Jhon Anthony M Briones

JD 2B

Rule 66

Moro vs. Del Castillo, G.R. No. 184980, March 30, 2011

Facts:
On December 7, 2005 the Ombudsman charged respondent Generoso Reyes Del Castillo, Jr. (Del Castillo),
then Chief Accountant of the General Headquarters (GHQ) Accounting Center of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), with dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

On April 1, 2006 the GHQ reassigned Del Castillo to the Philippine Air Force (PAF) Through the same order,
petitioner Danilo Moro (Moro), then Chief Accountant of the Philippine Navy, took over the position of Chief
Accountant of the GHQ Accounting Center.

Meantime, on August 30, 2006 the Ombudsman placed Del Castillo under preventive suspension for six
months and eventually ordered his dismissal from the service on February 5, 2007.

Following the lapse of his six-month suspension or on March 12, 2007 Del Castillo attempted to reassume
his former post of GHQ Chief Accountant.  But, he was unable to do so since Moro declined to yield the position.  
Consequently, on April 4, 2007 Del Castillo filed a petition for quo warranto against Moro with the Regional Trial
Court. (RTC) of Parañaque City

On October 10, 2007 the RTC dismissed Del Castillo's petition, The RTC denied Del Castillo's motion for
reconsideration.

Instead of appealing from the order of dismissal of his action, Del Castillo filed a petition for  certiorari with
the Court of Appeals (CA).  On October 13, 2008 the CA reversed the RTC Decision

Issue:
Whether or not respondent Del Castillo is entitled to be restored to the position of Chief Accountant of
the GHQ Accounting Center that he once held.

Held:

An action for quo warranto under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court may be filed against one who usurps,
intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office. It may be brought by the Republic of the Philippines
or by the person claiming to be entitled to such office.  In this case, it was Del Castillo who filed the action, claiming
that he was entitled as a matter of right to reassume the position of GHQ Chief Accountant after his preventive
suspension ended on March 11, 2007.  He argues that, assuming his reassignment to the PAF Accounting Center
was valid, the same could not exceed one year.  Since his detail at the PAF took effect under SO 91 on April 1, 2006,
it could last not later than March 31, 2007.  By then, Moro should have allowed him to return to his previous
posting as GHQ Chief Accountant.

In quo warranto, the petitioner who files the action in his name must prove that he is entitled to the
subject public office.  Otherwise, the person who holds the same has a right to undisturbed possession and the
action for quo warranto may be dismissed.

Here, Del Castillo brought the action for quo warranto in his name on April 4, 2007, months after the
Ombudsman ordered his dismissal from service on February 5, 2007.  As explained above, that dismissal order was
immediately executory even pending appeal.  Consequently, he has no right to pursue the action for quo
warranto or reassume the position of Chief Accountant of the GHQ Accounting Center.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition, REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision dated October 13,

2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 103470, and REINSTATES the October 10, 2007 decision of the Regional
Trial Court in Civil Case 07-0111, which dismissed the complaint for quo warranto.

Comment:

Rule 66 were not substantially amended by the new rules, hence this case will not be affected
Calleja vs. Panday, G.R. No. 168696, February 28, 2006

FACTS:
On May 16, 2005, respondents filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of San Jose,
Camarines Sur for quo warranto with Damages and Prayer for Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction,
Damages and Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order against herein petitioners. Respondents alleged
that from 1985 up to the filing of the petition with the trial court, they had been members of the board
of directors and officers of St. John Hospital, Incorporated, but sometime in May 2005, petitioners, who
are also among the incorporators and stockholders of said corporation, forcibly and with the aid of
armed men usurped the powers which supposedly belonged to Respondents.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for quo warranto is the proper remedy to assail the persons who
usurped the powers of a board member of a private corporation.

HELD:
No. Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure does not apply to quo warranto cases against
persons who usurp an office in a private corporation. As declared by Justice Jose Y. Feria in Unilongo v.
Court of Appeals, Section 1, Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is "limited to actions of quo
warranto against persons who usurp a public office, position or franchise; public officers who forfeit
their office; and associations which act as corporations without being legally incorporated”
Clearly, the present Rule 66 only applies to actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp a
public office, position or franchise; public officers who forfeit their office; and associations which act as
corporations without being legally incorporated despite the passage of R.A. No. 8799. It is, therefore,
The Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies Under R.A. No. 8799
(hereinafter the Interim Rules) which applies to the petition for quo warranto filed by respondents
before the trial court since what is being questioned is the authority of herein petitioners to assume the
office and act as the board of directors and officers of St. John Hospital, Incorporated.

Comment:

Rule 66 were not substantially amended by the new rules, hence this case will not be affected

 
Rule 67

Republic vs. La Orden, 1 SCRA 647

Facts:

To ease and solve the daily traffic congestion on Legarda Street, the Government drew plans to extend
Azcarraga St. (now Recto) from its junction with Mendiola St., up to the Sta. Mesa Rotonda, Sampaloc, Manila. To
carry out this plan it offered to buy a portion of a parcel belonging to La Orden situated on Mendiola St. Not
having been able to reach an agreement on the matter with the owner, the Government instituted an
expropriation proceeding.
On May 27, 1957 the trial court valued the property in question and authorized appellant to take
immediate possession upon depositing said amount. The deposit having been made with the City Treasurer of
Manila, the trial court issued the corresponding order directing the Sheriff of Manila to place appellant in
possession of the property aforesaid.
In answer, the herein appellee filed a motion to dismiss the complaint based on the grounds that: (1) the
property sought to be expropriated is already dedicated to public use and therefore is not subject to expropriation;
(2) there is no necessity for the proposed expropriation; (3) the proposed Azcarraga Extension could pass through
a different site which would entail less expense to the Government and which would not necessitate the
expropriation of a property dedicated to education. The trial court granted the motion, holding that the
expropriation was not of extreme necessity. Hence this present petition.

Issue:
Whether or not there is a genuine necessity for the exercise of the Power of Eminent Domain.

Held:

It is the rule in this jurisdiction that private property may be expropriated for public use and upon
payment of just compensation; that condemnation of private property is justified only if it is for the public good
and there is a genuine necessity therefor of a public character. Consequently, the courts have the power to inquire
into the legality of the exercise of the right of eminent domain and to determine whether or not there is a genuine
necessity therefor. It does not need extended argument to show that whether or not the proposed opening of the
Azcarraga extension is a necessity in order to relieve the daily congestion of traffic on Legarda St., is a question of
fact dependent not only upon the facts of which the trial court very liberally took judicial notice but also up on
other factors that do not appear of record and must, therefore, be established by means of evidence. The parties
should have been given an opportunity to present their respective evidence upon these factors and others that
might be of direct or indirect help in determining the vital question of fact involved, namely, the need to open the
extension of Azcarraga street to ease and solve the traffic congestion on Legarda street.
WHEREFORE, the appealed order of dismissal is set aside and the present case is remanded to the trial
court for further proceedings in accordance with this decision.

Comment:

Rule 67 were not substantially amended by the new rules, hence this case will not be
affected
Pulido v. CA, 122 SCRA 63

Facts:

The Farmers, seventy-six (76) in number, and the Samahan Ng Magsasaka at Mamumuwisan sa Cavite, of
which they are members, filed a complaint against Cornelio T. Rivera, the officer-in-charge of the Cavite Export
Processing Zone, and the J.H. Pajara Construction Corporation, the construction company hired by the EPZA to
build the roads and drainage systems in Phase I of the project, before the Court of Agrarian Relations

On March 19, 1981, the Court of Agrarian Relations issued an order restraining the defendants from
"performing any act that will tend to interfere in any way with the status quo."

Then, after further hearings, or on March 30, 1981, the Court of Agrarian Relations dismissed the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction and lifted the restraining order it previously issued, since "the lots in controversy
were no longer agricultural The farmers appealed to the Court of Appeals, appellate court issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining the defendants-appellees and/or their representatives from entering the portions
within the 275 hectares of riceland subject of the litigation, the respondent Court of Appeals lifted the said
restraining order upon the posting by the defendants-appellees of a bond

Hence, the present recourse, to annul and set aside the appellate court’s resolution of July 17, 1981. As
prayed for, the Court issued a temporary restraining order on August 13, 1981.

On February 16, 1982, February 25, 1982, and March 2, 1982, however, the Court granted the motions of
Bienvenido Gonzales et al. to withdraw their petition for the reason that they were no longer interested in
prosecuting their case since their respective claims had already been satisfied. Thus Court also lifted the temporary
restraining order it issued on August 13, 1981, except as to the land holding of the petitioner Avelino Pulido who
did not file any motion to withdraw and instead, manifested and prayed that his land holding should not be
bulldozed and/or that said petitioner and/or his parents should not be dispossessed, ejected, ousted, evicted or
removed therefrom, or likewise prohibited or molested in his possession and cultivation of palay and other
agricultural crops thereon, without prejudice to, or until and unless the legal issues raised by the adverse parties in
this case or the case between the petitioner Pulido and the respondent EPZA shall have been finally settled, either
amicably or judicially.

With the withdrawal of the other petitioners, only the petition of Avelino Pulido remains to be settled.

Issue:
whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in lifting the restraining
order it previously issued pending the appeal of the herein petitioner from the order of the Court of Agrarian
Relations.

Held:
It would appear, however, that subsequent to the filing of this petition, a complaint for the expropriation
of the property occupied by the petitioner Avelino Pulido had been filed with the Court of First Instance of Cavite,
docketed therein as Civil Case No. N-4079, and the amount of P17,027.00, equivalent to 10% of the just
compensation for the property had already been deported with the Cavite Branch of the Philippine National Bank
for the account of the landowners. 16 It further appears that the court having jurisdiction over the expropriation
proceedings had already issued an order for the issuance of a writ of possession over the property occupied by
Avelino Pulido, 17 so that the issue of whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals had abused its discretion in
lifting the restraining order it issued is moot and academic.
Besides, the wisdom of converting their ricelands into an industrial site is within the proper exercise of
Presidential prerogatives and the Court may not inquire into it. The necessity and expediency of exercising the
right of eminent domain are questions essentially political and not judicial in their character.
At any rate, since an application to condemn or appropriate had already been made directly to the court,
the question]/ of necessity of such condemnation should be raised before, and decided by, the court having
jurisdiction over the expropriation proceedings.
It is unfortunate that the petitioner would be deprived of his land holdings, but his interest and that of his
family should not stand in the way of progress and the benefit of the greater majority of the inhabitants of the
country. WHEREFORE, the petition should be, as it is hereby, DISMISSED. With costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Comment:

Rule 67 were not substantially amended by the new rules, hence this case will not be
affected
Sebastian Cosculluela v. CA, 164 SCRA 393

Facts:
On March 8, 1976, the Republic of the Philippines filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of
Iloilo to expropriate two parcels of land in the municipality of Barotac, Iloilo owned by petitioner Sebastian
Cosculluela and one Mita Lumampao, for the construction of the canal network of the Barotac Irrigation Project.
On April 4, 1976, the trial court rendered a decision granting the expropriation On appeal, the Court of
Appeals modified the trial court's decision with regard the attorneys fees and expense. The decision became final
and executory on September 21, 1985.
On May 7, 1986, on motion of the petitioner, the trial court ordered the issuance of a writ of execution to
implement the judgment of the appellate court. On August 11, 1986, the respondent Republic filed a motion to set
aside the order of May 7, 1986 as well as the writ of execution issued pursuant thereto, contending that the funds
of the National Irrigation Authority (NIA) are government funds and therefore, cannot be disbursed without a
government appropriation.
On October 6, 1986, the lower court issued an order modifying its order of May 7, 1986, directing instead
that the respondent Republic deposit with the Philippine National Bank (PNB) in the name of the petitioner, the
amount adjudged in favor of the latter. The respondent filed a petition with the Court of Appeals to annul the
orders of May 7 and October 6, 1986. On November 25, 1986, the appellate court rendered the questioned
decision setting aside the aforementioned orders of the trial court on the ground that public or government funds
are not subject to levy and execution.

Issue:

Whether or not the decision of the appellate court is being violative of his right to just compensation and
due process of law.

Held:

We rule for the petitioner,

One of the basic principles enshrined in our Constitution is that no person shall be deprived of his private
property without due process of law; and in expropriation cases, an essential element of due process is that there
must be just compensation whenever private property is taken for public use.

The property of the petitioner was taken by the government in 1975. The following year, respondent NIA
made the required deposit of P2,097.30 with the Philippine National Bank and within the same year, the Barotac
Viejo Irrigation Project was finished. Since then, for more than a period of ten (10) years, the project has been of
service to the farmers nearby in the province of Iloilo. It is, thus, inconceivable how this project could have been
started without the necessary appropriation for just compensation. Needless to state, no government
instrumentality, agency, or subdivision has any business initiating expropriation proceedings unless it has adequate
funds, supported by proper appropriation acts, to pay for the property to be seized from the owner. Not only was
the government able to make an initial deposit of P2,097.30 but the project was finished in only a year's time. We
agree with the petitioner that before the respondent NIA undertook the construction of the Barotac Viejo
Irrigation Project, the same was duly authorized, with the corresponding funds appropriated for the payment of
expropriated land and to pay for equipment, salaries of personnel, and other expenses incidental to the project.
The NIA officials responsible for the project have to do plenty of explaining as to where they misdirected the funds
intended for the expropriated property.

In the present case, the irrigation project was completed and has been in operation since 1976. The
project is benefitting the farmers specifically and the community in general. Obviously, the petitioner's land cannot
be returned to him. However, it is high time that the petitioner be paid what was due him eleven years ago. It is
arbitrary and capricious for a government agency to initiate expropriation proceedings, seize a person's property,
allow the judgment of the court to become final and executory and then refuse to pay on the ground that there
are no appropriations for the property earlier taken and profitably used. We condemn in the strongest possible
terms the cavalier attitude of government officials who adopt such a despotic and irresponsible stance.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision and order of the respondent appellate court
dated November 25, 1987 and February 16, 1987 respectively are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

Comment:

Rule 67 were not substantially amended by the new rules, hence this case will not be
affected
Mun. of Biñan v. Garcia, G.R. No. 69260, 12/22/89

Facts:
Municipality of Binan filed an expropriation suit in the RTC Laguna which impleaded defendant
Erlinda Francisco and other defendants who owned the land in question and the case was presided over
by Respondent Judge Garcia. Petitioner sought the expropriation of 11 adjacent parcels of lands in
Binan with an aggregate area of 11 and 1/2 hectares. Lot was to be used for the new site of a modern
public market.
Acquisition was authorized by a resolution of the Sangguniang Bayan of Binan Erlinda filed for a
“Motion to Dismiss” on the grounds that the complaint filed by Petitioner (1) was vague and conjectural,
(2) violates the constitutional limitations of law and jurisprudence in eminent domain, (3) it was
oppressive, (4) barred by prior decision and disposition on the subject matter, (5) it states no cause of
action.
The motion to dismiss was actually a pleading that substituted an answer in an ordinary civil
action thus it was not governed by the Rules of Court. Respondent Judge issued a writ of possession in
favor of the Municipality Erlinda filed a “Motion for Separate Trial” stating that she had another defense
as opposed to the common defenses of the other defendants. Erlinda had a constitutional defense
provided by an approved Locational Clearance from H.S.R.C. She alleged that until her clearance was
revoked, the Municipality should not file the expropriation case for it would be premature.

At the separate trial, the Respondent Judge decided in favor of Erlinda dismissing the
complaint naming her as defendant and amending the Writ of Possession granted by the court to the
Municipality to remove the properties of Erlinda Francisco.

Issue:
Whether or not the special civil action of eminent domain under Rule 67 is a case wherein
multiple appeals are allowed as regards which the period of appeal shall be thirty (30) days, instead of
fifteen (15) days.

Held: Yes

2 phases/stages in every action for expropriation:

The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the
power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the
suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, "of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff
has a lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described
in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing
of the complaint.”
The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the
Court of "the just compensation for the property sought to be taken." This is done by the Court with the
assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. The order fixing the just compensation on the
basis of the evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners would be final, too. It would finally
dispose of the second stage of the suit, and leave nothing more to be done by the Court regarding the
issue. Obviously, one or another of the parties may believe the order to be erroneous in its appreciation
of the evidence or findings of fact or otherwise. Obviously, too, such a dissatisfied party may seek
reversal of the order by taking an appeal therefrom.
In actions of eminent domain, as in actions for partition, since no less than two (2) appeals are
allowed by law, the period for appeal from an order of condemnation is thirty (30) days counted from
notice of order and not the ordinary period of fifteen (15) days prescribed for actions in general,
conformably with the provision of Section 39 of BP129 to the effect that in "appeals in special
proceedings in accordance with Rule 109 of the Rules of Court and other cases wherein multiple
appeals are allowed, the period of appeal shall be thirty (30) days, a record of appeal being required.

Comment:

Rule 67 were not substantially amended by the new rules, hence this case will not be
affected
EPZA v. Dulay, 149 SCRA 305

Facts:

January 1957, president of the Philippines issued proclamation no 1811 reserving a parcel of
land in Lapu-lapu for the establishment of an export processing zone. Not all the reserved land was
public. EPZA then offered to purchase the lands from its registered owners, in the valuation set by PD
464,as amended. The owners did not agree.

EPZA filed with CFI-Cebu a complaint for expropriation with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
possession against the landowners. Judge Dulay, later issued a writ of possession authorizing EPZA to
take immediate possession of the premises.

After the recommendation of the appointed commissioners as to the just compensation, EPZA
filed for a motion for reconsideration saying that the PD 464, as amended, superseded the rules of
court. The trial court denied the motion. EPZA then filed for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary
restraining order.

Issue:

Whether PD 76, 464, 794 and 1533 have repealed the Revised Rules of Court, such that in
determining just compensation in expropriation shall be based only in its market value as declared by
the owner or by assessor, whichever is lower.

Held:

PD 464 on just compensation is unconstitutional and void. The method of just compensation
provided by PD 464 is an encroachment on judicial prerogatives, contradicting the Constitution which
reserved the power to determine just compensation to the Court's final determination. We are
convinced and so rule that the trial court correctly stated that the valuation in the decree may only
serve as a guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation but it may not
substitute the court's own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such
amount.

Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of the taking. It means a fair and
full equivalent for the loss sustained. All the facts as to the condition of the property and its
surroundings, its improvements and capabilities, should be considered. The determination of "just
compensation" in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. The executive department or the
legislature may make the initial determinations but when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in
the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no
statute, decree, or executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the court's
findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the "just-ness" of the decreed
compensation.

Comment:

Rule 67 were not substantially amended by the new rules, hence this case will not be
affected
Rule 68

Limpin vs. IAC, 166 SCRA 88

Facts:
Four lots were mortgaged by the spouses Jose and Marcelina Aquino to Guillermo Ponce and his wife
Adela (since deceased) as security for a loan of P2,200,000.00. The mortgages were registered. Two of the lots,
those covered by TCTs Nos. 92836 and 92837, were afterwards sold by the Aquinos to the Butuan Bay Wood
Export Corporation, which caused an adverse claim to be annotated on the certificates of title.
Gregorio Y. Limpin, Jr. obtained a money judgment against Butuan Bay Wood Export Corporation in Court
of First Instance of Davao. To satisfy the judgment, the lots covered by TCTs Nos. 92836 and 92837 were levied
upon on and sold at public auction to Limpin as the highest bidder .On order of the trial court, the covering titles
were cancelled and issued to Limpin. Limpin sold the two lots to Rogelio M. Sarmiento. By virtue of said sale, TCTs
Nos. 285450 and 285451 were cancelled on November 4, 1983, and TCT’S were replaced in Sarmiento's name.
Ponce filed suit against the Aquino spouses for judicial foreclosure of the mortgage over the Aquinos' four lots.
Judgment was rendered in favor of Ponce. After the judgment became final, the Trial Court, directed the sale at
public auction of the 4 mortgaged lots to satisfy the judgment.
The 4 lots, including those formerly covered by TCTs Nos. 92836 and 92837, were sold to Ponce himself
whose bid was the highest and exactly correspond to the judgment debt. On the same day, the sheriff's certificate
of sale was registered. Ponce then moved for the confirmation of the sale and the issuance of a writ of possession
in his favor covering the four lots. But the Trial Court confirmed only the sale of the lots covered by TCTs Nos.
02839 and 92840, refusing to confirm the sale or issue a writ of possession in regard to the lots covered by TCTs
Nos. 92836 and 92837 on the ground that those titles had already been cancelled and new ones issued to Gregorio
F. Limpin.
Limpin refused to participate in the hearings contending that the Court had no jurisdiction over his
person; but he did comment that the mortgage over the lots covered by TCTs Nos. 92836 and 92837 had been
released by Ponce by virtue of a "Partial Release of Real Estate Mortgage". The Trial Court denied Ponce's motion
for reconsideration, whereupon he sought corrective relief by filing a special civil action for certiorari and
mandamus in the Intermediate Appellate Court, impleading Limpin and Sarmiento, as private respondents.
IAC set aside the judgment of the Trial Court and issue a writ of possession to Ponce with respect thereto, subject
to Sarmiento's equity of redemption.

Issue:

Whether or not IAC erred in according superiority to the mortgage rights of Ponce over the levy and sale
in favor of Limpin and the subsequent sale to Sarmiento.

Held:
NO. The superiority of the mortgagee's lien over that of a subsequent judgment creditor is now expressly
provided in Rule 39, Section 16 of the Revised Rules of Court, which states with regard to the effect of levy on
execution that it shall create a lien in favor of a judgment creditor over the right title and interest of the judgment
debtor in such property at the time of the levy, subject to the liens or encumbrances then existing.

Using jurisprudence in Santiago v Dionisio, the Court in that case held that:
... [T]he effect of the failure to implead a subordinate lienholder or subsequent purchaser or both is to render the
foreclosure ineffective as against them, with the result that there remains in their favor the "unforeclosed equity
of redemption." But the foreclosure is valid as between the parties to the suit.
Applied to this case, this means that the sale to Ponce, as the highest bidder in the foreclosure sale of the
two lots in question should have been confirmed, subject to Limpin's (and now Sarmiento's equity to redemption.
The registration of the lands, first in the name of Limpin and later of Sarmiento, was premature. At most what they
were entitled to was the registration of their equity of redemption.
It is well settled that a recorded mortgage is a right in rem, a lien on the property whoever its owner may
be. The recordation of the mortgage in this case puts the whole world on constructive notice of its existence and
warned everyone who thereafter dealt with the property on which it was constituted that he would have to reckon
with that encumbrance. Hence, Limpin's subsequent purchase of the "interests and participation" of Butuan Bay
Wood Export Corporation in the lots covered by TCTs Nos. 92836 and 92837, as well as the sale of the same to
Sarmiento were both subject to said mortgage.

Comment:
 Rule 68 were not substantially amended by the new rules, hence this case will not be
affected
Monzon vs. Spouses Relova v. Addio Properties,  G.R. No.171827, Sept. 17, 2008

Facts:

Monzon executed a promissory note in favor of Spouses Perez secured by a lot which was part of a
bigger land. She also executed a Deed of Absolute Favor in their favor. Monzon executed another promissory
note in favor of Spouses Perez secured by another lot of the land. Monzon executed a Deed ot
Conditional Sale over said parcel of land in favor of the spouses Relova. Before the due date of the debts. Coastal
Lending Corporation extrajudicially foreclosed on the land. including the portions mortgaged and sold to
Spouses Perez and Spouses Relova. Monzon was indebted to the Coastal Lending Corporation In the total
amount of P3.398.832,35. The winning bidder in the extrajudicial foreclosure. Addio Properties Inc. paid the
amount of P5.001127.00. thus leaving a P1,602,393.65 residue which was in the custody oh Attv. Luna as Branch
Clerk of Court. Spouses Perez and Spouses Relova thus filed a petition for injunction against Atty. Luna and
Monzon to compel Atty. Luna to deliver the amount to them and restrain Atty. Luna from delivering any
amount to Monzon pending such delivery. Monzon fled an Answer claiming that they did not have a cause of
action. Upon oral motion of the spouses. the RTK issued an order allowing the spouses to present evidence ex
parte because Monzon and her counsel failed to appear on the hearing date. The RTC ruled in favor of the
spouses. CA affirmed.

Issue:

Whether or Not the RTC erred in rendering its Deeision immediately after the spouses presented their
evidence ex parte without giving Monzon a chance to present her evidence.

Held:
The Court ruled in the affirmative. Failure to file a responsive pleading within the reglementary period.
and not failure to appear at the hearing. is the sole ground for an order of default. except the failure to appear
at a pre-trial conference wherein the effects of a default on the part of the defendant are followed. that is.
the plaintiff shall be allowed to present evidence ex parte and a judgment based thereon may be rendered
against the defendant (Section 5. Rule 18).

We are, therefore, inclined to remand the case to the trial court for reception of evidence for the defense.
Before we do so, however, we need to point out that the trial court had committed another error which we should
address to put the remand in its proper perspective. We refer to Monzon's argument as early as the Answer stage
that respondents' Petition for Injunction had failed to state a cause of action.

Section 4, Rule 68 of the Rules of Court, which is the basis of respondent's alleged cause of action entitling them to
the residue of the amount paid in the foreclosure sale, provides as follows:

SEC. 4. Disposition of proceeds of sale.--The amount realized from the foreclosure sale of the mortgaged
property shall, after deducting the costs of the sale, be paid to the person foreclosing the mortgage, and  when
there shall be any balance or residue, after paying off the mortgage debt due, the same shall be paid to junior
encumbrancers in the order of their priority, to be ascertained by the court, or if there be no such encumbrancers
or there be a balance or residue after payment to them, then to the mortgagor or his duly authorized agent, or to
the person entitled to it.
However, Rule 68 governs the judicial foreclosure of mortgages. Extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgages,
which was what transpired in the case at bar, is governed by Act No. 3135, 11 as amended by Act No. 4118,12 Section
6 of Republic Act No. 7353, Section 18 of Republic Act No. 7906, and Section 47 of Republic Act No. 8791. A.M. No.
99-10-05-0, issued on 14 December 1999, provides for the procedure to be observed in the conduct of an
extrajudicial foreclosure sale. Thus, we clarified the different types of sales in  Supena v. Dela Rosa.

Comment:

Rule 68 were not substantially amended by the new rules, hence this case will not be
affected
Rule 69

Dadizon vs. Bernadas, G.R. No. 172367, June 5, 2009

 FACTS:
Petitioners and respondents are the heirs and representatives of the deceased children of the late
Diosdado Bernadas, Sr. who died intestate on February 1, 1977, leaving in coownership with his then surviving
spouse, Eustaquia Bernadas (who died thereafter), several parcels of agricultural and residential land in Naval,
Biliran. Respondents filed a Complaint against petitioners to compel the partition of the 1/2 conjugal share of the
properties left by their late father based on the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition. They alleged that petitioner
Felicidad Dadizon was in possession of the subject properties and refused to heed their demands to cause the
partition of the same. Petitioners averred that the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition was revoked by another Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition. They argued that certain parcels of land included in respondents’ complaint had long been
disposed of or extrajudicially partitioned by them. Respondents contended that the second Deed of Extrajudicial
Partition was a product of malice directed against respondent Socorro Bernadas, for not all of the heirs of their late
father participated in the execution of the alleged subsequent deed. The counsel of respondents then filed a
Project of Partition, however the same was not signed by all of the heirs. Petitioners did not file any comment to
the Project of Partition. The RTC ordered the parties to submit the signed extrajudicial partition for approval, which
the respondents complied with. The RTC thus approved the Project of Partition. Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of but the same was denied. The RTC noted that petitioners had failed to file any comment on or
objection to the Project of Partition despite the RTC's orders. Hence, petitioners filed an appeal before the CA
alleging, among others, that the RTC erred in finding that their counsel agreed to the approved Project of Partition.
The CA dismissed the petition. Its subsequent MR was also denied. Hence, this Petition.

ISSUE:
Whether the RTC erred in approving the Project of Partition.

HELD:
YES. There are two stages in every action for partition under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court. The first stage
is the determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists and a partition is proper (i.e., not otherwise
legally proscribed) and may be made by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property. The
second stage commences when it appears that the parties are unable to agree upon the partition directed by the
court. In that event, partition shall be done for the parties by the court with the assistance of not more than 3
commissioners. There are, thus, two ways in which a partition can take place under Rule 69: by agreement under
Section 2, and through commissioners when such agreement cannot be reached under Sections 3 to 6.

A careful study of the records of this case reveals that the RTC departed from the foregoing procedure mandated
by Rule 69. The RTC noted that both parties filed the Project of Partition that it approved. In its Order denying
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, the RTC reiterated that both parties filed the same. However, the records
show that the Project of Partition was filed only by respondents’ counsel, and that the same was not signed by the
respondents or all of the parties. Even if petitioners did manifest in open court to the RTC that they have already
agreed with the respondents on the manner of partition of the subject properties, what is material is that only the
respondents filed the Project of Partition and that the same did not bear the signatures of petitioners because only
a document signed by all of the parties can signify that they agree on a partition. Hence, the RTC had no authority
to approve the Project of Partition.

Comment:

Rule 69 were not substantially amended by the new rules, hence this case will not be
affected
Valmonte vs. CA, 252 SCRA 102

Facts:

Petitioners Spouses Valmontes and Respondent Dimalanta are all residents of the U.S.A. Petitioner
Alfredo D. Valmonte, who is a member of the Philippine bar, however, practices his profession in an office in
Manila, Philippines. Private respondent Rosita Dimalanta, sister of Lourdes A. Valmonte, filed a complaint for
partition of real property and accounting of rentals against the spouses before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
The subject of the action is a three-door apartment located in Paco, Manila. In her Complaint, private respondent
alleged that the complaint may be served with summons at Ermita, Manila where defendant Alfredo D. Valmonte
as defendant Lourdes Valmonte’s spouse holds office and where he can be found. The foregoing averments were
made on the basis of a letter sent by petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte to private respondent’s counsel in which, in
regard to the partition of the property in question, she referred private respondent’s counsel to her husband as
the party to whom all communications intended for her should be sent. Service of summons was then made upon
petitioner Alfredo, who was at his office in Manila. Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte accepted the summons, insofar
as he was concerned, but refused to accept the summons for his wife, on the ground that he was not authorized to
accept the process on her behalf. Accordingly the process server left without leaving a copy of the summons and
complaint for petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte. Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte thereafter filed his Answer with
Counterclaim. Petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte, however, did not file her Answer. For this reason private
respondent moved to declare her in default. Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte entered a special appearance in behalf
of his wife and opposed the private respondent’s motion. The trial court, denied private respondent’s motion to
declare petitioner Lourdes in default. A motion for reconsideration was similarly denied. Whereupon, private
respondent filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals rendered a decision granting the petition and declaring Lourdes A. Valmonte in default. Hence, this
petition.

Issue:

Whether or Not petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte was validly served with summons.

Held:

There was no valid service of process on Lourdes A. Valmonte. The Court of Appeals holding that she had
been validly served stated that she clearly and unequivocally directed that all communications be addressed to her
lawyer who happens also to be her husband. Such directive was made without any qualification. This view is
bolstered by Atty. Valmonte’s subsequent alleged special appearance made on behalf of his wife. The CA cannot
allow Mrs. Valmonte’s assertion that representation by her lawyer and husband as far as the Paco property
controversy is concerned, should only be made by him when such representation would be favorable to her but
not otherwise.

Determination should first be made on whether the action is in personam, in rem or quasi in rem. This is
because the rules on service of summons embodied in Rule 14 apply according to whether an action is one or the
other of these actions. In an action in personam, personal service of summons or, if this is not possible, substituted
service, as provided in Rule 14, § 7-8[2] is essential for the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person
of a defendant who does not voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the court.[3] If defendant cannot be
served with summons because he is temporarily abroad, but otherwise he is a Philippine resident, service of
summons may, by leave of court, be made by publication as provided in § 17 and 18 of the same Rule.[5] In all of
these cases, defendant must be a resident of the Philippines, otherwise an action in personam cannot be brought
because jurisdiction over his person is essential to make a binding decision. If the action is in rem or quasi in rem,
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not essential for giving the court jurisdiction so long as the court
acquires jurisdiction over the res.

Private respondent’s action, which is for partition and accounting under Rule 69, is in the nature of an
action quasi in rem. Such an action is essentially for the purpose of affecting the defendant’s interest in a specific
property and not to render a judgment against him.

Comment:

Rule 69 were not substantially amended by the new rules, hence this case will not be
affected