ETHICS & BEHAVIOR, 1(4), 221-238 Copyright © 1991, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc. The Ethical Foundations of Behavior Therapy Richard F. Kitchener Department of Philosophy Colorado State University In this article, I am concerned with the ethical foundations of behavior therapy, that is, with the normative ethics and the meta-ethics underlying behavior ther- apy. In particular, I am concerned with questions concerning the very possibility of providing an ethical justification for things done in the context of therapy. Because behavior therapists must be able to provide an ethical justification for various actions (if the need arises), certain meta-ethical views widely accepted by behavior therapists must be abandoned; in particular, one must give up ethical subjectivism, ethical skepticism, and ethical relativism. An additional task is to show how it is possible to provide a nonsubjective, nonskeptical, and nonrelativ- istic moral justification for an ethical statement. Although this is a monumental task, I provide a rough sketch of such a model, one that is congenial to the value judgments underlying behavior therapy Key words: behavior therapy, ethical reasoning, moral judgment In this article, I am concerned with the ethical foundations of behavior ther- apy." I believe it will be accepted by virtually all behavior therapists that there are distinctive ethical issues facing behavior therapy, ones that cannot be ignored or dismissed as “pseudo-issues.” Indeed given the spate of articles on the ethics of behavior therapy and behavior modification that have appeared in the last two decades, it seems clear that behavior therapists do recognize the need to address these underlying ethical issues and to construct a set of ethical principles for their discipline (Erwin, 1978), including ethical guidelines (Asso- ciation for Advancement of Behavior Therapy [AABT], 1977). Requests for reprints should be sent to Richard F. Kitchener, Department of Philosophy, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO 80523. ‘In this article, I do not distinguish behavior therapy from behavior modification. Conse- quently, when [use the term behavior therapy, I am also including behavior modification even though it may be possible to distinguish the two.222 KITCHENER If one is concerned with the ethical foundations of some discipline, one is concerned with two things: normative ethics and meta-ethics. (For a brief discussion of the difference between these two, see Nielsen, 1967, or O’Dona- hue, Fisher, & Krasner, 1987.) Normative ethics deals with questions concern- ing what a person ought to do, what kinds of things are good both intrinsically and instrumentally, what are the rights of individuals, what is justice, and so forth. In the context of behavior therapy, normative ethics examines questions such as: What is the behavior therapist’s ethical duty or obligation? For example, must a therapist’s duty or obligation always benefit the client? What behavioral outcomes are intrinsically good and desirable? What procedures are instrumentally good toward obtaining these desirable therapeutic goals? What are the moral (as distinct from the legal) rights of clients? For example, do they have a moral right to treatment? By contrast, meta-ethics deals with higher level, more reflective questions concerning (a) the nature and meaning of moral concepts and (b) the nature of moral justification and moral reasoning. Because it would be impossible to discuss both of these areas in a single article, I focus on questions about the meta-ethics of behavior therapy. Briefly put, my thesis is that there is a wide- spread set of meta-ethical views espoused by behavior therapists that is incor- rect and incoherent, contradicting other basic beliefs they have and behaviors they manifest. After suggesting what these incorrect views are, I sketch a model of justification that makes moral justification possible and that contains basic principles similar to several values characterizing the goals of behavior therapy. MORAL JUSTIFICATION AND BEHAVIOR THERAPY It is widely agreed and well established that behavior therapists are respon- sible for what they do in therapy (Davison & Stuart, 1975; Hawkins, 1975; Krasner, 1962, 1965, 1969; Schnaitter, 1977; Stolz, 1975, 1978). For exam- ple, they are held accountable for the choice of treatment, for monitoring the progress of the client, for not violating the rights of the client, and so on (Krapfi, 1975; Stolz, 1975, 1978). It is widely conceded that the thera- pist’s values enter into the process of therapy both with regard to the goals chosen (Bandura, 1969; Feldman & Peay, 1982: Hawkins, 1975; Krasner & Ullmann, 1973; Stolz, 1975) and to the means or techniques employed (Bandura, 1969; Begelman, 1971, 1973, 1975; Goldiamond, 1974). But if this is so, then the therapist must be able to justify these value judgments (Feldman & Peay, 1982; Goldiamond, 1974; Kanfer, 1965; Krasner, 1976; O'Donahue et al., 1987; Ullmann, 1969). It should not be thought that the point just made is merely an abstractBEHAVIOR THERAPY 223. philosophical idea that has no real bearing on moral discussions of behavior therapy, for there are several examples of behavior by behavior therapists that have been judged to be morally improper. The most widespread case is that of Cotter (1967), which has been criticized on ethical grounds by Be- gelman (1975), Feldman and Peay (1982), Krasner (1976), and Stuart (1973) for being “ethically mismanaged,” a “flagrant abuse” of others, a “misuse of behavior modification,” a “violation of the rights of others,” an example of “coercion,” and so forth. Another example of charges of ethical misbehavior concerns the use of succinylcholine chloride (anectine) in aver- sive conditioning involving alcoholism, deviant sexual behavior, and so on, in which informed consent was absent (e.g, Bandura, 1975; Rachman & Teasdale, 1969). As recent court decisions have pointed out, behavior thera- pists can be held legally liable (blameworthy) for certain kinds of behaviors involving, say, token economies, and as members of professional organiza- tions (e.g., the AABT and the American Psychological Association), they can be held accountable for the violation of these professional ethical stan- dards. In response to charges that they did what was morally wrong, it must be (logically) possible for them to give a moral justification for what they did. For if it were not possible to do so because of their underlying ethical principles, if in their reply they merely said that they did it because it was their personal preference or personal bias, this would not be an adequate response. If, for example, they were charged with raping a client (and there was a real basis to the charge), it would be ludicrous to fail to provide a defense on the grounds that it is never possible to offer moral justifications; it is only a matter of personal bias. Indeed, if it were merely a matter of personal bias, then not only could the defendant not provide any justification, but no one could ever justifiably make ethical judgments condemning his or her behavior—some- thing that is frequently done by behavior therapists. It must be logically possible, therefore, for the behavior therapist to provide moral justification. But this conclusion conflicts with several other important meta-ethical views maintained with equal resolve by several behaviorists and behavior therapists—namely, ethical relativism, ethical subjectivism, and ethi- cal skepticism. If one holds these latter meta-ethical views,’ then it is not possible to engage in the moral justification of one’s actions. Either behavior therapy must give up the possibility of moral justification, or it must give up relativism, subjectivism, and skepticism. Because it cannot and should not give up moral justification, it must abandon relativism, subjectivism, and skepti- cism. "In the subsequent pages, I often use meta-ethical and ethical interchangeably when no obvious confusion will result.224 KITCHENER ETHICAL RELATIVISM, SUBJECTIVISM, AND SKEPTICISM Three ethical views, widely held by behavior therapists, concern the logical and epistemic standing of moral concepts and moral reasoning: ethical subjectiv- ism, ethical skepticism, and ethical relativism. Meta-Ethical Subjectivism Many behavior therapists and psychologists, including many individuals at odds with behaviorism (e.g., Freud, 1962; Rogers, 1956), appear to believe in meta-ethical subjectivism (Bandura, 1969; Day, 1977; Feldman, 1976; Feld- man & Peay, 1982; Fishman, Rotgers, & Franks, 1988; Kendall & Bacon, 1988; Krasner & Houts, 1984; Krasner & Ullmann, 1973; Reese & Freemouw, 1984; Rotgers, 1988; Stuart, 1973; Ullmann & Krasner, 1969; Woolfolk & Richardson, 1984). This view has been expressed in several ways, as the thesis that values are just feelings, personal biases, and personal preferences (UII- mann & Krasner, 1969); values are selected or chosen (Fishman et al., 1988; Krasner & Ullmann, 1973); value judgments are acts of commitment, analo- gous to religious conversion involving faith (Kendall & Bacon, 1988; Rotgers, 1988); value judgments are arbitrary, not objective (Feldman, 1976; Feldman & Peay, 1982; Krasner & Ullmann, 1973; Reese & Freemouw, 1984); and so forth. Although these various views are expressed in different terms, they express a common underlying point of view: meta-ethical subjectivism. There are two forms of meta-ethical subjectivism. First, ethical statements are true or false and are reports of one’s feelings (emotions) or beliefs. Second, ethical statements are neither true nor false and are not really propositions at all; they are the very expression of one’s emotions, feelings, or attitudes— emotivism.’ Although emotivism is a well-known meta-ethical position among moral philosophers, it has never had wide acceptance among psychologists (see, however, Day, 1977; Feldman, 1976; Feldman & Peay, 1982; Krasner & Ullmann, 1973) and, hence, is ignored here. The essence of meta-ethical subjectivism is its contrast with meta-ethical objectivism. For a meta-ethical subjectivist, an ethical statement such as “x is wrong” is to be translated into a statement like “I (or others) have a negative emotion or belief about x." If it is a negative emotion (e.g., disgust), this is clearly subjective because it is merely personal and does not purport to be about the objective moral standing of x or about any rational basis for this emotional feeling. After all, if one feels emotional disgust or heightened arousal at a picture of a naked “The term feeling is ambiguous between an internal emotion (“‘I feel nauseous”) and a guarded speliefas when one.says, “T.Geeln.is.the case.” Resauve of this ambiguity. 1 discuss nach spnacately.BEHAVIOR THERAPY 225 male, this has no bearing on the truth value of any statement about an objective moral property of this male, nor does such an emotion count as epistemic evidence for there being some objective and intrinsic property about this object (as different from its causal effects on the person). Hence, in matters of emo- tion, it is just a matter of personal taste, and de gustibus non est disputandum (“in matters of taste there can be no disagreement”; Feigl, 1963).* At other times, the meta-ethical subjectivist speaks not about emotions but about mere beliefs, subjective choices, or value commitments. Suppose an ethical statement were a mere belief in the sense that it was just an internal subjective state lacking any rational support. This is often the sense in which behavior therapists write about their value judgments being personal prefer- ences or personal beliefs. For example, after writing that “violating the rights of clients is bad” or “forcing a client into aversive conditioning with succinyl- choline chloride without his or her consent is bad,” one will often find these same authors saying: “But this is our personal opinion (bias, preference)”—for example, see Krasner, 1976, and Rachman and Teasdale, 1969. What can such statements mean? Of course, every opinion one has is one’s own personal opinion (Whose else would it be?). But apparently these authors mean more than this; they mean that these judgments are merely their personal opinion in the sense intended by meta-ethical subjectivism, namely, that they are beliefs that have no objective basis, no good reasons, and no evidential backing of any kind. Hence, they are arbitrary and without any foundation. The natural response, of course, is to reply: “But then why should others believe them?” or “Keep your personal prejudices out of this.” What is the point of including them in an article addressing ethical issues? If they are relevant to the claims being made in the article, then, of course, they need to be scientifically backed by evidence and to be well supported by logical reasons. This is one of the tacit rules of science—One’s personal biases do not belong in scientific discussions! But, of course, if this were to happen, then they could not make the ethical indictments they do. But if so, then how can behavior therapists even write about the ethical issues underlying behavior therapy? Likewise, when one suggests that values are chosen, one is suggesting that “This meta-ethical view is to be contrasted with a close cousin (ie., hedonism). Hedonism claims that what is instrumentally good is what produces pleasure and that pleasure is intrinsically good. Egoistic hedonism maintains that what is instrumentally good is what produces pleasure in the individual and that what is intrinsically good is what is pleasing to the individual. If pleasure were equivalent to some inner feeling of the individual, then what is good, on this view, would simply be this internal feeling. On this view, however, it would be possible to offer moral justifica- tion. Meta-ethical subjectivism is quite different, however, because it is a thesis about the very meaning of value terms (a thesis about what a moral reason is). I must add that I do not believe that egoistic hedonism can be defended as an adequate moral principle and, a fortiori, it cannot provide the pillar for the ethical foundations of behavior therapy, even though it is a widespread view.226 =~ KITCHENER value judgments or beliefs are like existential leaps of faith, a stance or attitude adopted toward one’s being in the world. Such acts of commitment (Bartley, 1984; Trigg, 1973), like Kierkegaard’s (1846/1941) leap of faith, are not ratio- nal choices (nor irrational ones) but rather “‘a-rational” ones: They create the very framework within which rationality can operate. They are commitments, however, in the sense that one believes them, but this act of commitment is precisely like an a-rational religious conversion. In short, this is an instance of fideism: This view can also be found in philosophers such as Carnap (1947), Wittgenstein (1953), and Kuhn (1970). If ethical statements are just personal preferences without any objective standing, then it will be impossible to give an ethical justification for a decision or an action. To give a justification of something is to give reasons, evidence, and the like, which are themselves good reasons and adequately support the conclusion. If the reasons advanced are merely one’s personal preferences, then one can neither rationally defend them nor be blamed for holding them. One can believe that Blacks should be sterilized because they are innately inferior, that homosexuals should have no rights whatsoever, or that the second coming of Christ is immanent, and because these are merely personal biases, one cannot be required to give a moral and rational justification for them because, by definition, this is impossible. Correlatively, no one else can rationally criti- cize them, I cannot be judged to have failed to give a moral justification, and so forth. In short, anything I do in therapy, no matter how ethically heinous, can be “rationally defended” by citing my existential commitments that, by definition, are beyond discussion. This, I suggest, is an ethically untenable situation. Consequently, ethical subjectivism must be rejected. Ethical Relativism Ethical relativism is a view explicitly endorsed by several behavior therapists and psychologists (Feldman, 1976; Feldman & Peay, 1982; Gergen, 1982; Krapfi & Vargas, 1977; Krasner, 1969; Krasner & Houts, 1984; Reese & Freemouw, 1984; Silber, 1976; Ullmann & Krasner, 1969). There are numer- ous kinds of relativism, but I will mention only the three most relevant ones. According to descriptive relativism, no individuals (cultures) actually have the same values. There are no universal values (value judgments) shared by all individuals (cultures).* What is distinctive about this claim is its straightfor- ward empirical status, which is verifiable or falsifiable by ordinary scientific means. Many psychologists believe that descriptive relativism is correct and “There are two versions of descriptive relativism, depending on whether one is referring to individual persons or cultures. Because many psychologists endorse both views, I have included the cultural variant.BEHAVIOR THERAPY = 227 that there is substantial empirical evidence in favor of it. Although I have serious doubts about such empirical evidence and what it shows, for the present I simply accept the truth of its claim. In normative relativism, what actually is correct is relative to the individual (culture): (a) Different individuals (cultures) have different value judgments (descriptive psychological relativism), and (b) all of these views are correct. Normative relativism is a thesis about what is actually morally correct. That is why it is a normative thesis and not merely a descriptive or empirical one. As such it is opposed to ethical skepticism. It advocates ethical pluralism and is opposed to ethical absolutism, the view that there is only one correct value judgment or principle. Finally, meta-ethical relativism is the view that there is no single criterion for judging the correctness (objectivity, rationality) of moral statements. The criterion of correctness is relative to the individual (culture); that is, different individuals (cultures) have different criteria of correctness, and all of them are correct. This view assumes that meta-ethical skepticism is incorrect and claims to be giving us a meta-ethical proposition that is true. What reason is given for thinking that all of these vastly different criteria, some of which are con- trary to the others, are correct? Such a view is incoherent (Kitchener, 1980) and really is indistinguishable from meta-ethical skepticism. Clearly, meta-ethical relativism is obviously incompatible with moral justi- fication. For if this view is correct, then anyone can justify anything in that they need only refer to a standard of some kind that will be true for them; for example, the behavior of raping one’s client is justified by the following princi- ple: All women ought to be raped, which is correct for the therapist. Clearly, what is crucial is not merely the possession of a principle (which justifies some action); the real question is over the principle itself—Is it arbitrary or weli founded? Many behavior therapists apparently believe that one cannot raise such questions about the principle itself, Indeed, following the influence of Kuhn (1970), they suggest that moral judgments are relative to a paradigm or world view that justifies a particular moral judgment but that these paradigms them- selves cannot be evaluated or rationally compared. (For a contrary argument, see Erwin, 1988, and Siegel, 1987.) This is so because there are no criteria of evaluation not relative to the paradigm by means of which one can rationally and/or morally compare the two paradigms in question. Clearly, this is an “To show that normative relativism is true, one needs a further premise in addition to descrip- tive relativism. Earlier (see Kitchener, 1980), I examined one such premise, a version of radical naturalism in which ought is reduced to is (e.g., positive reinforcer). Because I have already criticized that argument and others (e.g., see Begelman, 1971, 1973, 1975) have also raised objections, I will not repeat them here.228 = KITCHENER example of ethical skepticism (Ward, 1980). But if ethical skepticism were true and there was no way to evaluate the adequacy of one’s principle, then any- thing goes. The therapist-rapist cannot be condemned (because he or she can appeal to higher personal principles that justify the action), and this higher principle itself cannot be called into question. On this view, we are not entitled to criticize a personal moral principle (because this is logically impossible), and we cannot condemn the behavior. What was done must be judged to be morally acceptable. This can hardly be adequate. Meta-Ethical Skepticism Meta-ethical skepticism is a thesis about the logic and epistemology of ethical judgments. Although it is not a view that one finds explicitly endorsed by behavior therapists, it is a view that many of them tacitly endorse. Those who adopt ethical subjectivism and ethical relativism often appeal to ethical skepti- cism in defending their other meta-ethical positions. In many ways, it is the cornerstone for both views. Meta-ethical skepticism is the view that one cannot know anything in the ethical realm. One can have beliefs about, say, what one’s duty is, but this is the most that one can have. One certainly cannot know what one’s duty moral beliefs cannot be adequately justified or true, and so on. Meta-ethical skepticism can be defended in at least three ways. First, by claiming there is no independently existing realm of moral truth and falsity by means of which ethical statements can be judged to be true or false. If so, then one can deny that ethical statements can ever be true or false. This view is an attack on moral realism and its underlying correspondence theory of truth (for recent defenses of moral realism, see Brink, 1989; Sayre-McCord, 1988). Sec- ‘ond, one can deny that there are, strictly speaking, moral beliefs at all. For if (like emotivism) one maintains that expressions of moral beliefs are not really propositions at all, they cannot be either true or false. Finally, by denying that there ever is any adequate evidence (criteria) for ethical beliefs, one can defend ethical skepticism. Clearly, if there is no adequate evidence for ethical beliefs, ‘one can never justify a moral belief. In short, if ethical skepticism is true, moral justification is impossible; however, if moral justification is possible, ethical skepticism must be false. Because behavior therapists insist on the possibility of moral justification, they must abandon ethical skepticism. If ethical skepticism is false, then there must be moral evidence, moral criteria, and so forth that adequately establish and “ground” certain ethical conclusions. What are such criteria? In short, it must be shown, in a positive way, how moral knowledge is possible, and this amounts to showing that there are canons of rationality and evidence underly- ing one’s moral judgments. For many thinkers, the major problem facing anyBEHAVIOR THERAPY 229. ethical view is to provide such a justification. This is the task to which I now turn. A MODEL OF ETHICAL JUSTIFICATION ‘Suppose that ethical subjectivism, ethical relativism, and ethical skepticism are wrong. Can one provide a contrary alternative set of views that is rationally and morally defensible? Although I do not have the time to develop such a full-fledged account, I can at least sketch a possible model of justification, one that is not only promising but one that is fundamentally compatible with the basic value judgments made by behavior therapists, those concerning the very goals of behavior therapy. The task before me is to provide some kind of justification of one’s ultimate or basic moral principles, a justification that does not beg important moral issues but one that is rationally defensible. Such a task has been viewed by many as impossible. According to them, any such attempt is doomed to failure because of what is known as the Munchhausen trilemma.’ The Munchhausen Trilemma According to the Munchhausen trilemma, any kind of justification must ulti- mately face a trilemma: either one’s justification will constitute an infinite regress, a vicious circle, or an arbitrary commitment. Suppose some principle, p, justifies some particular conclusion, g. Then what justifies p? Suppose r justifies p. Then what justifies r? And so on ad infinitum. Second, one can justify g by reference to p, and p may be justified in relation to 7, and r can be justified in turn by reference to g. But here we have a vicious circle. Finally, q can be justified by p, and p can be justified by r, but because you must avoid an infinite regress and a vicious circle, the process of justification stops by one’s arbitrary (ie., nonjustified) decision to adopt r—fideism. Clearly, this is a dilemma, It is because of the Munchhausen trilemma that so many philosophers have mistakenly adopted a fourth alternative: radical foundationalism, according to which our ultimate principle of justification justifies everything else but is itself in no need of justification by other propositions. This is because it is self- justifying, because the principle itself is absolutely certain, incapable of doubt, intuitively obvious, impossible to doubt, and so on. However, in light of the well-known failure of radical foundationalism in epistemology and philosophy "This was named for Baron von Munchhausen, who allegedly attempted to pull himself up out of the mud by grabbing his hair and pulling.230 KITCHENER of science, one can hardly expect it to fare better in ethics. But what can be offered in its place? How to Escape From This Trilemma There are several things wrong with the Munchhausen trilemma, but for our purposes a basic defect concerns the very notion of justification presupposed by this trilemma and tacitly accepted by most behavior therapists; namely, justification must be deduction: To justify a proposition, p, one must find another proposition, q (or a set of propositions 4,, ¢2,...4,) together with a set of auxiliary propositions, 7, such that (together with r) logically entails 9 (q is a deductive consequence of p and 7). This deductive model of justification is widespread and has a broad ap- peal, but it should be rejected as the only notion of justification. There are, at least, two problems with it. First, it is committed to epistemic infallibil- ism. Because, by definition, deduction (ie., a deductively valid argument) is absolutely certain, the conclusion itself seems to be absolutely certain (given the premises). This kind of certainty, which is rare and infrequent indeed, is a misleading aspiration for justification in general and must be rejected for ethical justification. The Quest for Certainty (Dewey, 1938) is a will-o’-the- wisp, rooted in the epistemological tradition of radical foundationalism,* which claims that (a) there must be foundations for what one believes such that (b) these foundations are absolutely certain, incorrigible, infallible, and so forth. But scientific knowledge is fallible, corrigible, and subject to per- petual revision as new evidence accumulates. Indeed, inductive logic, which is arguably the logic of science, is by definition less than absolutely certain. In short, our model here must be one of fallible justification and not abso- lutely certain justification. Second, this deductive model of justification, together with its correlative assumption of infallibility, leads to an infinite regress, which can only be overcome by claiming, at some point, nondeductive but absolutely certain justification of one’s first principles. Descartes’s (1701/1955) solution to this problem was to argue that there was a nondeductive but infallible mode of justification—intuition of first principles (self-evident truths). But I think vir- tually no one today will take this solution very seriously. If one does, however, ‘Radical (infallible) foundationalism must be distinguished from modest (fallible) founda- tionalisin (Alston, 1976; Pastin, 1978; Pollock, 1986), which maintains that there are basic propositions but that these basic propositions need not be infallible. Although virtually all con- temporary epistemologists reject radical foundationalism, many of them continue to hold some version of modest foundationalism. I believe some version of modest foundationalism is most likely correct and is certainly compatible with everything I have said in this article.BEHAVIOR THERAPY 231 then how can one establish the absolutely certain truth of one’s ultimate principles? Third, this deductive mode of justification leads to a mistaken view of rationality I will call the “algorithmic model of rationality.” According to this model, which we have mistakenly interpreted as being characteristic of the rationality found in logic and mathematics,’ in order to have rational (logical) principles, such principles must be algorithmic, that is, explicit and clearly specified mechanical principles that anyone could follow (even a machine), such that an unambiguous and certain answer to the question could be found in a finite amount of time. If one has such an algorithmic principle, then there can be no disagreement among individuals; for merely by following the princi- ple, everyone (including one’s opponents) will come to reach the same conclu- sion. This model of rationality is mistaken, however. It is not a necessary condition of rationality that one possess a set of rules, which if successfully followed will be effective in converting one’s logical opponent and settling all disputes. Rationality does not require such algorithmic agreement any more than science requires all the accumulated data (evidence) to unequivocally point to the truth of one scientific hypothesis or theory. If scientific theories are underdetermined by the data and still can retain their credibility, conclu- sions about less certain matters may be underdetermined by one’s reasons and still retain their rationality. Because rationality and objectivity need not be algorithmic, it remains possible for there to be less than complete and total unanimous agreement over moral principles and yet allow for the various parties to be rationally and morally justified in their opposing views."° Although there is room for some diversity of viewpoints, however, it does not follow that anything goes and that there is indefinite plurality. This was one major mistake of relativism: to insist ‘on a radical pluralism that amounts to anarchy and to mistake tolerance for radical ethical pluralism (see Krausz & Meiland, 1982). "That this model of rationality is mistakenly ascribed to logic and mathematics has been shown by Gadel (1931/1962), Church (1936), and Tarski (1936/1956), who have proven that there is no effective decision procedure (an algorithm) for formal-logical systems rich enough to include mathematics. There are, in short, certain properties of such formal-logical systems (e., truth, provability, consistency) for which there are no algorithms. “This is because rationality Gustification) is an epistemic concept, not an ontological one, and is relative to one’s epistemic perspective. Although one can argue that there is only one truth in reality—which requires univocality--when it comes to epistemic matters involving evidence, justification, and rationality, there is bound to be equivocality. No scientist would argue that just because a scientific theory is extremely well justified by the evidence that it is therefore true; no scientist would argue that there cannot be two (or more) theories both of which are justified by the evidence. If this is not required in the area of science, why should it be required in the area of moral justification? Should we assess morality according to a standard more stringent and extreme than that used in the sciences?232 KITCHENER SEE ITLL meee UTED mone 1 ee gece i: Ganeral Moral Principles j Vertiestion (Deduetive) wv Particular Moral Judgments FIGURE 1 The four-stage vindication model of justification Verification, Validation, Vindication, and Rational Choice If one rejects the deductive model of justification, then the way is open for alternative, nondeductive notions of justification (e.g., an inductive notion of justification, a Popperian model of falsifiability, etc.). In the context of moral justification, the vindication model of justification seems particularly promis- ing.'' It is rooted in the work of Baier (1958), Falk (1986), Rawls (1971), and especially in the work of Feigl (1952, 1963) and Taylor (1961). According to its most well-known defender (Taylor, 1961), it involves a four-stage model of justification (see Figure 1): I distinguish four general phases in the over-all process of justifying value judg- ments: verification, validation, vindication and rational choice. We verify value judgments by appeal either to standards or to rules which we have adopted. We validate standards or rules (Le., we justify our adopting certain standards or rules) by appeal to higher standards or rules. The adoption of standards or rules which themselves cannot be validated by appeal to any higher standards or rules results from our decision to accept a whole value system. We vindicate our accepting a whole value system by appeal to a way of life to which we are committed. Our commitment to a way of life can be justified in terms of a rational choice among different ways of life. (p. 77) “One reason why it is promising is the fact that it does incorporate a place for choices and commitments and, hence, attempts to accommodate the insights championed by existentialist thinkers, emotivists, prescriptivists, and the like. However, although it allows for such a place, it goes on to suggest that such decisions and choices themselves can be justified—justified prag- matically (ie., vindicated), ‘=Waller (1982) discussed the relation between Feigl’s work and Skinner’s but, in my opinion, failed to draw out the more important conclusions concerning rational justification.BEHAVIOR THERAPY 233 To gloss over important differences, we can roughly treat verification and validation as involving ordinary, formal-logical modes of justification; for example, particular ethical decisions are deductively justified by reference to more general ethical principles, and these more general ethical principles are, in turn, deductively justified by even more general ethical principles until we arrive at basic or ultimate moral principles. At this stage, deductive justifica- tion must end—on pain of an infinite regress to be stopped only by an arbitrary commitment, a vicious circle,” or some version of strong foundationalism. But this does not rule out the possibility of a non formal-logical form of justification of our acceptance of ultimate moral principles. The type of nondeductive justification of actions (instead of propositions) relevant here is a pragmatic justification. If one can give a pragmatic justifica- tion to one’s commitment to a certain principle, one will have rationally vindicated one’s choice and, hence, will not be a fideist. To give a vindication (Feigl, 1952, 1963; Reichenbach, 1949) of an action is to show that the action leads to certain consequences" or leads to them in a way superior to that of other actions or is necessary in order to lead to these consequences. In the case of the adoption of moral principles, one vindicates this decision by showing that the consistent following of such principles actually leads to a certain way of life, whereas other moral principles do not (or do so in a better way). There are at least two important questions here: (a) Does the adoption of and follow- ing of certain moral principles really lead to the end in question—the particu- lar way of life? (the empirical question) and (b) How can one justify one way of life as being better than another way of life? It is this second question that is relevant here. To speak of a way of life as being of a certain kind (e.g., one in which there is little suffering, maximum freedom, the opportunity to develop one’s poten- tialities to his or her fullest, a social structure that is supportive and facilitative, etc.) is especially relevant to the ethics of behavior therapy. First, it should be obvious to most behavior therapists that the just-mentioned way of life has striking similarities to the type of life described in Skinner’s (1948) Walden Two, which is explicitly concerned with the nature of the good life. Therefore, if I am correct, Skinner’s Walden Two should be seen as a way of answering relativism, skepticism, and subjectivism—not as supporting these positions— and, hence, as providing a justification for certain moral principles (see Gar- rett, 1979, and Rottschaefer, 1980, who argued for this same conclusion). 'Several epistemologists have argued that such a circular mode of justification is not really vicious after all. For example, one such approach to a circular form of justification is a coherence theory of justification (Bonjour, 1985), whereas another one is a pragmatic or “‘contextualist” approach (Annis, 1978). In the model of justification I am proposing, elements of coherence and contextualism are combined with elements of a modest foundationalism. “Actually, this very concept of pragmatic justification was hinted at by Krasner and Ullmann (1973, p. 491), who unfortunately did not sufficiently pursue its philosophical implications.234 KITCHENER Second, if one examines the proffered description of the good life given earlier, one will also note that it has much in common with what many behavior therapists (Bandura, 1969; Davison & Stuart, 1975; Feldman & Peay, 1982; Fishman et al., 1988; Goldiamond, 1974; Hawkins, 1975; Krasner, 1969, 1976; Krasner & Ullmann, 1965, 1973; Stolz, 1978; Ullmann, 1969) describe as the “ideal goals of therapy”: to increase the client’s freedom of choice, independence, spontaneity, creativity, dignity, self-direction, and self-determi- nation; to relieve his or her suffering; to increase the adequacy of the behavior repertoire (and skills) of the client in coping with the world; and to make these more functional, and so forth. In short, many behavior therapists can be read as championing a particular conception of the good life (Alford, 1981). Be- cause the adoption of certain moral principles would lead to this way of life, the adoption of these moral principles would, ceteris paribus, be justified, and behavior therapy would have provided an answer to relativism, skepticism, and subjectivism. Of course, the next question that arises concerns the question of whether this way of life itself can be justified as being better than another way of life. How is this possible? The answer suggested in the just-discussed model is the following: A way of life can be justified by being shown to be more rational (i.e., a more rational choice) than another way of life. If there were several ways of life, the commit- ment to the one in question was (or would have been) a rational choice (or more rational) and, hence, justified. To show that a choice was rational is to show that it was not arbitrary, that in such a choice situation, the particular way of life would be chosen (preferred) by a fully rational person, and so on. What then do rational and rational choice mean? According to Taylor (1961), rationality involves three components: free- dom, enlightenment, and impartiality. 1 can do no better than to summarize Taylor’s discussion of these three concepts. 1. A choice is free if (a) the choice is not decisively determined by uncon- scious motives, (b) the choice is not at all determined by internal con- straint, (c) the choice is not at all determined by external constraint, and (d) the choice is decisively determined by the person’s own preference. 2. A choice is enlightened if (a) the nature of each way of life is fully known, (b) the probable effects of living each way of life are fully known, and (c) the means necessary to bring about each way of life are fully known. 3. A choice is impartial if (a) the choice is disinterested, (b) the choice is detached or objective, and (c) the choice is unbiased. In that it was rationally chosen, it was not a capricious choice; it was a choice backed by good reasons. Hence, the choice is justified.BEHAVIOR THERAPY = ESS It should be be pointed out that many of the properties characterizing a rational choice (viz., freedom, impartiality, and unbiasedness) also fit into the ideal goals of behavior therapy. Indeed, upon reflection it may appear obvious that what one is attempting to accomplish in behavior therapy (as in other types of psychotherapy) is precisely to enable the client to become more rational in his or her way of living. Hence, in so far as there is any agreement among behavior therapists about the value-laden goals toward which therapy is moving, they are similar, in important ways, to a rational choice. Finally, to the question, What justifies these components as constituting a rational choice?, the only response would be, “What else could a rational choice be?” This is the very meaning (or a large part of the meaning) of rational choice. In short, the form of life in question is justified because it was rationally chosen. CONCLUSION Clearly, in a full-length discussion of this model, each of these points would have to be thoroughly discussed, which is obviously something I cannot do. I believe enough has been said, however, to give the reader some idea of how the model is supposed to work. Of course, there are numerous objections one can make to this model, and there are also numerous qualifications and caveats that must be made. But all of that aside, the previously mentioned model of the rational justification of moral principles is a very promising approach to providing a rational foundation for the meta-ethics of behavior therapy, a meta-ethics that explicitly rejects ethical relativism, ethical subjectivism, and ethical skepticism. For if this model is correct, one can provide a justification of ultimate moral principles that is objective (not subjective), universal (not relative) and rational (not skeptical). Such a model, I suggest—or something like it—could constitute the meta-ethical foundations of behavior therapy, meta-ethical foundations that are both philosophically adequate and congenial to the very conception of the types of value judgments behavior therapists make in therapy. If so, then what we have is an interesting and surprising convergence between rational (philosophical) morality and (empirical) behav- ior therapy. 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