. On the other hand, the Court dismissed the administrative case on the
same charge against Maria Fe P. Brooks, Court Interpreter of the Quezon City RTC, Branch 69.

In a six-page decision penned by Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., the Supreme Court affirmed the Office of the Court
Administrator’s recommendations that the charge against Brooks be dismissed and that Crisostomo be suspended
for three months. “Falsification of daily time records amounts to dishonesty; dishonesty, being in the nature of a grave
offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits except accrued
leave credits, and perpetual disqualification for reemployment in government service. Indeed, dishonesty has no
place in the Judiciary,” the Court said.

The Court reminded Brooks and Crisostomo that “the conduct of court personnel, from the presiding judge to the
lowliest clerk, must always be beyond reproach and must be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility as
to let them be free from any suspicion that may taint the judiciary.”

The Court found that Crisostomo admitted having made some alterations on her October 2003 DTR. It rejected her
justification that at the time said alterations were made she was in her first trimester of pregnancy which made her
body weak due to her heavy workload. Crisostomo said that she made the alterations fearing that her recorded
tardiness fro three instances would be a ground for her suspension. The Court noted that she sincerely apologized for
her actions and manifested her willingness to accept whatever punishment would be meted against her.

On the other hand, the Court found Brooks to have made changes in the entries made in her DTR particularly those
for October 1, 3, and 8, 2003. The Court accepted her explanation that the changes were made only to correct the
entries and to make them tally with their office attendance logbook, with the knowledge of their Branch Clerk of Court,
made in good faith, and without any interest of dishonesty.

Concurring in the decision were Senior Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, Justices Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez, and
Dante O. Tinga. Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario was on leave.

(A.M. No. P-05-2086 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 05-9-583-RTC, Re: Falsification of Daily Time Records of Maria Fe P.
Brooks, Court Interpreter, Regional Trial Court Quezon City, Branch 69, and Andria Forteza-Crisostomo, Clerk III,
Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 39, October 20, 2005)
  
THIRD DIVISION
 
 
Re: Report on the Irregularity   A.M.  No.  P-08-2494
in the Use of Bundy Clock by   (Formerly  OCA IPI No. 06-2399-P)   
Alberto Salamat, Sheriff IV,  
RTC-Br.80, Malolos City, Present:
                           
  YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
         Chairperson,
  AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
  CHICO-NAZARIO,
  NACHURA, and
  REYES, JJ.
   
  Promulgated:
   
                            November 27, 2008
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
 
 
 R E S O L U T I O N
 
 
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
 
 
Before this Court is an administrative charge against Sheriff IV Alberto
Salamat (respondent) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos City, Branch
80, accusing him of punching in the daily time cards for his co-employees.
 
Black Tiger Security Services, Inc. (Black Tiger) provides security services
by assigning security guards to the Bulacan Halls of Justice.  One of the security
guards of Black Tiger, Glicerio Magbanua (Magbanua), was assigned to the lobby
of the Bulacan Halls of Justice from 6:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. on 22 April
2005.  At 7:40 a.m. and 7:45 a.m., Magbanua saw respondent punch in more than
five daily time cards.[1]  Magbanua initially reminded respondent about the
prohibition on punching in a multiple number of daily time cards but the latter
answered, “Isa isa lang naman ang punch ko.”[2]  When respondent persisted in
punching in more daily time cards, Magbanua merely observed him and recorded
the incident in the logbook.[3]
 
Thereafter, Magbanua reported the matter to his superiors at Black
Tiger.  The report was passed on from Deputy Detachment Commander Eduardo
de Guzman (DDC De Guzman) to Detachment Commander Lino Quitoriano (DC
Quitoriano). Finally, President/General Manager Dr. Celso B. Songcuya, Jr. (Dr.
Songcuya) and Executive Vice President/Managing DirectorRolando G. Macaoay
(EVP/MD Macaoay) sent their letter-report dated 18 May 2005 to Atty. Peter John
U. Javier (Atty. Javier), Officer-in-Charge of the Bulacan Halls of Justice-
Secretariat.  In said letter report, however, respondent was charged with punching
in the daily time cards of his co-employees on 5 May 2005, instead of 22 April
2005. 
 
On 15 July 2005, Court Administrator now Associate Justice Presbitero J.
Velasco, Jr., required[4] respondent to submit his comment within 10 days from
receipt.
         
In his Comment[5] dated 18 August 2005 submitted to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA), respondent denied the allegations against him.  He argued
that, as shown in the logbook of the daily time of arrival and departure kept by
their office, he punched in his daily time card on 5 May 2005 at 8:01 a.m. and
not 7:45 a.m. as claimed by Dr. Songcuya.  Hence, it would be illogical and
unlikely for him to punch in the daily time cards of his co-employees since some of
them arrived at the office earlier than he.
 
          On 6 March 2006, the First Division of this Court issued a
Resolution[6] referring the administrative matter to the Executive Judge of the RTC
of Malolos City, Bulacan, for investigation, report, and recommendation within 60
days from receipt of record.  In a letter[7] dated 6 June 2006, then Executive Judge
Petrita Braga Dime[8] of the Malolos City RTC informed this Court that the
administrative matter was raffled to First Vice Executive Judge Herminia V.
Pasamba (Judge Pasamba).
 
          Investigation of the aforementioned administrative matter ensued. 
 
On 23 June 2006, Judge Pasamba submitted a Final Report[9] finding that,
based on the facts established and evidence adduced, the act complained of
actually took place on 22 April 2005, not on 5 May 2005, the date stated in the
letter-report charging respondent.  Believing that any sanction on the respondent
based on the standing charge would be violative of his procedural right to due
process, Judge Pasamba recommended that the administrative matter be dismissed,
but without prejudice to any further proper action against the respondent.
 
          On 19 February 2007, the Third Division of this Court issued a
Resolution[10] resolving, inter alia, to require respondent to submit his Comment on
the charge that he punched in the daily time cards of his co-employees on 22 April
2005; and Judge Pasamba to undertake another investigation, report, and
recommendation on this matter.
 
          In his Comment[11] dated 9 April 2007, respondent argued that no irregular
punching in of time cards occurred on 22 April 2005, and if it so happened, then
the Bi-Monthly/Semi-Monthly Report of Black Tiger covering the period of 16 to
30 April 2005 should have reflected an entry on the same.  Respondent concludes
that the Black Tiger officers and personnel must have doctored, falsified, or
irregularly inserted an entry in their logbook to support their belated claim that the
correct and actual date of his commission of the offense charged took place on 22
April 2005 and not on 5 May 2005.
 
          The administrative matter was again set for hearing by Judge Pasamba.
 
 Subsequently, on 31 October 2007, Judge Pasamba rendered her Final
Report,[12] the pertinent portions of which state:
 
                                      “DISCUSSION
 
            Respondent sheriff IV has been placed twice under investigation on the
irregularity in the use of the bundy clock.  The first administrative matter under
AM No. 05-7-416 RTC was resolved on 19 February 2007.  A correct date of the
actual commission of the incident from May 5, 2005 to April 22, 2005, as a
consequence, is now the subject of the present administrative charge.  The officers
of the Black Tiger Security Services Inc. EVP/Managing Director Rolando G.
Macaoay and Detachment Commander Lino Quitoriano based here in the Halls of
Justice,RTC Malolos City explained where the error lied.  The erroneous entry
appeared on the Report submitted by DC Lino Quitoriano to EVP/Managing
Director Rolando G. Macaoay.  The report on the incident is rooted and sourced
to the entry in the log book of Security Guard Eduardo de Guzman then on duty
on Bldg. 3, Hall of Justice housing Branch 80 RTC where respondent Alberto
Salamat was seen punching in on two occasions, around 7:40 and 7:45 am the
time cards of his co-office mates.  An examination of the blotter and record book
under the custody of the security guard presented and marked as exhibit in this
case showed that indeed the incident took place on April 22, 2005 not onMay 5,
2005.  Involved in the incident was Sheriff IV respondent Alberto
Salamat.  Respondent’s offered defense is DENIAL and that the records on the
charge were “doctored etc. (sic) by the people concerned in the Black Tiger
Security Services Inc., who filed the present administrative matter upon insistence
of Assistant Clerk of Court Atty. Geronimo Santos.  Detachment Commander
Lino Quitoriano cleared the issue and explained that such was not the case.  They
were merely acting on the instruction of the Asst. Clerk of Court to report to the
Executive Judge through Atty. Santos those court personnel who punched in the
time cards of others and proper action was taken because of their contractual
obligation with the Supreme court (sic) to bring to its attention those who
breached the said canon.  The undersigned finds the explanation of DC Lino
Quitoriano credible.  And while the common stand and testimonies of three of the
co employees of the respondent cannot be undermined, the undersigned cannot
reconcile it with the fact that there appears no ulterior motive on the part of the
witnesses Security Guards and the Detachment Commander of the Black Tiger
Security Services Inc. to file a trumped up charge against the respondent. They
have no ax to grind against him for them to fabricate the case.  In a numberless of
cases, the Highest Court has held that everyone in the judiciary, from the
presiding judge to the clerk, must always be beyond reproach and must be
 circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility as to let them free of any
suspicion that may taint the judiciary.  As the administration of justice is a sacred
task, the persons involved in it ought to live up to the strictest standard of honesty
and integrity.  Their conduct, at all times, must not only be characterized by
propriety and decorum but, above all else, must be above suspicion.  Every
employee must accurately enter his/her time of arrival and departure in the
office.  Punching of one’s daily time record is a personal act of the holder.  It
should not be delegated to anyone else.
 
                                                RECOMMENDATION
 
            Given the foregoing, there is the likelihood that respondent Alberto
Salamat [Sheriff IV] committed the complained irregularity.  A strong
admonition, as a sanction, is meted upon respondent with a stern warning that a
repetition of a similar act will call for a more severe disciplinary action.
 
 
On 29 April 2008, the OCA submitted its report and recommendation to this
Court, concurring in and adopting the factual findings of Judge Pasamba with
modification of the recommended sanction, thus:
 
            IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the undersigned respectfully
recommend (sic) that:
 
1.                  the instant administrative case be RE-DOCKETED as a regular
administrative matter;
 
2.                  respondent Alberto Salamat, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch
80, Malolos City be found GUILTY of Dishonesty for his act of punching in the
time cards of his co-employees; and
 
3.                  the said respondent be meted the penalty of DISMISSAL with
forfeiture of all his retirement benefits, except his accrued leave credits, and
with perpetual disqualification from re-employment in any government agency,
including government owned and controlled corporation.[13]
 
 
          On 9 July 2008, the Court required[14] the parties to manifest within 10 days
from notice if they were willing to submit the matter for resolution based on the
pleadings filed.  Respondent submitted such a manifestation[15] on 10 September
2008. Resultantly, the case was already submitted for decision.
 
After a thorough review of the records of this case, the Court agrees in the
finding of the OCA that respondent is guilty of dishonesty, but diverges from the
recommended penalty.
 
          This Court held in Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Bautista,
[16]
 citing Mamba v. Garcia,[17] that inadministrative proceedings, only substantial
evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conviction, is required.  In the case at bar,
substantial evidence exists to hold respondent liable for the offense charged,
particularly: (1) Black Tiger Security Guard Magbanua’s testimony; (2) the
Information Report filed by DCC De Guzman to his superiors at Black Tiger; (3)
the letter report[18] dated 18 May 2005 of Black Tiger President/GM Dr. Songcuya
and EVP/MD Macaoay to Atty. Javier charging respondent with punching in the
daily time cards for his co-employees.
 
On the other hand, respondent merely denies the allegations against him.
Instead, he alleges that it would be illogical and unlikely for him to punch in the
daily time cards of his co-employees on 5 May 2005 since some of them arrived at
the office much earlier than he; and the Black Tiger officers and personnel merely
doctored, falsified, or irregularly inserted an entry in their logbook to make it
appear that he committed the offense charged not on 5 May 2005, but on 22 April
2005.
 
 It is settled that denial is inherently a weak defense.  To be believed, it must
be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability; otherwise, such denial is
purely self-serving and is with nil evidentiary value.  Like the defense of alibi, a
denial crumbles in the light of positive declarations.[19]
 
Respondent undeniably failed to substantiate the allegations in his
comment.  He could have submitted evidence to substantiate his allegations, other
than his mere denials, but respondent failed to submit any supporting proof.  The
basic rule is that mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof.[20]  
 
As to the alleged discrepancy on the date the incident happened, the Court
notes that this was already clarified by Black Tiger DC Quitoriano, who admitted
that he inadvertently and honestly committed the mistake by stating the date 5 May
2005 in his Information Report, since he prepared the report already late at night.
   The wrong date was eventually corrected[22] by changing it to 22 April
[21]

2005.  Both Judge Pasamba and the OCA found DC Quitariano’s explanation to be

credible, and there is no reason for this Court to rule otherwise.
 
Respondent’s assertion that the Black Tiger officers and personnel only
doctored, falsified, or irregularly inserted an entry on the incident in their logbook
deserves scant consideration.  It is purely speculation on his part.  As pointed out
by Judge Pasamba in her 31 October 2007 Final Report, no ulterior motive can be
attributed to Black Tiger officers and personnel for them to file a trumped up
charge against the respondent.  They have no ax to grind against him to spur them
to fabricate the present administrative charge.
 
There being substantive proof that respondent punched in the daily time
cards for his co-employees on 22 April 2007, the Court finds respondent’s
actuations to be in violation of OCA Circular No. 7-2003, which reads in part that:
 
            In the submission of Certificates of Service and Daily Time Records
(DTRs)/Bundy Cards by Judges and court personnel, the following guidelines
shall be observed:
 
1.         After the end of each month, every official and employee of each court
shall accomplish the Daily Time Record (Civil Service Form No. 48)/Bundy
Card, indicating therein truthfully and accurately the time of arrival in and
departure from the office x x x. (Emphasis supplied.)
 
 
The foregoing Circular clearly provides that every court official and
employee must truthfully and accurately indicate the time of his or her arrival at
and departure from the office. Equally important is the fact that this Court has
already held that thepunching in of one's daily time record is a personal act of
the holder.  It cannot and should not be delegated to anyone else. This is mandated
by the word “every” in the above-quoted circular.[23]
 
          Respondent's act of punching in another employee's daily time card falls
within the ambit of falsification.  Worse, he did not do it for only one co-employee,
but for at least five others.  He made it appear as though his co-employees
personally punched in their respective daily time cards and, at the same time, made
the card reflect a log-in time different from their actual times of arrival.  It is patent
dishonesty, reflective of respondent’s fitness as an employee to continue in office
and of the level of discipline and morale in the service. [24]  Falsification of daily
time records is an act of dishonesty.  For this, respondent must be held
administratively liable.  Rule XVII, Section 4 of the Omnibus Civil Service Rules
and Regulations (Civil Service Rules) provides:
 
             Section 4.        Falsification or irregularities in the keeping of time records
will render the guilty officer or employee administratively liable x x x.
 
 
          The Court has repeatedly emphasized that everyone in the judiciary, from
the presiding judge to the clerk, must always be beyond reproach and must be
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility as to let them free of any
suspicion that may taint the judiciary.[25]  Public service requires utmost integrity
and discipline.  A public servant must exhibit at all times the highest sense of
honesty and integrity, for no less than the Constitution mandates the principle that
"a public office is a public trust and all public officers and employees must at all
times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency.”[26]  As the administration of justice is a sacred
task, the persons involved in it ought to live up to the strictest standard of honesty
and integrity.[27]  Their conduct, at all times, must not only be characterized by
propriety and decorum but, above all else, must be above suspicion. Thus, every
employee of the judiciary should be an example of integrity, uprightness and
honesty.[28] 
 
          Respondent, by his actions, violated his sacred trust as a public servant and
judicial officer.  Indeed, dishonesty is a malevolent act that has no place in the
judiciary.[29] This Court has defined dishonesty as the "(d)isposition to lie, cheat,
deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or
integrity in principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to
defraud, deceive or betray.”[30]
 
          Under Rule XIV, Section 21 of the Civil Service Rules, falsification of
official documents (such as daily time records) and dishonesty are both grave
offenses.  As such, they carry the penalty of dismissal from the service with
forfeiture of retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and perpetual
disqualification from reemployment in government service.[31]
 
          However, there have been several other administrative cases[32] involving
dishonesty, in which the Court meted out a penalty lower than dismissal.  In these
cases, mitigating circumstances existed which merited the leniency of the Court. 
 
          In Re: Ting and Esmerio, the Court did not impose the severe penalty of
dismissal on the basis of the acknowledgment by respondents therein of their
infractions, and also their remorse and long years of service.  The Court imposed,
instead, the penalty of suspension for six months on Ting; and the penalty of
forfeiture of six months’ salary on Esmerio, on account of the latter’s retirement.
         
          In Re: Failure of Jose Dante E. Guerrero to Register His Time In and Out in
Chronolog Time Recorder Machine [for] Several Times,[33] the Court imposed the
penalty of six-month suspension on Guerrero, who was found guilty of dishonesty
for falsifying his time record. The Court considers as mitigating circumstances
Guererro’s good performance rating, his 13 years of satisfactory service in the
judiciary, and his acknowledgment of and remorse for his infractions.
         
          The compassion extended by the Court in these cases was not without legal
basis. Section 53, Rule IV of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases
in the Civil Service,[34] grants the disciplining authority the discretion to consider
mitigating circumstances in the imposition of the proper penalty. 
         
          In the case at bar, respondent was previously charged with grave
misconduct, dishonesty, and acts prejudicial to the interest of the service, as a
result of which he was suspended for one month.[35]  Three other cases[36] against
him were dismissed.  This is the second administrative case against him given due
course in his 18 years in government service. With the foregoing pronouncements,
the Court deems it proper to impose a suspension of ten months.
 
          The Court, though, could not rule on the supposed culpability of
respondent’s co-employees whose time cards he punched in, as Judge Pasamba, the
investigating judge, failed to make any factual findings thereon.
 
          WHEREFORE, Alberto Salamat is found GUILTY of dishonesty and is
hereby SUSPENDED for TEN (10) MONTHS, effective immediately, with a
stern WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with
more severely. 
 
          SO ORDERED.
 
 
 
  MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
 
 
WE CONCUR:
 
 
 
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice    
Chairperson
 
 
 
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-
MARTINEZ      ANTONIO EDUARDO B.
NACHURA
Associate Justice                                         Associate Justice
 
 
 
RUBEN T. REYES
                                                Associate Justice
 
 
 
 
 
 
[1]
               TSN, 7 September 2007, p. 24; rollo, p. 260.
[2]
               TSN, 16 June 2006, p. 36; id. at 73.
[3]
               TSN, 7 September 2007; id. at 261.
[4]
               Rollo, p. 8.
[5]
               Id. at 9-11.
[6]
               Id. at 20.
[7]
               Id. at 24.
[8]
               Now deceased.
[9]
               Rollo, pp. 35-38.
[10]
             Id. at 127.
[11]
             Id. at 129-131.
[12]
             Id. at 156-160.
[13]
             Id. at 476-477.
[14]
             Id. at 478.
[15]
             Id. at 480.
[16]
             456 Phil. 193, 207 (2003).
[17]
             412 Phil. 1, 10 (2001).
[18]
             Rollo, p. 3.
[19]
             Jugueta v. Estacio, A.M. No. CA-04-17-P, 25 November 2004, 444 SCRA 10, 16.   
[20]
             Navarro v. Cerezo, A.M. No. P-05-1962, 17 February 2005, 451 SCRA 626, 629.
[21]
             TSN, 7 September 2007, p. 41-44; rollo, pp. 277-280. 
[22]
             Rollo, ; Annex A.
[23]
             In Re: Irregularities in the Use of Logbook and Daily Time Records by Clerk of Court Raquel D. J.
Razon, Cash Clerk Joel M. Magtuloy and Utility Worker Tiburcio O. Morales, MTC-OCC, Guagua,
Pampanga, A.M. No. P-06-2243, 26 September 2006, 503 SCRA 52, 61.
[24]
             Alabastro v. Moncada, Sr., A.M. No. P-04-1887, 16 December 2004, 447 SCRA 42, 59; Nera v. Garcia
and Elicaño, 106 Phil. 1031, 1036 (1960).  
[25]
             Dipolog v. Montealto, A.M. No. P-04-190, 23 November 2004, 443 SCRA 465, 476.
[26]
             Section 1, Article XI, 1987 Constitution.
[27]
             Hernandez v. Borja, 312 Phil. 199, 204 (1995).
[28]
             Basco v. Gregorio, 315 Phil. 681, 688 (1995).
[29]
             Office of the Court Administrator v. Magno, 419 Phil. 593, 602 (2001); Sec. 22(a), Rule XIV of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 ( Administrative Code of 1987), as
amended by CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19, s. 1999(a).
[30]
             Re: Administrative Case for Dishonesty Against Elizabeth Ting, Court Sec. I & Angelita C. Esmerio,
Clerk III, Off. Clerk of Court, A.M. No. 2001-7-SC & No. 2001-8-SC, 22 July 2005, 464 SCRA 1, 15.
[31]
             Office of the Court Administrator v. Magno, supra note 29; Sec. 22(a), Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987), as amended by CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 19, s. 1999(a). 
[32]
             Concerned Employee v. Valentin, A.M. No. 2005-01-SC, 8 June 2005, 459 SCRA 307, 311; Dipolog v.
Montealto, A.M. No. P-04-190, 23 November 2004, 443 SCRA 465, 478; Re:  Alleged Tampering of the
Daily Time Records (DTR) of Sherry B. Cervantes, Court Stenographer III, Branch 18, Regional Trial
Court, Manila, A.M. No. 03-8-463-RTC, 20 May 2004, 428 SCRA 572, 576; Office of the Court
Administrator v. Sirios, 457 Phil. 42, 48-49 (2003); Atty. Reyes-Domingo v. Morales, 396 Phil. 150, 164
(2000).   
[33]
             A.M. No. 2005-07-SC, 19 April 2006, 487 SCRA 352, 369.
[34]
             CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19-99, 14 September 1999.
[35]
             Pan v. Salamat, A.M. No. P-03-1678, 26 June 2006, 492 SCRA 460.
[36]
             A.M. OCA IPI No. 01-1239-P (Sarmiento v. Salamat) - for abuse of authority-dismissed on 13 January
2003; A.M. No. P-01-1501 (Sarmiento v. Salamat, 416 Phil. 685 [2001]) - for dereliction of duty - was
dismissed on  4 September 2001; A.M. OCA IPI No. 00-881-MTJ (Joaquin-Agregado v. Presiding Judge
Ronquillo) - for grave abuse of authority and willful violation of Republic Act No. 3019 - was dismissed
on 3 December 2001
  

SECOND DIVISION

LIGAYA M. APOLINARIO,                  G.R. No. 152780

                                      Petitioner,

                                                                 Present:

 
                                                                 QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
                - versus -                                   CARPIO,
                                                                 CARPIO MORALES,
                                                                 TINGA, and
                                                                 VELASCO, JR., JJ.                 
 
 

DESIREE B. FLORES,                           Promulgated:
                            Respondent.                  January 22, 2007
 

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x   
 

DECISION
 

CARPIO, J.:

 
 The Case

         This is a petition for review[1] of the Decision[2] dated 27 February 2002 of the

Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63186.  The appellate court affirmed the
Decision[3] dated 21 September 2000 of the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-
ADM-1-99-0821 finding petitioner Ligaya M. Apolinario (petitioner) guilty of
dishonesty and penalizing her with six months suspension from the service.

The Facts

         On 24 September 1999, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman

for Luzon (Deputy Ombudsman) received a sworn letter-complaint[4] and
affidavit[5] from respondent Desiree B. Flores (respondent) against petitioner for
falsifying her daily time record (DTR).  Respondent alleged that petitioner
knowingly falsified her time entries in her DTR as evidenced by the official general
daily attendance record (GDAR).  Respondent stated that the National Food
Authority (NFA) Regional Office conducted an investigation[6] as early as
September 1998 and the fact-finding team already submitted an investigation
report[7] dated 7 October 1998.  However, the case remained pending prompting
respondent to file the complaint.

         In her counter-affidavit[8] dated 8 November 1999, petitioner denied

falsifying the entries in her DTRs.  Petitioner explained that the entries in her DTR
were based not only from the GDAR but also from “other attendance monitoring
sheets like pass-outs (official/personal), travel authority, travel permits, and
vehicle requisition slips” and these are all on file in the NFA Provincial Office.

         The Deputy Ombudsman docketed the complaint for falsification of public

document as OMB-1-99-1970.  In a Resolution[9] dated 10 April 2000, the Deputy
Ombudsman dismissed the complaint because the investigation report was still
under evaluation by the NFA Regional Office.  However, the Deputy
Ombudsman’s 10 April 2000 Resolution approved the re-docketing of the
complaint as CPL.[10]

         Subsequently, the complaint was re-docketed as OMB-CPL-1-00-0006 for

falsification and dishonesty.  In a Fact-Finding and Investigation
[11]
Report  dated 28 July 2000, the Deputy Ombudsman decided to consider the
case closed.  The decision was based on the reply of Juanito M. David (David), NFA
Regional Administrator, to the Deputy Ombudsman’s query on the status of the
investigation.  David reported that (1) in a case filed by a certain
Mrs. Nimfa Cuaresma (Mrs. Cuaresma), the Civil Service Commission (CSC) found
petitioner guilty of simple misconduct and ordered her suspension for six months;
(2) the NFA Regional Office already issued Special Order No. ROI-II-006 dated 24
August 1998 transferring petitioner to the Baguiooffice; and (3) another case had
been filed by Mrs. Cuaresma against petitioner before the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Lingayen,Pangasinan.

         On the other hand, the Deputy Ombudsman docketed the complaint for
dishonesty as OMB-ADM-1-99-0821.  In a Decision[12] dated 21 September 2000,
the Ombudsman found substantial evidence to hold petitioner guilty of
dishonesty and suspended her for six months.  The Decision reads:

           After a careful perusal of the records on bar, this Office adopts the result of the
NFA Fact-Finding Investigation regarding the absence of the personal or official pass-out
slips as required by the NFA per Office Memorandum 79 No. 19 (par. 2, Item 2) dated 27
February 1978 which states that:

           “xxx the official errand shall be covered by a Pass-out Slip.  The

Pass-out Slip shall be accomplished in duplicate, the Original to be
retained by the Directorate/Office for attachment to the time card for
payroll processing, if the official business would not enable the
employee to punch in or out his time card on the specified hours.  The
duplicate shall be surrendered to the ground security guard.  The form
 shall bear the initial[s] of the immediate supervisor and the signature of
the Division Chief concerned xxx.

           13. Also, under Item 4 of said Memorandum, it mandates that all

employees are required to report to their respective posts in the
morning before they go out on their official errands.  Should it be
necessary that the employee go directly to the place of errands from his
residence, the Pass-out slip may be accomplished later (Annex “A-7”).”

            The NFA Fact-Finding Team found out that: “no pass-out slips for the month[s] of
June and July 1995 could be located at the NFA-Lingayen, Pangasinan Provincial Office
nor at the NFA Regional Office.  Only the pass-out slips for the months of August,
September, October, November and December 1995 were found intact.  Examination,
however, of said pass-outs on file and original copies of DTR submitted to the Regional
Office totally negates the claim of Mrs. Apolinario that the tardiness and absences which
were not truthfully recorded in her DTRs could have been covered by pass-out slips,
Travel Authority or Trip Permits.  This finding was substantiated by a certification issued
by Manager Roberto S. Musngi of NFA-Western Pangasinan re: Non-existence of Pass-
out Slips in the name of Ligaya Apolinarioduring the above stated months (Exh.”J”)
(Annex “A-7”).

           Respondent failed to produce her pass-out slips, travel authority or trip permits
for the months of June and July 1995 before the NFA Fact Finding Team or before this
office to buttress her contention that she was on official business when her tardiness
and absences were recorded in the General Daily Attendance Record.  Hence, the
allegation that she falsified her entries for the aforesaid period in her Daily Time Record
remains uncontroverted.[13]

         Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.  Petitioner claimed that the

issues and subject matter of OMB-ADM-1-99-0821 were already dismissed by the
Ombudsman in the 10 April 2000 Resolution in OMB-1-99-1970 and closed in
the 28 July 2000 Report in OMB-CPL-1-00-0006.  Petitioner prayed for the
dismissal of OMB-ADM-1-99-0821 on the ground that her constitutional
protection against double jeopardy had been violated.

         The Ombudsman denied the motion.  The Ombudsman explained that the

prohibition against double jeopardy finds application only in criminal cases.  If
ever the prohibition against double jeopardy applied in administrative cases, it
would still not apply in this case because OMB-1-99-1970 was not dismissed on
the merits but because the investigation report was not yet approved by the NFA
Regional Office.  On OMB-CPL-1-00-0006, the Ombudsman explained that the
case was closed “on the wrong premise” that the CSC suspended petitioner for six
months on the same incident subject of the case.  The Ombudsman later learned
that the complainants in the CSC case were Ramon and Nimfa Cuaresma  and that
the complaint involved different issues and allegations.

         Petitioner filed a petition for review[14] in the Court of Appeals.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

 
         In its 27 February 2002 Decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner’s
petition and affirmed the Ombudsman’s 21 September 2000 Decision.  The
appellate court held:

            It is settled that the elements of res judicata are: (1) there must be a final
judgment or order; (2) the court rendering it must have jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; (3) there must be between the two cases, identity of parties,
subject matter and causes of action.  The ultimate test in ascertaining the identity of
causes of action is said to be to look into whether or not [sic] the same evidence fully
supports and establishes both the present cause of action and the former cause of
action.  In the present petition, the third element is lacking. The petitioner was
separately charged for different offenses before the Deputy [sic] Office of the [Deputy]
Ombudsman for Luzon.  The present petition for review is of the Decision rendered by
the Ombudsman in OMB-ADM-1-99-0821.  There is therefore no identity of subject
matter to speak of.  The Resolution dated April 10, 2000 in OMB-1-99-1970 involves the
offense of Falsification of Public Document.  The administrative offense for
which Apolinario was charged in OMB-[ADM]-1-99-0821 is for Dishonesty.  While it is
true that the initial recommendation in the Fact-Finding and Investigation Report
(docketed as OMB-CPL-1-00-0006 for Falsification and Dishonesty) is to consider the
complaint closed and terminated, two final separate resolutions by the same Office
refer to the separate and distinct offenses of first, Dishonesty, and second, Falsification
of Public Document.  Neither therefore is the doctrine of double jeopardy advanced by
the petitioner in the pleadings filed with this Court applicable since it is clear that she
has been charged with two separate and distinct offenses.

            Petitioner further contends that the findings of the Office of the Ombudsman are
allegedly not supported by substantial evidence.

            We disagree.

            Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might

accept as adequate to support a conclusion.  The quantum of proof required in
proceedings before administrative agencies is “substantial evidence” not overwhelming
or preponderance.

            In the present petition, Ligaya M. Apolinario did not challenge the validity or

authenticity of the General Daily Attendance Record reflecting her attendance.  Though
she offered an explanation for the incongruity between the General Daily Attendance
Record and her Daily Time Record, the fact-finding team of the National Food Authority,
after an exhaustive investigation, found that “pass-outs on file and original copies of DTR
submitted to the Regional Office totally negates the claim of Mrs. Apolinario (emphasis
ours) that the tardiness and absences which were not truthfully recorded in
her DTRs could have been covered by pass-out slips, Travel Authority or Trip
Permits.”  In short, there is clear evidence Apolinario was indeed dishonest in filling out
her daily time record.  The factual findings of the investigation conducted by the
Investigating Team have not been challenged.  Nor were these controverted by
petitioner who has been unable to present evidence to prove otherwise.  Her
explanations for the incongruity between the General Daily Attendance Record and her
 Daily Time Record are not sufficient to overcome the charge of Dishonesty considering
the two apparent facts that it was she who filled the Daily Time Record, and that she did
not correctly indicate therein her absences and tardiness, which are reflected in the
General Daily Attendance Record.  She claims that she went on official business trips
during the dates  she was tardy and absent as reflected in the General Daily Attendance
Record but she failed to produce any pass-out slip, Travel Authority or Trip Permit which
she must secure pursuant to internal office regulations.  The Investigating Team was
unable to find copies of the pass-out slips, Travel Authority or Trip Permit for the dates
she claims she went on official business trips which she should have given to the proper
officer concerned and kept on file in the Regional Offices following Office Memorandum
79 No. 19 dated 27 February, 1978.  Neither do we find the explanation that these
documents kept in the Office were lost during the onslaught of the typhoon “Gading”
tenable considering that the Investigating Team was able to find other slips or permits
intact in the Office files.  All told, petitioner’s explanation cannot overcome the
overwhelming evidence presented against presented [sic] against [sic] her to prove that
she did not disclose the truth in the entries she made in her General Daily Attendance
Record and her Daily Time Record.[15] (Emphasis in the original.)

         Hence, this petition. Petitioner now reiterates her claim that the
Ombudsman should have dismissed OMB-ADM-1-99-0821 considering that the
Ombudsman had previously dismissed the “same” complaint.  Petitioner also
insists that the findings of the Ombudsman were not supported by substantial
evidence.

         In her Memorandum,[16] respondent explained that she filed two complaints

against petitioner: (1) an administrative complaint for dishonesty and (2) a
criminal complaint for estafa thru falsification of public document.  Respondent
added that, although based on the same facts and evidence,  the dismissal of the
criminal case did not automatically lead to the dismissal of the administrative
case.  Besides, the Deputy Ombudsman dismissed the criminal case not on the
merits but on the ground the NFA Regional Office had not yet approved the
Investigation Report. As the Ombudsman explained, OMB-CPL-1-00-0006 was
closed “on the wrong premise” that the CSC’s decision referred to the same
complaint for falsification of public documents.  
 

The Issues

         Petitioner raised the following issues:

1.     Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the

Ombudsman considering that the “same” complaint had been
previously dismissed; and

2. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming that the

findings             of the Ombudsman were supported by substantial evidence.

The Ruling of the Court

 
         The petition has no merit.

         Petitioner contends that the dismissal of OMB-1-99-1970 and the

termination of OMB-CPL-1-00-0006 are valid grounds to dismiss OMB-ADM-1-99-
0821.  Petitioner argues that the “same” complaint, having been dismissed by the
Ombudsman, is nowres judicata and thus, bars the Ombudsman from hearing the
complaint for dishonesty. 

         The Court notes that, for falsifying petitioner’s DTR, respondent filed two
complaints against petitioner.  The first was a criminal complaint for estafa thru
falsification of public document and the second was an administrative complaint
for dishonesty.  The Ombudsman docketed the criminal case as OMB-1-99-1970
for falsification of public document, which was later re-docketed as OMB-CPL-1-
00-0006 for falsification and dishonesty, and the administrative case as OMB-
ADM-1-99-0821 for dishonesty. 

         In Tecson v. Sandiganbayan, we ruled that:

 
[I]t is a basic principle of the law on public officers that a public official or employee is
under a three-fold responsibility for violation of a duty or for a wrongful act or
omission.  This simply means that a public officer may be held civilly, criminally, and
administratively liable for a wrongful doing. Thus, if such violation or wrongful act
results in damages to an individual, the public officer may be held civilly liable to
reimburse the injured party. If the law violated attaches a penal sanction, the erring
officer may be punished criminally.  Finally, such violation may also lead to suspension,
removal from office, or other administrative sanctions. This administrative liability is
separate and distinct from the penal and civil liabilities.[17] (Italics in the original.)

 
 

         Thus, the dismissal of the criminal complaint did not necessarily foreclose
the continuation of the administrative action or carry with it relief from
administrative liability.[18]  The Office of the Ombudsman did not err when it
proceeded with the determination of petitioner’s administrative liability despite
the dismissal of the criminal complaint.

         The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that res judicata did not set in because

there is no identity of causes of action. Moreover, the decision of the
Ombudsman cannot be considered a valid and final judgment.  On the criminal
complaint, the Ombudsman only had the power to investigate and file the
appropriate case before the Sandiganbayan. 

         Petitioner’s claim that her constitutional protection against double jeopardy

was violated has no merit.

         Double jeopardy attaches only: (1) upon a valid indictment; (2) before a
competent court; (3) after arraignment; (4) when a valid plea has been entered;
and (5) when the defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed
or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.[19]  None of
these applies to the present case.  The Ombudsman only conducted a preliminary
investigation in OMB-1-99-1970 and OMB-CPL-1-00-0006.   Hence, double
jeopardy will not lie.

         Finally, the Court notes that the Ombudsman and the appellate court found
substantial evidence to prove petitioner’s administrative liability.   The Court
affirms this finding following the rule that factual findings of administrative
bodies, when supported by substantial evidence, are entitled to great weight and
respect on appeal.[20]

         WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition.  We AFFIRM the 27 February

2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63186.

         SO ORDERED.

 
                                                                  ANTONIO T. CARPIO

                                           Associate Justice
 
 
WE CONCUR:
 
 
 
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
 
 
 
 
     CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES               DANTE O. TINGA
                   Associate Justice                                 Associate Justice
 
 
                                         PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

                                               Associate Justice 

ATTESTATION
         I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
 
 
                                             LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
                                                                   Associate Justice
               Chairperson
 
CERTIFICATION
         Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
 
 
 
                                                             REYNATO S. PUNO
                                                                      Chief Justice
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

[1]
              Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[2]
              Penned by Associate Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga with Associate Justices Godardo A.
Jacinto           and Eloy R. Bello, Jr., concurring.
[3]
              Rollo, pp. 45-48.
[4]
              CA rollo, p. 43.
[5]
              Id. at 44-46.
[6]
              Petitioner was being investigated for the following charges:
                               1.  Falsification of official documents;
                               2.  Intriguing against honor of employees;
                               3.  Immoral conduct;
                               4.  Neglect of duty;
                               5. Soliciting or accepting directly or indirectly any gift, favor, loan or anything
of              monetary value    in the course of her official duties or in connection
withNFA’s business          transactions which may be affected by the functions of her office; and
                               6. Contracting loans of money or other property from persons with whom the NFA
has    business relations or other private parties.
[7]
              Rollo, pp. 56-76.
[8]
              Id. at 52-54.
[9]
              Id. at 77-79.
[10]
             The 10 April 2000 Resolution states: “WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant case is        hereby
recommended DISMISSED and the same be redocketed as CPL.” Deputy Ombudsman for                Luzon Jesus F.
Guerrero approved the Resolution.
[11]
             Rollo, pp.  80-81.
[12]
             Id. at 45-48.
[13]
             Id. at 46-47.
[14]
             Under Rule 43 of the Rules on Civil Procedure.
[15]
             Rollo, pp. 42-44.
[16]
             Id. at 111-115.
[17]
             376 Phil. 191, 198-199 (1999).
[18]
             Office of the Court Administrator v. Enriquez, A.M. No. P-89-290, 29 January 1993, 218 SCRA 1;   The
Police Commission v. Lood, No. L-34230, 31 March 1980, 96 SCRA 819.
[19]
             Dela Rosa v. CA, 323 Phil. 596 (1996).
[20]
             Civil Service Commission v. Ledesma, G.R. No. 154521, 30 September 2005, 471 SCRA 589.

 
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
 
EN BANC
 
 
THE CIVIL SERVICE                                       G.R. No. 187858
COMMISSION,
                                    Petitioner,                      Present:
                                                                       
                                                                 CORONA, C.J.,     
                                                                  CARPIO,
                                                                 VELASCO, JR.,
                                                                 LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
                                                                 BRION,
                                                                     PERALTA,
                 - versus -                                 BERSAMIN,
                                                                 DEL CASTILLO,*
                                                                 ABAD,**
                                                                 VILLARAMA, JR.,
                                                                 PEREZ,
                                                                     MENDOZA,** and
                                        SERENO, JJ.
                                          
                                                               Promulgated:                  
RICHARD G. CRUZ,
                        Respondent.                   AUGUST 9, 2011         
    x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
                                                                                               
DECISION
 
BRION, J.:
 
This petition for review on certiorari assails the decision[1] and the
resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 105410.  These
assailed CA rulings reversed and set aside the ruling of the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) in Resolution No. 080305[3] that denied respondent Richard G.
Cruz’s prayer for the award of back salaries as a result of his reinstatement to his
former position. 
 
THE FACTS
 
          The respondent, Storekeeper A of the City of Malolos Water District
(CMWD), was charged with grave misconduct and dishonesty by CMWD General
Manager (GM) Nicasio Reyes.  He allegedly uttered a false, malicious and
damaging statement (Masasamang tao ang mga BOD at General Manager) against
GM Reyes and the rest of the CMWD Board of Directors (Board); four of the
respondent’s subordinates allegedly witnessed the utterance. The dishonesty
charge, in turn, stemmed from the respondent’s act of claiming overtime pay
despite his failure to log in and out in the computerized daily time record for three
working days.
 
          The respondent denied the charges against him. On the charge of grave
misconduct, he stressed that three of the four witnesses already retracted their
statements against him. On the charge of dishonesty, he asserted that he never
failed to log in and log out. He reasoned that the lack of record was caused by
technical computer problems. The respondent submitted documents showing that
he rendered overtime work on the three days that the CMWD questioned.
 
          GM Reyes preventively suspended the respondent for 15 days. Before the
expiration of his preventive suspension, however, GM Reyes, with the approval of
the CMWD Board, found the respondent guilty of grave misconduct and
dishonesty, and dismissed him from the service.[4]
 
 CSC RULING
 
          The respondent elevated the findings of the CMWD and his dismissal to the
CSC, which absolved him of the two charges and ordered his reinstatement.  In
CSC Resolution No. 080305, the CSC found no factual basis to support the charges
of grave misconduct and dishonesty.
 
In ruling that the respondent was not liable for grave misconduct, the CSC
held:
 
Cruz was adjudged guilty of grave misconduct for his alleged utterance of such
maligning statements, “MASASAMANG TAO ANG MGA BOD AT GENERAL
MANAGER”. However, such utterance, even if it were true, does not constitute a
flagrant disregard of rule or was actuated by corrupt motive. To the mind of the
Commission, it was a mere expression of disgust over the management style of
the GM and the Board of Directors, especially when due notice is taken of the fact
that the latter officials were charged with the Ombudsman for various anomalous
transactions.[5]
 
In ruling that the charge of dishonesty had no factual basis, the CSC
declared:
 
            Based on the records of the case, the Commission is not swayed that the
failure of Cruz to record his attendance on April 21 and 22, 2007 and May 5,
2007, while claiming overtime pay therefor, amounts to dishonesty. Cruz duly
submitted evidence showing his actual rendition of work on those days. The
residents of the place where he worked attested to his presence thereat on the days
in question.[6]
         
The CSC, however, found the respondent liable for violation of reasonable
office rules for his failure to log in and log out. It imposed on him the penalty of
reprimand but did not order the payment of back salaries.
         
The CMWD and the respondent separately filed motions for reconsideration
against the CSC ruling.  CMWD questioned the CSC’s findings and the
respondent’s reinstatement. The respondent, for his part, claimed that he is entitled
to back salaries in light of his exoneration from the charges of grave misconduct
and dishonesty. The CSC denied both motions.
 
Both the CMWD and the respondent elevated the CSC ruling to the
CA via separate petitions for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.  The CA
dismissed the CMWD’s petition and this ruling has lapsed to finality. [7]  Hence, the
issue of reinstatement is now a settled matter. As outlined below, the CA ruled in
the respondent’s favor on the issue of back salaries. This ruling is the subject of the
present petition with us. 
 
CA RULING
 
Applying the ruling in Bangalisan v. Hon. CA,[8] the CA found merit in the
respondent’s appeal and awarded him back salaries from the time he was dismissed
up to his actual reinstatement. The CA reasoned out that CSC Resolution No.
080305 totally exonerated the respondent from the charges laid against him. The
CA considered the charge of dishonesty successfully refuted as the respondent
showed that he performed overtime service.  The CA thereby rejected the CSC’s
contention that the charge of dishonesty had been merely downgraded to a lesser
offense; the CA saw the finding in CSC Resolution No. 080305 to be for an
offense (failing to properly record his attendance) entirely different from the
dishonesty charge because their factual bases are different. Thus, to the CA, CSC
Resolution No. 080305 did not wholly restore the respondent’s rights as an
exonerated employee as it failed to order the payment of his back salaries.  The CA
denied the CSC’s motion for reconsideration.
 
ISSUE
 
WHETHER OR NOT [THE] RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO BACK
SALARIES AFTER THE CSC ORDERED HIS REINSTATEMENT TO HIS
FORMER POSITION, CONSONANT WITH THE CSC RULING THAT HE
 WAS GUILTY ONLY OF VIOLATION OF REASONABLE OFFICE
RULES AND REGULATIONS.[9]
 
 
CSC’s position
         
          The CSC submits that the CA erred in applying the ruling in Bangalisan,
requiring as a condition for entitlement to back salaries that the government
employee be found innocent of the charge and that the suspension be unjustified.
CSC Resolution No. 080305 did not fully exculpate the respondent but found him
liable for a lesser offense. Likewise, the respondent’s preventive suspension
pending appeal was justified because he was not exonerated.   
 
          The CSC also submits that the factual considerations in Bangalisan are
entirely different from the circumstances of the present case. In Bangalisan, the
employee, Rodolfo Mariano, a public school teacher, was charged with grave
misconduct for allegedly participating, together with his fellow teachers, in an
illegal mass action. He was ordered exonerated from the misconduct charge
because of proof that he did not actually participate in the mass action, but was
absent from work for another reason. Although the employee was found liable for
violation of office rules and regulations, he was considered totally exonerated
because his infraction stemmed from an act entirely different (his failure to file a
leave of absence) from the act that was the basis of the grave misconduct charge
(the unjustified abandonment of classes to the prejudice of the students).
         
The CSC argues that in the present case, the charge of dishonesty and the
infraction committed by the respondentstemmed from a single act – his failure to
properly record his attendance. Thus, the respondent cannot be considered totally
exonerated; the charge of dishonesty was merely downgraded to a violation of
reasonable office rules and regulations.
 
          Accordingly, the CSC posits that the case should have been decided
according to our rulings in Jacinto v. CA[10] and De la Cruz v. CA[11] where we held
the award of back salaries to be inappropriate because the teachers involved were
not fully exonerated from the charges laid against them.
 
The respondent’s position
 
          The respondent maintains that he is entitled to reinstatement and back
salaries because CSC Resolution No. 080305 exonerated him from the charges laid
against him; for the purpose of entitlement to back salaries, what should control is
his exoneration from the charges leveled against him by the CMWD. That the
respondent was found liable for a violation different from that originally charged is
immaterial for purposes of the back salary issue.
 
          The respondent also asserts that the Bangalisan ruling squarely applies since
the CSC formally admitted in its Comment to CMWD’s petition for review before
the CA that the penalty of reprimand is not a reduced penalty for the penalty of
dismissal imposable for grave misconduct and dishonesty.[12]
 
THE COURT’S RULING
 
          We deny the petition for lack of merit.    
 
The issue of entitlement to back salaries, for the period of suspension
pending appeal,[13] of a government employee who had been dismissed but was
subsequently exonerated is settled in our jurisdiction. The Court’s starting point for
this outcome is the “no work-no pay” principle – public officials are only entitled
to compensation if they render service.  We have excepted from this general
principle and awarded back salaries even for unworked days to illegally dismissed
or unjustly suspended employees based on the constitutional provision that “no
officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for
cause provided by law”;[14] to deny these employees their back salaries amounts to
unwarranted punishment after they have been exonerated from the charge that led
to their dismissal or suspension.[15]
 
The present legal basis for an award of back salaries is Section 47, Book V
of the Administrative Code of 1987.
 
Section 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. – x x x.
 
(4) An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory, and in case the
penalty is suspension or removal, the respondent shall beconsidered as having
been under preventive suspension during the pendency of the appeal in the event
he wins an appeal. (italics ours)
 
 
This provision, however, on its face, does not support a claim for back salaries
since it does not expressly provide for back salaries during this period; our
established rulings hold that back salaries may not be awarded for the period
of preventive suspension[16] as the law itself authorizes its imposition so that its
legality is beyond question.
 
To resolve the seeming conflict, the Court crafted two conditions before an
employee may be entitled to back salaries: a)the employee must be found innocent
of the charges and b) his suspension must be unjustified.[17] The reasoning behind
these conditions runs this way: although an employee is considered under
preventive suspension during the pendency of a successful appeal, the law itself
only authorizes preventive suspension for a fixed period; hence, his suspension
beyond this fixed period is unjustified and must be compensated.
         
          The CSC’s rigid and mechanical application of these two conditions may
have resulted from a misreading of our rulings on the matter; hence, a look at our
jurisprudence appears in order.
 
Basis for award of back salaries
 
 
The Court had the occasion to rule on the issue of entitlement to back
salaries as early as 1941,[18] when Section 260 of the Revised Administrative Code
of 1917 (RAC)[19] was the governing law. The Court held that a government
employee, who was suspended from work pending final action on his
administrative case, is not entitled to back salaries where he was ultimately
removed due to the valid appointment of his successor.  No exoneration or
reinstatement, of course, was directly involved in this case; thus, the question of
back salaries after exoneration and reinstatement did not directly arise.  The Court,
however, made the general statement that:
 
As a general proposition, a public official is not entitled to any compensation
if he has not rendered any service, and the justification for the payment of
salary during the period of suspension is that the suspension was
unjustified or that the official was innocent. Hence, the requirement that, to
entitle to payment of salary during suspension, there must be either reinstatement
of the suspended person or exoneration if death should render reinstatement
impossible.[20] (emphasis and underscoring ours)
 
 
In Austria v. Auditor General,[21] a high school principal, who was penalized
with demotion, claimed payment of back salaries from the time of his suspension
until his appointment to the lower position to which he was demoted. He argued
that his later appointment even if only to a lower position of classroom teacher
amounted to a reinstatement under Section 260 of the RAC. The Court denied his
claim, explaining that the reinstatement under Section 260 of the RAC refers to the
same position from which the subordinate officer or employee was suspended and,
therefore, does not include demotional appointments. The word “reinstatement”
was apparently equated to exoneration. 
 
 In the 1961 case of Gonzales v. Hon. Hernandez, etc. and
Fojas  interpreting the same provision, the Court first laid down the requisites for
[22]

entitlement to back salaries.  Said the Court:     

 
A perusal of the decisions of this Court[23] x x x show[s] that back salaries are
ordered paid to an officer or an employee only if he is exonerated of the
charge against him and his suspension or dismissal is found and declared to
be illegal. In the case at bar, [the employee] was not completely exonerated,
because although the decision of the Commissioner of Civil Service [ordering
separation from service] was modified and [the employee] was allowed to be
reinstated, the decision [imposed upon the employee the penalty of two months
suspension without pay]. [emphasis and underscoring ours]
 
 
Obviously, no exoneration actually resulted and no back salary was due; the
liability for the offense charged remained, but a lesser penalty was imposed.
 
In Villamor, et al. v. Hon. Lacson, et al.,[24] the City Mayor ordered the
dismissal from the service of city employees after finding them guilty as charged.
On appeal, however, the decision was modified by considering “the suspension of
over one year x x x, already suffered x x x [to be] sufficient punishment”[25] and by
ordering their immediate reinstatement to the service. The employees thereupon
claimed that under Section 695 of the RAC, the punishment of suspension without
pay cannot exceed two (2) months. Since the period they were not allowed to work
until their reinstatement exceeded two months, they should be entitled to back
salaries corresponding to the period in excess of two months. In denying the
employees’ claim for back salaries, the Court held:
 
The fallacy of [the employees’] argument springs from their assumption that the
modified decision had converted the penalty to that of suspension. The modified
decision connotes that although dismissal or resignation would be the proper
penalty, the separation from work for the period until their reinstatement, would
be deemed sufficient. Said decision did not, in the least, insinuate that suspension
should have been the penalty.
 
x x x [T]he modified decision did not exonerate the petitioners. x x x
And even if we consider the punishment as suspension, before a public official or
employee is entitled to payment of salaries withheld, it should be shown that the
 suspension was unjustified or that the employee was innocent of the charges
proffered against him.[26]  
 
 
On the whole, these rulings left the application of the conditions for the
award of back salaries far from clear. Jurisprudence did not strictly observe the
requirements earlier enunciated in Gonzales as under subsequent rulings, the
innocence of the employee alone served as basis for the award of back salaries.
 
The innocence of the employee as sole basis for
an award of back salaries  
 
 
In Tan v. Gimenez, etc., and Aguilar, etc.,[27] we ruled that the payment of
back salary to a government employee, who was illegally removed from office
because of his eventual exoneration on appeal, is merely incidental to the ordered
reinstatement.   
 
Tan was subsequently reiterated in Tañala v. Legaspi, et al.,[28] a case
involving an employee who was administratively dismissed from the service
following his conviction in the criminal case arising from the same facts as in the
administrative case. On appeal, however, he was acquitted of the criminal charge
and was ultimately ordered reinstated by the Office of the President. Failing to
secure his actual reinstatement, he filed a mandamus petition to compel his
superiors to reinstate him and to pay his back salaries from the date of his
suspension to the date of his actual reinstatement. We found merit in his plea and
held: 
 
 
[The employee] had been acquitted of the criminal charges x x x, and the
President had reversed the decision x x x in the administrative case which ordered
his separation from the service, and the President had ordered his reinstatement to
his position, it results that the suspension and the separation from the service of
the [employee] were thereby considered illegal. x x x.
 
 x x x [In this case,] by virtue of [the President’s order of reinstatement],
[the employee’s] suspension and separation from the service x x x was thereby
declared illegal, so that for all intents and purposes he must be considered as not
having been separated from his office. The lower court has correctly held that the
[employee] is entitled to back salaries.[29]
 
The Tañala ruling was reiterated in Cristobal v. Melchor,[30] Tan, Jr.  v.
Office of the President,[31] De Guzman v. CSC[32] and Del Castillo v. CSC[33] - cases
involving government employees who were dismissed after being found
administratively liable, but who were subsequently exonerated on appeal.
 
In Garcia v. Chairman Commission on Audit,[34] the Court held that – where
the employee, who was dismissed after being found administratively liable for
dishonesty, was acquitted on a finding of innocence in the criminal case (for
qualified theft) based on the same acts for which he was dismissed – the executive
pardon granted him in the administrative case (in light of his prior acquittal)
entitled him to back salaries from the time of his illegal dismissal up to his actual
reinstatement.
 
The above situation should be distinguished from the case of an employee
who was dismissed from the service after conviction of a crime and who was
ordered reinstated after being granted pardon. We held that he was not entitled to
back salaries since he was not illegally dismissed nor acquitted of the charge
against him.[35] 
 
Incidentally, under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,[36] if the public
official or employee is acquitted of the criminal charge/s specified in the law, he is
entitled to reinstatement and the back salaries withheld during his
suspension, unlessin the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed
against him.
 
In Tan, Jr. v. Office of the President,[37] the Court clarified that the silence of
Section 42 (Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending Administrative
Investigation) of the Civil Service Decree[38] on the payment of back salaries,
unlike its predecessor,[39] is no reason to deny back salaries to a dismissed civil
servant who was ultimately exonerated.          
 
Section 42 of P.D. No. 807, however, is really not in point x x x [as] it
does not cover dismissed civil servants who are ultimately exonerated and ordered
reinstated to their former or equivalent positions. The rule in the latter instance,
just as we have said starting with the case of Cristobal vs. Melchor is that when "a
government official or employee in the classified civil service had been illegally
dismissed, and his reinstatement had later been ordered, for all legal purposes he
is considered as not having left his office, so that he is entitled to all the rights and
privileges that accrue to him by virtue of the office that he held."[40]
 
 
          These cited cases illustrate that a black and white observance of the
requisites in Gonzales is not required at all times. The common thread in these
cases is either the employee’s complete exoneration of the administrative charge
against him (i.e., the employee is not found guilty of any other offense), or the
employee’s acquittal of the criminal charge based on his innocence. If the case
presented falls on either of these instances, the conditions laid down
in Gonzales become the two sides of the same coin; the requirement that the
suspension must be unjustified is automatically subsumed in the other requirement
of exoneration.
 
Illegal suspension as sole basis for an award of
back salaries
 
 
By requiring the concurrence of the two conditions, Gonzales apparently
made a distinction between exoneration and unjustified suspension/dismissal. This
distinction runs counter to the notion that if an employee is exonerated, the
exoneration automatically makes an employee’s suspension unjustified. However,
in Abellera v. City of Baguio, et al.,[41] the Court had the occasion to illustrate the
independent character of these two conditions so that the mere illegality of an
employee’s suspension could serve as basis for an award of back salaries.
  
Abellera, a cashier in the Baguio City Treasurer’s Office, was ordered
dismissed from the service after being found guilty of dishonesty and gross
negligence. Even before the period to appeal expired, the City of Baguio dismissed
him from the service. On appeal, however, the penalty imposed on him was
reduced “to two months suspension, without pay” although the appealed decision
was affirmed “in all other respects.”
 
When the issue of Abellera’s entitlement to back salaries reached the Court,
we considered the illegality of Abellera’s suspension - i.e., from the time he was
dismissed up to the time of his actual reinstatement – to be a sufficient ground to
award him back salaries.
 
The rule on payment of back salaries during the period of suspension of a
member of the civil service who is subsequently ordered reinstated, is already
settled in this jurisdiction. Such payment of salaries corresponding to the period
when an employee is not allowed to work may be decreed not only if he is found
innocent of the charges which caused his suspension (Sec. 35, RA 2260), but also
when the suspension is unjustified.
 
In the present case, upon receipt of the [Civil Service Commissioner’s]
decision x x x finding [Abellera] guilty, but even before the period to appeal had
expired, [the Baguio City officials] dismissed [Abellera] from the service and
another one was appointed to replace him.[Abellera’s] separation x x x before
the decision of the Civil Service Commissioner had become final was
evidently premature.[The Baguio City officials] should have realized that
[Abellera] still had the right to appeal the Commissioner's decision to the Civil
Service Board of Appeals within a specified period, and the possibility of that
decision being reversed or modified.[42] As it did happen on such appeal x x x the
penalty imposed by the Commissioner was reduced x x x to only 2 months
suspension. And yet, by [the Baguio City officials’] action, [Abellera] was
deprived of work for more than 2 years. Clearly, Abellera’s second suspension
from office [i.e., from the time he was dismissed up to his actual
reinstatement] was unjustified, and the payment of the salaries corresponding
to said period is, consequently, proper.[43]  (emphases and underscoring ours)
 
 
The import of the Abellera ruling was explained by the Court in the
subsequent case of Yarcia v. City of Baguio[44] that involved substantially similar
facts. The Court clarified that the award of back salaries in Abellera was based on
the premature execution of the decision (ordering the employee’s dismissal from
the service), resulting in the employee’s unjustified “second suspension.” Under
the then Civil Service Rules, the Commissioner of Civil Service had the discretion
to order the immediate execution of his decision in administrative cases “in the
interest of public service.” Unlike in Abellera, this discretion was exercised
in Yarcia; consequently, the employee’s separation from the service pending his
appeal “remained valid and effective until it was set aside and modified with the
imposition of the lesser penalty.”[45]
 
The unjustified “second suspension” mentioned in Abellera actually refers to
the period when the employee was dismissed from the service up to the time of his
actual reinstatement. Under our present legal landscape, this period refers to
“suspension pending appeal.”[46]  
 
In Miranda v. Commission on Audit,[47] the Court again had the occasion to
consider the illegality of the suspension of the employee as a separate ground to
award back salaries. Following the filing of several administrative charges against
him, Engr. Lamberto Miranda was “preventively” suspended from June 2,
1978 to May 7, 1986. He was reinstated on May 22, 1986. On October 7, 1986, the
administrative case against him was finally dismissed “for lack of evidence.”
When his claim for back salaries (from the time he was “preventively” suspended
up to his actual reinstatement) was denied by the Commission on Audit, he brought
a certiorari petition with this Court.
 
In granting the petition, the Court ruled that since the law[48] limits the
duration of preventive suspension to a fixed period, Engr. Miranda’s suspension
for almost eight (8) years is “unreasonable and unjustified.” Additionally, the
Court observed that the dropping of the administrative case against Engr. Miranda
for lack of evidence “is even an eloquent manifestation that the suspension is
unjustified.”[49] The Court held:
 
This being so, Engineer Miranda is entitled to backwages during the period of his
suspension as it is already settled in this jurisdiction that a government official or
employee is entitled to backwages not only if he is exonerated in the
 administrative case but also when the suspension is unjustified.[50]  (emphases
and underscoring ours)
 
 
Jurisprudential definition of exoneration
 
The mere reduction of the penalty on appeal does not entitle a government
employee to back salaries if he was not exonerated of the charge against him. This
is the Court’s teaching in City Mayor of Zamboanga v. CA.[51] In this case, the
employee was initially found guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct and was
given the penalty of dismissal by the City Mayor of Zamboanga. On appeal,
however, the CA limited the employee’s guilt to improper conduct and
correspondingly reduced the penalty to “six-months suspension without pay with a
stern warning that repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more
severely."[52] The CA also awarded him “full backwages.”[53]
 
We held that the CA erred in awarding back salaries by reiterating the
principle that back salaries may be ordered paid to an officer or employee only if
he is exonerated of the charge against him and his suspension or dismissal is found
and declared to be illegal.[54]
 
The Court had the occasion to explain what constitutes “exoneration”
in Bangalisan v. Hon. CA,[55] the respondent’s cited case.  In this case, the
Secretary of Education found the public school teachers guilty as charged and
imposed on them the penalty of dismissal. On appeal, the CSC affirmed the
Secretary’s ruling but reduced the penalty imposed to suspension without pay.
However, the CSC found one of the teachers (Mariano) guilty only of violation of
reasonable office rules and regulations, and only penalized her with reprimand.
None of the petitioning public school teachers were awarded back salaries.
 
On appeal to this Court, we awarded back salaries to Mariano. We explained
that since the factual premise of the administrative charges against him - i.e., his
alleged participation in the illegal mass actions, and his suspension - was amply
rebutted, then Mariano was in effect exonerated of the charges against him and
was, thus, entitled to back salaries for the period of his suspension pending
appeal.  
 
With respect to petitioner Rodolfo Mariano, payment of his back wages is
in order. A reading of the resolution of the [CSC] will show that he was
exonerated of the charges which formed the basis for his suspension. The
Secretary of the DECS charged him with and he was later found guilty of grave
misconduct x x x [and] conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service x x x
for his participation in the mass actions x x x. It was his alleged participation in
the mass actions that was the basis of his preventive suspension and, later, his
dismissal from the service.
 
However, the [CSC], in the questioned resolution, made [the] finding that
Mariano was not involved in the "mass actions" but was absent because he was in
Ilocos Sur to attend the wake and interment of his grandmother. Although the
CSC imposed upon him the penalty of reprimand, the same was for his violation
of reasonable office rules and regulations because he failed to inform the school
or his intended absence and neither did he file an application for leave covering
such absences.
 
                        x x x x
 
However, with regard to the other petitioners, the payment of their back
wages must be denied. Although the penalty imposed on them was only
suspension, they were not completely exonerated of the charges against them. The
CSC made specific findings that, unlike petitioner Mariano, they indeed
participated in the mass actions. It will be noted that it was their participation in
the mass actions that was the very basis of the charges against them and their
subsequent suspension.[56]
 
 
Bangalisan clearly laid down the principle that if the exoneration of the
employee is relative (as distinguished from complete exoneration), an inquiry into
the factual premise of the offense charged and of the offense committed must be
made.  If the administrative offense found to have been actually committed is of
lesser gravity than the offense charged, the employee cannot be considered
exonerated if the factual premise for the imposition of the lesser penalty remains
the same.  The employee found guilty of a lesser offense may only be entitled to
back salaries when the offense actually committed does not carry the penalty of
more than one month suspension or dismissal.[57]  
 
Bangalisan reiterated that the payment of back salaries, during the period of
suspension of a member of the civil service who is subsequently ordered reinstated,
may be decreed only if the employee is found innocent of the charges which
caused the suspension and when the suspension is unjustified. This
pronouncement was re-echoed in Jacinto v. CA,[58] De la Cruz v. CA,[59] and Hon.
Gloria v. CA.[60] Taking off from Bangalisan, the Court in De la Cruz categorically
stated:
 
The issue of whether back wages may be awarded to teachers ordered
reinstated to the service after the dismissal orders x x x were commuted by the
CSC to six (6) months suspension is already settled.
 
In Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals, we resolved the issue in the negative
on the ground that the teachers were neither exonerated nor unjustifiably
suspended, two (2) circumstances necessary for the grant of back wages in
administrative disciplinary cases.[61]
 
 
In Hon. Gloria, involving the same factual situation as Bangalisan, the CA
awarded the public school teachers back salaries - for the period beyond the
allowable period of preventive suspension - since they were ultimately exonerated.
In affirming the CA, the Court
distinguished preventive suspension from suspension pending appeal for the
purpose of determining the extent of an employee’s entitlement to back salaries.
The Court ruled that under Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292, there are two kinds of
preventive suspension of civil service employees who are charged with offenses
punishable by removal or suspension: (i) preventive suspension pending
investigation[62] and (ii) preventive suspension pending appeal;[63]  compensation is
due only for the period of preventive suspension pending appeal should the
employee be ultimately exonerated.[64] Citing Floyd R. Mechem's A Treatise on the
Law of Public Offices and Officers,[65] Hon. Gloria ruled:
  
Thus, it is not enough that an employee is exonerated of the charges
against him. In addition, his suspension must be unjustified. The case
of Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals itself similarly states that "payment of salaries
corresponding to the period [1] when an employee is not allowed to work may be
decreed if he is found innocent of the charges which caused his
suspension and [2] when the suspension is unjustified.”[66]  (emphases and
underscoring ours)
 
 
          A careful reading of these cases would reveal that a strict observance of the
second condition for an award of back salaries becomes important only if the
employee is not totally innocent of any administrative infraction. As previously
discussed, where the employee is completely exonerated of the
administrative  charge  or acquitted in the criminal case arising from the same facts
based on a finding of innocence, the second requirement becomes subsumed in the
first. Otherwise, a determination of the act/s and offense/s actually committed and
of the corresponding penalty imposed has to be made. 
 
Unjustified suspension
 
 
On the suspension/dismissal aspect, this second condition is met upon a
showing that the separation from office is not warranted under the circumstances
because the government employee gave no cause for suspension or dismissal. This
squarely applies in cases where the government employee did not commit the
offense charged, punishable by suspension or dismissal (total exoneration); or the
government employee is found guilty of another offense for an act different from
that for which he was charged.
 
Bangalisan, Jacinto and De la Cruz illustrate
the application of the two conditions
 
 
          Both the CA and the respondent applied Bangalisan to justify the award of
back salaries.  The CSC argues against this position with the claim that the rulings
in Jacinto and De la Cruz, not Bangalisan, should apply.  After due consideration,
we see no reason why the cited rulings and their application should be pitted
against one another; they essentially espouse the same conclusions after applying
the two conditions for the payment of back salaries.
 
Bangalisan, Jacinto and De la Cruz all stemmed from the illegal mass
actions of public school teachers in Metro Manila in 1990. The teachers were
charged with grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, and gross violation of civil
service law, rules and regulations, among others. The then Secretary of Education
found them guilty and dismissed them from the service.  The CSC, on appeal,
ordered the teachers reinstated, but withheld the grant of their back salaries. The
CSC found the teachers liable for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service and imposed on them the penalty of suspension. The CSC reasoned that
since the teachers were not totally exculpated from the charge (but were found
guilty of a lesser offense), they could not be awarded back salaries.
 
When these cases reached the Court, the issue of the teachers’ entitlement to
back salaries was raised. The teachers claimed that they were entitled to back
salaries from the time of their dismissal or suspension until their reinstatement,
arguing that they were totally exonerated from the charges since they were found
guilty only of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
 
Under this factual backdrop, we applied the two conditions and
distinguished between the teachers who were absent from their respective classes
because they participated in the illegal mass action, on one hand, and the teachers
who were absent for some other reason, on the other hand.
 
 With respect to the teachers who participated in the illegal mass actions, we
ruled that they were not entitled to back salaries since they were not exonerated.
We explained that liability for a lesser offense, carrying a penalty less than
dismissal, is not equivalent to exoneration. On the second condition, we ruled that
their suspension is not unjustified since they have given a ground for their
suspension – i.e., the unjustified abandonment of their classes to the prejudice of
their students, the very factual premise of the administrative charges against them –
for which they were suspended.
 
With respect to the teachers who were away from their classes but did not
participate in the illegal strike, the Court awarded them back salaries, considering
that:  first, they did not commit the act for which they were dismissed and
suspended; and second, they were found guilty of another offense, i.e., violation of
reasonable office rules and regulations which is not penalized with suspension or
dismissal. The Court ruled that these teachers were totally exonerated of the
charge, and found their dismissal and suspension likewise unjustified since the
offense they were found to have committed only merited the imposition of the
penalty of reprimand.
 
These cases show the Court’s consistent stand in determining the propriety
of the award of back salaries. The government employees must not only be found
innocent of the charges; their suspension must likewise be shown to be unjustified.
 
The Present Case
 
We find that the CA was correct in awarding the respondent his back salaries
during the period he was suspended from work, following his dismissal until his
reinstatement to his former position. The records show that the charges of grave
misconduct and dishonesty against him were not substantiated. As the CSC found,
there was no corrupt motive showing malice on the part of the respondent in
making the complained utterance. Likewise, the CSC found that the charge of
dishonesty was well refuted by the respondent’s evidence showing that he rendered
overtime work on the days in question.
 
          We fully respect the factual findings of the CSC especially since the CA
affirmed these factual findings. However, on the legal issue of the respondent’s
entitlement to back salaries, we are fully in accord with the CA’s conclusion that
the two conditions to justify the award of back salaries exist in the present case.
 
The first condition was met since the offense which the respondent was
found guilty of (violation of reasonable rules and regulations) stemmed from an act
(failure to log in and log out) different from the act of dishonesty
(claiming overtime pay despite his failure to render overtime work) that he was
charged with.  
 
The second condition was met as the respondent’s committed offense merits
neither dismissal from the service nor suspension (for more than one month), but
only reprimand. 
         
In sum, the respondent is entitled to back salaries from the time he was
dismissed by the CMWD until his reinstatement to his former position - i.e., for the
period of his preventive suspension pending appeal. For the period of his
preventive suspension pending investigation, the respondent is not entitled to any
back salaries per our ruling in Hon. Gloria.[67]
 
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. Costs against the
petitioner.
 
          SO ORDERED.
 
 
 
                                                                    ARTURO D. BRION
                                                                       Associate Justice
 
WE  CONCUR:
 
 
 
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
 
 
 
 
 
ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
   
   
   
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
   
   
  (no part)
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
   
   
(on leave)  
ROBERTO A. ABAD MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
   
   
  (on leave)
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ   JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
 Associate Justice                  Associate Justice
                          
   
                                          
 MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice
 
 
CERTIFICATION
 
          Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
 
 
 
                                                                   RENATO C. CORONA
                                                                             Chief Justice
 
 

*
               No part.
**
             On official leave.
[1]
               Penned by Associate Justice (now Supreme Court Associate Justice) Mariano C. del Castillo, and
concurred in by Associate Justices Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa (ret.) and Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr.; dated February
20, 2009.  Rollo, pp. 32-43.
[2]
               Dated May 8, 2009; id. at 44-45.
[3]
               Penned by Commissioner Mary Ann Z. Fernandez-Mendoza; id. at 250-258.
[4]
               CMWD Memorandum No. 31-07 dated June 6, 2007; id. at 60.
[5]
               Id. at 72-73.
[6]
               Id. at 73.
[7]
               Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 104704, entitled “The City of Malolos Water District v. Civil Service
Commission and Richard G. Cruz.” The CA Decision promulgated on June 25, 2010 became final and executory on
July 29, 2010, per Entry of Judgment dated January 10, 2011.
[8]
               342 Phil. 586 (1997).
[9]
               Rollo, p. 21.
[10]
             346 Phil. 656 (1997).
[11]
             364 Phil. 786 (1999).
[12]
             Rollo, p. 282.
[13]
             Hon. Gloria v. CA, 365 Phil. 744 (1999).
[14]
             This provision uniformly exists in the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
[15]
             Tan v. Gimenez, etc., and Aguilar, etc., 107 Phil. 17 (1960).
[16]
             Hon. Gloria v. CA, supra note 13.
[17]
             Bangalisan v. CA, supra note 8.
[18]
             Reyes v. Hernandez, 71 Phil. 397 (1941).
[19]
             Section 260 of the RAC reads:
Payment of salary accruing pending suspension. – When the chief of a Bureau or Office
suspends a subordinate officer or employee from duty, the person suspended shall not receive pay
during suspension unless the Department Head shall so order; but upon subsequent reinstatement
of the suspended person or upon his exoneration, if death should render reinstatement impossible,
 any salary so withheld shall be paid, but without prejudice to the application of the disciplinary
provisions of section six hundred and ninety-five hereof.
[20]
             Reyes v. Hernandez, supra note 18, at 398. 
[21]
             No. L-21918, January 24, 1967, 19 SCRA 79.
[22]
             112 Phil. 160, 166 (1961).
[23]
             Gonzales v. Hernandez, ibid., did not specify the cases it relied upon for its pronouncement. A survey of
prior jurisprudence, however, reveals the following as bases:Reyes v. Hernandez, supra note 18; Batungbakal v.
National Development Company, 93 Phil. 182 (1953); National Rice and Corn Corp. v.  NARIC Workers’ Union, 98
Phil. 563 (1956); Tabora v. Montelibano, et al., 98 Phil. 800 (1956); and Tan v. Gimenez, etc., and Aguilar, etc.,
supra note 15.
[24]
             120 Phil. 1213 (1964).
[25]
             Id. at 1215.
[26]
             Id. at 1218-1219.
[27]
             Supra note 15.
[28]
             121 Phil. 541 (1965).
[29]
             Id. at 551-553.
[30]
             189 Phil. 658 (1980).
[31]
             G.R. No. 110936, February 4, 1994, 229 SCRA 677.
[32]
             G.R. No. 101105, March 11, 1994, 231 SCRA 169. The illegality of the dismissal in this case resulted
from the invalidity of the reorganization that authorized the employee’s dismissal. 
[33]
             343 Phil. 734 (1997).
[34]
             G.R. No. 75025, September 14, 1993, 226 SCRA 356, 362-363.
[35]
             Sabello v. Department of Education, Culture and Sports, 259 Phil. 1109, 1114 (1989).
[36]
             Section 13 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 reads:
Suspension and loss of benefits. — Any incumbent public officer against whom any
criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or
property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and
mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office.  Should he be convicted
by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is
acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to
receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed
against him.
[37]
             Supra note 31.
[38]
             Section 42 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 807 reads:
Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending Administrative Investigation. When the
administrative case against the officer of employee under preventive suspension is not finally
decided by the disciplining authority within the period of ninety (90) days after the date of
suspension of the respondent who is not a presidential appointee, the respondent shall be
automatically reinstated in the service: Provided, That when the delay in the disposition of the case
is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, the period of delay shall not be
counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided. 
[39]
             R.A. No. 2260 or Civil Service Act of 1959. Section 35 of R.A. No. 2260 reads:
Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending Administrative Investigation. When the
administrative case against the officer or employee under preventive suspension is not finally
decided by the Commissioner of Civil Service within the period of sixty (60) days after the date of
suspension of the respondent, the respondent shall be reinstated in the service. If the respondent
officer or employee is exonerated, he shall be restored to his position with full pay for the period
of suspension. (italics ours)
[40]
             Tan, Jr. v. Office of the President, supra note 31, at 679.
[41]
             No. L-23957, March 18, 1967, 19 SCRA 600.
[42]
             Under Section 28 of the Civil Service Rules implementing R.A. No. 2260 (Civil Service Act of 1959), the
Commissioner of Civil Service has the discretion to order the immediate execution of his  decision in administrative
cases (J. Barredo’s Dissent in Yarcia v. City of Baguio, etc., 144 Phil. 351 [1970]).
[43]
             See Neeland v. Villanueva, Jr., A.M. No. P-99-1316, August 31, 2001, 364 SCRA 204, 217, where the
Court awarded back salaries to a Clerk of Court and Ex-officioProvincial Sheriff, whom the Court ordered dismissed
from the service for gross misconduct. The resolution of dismissal was immediately implemented. On
reconsideration, however, the Court found him guilty of simple neglect of duty and imposed on him only the penalty
of fine. In granting his subsequent request for back salaries from the time of his dismissal until his reinstatement, the
Court considered, among others, the prematurity of the immediate execution of the resolution of dismissal as basis
for the award. 
[44]
             Supra note 42.
[45]
             Citing Villamor, et al. v. Hon. Lacson, et al., supra note 24, which was also cited in Sales v. Mathay, Sr.,
etc., et al., 214 Phil. 153 (1984).
[46]
             See Bautista v. Peralta, No. L-21967, September 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 223, where the Court considered the
“second suspension” mentioned in Abellera v. City of Baguio, et al., supra note 41, as a “preventive suspension.” At
the time, R.A. No. 2260 allows the payment of back salaries for the entire period of suspension in the event of
exoneration. At present, there is a clear legal distinction between preventive suspension (i.e., suspension pending
investigation) and suspension pending appeal. 
[47]
             G.R. No. 84613, August 16, 1991, 200 SCRA 657.
[48]
             Section 35 of R.A. No. 2260 and Section 42 of P.D. No. 807.
[49]
             Miranda v. Commission on Audit, supra note 47, at 662.
[50]
             Ibid.
[51]
             G.R. No. 80270, February 27, 1990, 182 SCRA 785.
[52]
             Id. at 788.
[53]
             Ibid.
[54]
             The Court also relied on Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 337 which required that an employee must
be exonerated of the charges in order that he may be paid his back salaries. See also Yarcia v. City of
Baguio, supra note 42, where the Court held that the mere reduction, on appeal, of the penalty imposed (from
dismissal to a fine of six months pay), without however exonerating the employee from the charge (of dishonesty)
against him, does not entitle him to back salaries.
[55]
             Supra note 8.
[56]
             Id. at 598-599.
[57]
             If the proper penalty imposable for the offense actually committed does not exceed one month, then there
would have been no occasion for a suspension pending appeal since a decision imposing the penalty of suspension
for not more than thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days salary is final and not subject to appeal.
(See Book V, Section 47, par. 2 of Executive Order No. 292; Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No.
7, Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, dated April 10, 1990, as amended by Administrative Order
No. 17 dated September 15, 2003 which took effect on November 19, 2003.)
[58]
             Supra note 10.
[59]
             Supra note 11.
[60]
             Supra note 13.
[61]
             De la Cruz v. CA, supra note 11, at 797.
[62]
             Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Section 51 of E.O. No. 292.
[63]
             Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Section 47(4) of E.O. No. 292.
[64]
             The Court ruled that the absence of a provision in P.D. No. 807 and later in E.O. No. 292 allowing the
payment of back salaries during the period of preventive suspension, unlike in Act No. 2711 and R.A. No. 2260,
evidences a legislative intent to disallow payment of back salaries for the period of preventive suspension regardless
of the employee’s exoneration. But the payment of back salaries per se, that is, without regard to the duration of the
payment, has been consistently recognized.     
[65]
             §864. Officer not entitled to Salary during Suspension from Office. - An officer who has been lawfully
suspended from his office is not entitled to compensation for the period during which he was so suspended, even
though it be subsequently determined that the cause for which he was suspended was insufficient. The reason given
is "that salary and perquisites are the reward of express or implied services, and therefore cannot belong to one who
could not lawfully perform such services.
[66]
             Hon. Gloria v. CA, supra note 13, at 762.
[67]
             The preventive suspension pending the investigation of the charges is not imposed as a penalty but only to
enable the disciplining authority to conduct an unhampered investigation; the preventive suspension in this regard is
a necessary sacrifice, which holding a public office requires.