26 JILI (1984) 573 Retrenchment and The Supreme Court: An Overview R S C: A O

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26 JILI (1984) 573
Retrenchment and the Supreme Court: An Overview
RETRENCHMENT AND THE SUPREME COURT: AN OVERVIEW

by
Shashi K. Sharma* and K.K. Uppal**
Exordium
UNDER THE Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as originally enacted, there was no
provision relating to retrenchment. All disputes concerning retrenchment used to be
decided on the principles of social justice and equity.1 This resulted in a great variance
in the decisions of the tribunals and the courts. At the same time, an alarming
situation had come into existence, particularly in the erstwhile State of Bombay, in the
cotton textiles industry owing to large scale accumulation of stocks. Large-scale
retrenchment of workers was an inevitable remedy. The central government realized
the seriousness of the situation and an ordinance was promulgated in 1953 to bring
uniformity in the rules regarding retrenchment of workers and their compensation.2
This ordinance was later replaced by the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1953.3
It was through this Act that a statutory definition4 of retrenchment was added to the
Industrial Disputes Act.
According to section 2(oo) of the Act, ‘retrenchment’ means the termination by the
employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a
punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include—
(a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or
(b) retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the
contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned
contains a stipulation in that behalf; or
(c) termination of the service of a workman on the ground of continued ill-health.
This is an “extremely wide”5 definition and has two parts. The first part lays down
what retrenchment means while the second part excludes termination of service for
certain reasons from the ambit of retrenchment.6 Retrenchment is one of the modes of
termination of service. Termination of service may be brought about by dismissal,
discharge, removal from service or even retrenchment apart from resignation or
voluntary retirement.7 Therefore, every termination of service is not retrenchment; but
every retrenchment is a termination of service.
Page: 574
In ordinary parlance, retrenchment means the discharge of surplus labour.8 This

puts a restrictive meaning on the scope of the words “for any reason whatsoever”
which occur in the main body of the definition. These words are considered to be the
“key words”9 in the definition. But there is a considerable divergence of judicial opinion
as to their scope. The year 1976 marks the dividing line between the restrictive or
noscuntur a soceis approach and the literal or the so-called liberal approach. The
present paper endeavours to analyse critically, the various Supreme Court judgements
on the issue and present some observations highlighting the inherent contradiction in
the latest judicial approach.
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Supreme Court's swing

To begin with, the Supreme Court10 while considering the termination of services on
closure, adhered to the ordinary accepted connotation of the term retrenchment
without attaching much significance to the words ‘for any reason whatsover.’
The court observed:
[Retrenchment connotes in its ordinary acceptation that the business itself is
being continued but that a portion of the staff or the labour force is discharged as
surplusage and the termination of services of all the workmen as a result of the
closure of the business cannot therefore be properly described as retrenchment.11
This viewpoint was approved by the Constitution Bench of the court in Hari Prasad12
where it held that retrenchment, as defined in section 2(oo) and as used in section
25F had no wider meaning than the discharge of surplus labour or staff by the
employer for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way
of disciplinary action. Where the services of all workmen have been terminated by the
employer on a real and bona fide closure of business or where the services of all
workmen have been terminated by the employer on the business or undertaking being
taken over by another employer, it was held that it did not amount to retrenchment.13
Thus such workmen were denied the benefit of retrenchment relief.
As a result of these decisions, the Parliament had to intervene for rescuing the
workers from the danger of being rendered jobless on the closure of the business or
the transfer of undertakings. Accordingly,
Page: 575
sections 25FF and 25FFF were introduced through an amendment in 1957.14 This
amendment merely treated closure and transfer of undertaking “as if the workman had
been retrenched”15 for the limited purposes of the notice and compensation to the
workmen. The definition of retrenchment in section 2(oo) was left untouched. These
amendments only made a deeming provision to treat the closure or transfer of
undertakings as if the workmen had been retrenched. Sections 25FF and 25FFF
nowhere use the words ‘termination of service’ of a workman which is the sine qua non
of retrenchment as per section 2(oo). Therefore, in deference to and in consonance
with the court's line of argument, the parliament accepted the proposition that only
termination of service be properly described as retrenchment. After the amending Act
of 1957, the interpretation of ‘retrenchment’ in Hari Prasad was affirmed by the
Supreme Court in Anakappalla Co-operative Agricultural and Industrial Society v. Its
Workmen16 where it was observed that retrenchment “necessarily postulates the
termination of the employees services on the ground that the employees had become
surplus”.
After these decisions the law appears to have settled down that retrenchment
means the discharge of surplus labour whatever may be the reasons (e.g., economy,
rationalization in industry or labour saving devices, etc.). This position continued to
have its way for nearly two decades. But from Sundara Money17 onwards the Supreme
Court took a swing and adopted a different line of reasoning. In this case the
employee's services were terminated after the expiry of the period stipulated in the
contract of employment. It was expressly stated in the order of appointment itself that
the services of the employee were not required by the employer beyond the period
specified therein. Holding it to be a case of retrenchment, the court observed:
A termination takes place where a term expires either by the active step of the
master or the running out of the stipulated term. To protect the weak against the
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strong this policy of comprehensive definition has been effectuated. Termination

embraces not merely the act of termination by the employer but the fact of
termination however produced…. an employer terminated employment not merely
by passing an order as the service runs. He can do so by writing a composite order,
one giving employment and the other ending or limiting it. A separate subsequent
determination is not the sole magnetic pull of the provision. A pre-emptive
provision to terminate is struck by the same vice as the post-appointment
termination.
Similarly in Ms Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. The Presiding Officer, Labour
Page: 576
Court,18 certain workmen (head time-keepers) were discharged on the ground that
they had become surplus. On the expiry of the period specified in the orders of
appointment issued to the workmen, the appellant company chose not to renew their
contract of service pursuant to a policy to “streamline the organisation and to effect
economics wherever possible.” There was no specific order terminating their services.
The plea of the appellant was that the termination was automatic on the expiry of the
contractual period of service and as no order of termination had been passed by the
employer it did not amount to retrenchment. Following Sundara Money's case the
Supreme Court upheld the contention of the workmen that termination was a
retrenchment.
Again in Delhi Cloth and General Mills, Ltd. v. Shambunath Mukerjee19 where the
name of a workman was struck off from the rolls of the company for absence from
work for nearly eight consecutive days, the court held it to be a case of retrenchment.
In the series of such cases, Santosh Gupta v. State Bank of Patiala20 stirred up the
maximum controversy. Here the services of a workman (a woman who had put in more
than 240 days in a year) were terminated for her failure to pass the test which would
have enabled her to be confirmed in the service. The court held it to be a case of
retrenchment and observed:
If the definition of ‘retrenchment’ is looked at unaided and unhampered by
precedent, one is at once struck by the remarkably wide language employed and
particularly by the use of the words “termination… for any reason whatsoever” ….[I]
f the words “for any reason whatsoever” are understood to mean what they plainly
say, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the expression ‘retrenchment’ must
include every termination of the service of a workman by an act of the employer20a
Explaining the object and nature of retrenchment, the court observed:
The manifest object of these provisions is to so compensate the workman for loss
of employment as to provide him the wherewithal to subsist until he finds fresh
employment… As the expression retrenchment compensation indicates, it is
compensation paid to a workman on his retrenchment and it is intended to give him
some relief and to soften the rigour of hardship which retrenchment inevitably
causes. The retrenched workman is suddenly and without his fault, thrown on the
street and has to face the grim problem of unemployment. At the commencement
of his emyloyment a workman certainly expects and looks forward to security of
service
Page: 577
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spread over a long period, but retrenchment destroys his hopes and expectations.21
In Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha,22 the court
reiterated its aforesaid stand by stating:
We are disposed to stand by the view that discharge, even where it is not
occasioned by a surplus of hands, will be retrenchment, having regard to the
breadth of the definition…
In Mohan Lal v. Management, Bharat Electronics Ltd.23 where the services of Mohan
Lal were terminated during the extended period of probation because the employer
found the same to be unsatisfactory, the court, while holding it out to be a case of
retrenchment, opined:
Termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason
whatsoever would constitute retrenchment except in cases excepted in the section
itself.24
Autopsy of the court's thinking
A critical analysis of such observations of the Supreme Court, tempts one to make
certain comments regarding the new interpretational thinking adopted by it in regard
to the definition of retrenchment. It appears that the court has tried to import new
aspects without there being any compelling reasons to do so.
It is submitted that the courts need not in the guise of liberal construction assume
the role of legislature.25 Section 2(oo) envisages retrenchment as a mode of
termination of service. But every termination of service is not always retrenchment.
Apart form retrenchment, termination of service can be effected by other means like
discharge, etc. To say that ‘every termination spells of retrenchment,’26 seems to be
an erroneous interpretation destroying the well settled definition of section 2(oo). The
defective drafting of the definition might be the reason which prompted the court to
swing away from the ordinary accepted construction. The words by ‘an act of the
employer’ envisage a volitional act involving active steps on the part of the employer,
and all non-volitional active acts which may result in the termination of the services
would be outside the purview of the definition. If that is so, then the existence of the
first two exceptions becomes superfluous and redundant. Under the first exception, it
is the volitional active step of the employee himself rather than that of the employer
which terminates the services (i.e., voluntary retirement).
Page: 578
Similarly, retirement on attaining the age of superannuation is the ultimate effect of

the contract of employment whereby the employee had consented to leave the job on
attaining a particular age. Both the exceptions can be treated as almost falling within
the maxim volenti non fit injuria thereby depriving the employee to claim
retrenchment compensation. If we look to the nature of these exceptions, then the act
of the employer in terminating the services is not of any essence. But the definition
requires the termination of services by an act of the employer. This is an irreconcilable
situation. In such a paradoxical situation, the proper course is to follow that
construction which upholds and keeps intact the definition given in the statute rather
than that which destroys it. “Sub-Cls. (a), (b) and (c) are not conclusive of the
question, they no doubt apply to a running or continuing business only, but whether
inserted by way of abundant caution or on account of excessive anxiety for clarity,
they merely exclude certain categories of termination of service from the ambit of the
definition. They do not necessarily show what is to be included within the definition.”27
Although the definition is not properly drafted, it is submitted that by applying the
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rule of harmonious construction, an argument can be advanced that these exceptions

are only illustrative of the point that all termination of services due to no active step of
the employer but rather due to the consent or fault of the employee, do not amount to
retrenchment. Such a construction is in consonance with the policy which upholds the
definition rather than which destroys it.
Secondly, the court, in the initial stages of the changed attitude gave a broader
interpretation that ‘retrenchment embraces not merely the act of termination by the
employer but the fact of termination howsoever produced,’28 but lately appears to have
adopted a limited approach when it says that retrenchment is the ‘termination by the
employer of the service of a workman’.29 The latter line of approach is more in
conformity with the pre Sundara Money position. But in reality, the court is applying
the broader principle of Sundara Money30 where the services were terminated without
the active volitional steps of the employer.31 The terms of a contract of employment
always imply that the work is to be done in accordance with the terms (which may be
to pass a test, to do work diligently efficiently, etc.) and if the contract is broken or
violated due to the fault of the employee it is a case of the contract coming to an end
due to the act of the employee himself. Similarly, where the purpose of the contract is
fulfilled and the contract comes to an end due to completion of the work for which the
contract was entered into by the parties, it will be unreasonable to permit the
employees to take benefit32 beyond the contractual
Page: 579
obligations as they had voluntarily tied themselves down to the contract-employment

for an agreed period. In case of term-employment, the court has tried to argue that an
employer terminates employment not merely by passing an order as the service runs
but by writing a composite order, one giving employment and other limiting it.33 If
that is so, it is submitted, the reverse can also be true. That is, an employee may not
merely voluntarily resign as the service runs but also submit an advance resignation
by entering into a contract of employment wherein he is a consenting party to a
composite letter of employment which provides for employment on the one hand, and,
at the same time, provides for its termination at the end of the period mentioned in
the contract. A pre-emptive consent to leave or retire from the employment has the
same effect as the post appointment voluntary resignation. Although, the termination
of service on an agreed date is recognized as entitling a workman to retrenchment
compensation (proviso to cl.(a) to section 25F),34 it is submitted that for reasons
already given, this is in contradiction of the definition of retrenchment.35
Thirdly, the court has very rightly adopted the reasoning of no-fault theory36 as the
underlying basis of retrenchment. But it is regrettable that the court has miserably
failed to take its reasoning to a logical conclusion. This leaves a patent gap between
the reasoning and the ultimate decisions. The no-fault theory is in conformity with the
ordinary accepted meaning of retrenchment that it is a discharge of surplus labour
only. Therefore, the court has recognized this meaning without actually applying it to
the cases coming before it. If absence for nearly eight days from work by a workman
(Delhi Cloth Mills caes),37 failure to pass a test (Santosh Gupta's case)38 and
unsatisfactory service during the probation period (Mohan Lal's case),39 cannot be
termed as the faults of a workman, then one wonders as to what is the concept of fault
theory with the court upon which it mainly relies to justify retrenchment
compensation. Once it is conceded that all these are cases of the faults on the part of
a workman, then still to hold these as retrenchment would be to destroy the very roots
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of the judgements.
Page: 580
A natural corollary to the no-fault theory is that where an employee is suddenly40

thrown on the street it amounts to retrenchment. The service cannot be said to be
terminated unless it is capable of being continued and that if it is not capable of being
continued (after the expiry of the stipulated term of employment or the automatic
termination due to the applicability of the standing orders), it is not a termination of
service41 amounting to retrenchment. Therefore, automatic termination on the expiry
of the term period of service42 should not be treated as a retrenchment.
Fourthly, if every termination of service is accepted as retrenchment then discharge
simpliciter would also be covered by retrenchment and hence the concept of discharge
simpliciter would become redundant. The Industrial Disputes Act very clearly
recognizes a distinction between a retrenchment and a discharge simpliciter.43 In
discharge simpliciter, the termination of service is brought about by the conduct of the
workman and by the operation of the Standing Orders. For any termination of service,
the reasons are to be recorded by the employers and the reasons normally are loss of
confidence,44 fall in efficiency, incompetence,45 failure to pass a qualifying test,46 etc.
This position is well recognised by the Supreme Court itself.47 Therefore every
termination of service, particularly discharge simpliciter, cannot be properly described
as retrenchment. “A plain reading of section 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act gives a
clear and unfailing indication that the legislature itself had no intention of confusing or
identifying retrenchment with other forms of termination of service.”48 Similarly, in the
context of section 11A retrenchment is recognised as a separate and distinct form of
termination of service, as compared to discharge or dismissal.
Fifthly, under section 2 of the Act all the definitions are conditioned by the words
“unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context.” Accordingly, the
definition of retrenchment is not to be given any such construction which may render
it repugnant to the context in which it is used. The court has failed to take cognizance
of this important aspect in its judgements. As per the court's latest trend, if
terminations other than of surplus labour are to be considered as retrenchment, then
adherence to the “last come first go” rule is not practicable under sections 25G and
25H. Section
Page: 581
25H obliges an employer to give preference to the retrenched employee in case the
employer again wants to employ persons. The construction placed by the Supreme
Court creates a situation that even if an employee had been dishonest, inefficient,
incompetent or fails to pass a test, such an employee being treated as retrenched
cannot be refused re-employment and hence cannot be discontinued. This is an
interpretation which the Parliament must have never intended.
“It would be anomalous to the point of absurdity and would result in a horrifying
situation if an employer who terminates the service of his workman for loss of
confidence or inefficiency or insubordination and the like, is to be expected, nay, be
compelled, to re-employ that very worker in the same industry and that too in
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preference to other workmen whose services are not terminated either for loss of
confidence, inefficiency, insubordination and the like.”49 If the apex court wants to
overact zealously as a benevolent despot by imposing unwanted and undesirable
employees on the employer, it will lead to sabotaging and bringing to a total
collapse the whole industrial system. It is submitted that section 25H has been
designed with an intention to re-employ retrenched workers who are otherwise
competent, efficient and eligible for employment in a service.
Sixthly, the court (through Krishna Iyer J.) has given too much significance to the
literal meaning of the words “for any reason whatsoever”. Literal interpretation in
isolation devoid of the statutory context can lead to “creating uncertainty in the
industrial jurisprudence”. Krishna Iyer J. in another case,50 observed:
….the literal latitude of the words in the definition cannot be allowed grotesquely
inflationary play……To bend beyond credible limits is to break with facts, unless
language leaves no option.”
(emphasis added).
No doubt, labour legislation is primarily meant for ameliorating the plight of the
workers, but the same should not be artificially so streched and strained too far as to
break the very fabric of industrial peace and harmony between the management and
the labour. Employer is as much “an integral part of the nation's economic
community”51 as the labour. And hence, the court should not adopt an attitude which
may appear to be favouring only one segment of the nation's economic community.
Even in Sundara Money (where for the first time both a literal and liberal interpretation
was given to the word retrenchment), the court while recognizing the relevance of the
statutory “context”52
Page: 582
in the interpretation observed:
While canons of traditional sanctity cannot wholly govern, courts cannot go

haywire in interpreting provisions ignoring the text and context.53
Lastly, while interpreting a particular definition, the court should not loose sight of
the signposts available in other parts of the statute. The grounds leading to
retrenchment are given in the schedule as standardisation, improvement of plant or
technique for which there could be retrenchment, i.e., termination of surplus labour.
Therefore, there is a clear indication in the statute itself that retrenchment is linked up
with surplusage of labour; a fact which has been pushed to the background by the
court.
Peroration
1. In 1953, the definition of retrenchment was added to the Industrial Disputes Act
to cases of surplus labour only.54
2. Amendment of 1957 merely treats the termination of service on closure or
transfer of undertaking as if a case of retrenchment and not proper retrenchment
as such.
3. Supreme Court has not appreciated the definition in the context in which it has
been used, i.e., sections 2A, 11A, 25G, 25H, 33 and item no. 10 of schedule IV
read with the opening words of section 2 itself.
4. Of all the judges of the Supreme Court, only a group of judges55 have been
associated with new adventurous interpretation, while one of them has very
candidly and distinctly disassociated himself from this move. For example,
Pathak J. has observed:
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No question arises before us whether the termination of the services of the

appellants amounts to “retrenchment” within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the
Act. The respondent Bank of India has apparently accepted the finding of the
Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court that the termination amounts to
retrenchment. It has not preferred any appeal. I mention this only because I should
not be taken to have agreed with the interpretation of S. 2(oo) rendered in Santosh
Gupta v. State Bank of Patiala.56
Page: 583
The Supreme Court shall be serving the cause of legal profession if it can reason
out, at the earliest available opportunity, as how to reconcile the new construction of
the definition of retrenchment in the light of the provisions of sections 2A, 11 A, 25G,
25H, 33 and item number 10 of schedule IV of the Industrial Disputes Act. In view of
the fact that the definition is not properly drafted coupled with the unsatisfactory
situation created by the recent pronouncements of the Supreme Court, it is desirable
that Parliament should come forward with an amendment to set the controversy at
rest or the whole situation be reviewed by a larger constitutional Bench of the court
itself.
———
*
Lecturer, Department of Laws, Panjab University, Chandigarh.
** Lecturer, Department of Commerce and Business Management, Panjab University, Chandigarh.
1
Ashok Textiles Ltd. v. Their Employees, (1954) I Lab. L.J. 885.
2
See Gazette of India 365 (24 October 1983).
3 See Government of India, Gazette Extraordinary part II, sec. 2(iv) at 955 (13 November 1953).
4
S. 2(00).
5 See Malkhan Singh v. Union of India, (1981) Lab.I.C. 1633, 1636.
6 Hariprasad Shivshankar Shukla v. A.D. Divelkar, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 121.
7
Avon Services Production Agencies (P) Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal, (1979) I Lab. L.J. 1 at 7 (S.C).
8 Pipraich Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Pipraich Sugar Mills Mazdoor Union, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 95.
9 State Bank of India v. Sundara Money, (1976) Lab. I.C. 769.
10
Supra note 8.
11 Id. at 103. Emphasis added.
12 Supra note 6.
13
Ibid.
14 Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1957
15 See ss. 25FF and 25FFF.
16
(1962) II Lab. L.J. 621.
17 Supra note 9.
18 (1976) Lab. I.C. 1766.
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19
(1977) Lab. I.C. 1695.
20 (1980) Lab. I.C. 687.
20a Id. at 689.
(Emphasis added).
21 Id. at 689-90; see also Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd. v. The Workmen, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 251.
22
(1980) Lab. I.C. 1004.
23
(1981) Lab. I.C. 806.
24
Ibid.
25 Pamadi Subbarama Chetti v. Mirza Zawar Ali, (1959) II Lab. L.J. 524.
26
Supra note 20.
27
Hariprasad, supra note 6.
28 Sundara Money, supra note 9.
29
Mohan Lal, supra note 23.
30
Supra note 9.
31 Hindustan Steel Ltd., supra note 18; Santosh Gupta, supra note 20.
32 Retrenchment compensation.
33
Supra note 20.
34 Sundara Money, supra note 9.
35Since the writing of this paper in 1982 many developments have taken place in the law of retrenchment. By
the amendments of 1984, the following exception has been added to the definition of retrenchment under
section 2(oo):
(bb) Termination of service of the workman as a result of non-renewal of the contract of employment
between the employer and the workmen concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under
a stipulation in that behalf contained therein; or……
And further proviso to cl. (a) of section 25F has been omitted.
These amendments themselves overrule Sundara Money cases and have vindicated our view point. The
Parliament still has to come forward to interpret ‘for any reason whatsoever’ in order to avoid further
controversy.
36
Supra note 25.
37 Supra note 19.
38 Supra note 20.
39 Supra note 23.
40 Supra note 25.
41 The Workmen v. Bangalore W.C. & S. Mills Co., A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1363.
42 Supra notes 22 and 23.

43 S. 2A
44Chartered Bank v. Chartered Bank Employees Union, (1960) II Lab. L.J. 222; Jabalpur Electric Supply Co. v.
Shankar Prasad Srivastava, (1962) II Lab. L.J. 216.
45 L.I.C. of India v. Sunil Kumar Mukherjee., (1964) II Lab. L.J. 442.

46 Orissa Cement Ltd. Rajgangpur v. Their Workmen, (1960) II Lab. L.J. 91.
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47
Ibid.
48 Ramteshkumar v. Central Government, Industrial Tribunal Bombay, (1980) Lab. IC. 1116, 1122.
49
Ibid.
50
Bangalore Water Supply and Sewage Board v. A. Rajjapa, (1978) 2 SCC 213 : A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 548.
51 Ibid.
52 Hariprasad, supra note 6.
53 Sundara Money, supra note 9 at 771
(Emphasis added).
54 See Statement of Objects and Reasons to Act 43 of 1953.
55 Chandrachud C.J., Krishna Iyer, A.C. Gupta, Goswami, P.N. Shinghal, Jaswant, Desai and Chinnappa Reddy JJ.
56 Surendra Kumar v. Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court, (1980) Lab. I.C. 1292
(Emphasis added).
Disclaimer: While every effort is made to avoid any mistake or omission, this casenote/ headnote/ judgment/ act/ rule/ regulation/ circular/
notification is being circulated on the condition and understanding that the publisher would not be liable in any manner by reason of any mistake
or omission or for any action taken or omitted to be taken or advice rendered or accepted on the basis of this casenote/ headnote/ judgment/ act/
rule/ regulation/ circular/ notification. All disputes will be subject exclusively to jurisdiction of courts, tribunals and forums at Lucknow only. The
authenticity of this text must be verified from the original source.

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Page 1 Sunday, May 01, 2022

26 JILI (1984) 573

Retrenchment and the Supreme Court: An Overview

RETRENCHMENT AND THE SUPREME COURT: AN OVERVIEW

In ordinary parlance, retrenchment means the discharge of surplus labour.8 This

Supreme Court's swing

strong this policy of comprehensive definition has been effectuated. Termination

Similarly, retirement on attaining the age of superannuation is the ultimate effect of

rule of harmonious construction, an argument can be advanced that these exceptions

obligations as they had voluntarily tied themselves down to the contract-employment

A natural corollary to the no-fault theory is that where an employee is suddenly40

in the interpretation observed:

While canons of traditional sanctity cannot wholly govern, courts cannot go

No question arises before us whether the termination of the services of the

42 Supra notes 22 and 23.

45 L.I.C. of India v. Sunil Kumar Mukherjee., (1964) II Lab. L.J. 442.

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