ROMANIA’S POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST (1950-1970)

CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

Cezar Stanciu

Abstract
Could small states rise against the superpowers of the Cold War in order to
promote their own interests in world affairs? This was the basic premise for this study
and it argues that, in the period of reference, Romania could and did develop an
independent policy in the Middle East, different from that of the Communist bloc. In spite
similarities, Romania’s policy pursued its own economic and political interests, aimed at
identifying alternative sources of raw materials and markets, in order to reduce its
vulnerability in front of Moscow. The basic aim was to be acknowledged as an
independent partner. Relying on Romanian Communist Party sources, declassified in the
recent years, this study reveals that this policy was successful and its goals were reached.

The sun-burnt deserts of the Middle East were the scene of great turmoil in the
aftermath of World War II. The Arabian and non-Arabian nations of this region
underwent a very troubled process of de-colonization and state building, in search for a
new identity in the age of Cold War and globalization, when its culture and traditional
way of life were under threat by penetrating Western civilization and lifestyle. Some of
these countries had been for centuries under foreign occupation and their priorities were
somewhat different from what both the Americans and the Soviets expected from them in
a divided and ideologically torn apart world. Taking whatever advantage they could of
this situation, the nations of the Middle East tried to use it to their own benefit, as much
as the superpowers of the time permitted. Interferences were not few.

The World Seen with Different Eyes

On the other hand, Romania wasn’t much of a fortunate case, either. When
speaking about a country, there is a tendency of presuming that the government’s and the
people’s wishes coincide, but that is rarely so. Romania, from a political point of view,
was at this time nothing more than the Communist Party (RWP Romanian Workers
Party)1, an entity placed under direct Soviet control and obedient to the last detail. Such a
situation was a direct consequence of World War II and the European division which
occurred, placing Eastern Europe under USSR’s influence, which, in turn, resulted in the
installation of Communist regimes in these countries.
So, when talking of Romania’s foreign policy we must at all times relate to the
relations between the RWP and the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union)

1
RWP [Romanian Workers Party] (1948-1965) and later RCP [Romanian Communist Party] (1965-1989).
See: Rober R. King, A history of the Romanian Communist Party, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford
University, 1980

1
including the way international relations influenced Moscow’s relations with its satellites.
For all Soviet satellites, the period 1948-1953 was absent in international relations
because of the Soviet pressures2. It was the early Cold War, when the balance of power
was just being settled between the Soviets and the Americans and the anti-Cosmopolitan
campaign in the USSR, which inspired similar evolutions in the Communist bloc, called
for a rupture in East-West relations. Isolationism and ideological adversity were the
primary factors conditioning foreign-policy making in the satellites 3 . Things changed
after Stalin’s death, when the struggle for power in the Kremlin significantly reduced
pressures upon the satellites and improved the freedom of maneuver.
This is the moment when we can start talking about a Romanian foreign policy,
differing with various intensities from that of Moscow. Initially, the impulse of change
came from Kremlin, as Stalin’s successors understood pretty well the risks involved by
his policies. The excessive investments in heavy industry and arming caused serious
social distress, visible in events like the Berlin riot of June 1953. The complaints were
related especially to the absence of consumer goods on the market, the low standard of
living and increasing work norms4. Also, the Korean War proved once more after the
Berlin Blockade the high stakes of confronting the United States and how easily thing can
get out of control. In a reflex of responsibility, Malenkov and Khrushchev sought to
release some of the social and political pressures in the Communist bloc, by improving
relations with the West – in the field of foreign policy and improving conditions of life –
in the field of domestic policy5.
Romania had a particularly difficult situation caused by a very high and
unsustainable rhythm of industrial development in the years preceding Stalin’s death. In
an attempt to emulate the Stalinist model of development, Romania invested huge
resources in industrial plants, especially energy and metallurgy, using equipment and
technology from abroad, imported either from the West, on hard currency, or from the
Communist bloc, in exchange for raw materials and agricultural products. The impulse
for change came from Moscow, in July 1953, when the RCP leadership was summoned
to Kremlin and subjected to a virulent criticism. Malenkov and Khrushchev firmly asked
for serious changes in Romania’s economic policy, as they asked from all satellites6. This
criticism had been accompanied, until that moment, by changes in the leadership, like in
Hungary 7 , but Gheorghiu-Dej’s luck was that right before his meeting with the new
people in charged in Moscow, something unexpected happened: the workers’ riot in
Berlin. It was the first open movement directed against a Communist regime and it scared

2
Paul Nistor, Înfruntând Vestul. PCR, România lui Dej şi politica americană de îngrădire a comunismului,
Editura Vremea, Bucureşti, 2006, p. 141
3
Nigel Gould-Davis, “Rethinking the Role of Ideology in International Politics During the Cold War”.
Journal of Cold War Studies, Winter 1999, p. 92-96
4
Christian F. Ostermann, ed., Uprising in East Germany 1953, Central European University Press, 2003, p.
183
5
Mark Kramer, „The Early Post-Stalin Succession Struggle and Upheavals in East-Central Europe. Internal
and External Linkages in Soviet Policy Making (Part I)”. Journal of Cold War Studies, vol. I, no. 1/1999, p.
7-10
6
Liviu łăranu, „Noul Curs” în politica economică a României comuniste. August 1953, I”. Arhivele
Totalitarismului, no. 1-2/2004, p. 147
7
János Rainer, The New Course in Hungary in 1953, Working Paper no. 38, Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars, Washington, 2002, p. 14-15

2
terribly all Communist leaders. So when Gheorghiu-Dej arrived in Moscow, the Soviets
were much kinder in tone. No change of leadership was requested.
But the effects of this impulse for change were unusual. The Soviets demanded a
change of percentages in what concerned industrial investments, increasing investments
in consumer goods and reducing investments in heavy industry. Somehow, Gheorghiu-
Dej saw in this a threat to its developmental model, inspired by Stalinism, and tried his
best to elude the change. He confessed later that all they did was to simulate the reforms
while nothing changed in the background. Investments in heavy industry continued, but
in a very discreet manner8. Gheorghiu-Dej and Khrushchev did not agree on this point, as
it was obvious, but they surprisingly agreed on another, as the future would show,
although for different reasons.
What Gheorghiu-Dej understood in the summer and fall of 1953 was that Moscow
was no longer a supporter, but a hazard. He was Stalin’s man and Khrushchev didn’t like
that, but further more, Khrushchev had all sorts of plans that Gheorghiu-Dej didn’t fancy
at all, especially in what concerned giving up the industrialization project. Therefore, the
RCP leadership decided to take serious measures of consolidation, of reducing its
vulnerability. That involved, on a very long duration – almost a decade – a complex
program of developing relations with Western countries, finding alternative sources of
technology and financing, finding alterative markets, and, last but not least, improving
relations with society by increasing the standards of living and reducing repression.
Looking towards other horizons for the first time, in economy and politics, was a great
challenge, but by coincidence that was precisely what Moscow asked from its satellites,
few months later. On that point, Gheorghiu-Dej and Khrushchev agreed.
In March 1954, when the Soviets were commemorating one year since Stalin’s
death, the leaders of all peoples’ democracies were again summoned to Moscow, for a
meeting of the Executive Committee of CMEA. The debates took place under A.
Mikoian chairmanship and concerned the foreign trade policy of the Communist bloc.
Mikoian was the most important Soviet voice in the field of economy and member of the
Politburo, a man who surprisingly escaped of the Stalinist purges and remained in the
highest circles of power, just as he will continue to do in the following years. CMEA
recommended that all peoples’ democracies should improve their cooperation so as to
avoid parallelism in industrial development and also to expand their trade with the
capitalist countries9.
On this last issue, a special Commission held another meeting in May 1954 in
Prague, recommending CMEA members to take whatever measures necessary in order to
enlarge mutual trade with Capitalist countries, on bases of Long Term Commercial
Agreements that would facilitate five-year planning. Also, Moscow was explicitly
suggesting its satellites to make no connection between exporting strategic products (oil,
other important raw materials) and importing similar goods from the Capitalist countries.
After 1948, following USA’s example, most Western countries adopted various
restrictions to exporting strategic products (technology) to Communist countries. What
Moscow was saying now was that even if those restrictions are still applied, exports to
Capitalist countries should be enlarged anyway, because hard currency was just as good

8
Dosar Ana Pauker. Plenara Comitetului Central al Partidului Muncitoresc Român din 30 noiembrie-5
decembrie 1961, ed. Elis Neagoe-Pleşa, Liviu Pleşa, vol. I, Editura Nemira, Bucureşti, 2006, p. 381
9
ANIC, fund CAER, dossier no. 13/1954. Notă Miron Constantinescu către Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej, f. 28-30

3
as strategic merchandises 10 . This recommendation was aimed at improving the
commercial and financial deficit with the West which caused great concern to many
Communist bloc countries. Romania was a special case from this point of view, as well,
having one of the largest deficits of this kind among all peoples’ democracies.
Gheorghiu-Dej had nothing to object to this recommendation. In fact, it was
something he had been thinking about and it fitted his plans well. At the March 1954
meeting, one of the things which Mikoian suggested was improving relations which
“backward Capitalist countries”, especially from Asia and Latin America, where exports
of industrial products could be successfully placed in exchange for essential raw
materials, not having to deal with economical or political restrictions as it happened on
the Western markets 11 . Back in Romania, Gheorghiu-Dej suggested this measure in
particular, as a solution to reducing the commercial deficit and finding markets for a
Romanian industry that was slowly progressing12. This was a double sword with political
blade, for both sides. For Khrushchev, improving the Communist bloc’s relations in the
Middle East was a key component of his foreign policy, aimed at using in USSR’s favor
the anti-American and anti-British tone of the movements of national emancipation in
this part of the world13. On the other hand, for Gheorghiu-Dej, improving Romania’s
trade relations in the Middle East was aimed at reducing his regime’s economic
vulnerability, by identifying alternative sources of raw materials as well as alternative
markets for the young Romanian industry, outside CMEA.
The first attempts towards developing a Middle East policy based on economic
complementarities are therefore visible in the interval 1954-1956. On 18 January 1954
Romania signed a Commercial Agreement with Egypt for the exportation of various
industrial goods in exchange for agricultural products and raw materials like cotton for
the textile industry, which was previously imported only from the USSR14. An Egyptian
governmental delegation arrived in Romania in March 1954, to discuss the possibility of
enlarging mutual trade and especially the import of products like: telephones, electrical
equipment, chemical products and oil. Cairo was offering cotton and iron ore for export,
which Romania needed terribly for its textile and rather large metallurgy15. In June 1956
a Romanian governmental delegation led by deputy Minister of Foreign Trade visited the
Arab Republic of Egypt and signed a three years Trade Agreement, stipulating the
exchanges of the products mentioned above.
For Romania, Egypt was a special case, because its entire trade with India, China,
Burma, Indonesia, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia was passing through the Suez Channel. In
1955 the Enterprise for Civilian Navigation NAVROM, a Romanian state-owned
company, transported approximately 480.000 tones of merchandise by route of the Suez

10
ANIC, fund CAER, dossier no. 14/1954. Hotărârea Consiliului de Ajutor Economic Reciproc. Despre
comerŃul Ńărilor membre ale Consiliului cu Ńările capitaliste, f. 151
11
ANIC, fund CAER, dossier no. 13/1954. Note din discursul tov. Mikoian 26.III.1954, f. 27
12
ANIC, fund CC al PCR – secŃia Cancelarie, dossier no. 31/1954. Stenograma şedinŃei Biroului Politic din
24 martie 1954. Cu privire la Planul de Stat pe 1954, f. 11
13
David J. Dallin, Soviet Foreign Policy after Stalin, Greenwood Press Publishers, Westport, Connecticut,
1975, pp. 297-302
14
ANIC, fund CAER, dossier no. 160/1953-1954. InformaŃia MCE al RPR privind vizita delegaŃiei
egiptene, f. 112-113
15
ibid.

4
Channel16. But other countries were important as well, such as Lebanon. Between 29
November and 9 December 1955, while the 2nd Congress of the RWP was well under
way, a governmental delegation from the Ministry of Foreign Trade visited Lebanon, to
negotiate a Trade Agreement for one year. Its main stipulations included the exportation
of timber, paper, oil, chemical products, industrial tools and equipments, in exchange for
cotton, other agricultural products and also various ores. Romania did obtain the right to
re-export towards third markets merchandises imported from Lebanon. At the end of the
same year, another delegation from the Ministry of Foreign Trade visited Burma signing
a three year Trade Agreement for imports like cotton, rice and ores and exports like
agricultural machinery, mining equipment and electro-technical equipment17. Same thing
happened with Syria in January 1956, involving Romanian exports of timber, oil, tools
and industrial machinery in exchange for imports like cotton and wool. Both countries
also agreed to grant each other the most favored nation clause and also establish offices
of Economical Representatives in both capitals18.
These can count as numerous successes in a short period of time. The structure of
exchanges clearly illustrates Romania’s interests of finding alternative markets for its
new industry and alternative sources of raw materials for it, as stated above. In order to
achieve this goal, the State Planning Committee in Romania was working hard under the
leadership of Gaston Marin such complementarities in economic relations with
developing countries, which reduced the vulnerability of Romania’s industry in front of
CMEA pressures. But this involved some political concessions as well. For example
Romania was rather reserved in what concerned its oil exports because they were needed
on the foreign markets and could easily produce hard currency which is why the State
Planning Committee found it preferable to export oil on Western markets that paid with
hard currency, instead of exporting it on CMEA markets in exchange for other
commodities. Developing countries like those in Middle East rarely afforded to pay hard
currency for their imports and that is why Romania did not enjoy much exporting oil to
them. But when it was necessary to consolidate a profitable trade relation, exceptions
were done. For example, in 1956, Egypt refused to sign another Trade Agreement for the
period 1957-1960 if Romania did not accept to export some quantities of oil on the
Egyptian market19. The party leadership regarded these demands with… understanding.
In January 1956 Gheorghiu-Dej summoned many of Romania’s diplomatic
representatives and the leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in a long
meeting meant to analyze the regime’s foreign policy until that moment and also to
establish new task for the Romanian diplomacy, in the political circumstances that
regarded the Romanian-Soviet relations. Gheorghiu-Dej’s determination to find new
opportunities abroad, outside the Communist bloc, involved an active use of diplomacy.
Romania’s Foreign Ministry was not exactly prepared for this, as its tasks in the years of
Stalinism were related only to a sterile imitation of Soviet initiatives and its own power

16
Constantin Botoran, RelaŃiile româno-egiptene în epoca modernă şi contemporană, Editura ŞtiinŃifică,
Bucureşti, 1974, p. 174-179
17
ANIC, fund CAER, dossier de comerŃ exterior no. 267/1955-1956. Notă asupra tratativelor pentru
încheierea acordului dintre RPR şi Birmania, f. 189-190
18
ANIC, fund CAER, dossier de comerŃ exterior no. 267/1955-1956. Notă asupra tratativelor privind
încheierea Acordului Comercial şi de PlăŃi dintre RPR şi Republica Siriană, f. 196-197
19
ANIC, fund CC al PCR – secŃia RelaŃii Externe, dossier no. 99/1956. Exportul de produse petrolifere în
Ńările capitaliste în anii 1957-1960, f. 30

5
of initiative was almost inexistent 20 . But Gheorghiu-Dej was trying to change that
situation and to professionalize Romanian diplomats: a good example is that in 1957
I.Gh. Maurer21 was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs. The meeting mentioned above
was an attempt to send a discreet message to the diplomats, by means of a very critical
analysis of what they had done so far. The meeting is very interesting also for the info
Romania’s ministers in the Middle East have brought home, given the fact that they were
for the first time really listened by the party leadership.
Unfortunately only one of the Romanian ministers in the Middle East was present
and took the floor at that meeting for a short presentation: Traian Micu, minister in Iran.
In his word, the country had a “feudal-capitalist regime”, in which both industry and
agriculture were in a disastrous situation because of English and German capitalists,
which led to a very low standard of living and a terrible commercial and financial
deficit 22 . The Iranian government, being under a constant pressure from international
“imperialist circles” was not very interested in developing relations with Romania, until
then, as Micu mentioned. Moreover, the Iranian government refused to open a Legation
in Bucharest and also to negotiate a Trade Agreement with Romania. The reasons
identified by Micu in confidential discussions with various industrialists and tradesmen
were that the government was afraid that Romania was only interested in financing the
Tudeh (Communist party in Iran) behind the appearances of commercial exchanges. Also,
there was a terrible mistrust towards Romania in the governmental circles and even
administrative measures have been, at different moments, adopted against the Romanian
Legation. Traian Micu also added that a main cause of this situation was that the
Cominform (Informative Bureau of Communist Parties) had its headquarters in
Bucharest23. It was something Gheorghiu-Dej disliked obviously, because it limited his
freedom of movement.
Traian Micu also blamed the Romanian authorities for the setbacks in Romanian-
Iranian relations. He referred to the unexplainable delays from the Ministry of Foreign
Trade (MFT) in responding to commercial offers from Iran, but also the MFA who
delayed visas for so long that all Iranian businessmen who requested visas eventually
gave up their intention of coming to Romania for business24. Gheorghiu-Dej needed to
know these things, so that he could work on it. Gheorghiu-Dej drew a conclusion in the
end which was valid for Romania’s relations with all developing countries. After
stressing the importance of having commercial relations with such countries, he said:
“maybe they think that if they have relations with the Soviet Union, than why should they

20
Dan Cătănuş, „RelaŃiile externe ale României şi influenŃa factorului sovietic asupra acestora în primele
două decenii postbelice”. Studii şi Materiale de Istorie Contemporană, serie nouă, vol. I/2002, p. 212. See
also: Cezar Stanciu, „Europeans Against Europe. The Practice of Foreign Isolationism and Seclusion in
Stalinist Romania”. Slovo, vol. 20, no. 1, Spring 2008
21
Ion Gheorghe Maurer (1902-2000), high ranking RCP member, close friend to Dictator Gheorghe
Gheorghiu-Dej and prime-minister of Romania (1961-1974). He was a lawyer – one of the few real
intellectuals who survived in the party leadership – and one of the most important designers of Romania’s
policy of “independence” in the Communist bloc.
22
ANIC, fund CC al PCR – secŃia Cancelarie, dossier no. 10/1956. Stenograma şedinŃei din 18 ianuarie
1956, la care au participat tovarăşii Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej, Chivu Stoica, Iosif Chişinevschi, Simion Bughici,
Grigore Preoteasa, locŃiitorii ministrului Afacerilor Externe, directori din MAE şi şefii oficiilor diplomatice
ale RPR, p. 23-24
23
ibid., p. 25-26
24
ibid., p. 27

6
have relations with Romania, too, who is just a satellite and a minor country after all.”25
This was what he had to fight and he called for the MFA to assembly groups of
specialists, concerned especially with countries like Egypt, Syria, Iran, Lebanon and
India, and to exert pressures on other institutions like the MFT in order to respond more
promptly to whatever comes up and leave an impression of seriousness.
The dossier containing the transcript of the meeting contains a few other
documents, like a report on the Romanian-Israeli relations that was not verbally
presented. It depicts the status of relations in simple terms: politically, the relations are
bad because the Israeli government intervenes too often in favor of Jewish emigration
from Romania and lead a “hostile propaganda” against Romania from this point of view.
Economically, the relations were very good, having a 300% rise in only one year (1955
as compared to 1954) as the prospects were just as good. A major problem in relations –
from Romania’s point of view – was the poor qualification of the diplomatic personnel
working in Tel Aviv. For example, neither one of the employees of the Romanian
Legation spoke any foreign language 26 . The report was accompanied by proposals to
improve this situation.
The MFA also put together a list of proposals addressed to the party leadership,
containing measures meant to improve relations with the Middle East. Among these
proposals there were some like: improving Romania’s popularity in these countries by
cultural exchanges (book translations, folk concerts, etc), improving the level of
diplomatic representation, inviting various cultural or governmental personalities from
these countries to visit Romania and so on. The basic argument supporting the proposals
was the economic factor. As the MFA analysis was showing, there were large markets in
the Middle East were Romania could place its industrial products and also there were
numerous possibilities for importing much-needed raw materials 27 . The document
mentioned that Romania should accept raw materials from these countries even if they
were of lower quality, although it didn’t specify the reason (perhaps because the sources
did not involve any kind of political commitments and was a manifestation of liberty in
international relations?) and it was also mentioned that the MFT should try really hard to
work with local firms and enterprises, avoiding intermediaries, especially Western
companies28. It was obviously a struggle of the small states against the superpowers, or at
least that’s how it was seen in Bucharest.
As a paradox, Moscow saw things in a similar fashion. The USSR supported Arab
nationalism and emancipation movements, regarded as anti-imperialist and anti-
American manifestations – so, after all, from a Cold War dichotomy perspective. On the
other hand, Romania supported the same movements, but from reasons different as those
of Moscow. For Romania, these countries were opposing the USA as a superpower and
Romania was interested in opposing a superpower itself, so it had understandable
sympathies. On the other hand, being non-aligned (some of them) they offered better
economic prospects than the bloc-aligned countries. So both Romania and the USSR took
the side of Arabs fighting against English and American imperialism, but from different

25
ibid., p. 46
26
ANIC, fund CC al PCR – secŃia Cancelarie, dossier no. 10/1956. Israel, p. 85
27
ANIC, fund CC al PCR – secŃia Cancelarie, dossier no. 10/1956. Propuneri pentru dezvoltarea relaŃiilor
cu Ńările din Orientul Apropiat şi Mijlociu, p. 87-90
28
ibid., p. 91

7
point of view. This is the essence of Romania’s dissidence in the Soviet bloc at this point:
a discreet and dissimulated opposition, the escaped even Moscow’s attention29. Standing
on this position, Romania noisily condemned the American intervention in Lebanon, in
1958.
President Camille Chamoun of Lebanon was a Christian and pro-Westerner, in a
country dominated by Muslims with pan-Arabic and pro-Nasser sympathies. President
Nasser of Egypt and his courageous struggle against Britain and France during the Suez
Crisis was becoming an action model for many Arabs and the Lebanese also wanted to
join the newly created United Arab Republic, although Camille Chamoun was totally
against it. Faced with increasing domestic pressures, President Chamoun asked for
America’s help and Dwight Eisenhower hurried to send troops in Lebanon, to protect
what he saw as a Western-oriented government under threat from Communist-oriented
opposition 30 . The American intervention in Lebanon was strongly condemned by
Romania who, in the latter years, would become more and more active in what concerned
the condemnation of foreign interventions in any corner of the globe.
Romania promptly answered to events in Lebanon by organizing public
manifestations against the American intervention which included party meetings in
various cities and industrial enterprises in the country where workers were asked to take
the floor against the USA, public manifestations in the capital city organized by students
and intellectuals and also a anti-American manifestation in front of the American
Embassy in Bucharest. On the following Sunday, similar actions took place in the rural
areas, where villagers were asked to participate in meetings where the events were
explained to them by party activists. Various organizations like the Trade Unions adopted
Declarations against the “aggression” and the press also offered a lot of space for this
mobilization 31 . Romania’s discomfort in seeing small states occupied by the military
forces of superpowers was explainable but – in no way diminishing the relevance of this
argument – there was another factor to be considered when observing this display of
forces. In the summer of 1958 the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Romania was
commencing32. Gheorghiu-Dej obtained that after a long and dangerous game of seizing
opportunities and posing as the most loyal satellite: he just had to keep up that game for
the moment.

Small Steps Forward

Romania’s relations in the Middle East continued to develop in a steady but
progressive rhythm, in the following years. The most important indicator was the figures
of mutual trade, the only ones which could depict the real level of interests and benefits.
The increase was very consistent, taking under consideration the period between 1960
and 1967, when the Egyptian-Israeli War broke out, reaching a volume of trade even five

29
Stephen Fischer-Galati, The New Rumania. From People’s Democracy to Socialist Republic, MIT Press,
1967, p. 69
30
Erika G. Alin, The United States and the 1958 Lebanon crisis: American intervention in the Middle East,
University Press of America, 1994, p. 95-96
31
ANIC, fund CC al PCR – secŃia Cancelarie, dossier no. 19/1958. Plan de măsuri privind organizarea
manifestărilor de protest împotriva agresiunii imperialismului american şi englez în Liban şi Iordania, p. 4-
5
32
Sergiu Verona, Military Occupation and Diplomacy. Soviet Troops in Romania, 1944-1958, Duke
University Press, 1992, p. 122-123

8
or six times higher at the end of this interval, as compared to its beginning. This results
clearly from the following table:
Volume of Romanian trade in the Middle East 1960-196733
Country 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967
JORDAN 5,4 4,3 5,4 6,9 6,1 7,6 8,4 7,7
IRAN 0,7 * 1 1,7 2,4 7,1 58,8 133,4
ISRAEL 13 16,3 18,2 8,7 24,1 21,1 30,4 67,1
LEBANON 39,7 54,4 64,4 67,2 68 52,6 102,6 242,8
SYRIA 15,7 35,1 109,5 100,5 95,6 104,5 81,6 97,6
UAR 102,8 177,8 179,5 112,6 150,7 206,3 235,4 311,1
According to Romania Statistical Yearbook 1968. The figures represent million lei.

The highest rates of increase were reached in relations with Iran, previously very
reticent to Romania, and also in relations with Lebanon and Israel. The highest volume of
exchanges was, on the other hand, held by United Arab Republic and Lebanon. This is
why special attention was given to the United Arab Republic, more so as President
Nasser’s policy of non-alignment began to sound increasingly pleasant to RCP leadership
as it obtained a Socialist note. Nasser claimed that Egypt was pursuing a special brand of
socialism, adapted to the country’s developmental needs and based on the abolition of
artificial class barriers, but outside the sphere of international Communism. It was a Arab
Socialism, therefore a combination between ideals of social justice and equity with ideas
of Arab national emancipation and struggle against foreign domination34. In other words,
that came pretty close to what Romania envisaged for itself after the separation from the
Soviet Union became evident.
In the seventh decade of the 20th century, things had already changed dramatically
in Romanian-Soviet relations and that had a major impact on Romania’s policy in the
Middle East. That discreet policy of independence mentioned above had became less
discreet and more explicit one Khrushchev started his reform projects within CMEA. His
plans for integration and international division of labor based on the principle of
specialization reserved only a modest role of food supplier for Romania 35 . While
countries like East Germany or Czechoslovakia were called upon to develop their
industries, Romania’s responsibility was to develop its agriculture, in order to supply
other Communist bloc members with cereals, food and raw materials. This in the end led
Gheorghiu-Dej on a collision course with Khrushchev and to an open denunciation of
Moscow’s leading role in the Communist movement36.
Gheorghiu-Dej took advantage of the Sino-Soviet schism in order to challenge the
thesis that Moscow was the leader of world Communism. Borrowing from both the
Titoist and Maoist critique of the USSR and also elements from the non-aligned rhetoric,
the RCP developed an original discourse, emphasizing each Communist party’s right to
33
Anuarul Statistic al Republicii Socialsite România 1968, DirecŃia Centrală de Statistică, Bucureşti, 1968,
p. 514-515
34
Rami Ginat, “Nasser and the Soviets”, in Elie Podeh, Onn Winckler, eds., Rethinking Nasserism:
revolution and historical memory in modern Egypt, University Press of Florida, 2004, p. 244
35
Horia Socianu, “The Foreign Policy of Romania in the Sixties”, in James A. Kuhlman, ed., The Foreign
policies of Eastern Europe: domestic and international determinants, vol. II, A.W. Sijthoff, 1978, p. 173-
175
36
Gheorghe Boldur-LăŃescu, The communist genocide in Romania, Nova Science Publishers, 2005, p. 50-
51

9
follow its own course, based on the country’s specificity. His successor, Nicolae
Ceauşescu inherited this policy and continued it in a somewhat oblivious manner which
latter made him famous37. The impact on Romania’s policy in the Middle East was that
the search for partners outside the Communist bloc lost its previous discretion and
became explicit also gaining some extra dynamism and energy, with obvious effects in
what concerned the outcome.
Such effects can be observed, for example, in relation to Egypt. In September
1964 the two countries moved their relations to a higher level by signing an Agreement
of Economical and Technical Cooperation. It provided for the construction of various
industrial objectives in Egypt by Romanian enterprises, starting from the project, delivery
of components, equipments and machinery, assembly and also technical assistance. It was
the case with a factory of phosphates in Hamrawein, a soda factory and two cement
factories, reaching a total contractual value of over 30 million US dollars38. Egypt wasn’t
going to pay with hard currency, but with phosphates from the factory and – starting with
1970 – with iron ore deliveries to Romania. As the Romanian metallurgy was expanding,
the government was more and more interested in identifying alternative sources of raw
materials, since the most important source until then had been the USSR. Unfortunately,
the Agreement could not run its course as predicted due to financial difficulties
encountered by the Egyptian part.
Some of these problems were discussed one month later, when Romanian prime-
minister Ion Gheorghe Maurer visited Egypt. He met Nasser and talked about mutual
relations and world affairs and on the same occasion decided upon the establishment of a
Mixed Governmental Economic Commission presided by vice-premiers of the two
countries39. The high level of representation was an indicator of the interest both parts
attributed to mutual cooperation and it was also visible in the way the volume of
Romanian-Egyptian trade evolved in the following years: the next two years marked
almost a doubling in the quantum of trade40. Still, there were problems: only a month had
passed since the signing of the Agreement of Economical and Technical Cooperation and
the two cement factories were already delayed because of financial difficulties
encountered by Cairo.
Similar progress was being reached in relations with another country, in the
immediate and troubled neighborhood of Egypt, respectively Israel. Although less
developed in comparison with Egypt, the Romanian-Israeli relations marked a big step
forward in March 1967, when a Romanian governmental delegation visited Israel to
discuss the possibility to improve mutual cooperation. The negotiations concerned an
Agreement of Economical and Technical-Scientific Cooperation, similar as that with
Egypt, but a lot more complex, given Israel’s superior industrial development. Both parts
expressed their interest in exchanging experience and developing bilateral projects in the
field of chemistry, food and light industry, timber processing, agriculture and tourism41.

37
Vladimir Tismăneanu, Stalinism for all seasons: a political history of Romanian communism, University
of California Press, 2003, p. 187-188
38
ANIC, fund CC al PCR – secŃia Cancelarie, dossier no. 15/1966. Notă privind prima sesiune a comisiei
economice guvernamentale mixte româno-RAU, p. 41
39
ibid., p. 39
40
Anuarul Statistic al Republicii Socialsite România 1968…, p. 515
41
ANIC, fund CC al PCR – secŃia Cancelarie, dossier no. 48/1967. Raport privind deplasarea în Israel a
delegaŃiei însărcinată cu discutarea unor probleme de cooperare economică şi tehnico-ştiinŃifică, p. 118

10
The Israeli delegation was very open and receptive during the negotiations, accepting
most of the Romanian proposals, including a governmental visit to Bucharest. Both parts
agreed to take measures in order to increase the volume of mutual trade and also to
accelerate the signing of the above-mentioned Agreement42. The visit was a full success
from this point of view.

The Advisers and the “Analphabets”

A major turning point in Romania’s policy in the Middle East was caused by the
Six Days War. It represented the first independent affirmation of Romania’s distinct
foreign policy, of its claims to a separate point of view, derived from its own analysis and
interests. The RCP leadership was asking for Romania’s recognition as an autonomous
actor in the Middle East, no matter how small or modest its role may be. For the USSR
things were much more complicated. Just like in Vietnam, Moscow saw itself thrown on
an unwanted course of collision with the United States. USSR had supported Egypt and
Syria before, because the Arab movement of national liberation undermined the
American and English positions in the area and this is why Soviet-Israeli relations
couldn’t be expected to rise to a very cordial level. In November 1966, a Note of the
Soviet MFA openly accused Israel that it placed itself in the service of “imperialism”
interested to use Israel as a base for a fight against free Arab nations. But Moscow also
warned Nasser to try to avoid a war with Israel because such a war would only serve the
Americans’ interests43.
Egyptian leader Gamal Nasser consciously pursued an aggressive course towards
Israel, feeling ready for a confrontation and at the same time being afraid of an
aggression. Moscow had nothing to do but to support him, although sometimes the
Soviets had serious doubts regarding where that course was headed. When Nasser asked
for the withdrawal of UN troops that secured the Suez Canal since 1956 and also when he
decided to close the Tiran straits in May 1967, Moscow stood by him, in spite of the fact
that Kremlin understood the dangers and warned him on multiple occasions about it44.
Still, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev seemed to be rather unable to do anything to prevent
the escalation of tensions. On the other hand, things were much simpler for Romania, for
whom there was no direct stake and, furthermore, maintained good relations both with
Egypt and Israel. So when the military conflict broke out, the Central Committee (CC)
Presidium of the RCP instructed the MFA to summon both diplomatic representatives –
from Israel and from the United Arab Republic – and to communicate to them the
Romanian Government’s appeal for an immediate seize fire45. As with the Sino-Soviet
conflict, Romania was playing the mediation game that proved to be so advantageous in
the past.
In the afternoon of 8 June 1967, Romanian party leader Nicolae Ceauşescu
received a special “red line” phone call from the Kremlin and from the other end of the
line his homologous Leonid Brezhnev invited him to an urgent meeting in Moscow the
42
ibid.
43
Yaacov Ro’i, “Soviet Policy towards the Six Day War through the Prism of Moscow’s Relations with
Egypt and Syria”, in Yaacov Ro’i, Boris Morozov, eds., The Soviet Union and the June 1967 Six Day War,
Stanford University Press, 2008, p. 3-4
44
ibid., p. 8
45
ANIC, fund CC al PCR – secŃia Cancelarie, dossier no. 81/1967. Protocol no. 31 al şedinŃei Prezidiului
Permanent al CC al PCR din ziua de 5 iunie 1967, p. 2

11
next day, to discuss the situation in the Middle East. Brezhnev said that the initiative
belonged to the East German leader Walter Ulbricht but that was irrelevant anyway. After
a short consultation with the members of the CC Presidium, Ceauşescu agreed to
participate. The meeting convened the next day in Moscow and Brezhnev made a briefing
concerning USSR’s involvement in the crisis and emphasizing the support Nasser
received from the Soviets and that he acted on his own most of the times, not informing
Moscow and not considering Moscow’s advice when received46. But for Ceauşescu this
was a great opportunity to take advantage of Brezhnev’s weakness and highlight his
independence. He couldn’t waste it.
Brezhnev was explaining to the East European party leaders how his efforts to
moderate Nasser had failed, especially in what concerned his determination to close the
Suez Canal or to set as objective the liquidation of Israel as a state47. Brezhnev also
offered details about the military support the USSR had offered Egypt, in terms of arms,
logistics and military assistance. A special feature of his exposition was that the
Americans were not involved in the war, they did not take part in any way and the victory
had been obtained solely by Israel48. This was another weak point for Brezhnev, visible in
his attempts to convince the others of USA’s non-involvement. In the context of the Sino-
Soviet dispute, China had long plaid the card of accusing Moscow to fraternize with the
Americans and, on the other hand, the Soviets weren’t really trying to jeopardize their
relations with the Americans – especially the agreements on atomic non-proliferation –
for the sake of propaganda.
Most of the speakers expressed their agreement with Brezhnev’s considerations,
in a much disciplined fashion, condemning Israel’s action as an aggression. Ceauşescu,
on the other hand, wasn’t so kind to Brezhnev49. His speech raised questions like how
was it possible given the amount of logistic support Nasser had received previously, to
suffer such a colossal defeat in such a short time. This was a direct attack to the USSR, of
course, who had provided that support. He was insinuating that the Soviet support wasn’t
very efficient, that maybe military intelligence had serious flops and all that could easily
generate similar effects at home. According to Ceauşescu’s account of the meeting, he
suggested that, if the Egyptian army had failed so ridiculously with its Soviet support,
wasn’t it possible for the East European armies to suffer a similar fate, if supported by the
Soviets?50 Brezhnev did not reply to this fierce attack, but it caused an exchange of harsh
words between Romanian Premier Maurer and Polish Leader Gomulka. Trying to take
Brezhnev’s side, cornered by the Romanians, Gomulka said, with a note of arrogance,
that it wasn’t the Soviets’ deficiencies which caused the defeat but rather the fact that
there were many “analphabets” in the Egyptian army. Maurer answered that ironically,
saying that in his opinion there were just as many “analphabets” in the Warsaw Pact
structures, as well51. This was, obviously, terribly inconvenient for Brezhnev.
Ceauşescu’s position was that although Israel was indeed guilty, Nasser himself
had a part of the responsibility too, since he did everything possible to escalate the
46
ANIC, fund CC al PCR – secŃia Cancelarie, dossier no. 88/1967. Stenograma şedinŃei Comitetului
Central al Partidului Comunist Român din ziua de 10 iunie 1967, p. 8
47
ibid., p. 5
48
ibid., p. 6-7
49
ibid., p. 9
50
ibid., p. 10
51
ibid., p. 11

12
conflict, refusing to listen to any kind of advice and claiming to pursue the liquidation of
Israel as a state52. On the next day upon his return from Moscow, Ceauşescu convoked a
meeting of the CC Plenum where he explained his position and asked for confirmation.
This was a practice initiated by Gheorghiu-Dej, inspired by Tito, aimed at gathering the
entire party around the leader’s decisions, so that he could have party back-up in case of
conflict with Moscow. The Plenum voted what Ceauşescu asked for without hesitation53.
Of course, he added, in the end, his own impression: Brezhnev was in a tough situation
and somehow wanted to justify himself in front of everybody, considering the support he
offered to Nasser for so long. That support could have made him look guilty so that was
why he insisted on calling every party boss to Moscow to tell them: it’s not my fault, I
taught him well but he didn’t listen to me. Ceauşescu didn’t care much for that.
The Romanian government and the Central Committee of the RCP published a
Declaration the next day, explaining Romania’s position vis-à-vis the Middle East crisis.
The Israeli action was condemned as an aggression in the name of principles like non-
interference in domestic affairs and non-utilization of force in inter-state relations. The
source of the war was blamed on the international imperialism and its policy of splitting
peoples and spreading national enmities. Further on, the Declaration confirmed
Romania’s commitment to supporting the national liberation struggle and the anti-
imperialist struggle of the Arab nations, as well as its dedication to the cause of peace in
the world54. At the first glance, the Declaration resembled a lot what the Soviet Union or
the other Socialist states of Eastern Europe were saying out loud, but a careful analysis
would reveal that it was nothing of the sort. First of all, Moscow recommended cutting
off relations with Israel, just as the USSR had done55.
As noisy as it may had been, the Romanian Declaration was everything. There
was no cutting off of relations with Israel. Apart from many things, this stood out as the
most visible sign of opposition from Moscow’s line, since all satellites had hurried to
follow Brezhnev’s council except Ceauşescu. This, in turn, appeared for many as a sign
of support for Israel. In fact, it was not. Ceauşescu was not willing to follow Moscow’s
line, no matter what that was, as long as it involved taking sides. Romania enjoyed the
role of mediator because it involved fewer risks than taking anybody’s side. In the end,
Romania was interested in developing good relations with both Egypt and Israel and
wasn’t willing to jeopardize its relations with any of them. Moreover, in its quest to
affirm its independence, the RCP leadership seized this chance to shake Moscow’s
position a little, to reveal its weaknesses and, once more, to assert its right to having a say
in any international affair, as a sovereign and independent state. As mentioned
previously, it was an opportunity that Ceauşescu couldn’t afford to miss.
So in the following days he sought to consolidate this neutral position, from a
more active perspective. On 12 June, Ceauşescu convoked a meeting of the Executive
Committee of the CC of RCP – a larger structure compared to the Presidium – in order to
discuss Romania’s position in the Middle East crisis and to convince the organ to vote for
a active attitude of mediation, meant to reveal Romania’s constructive approach in

52
ibid., p. 12
53
ibid., p. 13
54
Scânteia, 11 June 1967
55
Bruce D. Porter, The USSR in Third World Conflicts: Soviet Arms and Diplomacy in Local Wars 1945-
1980, Cambridge University Press, 1984, p. 118

13
solving world crisis, on one hand, and to assert its freedom of initiative in relation to the
USSR, on the other hand. In the last couple of days, his opinion that Moscow bore much
of he responsibility for the events in the Middle East consolidated, as it was evident from
his speech in front of the Executive Committee:
“If, along the years, the Socialist peoples, the Communist parties in these
countries, the Soviet Union, would have counseled the Arabs in the right way, if they
would have said that their position will not bring them anything good, then they [the
Arabs] they might had understood that their way to act is not wise and won’t bring
neither unity nor liberation from imperialist domination. But nobody did this and,
moreover, they were encouraged in this policy, they weren’t told that it’s bad but on the
contrary they were given hope, even statements that they will be supported in their
struggle. Ulbricht openly said that. In what concerns him, I can understand, but I don’t
understand why others did that.”56
“Others” were the Soviets, evidently. Brezhnev had called for a cutting off in the
relations with Israel and Ceauşescu, who refused to do so, was looking for a way to
justify his decision and to show the incorrect character of the Soviet request. He was
making an appeal to calm, to a more flexible approach in relation to Israel. The Executive
Committee of the CC of RCP decided that Romania would address both countries
involved in the conflict, to ask for reconciliation. But Ceauşescu pointed out that –
especially in what concerned Israel – the attitude must not be aggressive, must not blame
or accuse anybody or anything: “about Israel, we shouldn’t make it [the diplomatic Note]
in the meaning of a protest or a threatening note, but we must tell them clearly how we
see the solving of this issue. A step must be taken but not as a threat or as a cutting off of
diplomatic relations, because this way we’ll only encourage the others.”57 This time, the
“others” were the Arabs.
The same day, Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs Corneliu Mănescu
summoned both the Egyptian and the Israeli ambassador to the MFA and handed them
the text of the governmental Declaration previously adopted and also made an appeal to
reconciliation 58 . This confirmed one more Romania’s neutral position in the conflict.
Such an attitude contributed to improving Romania’s image abroad and the growing
impression that its foreign policy could not longer be assimilated in any way to that of the
other satellites. Also, this neutral stand created a great impression in Israel, where it was
seen as a support – although it wasn’t exactly meant like that – and had a positive
influence on Romanian-Israeli relations without jeopardizing Romanian-Egyptian
relations either. When Premier Maurer went to Washington, a few days later, to
participate in the Session of the United Nations General Assembly dedicated to the
Middle East crisis, he met Egyptian ambassador Mahmoud Fawzi with whom he had a
long and friendly conversation which revealed that Cairo understood Romania’s point of
view and had no hard feelings about it. Fawzi made it clear that Egypt had nothing to
reproach to Romania, in spite of the fact that it was the only Socialist country in Europe

56
ANIC, fund CC al PCR – secŃia Cancelarie, dossier no. 90/1967. Stenograma şedinŃei Comitetului
Executiv al CC al PCR din ziua de 12 iunie 1967, p. 6
57
ibid., p. 7-8
58
Scânteia, 14 June 1967

14
to maintain diplomatic relations with Israel59. Obviously, one should expect Nasser to
understand the logic of non-alignment… On the other hand, Fawzi himself was an old
and experienced diplomat so there were no dilettantes in this entire equation.

Principles, Resolutions and Force

In the fall of 1967, when the 22nd Session of the UN General Assembly convened
in New York, Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs Corneliu Mănescu was elected
President of the assembly – the first President in the history of the institution to come
from a Socialist country60. At that session, Romania’s position on the Middle East crises
differed completely from that of the Communist bloc, respectively to identify a solution
acceptable for both parties involved in the conflict. That was exactly the formulation
included in the directives addressed to the Romanian delegation at the UN and adopted
by the MFA with approval from the party leadership 61 . All other Socialist states in
Europe took Egypt’s side condemning the Israeli aggression, as it was established din
Moscow. In November, the Security Council of the UN adopted Resolution 242 in which
Israel was called upon to withdraw its forces from the territories it occupied during the
was against the united Arab Republic. The Resolution also mentioned that the fulfillment
of the UN Charter principles in the Middle East required that all states in the area respect
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all other states and that land acquisition by
means of war be terminated62.
The following months saw a freeze in the situation. Nothing changed in the status
of the occupied territories until the beginning of 1968 when the Israeli government
adopted a rather controversial administrative measure deciding that the territories in
question will no longer be considered “enemy territories”. Israel motivated it was only a
technical measure and was not intended at incorporating the occupied territories inside
Israeli borders, but such statements did not inspire much credibility. This of course
caused a lot of distress and protests among the Arabs, not only the Egyptians. Romania,
on this occasion, adopted a different stance, more clearly directed against Israel, just as
the rest of the world did. The Ambassador of the United Arab Republic in Bucharest, in a
visit at the Romanian MFA, asked for support on behalf of his government, for the
application of Resolution 242 concerning the occupied territories. Also, the Romanian
Ambassador in Syria was also called by the Syrian MFA to be transmitted this
government’s request that Romania condemn the “expansionist” measures adopted by
Israel, in defiance of Resolution 24263.
Against this background, of Israel refusing to obey Resolution 242, another
incident occurred in March 1968, when an Israeli school bus exploded because of a mine
placed by the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization), probably the Fatah faction64. It
happened near the border with Jordan, country known for its protection of PLO armed

59
Mircea MaliŃa, Tablouri din războiul rece. Memorii ale unui diplomat român, Editura C.H. Beck,
Bucureşti, 2007, p. 162
60
New York Times, 20 September 1967
61
ANIC, fund CC al PCR – secŃia Cancelarie, dossier no. 125/1967. Directive pentru delegaŃia Republicii
Socialiste România la cea de-a XXII-a sesiune a Adunării Generale a ONU, p. 10
62
Renata Sonnenfeld, Resolutions of the United Nations Security Council, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,
1988, p. 135
63
ANIC, fund CC al PCR – secŃia Cancelarie, dossier no. 74/1968. MAE Notă de propuneri, p. 26+27
64
New York Times, 19 March 1968

15
militants. Israel replied on 21 March 1968 with an attack across the border, hitting several
positions in Jordan which also caused great international turmoil among the Arabs65. In
May 1968, the CC Presidium of the RCP adopted a decision instructing the MFA to
summon the Israeli ambassador in Bucharest in order to inform him of Romania’s
concern regarding the unjustified delay in applying Resolution 242. The Israeli
ambassador was received by the deputy minister who explained to him that Romania was
interested in a successful peace process in the Middle East and it considered that this
success depended very much on respecting the territorial integrity of other states (with
reference to Jordan) and also on obeying the UN Resolutions (in reference to Egypt)66.
This harsh attitude on Israel was not really a change in Romania’s policy. As
previously stated, Romania was not interested in taking Israel’s side against Egypt, nor
the other way around mainly because its relations with both Middle East countries were
beneficial. There was indeed an exterior factor to be considered, a factor that did play a
role in Romania’s decision, but that role was somehow minor. The factor was the USSR
and Romania’s ambition to refuse its advice on any situation, for the sake of asserting its
independence, but the main rationality of all decisions regarding the Middle East was
Romania’s national interest. Politically, it indicated good relations with all countries, just
as economically Romania could benefit from trade with all countries, and this is why
Nicolae Ceauşescu chose not to take sides. His policy remained unchanged so far, in spite
of its appearances: first it appeared to support the Israelis, later it appeared to support the
Arabs, but in the end it was the same policy, aiming at a neutral position, for the sake of
Romania’s economic benefits. This was the primary factor; opposing the USSR came
second.
Still, Romania’s famous gesture of refusing to cut off relations with Israel in the
summer of 1967 had a positive impact of Romanian-Israeli relations. Although very
modest from a political point of view, bilateral relations reinvigorated soon, under the
impact of Romania’s courageous gesture. It first raised attention in Tel Aviv, of course.
In August 1968, when Ceauşescu was busy dealing with the crisis in Prague, Israeli
authorities were intensifying their steps for improving their relations with Romania.
Israeli Premier Levy Eshkol sent a message to Bucharest through his minister asking
permission for a visit of MFA director Ghideon Rafael in Romania67. His mission was to
asses Romania’s availability for taking relations a step further. The message insisted that
the Israeli Premier would appreciate very much an official audience of G. Rafael to
Minister Corneliu Mănescu and an un-official audience to Premier Maurer. Bucharest
accepted the visit and it turned out to be a success. It was only one of the small details
that in time add up to compose the larger picture of better diplomatic relations.

Conclusion
This short description of the basic premises and conditions which determined and
influenced the evolution of Romania’s policy in the Middle East will end with an

65
Ḥemdā Ben-Yehûdā, Shmuel Sandler, The Arab-Israeli conflict transformed: fifty years of interstate and
ethnic crisis, State University of New York Press, 2002, p. 34
66
ANIC, fund CC al PCR – secŃia Cancelarie, dossier no. 74/1968. Protocol no. 24 al şedinŃei Prezidiului
Permanent al CC al PCR din ziua de 6 mai 1968, p. 3
67
ANIC, fund CC al PCR – secŃia Cancelarie, dossier no. 197/1968. Notă de propuneri referitor: vizita în
Ńara noastră a lui Ghideon Rafael, director general în MAE izraelian, p. 78-79

16
interesting episode, which occurred in the summer of 1970. Romania’s policy of
neutrality and its energetic advocacy for sovereignty and territorial integrity gained her a
certain degree of respectability 68 which Romanians nowadays have a tendency of
denying, mainly because it was associated with Nicolae Ceauşescu’s name, a dictator
whose reputation in the public mind is extremely negative. But that means to mix and
confuse historical contexts which are profoundly different. His policy managed to bring
him a positive reputation in the 60s and 70s, visible in the USA’s honest intention of
using Romania as a mediation channel in relation with China, but also in Vietnam69. The
fact that it failed is another business. Not having the intention to study Romania’s
(attempt of) mediation in the Israeli-Arab conflict, we accidentally stumbled upon
documents revealing that Ceauşescu was asked to do so, by the Israelis, as early as 1970.
On 31 August 1970 the MFA sent to Ceauşescu and the members of CC
Presidium a note received from the Embassy in Tel Aviv. Ambassador V. Georgescu,
who had just returned to his post after a short vacation, met Vice-premier Ygal Allon in a
visit of courtesy and received an important and confidential message for Bucharest. Allon
complained to V. Georgescu about the difficulties encountered by the Israeli government,
due to its split. There were two factions, Allon explained, one lead by Minister of
Defense Moshe Dayan, with a radical orientation and unwilling to give back the occupied
territories, and one lead by himself, Ygal Allon, with a moderate orientation, willing to
reach a convenient settlement regarding the occupied territories, which involved
returning a large portion of it. In the mean time, though, Egypt started to build missile
launch sites in the seize-fire zone separating the two countries. That, of course, was
regarded as a terrible threat by Israeli military and the public opinion, which made it
much more difficult for the moderate faction of the government to reach a negotiated
settlement and, moreover, encouraged the radical faction70.
Given these circumstances, the Israeli Vice-premier Allon officially asked the
Romanian government to mediate in relation to the United Arab Republic, considering
Romania’s positive relations with this country. Allon wanted the Romanian government
to intervene to Egyptian President Nasser in order to obtain some concessions like:
withdrawal of the missile launch pads, at least for a few kilometers and an exchange of
prisoners. Y. Allon argued that such concessions on Nasser’s side would very much
facilitate the actions of the moderate faction, proving to the public opinion that
negotiation is better that war and it can really lead to beneficial settlements. In case of
failure, Allon told the Romanian ambassador, the radical faction would be encouraged71.
A few days latter, the CC Presidium in Bucharest decided to accept the mediation, in

68
Nicolae Ceauşescu, Democratization of International Relations: The Political Settlement of Conflicts and
Tension among States, Meridiane Publishing House, 1981
69
LaurenŃiu Constantiniu, „Between Washington and Beijing: the Romanian Channel 1970-1971”. Arhivele
totalitarismului, no. 1-2/2002, p. 292-293
70
ANIC, fund CC al PCR – secŃia Cancelarie, dossier no. 89/1970. Notă MAE strict secret către tov.
Nicolae Ceauşescu, secretar general al PCR, preşedintele Consiliului de Stat, p. 5-6. For the confirmation
of those related by the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, see: Middle East Record 1968, Israel
University Press, 1973, p. 544; Yvonne Schmidt, Foundations of Civil and Political Rights in Israel and
the Occupied Territories, GRIN Verlag, 2001, p. 354-355; Martín Gilbert, The Routledge Atlas of the Arab-
Israeli conflict, Routledge, 2005, p. 135.
71
ANIC, fund CC al PCR – secŃia Cancelarie, dossier no. 89/1970. Notă MAE strict secret către tov.
Nicolae Ceauşescu…, p. 6-7

17
charging the MFA to use specific channels in order to convey the message to President
Nasser of Egypt72. This was a great success for the Romanian diplomacy: its independent
policy in the Middle East was finally acknowledged after a decade and a half of efforts.
The current phase of documentation cannot offer complete answers regarding
Romania’s mediation in the Middle East conflict and it was not our intention to offer
answers to the question raised above. This involves a different research which must be
focused primarily on MFA archives and foreign archives from the Middle East. Today,
not even the Romanian MFA archives are available, because according to law a limit of
50 years must pass before the documents are open to public research. Therefore, the issue
of Romanian mediation has to be treated separately. In the end of this paper, it was only
used to reveal the success of two decades of foreign policy. Romania’s foreign policy
was aimed at building relations different from those of the Communist bloc, relations that
would recognize and accept Romania as an independent partner, having its own say in
international relations. The Israeli invitation to mediation confirmed, in the summer of
1970, that this particular aim had been reached. Romania was no longer seen just like any
other obedient Soviet satellite and was taken under consideration as an independent
partner. That was, in the end, Gheorghiu-Dej’s dream, in the troubled context which
followed Stalin’s death.
Romania’s policy in the Middle East, in the period of reference, can best be
described as a small state’s energetic effort to overcome the aligned and subordinated
status to which the international relations had condemned it. In a world dominated by two
superpowers, Romania strived to assert its own independent voice in world affairs, to
consolidate its independence and sovereignty, especially under the pressure of the Soviet
Union. As Gheorghiu-Dej established in the mid fifties, the only way to achieve that aim
was economical development. Reducing vulnerabilities and dependencies, in what
regarded both the sources of raw materials and the markets for its economy, was seen as a
basic factor to overcome subordination. This is why Romania’s independent foreign
policy had a very active economic component. On the other hand, the Soviet Union
would have never free-willingly accepted the “emancipation” of any of its satellites and
that is why Romania’s either complete or partial “emancipation” focused primarily on the
economic component. Economy was a field of state action where Moscow granted much
more freedom to its satellites. Also, Romania carefully took only those particular steps
that were not going to attract Soviet retaliation measures and this explains the slow pace
of its successes in the Middle East.
In the end, a cautiously mastered foreign policy, without sudden moves that
would alarm Moscow, focused on the least noisy domain of state action but at the same
time the most important in what concerned long term consolidation, also benefiting from
favorable evolutions in world affairs, drove Romania towards the long-desired status of
an independent partner for most Middle East countries. This paper is merely the
beginning of such a study, since it relies only of party archives sources. Diplomatic
archives are still waiting to be open and can bring forth a lot more knowledge,
completing the image of Romania’s policy in the Middle East. Nevertheless, the
documents uncovered so far do reveal the success story of a small state’s political
affirmation in the divided world of Cold War superpowers.

72
ANIC, fund CC al PCR – secŃia Cancelarie, dossier no. 89/1970. Protocol no. 35 A al şedinŃei Prezidiului
Permanent din ziua de 2 septembrie 1970, p. 3

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