The lawyer’s duties to the legal profession unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high
degree. It has been held that a lawyer is guilty of gross
‘Attorney” is not only a title—it is a responsibility.
“As officers of the court, lawyers must not only, in fact, be
of good moral character but must also be seen to be of
good moral character in leading lives in accordance with
the highest moral standards of the community. More
specifically, a member of the bar and officer of the court is
not only required to refrain from adulterous relationship or
the keeping of mistresses [Toledo v. Toledo, 75 SCRA 747
(1963)] but must also behave himself as to avoid
scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is
flouting those moral standards” (Tolosa v. Cargo, 171
SCRA 21 [1989]).
A lawyer shall always conduct himself ethically and
morally. The best way a lawyer can uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession is not to engage in any
conduct or do any act that adversely reflects on his fitness
to practice law, nor to behave, in his public or private life,
in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession (Rule 17.03, Code of Professional
Responsibility). He should instead endeavor to conduct
himself at all times in such a way as to give credit to the
legal profession and to inspire the confidence, respect and
trust of his clients and the community. (Comments of IBP
Committee that drafted the Code, p. 37) It is a fair
characterization of the lawyer’s responsibility in our society
that he stands “as a shield” in the defense of rights and to
ward off wrong. From the profession charged with these
responsibilities there must be expected those qualities of
truth speaking, of a high sense of honor, of granite
discretion, of the strictest observance of fiduciary
responsibility, that have throughout the centuries been
compendiously described as “moral character” (Ibid, p. 37).
Some lawyers have taken the forbidden path and, as a
consequence, have been disciplined or deprived of their
privilege to practice law. Among those acts that adversely
reflect on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law, which justify
suspension from practice or disbarment include gross
immorality. Gross immorality is reflective of unfitness to
practice.
An act of personal immorality on the part of a lawyer in his
private relation with the opposite sex may put his moral
character in doubt. However, to justify suspension or
disbarment, the act must not only be immoral; it must be
grossly immoral as well. A grossly immoral act is one that
is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so
immorality, which justifies denial of his application to take
the lawyer’s oath or, after his admission, his suspension or
disbarment, where he lives an adulterous life with a
married woman (Cordova v. Cordova, 179 SCRA 837
[1989]), or abandons his lawful wife to live with another
woman (Obusan v. Obusan, 128 SCRA 485 [1984]).
On the other hand, it has also been held that mere intimacy
between a man and a woman, either of whom possesses
no legal impediment to marry, voluntarily carried on and
devoid of any deceit on the part of the lawyer, is neither so
corrupt nor so unprincipled as to warrant imposition of
disciplinary sanction against him as a member of the bar,
even if as a result of such relationship the woman gave
birth to a child, and so long as he admits the paternity of,
and agrees to support, such child. He may be disciplined if
he subsequently disowns, or refuses to support the child
(Marcayda v. Mari Wang, 106 SCRA 591 [1981]).
Lawyers as guardians of the law play a vital role in the
preservation of society. The fulfillment of this role requires
an understanding by lawyers of their relationship with and
function in our legal system. A consequent obligation of
lawyers is to maintain the highest standards of ethical
conduct. Canon 7 provides that, “A lawyer shall at all times
uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession…”
In fulfilling his professional responsibilities, a lawyer
necessarily assumes various roles that require the
performance of many difficult tasks. Not every situation
that he may encounter can be foreseen, but fundamental
ethical principles are always present to guide him. Within
the framework of these principles, a lawyer must with
courage and foresight be able and ready to shape the body
of the law to the ever-changing relationship of society.
The Code of Professional Responsibility points the way to
the aspiring and provides standards by which to judge the
transgressor. Each lawyer must find within his own
conscience the touchstone against which to test the extent
to which his actions should rise above minimum standards.
But in the last analysis it is the desire for the respect and
confidence of the members of his profession and of the
society which he serves that should provide to a lawyer the
incentive for the highest possible degree of ethical
conduct. The possible loss of that respect and confidence
is the ultimate sanction. So long as its practitioners are
guided by these principles, the law will continue to be a
noble profession. This is its greatness and its strength,
which permit of no compromise.
To say that “all lawyers are womanizers” or that “all lawyers
are not faithful” is not only making false statements, but is
irresponsible and improper conduct, eroding public
confidence in law and lawyers. Lawyers cannot be
effective instruments in the proper administration of justice
if respect for the legal profession is diminished by public
ridicule and condemnation of all lawyers. For indeed, the
bar can only be as reputable as its members. Thus, every
lawyer (and that includes the Speaker of the House and
the President) should act and comport himself in such a
manner that would promote public confidence in the
integrity of the legal profession.
[B.M. No. 553. June 17, 1993.]
MAURICIO C. ULEP, Petitioner, v. THE LEGAL
CLINIC, INC., Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; PRACTICE OF LAW,
MEANING AND EXTENT OF. — Practice of law means
any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedures, knowledge, training
and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to
perform those acts which are characteristic of the
profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or
render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or
skill. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of
cases in court. It includes legal advice and counsel, and
the preparation of legal instruments and contracts by which
legal rights are secured, although such matter may or may
not be pending in a court. In the practice of his profession,
a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three
principal types of professional activity: legal advice and
instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and
obligations, preparation for clients of documents requiring
knowledge of legal principles not possessed by ordinary
layman, and appearance for clients before public tribunals
which possess power and authority to determine rights of
life, liberty, and property according to law, in order to assist
in proper interpretation and enforcement of law. When a
person participates in a trial and advertises himself as a
lawyer, he is in the practice of law. One who confers with
clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes
the business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after
the case in court, is also practicing law. Giving advice for
compensation regarding the legal status and rights of
another and the conduct with respect thereto constitutes a
practice of law. One who renders an opinion as to the
proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it,
is, to that extent, practicing law.
2. ID.; ID.; LEGAL SUPPORT SERVICES IN CASE AT
BAR CONSTITUTE PRACTICE OF LAW. — The practice
of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and
out of court. Applying the aforementioned criteria to the
case at bar, we agree with the perceptive findings and
observations of the aforestated bar associations that the
activities of respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice
of law." The contention of respondent that it merely offers
legal support services can neither be seriously considered
nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent’s
own description of the services it has been offering, to wit:
. . . While some of the services being offered by respondent
corporation merely involve mechanical and technical
know-how, such as the installation of computer systems
and programs for the efficient management of law offices,
or the computerization of research aids and materials,
these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general
rule. What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation
gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its
contention that such function is non-advisory and non-
diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing
information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage,
divorce and adoptation, it strains the credulity of this Court
that all that respondent corporation will simply do is look
for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop
there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys
and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain
to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her
on the proper course of action to be taken as may be
provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements
represent and for which services it will consequently
charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the
jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a
conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent
corporation does not represent clients in court since law
practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not limited
merely to court appearances but extends to legal research,
giving legal advice, contract drafting, and so forth. The
aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article
published in the January 13, 1991 issue of the
Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippine Star,
entitled "Rx for Legal Problems," where an insight into the
structure, main purpose and operations of respondent
corporation was given by its own "proprietor," Atty. Rogelio
P. Nogales: . . . 6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PRACTICE OF LAW IN CASE AT
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; PARALEGAL OR LEGAL ASSISTANT;
CONCEPT IN THE UNITED STATES. — Paralegals in the
United States are trained professionals. As admitted by
respondent, there are schools and universities there which
offer studies and degrees in paralegal education, while
there are none in the Philippines. As the concept of the
"paralegal" or "legal assistant" evolved in the United
States, standards and guidelines also evolved to protect
the general public. One of the major standards or
guidelines was developed by the American Bar
Association which set up Guidelines for the Approval of
Legal Assistant Education Programs (1973). Legislation
has even been proposed to certify legal assistants. There
are also associations of paralegals in the United States
with their own code of professional ethics, such as the
National Association of Legal Assistants, Inc. and the
American Paralegal Association.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CONCEPT IN THE PHILIPPINES. — In
the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and
limited acceptance of what may be considered as
paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons
not duly licensed to practice law are or have been allowed
limited representation in behalf of another or to render legal
services, but such allowable services are limited in scope
and extent by the law, rules or regulations granting
permission therefor. (Illustrations: . . .)
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PHILIPPINE JUDICIAL POLICY ON
PARALEGAL. — We have to necessarily and definitely
reject respondent’s position that the concept in the United
States of paralegals as an occupation separate from the
law profession be adopted in this jurisdiction. Whatever
may be its merits, respondent cannot but be aware that this
should first be a matter for judicial rules or legislative
action, and not of unilateral adoption as it has done. . . .
Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy
that, in the absence of constitutional or statutory authority,
a person who has not been admitted as an attorney cannot
practice law for the proper administration of justice cannot
be hindered by the unwarranted intrusion of an
unauthorized and unskilled person into the practice of law.
That policy should continue to be one of encouraging
persons who are unsure of their legal rights and remedies
to seek legal assistance only from persons licensed to
practice law in the state.
BAR CANNOT BE PERFORMED BY PARALEGALS;
REASON. — It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the
services being offered by private respondent which
constitute practice of law cannot be performed by
paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a member of
the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with
the provisions of the Rules of Court, and who is in good
and regular standing, is entitled to practice law. . . .
7. ID.; ADVERTISEMENT BY LAWYER; RULE. — Anent
the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements,
the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a
lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only
true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or
statement of facts. He is not supposed to use or permit the
use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,
undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim
regarding his qualifications or legal services. Nor shall he
pay or give something of value to representatives of the
mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to
attract legal business. Prior to the adoption of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, the Canons of Professional
Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort to
indirect advertisements for professional employment, such
as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or
procuring his photograph to be published in connection
with causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged or
concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of
the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer’s
position, and all other like self-laudation.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; CHARACTER AND CONDUCT AS BEST
ADVERTISEMENT. — We repeat, the canons of the
profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a
lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional
capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the
outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient
service to a client as well as to the community has a way
of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That
publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which
is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no
artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success.
He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product
of able service and the unwholesome result of
propaganda.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROHIBITION ON ADVERTISEMENT OF
TALENT OR SKILL. — The standards of the legal
profession condemn the lawyer’s advertisement of his
talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his
profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner
similar to a merchant advertising his goods. The
proscription against advertising of legal services or
solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental
postulate that the practice of law is a profession. . . .
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXCEPTIONS. — The first of such
exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a
manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed
by the canons, of brief biographical and informative data.
"Such data must not be misleading and may include only a
statement of the lawyer’s name and the names of his
professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers,
cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date and
place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended
with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational
distinction; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor;
legal authorships; legal teaching positions; memberships
and offices in bar associations and committees thereof, in
legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact
of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and
addresses of references; and, with their written consent,
the names of clients regularly represented.." . . The use of
an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The
card may contain only a statement of his name, the name
of the law firm which he is connected with, address,
telephone number and special branch of law practiced.
The publication of a simple announcement of the opening
of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates,
firm name or office address, being for the convenience of
the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have
his name listed in a telephone directory but not under a
designation of special branch of law.
11. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUIREMENT FOR LAW LIST.
— The law list must be a reputable law list published
primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere
supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal
or periodical which is published principally for other
purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly
publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily
paper, magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor
may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list
the conduct, management or contents of which are
calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar,
or to lower the dignity or standing of the profession.
12. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — Verily, taking
into consideration the nature and contents of the
advertisements for which respondent is being taken to
task, which even includes a quotation of the fees charged
by said respondent corporation for services rendered, we
find and so hold that the same definitely do not and
conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned
exceptions.
13. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXCEPTION IN BATES, ET
AL. v. STATE BAR OF ARIZONA (433 U.S. 350, 53 L Ed
2d 810, 97 S Ct. 2691) AS TO PUBLICATION OF LEGAL
FEES, NOT APPLICABLE; REASONS. — The ruling in the
case of Bates, Et. Al. v. State Bar of Arizona, which is
repeatedly invoked and constitutes the justification relied
upon by respondent, is obviously not applicable to the case Annex A
at bar. Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule
involved in said case explicitly allows a lawyer, as an SECRET MARRIAGE?
exception to the prohibition against advertisements by
lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees for an initial P560.00 for a valid marriage.
consultation or the availability upon request of a written
schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee to be charged Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
for the specific services. No such exception is provided for,
expressly or impliedly, whether in our former Canons of ANNULMENT. VISA.
Professional Ethics or the present Code of Professional
Responsibility. Besides, even the disciplinary rule in the THE Please call: 521-0767,
Bates case contains a proviso that the exceptions stated
therein are "not applicable in any state unless and until it is LEGAL 5217232, 5222041
implemented by such authority in that state." This goes to
show that an exception to the general rule, such as that CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am-6:00 pm
being invoked by herein respondent, can be made only if
and when the canons expressly provide for such an 7-Flr. Victoria Bldg.UN Ave., Mla.
exception. Otherwise, the prohibition stands, as in the case
at bar. It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the Annex B
American Bar Association after the decision in Bates, on
the attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing GUAM DIVORCE
television commercials, it was found that public opinion
dropped significantly with respect to these characteristics DON PARKINSON
of lawyers: . . . Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the
present situation of our legal and judicial systems, to allow an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam
the publication of advertisements of the kind used by Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to
respondent would only serve to aggravate what is already Friday during office hours.
a deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whose
integrity has consistently been under attack lately by media Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration
and the community in general. At this point in time, it is of Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special
utmost importance in the face of such negative, even if Retiree’s Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to
unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that level Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil.
of professional conduct which is beyond reproach, and to US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.
exert all efforts to regain the high esteem formerly
accorded to the legal profession. THE 7 F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave.
RESOLUTION
LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy
REGALADO, J.:
CLINIC, INC. 1 Tel. 521-7232521-7251
Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to
cease and desist from issuing advertisements similar to or 522-2041; 521-0767
of the same tenor as that of Annexes `A’ and `B’ (of said
petition) and to perpetually prohibit persons or entities from It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements
making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the above reproduced are champertous, unethical, demeaning
law profession other than those allowed by law." of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of
the community in the integrity of the members of the bar
The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is
as follows: ashamed and offended by the said advertisements, hence
the reliefs sought in his petition as herein before quoted.
In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of
publication of said advertisements at its instance, but
claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the
rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals
with the use of modern computers and electronic
machines. Respondent further argues that assuming that
the services advertised are legal services, the act of
advertising these services should be allowed supposedly
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O’Steen
v. State Bar of Arizona, 2 reportedly decided by the United
States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.
Considering the critical implications on the legal profession
of the issues raised herein, we required the (1) Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar Association
(PBA), (3) Philippine Lawyers’ Association (PLA), (4) U.P.
Women Lawyers’ Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers
Association of the Philippines (WLAP), and (6) Federation
International de Abogadas (FIDA) to submit their
respective position papers on the controversy and,
thereafter, their memoranda. 3 The said bar associations
readily responded and extended their valuable services
and cooperation of which this Court takes note with
appreciation and gratitude.
The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are
whether or not the services offered by respondent, The
Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of
law and, in either case, whether the same can properly be
the subject of the advertisements herein complained of.
Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits
of this case, we deem it proper and enlightening to present
hereunder excerpts from the respective position papers
adopted by the aforementioned bar associations and the
memoranda submitted by them on the issues involved in
this bar matter.
1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
x x x The impression created by the advertisements in question
Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent
endeavored to distinguish the two terms, i.e., "legal
support services" vis-a-vis "legal services", common sense
would readily dictate that the same are essentially without
substantial distinction. For who could deny that document
search, evidence gathering, assistance to layman in need
of basic institutional services from government or non-
government agencies like birth, marriage, property, or
business registration, obtaining documents like clearance,
passports, local or foreign visas, constitute practice of law?
x x x
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish
to make issue with respondent’s foreign citations. Suffice it
to state that the IBP has made its position manifest, to wit,
that it strongly opposes the view espoused by respondent
(to the effect that today it is alright to advertise one’s legal
services).
The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its
opposition to respondent’s act of establishing a "legal
clinic" and of concomitantly advertising the same through
newspaper publications.
The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative
supervision of this Honorable Court to perpetually restrain
respondent from undertaking highly unethical activities in
the field of law practice as aforedescribed 4 .
x x x
A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the
impression that respondent corporation is being operated
by lawyers and that it renders legal services.
While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal
services to the public, the advertisements in question give
the impression that respondent is offering legal services.
The Petition in fact simply assumes this to be so, as earlier
mentioned, apparently because this (is) the effect that the
advertisements have on the reading public.
can be traced, first of all, to the very name being used by
respondent — "The Legal Clinic, Inc." Such a name, it is
respectfully submitted connotes the rendering of legal
services for legal problems, just like a medical clinic
connotes medical services for medical problems. More
importantly, the term "Legal Clinic" connotes lawyers, as
the term medical clinic connotes doctors.
Furthermore, the respondent’s name, as published in the
advertisements subject of the present case, appears with
(the) scale(s) of justice, which all the more reinforces the
impression that it is being operated by members of the bar
and that it offers legal services. In addition, the
advertisements in question appear with a picture and name
of a person being represented as a lawyer from Guam, and
this practically removes whatever doubt may still remain as
to the nature of the service or services being offered.
It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely
offering "legal support services" as claimed by it, or
whether it offers legal services as any lawyer actively
engaged in law practice does. And it becomes
unnecessary to make a distinction between "legal
services" and "legal support services," as the respondent
would have it. The advertisements in question leave no
room for doubt in the minds of the reading public that legal
services are being offered by lawyers, whether true or not.
B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the
performance of acts contrary to law, morals, public order
and public policy.
It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the
advertisements in question are only meant to inform the
general public of the services being offered by it. Said
advertisements, however, emphasize a Guam divorce,
and any law student ought to know that under the Family
Code, there is only one instance when a foreign divorce, is
recognized, and that is:
Article 26. . . . If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine Law.
It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines)
a marriage as follows:
Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union
between a man and a woman entered into in accordance
with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It
is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are
governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that
marriage settlements may fix the property relation during
the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is
obvious that the message being conveyed is that Filipinos
can avoid the legal consequences of a marriage celebrated
in accordance with our law, by simply going to Guam for a
divorce. This is not only misleading, but encourages, or
serves to induce, violation of Philippine law. At the very
least, this can be considered "the dark side" of legal
practice, where certain defects in Philippine laws are
exploited for the sake of profit. At worst, this is outright
malpractice.
Rule 1.02. — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities
aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in
the legal system.
In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that
advertisements such as that shown in Annex "A" of the
Petition, which contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle with
the words "Just Married" on its bumper and seems to
address those planning a "secret marriage," if not
suggesting a "secret marriage," makes light of the "special
contract of permanent union," the inviolable social
institution," which is how the Family Code describes
marriage, obviously to emphasize its sanctity and
inviolability. Worse, this particular advertisement appears
to encourage marriages celebrated in secrecy, which is
suggestive of immoral publication of applications for a
marriage license.chanrobles law library : red
can readily be concluded that the above impressions one
may gather from the advertisements in question are
accurate. The Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion
example alone confirms what the advertisements suggest.
Here it can be seen that criminal acts are being
encouraged or committed (a bigamous marriage in Hong
Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply because the
jurisdiction of Philippine courts does not extend to the
place where the crime is committed.
Even if it be assumed, arguendo, that the "legal support
services" respondent offers do not constitute legal services
as commonly understood, the advertisements in question
give the impression that respondent corporation is being
operated by lawyers and that it offers legal services, as
earlier discussed. Thus, the only logical consequence is
that, in the eyes of an ordinary newspaper reader,
members of the bar themselves are encouraging or
inducing the performance of acts which are contrary to law,
morals, good customs and the public good, thereby
destroying and demeaning the integrity of the Bar.
x x x
It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be
enjoined from causing the publication of the
advertisements in question, or any other advertisements
similar thereto. It is also submitted that respondent should
be prohibited from further performing or offering some of
the services it presently offers, or, at the very least, from
offering such services to the public in general.
The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized
legal research, electronic data gathering, storage and
retrieval, standardized legal forms, investigators for
gathering of evidence, and like services will greatly benefit
the legal profession and should not be stifled but instead
encouraged. However, when the conduct of such business
by non-members of the Bar encroaches upon the practice
of law, there can be no choice but to prohibit such
business.
Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at
bar can be better performed by specialists in other fields,
such as computer experts, who by reason of their having
devoted time and effort exclusively to such field cannot
fulfill the exacting requirements for admission to the Bar.
To prohibit them from "encroaching" upon the legal
profession will deny the profession of the great benefits
and advantages of modern technology. Indeed, a lawyer
using a computer will be doing better than a lawyer using
a typewriter, even if both are (equal) in skill.
Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful
not to allow or tolerate the illegal practice of law in any
form, not only for the protection of members of the Bar but
also, and more importantly, for the protection of the public.
Technological development in the profession may be
encouraged without tolerating, but instead ensuring
prevention of, illegal practice.
There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is
allowed to perform all of its services, but only if such
services are made available exclusively to members of the
Bench and Bar. Respondent would then be offering
technical assistance, not legal services. Alternatively, the
more difficult task of carefully distinguishing between
which service may be offered to the public in general and
which should be made available exclusively to members of
the Bar may be undertaken. This, however, may require
further proceedings because of the factual considerations
involved.
It must be emphasized, however, that some of
respondent’s services ought to be prohibited outright, such
as acts which tend to suggest or induce celebration abroad
of marriages which are bigamous or otherwise illegal and
void under Philippine law. While respondent may not be
prohibited from simply disseminating information regarding
such matters, it must be required to include, in the
information given, a disclaimer that it is not authorized to
practice law, that certain course of action may be illegal
under Philippine law, that it is not authorized or capable of
rendering a legal opinion, that a lawyer should be
consulted before deciding on which course of action to
take, and that it cannot recommend any particular lawyer
without subjecting itself to possible sanctions for illegal
practice of law.
If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be
directed exclusively at members of the Bar, with a clear
and unmistakable disclaimer that it is not authorized to
practice law or perform legal services.
The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be
ignored. But nobody should be allowed to represent
himself as a "paralegal" for profit, without such term being
clearly defined by rule or regulation, and without any
adequate and effective means of regulating his activities.
Also, law practice in a corporate form may prove to be
advantageous to the legal profession, but before
allowance of such practice may be considered, the
corporation’s Articles of Incorporation and By-laws must
conform to each and every provision of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Rules of Court 5
2. Philippine Bar Association:
x x x
Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice
of law but engaged in giving legal support services to
lawyers and laymen, through experienced paralegals, with
the use of modern computers and electronic machines"
(pars. 2 and 3, Comment). This is absurd. Unquestionably,
respondent’s acts of holding out itself to the public under
the trade name "The Legal Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting
employment for its enumerated services fall within the
realm of a practice which thus yields itself to the regulatory
powers of the Supreme Court. For respondent to say that
it is merely engaged in paralegal work is to stretch
credulity. Respondent’s own commercial advertisement
which announces a certain Atty. Don Perkinson to be
handling the fields of law belies its pretense. From all
indications, respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." is offering
and rendering legal services through its reserve of lawyers.
It has been held that the practice of law is not limited to the
conduct of cases in court, but includes drawing of deeds,
incorporation, rendering opinions, and advising clients as
to their legal rights and then take them to an attorney and
ask the latter to look after their case in court (See Martin,
Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1948 ed., p. 39).
It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in
the practice of law, and such limitation cannot be evaded
by a corporation employing competent lawyers to practice
for it. Obviously, this is the scheme or device by which
respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to the
public and solicits employment of its legal services. It is an
odious vehicle for deception, especially so when the public
cannot ventilate any grievance for malpractice against the
business conduit. Precisely, the limitation of practice of law
to persons who have been duly admitted as members of
the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court) is to
subject the members to the discipline of the Supreme
Court. Although respondent uses its business name, the
persons and the lawyers who act for it are subject to court
discipline. The practice of law is not a profession open to
all who wish to engage in it nor can it be assigned to
another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270). It is a personal right limited
to persons who have qualified themselves under the law.
It follows that not only respondent but also all the persons
who are acting for respondent are the persons engaged in
unethical law practice. 6
3. Philippine Lawyers’ Association:
The Philippine Lawyers’ Association’s position, in answer
to the issues stated herein, are, to wit:
1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;
2. Such practice is unauthorized;
3. The advertisements complained of are not only
unethical, but also misleading and patently immoral; and
4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to
suppress and punish the Legal Clinic and its corporate
officers for its unauthorized practice of law and for its
unethical, misleading and immoral advertising.
x x x
Respondent posits that it is not engaged in the practice of
law. It claims that it merely renders "legal support services"
to lawyers, litigants and the general public as enunciated
in the Primary Purpose Clause of its Article(s) of
Incorporation. (See pages 2 to 5 of Respondent’s
Comment). But its advertised services, as enumerated
above, clearly and convincingly show that it is indeed
engaged in law practice, albeit outside the court.
As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory
services on Persons and Family Relations Law, particularly
regarding foreign divorces, annulment of marriages, secret
marriages, absence and adoption; Immigration Laws,
particularly on visa related problems, immigration
problems; the Investment Law of the Philippines and such
other related laws.
Its advertised services unmistakably require the
application of the aforesaid laws, the legal principles and
procedures related thereto, the legal advises based
thereon and which activities call for legal training,
knowledge and experience.
Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited
Agrava Case, the activities of respondent fall squarely and
are embraced in what lawyers and laymen equally term as
"the practice of law." 7
4. U.P. Women Lawyers’ Circle:
In resolving the issues before this Honorable Court,
paramount consideration should be given to the protection
of the general public from the danger of being exploited by
unqualified persons or entities who may be engaged in the
practice of law.
At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a
rigorous four-year course of study on top of a four-year
bachelor of arts or sciences course and then to take and
pass the bar examinations. Only then, is a lawyer qualified
to practice law.
While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many
jurisdictions as an aid to the administration of justice, there
are in those jurisdictions, courses of study and/or
standards which would qualify these paralegals to deal
with the general public as such. While it may now be the
opportune time to establish these courses of study and/or
standards, the fact remains that at present, these do not
exist in the Philippines. In the meantime, this Honorable
Court may decide to take measures to protect the general
public from being exploited by those who may be dealing
with the general public in the guise of being "paralegals"
without being qualified to do so.
In the same manner, the general public should also be
protected from the dangers which may be brought about
by advertising of legal services. While it appears that
lawyers are prohibited under the present Code of
Professional Responsibility from advertising, it appears in
the instant case that legal services are being advertised
not by lawyers but by an entity staffed by "paralegals."
Clearly, measures should be taken to protect the general
public from falling prey to those who advertise legal
services without being qualified to offer such services." 8
A perusal of the questioned advertisements of
Respondent, however, seems to give the impression that
information regarding validity of marriages, divorce,
annulment of marriage, immigration, visa extensions,
declaration of absence, adoption and foreign investment,
which are in essence, legal matters, will be given to them
if they avail of its services. The Respondent’s name — The
Legal Clinic, Inc. — does not help matters. It gives the
impression again that Respondent will or can cure the legal
problems brought to them. Assuming that Respondent is,
as claimed, staffed purely by paralegals, it also gives the
misleading impression that there are lawyers involved in
The Legal Clinic, Inc., as there are doctors in any medical
clinic, when only "paralegals" are involved in The Legal
Clinic, Inc.
Respondent’s allegations are further belied by the very
admissions of its President and majority stockholder, Atty.
Nogales, who gave an insight on the structure and main
purpose of Respondent corporation in the aforementioned
"Starweek" article." 9
5. Women Lawyer’s Association of the Philippines:
Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly
advertisements to solicit cases for the purpose of gain
which, as provided for under the above cited law, (are)
illegal and against the Code of Professional Responsibility
of lawyers in this country.
Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an
advertisement to solicit cases, but it is illegal in that in bold
letters it announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc., could work
out/cause the celebration of a secret marriage which is not
only illegal but immoral in this country. While it is
advertised that one has to go to said agency and pay P560
for a valid marriage it is certainly fooling the public for valid
marriages in the Philippines are solemnized only by
officers authorized to do so under the law. And to employ
an agency for said purpose of contracting marriage is not
necessary.
No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other
countries the trend is towards allowing lawyers to advertise
their special skills to enable people to obtain from qualified
practitioners legal services for their particular needs can
justify the use of advertisements such as are the subject
matter of this petition, for one (cannot) justify an illegal act
even by whatever merit the illegal act may serve. The law
has yet to be amended so that such as act could become
justifiable.
We submit further that these advertisements that seem to
project that secret marriages and divorce are possible in
this country for a fee, when in fact it is not so, are highly
reprehensible.
It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how
they could go about having a secret marriage here, when
it cannot nor should ever be attempted, and seek advice
on divorce, where in this country there is none, except
under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws in the
Philippines. It is also against good morals and is deceitful
because it falsely represents to the public to be able to do
that which by our laws cannot be done (and) by our Code
of Morals should not be done.
In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme
Court held that solicitation for clients by an attorney by
circulars of advertisements, is unprofessional and offenses
of this character justify permanent elimination from the Bar.
10
6. Federacion International de Abogadas:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
x x x
1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of
law, such as management consultancy firms or travel
agencies, whether run by lawyers or not, perform the
services rendered by Respondent does not necessarily
lead to the conclusion that Respondent is not unlawfully
practicing law. In the same vein, however, the fact that the
business of respondent (assuming it can be engaged in
independently of the practice of law) involves knowledge
of the law does not necessarily make respondent guilty of
unlawful practice of law.
". . . Of necessity, no one . . . acting as a consultant can
render effective service unless he is familiar with such
statutes and regulations. He must be careful not to suggest
a course of conduct which the law forbids. It seems . . .
clear that (the consultant’s) knowledge of the law, and his
use of that knowledge as a factor in determining what
measures he shall recommend, do not constitute the
practice of law . . .. It is not only presumed that all men
know the law, but it is a fact that most men have
considerable acquaintance with the broad features of the
law . . .. Our knowledge of the law — accurate or inaccurate
— moulds our conduct not only when we are acting for
ourselves, but when we are serving others. Bankers, liquor
dealers and laymen generally possess rather precise
knowledge of the laws touching their particular business or
profession. A good example is the architect, who must be
familiar with zoning, building and fire prevention codes,
factory and tenement house statutes, and who draws plans
and specifications in harmony with the law. This is not
practicing law.
"But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire
tower, replies that it is required by the statute. Or the
industrial relations expert cites, in support of some
measure that he recommends, a decision of the National
Labor Relations Board. Are they practicing law? In my
opinion, they are not, provided no separate fee is charged
for the legal advice or information, and the legal question
is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem.
"It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.
"If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his
land to engage a lawyer to advise him and the architect in
respect to the building code and the like, then an architect
who performed this function would probably be considered
to be trespassing on territory reserved for licensed
attorneys. Likewise, if the industrial relations field had been
pre-empted by lawyers, or custom placed a lawyer always
at the elbow of the lay personnel man. But this is not the
case. The most important body of industrial relations
experts are the officers and business agents of the labor
unions and few of them are lawyers. Among the larger
corporate employers, it has been the practice for some
years to delegate special responsibility in employee
matters to a management group chosen for their practical
knowledge and skill in such matters, and without regard to
legal training or lack of it. More recently, consultants like
the defendant have tendered to the smaller employers the
same service that the larger employers get from their own
specialized staff.
"The handling of industrial relations is growing into a
recognized profession for which appropriate courses are
offered by our leading universities. The court should be
very cautious about declaring [that] a widespread, well-
established method of conducting business is unlawful, or
that the considerable class of men who customarily
perform a certain function have no right to do so, or that
the technical education given by our schools cannot be
used by the graduates in their business.
"In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should
consider his work for any particular client or customer, as
a whole. I can imagine defendant being engaged primarily
to advise as to the law defining his client’s obligations to
his employees, to guide his client along the path charted
by law. This, of course, would be the practice of the law.
But such is not the fact in the case before me. Defendant’s
primary efforts are along economic and psychological
lines. The law only provides the frame within which he must
work, just as the zoning code limits the kind of building the
architect may plan. The incidental legal advice or
information defendant may give, does not transform his
activities into the practice of law. Let me add that if, even
as a minor feature of his work, he performed services
which are customarily reserved to members of the bar, he
would be practicing law. For instance, if as part of a welfare
program, he drew employees’ wills.
"Another branch of defendant’s work is the representation
of the employer in the adjustment of grievances and in
collective bargaining, with or without a mediator. This is not
per se the practice of law. Anyone may use an agent for
negotiations and may select an agent particularly skilled in
the subject under discussion, and the person appointed is
free to accept the employment whether or not he is a
member of the bar. Here, however, there may be an
exception where the business turns on a question of law.
Most real estate sales are negotiated by brokers who are
not lawyers. But if the value of the land depends on a
disputed right-of-way and the principal role of the
negotiator is to assess the probable outcome of the dispute
and persuade the opposite party to the same opinion, then
it may be that only a lawyer can accept the assignment. Or
if a controversy between an employer and his men grows
from differing interpretations of a contract, or of a statute,
it is quite likely that defendant should not handle it. But I
need not reach a definite conclusion here, since the
situation is not presented by the proofs.
"Defendant also appears to represent the employer before
administrative agencies of the federal government,
especially before trial examiners of the National Labor
Relations Board. An agency of the federal government,
acting by virtue of an authority granted by the Congress,
may regulate the representation of parties before such
agency. The State of New Jersey is without power to
interfere with such determination or to forbid
representation before the agency by one whom the agency
admits. The rules of the National Labor Relations Board
give to a party the right to appear `in person, or by counsel,
or by other representative.’ Rules and Regulations,
September 11th, 1946, S. 203.31. `Counsel’ here means a
licensed attorney, and `other representative’ one not a
lawyer. In this phase of his work, defendant may lawfully
do whatever the Labor Board allows, even arguing
questions purely legal." (Auerbacher v. Wood, 53 A. 2d
800, cited in Statsky, Introduction to Paralegalism [1974],
at pp. 154-156.).
1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person
engaged in a lawful calling (which may involve knowledge
of the law) is not engaged in the practice of law provided
that:
(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a
major non-legal problem;
(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to
members of the bar;
(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or
information.
All these must be considered in relation to the work for any
particular client as a whole.
1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer,
the Code of Professional Responsibility succinctly states
the rule of conduct:
"Rule 15.08 — A lawyer who is engaged in another
profession or occupation concurrently with the practice of
law shall make clear to his client whether he is acting as a
lawyer or in another capacity."cralaw virtua1aw library
1.10. In the present case, the Legal Clinic appears to
render wedding services (See Annex "A", Petition).
Services on routine, straightforward marriages, like
securing a marriage license, and making arrangements
with a priest or a judge, may not constitute practice of law.
However, if the problem is as complicated as that
described in Rx for Legal Problems" on the Sharon
Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion-Richard Gomez case, then
what may be involved is actually the practice of law. If a
non-lawyer, such as the Legal Clinic, renders such
services, then it is engaged in the unauthorized practice of
law.
1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on
divorce, absence, annulment of marriage and visas (See
Annexes "A" and "B", Petition). Purely giving informational
materials may not constitute practice of law. The business
is similar to that of a bookstore where the customer buys
materials on the subject and determines by himself what
courses of action to take.
It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from
purely giving information, the Legal Clinic’s paralegals may
apply the law to the particular problem of the client, and
give legal advice. Such would constitute unauthorized
practice of law.
"It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text
which purports to say what the law is amounts to legal
practice. And the mere fact that the principles or rules
stated in the text may be accepted by a particular reader
as a solution to his problem does not affect this. . . .
Apparently it is urged that the conjoining of these two, that
is, the text and the forms, with advice as to how the forms
should be filled out, constitutes the unlawful practice of law.
But that is the situation with many approved and accepted
texts. Dacey’s book is sold to the public at large. There is
no personal contact or relationship with a particular
individual. Nor does there exist that relation of confidence
and trust so necessary to the status of attorney and client.
THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL PRACTICE — THE
REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING OF A PARTICULAR
PERSON IN A PARTICULAR SITUATION. At most the
book assumes to offer general advice on common
problems, and does not purport to give personal advice on
a specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily
identified person. Similarly the defendant’s publication
does not purport `to give personal advice on a specific
problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified
person in a particular situation — in the publication and
sale of the kits, such publication and sale did not constitute
the unlawful practice of law . . .. There being no legal
impediment under the statute to the sale of the kit, there
was no proper basis for the injunction against defendant
maintaining an office for the purpose of selling to persons
seeking a divorce, separation, annulment or separation
agreement any printed material or writings relating to
matrimonial law or the prohibition in the memorandum of
modification of the judgment against defendant having an
interest in any publishing house publishing his manuscript
on divorce and against his having any personal contact
with any prospective purchaser. The record does fully
support, however, the finding that for the charge of $75 or
$100 for the kit, the defendant gave legal advice in the
course of personal contacts concerning particular
problems which might arise in the preparation and
presentation of the purchaser’s asserted matrimonial
cause of action or pursuit of other legal remedies and
assistance in the preparation of necessary documents
(The injunction therefore sought to) enjoin conduct
constituting the practice of law, particularly with reference
to the giving of advice and counsel by the defendant
relating to specific problems of particular individuals in
connection with a divorce, separation, annulment of
separation agreement sought and should be affirmed."
(State v. Winder, 348, NYS 2d 270 [1973], cited in Statsky,
supra at p. 101.)
1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are
"strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory." It is not
controverted, however, that if the services "involve giving
legal advice or counselling," such would constitute practice
of law (Comment, par. 6.2). It is in this light that FIDA
submits that a factual inquiry may be necessary for the
judicious disposition of this case.
2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can
give the impression (or perpetuate the wrong notion) that
there is a secret marriage. With all the solemnities,
formalities and other requisites of marriages (See Articles
2, et seq., Family Code), no Philippine marriage can be
secret.
2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable.
The second paragraph thereof (which is not necessarily
related to the first paragraph) fails to state the limitation
that only "paralegal services" or "legal support services",
and not legal services, are available." 11
A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase
"practice of law" becomes exigent for a proper
determination of the issues raised by the petition at bar. On
this score, we note that the clause "practice of law" has
long been the subject of judicial construction and
interpretation. The courts have laid down general
principles and doctrines explaining the meaning and scope
of the term, some of which we now take into account.
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedures,
knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the
practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law
is to give advice or render any kind of service that involves
legal knowledge or skill. 12
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in
court. It includes legal advice and counsel, and the
preparation of legal instruments and contracts by which
legal rights are secured, although such matter may or may
not be pending in a court. 13
In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law
generally engages in three principal types of professional
activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform
them of their rights and obligations, preparation for clients
of documents requiring knowledge of legal principles not
possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance for clients
before public tribunals which possess power and authority
to determine rights of life, liberty, and property according
to law, inorder to assist in proper interpretation and
enforcement of law. 14
When a person participates in a trial and advertises himself
as a lawyer, he is in the practice of law. 15 One who
confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights
and then takes the business to an attorney and asks the
later to look after the case in court, is also practicing law.
16 Giving advice for compensation regarding the legal
status and rights of another and the conduct with respect
thereto constitutes a practice of law. 17 One who renders
an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute, and
receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law. 18
In the recent case of Cayetano v. Monsod, 19 after citing
the doctrines in several cases, we laid down the test to
determine whether certain acts constitute "practice of law,"
thus:
Black defines "practice of law" as:
"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the
application of legal principles and technique to serve the
interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to
appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the conduct
of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings,
and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal
instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to
clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions
taken for them in matters connected with the law."
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in
court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129
Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650). A person is also considered to
be in the practice of law when he:
". . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of
advising persons, firms, associations or corporations as to
their rights under the law, or appears in a representative
capacity as an advocate in proceedings, pending or
prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee,
board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law
or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such
representative capacity, performs any act or acts for the
purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients
under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
representative capacity, engages in the business of
advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so
engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside
of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law.
(State ex. rel. Mckittrick v. C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W.
2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)."
This Court, in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association
v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-177), stated:
"The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases
or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of
pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, the management of, such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts,
and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients,
and all action taken for them in matters connected with the
law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation
services contemplating an appearance before a judicial
body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a
creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings,
and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters
of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute
law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect
of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).
"Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no
small part of work performed outside of any court and
having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It
embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a
large variety of subjects, and the preparation and
execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field
of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although
these transactions may have no direct connection with
court proceedings, they are always subject to become
involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high
degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and
affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and
complex situations. These customary functions of an
attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the
administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction,
so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can
be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which
involves appearance in court and that part which involves
advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of
importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold
customary functions be performed by persons possessed
of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character,
and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to
clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments
on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665-666, citing
In Re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted
in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.]
179 A. 139, 144)."
The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of
activities in and out of court. Applying the aforementioned
criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the perceptive
findings and observations of the aforestated bar
associations that the activities of respondent, as
advertised, constitute "practice of law."
The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal
support services can neither be seriously considered nor
sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent’s own
description of the services it has been offering, to wit:
"Legal support services basically consist of giving ready
information by trained paralegals to laymen and lawyers,
which are strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory, through
the extensive use of computers and modern information
technology in the gathering, processing, storage,
transmission and reproduction of information and
communication, such as computerized legal research;
encoding and reproduction of documents and pleadings
prepared by laymen or lawyers; document search;
evidence gathering; locating parties or witnesses to a case;
fact finding investigations; and assistance to laymen in
need of basic institutional services from government or
non-government agencies, like birth, marriage, property, or
business registrations; educational or employment records
or certifications, obtaining documentation like clearances,
passports, local or foreign visas; giving information about
laws of other countries that they may find useful, like
foreign divorce, marriage or adoption laws that they can
avail of preparatory to emigration to that foreign country,
and other matters that do not involve representation of
clients in court; designing and installing computer systems,
programs, or software for the efficient management of law
offices, corporate legal departments, courts, and other
entities engaged in dispensing or administering legal
services." 20
While some of the services being offered by respondent
corporation merely involve mechanical and technical
know-how, such as the installation of computer systems
and programs for the efficient management of law offices,
or the computerization of research aids and materials,
these will not suffice to justify an exception to the general
rule.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives
out legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its contention
that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is
more apparent than real. In providing information, for
example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and
adoption, it strains the credulity of this Court that all that
respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law,
furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it
were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so called
paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client
the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the
proper course of action to be taken as may be provided for
by said law. That is what its advertisements represent and
for which services it will consequently charge and be paid.
That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential
definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be
altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not
represent clients in court since law practice, as the weight
of authority holds, is not limited merely to court
appearances but extends to legal research, giving legal
advice, contract drafting, and so forth.
The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an
article published in the January 13, 1991 issue of the
Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippine Star,
entitled "Rx for Legal Problems," where an insight into the
structure, main purpose and operations of respondent
corporation was given by its own "proprietor," Atty. Rogelio
P. Nogales:
This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at
The Legal Clinic, with offices on the seventh floor of the
Victoria Building along U.N. Avenue in Manila. No matter
what the client’s problem, and even if it is as complicated
as the Cuneta-Concepcion domestic situation, Atty.
Nogales and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors, are
"specialists" in various fields, can take care of it. The Legal
Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and criminal law,
medico-legal problems, labor, litigation and family law.
These specialists are backed up by a battery of paralegals,
counsellors and attorneys.
Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by
the trend in the medical field toward specialization, it caters
to clients who cannot afford the services of the big law
firms.
The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "When
they come, we start by analyzing the problem. That’s what
doctors do also. They ask you how you contracted what’s
bothering you, they take your temperature, they observe
you for the symptoms, and so on. That’s how we operate,
too. And once the problem has been categorized, then it’s
referred to one of our specialists."
There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require
surgery or follow-up treatment. These The Legal Clinic
disposes of in a matter of minutes. "Things like preparing
a simple deed of sale or an affidavit of loss can be taken
care of by our staff or, if this were a hospital, the residents
or the interns. We can take care of these matters on a while
you wait basis. Again, kung baga sa ospital, out-patient,
hindi kailangang ma-confine. It’s just like a common cold
or diarrhea," explains Atty. Nogales.
Those cases which require more extensive "treatment" are
dealt with accordingly. "If you had a rich realtive who died
and named you her sole heir, and you stand to inherit
millions of pesos of property, we would refer you to a
specialist in taxation. There would be real estate taxes and
arrears which would need to be put in order, and your
relative is even taxed by the state for the right to transfer
her property, and only a specialist in taxation would be
properly trained to deal with that problem. Now, if there
were other heirs contesting your rich relative’s will, then
you would need a litigator, who knows how to arrange the
problem for presentation in court, and gather evidence to
support the case." 21
That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry
out its services is not controlling. What is important is that
it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature
of the services it renders which thereby brings it within the
ambit of the statutory prohibitions against the
advertisements which it has caused to be published and
are now assailed in this proceeding.chanrobles.com :
Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the
U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts sufficiently establish that
the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-
shop of sorts for various legal problems wherein a client
may avail of legal services from simple documentation to
complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of
these services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of
paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers
engaged in the practice of law. 22
It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being
offered by private respondent which constitute practice of
law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly
admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as
such in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of
Court, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled
to practice law. 23
Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to
those individuals found duly qualified in education and
character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is
an individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if
he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and
professional conduct. The purpose is to protect the public,
the court, the client and the bar from the incompetence or
dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not
subject to the disciplinary control of the court. 24
The same rule is observed in the American jurisdiction
where from respondent would wish to draw support for his
thesis. The doctrines there also stress that the practice of
law is limited to those who meet the requirements for, and
have been admitted to, the bar, and various statutes or
rules specifically so provide. 25 The practice of law is not
a lawful business except for members of the bar who have
complied with all the conditions required by statute and the
rules of court. Only those persons are allowed to practice
law who, by reason of attainments previously acquired
through education and study, have been recognized by the
courts as possessing profound knowledge of legal science
entitling them to advise, counsel with, protect, or defend
the rights, claims, or liabilities of their clients, with respect
to the construction, interpretation, operation and effect of
law. 26 The justification for excluding from the practice of
law those not admitted to the bar is found, not in the
protection of the bar from competition, but in the protection
of the public from being advised and represented in legal
matters by incompetent and unreliable persons over whom
the judicial department can exercise little control. 27
We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent’s
position that the concept in the United States of paralegals
as an occupation separate from the law profession be
adopted in this jurisdiction. Whatever may be its merits,
respondent cannot but be aware that this should first be a
matter for judicial rules or legislative action, and not of
unilateral adoption as it has done.
Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals.
As admitted by respondent, there are schools and
universities there which offer studies and degrees in
paralegal education, while there are none in the
Philippines. 28 As the concept of the "paralegal" or "legal
assistant" evolved in the United States, standards and
guidelines also evolved to protect the general public. One
of the major standards, or guidelines was developed by the
American Bar Association which set up Guidelines for the
Approval of Legal Assistant Education Programs (1973).
Legislation has even been proposed to certify legal
assistants. There are also associations of paralegals in the
United States with their own code of professional ethics,
such as the National Association of Legal Assistants, Inc.
and the American Paralegal Association. 29
In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and
limited acceptance of what may be considered, as
paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons
not duly licensed to practice law are or have been allowed
limited representation in behalf of another or to render legal
services, but such allowable services are limited in scope
and extent by the law, rules or regulations granting
permission therefor. 30
Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy
that, in the absence of constitutional or statutory authority,
a person who has not been admitted as an attorney cannot
practice law for the proper administration of justice cannot
be hindered by the unwarranted intrusion of an
unauthorized and unskilled person into the practice of law.
31 That policy should continue to be one of encouraging
persons who are unsure of their legal rights and remedies
to seek legal assistance only from persons licensed to
practice law in the state. 32
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned
advertisements, the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services
shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective
information or statement of facts. 33 He is not supposed to
use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading,
deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or
claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. 34 Nor
shall he pay or give something of value to representatives
of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for,
publicity to attract legal business. 35 Prior to the adoption
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of
Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should
not resort to indirect advertisements for professional
employment, such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper
comments, or procuring his photograph to be published in
connection with causes in which the lawyer has been or is
engaged or concerning the manner of their conduct, the
magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the
lawyer’s position, and all other like self-laudation. 36
The standards of the legal profession condemn the
lawyer’s advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot,
without violating the ethics of his profession, advertise his
talents or skills as in a manner similar to a merchant
advertising his goods. 37 The proscription against
advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business
rests on the fundamental postulate that the practice of law
is a profession. Thus, in the case of The Director of
Religious Affairs v. Estanislao R. Bavot 38 an
advertisement, similar to those of respondent which are
involved in the present proceeding, 39 was held to
constitute improper advertising or solicitation.
The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:
It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a
flagrant violation by the respondent of the ethics of his
profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from
the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides
among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at
law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly
unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as
a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and
not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his
profession who stoops to and adopts the practices of
mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to
the public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the temple
of justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers
of old defiled the temple of Jehovah. The most worthy and
effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer,
. . . is the establishment of a well-merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be
forced but must be the outcome of character and conduct."
(Canon 27, Code of Ethics.)
We repeat, the canons of the profession tell us that the
best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited
reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust,
which must be earned as the outcome of character and
conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to
the community has a way of publicizing itself and catching
public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of
effective service which is right and proper. A good and
reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it
and to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference
between a normal by-product of able service and the
unwholesome result of propaganda. 40
Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are
prohibited. The canons of the profession enumerate
exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation and
define the extent to which they may be undertaken. The
exceptions are of two broad categories, namely, those
which are expressly allowed and those which are
necessarily implied from the restrictions. 41
The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable
law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of
conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and
informative data. "Such data must not be misleading and
may include only a statement of the lawyer’s name and the
names of his professional associates; addresses,
telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law
practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar;
schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and
other educational distinction; public or quasi-public offices;
posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions;
membership and offices in bar associations and
committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and
legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law
lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with
their written consent, the names of clients regularly
represented." 42
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily
for that purpose; it cannot be a mere supplemental feature
of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is
published principally for other purposes. For that reason, a
lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and
informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal
or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to
be published in a law list the conduct, management or
contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or
injure the public or the bar, or to lower the dignity or
standing of the profession. 43
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also
permitted. The card may contain only a statement of his
name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with,
address, telephone number and special branch of law
practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the
opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership,
associates, firm name or office address, being for the
convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He
may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory
but not under a designation of special branch of law. 44
Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of
the advertisements for which respondent is being taken to
task, which even includes a quotation of the fees charged
by said respondent corporation for services rendered, we
find and so hold that the time definitely do not and
conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned
exceptions.
The ruling in the case of Bates, Et. Al. v. State Bar of
Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly invoked and constitutes
the justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not
applicable to the case at bar. Foremost is the fact that the
disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows a
lawyer, as an exception to the prohibition against
advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal
fees for an initial consultation or the availability upon
request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of the
fee to be charged for the specific services. No such
exception is provided for, expressly or impliedly, whether
in our former Canons of Professional Ethics or the present
Code of Professional Responsibility. Besides, even the
disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a proviso that
the exceptions stated therein are "not applicable in any
state unless and until it is implemented by such authority
in that state." 46 This goes to show that an exception to the
general rule, such as that being invoked by herein
respondent, can be made only if and when the canons
expressly provide for such an exception. Otherwise, the
prohibition stands, as in the case at bar.
It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the
American Bar Association after the decision in Bates, on
the attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing
television commercials, it was found that public opinion
dropped significantly 47 with respect to these
characteristics of lawyers:
Trustworthy from 71% to 14%
Professional from 71% to 14% action, 50 after due ascertainment of the factual
background and basis for the grant of respondent’s
Honest from 65% to 14% corporate charter, in light of the putative misuse thereof.
That spin-off from the instant bar matter is referred to the
Dignified from 45% to 14% Solicitor General for such action as may be necessary
under the circumstances.
Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation
of our legal and judicial systems, to allow the publication of ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and
advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only ENJOIN herein respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., from
serve to aggravate what is already a deteriorating public issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any
opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has advertisement in any form which is of the same or similar
consistently been under attack lately by media and the tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition,
community in general. At this point in time, it is of utmost and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity,
importance in the face of such negative, even if unfair, operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code of
criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that level of Professional Ethics as indicated herein. Let copies of this
professional conduct which is beyond reproach, and to resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
exert all efforts to regain the high esteem formerly Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office
accorded to the legal profession. of the Solicitor General for appropriate action in
accordance herewith.
In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the
lawyer, subject to disciplinary action, to advertise his
services except in allowable instances 48 or to aid a
layman in the unauthorized practice of law. 49 Considering
that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the prime
incorporator, major stockholder and proprietor of The
Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of the Philippine Bar, he is
hereby reprimanded, with a warning that a repetition of the
same or similar acts which are involved in this proceeding
will be dealt with more severely.

While we deem it necessary that the question as to the

legality or illegality of the purpose/s for which the Legal
Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed upon and
determined, we are constrained to refrain from lapsing into
an obiter on that aspect since it is clearly not within the
adjudicative parameters of the present proceeding which
is merely administrative in nature. It is, of course,
imperative that this matter be promptly determined, albeit
in a different proceeding and forum, since, under the
present state of our law and jurisprudence, a corporation
cannot be organized for or engage in the practice of law in
this country. This interdiction, just like the rule against
unethical advertising, cannot be subverted by employing
some so-called paralegals supposedly rendering the
alleged support services.

The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by

respondent is the concern and province of the Solicitor
General who can institute the corresponding quo warranto
 A.C. No. 2519 August 29, 2000
TEODORO R RIVERA, ANTONIO D. AQUINO and
FELIXBERTO D. AQUINO, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. SERGIO ANGELES, respondent.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On March 25, 1983, complainants filed a Complaint for
Disbarment against Atty. Sergio Angeles on the grounds of
Deceit and Malpractice. The Affidavit-Complaint1 reads as
follows:
"1. The undersigned are plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos. Q-
12841 and Q-13128 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch V at Quezon City;
2. Atty. Sergio Angeles is their counsel of record in the said
cases and his office is located at Suite 335, URC Building,
2123 España, Manila;
3. That after receiving favorable decision from the CFI on
May 21, 1973 and sustained by the Court of Appeals and
the Supreme Court an alias writ of execution was issued in
said cases;
4. That in the first week of January 1983 we obtained from
the CFI a sheriff's return, dated November 10, 1982,
stating that no leviable property can be found in the
premises of the defendants;
5. That on or before January 13, 1983, we learned that Mr.
Rodolfo M. Silva, one of the defendants in said cases had
already given Atty. Angeles a partial settlement of the
judgment in the amount of P42,999.00 (as evidenced by
xerox copies of Partial Settlement of Judgment dated
September 21, 1982 and Receipt of Payment dated
September 22, 1982, hereto attached as Annexes "A" and
"B", respectively), without our knowledge.
6. That Atty. Sergio Angeles never informed the
undersigned of the amount of P42,999.00 he received from
Mr. Silva nor remitted to them even a part of that amount;
7. That a demand letter was sent to Atty. Sergio Angeles
which was received by him on February 17, 1983, but as
of this date the undersigned have not yet received any
reply. (See Exhibit "C" and "D" attached)."
In his Comment filed on June 21, 1983, respondent denied
the accusations and stated that he has the right to retain
the said amount of P42,999.00 and to apply the same to
professional fees due him under the subsequent
agreement first with complainant Teodoro Rivera and later
with Mrs. Dely Dimson Rivera as embodied in the Deed of
Assignment (Annex "8")2 or under the previous agreement
of P20% of P206,000.00.
Complainants, in their Reply,3 vehemently denied the
assignment of their rights to respondent.
Thereafter, this case was referred to the Solicitor General
for investigation, report and recommendation in our
Resolution dated November 21, 1983. The Office of the
Solicitor General considered this case submitted for
resolution on April 30, 1985 by declaring respondent's right
to present evidence as considered waived due to the
latter's failure to appear on the scheduled hearings.
However, the records from said Office do not show any
resolution.
In October 1998, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
issued an Order requiring the parties to manifest whether
or not they are still interested in prosecuting this case, or
whether supervening events have transpired which render
this case moot and academic or otherwise. The copy of
said Order sent to the complainants was received by their
counsel on October 30, 1998 while the copy to the
respondent was returned unclaimed.
Investigating Commissioner Julio C. Elamparo submitted
his report on April 29, 1999 finding respondent Atty. Sergio
Angeles guilty of violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility specifically Rule 1.01, Canon 16 and Rule
16.01 thereof and recommends his indefinite suspension
from the practice of law.
The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines on June 19, 1999, issued a resolution, the
decretal portion of which reads:
"RESOLUTION NO. XIII-99-151
Adm. Case No. 2519
Teodoro R Rivera, et al. vs.
Atty. Sergio Angeles
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record
and the applicable laws and rules, with an amendment that
Atty. Sergio Angeles is SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for ONE (1) YEAR for his having been found guilty of
practicing deceit in dealing with his client."
The Court finds merit in the recommendation of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Respondent's act of
deceit and malpractice indubitably demonstrated his failure
to live up to his sworn duties as a lawyer. The Supreme
Court repeatedly stressed the importance of integrity and
good moral character as part of a lawyer's equipment in
the practice of his profession.4 For it cannot be denied that
the respect of litigants for the profession is inexorably
diminished whenever a member of the Bar betrays their
trust and confidence.5 1âwphi1
The Court is not oblivious of the right of a lawyer to be paid
for the legal services he has extended to his client but such
right should not be exercised whimsically by appropriating
to himself the money intended for his clients. There should
never be an instance where the victor in litigation loses
everything he won to the fees of his own lawyer.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Sergio Angeles, is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR
for having been found guilty of practicing deceit in dealing
with his client.
This Resolution shall take effect immediately and copies
thereof furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant,
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and appended to
respondent's personal record.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 3910 June 28, 2001
JOSE S. DUCAT, JR., complainant,
vs.
ATTYS. ARSENIO C. VILLALON, JR. and CRISPULO
DUCUSIN, respondents.
RESOLUTION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
On August 14, 2000, a Decision was rendered by this
Court in the above-entitled case, finding respondent Atty.
Arsenio C. Villalon, Jr. guilty of gross misconduct. The
dispositive portion of the Court's Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. ARSENIO C.
VILLALON, JR. is hereby found guilty of gross misconduct,
and he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of ONE (1) YEAR with a warning that a repetition of
the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
Respondent Villalon is further directed to deliver to the
registered owner, complainant Jose Ducat Jr., the latter's
TCT No. M-3023 covering the subject property within a
period of sixty (60) days from receipt of this Decision, at his
sole expense; and that failure on his part to do so will result
in his disbarment.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Villalon's
personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and
copies thereof be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
From the afore-quoted Decision respondent Atty. Arsenio
C. Villalon, Jr. seeks this reconsideration.
The finding of guilt for gross misconduct was based on the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines upon
whom the case was referred for investigation. We again
quote the said findings for emphasis:
Complainant and his witness, Jose Ducat, Sr., testified in
a straightforward, spontaneous and candid manner. The
sincerity and demeanor they displayed while testifying
before the Commission inspire belief as to the truth of what
they are saying. More importantly, respondent failed to
impute any ill motive on the part of the complainant and his
witness which can impel them to institute the instant
complaint and testify falsely against him. To be sure, the
testimony of the complainant and his witness deserves the
Commission's full faith and credence.
Respondent's evidence, on the other hand, leaves much
to be desired. His defense (that he considered himself the
owner of the subject property which was allegedly given to
him by Jose Ducat, Sr.) rings hollow in the face of a welter
of contravening and incontrovertible facts.
FIRST, the registered owner of the subject property is
complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. Accordingly, respondent
(being a lawyer) knew or ought to know that Jose Ducat,
Sr. could not possibly give to him the said property unless
the former is duly authorized by the complainant through a
Special Power of Attorney. No such authorization has been
given. Moreover, Jose Ducat, Sr. has vigorously denied
having given the subject property to the respondent. This
denial is not too difficult to believe considering the fact that
he (Jose Ducat, Sr.) is not the owner of said property.
SECOND, being a lawyer, respondent knew or ought to
know that conveyance of a real property, whether
gratuitously or for a consideration, must be in writing.
Accordingly, it is unbelievable that he would consider
himself the owner of the subject property on the basis of
the verbal or oral "giving" of the property by Jose Ducat,
Sr. no matter how many times the latter may have said
that.
THIRD, the Deed of Sale of Parcel of Land (Exh. "1" for the
respondent and Exh. "A-2" for the complainant) allegedly
executed by Jose Ducat, Sr. in favor of respondent Atty.
Arsenio Villalon and/or Andres Canares, Jr. covering the
subject parcel of land which respondent prepared allegedly
upon instruction of Jose Ducat, Sr. is of dubious character.
As earlier adverted to, Jose Ducat, Sr. is not the owner of
said property. Moreover, said Deed of Sale of Parcel of
Land is a falsified document as admitted by the respondent
himself when he said that the signature over the
typewritten name Maria Cabrido (wife of Jose Ducat, Sr.)
was affixed by Jose Ducat, Sr. Being a lawyer, respondent
knew or ought to know that the act of Jose Ducat, Sr. in
affixing his wife's signature is tantamount to a forgery.
Accordingly, he should have treated the said Deed of Sale
of Parcel of Land has (sic) a mere scrap of worthless paper
instead of relying on the same to substantiate his claim that
the subject property was given to him by Jose Ducat, Sr.
Again, of note is the fact that Jose Ducat, Sr. has
vigorously denied having executed said document which
denial is not too difficult to believe in the light of the
circumstances already mentioned.
FOURTH, the Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property
(Exh. "2" for the respondent and Exh. "A-3" for the
complainant) allegedly executed by Jose Ducat, Jr. in favor
of Andres Canares, Jr. over the subject property (which
respondent claims he prepared upon instruction of Jose
Ducat, Sr.) is likewise of questionable character.
Complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. has vigorously denied having
executed said document. He claims that he has never sold
said property to Andres Canares, Jr. whom he does not
know; that he has never appeared before Atty. Crispulo
Ducusin to subscribe to the document; and that he has
never received the amount of P450,000.00 representing
the consideration of said transaction. More importantly, the
infirmity of the said Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property
was supplied by the respondent no less when he admitted
that there was no payment of P450,000.00 and that the
same was placed in the document only to make it appear
that the conveyance was for a consideration. Accordingly,
and being a lawyer, respondent knew or ought to know the
irregularity of his act and that he should have treated the
document as another scrap of worthless paper instead of
utilizing the same to substantiate his defense.1
We remain convinced that respondent was remiss in his
duty to abide by his sworn oath as a member of the bar to
"do no falsehood nor consent to its commission"2 and
further violated the mandate of his profession to "uphold
the integrity and dignity of the legal profession."3
In the instant case, after a review of the records, we note
that this is the first and only administrative complaint
against respondent Atty. Villalon in his long career as a
member of the bar. At one time, he was even the President
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)-Manila 1
Chapter, and as such he introduced various programs to
uphold the confidence of the public in the integrity of the
legal profession and to uplift the welfare of his brethren.
Furthermore, it appears that as of July 8, 1997, respondent
Atty. Villalon already returned to the complainant himself
the owner's duplicate of the subject TCT No. M-3023 and
the complainant acknowledged receipt4 thereof, thus there
is a need to delete the directive to deliver the said TCT
from the Court's Decision. Hence, we agree to reduce the
penalty imposed on respondent Atty. Villalon.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration, and MODIFIES the Decision dated
August 14, 2000 in that respondent Atty. Arsenio C.
Villalon, Jr. is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS only with a warning
that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with
more severely. The directive in the Decision to deliver TCT
No. M-3023 to complainant Jose Ducat, Jr. is DELETED,
the delivery thereof having been accomplished as of July
8, 1997.
HERNANDEZ. GREGORIO R. CASTILLO. ALBERTO P.
Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in the personal
record of respondent as an attorney and as a member of
the Integrated Bar, and furnished the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. X92-1. July 30, 1979.]
PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF
THE FIRM NAME "SYCIP, SALAZAR, FELICIANO,
HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO." LUCIANO E. SALAZAR,
FLORENTINO P, FELICIANO, BENILDO G.
SAN JUAN, JUAN C. REYES, JR., ANDRES G.
GATMAITAN, JUSTINO H. CACANINDIN, NOEL A.
LAMAN, ETHELWOLDO E. FERNANDEZ, ANGELITO
C. IMPERIO, EDUARDO R. CENIZA, TRISTAN A.
CATINDIG, ANCHETA K. TAN, and ALICE V.
PESIGAN, petitioners.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR AUTHORITY

TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME "OZAETA,
ROMULO, DE LEON, MABANTA & REYES." RICARDO
J. ROMULO, BENJAMIN M. DE LEON, ROMAN
MABANTA, JR., JOSE MA. REYES, JESUS S. J.
SAYOC, EDUARDO DE LOS ANGELES, and JOSE F.
BUENAVENTURA, petitioners.
RESOLUTION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Two separate Petitions were filed before this Court 1) by
the surviving partners of Atty. Alexander Sycip, who died
on May 5, 1975, and 2) by the surviving partners of Atty.
Herminio Ozaeta, who died on February 14, 1976, praying
that they be allowed to continue using, in the names of their
firms, the names of partners who had passed away. In the
Court’s Resolution of September 2, 1976, both Petitions
were ordered consolidated.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law
library

Petitioners base their petitions on the following

arguments:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. Under the law, a partnership is not prohibited from

continuing its business under a firm name which includes
the name of a deceased partner; in fact, Article 1840 of the
Civil Code explicitly sanctions the practice when it provides
in the last paragraph that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The use by the person or partnership continuing the

business of the partnership name, or the name of a
deceased partner as part thereof, shall not of itself make
the individual property of the deceased partner liable for
any debts contracted by such person or partnership." 1
2. In regulating other professions, such as accountancy
and engineering, the legislature has authorized the
adoption of firm names without any restriction as to the
use, in such firm name, of the name of a deceased partner;
2 the legislative authorization given to those engaged in
the practice of accountancy — a profession requiring the
same degree of trust and confidence in respect of clients
as that implicit in the relationship of attorney and client —
to acquire and use a trade name, strongly indicates that
there is no fundamental policy that is offended by the
continued use by a firm of professionals of a firm name
which includes the name of a deceased partner, at least
where such firm name has acquired the characteristics of
a "trade name." 3 curiae. Before acting thereon, the Court, in a Resolution of
3. The Canons of Professional Ethics are not transgressed
by the continued use of the name of a deceased partner in
the firm name of a law partnership because Canon 33 of
the Canons of Professional Ethics adopted by the
American Bar Association declares
that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . The continued use of the name of a deceased or
former partner when permissible by local custom, is not
unethical, but care should be taken that no imposition or
deception is practiced through this use. . . ." 4
4. There is no possibility of imposition or deception
because the deaths of their respective deceased partners
were well-publicized in all newspapers of general
circulation for several days; the stationeries now being
used by them carry new letterheads indicating the years
when their respective deceased partners were connected
with the firm; petitioners will notify all leading national and
international law directories of the fact of their respective
deceased partners’ deaths.
5. No local custom prohibits the continued use of a
deceased partner’s name in a professional firm’s name; 6
there is no custom or usage in the Philippines, or at least
in the Greater Manila Area, which recognizes that the
name of a law firm necessarily identifies the individual
members of the firm. 7 thus
6. The continued use of a deceased partner’s name in the
firm name of law partnerships has been consistently
allowed by U.S. Courts and is an accepted practice in the
legal profession of most countries in the world. 8
The question involved in these Petitions first came under
consideration by this Court in 1953 when a law firm in Cebu
(the Dean case) continued its practice of including in its
firm name that of a deceased partner, C.D. Johnston. The
matter was resolved with this Court advising the firm to
desist from including in their firm designation the name of
C. D. Johnston, "who has long been dead."cralaw
virtua1aw library
The same issue was raised before this Court in 1958 as an
incident in G. R. No. L-11964, entitled Register of Deeds
of Manila v. China Banking Corporation. The law firm of
Perkins & Ponce Enrile moved to intervene as amicus
April 15, 1957, stated that it "would like to be informed why
the name of Perkins is still being used although Atty. E. A.
Perkins is already dead." In a Manifestation dated May 21,
1957, the law firm of Perkins and Ponce Enrile, raising
substantially the same arguments as those now being
raised by petitioners, prayed that the continued use of the
firm name "Perkins & Ponce Enrile" be held proper.
On June 16, 1958, this Court
resolved:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"After carefully considering the reasons given by Attorneys
Alfonso Ponce Enrile and Associates for their continued
use of the name of the deceased E. G. Perkins, the Court
found no reason to depart from the policy it adopted in
June 1953 when it required Attorneys Alfred P. Deen and
Eddy A. Deen of Cebu City to desist from including in their
firm designation, the name of C. D. Johnston, deceased.
The Court believes that, in view of the personal and
confidential nature of the relations between attorney and
client and the high standards demanded in the canons of
5 professional ethics, no practice should be allowed which
even in a remote degree could give rise to the possibility of
deception. Said attorneys are accordingly advised to drop
the name "PERKINS" from their firm name."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Petitioners herein now seek a re-examination of the policy
far enunciated by the Court.
The Court finds no sufficient reason to depart from the
rulings thus laid down.

A. Inasmuch as "Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and
Castillo" and "Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta and
Reyes" are partnerships, the use in their partnership
names of the names of deceased partners will run counter
to Article 1815 of the Civil Code which
provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Art. 1815. Every partnership shall operate under a firm
name, which may or may not include the name of one or
more of the partners.
"Those who, not being members of the partnership include
their names in the firm name, shall be subject to the liability
of a partner."cralaw virtua1aw library
It is clearly tacit in the above provision that names in a firm
name of a partnership must either be those of living
partners and, in the case of non-partners, should be living
persons who can be subjected to liability. In fact, Article
1825 of the Civil Code prohibits a third person from
including his name in the firm name under pain of
assuming the liability of a partner. The heirs of a deceased
partner in a law firm cannot be held liable as the old
members to the creditors of a firm particularly where they
are non-lawyers. Thus, Canon 34 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics "prohibits all agreement for the
payment to the widow and heirs of a deceased lawyer of a
percentage, either gross or net, of the fees received from
the future business of the deceased lawyer’s clients, both
because the recipients of such division are not lawyers and
because such payments will not represent service or
responsibility on the part of the recipient." Accordingly,
neither the widow nor the heirs can be held liable for
transactions entered into after the death of their lawyer-
predecessor. There being no benefits accruing, there can
be no corresponding liability.chanrobles law library : red
Prescinding the law, there could be practical objections to
allowing the use by law firms of the names of deceased
partners. The public relations value of the use of an old firm
name can tend to create undue advantages and
disadvantages in the practice of the profession. An able
lawyer without connections will have to make a name for
himself starting from scratch. Another able lawyer, who can
join an old firm, can initially ride on that old firm’s reputation
established by deceased partners.
B. In regards to the last paragraph of Article 1840 of the
Civil Code cited by petitioners, supra, the first factor to
consider is that it is within Chapter 3 of Title IX of the Code
entitled "Dissolution and Winding Up." The Article primarily
deals with the exemption from liability in cases of a
dissolved partnership, of the individual property of the
deceased partner for debts contracted by the person or
partnership which continues the business using the
partnership name or the name of the deceased partner as
part thereof. What the law contemplates therein is a hold-
over situation preparatory to formal reorganization.
Secondly, Article 1840 treats more of a commercial
partnership with a good will to protect rather than of a
professional partnership, with no saleable good will but
whose reputation depends on the personal qualifications
of its individual members. Thus, it has been held that a
saleable goodwill can exist only in a commercial
partnership and cannot arise in a professional partnership
consisting of lawyers. 9
"As a general rule, upon the dissolution of a commercial
partnership the succeeding partners or parties have the
right to carry on the business under the old name, in the
absence of a stipulation forbidding it, (s)ince the name of a
commercial partnership is a partnership asset inseparable
from the good will of the firm . . .." (60 Am Jur 2d, s 204, p.
115) (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand,
". . . a professional partnership the reputation of which
depends on the individual skill of the members, such as
partnerships of attorneys or physicians, has no good will to
be distributed us a firm asset on its dissolution, however
intrinsically valuable such skill and reputation may be,
especially where there is no provision in the partnership
agreement relating to good will as an asset. . . ." (ibid, s
203, p. 115) (Emphasis supplied).
C. A partnership for the practice of law cannot be likened
to partnerships formed by other professionals or for
business. For one thing, the law on accountancy
specifically allows the use of a trade name in connection
with the practice of accountancy. 10
"A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It
is a mere relationship or association for a particular
purpose. . . . It is not a partnership formed for the purpose
of carrying on trade or business or of holding property." 11
Thus, it has been stated that "the use of a nom de plume,
assumed or trade name in law practice is improper." 12
"The usual reason given for different standards of conduct
being applicable to the practice of law from those
pertaining to business is that the law is a ‘profession.’ . . .
"Dean Pound, in his recently published contribution to the
Survey of the Legal Profession, (The Lawyer from Antiquity
to Modern Times, p. 5) defines a profession as ‘a group of
men pursuing a learned art as a common calling in the
spirit of public service, — no less a public service because
it may incidentally be a means of livelihood.’
x x x
"Primary characteristics which distinguish the legal
profession from business are:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-
product, and in which one may attain the highest eminence
without making much money.
2. A relation as an ‘officer of court’ to the administration of
justice involving thorough sincerity, integrity, and reliability.
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree fiduciary.
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by
candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current
business methods of advertising and encroachment on
their practice, or dealing directly with their clients." 13
"The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional
right but is in the nature of a privilege or franchise. 14 It is
limited to persons of good moral character with special
qualifications duly ascertained and certified. 15 The right
does not only presuppose in its possessor integrity, legal
standing and attainment, but also the exercise of a special
privilege, highly personal and partaking of the nature of a
public trust." 16
D. Petitioners cited Canon 33 of the Canons of
Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association 17 in
support of their petitions.
It is true that Canon 33 does not consider as unethical the
continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner
in the firm name of a law partnership when such a practice
is permissible by local custom but the Canon warns that
care should be taken that no imposition or deception is
practiced through this use.
It must be conceded that in the Philippines, no local custom
permits or allows the continued use of a deceased or
former partner’s name in the firm names of law
partnerships. Firm names, under our custom, identify the
more active and/or more senior members or partners of the
law firm. A glimpse at the history of the firms of petitioners
and of other law firms in this country would show how their
firm names have evolved and changed from time to time
as the composition of the partnership changed.
"The continued use of a firm name after the death of one
or more of the partners designated by it is proper only
where sustained by local custom and not where by custom
this purports to identify the active members. . . .
"There would seem to be a question, under the working of
the Canon, as to the propriety of adding the name of a new
partner and at the same time retaining that of a deceased
partner who was never a partner with the new one." (H.S.
Drinker, op. cit., supra, at pp. 207-208) (Emphasis
supplied)
The possibility of deception upon the public, real or
consequential, where the name of a deceased partner
continues to be used cannot be ruled out. A person in
search of legal counsel might be guided by the familiar ring
of a distinguished name appearing in a firm title.
E. Petitioners argue that U.S. Courts have consistently
avowed the continued use of a deceased partner’s name
in the firm name of law partnerships. But that is so because
it is sanctioned by custom.
In the case of Mendelsohn v. Equitable Life Assurance
Society (33 N.Y.S. 2d 733) which petitioners Salazar, Et.
Al. quoted in their memorandum, the New York Supreme
Court sustained the use of the firm name Alexander &
Green even if none of the present ten partners of the firm
bears either name because the practice was sanctioned by
custom and did not offend any statutory provision or
legislative policy and was adopted by agreement of the
parties The Court stated therein:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The practice sought to be proscribed has the sanction of
custom and offends no statutory provision or legislative
policy. Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of
both the American Bar Association and the New York State
Bar Association provides in part as follows: ‘The continued
use of the name of a deceased or former partner, when
permissible by local custom is not unethical, but care
should be taken that no imposition or deception is
practiced through this use.’ There is no question as to local
custom. Many firms in the city use the names of deceased
members with the approval of other attorneys, bar
associations and the courts. The Appellate Division of the
First Department has considered the matter and reached
the conclusion that such practice should not be prohibited.
(Emphasis supplied)
x x x
"Neither the Partnership Law nor the Penal Law prohibits
the practice in question. The use of the firm name herein
is also sustainable by reason of agreement between the
partners." 18
Not so in this jurisdiction where there is no local custom
that sanctions the practice. Custom has been defined as a
rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly
observed (practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and
obligatory. 19 Courts take no judicial notice of custom. A
custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of
evidence. 20 A local custom as a source of right cannot be
considered by a court of justice unless such custom is
properly established by competent evidence like any other
fact. 21 We find such proof of the existence of a local
custom. and of the elements requisite to constitute the
same, wanting herein. Merely because something is done
as a matter of practice does not mean that Courts can rely
on the same for purposes of adjudication as a juridical
custom. Juridical custom must be differentiated from social
custom. The former can supplement statutory law or be
applied in the absence of such statute. Not so with the
latter.
Moreover, judicial decisions applying or interpreting the
laws form part of the legal system. 22 When the Supreme
Court in the Deen and Perkins cases issued its Resolutions
directing lawyers to desist from including the names of
deceased partners in their firm designation, it laid down a
legal rule against which no custom or practice to the
contrary, even if proven, can prevail. This is not to speak
of our civil law which clearly ordains that a partnership is
dissolved by the death of any partner. 23 Customs which
are contrary to law, public order or public policy shall not
be countenanced. 24
The practice of law is intimately and peculiarly related to
the administration of justice and should not be considered
like an ordinary "money-making trade."cralaw virtua1aw
library
". . . It is of the essence of a profession that it is practiced
in a spirit of public service.’A trade’ . . .’aims primarily at
personal gain; a profession at the exercise of powers
beneficial to mankind.’ If, as in the era of wide free
opportunity, we think of free competitive self assertion as
the highest good, lawyer and grocer and farmer may seem
to be freely competing with their fellows in their calling in
order each to acquire as much of the world’s good as he
may within the limits allowed him by law. But the member
of a profession does not regard himself as in competition
with his professional brethren. He is not bartering his
services as is the artisan nor exchanging the products of
his skill and learning as the farmer sells wheat or corn.
There should be no such thing as a lawyers or physicians’
strike. The best service of the professional man is often
rendered for no equivalent or for a trifling equivalent and it
is his pride to do what he does in a way worthy of his
profession even if done with no expectation of reward. This
spirit of public service in which the profession of law is and
ought to be exercised is a prerequisite of sound
administration of justice according to law. The other two
elements of a profession, namely, organization and pursuit
of a learned art have their justification in that they secure
and maintain that spirit."25cralaw:red
In fine, petitioners’ desire to preserve the identity of their
firms in the eyes of the public must bow to legal and ethical
impediments.
ACCORDINGLY, the petitions filed herein are denied and
petitioners advised to drop the names "SYCIP" and
"OZAETA" from their respective firm names. Those names
may, however, be included in the listing of individuals who
have been partners in their firms indicating the years
during which they served as such.chanrobles.com.ph :
virtual law library
SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, Concepcion Jr., Santos, Fernandez, Guerrero
and De Castro, JJ., concur.
Fernando, C.J. and Abad-Santos, J., took no part.
CERTIFICATION
FERNANDO, C.J.:
The petitions are denied, as there are only four votes for
granting them, seven of the .Justices being of the contrary
view, as explained in the plurality opinion of Justice
Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera. It is out of delicadeza that the
undersigned did not participate in the disposition of these
petitions, as the law office of Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano,
Hernandez and Castillo started with the partnership of
Quisumbing, Sycip, and Quisumbing, the senior partner,
the late Ramon Quisumbing, being the father-in-law of the
undersigned, and the most junior partner then, Norberto J.
Quisumbing, being his brother-in-law. For the record, the
undersigned wishes to invite the attention of all concerned,
and not only of petitioners, to the last sentence of the
opinion of Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera: ‘Those
names [Sycip and Ozaeta] may, however, be included in
the listing of individuals who have been partners in their
firms indicating the years during which they served as
such." It represents a happy compromise.
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I dissent. The fourteen members of the law firm, Sycip,
Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez & Castillo, in their petition
of June 10, 1975, prayed for authority to continue the use
of that firm name, notwithstanding the death of Attorney
Alexander Sycip on May 5, 1975 (May he rest in peace).
He was the founder of the firm which was originally known
as the Sycip Law Office.
On the other hand, the seven surviving partners of the law
firm, Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta & Reyes, in their
petition of August 13, 1976, prayed that they be allowed to
continue using the said firm name notwithstanding the
death of two partners, former Justice Roman Ozaeta and
his son, Herminio, on May 1, 1972 and February 14, 1976,
respectively.
They alleged that the said law firm was a continuation of
the Ozaeta Law Office which was established in 1957 by
Justice Ozaeta and his son and that, as to the said law firm,
the name Ozaeta has acquired an institutional and
secondary connotation.
Article 1840 of the Civil Code, which speaks of the use by
the partnership of the name of a deceased partner as part
of the partnership name, is cited to justify the petitions.
Also invoked is the canon that the continued use by a law
firm of the name of a deceased partner, "when permissible
by local custom, is not unethical" as long as "no imposition
or deception is practiced through this use" (Canon 33 of
the Canons of Legal Ethics).
I am of the opinion that the petition may be granted with
the condition that it be indicated in the letterheads of the
two firms (as the case may be) that Alexander Sycip,
former Justice Ozaeta and Herminio Ozaeta are dead or
the period when they served as partners should be stated
therein.
Obviously, the purpose of the two firms in continuing the
use of the names of their deceased founders is to retain
the clients who had customarily sought the legal services
of Attorneys Sycip and Ozaeta and to benefit from the
goodwill attached to the names of those respected and
esteemed law practitioners. That is a legitimate motivation.
The retention of their names is not illegal per se. That
practice was followed before the war by the law firm of
James Ross. Notwithstanding the death of Judge Ross the
founder of the law firm of Ross, Lawrence, Selph and
Carrascoso, his name was retained in the firm name with
an indication of the year when he died. No one complained
that the retention of the name of Judge Ross in the firm
name was illegal or unethical.
 B.M. No. 44 February 10, 1989
EUFROSINA YAP TAN, complainant,
vs.
NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, respondent.
B.M. No. 59 February 10, 1989
BENJAMIN CABIGON, complainant,
vs.
NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, respondent.
SBC No. 624 February 10, 1989
CORNELIO AGNIS and DIOMEDES D.
AGNIS, complainants,
vs.
NICOLAS EL. SABANDAL, respondent.
Alberto Concha for Eufrosina Yap Tan.
Nelbert Poculan for respondent.
RESOLUTION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Respondent Nicolas El. Sabandal passed the 1978 Bar
Examinations but because of pending administrative
complaints filed against him, he was not allowed to take
the lawyers oath. He then filed a Petition to be admitted to
the Philippine Bar and to be allowed to sign the Rollo of
Attorneys. The complainants, namely, Eufrosina Y. Tan,
Benjamin Cabigon, Cornelio Agnis and Diomedes D.
Agnis, opposed the Petition on several grounds.
In a Resolution of this Court en banc promulgated on 29
November 1983, respondent's petition was denied, the
Court finding, inter alia, that:
... the evidence supports the charge of unauthorized
practice of law. While respondent's infraction may be
mitigated in that he appeared for his in-laws in CAR Cases
Nos. 347 and 326 where they were parties, it is clear from
the proceedings in CAR Case No. 347 that he clarified his
position only after the opposing counsel had objected to
his appearance. Besides, he specifically manifested "Atty.
Nicolas Sabandal, appearing for the defendants, Your
Honor" (Exhibit "A-l"). He called himself "attorney" knowing
full well that he was not yet admitted to the Bar. Oppositors
evidence sufficiently shows that respondent had held
himself out as an "attorney" in the agrarian, civil and
criminal cases mentioned by said oppositors. Respondent
cannot shift the blame on the stenographer, for he could
have easily asked for rectification. ... Oppositors had also
presented evidence of proceedings wherein witnesses
testified as to respondent's being their lawyer and their
compensating him for his services (Exhibits "D-8" and "D-
9"). It may be that in the Court of a municipality, even non-
lawyers may appear (Sec. 34, Rule 138, Rules of Court). If
respondent had so manifested, no one could have
challenged him. What he did, however, was to hold himself
out as a lawyer, and even to write the Station Commander
of Roxas, complaining of harassment to "our clients." when
he could not but have known that he could not yet engage
in the practice of law. His argument that the term "client" is
"dependent or person under the protection of another and
not a person who engages in the profession" is puerile.
(126 SCRA 60, at 67 & 68)
A Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Resolution
was filed by respondent on 23 January 1984, which was
opposed by Complainants, who stated that the "span of
time was so short to determine with sufficient definiteness
whether or not respondent has reformed;" that "the
testimonials are self-serving obviously prepared by
respondent himself and had them signed by the signatories
who could not refuse him." In its Resolution of 8 May 1984
the Court denied reconsideration.
On 23 May 1985 respondent filed an Ex-parte Motion for
Reconsideration reiterating his prayer to be allowed to take
the lawyer's oath, which was again opposed by
Complainants, and which was denied by the Court on 16
July 1985, with the Court stating that no other Motions of
this kind would be entertained.
Undaunted, on 2 December 1985, respondent filed
another Motion for Reconsideration and Appeal for Mercy
and Forgiveness, which the Court simply NOTED in its
Resolution of 7 January 1986.
In a letter dated 4 December 1986 respondent's children
echoed his appeal to the Court to allow him to take the
lawyer's oath, which the Court noted without action on 7
July 1987.
On 28 June 1988, respondent filed a second Petition to be
allowed to take the lawyer's oath. Complainants were
required to comment but they have not done so to date.
In a letter dated 23 November 1988 addressed to the Chief
Justice and Associate Justices of this Court, respondent
asks for forgiveness, understanding and benevolence and
promises that, if given a chance to be a member of the
Philippine Bar, he would always be faithful to the lawyer's
oath and conduct himself in an upright manner.
Whether or not respondent shall be admitted to the
Philippine Bar rests to a great extent in the sound
discretion of the Court. An applicant must satisfy the Court
that he is a person of good moral character, fit and proper
to practice law.
In several cases wherein reinstatements to the legal
profession were allowed, the following criteria were
considered: the person appreciates the insignificance of
his dereliction and he has assured the Court that he now
possesses the requisite probity and integrity necessary to
guarantee that he is worthy to be restored to the practice
of law (Magat vs. Santiago, L-43301-45665, April 1, 1980,
97 SCRA 1); the time that has elapsed between
disbarment and the application for reinstatement, his good
conduct and honorable dealing subsequent to his
disbarment, his active involvement in civic, educational,
and religious organizations (In Re: Juan T. Publico, 102
SCRA 721 [1981]); the favorable indorsement of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as well as the local
government officials and citizens of his community (In Re:
Quinciano D. Vailoces, Adm. Case No. 439, September
30, 1982, 117 SCRA 1); the pleas of his mother and wife
for the sake and the future of his family (Andres vs.
Cabrera, SBC-585, February 29, 1984, 127 SCRA 802).
The foregoing criteria may be made applicable to
respondent's case. After the lapse of ten (10) years from
the time respondent took and passed the 1978 Bar
Examination, he has shown contrition and willingness to
reform. He has also submitted several testimonials,
including one from the IBP Zamboanga del Norte, attesting
to his good moral character and civic consciousness.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Nicolas El. Sabandal is
hereby allowed to take the lawyer's oath, with the Court
binding him to his assurance that he shall strictly abide by
and adhere to the language, meaning and spirit of the
Lawyer's Oath and the highest standards of the legal
profession.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 1053 August 31, 1981
SANTA PANGAN, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. DIONISIO RAMOS, respondent.
RE S O L U T I O N
DE CASTRO, J.:
On November 29, 1971, Santa Pangan filed before this
Court a verified complaint charging respondent Atty.
Dionisio Ramos with gross immorality, the latter having
misrepresented himself as still "single" when he started
courting complainant, proposed marriage to her and finally
succeeded in marrying her even with full consciousness
that his first marriage to his first wife was still valid and
subsisting. 1 (A Criminal Case for bigamy was also filed by
the complainant against the respondent in the Court of
First Instance of Manila, Branch XXI, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 15528).
In his answer to the complaint, respondent denied the
material allegations thereof for being without legal or
factual basis. He prayed for the dismissal of the complaint
for failure to state cause of action against respondent. 2
The case was referred to the Office of the Solicitor General
for report, investigation and recommendation. On June 1,
1976, the Solicitor General submitted his report finding
respondent Ramos guilty as charged, with a
recommendation for suspension from the practice of law
for a period of three (3) years, pursuant to Section 7, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court. 3 Subsequently, the
corresponding complaint for his suspension from the
practice of law was filed.
On September 13, 1976, respondent filed his answer to the
complaint and moved for the appointment of a
commissioner to hear and take additional evidence in his
behalf, which, however, was denied by the Court per its
Resolution of October 6, 1976. At the hearing of February
25, 1977, respondent, acting as counsel for his own behalf,
moved for the presentation of additional evidence, which
was, however, opposed by complainant's counsel on the
ground that respondent is resorting to dilatory tactics. At
the hearing of September 2, 1977, complainant and
respondent appeared and the Court set the hearing of the
case for the purpose of reception of additional evidence
before its Legal Officer-Investigator.
Meanwhile, on September 7, 1979, the Court, speaking
through Justice Felix Antonio, severely REPRIMANDED
respondent Dionisio Ramos, with warning that a repetition
of the same overt act may warrant his suspension or
disbarment from the practice of law. 4 The reprimand was
administered because respondent used the name "Pedro
Dionisio Ramos" in connection with Criminal Case No.
35906. He averred that he had a right to do so because in
his Birth Certificate his name is "Pedro Dionisio Ramos,"
and his parents are Pedro Ramos and Carmen Dayaw,
and that the D.D. in "Pedro DD Ramos" is but an
abbreviation of "Dionisio Dayaw" his other given name and
maternal surname. The Court opined that respondent in
effect resorted to deception. He demonstrated "lack of
candor in dealing with the courts."
At the hearing of October 23, 1979, Solicitor Celia Reyes
appeared submitting the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Branch XXI, in Criminal Case No.
15528, acquitting respondent of the charges of bigamy on
grounds of insufficiency of evidence, for having contracted
the second marriage with the complainant.
On January 15, 1980, the Legal Officer-Investigator
submitted his report concurring in the findings of the
Solicitor General, although he recommended a penalty of
a minimum five-year suspension from the practice of law,
with prospect for the imposition of a total disbarment from
the practice of law, as the Court finds fit and appropriate. 5
On February 27, 1981, counsel for complainant filed its
motion to expedite disposition of the case, further alleging
that respondent Ramos is still using the name of Pedro
Dionisio Ramos and PDD Ramos in two pleadings filed
before the Court of First Instance of Manila, disregarding
the Resolution of this Court dated September 7,
1979. 6 Commenting, respondent admitted the allegations
of complainant's counsel but alleged that he signed the
pleadings inadvertently because of poor eyesight.
The facts, as found by the Solicitor General who
investigated the case, and the Legal Officer-Investigator
before whom the additional evidence was presented, are
as follows: Respondent was admitted to the Philippine Bar
in 1964. He was legally married to and living with Editha
Encarnado the marriage with her having been celebrated
on September 4, 1963. Both complainant and respondent
were officemates in the Office of Councilor Lito Puyat, City
Hall, Manila since 1967. With the convenience thus
offered, respondent, representing himself to be "single,"
began courting complainant, proposed civil marriage to her
to be later followed with a church celebration after which
they will live together as husband and wife. From January
1968 to February 1971, they had carnal knowledge of each
other in various hotels in Manila, particularly the Golden
Gate Motel and Salem Motel. Sometime in June 1970,
complainant informed respondent that she was pregnant.
Whereupon, both agreed to get a quick marriage.
Accordingly, complainant and respondent filed their
respective applications for a marriage license (Exhs. "H",
"H-1" and "H-2") and based thereon, they obtained a
marriage license issued on June 16, 1970 (Exh. "D") and
celebrated their marriage before Minister Isidro Dizon on
June 18, 1970 (Exh. "B"). After the marriage, complainant
and respondent agreed to have a church marriage before
they live together as husband and wife, although they
continued to have sexual trysts. Respondent was invited
by complainant to meet the latter's mother to whom
respondent expressed his desire to marry complainant, to
which proposal complainant's mother agreed, provided
respondent bring his parents with him to ask for
complainant's hand. Several weeks had passed and
respondent failed to bring his parents to complainant's
home. Complainant and her mother became suspicious.
They made inquiries about the personal status of
respondent and they ultimately discovered that respondent
was already married to one Editha Encarnado (Exhs. "C"
and "E"). After discovering that respondent was a married
man, complainant resigned from her job as receptionist
from the office of Councilor Lito Puyat. She stopped having
intimate relationship with respondent and because of the
humiliation and embarassment she suffered before her
friends and officemates, she filed the present disbarment
case.
Upon the other-hand, respondent tried to prove, through
his affidavit subscribed before Asst. City Fiscal Primitivo
Peñaranda of Manila, that he never misrepresented
himself to be "single" and that complainant knew at the
outset of his married status; that it was purely
complainant's wish to carry on a love affair with him as
described in his affidavit; that he was threatened and
forced to sign blank marriage contract forms and
applications for marriage license by the brothers of the
complainant who are allegedly notorious police characters;
that his signature in the marriage contract (Exh. "B") was
forged and falsified; that the marriage contract was only
celebrated as a cover-up of the pregnancy of the
complainant; and that the disbarment proceedings were
initiated by complainant because he refused to elope with
complainant and abandon his wife Editha Encarnado and
he stopped giving her money and avoided seeing her
again.
Upon a review of the record, We are convinced that
respondent Dionisio Ramos is guilty of grossly immoral
conduct which warrants proper action from this Court. His
own declarations in his affidavit corroborate this imputation
of immorality. Thus, in his affidavit subscribed before Asst.
Fiscal Primitive Peñaranda of Manila on Feb. 22, 1967,
respondent frankly admitted having carnal relations with
complainant for several times. What is more, respondent
claimed that he was threatened and forced by
complainant's brothers to celebrate the marriage dated
June 18, 1980, but in the same breath, he admitted having
carnal affairs with complainant after the celebration of the
marriage. Worse still, respondent misrepresented his civil
status as "single", courted complainant, proposed
marriage to her — knowing his legal impediments to marry
complainant, respondent's motives were clearly and
grossly immoral — won her confidence and married her
while his first marriage to his present wife still validly
subsists.
In Villasanta vs. Peralta, 7 where respondent was
disbarred because he made love with complainant,
procured the preparation of a false marriage contract and
arranged a false wedding with complainant while his first
wife was still alive and their marriage still valid and existing,
this Court held: "the act of respondent of contracting the
second marriage (even his act in making love to another
woman while his first wife is still alive and their marriage
still valid and existing) is contrary to honesty, justice,
decency and morality. Respondent made a mockery of
marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect
and dignity."
It is of importance that members of the ancient and learned
profession of law must conform with the highest standards
of morality. As stated in paragraph 29 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics: "The lawyer should aid in guarding the Bar
against the admission to the profession of candidates unfit
or unqualified because deficient in either moral character
or education. He should strive at all times to uphold the
honor and to maintain the dignity of the profession and to
improve not only the law but also the administration of
justice." 8
Respondent, however, submits that having been acquitted
by the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXI, of the
charge of bigamy, the immorality charges filed against him
in this disbarment case should be dismissed. The acquittal
of respondent Ramos upon the criminal charge is not a bar
to these proceedings. The standards of legal profession
are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to
escape the penalties of the criminal law. Moreover, this
Court in disbarment proceedings is acting in an entirely
different capacity from that which courts assume in trying
criminal cases. 9
This Court has already severely reprimanded respondent
from using a name other than authorized name in the "Roll
of Attorneys" and was warned that a repetition of the same
overt act may warrant his suspension of disbarment from
office in the future. Notwithstanding such reprimand and
warning, however, respondent repeated the same overt
act of using an unauthorized name in two pleadings filed
before the Court of First Instance of Manila. His
explanation that he had done so inadvertently because of
poor eyesight appears unsatisfactory. He should have
employed more caution and prudence in filing pleadings
before courts considering the fact that he had already been
warned and reprimanded by this Court. Respondent's
conduct, thus, suggests lack of candor and respect in his
dealing with this Court. He has violated his oath of office of
assuming the duty of good faith and honorable dealings
with the court, of being respectful to it and of being
obedient to its rules and lawful orders.
In the light of the foregoing, the Court finds that respondent
committed a grossly immoral act, as found both by the
Solicitor General and this Court's Legal Officer-
Investigator, and as recommended by the Solicitor
General, respondent is hereby suspended from the
practice of law for a period of three (3) years, for gross
immorality, and an additional one (1) year for his willful
disregard of a lawful order against his using an
unauthorized name, in serious disrespect of this Court.
SO ORDERED.
 A.M. No. L-363 July 31, 1962
IN RE: DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ATTY.
DIOSDADO Q. GUTIERREZ, respondent.
Victoriano A. Savellano for complaint.
Nestor M. Andrada for respondent.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
Respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez is a member of the
Philippine Bar, admitted to it on October 5, 1945. In
criminal case No. R-793 of the Court of First Instance of
Oriental Mindoro he was convicted of the murder of
Filemon Samaco, former municipal mayor of Calapan, and
together with his co-conspirators was sentenced to the
penalty of death. Upon review by this Court the judgment
of conviction was affirmed on June 30, 1956 (G.R. No. L-
17101), but the penalty was changed to reclusion
perpetua. After serving a portion of the sentence
respondent was granted a conditional pardon by the
President on August 19, 1958. The unexecuted portion of
the prison term was remitted "on condition that he shall not
again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines."
On October 9, 1958 the widow of the deceased Filemon
Samaco, victim in the murder case, filed a verified
complaint before this Court praying that respondent be
removed from the roll of lawyers pursuant to Rule 127,
section 5. Respondent presented his answer in due time,
admitting the facts alleged by complainant regarding
pardon in defense, on the authority of the decision of this
Court in the case of In re Lontok, 43 Phil. 293.
Under section 5 of Rule 127, a member of the bar may be
removed suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court by reason of his conviction of a crime
insolving moral turpitude. Murder is, without doubt, such a
crime. The term "moral turpitude" includes everything
which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good
morals. In re Carlos S. Basa, 41 Phil. 275. As used in
disbarment statutes, it means an act of baseness, vileness,
or depravity in the private and social duties which a man
owes to his fellowmen or to society in general, contrary to
the accepted rule of right and duty between man and man.
State ex rel. Conklin v. Buckingham, 84 P. 2nd 49; 5 Am.
Jur. Sec. 279. pp. 428-429.
The only question to be resolved is whether or not the
conditional pardon extended to respondent places him
beyond the scope of the rule on disbarment aforecited.
Reliance is placed by him squarely on the Lontok case.
The respondent therein was convicted of bigamy and
thereafter pardoned by the Governor-General. In a
subsequent viction, this Court decided in his favor and
held: "When proceedings to strike an attorney's name from
the rolls the fact of a conviction for a felony ground for
disbarment, it has been held that a pardon operates to
wipe out the conviction and is a bar to any proceeding for
the disbarment of the attorney after the pardon has been
granted."
It is our view that the ruling does not govern the question
now before us. In making it the Court proceeded on the
assumption that the pardon granted to respondent Lontok
was absolute. This is implicit in the ratio decidendi of the
case, particularly in the citations to support it, namely. In
Re Emmons, 29 Cal. App. 121; Scott vs. State, 6 Tex. Civ.
App. 343; and Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 380. Thus in Scott
vs. State the court said:
We are of opinion that after received an unconditional
pardon the record of the felony conviction could no longer
be used as a basis for the proceeding provided for in article
226. The record, when offered in evidence, was met with
an unconditional pardon, and could not, therefore, properly
be said to afford "proof of a conviction of any felony."
Having been thus cancelled, all its force as a felony
conviction was taken away. A pardon falling short of this
would not be a pardon, according to the judicial
construction which that act of executive grace was
received. Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 344; Knote v. U.S., 95
U.S. 149, and cases there cited; Young v. Young, 61 Tex.
191.
And the portion of the decision in Ex parte Garland quoted
with approval in the Lontok case is as follows:
A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the
offense and the guilt of the offender; and when the pardon
is full, it releases the punishment and blots out the
existence of guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender
is as innocent as if he had never committed the offense. It
granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties
and disabilities, consequent upon conviction, from
attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes the
penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil
rights it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him
a new credit and capacity.
The pardon granted to respondent here is not absolute but
conditional, and merely remitted the unexecuted portion of
his term. It does not reach the offense itself, unlike that
in Ex parte Garland, which was "a full pardon and amnesty
for all offense by him committed in connection with
rebellion (civil war) against government of the United
States."
The foregoing considerations rendered In re Lontok are
inapplicable here. Respondent Gutierrez must be judged
upon the fact of his conviction for murder without regard to
the pardon he invokes in defense. The crime was qualified
by treachery and aggravated by its having been committed
in hand, by taking advantage of his official position
(respondent being municipal mayor at the time) and with
the use of motor vehicle. People vs. Diosdado
Gutierrez, supra. The degree of moral turpitude involved is
such as to justify his being purged from the profession.
The practice of law is a privilege accorded only to those
who measure up to certain rigid standards of mental and
moral fitness. For the admission of a candidate to the bar
the Rules of Court not only prescribe a test of academic
preparation but require satisfactory testimonials of good
moral character. These standards are neither dispensed
with nor lowered after admission: the lawyer must continue
to adhere to them or else incur the risk of suspension or
removal. As stated in Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 263, 27 Law
ed., 552, 556: "Of all classes and professions, the lawyer
is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their
sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to
repudiate and override the laws, to trample them under foot
and to ignore the very bonds of society, argues recreancy
to his position and office and sets a pernicious example to
the insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body
politic.
WHEREFORE, pursuant to Rule 127, Section 5, and
considering the nature of the crime for which respondent
Diosdado Q. Gutierrez has been convicted, he is ordered
disbarred and his name stricken from the roll of lawyers.
A.M. No. 944 July 25, 1974
FLORA NARIDO, complainant,
vs.
ATTORNEY JAIME S. LINSANGAN, respondent.
RESOLUTION
FERNANDO, J.:p
The spectacle presented by two members of the bar
engaged in bickering and recrimination is far from edifying,
although it is understandable, if not justifiable, that at times
zeal in the defense of one's client may be carried to the
point of undue skepticism and doubt as to the motives of
opposing counsel. Some such reflection is induced by
these two administrative cases wherein respondents
Jaime S. Linsangan and Rufino B. Risma, who
represented adverse parties in a workmen's compensation
case, did mutually hurl accusation at each other. The
charge against respondent Linsangan filed by a certain
Flora Narido is that he violated the attorney's oath by
submitting a perjured statement. When required to answer,
not only did he deny the complaint but he would also hold
respondent Risma accountable for having instigated his
client, the complainant, Flora Narido, to file a false and
malicious complaint resulting in what respondent
Linsangan called "embarrassment, humiliation and
defamation" of a brother in a profession.
On September 9, 1971, this Court referred the above
administrative cases to the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation. Such report
and recommendation was submitted on May 31 of this
year.
1. Insofar as the first case against respondent Jaime S.
Linsangan is concerned, the report contains the following:
"In support of her complaint filed with this Honorable Court,
complainant Narido heavily relies on the refusal of
respondent Linsangan to withdraw — despite warning —
the affidavit of Milagros M. Vergel de Dios ..., which
affidavit Narido claims to be perjured. ... Mrs. Narido and
Atty. Risma threatened Atty. Linsangan with disbarment
should he insist in offering the affidavit of Mrs. Vergel de
Dios."1 Nonetheless, such affidavit was filed. It was found
as a fact that there was nothing improper in presenting
such affidavit, its alleged falsity not being proven. Even if it
were otherwise, still there was no showing of respondent
having violated his attorney's oath for submitting a perjured
affidavit. Thus the report continues: "With respect to the
other allegations in the affidavit, suffice it to say that there
is no evidence showing Atty. Linsangan's awareness of the
falsity thereof, assuming arguendo that they are indeed
false. As testified by Atty. Linsangan he has no intention
whatsoever of misleading any court or judicial body, or of
violating his attorney's oath."2
2. As for the charge against Attorney Risma, the report
stated the following: "This administrative complaint
stemmed from the belief of Atty. Linsangan that Atty.
Risma 'by virtue of his financial interest in the Award,'
instigated the filing of Administrative Case No. 944 'in order
to accomplish a short cut in winning a case even by
intimidation or unfounded threats, by depriving a party of
due process and at the expense, embarrassment,
humiliation, and defamation of his undersigned brother-
respondent.' ... It seems unkind to allude evil motive to Atty.
Risma. It is perhaps more apt to state that Atty. Risma's
missionary zeal to fight for the rights of his clients triggered
him into filing Administrative Case No. 944. We should
admire Atty. Risma's dedication in championing the cause
of the poor. Mrs. Narido, his client, is a destitute woman.
She needed every centavo of the award. To her, any delay
in the payment thereof meant grave injustice; it meant
deprivation and starvation. Faced with the dilemma of his
client, Atty. Risma had to rise to the challenge. In view of
this, it is more in keeping with Christian precepts to say that
it must have been the plight of Mrs. Narido — rather than
his alleged financial interest — that Compelled Atty. Risma
to advise his client to file the case against Atty. Linsangan.
... There being no direct evidence to show the alleged bad
faith of Atty. Risma in advising his client to file
Administrative Case No. 944 against Atty. Linsangan, the
benefit of the doubt should be resolved in favor of Atty.
Risma. Consequently, the charge of instigating the filing of
'disbarment proceedings against a brother attorney with
improper motives and without just ground' necessarily
fails."3
3. From the above, it was the recommendation that on
such charges, both respondents should be exculpated. It
being shown in the investigation, however, although it was
not one of the charges in the counter-complaint filed
against him that respondent Risma would seek to collect
fifteen per cent of the recovery obtained by his client,
contrary to the explicit provision in the Workmen's
Compensation Act allowing only a maximum of ten per
cent and that only where the case is appealed, there was
likewise a recommendation for admonition or reprimand.
The aptness of such a penalty was predicated on the fact
that respondent Risma had not received a single centavo
from the client. Moreover, it was clear such contract for
attorney's fees would not be enforced. In the meanwhile,
he had been serving his poverty-stricken client faithfully
and well, even advancing some of the necessary
expenses. What was recommended commends itself for
acceptance.
4. This further observation is not amiss. The two
respondents would be well-advised to heed these words
from Justice Laurel, announced in Javier v. Cornejo:4 "It
should be observed, in this connection, that mutual
bickering and unjustifiable recriminations, between brother
attorneys detract from the dignity of the legal profession
and will not receive any sympathy from this court."5
5. One last word. The report submitted by the Solicitor
General is characterized by thoroughness and diligence,
but its quality would have been improved had there been
on the part of the Solicitor concerned a more adequate
grasp of notable opinions of this Court on legal ethics from
Justice Malcolm on, thus obviating the need for reliance on
secondary authorities, both Philippine and American.
WHEREFORE, the complaint in Administrative Case No.
944 against respondent Jaime S. Linsangan is dismissed
for lack of merit. Respondent Rufino B. Risma in
Administrative Case No. 1025 is exculpated from the
charge of having instigated the filing of an unfounded suit.
He is, however, admonished to exercise greater care in
ascertaining how much under our law he could recover by
way of attorney's fees. The contract entered into between
him and his client as to his being entitled to fifteen per cent
of the award granted her in a workmen's compensation suit
is declared to be of no force and effect, the penalty
imposed being that of admonition merely only because he
had made no effort to collect on the same and had even
advanced expenses for a poor client. Let a copy of this
resolution be spread on the records of both respondents.
 A.M. No. 219 September 29, 1962
CASIANO U. LAPUT, petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. FRANCISCO E.F. REMOTIGUE and ATTY.
FORTUNATO P. PATALINGHUG, respondents.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is an original complaint filed with this Court charging
respondents with unprofessional and unethical conduct in
soliciting cases and intriguing against a brother lawyer, and
praying that respondents be dealt with accordingly.
The facts which led to the filing of this complaint are as
follow: In May, 1952, petitioner was retained by Nieves
Rillas Vda. de Barrera to handle her case (Sp. Proc. No. 2-
J) in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, entitled "Testate
Estate of Macario Barrera". By January, 1955, petitioner
had contemplated the closing of the said administration
proceedings and prepared two pleadings: one, to close the
proceedings and declare Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera as
universal heir and order the delivery to her of the residue
of the estate and, second, a notice for the rendition of final
accounting and partition of estate. At this point, however,
the administratrix Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera refused to
countersign these two pleadings and instead advised
petitioner not to file them. Some weeks later, petitioner
found in the records of said proceedings that respondent
Atty. Fortunato Patalinghug had filed on January 11, 1955
a written appearance as the new counsel for Nieves Rillas
Vda. de Barrera. On February 5, 1955 petitioner voluntarily
asked the court to be relieved as counsel for Mrs. Barrera.
On February 7, 1955, the other respondent, Atty. Francisco
E. F. Remotigue, entered his appearance, dated February
5, 1955.
Complainant here alleges that the appearances of
respondents were unethical and improper for the reason
that they had nursed the desire to replace the petitioner as
attorney for the estate and the administratrix and, taking
advantage of her goodwill, intrigued against the
preparation of the final inventory and accounting and
prodded Mrs. Barrera not to consent to petitioner's
decision to close the administration proceedings; that
before their appearance, they brought petitioner's client to
their law office and there made her sign four documents
captioned "Revocation of Power of Attorney" and sent the
same by mail to several corporations and establishments
where the Estate of Macario Barrera is owner of certificates
of stocks and which documents purported to disauthorize
the petitioner from further collecting and receiving the
dividends of the estate from said corporations, when in fact
and in truth the respondents fully knew that no power of
attorney or authority was given to the petitioner by his
client, the respondents motive being to embarrass
petitioner to the officials, lawyers and employees of said
corporations, picturing him as a dishonest lawyer and no
longer trusted by his client — all with the purpose of
straining the relationship of the petitioner and his client,
Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera; and that Atty. Patalinghug
entered his appearance without notice to petitioner.
In answer, respondent Atty. Patalinghug stated that when
he entered his appearance on January 11, 1955 the
administratrix Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera had already
lost confidence in her lawyer, the herein petitioner, and had
in fact already with her a pleading dated January 11, 1955,
entitled "Discharge of Counsel for the Administration and
Motion to Cite Atty. Casiano Laput", which she herself had
filed with the court.1awphîl.nèt
In answer, respondent Atty. Remotigue stated that when
he filed his appearance on February 7, 1955, the petitioner
has already withdrawn as counsel.
After separate answers were filed by the respondents, the
Supreme Court referred the case to the Solicitor General
for investigation, report and recommendation. The Solicitor
General recommended the complete exoneration of
respondents.
It appears and it was found by the Solicitor General that
before respondent Atty. Fortunato Patalinghug entered his
appearance, the widow administratrix had already filed
with the court a pleading discharging the petitioner Atty.
Casiano Laput. If she did not furnish Atty. Laput with a copy
of the said pleading, it was not the fault of Atty. Patalinghug
but that of the said widow. It appears that the reason why
Mrs. Barrera dismissed petitioner as her lawyer was that
she did not trust him any longer, for one time she found out
that some dividend checks which should have been sent
to her were sent instead to petitioner, making her feel that
she was being cheated by petitioner. Moreover, she found
that withdrawals from the Philippine National Bank and
Bank of the Philippine Islands have been made by
petitioner without her prior authority.
We see no irregularity in the appearance of respondent
Atty. Fortunato Patalinghug as counsel for the widow;
much less can we consider it as an actual grabbing of a
case from petitioner. The evidence as found by the
Solicitor General shows that Atty. Patalinghug's
professional services were contracted by the widow, a
written contract having been made as to the amount to be
given him for his professional services.
Petitioner's voluntary withdrawal on February 5, 1955, as
counsel for Mrs. Barrera after Atty. Patalinghug had
entered his appearance, and his (petitioner's) filing almost
simultaneously of a motion for the payment of his
attorney's fees, amounted to an acquiescence to the
appearance of respondent Atty. Patalinghug as counsel for
the widow. This should estop petitioner from now
complaining that the appearance of Atty. Patalinghug was
unprofessional.
Much less could we hold respondent Atty. Remotigue guilty
of unprofessional conduct inasmuch as he entered his
appearance, dated February 5, 1955, only on February 7,
same year, after Mrs. Barrera had dispensed with
petitioner's professional services on January 11, 1955, and
after petitioner had voluntarily withdrawn his appearance
on February 5, 1955.
With respect to the preparation by Atty. Patalinghug of the
revocations of power of attorney as complained of by
petitioner, the Solicitor General found that the same does
not appear to be prompted by malice or intended to hurt
petitioner's feelings, but purely to safeguard the interest of
the administratrix. Evidently, petitioner's pride was hurt by
the issuance of these documents, and felt that he had been
pictured as a dishonest lawyer; for he filed a case before
the City Fiscal of Cebu against Atty. Patalinghug and the
widow for libel and falsification. It was shown, however,
that the case was dismissed.
No sufficient evidence having been submitted to sustain
the charges, these are hereby dismissed and the case
closed.
THIRD DIVISION
[A.C. No. 4807. March 22, 2000.]
MANUEL N. CAMACHO, Complainant, v. ATTYS. LUIS
MEINRADO C. PANGULAYAN, REGINA D.
BALMORES, CATHERINE V. LAUREL and HUBERT
JOAQUIN P. BUSTOS of PANGULAYAN AND
ASSOCIATES LAW OFFICES, Respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Respondent lawyers stand indicted for a violation of the
Code of Professional Ethics, specifically Canon 9 thereof,
viz:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"A lawyer should not in any way communicate upon the
subject of controversy with a party represented by counsel,
much less should he undertake to negotiate or
compromise the matter with him, but should only deal with
his counsel. It is incumbent upon the lawyer most
particularly to avoid everything that may tend to mislead a
party not represented by counsel and he should not
undertake to advise him as to law." chanrobles
virtuallawlibrary:red
Atty. Manuel N. Camacho filed a complaint against the
lawyers comprising the Pangulayan and Associates Law
Offices, namely, Attorneys Luis Meinrado C. Pangulayan,
Regina D. Balmores, Catherine V. Laurel, and Herbert
Joaquin P. Bustos. Complainant, the hired counsel of
some expelled students from the AMA Computer College
("AMACC"), in an action for the Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and for Damages,
docketed Civil Case No. Q-97-30549 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 78, of Quezon City, charged that
respondents, then counsel for the defendants, procured
and effected on separate occasions, without his
knowledge, compromise agreements ("Re-Admission
Agreements") with four of his clients in the aforementioned
civil case which in effect required them to waive all kinds
of claims they might have had against AMACC, the
principal defendant, and to terminate all civil, criminal and
administrative proceedings filed against it. Complainant
averred that such an act of respondents was unbecoming
of any member of the legal profession warranting either
disbarment or suspension from the practice of law.
In his comment, Attorney Pangulayan acknowledged that
not one of his co-respondents had taken part in the
negotiation, discussion, formulation, or execution of the
various Re-Admission Agreements complained of and
were, in fact, no longer connected at the time with the
Pangulayan and Associates Law Offices. The Re-
Admission Agreements, he claimed, had nothing to do with
the dismissal of Civil Case Q-97-30549 and were executed
for the sole purpose of effecting the settlement of an
administrative case involving nine students of AMACC who
were expelled therefrom upon the recommendation of the
Student Disciplinary Tribunal. The students, namely, Ian
Dexter Marquez, Almira O. Basalo, Neil Jason R. Salcedo,
Melissa F. Domondon, Melyda B. De Leon, Leila D. Joven,
Signorelli A. Santiago, Michael Ejercito, and Cleo B.
Villareiz, were all members of the Editorial Board of
DATALINE, who apparently had caused to be published
some objectionable features or articles in the paper. The
3-member Student Disciplinary Tribunal was immediately
convened, and after a series of hearings, it found the
students guilty of the use of indecent language and
unauthorized use of the student publication funds. The
body recommended the penalty of expulsion against the
erring students.
The denial of the appeal made by the students to Dr.
Amable R. Aguiluz V, AMACC President gave rise to the
commencement of Civil Case No. Q-97-30549 on 14th
March 1997 before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, of
Quezon City. While the civil case was still pending, letters
of apology and Re-Admission Agreements were
separately executed by and/or in behalf of some of the
expelled students, to wit: Letter of Apology, dated 27 May
1997, of Neil Jason Salcedo, assisted by his mother, and
Re-Admission Agreement of 22 June 1997 with the
AMACC President; letter of apology, dated 31 March 1997,
of Mrs. Veronica B. De Leon for her daughter Melyda B.
De Leon and Re-Admission Agreement of 09 May 1997
with the AMACC President; letter of apology, dated 22 May
1997, of Leila Joven, assisted by her mother, and Re-
Admission Agreement of 22 May 1997 with the AMACC
President; letter of apology, dated 22 September 1997, of
Cleo Villareiz and Re-Admission Agreement of 10 October
1997 with the AMACC President; and letter of apology,
dated 20 January 1997, of Michael Ejercito, assisted by his
parents, and Re-Admission Agreement of 23 January 1997
with the AMACC President.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Following the execution of the letters of apology and Re-
Admission Agreements, a Manifestation, dated 06 June
1997, was filed with the trial court where the civil case was
pending by Attorney Regina D. Balmores of the
Pangulayan and Associates Law Offices for defendant
AMACC. A copy of the manifestation was furnished
complainant. In his Resolution, dated 14 June 1997, Judge
Lopez of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court thereupon
dismissed Civil Case No. Q-97-30549.
On 19 June 1999, the Board of Governors of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines ("IBP") passed Resolution No. XIII-
99-163, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby
ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the
above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution/Decision as Annex ‘A’ and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record
and the applicable laws and rules, with an amendment
Atty. Meinrado Pangulayan is suspended from the practice
of law for SIX (6) MONTHS for being remiss in his duty and
DISMISSAL of the case against the other Respondents for
they did not take part in the negotiation of the case."cralaw
virtua1aw library
It would appear that when the individual letters of apology
and Re-Admission Agreements were formalized,
complainant was by then already the retained counsel for
plaintiff students in the civil case. Respondent Pangulayan
had full knowledge of this fact. Although aware that the
students were represented by counsel, respondent
attorney proceeded, nonetheless, to negotiate with them
and their parents without at the very least communicating
the matter to their lawyer, herein complainant, who was
counsel of record in Civil Case No. Q-97-30549. This
failure of respondent whether by design or because of
oversight is an inexcusable violation of the canons of
professional ethics and in utter disregard of a duty owing
to a colleague. Respondent fell short of the demands
required of him as a lawyer and as a member of the Bar.
The allegation that the context of the Re-Admission
Agreements centers only on the administrative aspect of
the controversy is belied by the Manifestation 1 which,
among other things, explicitly contained the following
stipulation; viz:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. Among the nine (9) signatories to the complaint, four
(4) of whom assisted by their parents/guardian already
executed a Re-Admission Agreement with AMACC
President, AMABLE R. AGUILUZ V acknowledging guilt for
violating the AMA COMPUTER COLLEGE MANUAL FOR
DISCIPLINARY ACTIONS and agreed among others to
terminate all civil, criminal and administrative proceedings
which they may have against the AMACC arising from their
previous dismissal.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
"x x x
"3. Consequently, as soon as possible, an Urgent Motion
to Withdraw from Civil Case No. Q-97-30549 will be filed
by them."cralaw virtua1aw library
The Court can only thus concur with the IBP Investigating
Commission and the IBP Board of Governors in their
findings, nevertheless, the recommended six-month
suspension would appear to be somewhat too harsh a
penalty given the circumstances and the explanation
of Respondent.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Luis Meinrado C.
Pangulayan is ordered SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of THREE (3) MONTHS effective
immediately upon his receipt of this decision. The case
against the other respondents is DISMISSED for
insufficiency of evidence.
Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal
record of respondent as an attorney and as a member of
the Bar, and furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts in the country.chanrobles virtual
lawlibrary
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[A.C. No. 1261. December 29, 1983.]
TAN TEK BENG, Complainant, v. TIMOTEO A.
DAVID, Respondent.
Basilio Lanoria for complainant.
Timoteo A. David for and in his own behalf.
SYLLABUS
1. LEGAL ETHICS; MEMBER OF THE BAR; SOLICITING
CASES AT LAW FOR THE PURPOSE OF GAIN;
CONSTITUTES MALPRACTICE. — Where in the
agreement lawyer David not only agreed to give one-half
of his professional fees to an intermediary or commission
agent but he also bound himself not to deal directly with
the clients, the Court held that the said agreement is void
because it was tantamount to malpractice which is "the
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or brokers" (Sec.
27, Rule 138, Rules of Court). Malpractice ordinarily refers
to any malfeasance or dereliction of duty committed by a
lawyer. Section 27 gives a special and technical meaning
to the term "malpractice" (Act No. 2828, amending Sec. 21
of Act No. 190). That meaning is in consonance with the
elementary notion that the practice of law is a profession,
not a business. "The lawyer may not seek or obtain
employment by himself or through others for to do so would
be unprofessional" (2 R.C.L. 1097 cited in In re Tagorda,
33 Phil. 37, 42).
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; UNPROFESSIONAL CONDUCT; CAUSE
FOR CENSURE. — The commercialization of law practice
is condemned in certain canons of professional ethics
adopted by the American Bar Association. "Unprofessional
conduct in an attorney is that which violates the rules or
ethical code of his profession or which is unbecoming a
member of that profession" (Note 14, 7 C.J.S. 743). We
censure lawyer David for having entered and acted upon
such void and unethical agreement. We discountenance
his conduct, not because of the complaint of Tan Tek Beng
(who did not know legal ethics) but because David should
have known better.
 that I will be sincere, honest and fair with you in connection
with our transactions with our clients. Likewise you must
be sincere, honest and fair with me.
DECISION
AQUINO, J.: Very truly yours,

The issue in this case is whether disciplinary action should (Sgd.) Illegible
be taken against lawyer Timoteo A. David (admitted to the
bar in 1945) for not giving Tan Tek Beng, a nonlawyer TIMOTEO A. DAVID
(alleged missionary of the Seventh Day Adventists), one-
half of the attorney’s fees received by David from the "P.S.
clients supplied by Tan Tek Beng. Their agreement
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph I will be responsible for all documents entrusted me by our
clients.
"December 3, 1970
(Sgd.) Initial
"Mr. Tan Tek Beng
"CONFORME to the above and likewise will reciprocate
"Manila my sincerity to Atty. David as stated in the last paragraph
of this letter.
"Dear Mr. Tan:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(Sgd.) Tan Tek Beng
In compliance with your request, I am now putting into
writing our agreement which must be followed in MR. TAN TEK BENG"
connection with the accounts that you will entrust to me for
collection. Our terms and conditions shall be as The foregoing was a reiteration of an agreement dated
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph August 5, 1969. Note that in said agreement lawyer David
not only agreed to give one-half of his professional fees to
"1. On all commission or attorney’s fees that we shall an intermediary or commission agent but he also bound
receive from our clients by virtue of the collection that we himself not to deal directly with the clients.
shall be able to effect on their accounts, we shall divide
fifty-fifty. Likewise you are entitled to commission, 50/50 The business relationship between David and Tan Tek
from domestic, inheritance and commercial from our said Beng did not last. There were mutual accusations of
clients or in any criminal cases where they are involved. doublecross. For allegedly not living up to the agreement,
Tan Tek Beng in 1973 denounced David to Presidential
"2. I shall not deal directly with our clients without your Assistant Ronaldo B. Zamora, to the Office of Civil
consent. Relations at Camp Crame and to this Court. He did not file
any civil action to enforce the agreement.
"3. You shall take care of collecting our fees as well as
advances for expenses for the cases referred to us by our In his 1974 comment, David clarified that the partnership
clients and careful in safeguarding our interest. was composed of himself as manager, Tan Tek Beng as
assistant manager and lawyer Pedro Jacinto as president
"4. It is understood that legal expenses that we shall and financier. When Jacinto became ill and the costs of
recover from the debtors shall be turned over to our clients. office maintenance mounted, David suggested that Tan
Other clients who directly or indirectly have been Tek Beng should also invest some money or shoulder a
approached or related (sic) to you as a result of your labor part of the business expenses but Tan Tek Beng
are your clients. refused.chanrobles.com : virtual law library

"I hereby pledge in the name of God, our Heavenly Father, This case was referred to the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation. Hearings were
scheduled from 1974 to 1981. It was proposed that
respondent should submit a stipulation of facts but that did
not materialize because the scheduled hearings were not
held due to the nonavailability of Tan Tek Beng and his
counsel.
On September 16, 1977 Tan Tek Beng died at the
Philippine Union Colleges Compound, Baesa, Caloocan
City but it was only in the manifestation of his counsel
dated August 10, 1981 that the Solicitor General’s Office
was informed of that fact. A report on this case dated
March 21, 1983 was submitted by the Solicitor General to
this Court.
direct to the client. . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
"38. Compensation, Commissions and Rebates. — A
lawyer should accept no compensation, commissions,
rebates or other advantages from others without the
knowledge and consent of his client after full disclosure."
(Appendix, Malcolm, Legal Ethics).
We censure lawyer David for having entered and acted
upon such void and unethical agreement. We
discountenance his conduct, not because of the complaint
of Tan Tek Beng (who did not know legal ethics) but
because David should have known better.chanrobles law
library

We hold that the said agreement is void because it was "Unprofessional conduct in an attorney is that which
tantamount to malpractice which is "the practice of violates the rules or ethical code of his profession or which
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either is unbecoming a member of that profession" (Note 14, 7
personally or through paid agents or brokers" Sec. 27, Rule C.J.S. 743).
138, Rules of Court). Malpractice ordinarily refers to any
malfeasance or dereliction of duty committed by a lawyer. WHEREFORE, respondent is reprimanded for being guilty
Section 27 gives a special and technical meaning to the of malpractice. A copy of this decision should be attached
term "malpractice" (Act No. 2828, amending sec. 21 of Act to his record in the Bar Confidant’s office.
No. 190).
SO ORDERED.
That meaning is in consonance with the elementary notion
that the practice of law is a profession, not a business. "The
lawyer may not seek or obtain employment by himself or
through others for to do so would be unprofessional" (2
R.C.L. 1097 cited in In re Tagorda, 53 Phil. 37, 42;
Malcolm, J., Jayme v. Bualan, 58 Phil. 422; Arce v.
Philippine National Bank, 62 Phil. 569). The
commercialization of law practice is condemned in certain
canons of professional ethics adopted by the American Bar
Association:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"34. Division of Fees. — No division of fees for legal

services is proper, except with another lawyer, based upon
a division of service or responsibility."cralaw virtua1aw
library

"35. Intermediaries. — The professional services of a

lawyer should not be controlled or exploited by any law
agency, personal or corporate, which intervenes between
client and lawyer. A lawyer’s responsibilities and
qualifications are individual. He should avoid all relations
which direct the performance of his duties by or in the
interest of such intermediary. A lawyer’s relation to his
client should be personal, and the responsibility should be