O n sy m b o lo n a n o syn t h ëm a

in t h e Pl a t o n i c Th e o l o g y o f P r o c l u s

Dm itry Ku r d y b a y l o
Russian Christ ian Academ y for t he H um anit ies;
Saint Petersburg State University;
The H erzen State Pedagogical Uni versi t y of Russia
t heoreo@yandex.r u

A BSTRA CT . M an y r ecen t st u d i es p r op ose t h at sy m b o l o n an d sy n t h ëm a ar e syn on ym ou s in

t h e w r i t i n gs o f Pr ocl us. H ow ever , h i s P l a t o n i c T h eo l o g y con t ai n s r el i abl e evi d en ce t o pu t
t h i s op i n i on t o doubt . Th e goal o f t h i s r esear ch i s t o d et er m i n e t h e m ean i n g o f bot h
t er m s fr om t h e con t ext s o f t h ei r usage, en gagi n g t h e t ext u al an al ysi s an d t h e fol l ow i n g
p h i l osop h i cal r econ st r u ct i on . A s d i st i n gu i sh ed fr om a sym bol , a sy n t h ëm a h as su b st an ­
t i al n at u r e, is st abl e an d r em ai n s i n var i ab l e w h en i s d i scover ed at d i ffer en t l evel s o f t h e
on t ol ogi cal h i er ar ch y. I n t h e P l a t o n i c T h eo l o g y , a sym bol i s oft en con si d er ed i n t er m s o f
t h e h i er ar ch i c l evel , w h er e i t ap p ear s: i n t h e m at er i al w or l d , i t is cor por eal ; am on g n u m ­
ber s, i t is on t ol ogi cal l y i r r el evan t , t h e i n t el l i gi bl e r eal m con t ai n s it s p r op er sym bol s as
w el l . A si gn i fi can t d i ffer en ce b et w een sy m b o l o n an d sy n t h ëm a is r el at ed t o t h e d i al ect i cs
o f p ar t i ci p at i on : sy n t h ëm a in an ob ject k eep s i t on an u n p ar t i ci p at ed l evel , w h i l e a sym ­
b ol i m p l i es fu r t h er p ar t i ci p at i on t o a sym b ol i c object . Fi n al l y, a sy n t h ëm a is d escr i b ed as
“ d i ssem i n at ed ,” “p l an t ed ,” or i n an y ot h er w ay h i d d en i n t h e b ei n g; w h i l e a sym b ol is
“ d i scover ed ,” or fou n d i n t h e b ei n g, t h er efor e sy n t h ëm a m ay b e con si d er ed an i n n er k er ­
n el o f w h at is d i scover ed as a sym bol , an d a sym bol - as an ou t w ar d exp r essi on o f a
sy n t h ëm a . Su ch u n d er st an d i n g o f t h ese t er m s agr ees w i t h b ot h exeget i cal an d t h eu r gi c
con t ext s i n Pr ocl u s’ P l a t o n i c T h eo l o g y .

K EYW ORDS: Pr ocl us, T h eo l o g i a p la t o n ica, Plat on ic T h eo l o g y , N eop l at on i sm , sym bol ,

syn t h ëm a, t h eu r gy, on t ol ogy, m yt h .

* T h e r esear ch w as car r i ed ou t at Ru ssi an Ch r i st i an A cad em y for t h e H u m an i t i es (Sain t

Pet er sbu r g) w i t h t h e fi n an ci al su p p or t o f Ru ssi an Sci en ce Fou n d at i on , p r oject Γ7-78-
roo6r.

ΣΧΟ ΛΗ Vol . r3.2 (2or 9 ) © D m i t r y K u r d ybayl o, 2or 9

w w w .n su .r u / cl assi cs/ sch ol e D O I:r o.25205/ r 995-4328-2or 9-r 3-2-463-485
464 On sy m b o l o n an d sy n t h em a i n Pr o cl u s

N eoplat onic phil osophy of language, t he t heory of reference and significat ion,
and t h ei r ontologie stat us have at t ract ed m uch schol arl y int er est during past dec­
ades. The researches o f Robbert van den Berg (2008), Pet er St ruck (2004), and
Sara Rappe (2007) provide an ext ensive elaborat i on of t hem es, init i ally exposed
b yj o h n Dillon ( i g75),Jean Trouillard (1981), and Gregory Shaw (1995).
One of t he essent ial N eoplat onic not ions in t his field is σύμ βολον, “a sym bol.”
H owever, anot her t erm , σύνθημ α has a sim ilar m eaning. M an y scholars and t rans­
lat ors of Proclus' works do not dist inguish t hese notions and easi ly int erchange
t hem .1Ju st a few resear chers t ried to find a di st inct ion bet w een sy m b o l o n and
s y n t h ëm a in Proclus' writ ings. In 1981, Jean Trouillard int roduced t he basic con­
siderat ions relat ed to t his problem (Trouillard 1981), and in 1985 Rosa Loredano
Cardullo undert ook a profound exam in at ion o f all t he places, where t erm s sy m ­

b o l o n , sy n t h ëm a , and ei k o n are m en t ioned in Proclus' com m ent ary on Plat o's R e ­

p u b lic (Cardullo 1985).2 Unfort unat ely, I could not find any furt her exam inat ions
of ot her Proclean t ext s done in the sam e way. H owever, t he st udy of R.L. Cardullo
provided ver y prom ising results, and ot her writ ings of Proclus con t ain m uch rele­
van t m at erial.
Using t he analyt ic t ools of t he TLG, one can find at least 238 occurrences of
sy m b o l o n in all ext an t works of Proclus. Am on g t hem , 65 occurrences are locat ed
in t he com m ent ary i n R em p u b l i c a m ; 66 in t he com m ent ary i n T i m a eu m ·, 35 in the
com m ent ary i n P a r m en i d em , and at least 30 in t he T h eo l o g i a P l a t o n i c a . Other
w rit ings cont ain 42 ot her m ent ions, i.e. less t han 1/5. A h al f less fr equen t t erm is
s y n t h ëm a w it h 120 m en t ions dist ribut ed bet w een Proclean writ ings in a sim ilar
proport ion. A ft er t he st udies of the sem ant ics o f sy m b o lo n and sy n t h ëm a in Pro­
clean com m ent ari es i n T i m a eu m and in C r at y lu m , publi shed recent ly,3 t his work
cont inues t he research addressing t he T h eo l o g i a P l a t o n i c a (refer enced as TP her e­
inaft er). D espit e less fr equent usage of sy m b o lo n , t he cont ent s of t he TP provides

1Sh ep p ar d 19 8 0 ,146 ; St r u ck 2004, 234; Rap p e 20 0 7,11- 12 an d 176 - 178 ; Pet r o ff 2013, 217.
See al so t h e t r an sl at i on s o f Pr ocl u s b y Fest u gi èr e 19 66- 19 68, an d T ar r an t , D u vi ck 2014. In
t h e n ot es t o t h ei r t r an sl at i on , D. Saffr ey an d L.G. W est er i n k ( 1968- 199 7) m en t i on t h at
σύμ βολον can b e d i st i n gu i sh ed fr om σύνθημ α (vol. 2, p. 114, n. 5) an d can b e t r an sl at ed
u si n g d i ffer en t t er m s (vol. 4, p. 131, n. 7). H ow ever , t h ei r t r an sl at i on con t ai n s 27 places,
w h er e σύνθημ α i s r en d er ed as “ sym b ol e,” on ce as “ car act èr e d i st i n ct i f ’ (6.78.29), an d on ce
as “l a m ar qu e u n i q u e” ( 6.24.8-9) . I n ot h er w or d s, σύνθημ α ap p ear s t o b e al m ost n ot dis­
t i n gu i sh ed fr om σύμ βολον i n t h e Fr en ch ver si on .
2 I t sh ou l d b e m en t i on ed t h at r el at i vel y ol d t r an sl at i on s su ch as T ayl or 's (1995) an d
T u r ol l a's (1957) r en d er σύμ βολον an d σύνθημ α w i t h cor r esp on d i n g d i ffer en t t er m s (m or e
or l ess st abl e over t h e w h ol e t ext ).
3 See K u r d yb ayl o 2018 an d 2019.
 D m i t r y K u r d y b ay l o / ΣΧΟΛΗ Vol. r3. 2 (2or9) 465

a m uch deeper insight into t he phi losoph y o f Proclus, t han w hat can be con clud­
ed from t he previ ously st udied com m ent ari es on Plat o’s dialogues. Bein g one of
t he lat est Proclean writ ings, t he TP reveals t he m ost int ricat e det ails of his sem an ­
t ics and dialectics.
The m ain m et hod em ployed in t his st udy is t he con t ext analysis, w hi ch is used
to rest ore t he m eaning of sy m b o lo n and s y n t h ëm a from t heir original t ext ual en­
vi ronm ent , following t he basic approach int roduced by Em ile Benven ist e (Ben-
ven ist e r966, 3o7). A ft er t he search of relevant cont ext s, t hey are classified and
ordered. Below all t he gat hered evidence wi ll be described and analysed. The m a­
jor i t y of conclusions will be m ade according t o t he TP t ext only, i.e. in dependent ­
l y o f ot her Pr oclean writ ings. This is int ended to provide t he furt her possi bili t y to
com pare argum ent at i on o f Proclus in his differ ent works, and i f it appear s possi­
ble, to t race t he evolut ion of his views.

M yt h an d sym bol as a m ean s t o expr ess t h eol ogi cal k n ow ledge

In t he first book of t he TP, Proclus com pares different ways to express t he t heo­
logical knowledge, and prom ises t hat during all t he following discussion he will
“prefer t he clear, dist inct, and sim ple [ narrat ion] to t he cont raries of t hese,” while
“t he cont rar ies” are “delivered t hrough sym bols (διά συμ βόλων) ... and im ages (δι’
εικόνων).”4
The sym bolic w ay of speaking as at t ribut ed first ly to Plat o, who is said to
“t each us m yst i c doct rines o f divine nat ures” using four m odes: an ecst at ic
(ένθεαστικώς ), a dialect ical, a sym bolical, and vi a an ascen t from im ages (άπό των
εικόνων) to t hei r prot ot ypes.5Plato in t ent ionally “in a sym bolical m ann er conceals
t he t rut h about divine nat ures,”6 t hus m aking his t hought underst andable only to
his closest disciples.7
Each w ay o f speaking is used for a differ ent purpose: the sym bolic (or m ythic),
and t he figurat ive (δι’ εικόνων) w ays are used w hen speaking about gods and di­
vin e t hings. An expressi on of hum an’s own thought s is perform ed “according to
science” (κατ’ έπιστήμ ην), or under divine inspir at ion (κατά τήν έκ θεών

4 T P r .9.2o-24, h er ei n aft er t h e Gr eek t ext is ci t ed fr om : Saffr ey, W est er i n k r 968-r 997.

En gl i sh t r an sl at i on is b ased on t h e T h om as T ayl or ’s ed i t i on (r995) w i t h m y si gn i fi can t
m od i fi cat i on s t ak i n g i n accou n t m od er n Fr en ch (by Saffr ey an d W est er i n k ) an d I t al i an
( Casagli a, L i n gu i t i 2oo7; T u r ol l a r957) t r an sl at i on s. T ayl or ’s t r an sl at i on is r efer en ced b e­
l o w as Tr. w i t h a page n u m ber . Th i s q u ot at i on goes fr om Tr. 53. For m or e d et ai l s on t h e
p assage ci t ed see: Sh ep p ar d 2or4, 62.
5 T P r .r 7.r 8-24, Tr. 59. See al so n ot e ad l oc. in : Saffr ey, W est er i n k vol . r, p. r32, n. 4.
6 T P r .r 9.3-4, Tr. 59: τον συμ βολικόν τρόπον κ ατ ακ ρύπτ ει τήν περί τών θείων άλήθειαν.
7T Pr .r 9.4- 5, Tr. 59.
466 On sy m b o l o n an d sy n t h em a i n Pr o cl u s

επίπνοιαν).8 Proclus not es t hat t he m yt hic or sym bolic w ay pert ains to Orphic t ra­
dition, t he figurat ive one - to Pyt hagorean, and t he “scien t i fic” (κατ' επιστήμ ην)
w ay per t ains t o Plat onist s.9
Sym bols and m yt hs are considered in fer ior w h en com pared w it h a “phi losoph ­
ical” t ype of nar rat ive, an exam ple of w hi ch one can find in Plat o's R ep u b l i c . The
dr aw back of sym bolism is t hat it shows “intelligible w it h t he m eans o f sensible,
im m at eri al w it h t he m at erial, whole w it h part ial, and w hat is t rue w it h im ages
t hat have false being.”10
The figurat ive language of sym bol and m yt h m ay be confusing: w hat is assert ­
ed sym bolically, m ay be denied by a m ore precise discourse. For inst ance, a m yth
(e.g., D iot im a's nar rat ive in t he Sy m p o si u m ) speaks of a god's birt h w h en a “dia­
l ect ical di scourse” (διαλεκτικευομ ένω) finds all gods bein g unbegot t en.11This lat t er
w ay is called “int ellect ual and not m yst ic,” it reveals t hat w hat sym bolically is de­
scri bed as a god's genealogy, act ually is a rel at i on to “unspeak able causes” o f an
ever-unbegot t en deit y.12
Nevert heless, t here is a m ore or less st able cor respondence bet w een t he in t el­
lect ual realm and it s sensual revel at ions,13 thus m aking up a kind of sem an t ic sys­
t em , w hich one m ay call a language o f sym bols. Proclus develops t his idea into a
t heory of divine nam es. H e m en t ions it ver y bri efly in the TP book 1, chapt er 29,
perhaps, because a det ail ed discussion w as already given in his com m ent ary to
t he C r at y lu s of Plat o.14
The di fference bet w een a m yt h and a sym bol is quite clear in t he TP: m an y
sym bols are used to express t heological kn owledge in a com posit e narrat ive,
which is considered a m yt h as a whole. Thus, t he m yt hological language is nat u­
rally a language of sym bols. H owever, not every expressi on t hat is built of sym ­
bols is n ecessar y a myth.

8 T P 1.20 .1- 5, Tr. 60.

9 T P 1.20 .7- 25, Tr. 60.
10 T P 1.21.7- 22, Tr. 6 1:... είδωλα καί ψευδώς οντα.
11For ot h er exam p l es, see r efer en ces i n Saffr ey, W est er i n k 1968, vol . 1, pp. 137- 138 , n. 2.
12 T P 1.120.22- 121.14, Tr. 123. N ot i ceabl y, t h i s p at t er n w as i n t r od u ced as ear l y as b y t h e
t i m es o f Pl ot i n us, w h o t r i ed t o r econ ci l e t h e or i gi n o f t h e u n i ver se d escr i b ed i n Pl at o's
T i m a eu s w i t h a t r ad i t i on al an ci en t v i ew o f t h e u n i ver se's et er n al bei n g, w i t h n o b egi n ­
n i n g or en d (i n ad d i t i on t o En n . II.1, a t r eat i se d ed i cat ed t o t h i s quest i on , see al so: En n .

I V .3.9.15-19, an d VI.2.7.36-41) .
13 Cf. TP 1.124.12- 20 , Tr. 125.
14 See: Tar r an t , D u vi ck 2014; van den Ber g 2008.
 D m i t r y K u r d y b ay l o / ΣΧΟΛΗ Vol. r3. 2 (2or9) 467

Sym bols i n t h eu r gy

For Proclus, t heurgy “awakes t he divine presence” w it h t he use of m at er ial sym ­

bols.15 Such t heurgic sym bols m ake up a group t hat differs (at som e ext ent ) from
“exeget ical” sym bols, i.e. those discovered in a w ri t t en text, like Plat o’s dialogues,
for inst ance. The m ost im port an t di fference is obvious: t heurgic sym bols are m a­
t erial objects, w hi le t he exeget i cal ones are m ere lit er al descript i ons o f such ob­
ject s/ 6 The form er m ay influence a hum an bot h physically and int ellect ually
w hen t he lat t er is capable of an int ellect ual influence only.
H owever, Proclus does not com pare t heurgic sym bols w it h exeget ical ones,
but gives anot her surprising pair:

A s t h e t h eu r gi c ar t t h r ou gh cer t ai n s y m b o l s cal l s for t h t h e u n en vyi n g good n ess

o f t h e God s i n t o t h e i l l u m i n at i on o f ar t i fi ci al st at u es, t h u s al so t h e i n t el l ect u al sci en ce
o f d i vi n e con cer n s (ή νοερά τών θείων έπιστ ήμ η), b y t h e com p osi t i on s an d d i vi si on s o f
soun ds, r eveal s t h e con ceal ed essen ce o f t h e God s/ 7

The “int ellect ual science” t hat operat es w it h “t he com posi t ions and divisions
of sounds,” probably, is t hat “di alect ic di scourse,” w hich Proclus finds t he m ost
appropriat e to t he invi sible nat ure of gods, and w h i ch excels sym bols and myths.
But i f w e t r y to reflect t his int ellect ual revelat ion of divine nat ure int o t he m at eri ­
al realm , t he result will be an illum inat ed and deified t heurgic sym bol. Naturally,
an exeget ical sym bol should be placed bet w een t hese t wo ext rem es: it is m ore
int ellect ual t han a m at erial object , but is less int ellect ual t han w hat is expressed
“dialect ically.” H owever, it does not m ean t hat every m yt h or every exeget i cal
sym bol is based on real m at eri al sym bols. Proclus em phasizes t hat our int ellect is
capable of grasping “divine nat ures” and verball y expressing t hem via “im ages” in
a sym bolic m anner: “represen t in g t hat, w hi ch is void o f com posi t ion in t hem (το
άσύνθετον αύτών), t hrough com posit ion; t hat w hich is sim ple, t hrough var iet y; and
t hat w hich is unit ed, t hrough m ult it ude.”r8

Exeget i cal sym bols

As far as a t heurgic sym bol is a m at er ial object , and an exeget ic sym bol also has
prim ar ily m at erial at tribut es, one can expect t hat any part icular sym bol should

15 Tr ou i l l ar d r972, r 75: « L a t h éu r gi e est u n sym b ol i sm e op ér at oi r e d est i n é à évei l l er l a

p r ésen ce di vi n e».
16 D espi t e d i ffer en t n a t u r e, t h ei r ef f ec t m ay b e equ al : “ cer t ai n con st r u ct i on s i n l an ­
gu age, fr om i n d i vi d u al w or d s t o w h ol e p oet i c scen es, op er at e p r ec i sel y l i k e t h e sym bol i c
t ok en s i n t h e t h eu r gi c r i t u al ” ( em p h asi s b y P. St r u ck 2oo4, p. 235, cf. al so p. 25o).
17 T P r .r 24.23-r 25.2, Tr. r 25: ...έκφ αίνει τήν άποκεκρυμ μ ένην ούσίαν τών θεών.
ι8 T P r .r 24.r 9-2o, Tr. r25.
468 On sy m b o l o n an d sy n t h em a i n Pr o cl u s

per t ain to t he m at erial world. There is a w ide range o f relevant exam ples that
support this assum pt ion.
The “plain where t rut h st ands” in t he P h a ed r u s (248b5-c4)19 is in t er pret ed by
Proclus down to t he sm allest details. H e start s his explanat ion:

Th e “p l ai n o f t r u t h ” i s i n t el l ect u al l y exp osed t o i n t el l i gi bl e li gh t , an d is sp l en d i d w i t h

t h e i l l u m i n at i on s t h at p r oceed fr om t h er e. ... Th e “m ead ow ” i s t h e p r ol i fi c p ow er o f
l i fe, an d o f al l k i n d s o f lo go i, i s t h e com p r eh en si on (περιοχή) o f t h e fi r st effi ci en t cau s­
es o f li fe, an d i s t h e cau se o f t h e var i et y, an d gen er at i on o f for m s. For t h e m ead ow s al ­
so w h i ch ar e h er e ar e p r od u ct i ve o f al l k i n d s o f for m s an d logoi, an d b ear w at er w h i ch
is t h e s y m b o l o f vi vi fi cat i on (ζωογονίας ). A n d t h e “n ou r i sh i n g” cau se o f t h e Gods,
is a cer t ai n i n t el l i gi bl e u n i on , com p r eh en d i n g i n i t sel f t h e w h ol e p er fect i on o f t h e
G o d s.20

N oticeably, Proclus applies the t erm “sym bol” only to w at er t hat per t ains to
“t he m eadows, w hich are her e,” i.e. t he m at er ial w at er and m eadows. On the con­
trary, neit h er int ell ect ual “plain,” nor “m eadow ” nor any of t h ei r at tribut es are
called sym bols; t h ei r m eani ng is int roduced w it h a plain copula εστι (“is”). I f this
wor din g is not accident al, t hen Proclus avoids applyi ng “sym bol” to int ellect ual
and int elligible objects.
M at eri al object s m en t ioned in an cient Gr eek m yths, such as of H om er's epic,
can also be sym bols subject to int er pret at ion. For inst ance, Proclus writ es regard­
ing t he m yt hological h ist ory o f Cronus: “bonds and sect ions are sym bols of com ­
m un ion and separat ion, and each is t he offspring of t he sam e divine m yt hology
(θεομ υθίας ).”21In anot her place, the sam e bonds are “t he sym bol of t he connect ive
order of t he gods, since everyt hing, w h i ch is boun d (παν το δεδεμ ένον), is connect ­
ed by a bond (ύπο του δεσμ ού).”22
Anot her m yt hological sym bol is borrow ed from the P r o t a g o r a s, w her e the
“high cit adel (άκρόπολις ) t hat is t he house of Zeus” (321d6) is underst ood as “a
sym bol of int ellect ual circulation, and of t he highest sum m it of O lym pus.”23
The at tribut es o f t hree Fat es (αί Μοίραι) as described in the R es p u b l i c a X,

19 H er ei n aft er Pl at o's d i al ogu es a ci t ed fr om : Cooper , H u t ch i n son 1997.

20 T P 4.45.21- 46.11, Tr. 259 - 26 0 .
21T P 5.18.18- 20, Tr. 310.
22 T P 5.125.25- 27, Tr. 379: τ ης γάρ συνεκτ ικ ής τών νοερών θεών διακοσμ ήσεως σύμ βολόν.
N ot i ceabl y, t h e i n t er p r et at i on b ased on t h e l exi cal l i k en ess o f δεδεμ ένον an d δεσμ ός fol ­
l ow s on e o f t h e m et h od s o f Pl at o's C r at ylu s an d Pr ocl u s' com m en t ar y on t h i s di al ogue
(see: A d em ol l o 2011, esp. pp. 132- 138 ; van d en Ber g 20 0 8 ,173- 19 9 ; M acI saac 2013, 97- 118) .
Pr ocl u s m en t i on s t h e C r at ylu s exp l i ci t l y sever al l i n es ab ove (TP 5.125.18), w h er e h e ci t es
Cr at . 404a5- 6 .
23 T P 5.91.4- 9, Tr. 357.
 D m i t r y K u r d y b ay l o / ΣΧΟΛΗ Vol. 13. 2 (2or9) 469

6r7b7-d5, are gen erally nam ed sym bols. It is im por t ant t hat before this passage,
Proclus discusses t he sequence of t he Fates, in w hich t hey are ordered by Plato.
This order is in t er pret ed in detail and is never nam ed sym bolical or consist ing of
sym bols. But w h en Proclus t urns to t he “sit t ing on t hrones,” t hei r locat i on at the
“rim s” and t he “w horl s” of t he univer sal “spindle,”24 he proceeds w it h a sym bolical
explanat ion. Again, i f this is not accident al, t he order of subject s is im m at erial
enough to be not considered a sym bol as opposed to corporeal m at eri al objects.
An int en t ional m an n er of Pr oclean wor din g her e agrees w it h a corresponding
synopsis of this chapt er 23 in t he pi n ax of t he sixt h book.25
In anot her place, Proclus speaks about t he sym bols of a soul’s yout h, w hi ch are
“bein g beardless and havi n g sm oot h [ cheeks] inst ead of hoari ness and bear ds.”26
Generally, all t he im ager y of a hum an body applied to a soul m ay be considered
sym bolic; how ever, Proclus em ploys it in his exegesis not often.
Accordi ng to Proclus, t he ascent of t he soul to t he int ellect ual realm is accom ­
pan ied by t he “cut t ing off all t he generat ion -pr oduci ng sym bols” and changing
t he ver y ei d o s of t he soul’s life.27 Probably, t his “cut t ing off’ im plies t he cast rat ion
of Uranus by Cronus,28 as long as Proclus below calls the ascen ding souls “the
nurslings of Cronus.”29 Thus, in the nar row sense “t he gener at ion-producing sym ­
bols” are hum an genit als, w hich are bodily sym bols in t he sam e way, as beards
and sm oot hness of skin above. H owever, Proclus is speaking about a hum an soul
t hat does not have genitals as long as any ot her organs of a body. Thus in t he w id ­
er sense, t his “gener at ion-product ion” m ay st and for any becom ing, in herent to
anyt hing m at erial, while t he soul br eaki ng aw ay from t he m at eri al realm , ent ers
t he wor ld o f being and ceases any becom ing.
H owever, Pr oclean wor din g her e does not allow distinguishing, w het h er all
possible sym bols are t he “generat ion-producing” ones or t hese are ju st one type
in a w id er variet y.

Sy n t h ëm a as di st in guish ed fr om sy m b o lo n

In com pari son w it h a symbol, sy n t h ëm a has a slight ly different m eaning. Proclus

provides us w it h t he following evidence.

24R e s p u b l i c a X, 6r 6c-6r 7a.

25 T P 6.3.24- 28: Π ερί τ ής έν Π ολιτείφ μ ητρος τών Μ οιρών, ... τ ίνες αύτών αί δυνάμ εις διά
τών θείων παραδίδονται συμ βόλων.
26 T P 5 .27 .r r -r 5 , Tr. 3r 6: τή νεότ ητι σύμ βολ α,... το άτριχον καί το λεΐον.
27 T P 5.9 2.23-25, Tr. 358: πάντ α δέ τ ά γενεσιουργά σύμ βολ α περικ όπτ ετ αι καί προς τήν
νοεράν άκρότ ητα μ εθίστατ αι το τής ζωής είδος .
28 H es. T h eo g . r 73-r 82.
29 T P 5.92.26: τοΰ Κρόνου ... τρόφιμ οι. H er e Pr ocl u s qu ot es Pl at o’s P o l i t i c u s 272b8.
470 On sy m b o l o n an d sy n t h em a i n Pr o cl u s

First ly, t here are plen t y of exam ples of par t icular s y n t h ëm a t a . For inst ance,
“w isdom is a sy n t h ëm a of At hena and t he sum m it of virt ue.”30 Am ong At hena's
at tributes, Proclus also m en t ions “rhyt hm and dance,” w h i ch are a “m yst ic
sy n t h ëm a ” of h er divinit y.31Below Proclus says, t hat “t he form less, t he indefinit e,
and t he privat ion o f rhythm, are t he pecul iar it ies of m at t er,”32 and t herefore the
“rhyt hm and dance” should be considered proper t ies of t he im m at erial.
The “cut t ing off,” m en t ioned in t he T i m a eu s 36a1 (άποτέμ νων), is t aken as a
sy n t h ëm a also.33 In t he ot her place, Proclus says t hat “t he est rangem ent from the
part ial, t he agility, and t he free energy direct ed to the m ult iple is a s y n t h ëm a ap­
propri at e to t he liberat ed rulers.”34
A list of differ ent s y n t h ëm a t a is int roduced, w hen Proclus discusses t he Par­

m en i d es of Plato. The first and the highest poin t of t he int ellect ual h ebdom ad is
“t he fat her of t he int ellect ual realm ,” w hi ch is followed by “t he t hreefold figure,
and t he order of t he Gods w hich per fect s all things, t hat w hich is in i t sel f and in
anot her.” According to Proclus, “t hese t hings (ταύτα), ... are sy n t h ëm a t a of the
int ellect ual sum m it of t he int ellect ual m onads.”35
The pat ernal int ellect is described dually: as t he first king and as t he fat her of
t he int ellect ual realm , w hat is in t er pret ed in t erm s o f well-k nown N eoplat onic
t riad “unpart icipat ed — part ici pat ed — par t icipant .”36 Act ually, “bein g in it self”
can be int erpret ed as an unpart icipat ed rest, and “being in an ot her” as t he st ate of
being part ici pat ed and, consequent ly, bein g present in t he par t i cipant in some
way. These t wo m odes are t herefore called “a t wofold s y n t h ëm a .”37 Several pages
below Proclus uses a slight ly differ ent wording:

30 T P 6.53.8- 10, Tr. 425.

31 TP 5.130 .12- 13, Tr. 381: ο ρυθμ ος καί ή ορχησις σύνθημ α τ ής θεότητός εστι τ αύτης
μ υστικόν.
32 T P 5.130 .17- 18, Tr. 382.
33 T P 5.133.11- 13, Tr. 383: καί ο Τίμ αιος ... τ φ τ ής τομ ής κέχρηται συνθήμ ατι.
34 TP 6.78.26-29, Tr. 441- 442: το άψειμ ένον άπο τών μ ερικών καί το εΰλυτον καί το επί
πολ λ ά τ αίς ενεργείας αύτεξουσίως ψερόμ ενον σύνθημ α τών άπολύτων εστίν ήγεμ όνων.
35 TP 5.134.11- 12, Tr. 384: συνθήμ ατα δέ τ αύτ α τ ής νοερας άκρότητος επιδείκ νυτ αι τών
νοερών μ ονάδων.
36 For an i n t r od u ct i on i n t o t h i s con cep t see: Ch l u p 20 12,18 - 29 an d 9 9 - 111.
37 T P 5.135.1- 18 , Tr. 38 4- 38 5: ... διττοίς τούτοις συνθήμ ασιν. Th e w or d i n g o f Pr ocl u s h er e
is u n cl ear , b u t i t can b e i n t er p r et ed u si n g a si m i l ar for m u l a i n h i s com m en t ar y i n T i m a e­

um 1.210 .11- 16 : “A l l t h i n gs ... b ot h r em ai n i n an d r ever t t o t h e gods, r ecei vi n g t h i s ab i l i t y

fr om t h em an d ob t ai n i n g i n t h ei r ver y b ei n g a d ou bl e si gn at u r e (διτ τ ά συνθήμ ατα), t he
on e i n or d er t o r em ai n t h er e, t h e ot h er so t h at w h at p r oceed s for t h can r et u r n ” (En gl i sh
t r an sl at i on : Ru n i a, Sh ar e 2008, 46).
 D m i t r y K u r d y b ay l o / ΣΧΟΛΗ Vol. r3. 2 (2or9) 47r

[ bei n g] “i n an ot h er ” is t h e sy n t h ëm a o f t h e fat h er , [ an d bei n g] “i n i t sel f ’ is t he

s y n t h ë m a o f t h e ver y fi r st u n p ol l u t ed m on ad .38

In anot her place, Proclus em phasises t he rel at ion of sy n t h ëm a specifi cally to

t he rem aini ng “in oneself:”

b ei n g “i n an ot h er ” i s t h e d i st in gu i sh i n g p r op er t y o f t h e i n t el l i gi bl e an d p at er n al [ l ev­
el s] . ... [ A n d bei n g] “i n i t sel f ’ is t h e p r op er s y n t h ë m a o f t h e u n p ol l u t ed m on ad .39

Cer t ain dial ect ical t erm s can be sy n t h ëm ata, such as sam eness and ot herness:
“t he sam e appear s to be a sy n t h ëm a o f . t he pat ernal exi st ence,”4° and “t he t erm
t h e o t h er is a s y n t h ëm a of a corporeal m ode [ of bein g] .”4
Finally, t he pi n ax of t he fift h book st ates t hat the int er m ediat e int ellect ual or­
der is described in t he P a r m en i d es w it h t he use of s y n t h ëm a t a ,42 but t here is no
m ore det ail on this subject .43Fort unat ely, t he end of ch apt er 39 con t ains a full list
of all t erms, w hich can be r eli ably ident i fi ed w it h t he sy n t h ëm a t a , r evealed and
explained by Proclus in details. They are being in i t sel f and i n a n o t h er , sa m en ess

and d i f f er en c e, w hi ch can be appl ied to sel f and to the other, and all ot her funda­
m en t al predicat es exposed in t he P a r m e n i d e s .44

M ore one usage of s y n t h ëm a is given less clearly:

Si n ce t h e w h ol e or d er o f t h e assi m i l at i ve God s is su sp en d ed fr om t h e d em i u r gi c
m on ad , su bsi st s abou t , i s r ever t ed t o, an d p er fect ed b y it, i t is n ecessar y t o r efer t h e
s y n t h ë m a t a o f t h i s or d er t o t h e d em i u r gi c on es, an d t o gi ve t o t h e for m er a w el l -
or d er ed gen er at i on p r oceed i n g in m easu r es fr om t h e l at t er .45

In t he language of Proclus, m on ad has a quit e exact m eaning. In t he above-

38 T P 5.r 47.23-r 48.r , Tr. 393: ...το μ έν «έν άλλφ » σύνθημ α τοΰ πατρός έστι, το δέ «έν αύτφ »
τής άχράντου πρωτίστ ης μ ονάδος .
39 T P 5 .r 37 .r 9 - 25 , Tr. 386: το δ’ αύ «έν αύτφ » τ ής άχράντου μ ονάδος έστίν οίκεΐον σύνθημ α.
40 TP 5 .r 44 .r 8 - r 9 , Tr. 39 r: το δέ ταύτον τ ής οικείας ύπάρξεως αύτοΰ, τ ής πατ ρικ ής λέγω,
σύνθημ α προφ αίνεται.
41T P 5 .r 43 .r 4 , Tr. 39o: «τ ά άλλα» τής σωμ ατικ ής έστι συστάσεως σύνθημ α.
42 T P 5.5.r - 2: Π ώς τήν μ έσην διακόσμ ησιν τοΰ νοερού πλ άτ ους καί διά ποίων συνθημ άτων ο
Π αρμ ενίδης έξέφηνεν.
43 Th e sam e h ap p en s t w o m or e t i m es i n t h e T P: i n a p i n ax Pr ocl u s p r om i ses t o de­
scr i be “ cat ap h at i c sy n t h ëm a t a ” o f t h e su p er cel est i al p l ace (T P 4.2.2r - 23) or t h e sy n t h ëm a ­

ta o f t h e t h r ee h yp ost ases r el at ed t o i t ( T P4.3U - 3) , b u t t h e cor r esp on d i n g ch ap t er s (book

4, ch ap t er s r3 an d r6, r esp.) m en t i on n ei t h er sy m b o l o n n or sy n t h ëm a . O ne can t r y t o r e­
st or e fr om t h e con t ext , w h at Pr ocl u s cou l d h ave m ean t i n t h e p i n ax, b u t I cou l d n ot i n ­
t er p r et t h i s t ext u n am bi gu ou sl y.
44 T P 5.r 47.22-r 48.9, Tr. 393.
45 TP 6.68^ 4-69.4, Tr. 435: ... δεΐ δήπου καί τ ά τ ήσδε τ ής τ άξεως συνθήμ ατα προς τ ά
δημ ιουργικά τον λόγον άναφέρειν.
472 On sy m b o l o n an d sy n t h em a i n Pr o cl u s

m en t ioned di alect ics of par t icipat ion, t he t erm m on ad is relat ed to t he unit y of

unpart ici pat ed rest and can be appl ied to an y level of int ellect ual h ierar ch y such
as t he m on adic int ellect , t he m onadic soul of t he world, and so on down to par­
t i cul ar gods.
There are a few m ore exam ples of sy n t h ëm ata explicit ly relat ed to a m onad of
one or anot her layer of the intelligible.46 Proclus gives a list of m undane gods, “lead­
ers and rulers in the universe,” the angels, daemons, heroes, partial souls, mortals,
animals, and even plant s — all of t hem “aspire aft er t heir leaders; and in all things,
there is a sy n t h ëm a o f t heir proper m onad.”47 In anot her place, Proclus says that the
specific feat ures of the ruling gods “proceed from the demiurgic m onad, and from
the sy n t h ëm a t a , whi ch pre-exist t here.”48 Also, Proclus once considers a t riad of
gods as t hree m onads, whi ch have corresponding sy n t h ëm a t a .49

D i al ect i cs o f s y m b o lo n an d sy n t h ëm a

The m ain di fference bet w een sy m b o l o n and sy n t h ëm a is alm ost obvious: a sym bol
is a m at eri al object , w hi ch m akes an int ellect ual or int elligible subst an ce per cep­
t ible, whil e sy n t h ëm a is anyt hing incorporeal. It m ay var y from w hat is t he closest
to t he m at eri al worl d and defines it s st ruct ure or dynam ics, such as “rhyt hm ” and
“dance,” and up to t he m ost abst ract “sam en ess” and “ot herness.” H owever, t his is
t he roughest indicat ion, and i f w e stop at t his point , w e will find m an y in st ances
falling out of this scope.
The m ost helpful are t he places, where σύμ βολον m eet s σύνθημ α in one phrase.
The first exam ple of such com posit ion is found in t he explanat i on of t he soul's
ascen t to “t he supercelest ial place” as it is described in t he P h a ed r u s ( 247α ff.):

t h e “p er fect , an d si m pl e, an d u n sh ak eab l e an d bl i ssfu l vi si on s” ar e r eveal ed t o souls

su p er n al l y “fr om t h e su p er cel est i al p l ace,” t h r ou gh t h e h ol d i n g Gods. For t h e m yst i c
s y n t h ë m a t a o f i n t el l i gi bl e sh i n e for t h i n t h at pl ace, an d al so t h e u n k n ow n an d
i n effab l e “b eau t y o f ch ar act er s.” For m u ësi s an d ep o p t ei a ar e a s y m b o l o f i n effabl e
si l en ce an d t h e u n i on w i t h m yst i c n at u r es t h r ou gh i n t el l i gi bl e vi si on s. A n d w h at is
t h e m ost ad m i r ab l e o f al l i s t h i s, t h at as t h eu r gi st s or d er t h e w h ol e b o d y t o b e bu r i ed,
excep t t h e h ead , i n t h e m ost m yst i c o f i n i t i at i on s, Pl at o al so h as an t i ci p at ed t hi s, b e­
i n g m oved b y t h e God s t h em sel ves. “For b ei n g p u r e,” says he, “an d n ot b u r i ed i n t h is

46 Cf. V al er y Pet r o f f s exp l an at i on o f Pr ocl ean sy n t h ëm a t a r el at ed t o h en ad s, w h i ch

can b e con si d er ed m on ad s at t h e h i gh est on t ol ogi c l evel ( Pet r off 2013, 220 - 221) .
47 T P 6.24.2- 10, Tr. 406: Καί πάντ α μ έν εφ ίεται τών σφετέρων ηγεμ όνων καί το σύνθημ α εν
πασίν εστι τής οικείας μ ονάδος .
48 TP 6.70.21- 24, Tr. 436: άπο τ ής δημ ιουργικ ής μ ονάδος καί τών εκ εί προϋπαρχόντων
συνθημ άτων.
49 T P 6 .51.15- 18 et 52.14 - 18 , Tr. 424.
 D m i t r y K u r d y b ay l o / ΣΧΟΛΗ Vol. r3. 2 (2or9) 473

t h i n g w e ar e car r yi n g ar ou n d n ow , w h i ch w e cal l a b od y,” w e ob t ai n ed t h i s m ost

b l essed m u ësi s an d ep o p t ei a , b ei n g fu l l o f i n t el l i gi bl e l i gh t . For t h e “pu r e sh i n i n g”
s y m b o l i c a l l y r eveal s t o us i n t el l i gi bl e l i gh t .^

Thus, s y n t h ëm ata her e are m yst ical visions, w hich reveal t he int elligible realm .
In cont rast to t hem , t he init iat ion (μ ύησις ) and cont em plat ion (έποπτεία), whi ch
probably refer to Eleusi ni an m yst eries, are considered sym bols in t he sam e w ay
as “pure shining” bears sym bolical m eaning. Bot h s y n t h ëm a t a and sy m b o l a are
relat ed to t he int elligible, bot h reveal it to hum an souls, and bot h are im m at erial.
The differ ence bet w een t hem , which seem s to fit best, is t hat s y n t h ëm a is direct ed
downwards, as a vision, descended from t he divine to hum an souls, opposed to
sym bols di rect ed upwards, as init iat ions and purity, w hi ch provide a per son wit h
t he capabi li t y to ascen d to t he intelligible.
A sim ilar exam ple is given in t he discussion of At h en a and Curet es, where
Proclus tries to agree Orphic t heology w it h w hat is said about t hem in Plat o’s L e ­
g es:

N ot on l y O r ph eu s an d t h e t h eol ogi st s befor e Pl at o k n ew Cu r et i c or der , an d k n ow i n g,

ven er at ed it , b u t t h e A t h en i an gu est al so i n t h e Law s cel ebr at es it . For h e says, t h at
“t h e gam es i n ar m ou r o f t h e Cu r et es” i n Cr et e ar e t h e p r i n ci p al p ar ad i gm s (άρχηγικά
παραδείγμ ατ α) o f al l m easu r ed m ot i on (τής εύρύθμ ου κινήσεως ). A n d n ow , n ei t h er is h e
sat i sfi ed w i t h h avi n g m en t i on ed t h i s Cu r et i c or der, b u t al so ad d s t h e on e h en ad o f t he
Cur et es, n am el y ou r m i st r ess A t h en a.... Th e Cu r et es ar e su r r ou n d ed ab ove w i t h t h e
s y m b o l s o f A t h en a, as p r esi d i n g over an ever -fl ou r i sh i n g l i fe an d “vi gor ou s” i n t el ­
l ect i on ; b u t ben eat h , t h ey ar e m an i fest l y ar r an ged u n d er t h e p r ovi d en ce o f A t h en a.
For t h e fi r st Cu r et es, as b ei n g t h e at t en d an t s o f t h e i n t el l i gi bl e an d con ceal ed
(κρυφίας ) God d ess, ar e sat i sfi ed w i t h s y n t h ë m a t a t h at p r oceed fr om t h en ce;
b u t t h ose i n t h e secon d an d t h ir d ord er s, ar e su sp en d ed fr om t h e i n t el l ect u al A t h en i ­
an m on ad .5

H ere a ki nd i f hierar ch ical relat ion can be seen: sy n t h ëm ata pert ain only to the
first, highest order of Curet es, w hi le t he low est are relat ed to “t he int ellect ual
At heni an m onad.” The sym bols as t hose, w hi ch are above, are opposed to “the
providence o f At hena,” w hich is below. N ot ewort hy, t he rel at ion bet w een the
paradi gm and its im pl em ent at i ons is given separat ely, and t hus probably should
be confused neit h er w it h sym bolic, nor syn t hem at ic dependencies.
The “upper ” posit ion of bot h sym bols and sy n t h ëm a t a m akes it difficult to dis­
t inguish t hem . Pr oclean wor din g allows t reat ing t hese t erm s as com plet e syno­
nym s in this passage. But several lin es below Proclus gives a m ore dist inctive
com m ent ary:

50 T P 4.3o.9-3r .r , Tr. 25o.

51T P 5.r 28.5-2r , Tr. 38o.
474 On sy m b o l o n an d sy n t h em a i n Pr o cl u s

“k o r o n ” (το κόρον) as Socr at es says i n t h e C r a t y l u s, “ si gn i fi es t h e p u r i t y an d cl ar i t y.” A l ­

so, t h e Cu r et es ar e al l ot t ed t h ei r ap p el l at i on , as p r esi d i n g over t h e u n d efi l ed p u r i t y o f
t h e Gods. A n d t h e m on ad o f t h em is p ar t i cu l ar l y cel eb r at ed as “a m i st r ess an d as
Cor e,” as sh e is t h e l ead er o f an i n fl exi b l e an d fl ou r i sh i n g d om i n i on t o t h e Gods. Th e
w or d “k o r o n ” t h er efor e, as w e h ave said, i s a s y m b o l o f pur i t y, o f w h i ch t h ese
God s ar e t h e p r i m ar y l ead er s, an d accor d i n g t o w h i ch t h ey ar e p ar t i ci p at ed b y ot h er s
(ύπο τών άλλων μ ετέχοντ αι). A n d t h ei r “ar m am en t ” i s a s y n t h ë m a o f t h e gu ar d i an
p ow er accor d i n g t o w h i ch t h ey con n ect w h ol es, gu ar d t h em exem p t fr om secon d ar y
n at u r es, an d p r eser ve t h em est abl i sh ed i n t h em sel ves.52

H ere sy m b o l o n and sy n t h ëm a are involved in t he di alect ics of part icipat ion:

s y n t h ëm a st ands for t he unpar t icipat ed level, and part icipat i on is m ade possible
vi a sym bols. H owever, bot h sym bols and s y n t h ëm a t a are im part ed from a higher
ont ological level (here it is A t heni an m on ad relat ed to low er gods), but obviously,
this is an im plem ent at i on of a m ore gener al schem e. Thus, her e is no cont radi c­
t ion w it h t he previous quot ations, w here s y n t h ëm a is relat ed to part icipat ion:
bot h sym bol and s y n t h ëm a originat e from par t i cipat i on to a higher level, but t hen
sy n t h ëm a keeps t he current , par t icipat in g l evel in its rem nant state, i.e. unpar t ic­
ipat ed, w hi le a sym bol allows this par t icipat i ng level to be part icipat ed itself.
Probably, t he “ever-flourishing” can be underst ood as a “vi si ble,” i.e. part ici pat ed
form o f life expressed t hrough a symbol, as opposed to the “con cealed,” i.e. un par­
t i cipat ed char act er o f At hena, w hi ch is expressed w it h a sy n t h ëm a in t he previous
quotation.
A m ore difficult passage is con nect ed w it h t he O r a cu la C h a ld a ica , fr. 108 (des
Places), one of t he m ost favourit e places by Proclus, w hi ch he cit es m an y t im es in
his writ ings. N ot ewort hy, her e Proclus int en t ionally replaces t he original
“σύμ βολα” w it h “συνθήμ ατα,”53 so his wor din g her e is probably w ell con sidered:54

[ That , w h o is] t h e cau se o f all, “ d i ssem i n at ed i n al l t h i n gs” t h e s y n t h ë m a t a o f

h i s p er fect su p r em acy, an d t h r ou gh t h ese, h e est abl i sh es al l t h i n gs ab ou t h i m sel f, an d
b ei n g exem p t fr om t h e w h ol e o f t h i n gs, is i n effab l y p r esen t ever yw h er e. Th er efor e,
ever yt h i n g en t er i n g i n t o t h e i n effab l e o f it s ow n n at u r e fi n d s t h er e t h e s y m b o l of
t h e Fat h er o f al l. A l l t h i n gs ven er at e h i m accor d i n g t o i t s n at u r e an d ar e u n i t ed t o h i m
t h r ou gh an ap p r op r i at e m yst i c s y n t h ë m a, d i vest i n g t h em sel ves o f t h ei r n at ur e,

52 T P 5.129 .10- 22, Tr. 38 1:... τ ά ολα συνέχουσι καί φρουρούσιν εξηρημ ένα τών δευτέρων καί
εν αύτοίς έστώτα διαφ υλάττουσι.
53 Th e t er m sy n t h ëm a i s p r esen t i n t h e O r acu la t w i ce; on e o f t h e i n st an ces i s i n t h e fr.
109, j u st a f ew l i n es bel ow .
54 A si m i l ar su b st i t u t i on i s d on e i n t h e com m en t ar y in Cr at ylu m 71.18 - 20 : οί πατ έρες
τών ολον, συνθήμ ατα ... πασιν ενέσπειραν. O n t h e ot h er h an d , i n t h e com m en t ar y in T i m a e­

um ( 1.211.1- 2) Pr ocl u s r et ai n s or i gi n al “ σύμ βολ α” i n t h e sam e qu ot at i on fr om t h e O r acu la .

 D m i t r y K u r d y b ay l o / ΣΧΟΛΗ Vol. r3. 2 (2or9) 475

an d h ast en i n g t o b ecom e on l y h i s s y n t h ë m a, an d t o p ar t i ci p at e on l y i n hi m ,
t h r ou gh t h e d esi r e o f h i s u n k n ow ab l e n at u r e, an d o f t h e sp r i n g o f good .55

The di fference bet w een s y n t h ëm a and sy m b o l o n in t he first h al f of t he passage

m ay be expressed as follows: t he s y n t h ëm a is w hat is “di ssem i nat ed,” or plant ed
by t he “Fat h er o f all,” and t he sym bol is w h at is found by t he in fer ior beings. In
ot her words, sy n t h ëm a t a her e stand for a core or invisible subst ance, w hich is re­
vealed or di scovered as a symbol.
N onet heless, t he sy n t h ëm a as an ont ological “root ” of a sym bol can be event u­
ally reached, but it rem ains “m yst ic,” or in som e w ay ineffable. Finally, t he being,
which found a sym bol and reached t he “m yst i c s y n t h ëm a ,” can becom e a Fat her’s
s y n t h ëm a it self, w hat is t hought to be a unit ing w it h him and par t i cipat i on in his
being.
Again, s y n t h ëm a is closely relat ed to the di alect ics of par t icipat ion, whi le sy m ­

b o lo n acquires a dependent and secondary role as an expressi on or revelat ion of

s y n t h ëm a . Thus, s y n t h ëm a should have an essent ial nat ure, while sy m b o l o n m ay
be less ont ologically st able. H ere we can conclude t hat t he first dist inct feat ure of
s y n t h ëm a is its represent at ive funct ion,56 as it reveals t he upper ont ological level
inside t he lower, and perform s it as a form of par t i cipat i on in t he upper, but not
m aking t he low er part ici pat ed on its side.

N u m er ic sym bols

This inst abili t y m ay be illust rat ed by a n ot ew ort hy group of exam ples. Above, we
have seen t hat a sym bol is prim ar ily a cor por eal object as opposed to an im m at e­
rial sy n t h ëm a , w h i ch can be a dial ect ical notion, a par t of t he int ellect ual realm,
or an at t ribut e of soul or int ellect . But t here is one except ion: num bers, ratios be­
t w een part s of a whole, m easurable part s of t im e and space are always sym bols
and never s y n t h ëm ata in t he T P.

For exam ple, t wel ve (ή δυωδεκάς ) as a n um ber o f gods is “a sym bol of perfect
progression.”57 H ere Proclus em phasises: “this num ber m ust not be surveyed as i f
it was such as t w el ve is in units (for a num ber in t he Gods is not of this kind), but
[it m ust be beheld] in t he peculiari t y of subsist ence.”58
The prim ary k ey to underst andi ng this saying is t he N eoplat on ic doct rine of

55 T P 2.56^ 6- 26, Tr. r6r.

56 H er e I f ol l ow t h e w or d i n g o f Pet er St r u ck 2oo4, 234. H ow ever , h e d oes n ot d i st in ­
gu i sh sy m b o l o n fr om sy n t h ëm a an d t h er efor e ap p l i es t h i s fu n ct i on t o b ot h o f t h em .
57 T P 6.86.25, Tr. 447: παντελ ούς ... προόδου.
58 T P 6.86.2o- 22: .τ ο ν άριθμ ον ούχ οίον έν μ ονάδι δώδεκα θεωρητέον, . άλ λ ’ έν ίδιότητι
τής ύπάρξεως .
476 On sy m b o l o n an d sy n t h em a i n Pr o cl u s

ideal num bers, explicit ly given by Plotinus in t he E n n ea d es VI, 6 (34), t he treat ise
nam ed O n n u m b er s by Porphyry.59 Plotinus int roduced a differ ence bet w een ideal
and m onadic, or count able num bers (En n . VI.6.9.31-37). Ideal num bers are un ­
count able; t here is no progression or shift from one ideal num ber to anot her
t hrough adding or subt ract ing any ot her num ber. Thus, t he quant it at i ve char ac­
t erist ic of an ideal num ber is act ually its m ain qualit y (anot her qualit y of every
num ber is it s unity, and from this st andpoint , every ideal num ber is a henad, see:
En n . VI.6.11). On t he opposit e, m on adic num bers are countable; t h ey are subject
to arit hm et i cal operat ions and are ver y close to our ordi nar y con cept ion o f num ­
ber in m at hem at ics. Finally, t he m on adic num ber is considered an unclear im age
(εϊδωλον) of an ideal num ber, com pared to a m at er ial object relat ed to its idea
(είδος ). The ideal num ber is described in com pari son w it h t he “base, spring, root,
and origin” of w hat follows it .60
Probably, t he “peculiari t y of subsist ence,” m ent ioned by Proclus, expresses the
qualit ies of an ideal num ber as opposed to a sum o f m onadic “unit s.” N oticeably,
this “root and origin” of being is called symbol, not sy n t h ëm a , w h at could be ex­
pect ed in t he vein of an essen t i al and int ri nsi c sense of t he lat ter. An explanat ion
can be found again in t he O n n u m b er s: Plotinus stat es t hat an ideal num ber pre­
cedes an y being,61and t hus is excluded from any ont ological predicat i on .62 Pr oba­
bly for Proclus, t he essent ial nat ure o f sy n t h ëm a could not be harm on ised wit h
such an un-ont ological num ber, and t herefore t he t erm sy m b o l o n is em ployed.
In t he TP book 4, chapt er 29, Proclus gives his di alect ics of num bers, w hich is
expressed in a com plicat ed m anner t hat is difficult to in t er pr et w it h out t he Plo-
t inian background. First ly, Proclus separat es t he prim ary hen ads from num bers,
even at t he highest level. N onet heless, t h ey can be considered eit her supersub-
st ant ial (ύπερους ίως ), or eidet ic,63 and regarding t he l ow er ont ological levels, t hese
num bers produce t h ei r individual hierarchy, from t he int ellect ually-int elligible
order, t hrough pure int ellect ual, and super celest i al down to sublunary ones.64

59 V i t a Plo t in i, 5.35.
60 E n n . V I .6.9.38-39: Βάσιν δέ εχει τ ά οντα εν αύτφ καί πηγήν καί ρίζαν καί άρχήν.
61 E n n . V I .6.9 .12- 13: “T h e O ne p r eced es bei n g, an d t h e n u m b er p r eced es bein gs
(προηγήσετ αι τού τ ε οντος το εν καί ο άριθμ ος τών οντων).”
62 H ow ever , t h i s i s t h e h i gh est m od u s o f an i d eal n u m ber , as l on g as i t p r eced es bein g,
i t al so accom p an i es i t an d i s p r esen t i n i t (ο εν τ φ οντι καί μ ετ ά τού οντος καί προ τών οντων,
En n .V I .6.9 .35-37) .
63 T P 4.88.20- 21, Tr. 286.
64 T P 4.86.1- 19, Tr. 284- 285.
 D m i t r y K u r d y b ay l o / ΣΧΟΛΗ Vol. 13. 2 (2or9) 477

M at hem at i cal (count able) num bers per t ain to t he l ow er orders in t his schem e.65
H owever, t he num eri cal h ierar ch y rem ains separat ed from t he h ierar ch y of be­
ings and therefore m ay be called ont ologically irrelevant .
Probably, such ont ologically irrelevant m eaning of a sym bol is im plied by Pro­
clus w hen he speak s of “t he part s of t i m e” as t he “sym bols of en com passi ng ac­
cording to cause,”66 or of “t he di rect ” t hat is “a sym bol of progressi on.”67 A m ore
com plex com bi nat ion of Plat o’s im agery is built around the h ebdom adi c division
of t he circles in the soul and corresponding orders of gods: all o f t h em cont ain
sevenfold st ruct ure and thus are called “sym bols o f assi m i l at i ve,... and of t he li b­
erat ed gods.”68 Finally, t he abovem ent ioned chapt er 29 is referr ed in t he pin ax of
book 4 as explainin g “h ow divine num ber adorns all beings, and w hat t he powers
in it are w hich are sym bolically delivered from t he division o f num ber.”69 H owev­
er, t he ch apt er t ext i t sel f does not use t he t erm sy m b o l o n at all.
Thus, t he second dist inct ive feat ure of a sy n t h ëm a is its ont ological status, i.e.
its essent ial nat ure as opposed to a symbol, w hi ch can be excluded from any on­
t ological predicat ion.

Sy n t h ëm a as a m ean s o f k n ow i n g t h e in t el l i gi bl e

Anot h er role of s y n t h ëm a in Proclean m et aph ysics is relat ed to t he problem of

cognit ion o f t he highest ont ologic layers. Firstly, Proclus says about t he “order,
w hich is t he sum m it of t he int ellect ual Gods,” t hat it is

u n k n ow n an d i n effabl e, accor d i n g t o it s p ecu l i ar i t y (ιδιότητα), an d i s [ on ly] t o be

k n ow n t h r ou gh i n t el l i gi bl e s y n t h ë m a t a . For b ei n g t h e su m m i t o f t h e i n t el l ect u ­
al, i t con joi n s i t sel f w i t h t h e i n t el l i gi bl e.70

Several lin es below, Proclus adds:

A l l t h i n gs ar e fr om bot h , excl u si vel y fr om t h e i n t el l ect u al o f i n t el l i gi b l es (τοΰ νοερού

τών νοητών), b u t coor d i n at el y fr om t h e i n t el l i gi bl e o f i n t el l ect u al s (άπο τοΰ νοητού τών

65 Pr ocl u s p r ovi d es gen er al r eason i n g ab ou t t h e p l ace o f m at h em at i cal k n ow l ed ge an d

m at h em at i cal ob ject s r el at ed t o t h e u n i ver sal i n t el l ect an d t h e soul (see: O’M ear a 2or7,
r 72- r 75 an d r efer en ces t o r el evan t Pr ocl u s’ w or k s t h er e).
66 T P 6u .o5.7-8, Tr. 459.
67 T P 6.4r .9-r o, Tr. 4r7: προόδου γάρ το εύθύ σύμ βολον.
68 T P 5 .r 9 .24 - 2 o.9 , Tr. 3m
69 T P 4.4.r r -r 3.
70 T P 4.35U 7-23, Tr. 253:... διά συνθημ άτων γιγνώσκ ετ αι νοητών.
478 On sy m b o l o n an d sy n t h em a i n Pr o cl u s

νοερών). A n d b ot h r ejoi ce i n u n k n ow n su b st an ces; an d ar e al on e, as Plat o says, k n ow n

b y i n t el l i gi bl e, m yst i c, an d i n effab l e s y n t h ë m a t a.71

In ot her words, s y n t h ëm a t a are t he m ean s (possibly, t he o n ly m eans) for the

inhabit ant s of t he low er ont ological levels to k n ow t he upper level. O f course,
t hese s y n t h ëm a t a are not “hidden” in t he upper level, but are present am ong the
lowers as a “m essen ger” or an “eviden ce” of w h at is ot herwise ineffable and thus
unknowable. H owever, s y n t h ëm a t a t hem selves are not sufficient to provide such
kind of knowledge. In anot her place, Proclus provides a m ore det ailed descrip­
tion: he says t hat “t he m iddle order (μ έση διακόσμ ησις )” as a whole is

vi vi fi c, con n ect i ve an d p er fect i ve (τελεσιουργός ). Bu t t h e su m m i t o f i t r eveal s t h e

sy n t h ëm at a o f t h e i n t el l i gi bl e an d it s i n effab l e un i t y. It s l ow est [ l evel ] r ever t s
(επιστρέφ ει) t h e i n t el l ect u al , an d con joi n s i t t o t h e i n t el l i gi bl e. A n d t h e m i d d l e, l i k e a
“ cen t r e,” col l ect s i n t o, an d fi xes i n i t sel f t h e w h ol e gen er a o f t h e God s.72

Anot her well -k nown N eoplat on ic t riad of Proclus is “rem aining (μ ονή) - pro­
cession (πρόοδος ) - rever sion (επιστροφή).”73 Accor di ng to it, an y cognit ion o f the
upper level should be perfor m ed as som e kind of rever sion (επιστρφή). Therefore,
t he presence of a sy n t h ëm a, w hi ch reveals t he upper, “in effable” level, should be
accom pan ied by the epi st r ophic approach o f t he cognizant.
Finally, not only t he highest levels o f t he intelligible are ineffable, but the
D em iurge o f Plat o's T i m a eu s is also considered in con ceivable to some ext ent :

I f som eon e r ecol l ect i n g w h at is sai d i n t h e b egi n n i n g o f t h e T i m a eu s ab ou t h i m [ t he

D em i u r ge] , i.e. t h at “i t is d i ffi cu l t t o d i scover h i m ,” an d “w h en fou n d , i m p ossi b l e t o
sp eak o f h i m t o al l m en ,” sh ou l d en qu i r e i n t h e fi r st p l ace, w h y si n ce t h e Gr eek t h eol ­
ogy ascr i b es su ch a n am e t o t h e D em i u r ge, as w e h ave befor e m en t i on ed , T i m aeu s
says t h at h e is i n effabl e, an d est ab l i sh ed ab ove al l t h e i n d i cat i on w h i ch exi st s in
w or d s. I n t h e n ext pl ace, i f h e sh ou l d i n qu i r e w h y i n t el l i gi bl e an i m al (το νοητον ζφον)
w h i ch i s ar r an ged ab ove t h e D em i u r ge is b ot h d en om i n at ed an d i s m ad e k n ow n by
m an y s y n t h ë m a t a , b u t t h e D em i u r ge w h o h as est abl i sh ed h i s k i n gd om i n an
or d er secon d ar y t o t h at o f al l -p er fect an i m al (τού παντελ ούς ζφου), an d is an i n t el l ec­
t u al God, . i s l eft b y T i m aeu s i n effabl e, as w e h ave sai d, an d u n k n o w n ....
For w h en h e says t h at “i t i s i m p ossi b l e t o sp eak o f h i m t o al l m en ,” h e d oes n ot
l eave h i m en t i r el y i n effab l e an d u n k n ow n . A n d t h e asser t i on t h at “i t is d i ffi cu l t t o d i s­
cover ” h i m , is t h e s y n t h ë m a o f h i s p ecu l i ar i t y t o b e n ot w h ol l y u n k n ow n . For b e­
cau se t h e D em i u r ge h as est abl i sh ed a k i n gd om an al ogou s t o t h e Good, b u t in secon d ­

71 TP 4.36 .11- 15, Tr. 253- 254 : ... συνθήμ ασι μ όνοις γνωρίζετ αι νοητοίς μ υστ ικώς καί
άρρήτως .
72 T P 4.26.20- 27.1, Tr. 247- 248.
73 O n t h i s t r i ad i n Pr ocl u s' p h i l osop h y an d som e it s sou r ces see: Ger sh 1973, 4 9 - 53;
Ch l u p 2012, 64- 69 .
 D m i t r y K u r d y b ay l o / ΣΧΟΛΗ Vol. 13. 2 (2or9) 479

ar y an d m an i fol d or der s o f it , h e p ar t i ci p at es t h e s y n t h ë m a t a o f t h e Good, bu t

is al l ot t ed t h e p ar t i ci p at i on i n con ju n ct i on w i t h an ap p r op r i at e p ecu l i ar i t y, an d a
com m u n i on w i t h b ei n gs ad ap t ed t o h i m .74

D ifferent inst ances of sy n t h ëm ata m en t ioned here provide us w it h t he follow­

ing: firstly, t he “int elligible anim al” is expressed vi a s y n t h ëm a t a at l ow er levels,
am ong w hi ch is t he D em iurge as well. Secondly, t he Good has also proper
s y n t h ëm a t a dist ribut ed am ong differ ent int elligible and int el lect ual levels. These
highest inst ances are at least to som e ext ent in effable75 and are kn ow n through
t he part ici pat ion in t hem by t he low est beings t hat joi n proper s y n t h ëm a t a or
even di scover t hem inside t hem selves. Finally, t he s y n t h ëm a t a m ay be produced
not by t he generat ing (upper-level) subst an ce it self, but its cert ain essent ial prop­
ert y (“pecul iar it y” ). H owever, t he knowledge o f this propert y brings to t he par t ic­
ipat ion in t he upper subst an ce as a whole.

Sy n t h ëm a an d r ever si on (έπιστροφή)

The knowledge, acqui red w it h the m eans of sy n t h ëm ata accom pan ies t he t heur­
gic ascen t to t he highest levels of t he intelligible realm . Proclus provides ju st a
few but quite dist inct clues of t he per fect i ve role of a s y n t h ëm a :

Th e su p er cel est i al p l ace i s t h e fi r st t r i ad o f t h e i n t el l i gi bl e an d at t h e sam e t i m e i n t el ­

l ect u al G o d s.... I t r ecei ves i n i t sel f t h e p l en i t u d e o f for m s (το πλ ήρωμ α τών είδών) fr om
t h e i n t el l i gi bl e p ar ad i gm s an d p r od u ces i t s ow n “m ead ow ” fr om t h e fon t al su m m i t
w h i ch i s t h er e. Fr om t h e on e i n t el l ect i t gi ves exi st en ce (ύποστήσασα) t o t h e t h r ee vi r ­
t ues, p er fect s ever yt h i n g b y i n t el l i gi bl e s y n t h ë m a t a , an d in it s i n effab l e “b o s­
om s” (κόλπος ) r ecei ves t h e w h ol e o f i n t el l i gi bl e l i gh t .76

The di alect ics of rever sion is developed her e in a n ew direct ion: a s y n t h ëm a of

an upper subst ance being present at t he given level allows it to ascen d to its
origin on a w ay of return, ascend, and perfect ion. N otewort hy, t he “per fect i on,”
τελείωσις as derived from τέλος also im plies m ovem ent to t he final aim, com plet e
fulfilm ent, m at urity, and t herefore cease o f lin ear m ot ion.77 Once again Proclus
speaks about a sy n t h ëm a of a τελική ούσία, i.e. an essence considered an aim of

74 T P 5.r o2.r 2- 24 et r o4.2r -28, Tr. 36 4- 36 5.

75 Even t h e Good i t sel f m ay b e d escr i b ed as a cau se r el at ed t o it s con sequ en ces, e.g. as
a cau se o f var i ou s p ar t i cu l ar goods.
76 T P 4.53.22-54.9, Tr. 26 4- 26 5: πάσαν δέ έαυτήν τοΐς νοητοΐς συνθήμ ασιν τελειώσασα.
77 Li n ear , cir cu l ar , an d m i xed (spi r al ) m ot i on s p er t ai n t o d i ffer en t l evel s o f t h e i n t el l i ­
gi bl e r ealm , for d et ai l s see: St am at el l os 2oo7, r 3r - r 33. Th e sam e t r i ad i n t er m s o f li m i t ,
u n l i m i t ed , an d m i xed i s d i scu ssed in : Ger sh 2or 4, 84- 89 . Bot h t r i ad s ar e b r i efl y m en ­
t i on ed i n t h e TP 4.r r r .r 7-r r2.2, Tr. 3or.
480 On sy m b o l o n an d sy n t h em a i n Pr o cl u s

ont ologic progression.78

Finally, t he super celest i al place is said to be

w i t h ou t col ou r , w i t h ou t fi gur e, an d w i t h ou t con t act . H ow ever , i t t r an scen d s t h ese

t h r ee n ot pr i vat i vel y, b u t accor d i n g t o cau sal excel l en ce. For i t i m p ar t s t o col ou r fr om
i n t el l i gi bl e t h e p ar t i ci p at i on o f l i gh t ; on fi gu r e i t con fer s b y i l l u m i n at i on an i n t el l ec­
t u al bou n d ; an d i n con t act i t su p er n al l y i n ser t s u n i on an d con t i n u i t y, an d p er fect s al l
t h i n gs b y i t s p ow er ; t h i n gs w h i ch ar e t ou ch ed — t h r ou gh un i on , t h ose t h at ar e fi g­
u r ed — t h r ou gh t h e p ar t i ci p at i on o f bou n d , an d t h ose t h at ar e col ou r ed — t h r ou gh
t h e i l l u m i n at i on o f l i gh t . I t d r aw s u p w ar d , an d at t r act s t o i t sel f ever yt h i n g i n effab l y
w i t h t h e m ean s o f i n t el l i gi bl e s y n t h ë m a t a , an d fill s ever yt h i n g w i t h u n i t ar y
good s.79

It is im port an t to em phasise t hat it is t he supercelest i al place i t sel f t hat is

“drawing up” t he l ow er ont ological level, and t he corresponding s y n t h ëm a is ju st
an inst rum en t t hat provides t he possi bi lit y of such an ascent . O f course, t his does
not con t radict to w hat is said above but i sj u st a vi ew from anot her st andpoi nt at
t he sam e dialect ics of processi on and reversion. The reversion in Proclus has two
com plem ent ar y sides: on t he one hand, t he upper essence t hat proceeds down to
a l ow er level t hen ret urns at t he epi st r ophic phase to its original rest ing state; and
on t he ot her hand, t he epi st rophic phase m eans t he ascent of the n ew ly generat ­
ed (lower) in st ance to its “par en t al” origin.80 Thus sy n t h ëm a m ay be considered
from t he st andpoint of t he “parent al” and the “offspring” levels, and t hese two
var ian t s have been present ed above.
Anyway, t he t hird dist inct feat ure of a s y n t h ëm a is it s epi st r ophic or anagogic
function, closely relat ed to t he dialect ics of processi on and reversion.

I n effabl e an d an agogic sym bols

H owever, t he anagogic81and “m yst ical” char act er pert ains not to s y n t h ëm ata only,
but to sym bols as well. First ly, Proclus speaks about t he “ineffable sym bols”
kn ow n to t he highest gods, but incognizable by t he m ort als (however, in co g n iz a ­

b le her e does not m ean com plet ely unapproachable):

You m ay see t h e or d er o f t h i n gs, an d t h e r em i ssi on i n t h em p r oceed i n g i n a d ow n ­

w ar d pr ogr essi on . For t h e Good i s exem p t fr om al l si l en ce, an d al l l an gu age. Bu t t h e
gen u s o f t h e i n t el l i gi bl e God s r ejoi ces in si l en ce an d is d el i gh t ed w i t h i n effabl e

78 T P 5.83.12, Tr. 352.

79 T P 4.41.1- 14, Tr. 256: πάντ α δέ άρρήτως καί τοίς νοητοίς συνθήμ ασιν άνασπφ καί άνέλκει
προς έαυτον καί πλ ηροί τών ένιαίων άγαθών.
80 I n t h e I n st i t u t i o t h eo l o g i c a , 39, Pr ocl u s sp eak s ab ou t an “ap p et en cy” (ορεξις ) o f a
l ow er su b st an ce for t h e r ever si on t o it s cause.
81Th i s t er m is u sed accor d i n g t o h o w i t is u n d er st ood b y P. St r u ck 2004, 248- 252.
 D m i t r y K u r d y b ay l o / ΣΧΟΛΗ Vol. 13. 2 (2or9) 48!

s y m b o l s . H en ce, al so Socr at es i n t h e P h a ed r u s cal l s t h e vi si on o f t h e i n t el l i gi bl e

m on ad s t h e h ol i est i n i t i at i on s, as b ei n g i n vol ved i n si len ce, an d p er cei ved i n t el l ect u ­
al l y i n an ar can e m an n er . Bu t t h e vi si on o f t h e i n t el l ect u al i s effabl e, yet i s n ot effabl e
an d k n ow n t o al l m en , b u t is k n ow n w i t h d i ffi cu l t y.82

The not ion of “ineffable sym bol” is som ehow self-cont radict ory as all t he sym ­
bols di scussed above were capable of expressi ng anyt hing, and t he expression
im plies the availabil it y of w h at is expressed to som e observer. In effabili t y here
has t wo grades: firstly, w hat is incon ceivable for m ort als, m ay be avai lable for
pure int ellect s, and secondly, aft er Iam blichus, N eoplat on ic t heurgy knows
words, phrases, cert ain sym bols t hat cannot be underst ood w it h t he m ean s of
reason, but carr y sim ple and unit ed intelligible m ean ing (cf.: Iam blichus, D e m y s­

t er i i s 7.4.5-2r).
Above w e have m et sy n t h ëm a t a relat ed to unpart ici pat ed bein g in on esel f and
sy m b o l a relat ed to part icipat i on and bein g in anot her; but w hen considering a
“m yst ical” t ype o f sym bols, Proclus provides an exam ple of an unpart ici pat ed
sym bol t hat keeps t he being in on eself from relat ions w it h t he lower:

un i on is ... d er i ved t o al l t h i n gs, fr om t h e fi r st u n i t y, w h i ch i s exem p t fr om al l m u l t i ­

t ude, an d al l di vi si on . Bu t i n con seq u en ce o f t h ei r [i.e. su p er cel est i al God s’] h avi n g
pr e-assu m ed t h e p ow er o f t ou ch i n g t h em sel ves, accor d i n g t o t h e b ei n g i n self, t h ey
der i ve t h ei r exi st en ce fr om t h e u n p ol l u t ed Gods. For t h e b ei n g i n sel f i n t h e fi r st o f
t h e i n t el l ect u al fat h er s, w as t h e s y m b o l o f an i n var i ab l e cau se, an d w h i ch i m m u ­
t abl y su st ai n s m u l t i t u d e fr om secon d ar y n at u r es.83

The h ierar ch y of unity, w hich on t he w ay down war ds from t he One changes to

m ult iplicit y, can be par alleled w it h t he h ierar ch y of effabil it y t hat increases on
t he sam e way. The m ore m ult iple, part ial, and com plex an essence is, the m ore it
is subject to verbal expressi on and rat ional know ledge. The “int ellect ual fat hers”
rem aini ng in t h em selves and t hus sym bolising t he “invar iable cause,” are placed
at one of t he highest levels of this hierar chy, where sym bols rem ain only relat i ve­
ly effable, as is explain ed con cer nin g t he previous quotat ion. Such sym bols can­
not be com plet ely grasped by hum an reason. H owever, i f t here is any possibili t y
for a m ort al to approach t hem , it should be done supra-rat ionally, in a “hyperno-
et ic” way.84
Finally, as sy n t h ëm ata could have t he epi st r ophic funct ion, Proclus ascribes a

82 T P 5.r o5.3-r r , Tr. 366.

83 TP 6.r r 2.r 5-r r 3.3, Tr. 464: το γάρ έν αύτφ εν τ ω πρωτ ίστ φ τών νοερών πατ έρων τής
άκλινοΰς αιτίας ήν καί άτρέπτ ως άνεχούσης το πλήθος άπο τών δευτέρων σύμ βολον.
84 H er e I fol l ow t h e t er m s o f Tu om o L an k i l a (2or o). Cf. r el evan t sayi n gs o f Pr ocl u s: TP

4.3r .r 2-r 6; i n C r at . 7r .98-r o3.

482 On sy m b o l o n an d sy n t h em a i n Pr o cl u s

sim ilar act ivit y to sym bols as well:

Th er e is a t w ofol d r ever si on i n t h ose or der s, t h e on e b ei n g t ow ar d s t h em sel ves, bu t

t h e ot h er t ow ar d s t h e cau ses o f t h em .... A n d t h e i n t el l i gi bl e God s gen er at e al l t h i n gs
st abl y; b u t t h e i n t el l i gi bl e an d i n t el l ect u al God s, w h o i l l u m i n at e i m p ar t i ci p ab l e li fe,
i m p ar t t h e or i gi n al cau se o f p r ogr essi on t o al l t h i n gs; an d t h e i n t el l ect u al God s ar ­
r an ge an d ad or n w h ol es accor d i n g t o r ever si on . H en ce, i t is n ecessar y t h at t h e su m ­
m i t o f t h e i n t el l ect u al , w h i ch p ou r s for t h fr om i t sel f t h e w h ol e an d p er fect for m o f r e­
ver si on , sh ou l d b e ch ar act er i sed b y b ot h t h e r ever sal s y m b o l s , an d sh ou l d b e at
t h e sam e t i m e r ever sed t o i t sel f an d t h e n at u r es p r i or t o i t sel f.85

It is not clear, w hat exact l y is underst ood here by t he “rever sal sym bols.” M ost
probably, it is bein g in on esel f and bein g in anot her, as it follows from t he dis­
course of t he P a r m en i d es t hat is di scussed in t he chapt er quot ed, and from the
sim ilar passages in ot her places of t he T P, m an y o f which, as we have seen, con­
t ain frequen t uses of σύμ βολον and σύνθημ α.
Anot her problem t hat arises, when epi st r ophic sym bols are considered, is t hat
t hese sym bols are intelligible, i.e. absolut ely im m at erial. The only exclusion for
t he rule of sym bol’s m at erialit y, w h i ch we have m et yet, was relat ed to t he nu­
m er ical sym bolism . N ow it should be added t hat a sym bol can be int elligible.
H owever, it is not clear h ow subst ant ial it is, i.e. does it have t he sam e essent ial
nat ure as an int elligible s y n t h ëm a, or not?
As a clue, one can refer to t he supercelest i al light of H elios, w hi ch is said to be
“sim ilar to none of t he others; nor does he receive this light from t he subject m at ­
ter, but h i m sel f produces and gener at es it from him self, and ext ends ... a sym bol
of int ellect ual essences”.86 I f this im m at eri al light can be set analogous to t he il-
lum in at i on -ελλαμ ψις , t hen this part icular sym bol is not an aut onom ous essence,
and a m ore pr oper nam e for it should be e n er g y (in Ari st ot elian sense). As regards
sy n t h ëm a t a , t h ey are always subst ant ial and incorporeal, w h at m akes a difference
to sym bols of any kind — m at erial, num erical, or intelligible.

Con clusion

Com paring sy m b o l o n and sy n t h ëm a in t he T P, t he following di st inct ive feat ures

can be out lined:
— a sy n t h ëm a is di rect ed downwards, it is “di ssem inat ed,” “plant ed,” or in any
ot her w ay hidden in t he being; a sym bol is direct ed upwards, it is found, or “dis­

85 T P 5.r 36.2o-r 37.5, Tr. 38 6 :... τοΐς έπιστ ρεπτ ικ οΐς συμ βόλοις καί προς έαυτήν άμ α καί
προς τ ά προ αύτ ής έπιστρέφ ειν.
86 TP 6.63.4-7, Tr. 43 r: οίον έξ άδύτων τινών σύμ βολον προτείνας τών νοερών τοΐς
έγκοσμ ίοις ούσιών.
 D m i t r y K u r d y b ay l o / ΣΧΟΛΗ Vol. 13. 2 (2019) 483

cover ed” in t he being;

— a sy n t h ëm a is an in n er kernel of w hat is discovered as a sym bol, and a sym ­
bol is an out ward expressi on of a sy n t h ëm a ;
— any s y n t h ëm a has subst an t ial nat ure, w hi le a sym bol can be excluded from
any ontological predicat i on, or be com pared w it h an energy of a subst ance;
— s y n t h ëm a in an object keeps it on an unpart ici pat ed level, while a sym bol
m akes a sym bolic object capable of being part ici pat ed. H owever, bot h s y n t h ëm a ­

ta and sy m b o l a are produced as a result of part icipat i on to a higher level. They

differ only by t he form o f secondary (un)part i cipat i on on t he lower, part icipat i ng
level;
— bot h s y n t h ëm a t a and sy m b o l a are relat ed to the di alect ics of reversion.
H owever, a s y n t h ëm a is responsible for t he knowledge of intelligible, w hi le a
sym bol is relat ed to t he hypern oet ic grasping of w hat is ineffable;
— a sy n t h ëm a is always im m at erial: it is a notion, a st ructure, or a propert y of
t he int ellect ual or intelligible realm s. A sym bol m ay be eit her a m at eri al object or
som et hing incorporeal, w hich can have ont ologic predicat es (int elligible sym ­
bols) or be ont ologically ir rel evant (num eric symbols).
Finally, sym bols in t he TP can be ordered in four groups:
— t heurgic sym bols, w hich are m at eri al object s, available for t heurgic rites
and percept ibl e by any hum an;
— exeget ical sym bols, w hich are lit er al descript ions o f m at eri al objects; t hey
also m ay have t heurgic power, but are per ceived only rat ionally;
— ont ologically ir relevant sym bols, such as num bers, ratios, dist ances, parts
of t im e and space;
— “in effable” sym bols, w hich are ent ir ely unavailable to hum ans or available
only to the highest noet ic level of hum an int ellect.
On t he contrary, sy n t h ëm ata are uniform ; all of t hem have com m on propert ies
and cannot be divided int o groups. Therefore, t h ey m ay be considered as t he uni­
versal “t oken” t est ifyi ng the belongin g to t he prim ary essence (τελική ούσία) of
every being caused by it. In t erm s of Pr oclean dialect ics of causal “series,” a
s y n t h ëm a m ay be underst ood as a speci fi c “foot print ” of t he first cause in all its
con sequen ces.87 A sy n t h ëm a is w hat guarant ees t he in var iance and st abil it y along
t he w ay of ont ologic h ierar ch y gett ing evolved. The sym bols, on t h ei r part, reveal
t he corresponding s y n t h ëm a t a in a changeable way, gett ing “adjust ed” to every
corresponding ont ologic level.

87 Cf. Pet r o ff 2013, 211- 212.

484 On sy m b o l o n an d sy n t h em a i n Pr o cl u s

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