AASJS vs DATUMANONG

G.R. No. 160869, May 11, 2007

Facts:

Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition to prevent Justice Secretary Datumanong from
implementing R. A. 9225 entitled "An Act Making the Citizenship of Philippine Citizens Who
Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth Act No.
63, As Amended, and for Other Purposes." which was signed into law by President Gloria
M. Arroyo on August 29, 2003. Petitioner argued that R.A. 9225 is unconstitutional as it
violates Sec. 5, Article VI of the Constitution which states that “dual allegiance of citizens is
inimical to national interest and shall be dealt with by law.”

Petitioner contends that RA 9225 cheapens Philippine citizenship. He avers that Sections 2
and 3 thereof, together, allow dual allegiance and not dual citizenship. Petitioner maintains
that Section 2 allows all Filipinos, either natural-born or naturalized, who become foreign
citizens, to retain their Philippine citizenship without losing their foreign citizenship. Section
3 permits dual allegiance because said law allows natural-born citizens of the Philippines to
regain their Philippine citizenship by simply taking an oath of allegiance without forfeiting
their foreign allegiance.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) claims that Section 2 merely declares as a state
policy that "Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not
to have lost their Philippine citizenship." The OSG further claims that the oath in Section 3
does not allow dual allegiance since the oath taken by the former Filipino citizen is an
effective renunciation and repudiation of his foreign citizenship. The fact that the applicant
taking the oath recognizes and accepts the supreme authority of the Philippines is an
unmistakable and categorical affirmation of his undivided loyalty to the Republic.

Issues:

1. Whether R.A. 9225 is unconstitutional

2. Whether the court jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of dual allegiance

Held:

1. No. It is clear that the intent of the legislature in drafting Rep. Act No. 9225 is to do away
with the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 635 which takes away Philippine citizenship
from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries. What Rep.
Act No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost
Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. On its
face, it does not recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority of the
Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3,
Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear out of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden
of confronting the issue of whether or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign
country. What happens to the other citizenship was not made a concern of Rep. Act No.
9225.
2. Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is not a self-
executing provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance. In Sections
2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se,
but with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of
origin even after their naturalization. Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that
would set specific parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance. Until this is done, it
would be premature for the judicial department, including this Court, to rule on issues
pertaining to dual allegiance.

Moreover, in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, we said that the courts must assume that the

legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and passed
laws with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right and
advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence, in determining whether the acts of the
legislature are in tune with the fundamental law, we must proceed with judicial restraint and
act with caution and forbearance. The doctrine of separation of powers demands no less. We
cannot arrogate the duty of setting the parameters of what constitutes dual allegiance when
the Constitution itself has clearly delegated the duty of determining what acts constitute
dual allegiance for study and legislation by Congress.

Caballero vs COMELEC

FACTS:
Rogelio was a naturalised Canadian citizen who reacquired his Philippine citizenship
under Republic Act 9225 on September 13, 2010 by taking the Oath of Allegiance before the
Philippine Consul General in Toronto, Canada. He became a dual citizen as such. He
subsequently renounced Canadian citizenship by executing an Affidavit of Renunciation before
a Notary Public in Batanes on October 1, 2012 pursuant to Section 5(2) of RA 9225 and filed his
certificate of candidacy (COC) for mayor of Ayugan, Batanes. His opponent, Enrique Nanud,
filed a petition to deny due course to his COC, alleging that he made a false representation
when he declared in his COC that he was eligible to run for Mayor of Uyugan, Batanes

despite being a Canadian citizen and a nonresident thereof. On the other hand, petition Rogelio
argues that he did not lose his domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes despite becoming a
Canadian citizen as he merely left Uyugan temporarily to pursue a brighter future for him and
his family; and that he went back to Uyugan during his vacation while working in Nigeria,
California, and finally in Canada. During the 2013 election, Rogelio won the race. On May 3,
2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution finding that petitioner made a material
misrepresentation in his COC when he declared that he is a resident of Barangay Imnajbu,
Uyugan, Batanes within one year prior to the election. It found that while petitioner complied
with the requirements of RA No. 9225 since he had taken his Oath of Allegiance to the
Philippines and had validly renounced his Canadian citizenship, he failed to comply with the
other requirements provided under RA No. 9225 for those seeking elective office, i.e., persons
who renounced their foreign citizenship must still comply with the one year residency
requirement provided for under Section 39 of the Local Government Code. Petitioner’s
naturalization as a Canadian citizen resulted in the abandonment of his domicile of origin in
Uyugan, Batanes; thus, having abandoned his domicile of origin, it is incumbent upon him to
prove that he was able to reestablish his domicile in Uyugan for him to be eligible to run for
elective office in said locality which he failed to do. Rogelio moved to reconsider, but the
COMELEC En Banc denied it. In the meantime, Enrique was installed to the post by virtue of a
writ of execution which then Comelec Chairman Sixto Brillantes Jr. Issued. Rogelio filed the
instant petition for certiorari to assail the COMELEC ruling cancelling his certificate of
candidacy.

Issue:

Whether or not Rogelio complied with the residency requirement under the Local Government
Code.
Ruling:

We are not convinced. While private respondent failed to comply with the above-mentioned
requirements, the settled rule, however, is that the COMELEC Rules of Procedure are subject to
liberal construction. Moreover, the COMELEC may exercise its power to suspend its own rules
as provided under Section 4, Rule 1 of their Rules of Procedure. Sec. 4. Suspension of the
Rules. – In the interest of justice and in order to obtain speedy disposition of all matters pending
before the Commission, these rules or any portion thereof may be suspended by the
Commission. Under this authority, the Commission is similarly enabled to cope with all
situations without concerning itself about procedural niceties that do not square with the need to
do justice, in any case without further loss of time, provided that the right of the parties to a full
day in court is not substantially impaired.

David vs. Agbay G.R. No. 199113 March

18, 2015 Retroactivity of laws,
Citizenship, R.A. 9225
AUGUST 4, 2018

FACTS:

Petitioner migrated to Canada where he became a Canadian citizen by naturalization. Upon

retirement, petitioner and his wife returned to the Philippines and purchased a lot along the beach
in Oriental Mindoro where they constructed a residential house. However, the portion where they
built their house is public land and part of the salvage zone.

 
Petitioner filed a Miscellaneous Lease Application (MLA) over the subject land with the DENR.
In the said application, petitioner indicated that he is a Filipino citizen.

Private respondent Editha Agbay opposed the application on the ground that petitioner, a
Canadian citizen, is disqualified to own land. She also filed a criminal complaint for falsification
of public documents under Article 172 of the RPC against the petitioner.

Meanwhile, petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the provisions of Republic Act
No. 9225.

The CENRO rejected petitioner’s MLA, ruling that petitioner’s subsequent re-acquisition of
Philippine citizenship did not cure the defect in his MLA which was void ab initio.

An information for Falsification of Public Document was filed before the MTC and a warrant of
arrest was issued against the petitioner.

Since the crime for which petitioner was charged was alleged and admitted to have been
committed before he had re- acquired his Philippine citizenship, the MTC concluded that
petitioner was at that time still a Canadian citizen.

Petitioner elevated the case to the RTC via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, alleging grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the MTC. The petition was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner may be indicted for falsification for representing himself as a Filipino
in his Public Land Application despite his subsequent re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship
under the provisions of R.A. 9225.

RULING:

Considering that petitioner was naturalized as a Canadian citizen prior to the effectivity of R.A.
9225, he belongs to the first category of natural- born Filipinos under the first paragraph of
Section 3 who lost Philippine citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country. As the new law
allows dual citizenship, he was able to re-acquire his Philippine citizenship by taking the
required oath of allegiance.

For the purpose of determining the citizenship of petitioner at the time of filing his MLA, it is
not necessary to discuss the rulings in Frivaldo and Altarejos on the retroactivity of such
reacquisition because R.A. 9225 itself treats those of his category as having already lost
Philippine citizenship, in contradistinction to those natural-born Filipinos who became foreign
citizens after R.A. 9225 came into force. In other words, Section 2 declaring the policy that
considers Filipinos who became foreign citizens as not to have lost their Philippine citizenship,
should be read together with Section 3, the second paragraph of which clarifies that such policy
governs all cases after the new law’s effectivity.

Petitioner made the untruthful statement in the MLA, a public document, that he is a Filipino
citizen at the time of the filing of said application, when in fact he was then still a Canadian
citizen.

Under CA 63, the governing law at the time he was naturalized as Canadian citizen,
naturalization in a foreign country was among those ways by which a natural-born citizen loses
his Philippine citizenship. While he re-acquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 six
months later, the falsification was already a consummated act, the said law having no retroactive
effect insofar as his dual citizenship status is concerned. The MTC therefore did not err in
finding probable cause for falsification of public document under Article 172, paragraph 1.

MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR. vs.COMELEC, FPJ and

VICTORINO X. FORNIER, 
VICTORINO X. FORNIER, vs. HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FPJ
Facts:

Petitioners sought for respondent Poe’s disqualification in the presidential elections for having
allegedly misrepresented material facts in his (Poe’s) certificate of candidacy by claiming that he is a
natural Filipino citizen despite his parents both being foreigners. Comelec dismissed the petition,
holding that Poe was a Filipino Citizen. Petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the Comelec, contending
that only the Supreme Court may resolve the basic issue on the case under  Article VII, Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.

Issue:

Whether or not it is the Supreme Court which had jurisdiction.

Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Poe was a Filipino
citizen.

Ruling:

1.)   The Supreme Court had no jurisdiction on questions regarding “qualification of a candidate” for
the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.

“Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal”  in connection with Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution, refers to “contests” relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the “President”
or “Vice-President”, of the Philippines which the Supreme Court may take cognizance, and not of
“candidates” for President or Vice-President before the elections.

2.)   Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding Poe as a Filipino Citizen.

The 1935 Constitution on Citizenship, the prevailing fundamental law on respondent’s birth, provided
that among the citizens of the Philippines are “those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.”

Tracing respondent’s paternal lineage, his grandfather Lorenzo, as evidenced by the latter’s death
certificate was identified as a Filipino Citizen. His citizenship was also drawn from the presumption
that having died in 1954 at the age of 84, Lorenzo would have been born in 1870. In the absence of
any other evidence, Lorenzo’s place of residence upon his death in 1954 was presumed to be the
place of residence prior his death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the “en masse
Filipinization” that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. Being so, Lorenzo’s citizenship would
have extended to his son, Allan—respondent’s father.

Respondent, having been acknowledged as Allan’s son to Bessie, though an American citizen,   was
a Filipino citizen by virtue of paternal filiation as evidenced by the respondent’s birth certificate. The
1935 Constitution on citizenship did not make a distinction on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the
child, thus, the allegation of bigamous marriage and the allegation that respondent was born only
before the assailed marriage had no bearing on respondent’s citizenship in view of the established
paternal filiation evidenced by the public documents presented.

But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to
hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of
candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code.
 MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioners,
vs.
COMELEC, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, ANTONIO P. CONTRERAS AND
AMADO D. VALDEZ Respondents.
  G.R. No. 221698-700
PEREZ, J.:
Facts:
Petitioner Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares was found abandoned as a
newborn infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo on Sept. 3, 1968. After passing the
parental care and custody over petitioner by Edgardo Militar to Emiliano Militar and
his wife, she has been reported and registered as a foundling and issued a Foundling
Certificate and Certificate of Live Birth, thus was given the name, Mary Grace
Natividad Contreras Militar.

When the petitioner reached the age of five (5), celebrity spouses Ronal Allan Kelley
(aka Fernando Poe, Jr) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (aka Susan Roces) filed a petition foe
her adoption. The trial court granted their petition and ordered that her name be
changed to Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe.

Petitioner registered as a voter in San Juan City at the age of 18 in 1986; in 1988, she
applied and was issued Philippine Passport by the DFA; in 1993 and 1998, she
renewed her passport.

She left for the United States (U.S.) in 1988 to continue her studies after enrolling and
pursuing a degree in Development Studies at the University of the Philippines. She
graduated in 1991 from Boston College where she earned her Bachelor of Arts degree
in Political Studies.

She married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares, a citizen of both the Philippines
and the U.S., in San Juan City and decided to flew back to the U.S. after their
wedding. She gave birth to her eldest child while in the U.S.; and her two daughters in
the Philippines.

She became a naturalized American citizen in 2001. She came back to the Philippines
to support her father’s candidacy for president in the May 2004 elections and gave
birth to her youngest daughter. They then returned to the U.S. in 2004 but after few
months, she rushed back to the Philippines to attend to her ailing father. After her
father’s death, the petitioner and her husband decided to move and reside permanently
in the Philippines in 2005 and immediately secured a TIN, then her children followed
suit; acquired property where she and her children resided.
In 2006, She took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant
to RA No. 9225 or the Citizenship retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003; she filed
a sworn petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship together with petitions for
derivative citizenship on behalf of her three children which was granted. She
registered as a voter; secured Philippine passport; appointed and took her oath as
Chairperson of the MTRCB after executing an affidavit of Renunciation of American
citizenship before the Vice Consul of the USA and was issued a Certificate of Loss of
Nationality of the USA in 2011.

In 2012, she filed with the COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for
Senator for the 2013 Elections wherein she answered “6 years and 6 months” to the
question “Period of residence in the Philippines before May 13, 2013.” Petitioner
obtained the highest number of votes and was proclaimed Senator on 16 May 2013.

On 15 October 2015, petitioner filed her COC for the Presidency for the May 2016
Elections. In her COC, the petitioner declared that she is a natural-born citizen and
that her residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016 would be ten
(10) years and eleven (11) months counted from 24 May 2005. The petitioner attached
to her COC an “Affidavit Affirming Renunciation of U.S.A. Citizenship” subscribed
and sworn to before a notary public in Quezon City on 14 October 2015.

Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the
ground particularly, among others, that she cannot be considered a natural-born
Filipino citizen since she cannot prove that her biological parents or either of them
were Filipinos.  The COMELEC en banc cancelled her candidacy on the ground that
she was in want of citizenship and residence requirements, and that she committed
material misrepresentations in her COC.

On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed the ruling and held (9-6 votes) that Poe is
qualified as a candidate for Presidency.  Three justices, however, abstained to vote on
the natural-born citizenship issue.
Issue:
Whether or not Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino
citizen.

Held: 
Yes. Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares may be considered a natural-born
Filipino.
It ruled that a foundling is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines as there is no
restrictive language which would definitely exclude foundlings as they are already
impliedly so recognized.

There are also no provisions in the Constitution with intent or language permitting
discrimination against foundlings as the three Constitutions guarantee the basic right
to equal protection of the laws.

Foundlings are citizens under international law as this is supported by some treaties,
adhering to the customary rule to presume foundlings as having born of the country in
which the foundling is found.

ISSUE: Is Grace a natural-born citizen or a naturalized citizen

or something in between?
HELD: Grace is a natural-born citizen. Adopting these legal
principles from the 1930 Hague Convention and the 1961 Convention on
Statelessness is rational and reasonable and consistent with the jus
sanguinis regime in our Constitution. The presumption of natural-born
citizenship of foundlings stems from the presumption that their parents
are nationals of the Philippines. As the empirical data provided by the
PSA show, that presumption is at more than 99% and is a virtual
certainty.

It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the

present Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those
who are natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance
with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, ie., did not have to
undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship,
necessarily is a natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said
enumeration of a separate category for persons who, after losing
Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is
clear: as to such persons, they would either be natural-born or
naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and
the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof.
As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization
proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-
born Filipino.