RATIONAL PRESUPPOSITIONALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

_________________________

A Paper

Submitted to Dr. Owen Anderson

Phoenix Seminary

Phoenix, Arizona

________________________

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for

TH 595: The Problem of Evil

_________________________

by

Richard J. Klaus

June 5, 2020
 RATIONAL PRESUPPOSITIONALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

The problem of evil continues to be a major intellectual and existential challenge for

Christian theism. The literature on this topic is legion.1 Although written in the eighteenth-

century, David Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (1779) continues to serve as

a major statement regarding skepticism about the issue of Natural Theology and, in

particular, the problem of evil. The purpose of this paper will be to examine the problem of

evil as described and critiqued in Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion [hereafter,

Dialogues] and then to examine the particular approach of the philosophical view known as

Rational Presuppositionalism as an answer to the problem of evil.

David Hume’s Dialogues contains twelve parts consisting of a series of exchanges

between three participants: Demea, Cleanthes, and Philo. The problem of evil is specifically

taken up in parts ten and eleven but the entirety of the Dialogues is relevant since the

larger discussion of the existence and nature of God will affect one’s answer to the problem

of evil. Throughout the Dialogues the views of the three participants are manifest and come

to express three different approaches to the question of Natural Theology.

Demea is a religious rationalist and “is meant to represent the theologically

orthodox philosopher.”2 He is opposed to an attempted empirical demonstration of the

nature of God. Rather, he is partial to an a priori argument for God’s existence and nature

1
Thaddeus Williams mentions Barry Whitney’s published bibliography entitled Theodicy that contains
over 4,200 philosophical works on the topic of the problem of evil—this is simply for the years 1960-1990. I
would estimate that the subsequent thirty years has added nearly as much to the literature. Thaddeus J.
Williams, Love, Freedom, and Evil: Does Authentic Love Require Free Will? (New York: Rodopi, 2011), 3.
2
James N. Anderson, Hume (Phillipsburg, Penn.: Presbyterian and Reformed, 2019), 42. Anderson adds,
“Many commentators hold that Demea is modeled on the influential philosopher-theologian Samuel Clarke
(1675-1729)…”

2
—see part nine.3 Cleanthes is a religious empiricist and he is keen to demonstrate the

existence of God and conclusions regarding his nature from a strict empirical analysis of

the world. His main argument is a design argument that utilizes the principle of analogy.

Cleanthes urges his companions to look at the world around them and see the intricate

detail of “means to ends” which entails a divine Mind. Cleanthes argues in the following

manner:

The curious adapting of means to ends, throughout all nature, resembles exactly,
though it much exceeds, the productions of human contrivance; of human design,
thought, wisdom, and intelligence. Since therefore the effects resemble each other,
we are led to infer, by all the rules of analogy, that the causes also resemble; and that
the Author of Nature is somewhat similar to the mind of man; though possessed of
much larger faculties, proportioned by the grandeur of the work, which he has
executed. By this argument a posteriori, and by this argument alone, do we prove at
once the existence of a Deity, and his similarity to human mind and intelligence. 4

The third person engaged in the Dialogues, Philo, is a philosophical skeptic who is

committed to an empiricist epistemology. He does not seek to be a skeptic for skepticism’s

sake. Rather, he is attempting to argue on the basis of Cleanthes’ empiricist methodology

to show that such an epistemic starting point will not yield specific knowledge. 5 James

Anderson articulates the following understanding of Philo:

It is generally agreed that Philo serves as Hume’s primary mouthpiece in this work,
although Philo keeps his cards close to his chest. His strategy is to raise critical
questions about the arguments that Demea and Cleanthes use to justify their
religious convictions, but he also effectively plays the two theists against one
another, allowing their deep disagreements to vindicate his own skeptical position
indirectly.6

3
“But if so many difficulties attend the argument a posteriori, said Demea; had we not better adhere to that
simple and sublime argument a priori, which by offering to us infallible demonstration, cuts off at once all
doubt and difficulty?” David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, ed. Stanley Tweyman (New York,
N.Y.: Routledge, 1991), 148.
4
Hume, Dialogues, 109.
5
“You seem not apprehend, replied Philo, that I argue with Cleanthes in his own way; and by showing him
the dangerous consequences of his tenets, hope at last to reduce him to our opinion.” Hume, Dialogues, 111.
6
Anderson, Hume, 42.

3
 In his argumentation Philo reduces both Demea and Cleanthes’ reasoning to

skepticism. He shows that their views on Natural Religion lack a basis in reason. Demea,

for example, makes a move to render God completely incomprehensible, seemingly beyond

reason itself. Regarding the nature of God, Demea urges that such a topic is “altogether

incomprehensible and unknown to us.”7 When discussing the possibility of predicating

sentiments of the human mind (i.e., gratitude, love, friendship) of the Divine Mind, Demea

states, “…we ought to acknowledge, that their meaning, in that case, is totally

incomprehensible; and that the infirmities of our nature do not permit us to reach any

ideas which in the least correspond to the ineffable sublimity of the divine attributes.” 8

With such a view, Demea is reduced to a kind of religious mysticism devoid of rational

content.

Cleanthes is also pushed by the argumentation of Philo to severely modify the

notion of theism, even being willing to countenance a finite deity. 9 Ultimately, Cleanthes’

strict empiricism cannot get to the truth of God’s nature. Beyond being a designer of some

sort, the arguments of Cleanthes cannot establish his infinitude, his unity, or his

benevolence. Thus, Philo admonishes Cleanthes in the following manner:

In a word, Cleanthes, a man, who follows your hypothesis, is able, perhaps, to assert
or conjecture, that the universe, some time, arose from some thing like design: But
beyond that position he cannot ascertain one single circumstance, and is left
afterwards to fix every point of his theology, by the utmost licence of fancy and
hypothesis.10

In light of this, it is no wonder that Philo and his skeptical empiricism is reduced to saying

that, “All religious systems… are subject to great and insuperable difficulties” and that, “A

7
Hume, Dialogues, 107.
8
Hume, Dialogues, 121.
9
See Hume, Dialogues, 132 and 161.
10
Hume, Dialogues, 131.

4
total suspense of judgement is here our only reasonable resource.” 11 Thus, for all three

perspectives, a kind of religious skepticism devoid of actual knowledge is the conclusion of

the matter.

This religious skepticism also comes out when the topic turns to the problem of evil.

James Anderson succinctly brings out the tensions among the philosophical perspectives:

Hume’s overall strategy, in his discussion of the problem of evil, is to use Demea and
Cleanthes (with Philo serving as middleman) to pose an intolerable dilemma for the
theist: either (1) follow the a priori approach of Demea, positing an infinite God
whose moral relationship with the world is utterly mysterious and inscrutable, and
thus removing any basis for revealed religion, or (2) follow the empiricism of
Cleanthes and settle for an anthropomorphic deity (or pantheon of deities)
indifferent to the miseries we endure. Neither of these, as Hume well knows, will be
appealing to an orthodox Christian.12

In parts ten and eleven of Dialogues, there are essentially five different proposed solutions

to the problem of evil that are put forward for consideration.

1. God is incomprehensible.
2. We will know more in the afterlife.
3. There is more good than evil.
4. God is finite.
5. God is amoral.

A quick recitation of some of the problems for each of these proposed solutions is in order.

(1) God is incomprehensible. The problem with total incomprehensibility is that one

cannot know what it means to say God is “good.” This has the consequence that

one cannot knowingly pray or praise to such an unknown god with any sense of

genuine knowledge.

(2) We will know more in the afterlife. This solution, depending on how it is

nuanced, may fall prey to the same objections to (1). Regardless, even in the

11
Hume, Dialogues, 147.
12
Anderson, Hume, 47.

5
 eternal state a human person never becomes God and knows all things. Human

finitude is never jettisoned so there may always be a problem of evil, the

solution to which is never known.13

(3) There is more good than evil. An immediate issue is how one goes about

measuring “good” and “evil”—what unit of measurement should be used? Also,

it should be noted that the intensity of pain seems incomparable to even large

amounts of pleasure as Philo notes: “… you must at the same time, allow that, if

pain be less frequent than pleasure, it is infinitely more violent and durable.” 14

This solution also fails to answer the question, “Why is there any evil at all?”

(4) God is finite. Philo argues quite extensively that even a finite deity could have

done a better job constructing the world with its law-like regularity and that

such a being could have also done a better job in acting in secret, providential

ways to avoid certain evils. Although in the reasoning of Philo and Cleanthes,

“God” is more like Zeus, the notion of a finite deity is philosophically

problematic in that an eternal Being could not be finite.

(5) God is amoral. In this view the categories of “good” and “evil” do not apply to

God. This solution seems to land one in the objections to (1) above where the

incomprehensibility of God leads to intractable problems. Furthermore, if God

is amoral this has the consequence that the notion of God cannot be the

foundation of human morality and, yet, Cleanthes wants to argue that, “The

13
It should be noted that there is a stream of thought in the New Testament that does look to the glorified
state as providing some sort of context for our suffering in the present age. Romans 8.18: “For I consider that
the sufferings of this present time are not worthy to be compared with the glory that is to be revealed to us.”
2 Corinthians 4.17: “For momentary light affliction is producing for us an eternal weight of glory far beyond
all comparison.”
14
Hume, Dialogues, 158.

6
 proper office of religion is to regulate the heart of men, humanize their conduct,

infuse the spirit of temperance, order, and obedience…”15

Excursus: “Freewill” as a solution to the problem of evil

Although not specifically mentioned in Hume’s Dialogues, theists often apply the

free will solution to the problem of evil. In short form, it states:

(1) Natural evil is due to moral evil.

(2) Moral evil is due to free will.
(3) Free will is necessary to human dignity.

This is solution is not without its difficulties and objections. First, human free will may be

necessary to explain evil but this does not mean it is sufficient. Second, it is possible for

God to make humans with free will who never choose evil. Evil is not necessitated by free

will since God himself is not evil and he has free will. Furthermore, the saints in their

glorified state will be incapable of choosing evil but, nevertheless, will still have a faculty of

choice. It is important to note that the free will solution presupposes an indeterministic

view of the human will which states that an agent has the ability to do otherwise and that

one’s choice cannot be causally determined. By contrast, a compatibilistic view of the will

recognizes that “genuine free human action is compatible with causal conditions that

decisively incline the will without constraining it. By constraint compatibilists mean

conditions that incline the will contrary to the agent’s wishes.” 16 Thus, there are competing

definitions of the human will. At times, however, those affirming indeterministic freedom

15
Hume, Dialogues, 177.
16
John S. Feinberg, “God, Freedom, and Evil in Calvinist Thinking,” in The Grace of God, the Bondage of the
Will (vol. 2): Historical and Theological Perspectives on Calvinism (ed. Thomas R. Schreiner and Bruce Ware;
Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 1995), 464.

7
(or libertarian freedom) refuse to recognize the reality of any other type of freedom. John

Feinberg argues this point forcefully:

Indeterminists typically refuse to acknowledge compatibilism as even a possible

definition of freedom, because they say it is not what freedom means. Of course, this
sort of defining one’s opponent out of existence is illegitimate regardless of who
does it. It begs the question. The question is what is the correct account of free
human action. One cannot win the debate by defining freedom one’s own way and
refusing to admit that any other notion is possible.17

Although it has been argued that indeterminist freedom is in accord with our intuitions

and, thus, broadly accepted, it is not without its philosophical difficulties. 18 One crucial

problem is that a libertarian view of the will seems to commit one to an uncaused will

which reduces its effects to chance happening. R. K. McGregor Wright argues, “How can a

person be held responsible for chance events? If acts of the will are not caused in such a

way as to be actually manifestations of the character, how can they be my actions any more

than the result of tossing a coin?”19

______________________

After all the wrangling of argumentation, the Dialogues concludes with the words of

Philo wherein he finally surmises that natural theology cannot take one very far in getting

at the knowledge of God. The following is a key part of Philo’s conclusion:

If the whole of natural theology, as some people seem to maintain, resolves itself
into one simple, though somewhat ambiguous, at least undefined proposition, that
the cause or causes of order in the universe probably bear some remote analogy to
human intelligence: If this proposition be not capable of extension, variation, or
more particular explication: If it affords no inference that affects human life, or can
17
Feinberg, “God, Freedom, and Evil in Calvinist Thinking,” 465.
18
John Frame has challenged this “intuition”. He writes: “Nor can intuition reveal to us that all of our
actions do have an outside cause. If all of our actions were determined by an agency outside ourselves, we
could not identify that causation by any intuition or feeling, for we would have no way of comparing a feeling
of causation with a feeling of noncausation.” John Frame, No Other God: A Response to Open Theism
(Phillipsburg, Penn: Presbyterian and Reformed, 2001), 130.
19
R. K. McGregor Wright, No Place for Sovereignty: What’s Wrong with Freewill Theism (Downers Grove, Ill.:
Intervarsity Press, 1996), 48.

8
 be the source of any action or forbearance: And if the analogy, imperfect as it is, can
be carried no farther than to the human intelligence; and cannot be transferred,
with any appearance of probability, to the other qualities of the mind: If this really
be the case, what can the most inquisitive, contemplative, and religious man do
more than give a plain, philosophical assent to the proposition, as often as it occurs;
and believe, that the arguments on which it is established, exceed the objections,
which lie against it?20

The language of “ambiguous” and “undefined proposition” should be noted. Shortly after

the above quotation Hume speaks of a person who is “seasoned with a just sense of the

imperfections of natural reason” and that a believing Christian should be “a philosophical

skeptic.” All of this presupposes that the natural world—“general revelation” in Christian

theological terminology—does not clearly reveal the existence and nature of God. As will

be argued from within the Rational Presuppositionalist perspective, this Humean lack of

clarity in general revelation will entail a lack of inexcusability thus rendering a lack of belief

in the Creator God as potentially morally justified. It is to this Rationalist

Presuppositionalist perspective this paper now turns.

Rational Presuppositionalism has recently been described as “an up and coming

movement” and “a budding apologetic system.”21 Its principal architect is Surrendra

Gangadean as developed in his book Philosophical Foundation: A Critical Analysis of Basic

Beliefs (2008). Rational Presuppositionalism has a unique solution to the problem of evil;

indeed, it calls its answer “an ironic solution.”22 It recognizes that the problem of evil can

only be resolved, or, in its terminology “dissolved,” if the problem is situated within a larger

philosophical program of natural theology. Therefore, it is imperative to understand

20
Hume, Dialogues, 184-185.
21
Stephen Lawrence DeRose, “Review of Reason and Faith in the Theology of Charles Hodge by Owen
Anderson (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) in Philosophia Christi 19 (2017), 248.
22
Surrendra Gangadean, Philosophical Foundation: A Critical Analysis of Basic Beliefs (Lanham, Md.:
University Press of America, 2008), 111.

9
Rational Presuppositionalism’s unique approach to natural theology and its attendant

reasoning.

Rational Presuppositionalism (RP) has a robust understanding of natural theology.

This is based on an understanding of “clarity” in which some things—the most basic things

—are clear to reason.23 Reason is defined as the basic of laws of thought: (1) Identity: a is

a; (2) Non-contradiction: not both a and non-a; and (3) Excluded Middle: either a or non-a.

Reason can be used critically to test for meaning which is crucial, since one must know

what a statement means before it can be tested for truth. Reason is understood to be

natural (not conventional, but, rather universal), ontological (applying to being as well as

thought), fundamental to other aspects of human personality, and transcendental (it cannot

be questioned because it makes questioning possible). According to this understanding of

reason, there are some things that “maximally clear” to reason: it is clear that a is not non-a.

A related corollary is that maximal clarity is necessary for maximal responsibility.

This becomes important for natural theology since if reason is used to show God’s existence

and eternal nature, this should be maximally clear. As Anderson and Gangadean write:

If humans are maximally responsible before God for seeking, understanding, and
doing what is right then there must be this kind of clarity of about [sic] God’s
existence and nature. For instance, if humans are responsible for knowing that only
God is eternal, then it must be clear that connecting “eternal” with “non-God”
(matter, a finite spirit, some combination of the two) is a contradiction. 24

Without this understanding of maximal clarity, it is argued that the notion of inexcusability

is lost. The unbeliever may have a refuge of excusability if the revelation of God’s eternal

nature is not clearly seen from the created order. Confirmation of this understanding is
23
The following discussion of reason as understood by RP is based on Owen Anderson and Surrendra
Gangadean’s overview as contained in Owen Anderson, Reason and Worldviews: Warfield, Kuyper, Van Til and
Plantinga on the Clarity of General Revelation and Function of Apologetics (Lanham, Md.: University Press of
America, 2008), 88-89.
24
Anderson, Reason and Worldviews, 88.

10
sought in Romans 1.20: “For since the creation of the world his invisible attributes, his

eternal power and divine nature, have been clearly seen, being understood through what

has been made, so that they are without excuse.” According to RP, the knowledge of God

spoken here in Romans 1.18ff is a possible knowledge (not an actual knowledge) for all

people. If a person would properly use reason in a discursive process and move from more

basic things to less basic things, then the knowledge of God would be known. As Anderson

notes, “And when Paul says that God’s existence and nature are known from the things that

are made this suggests an inference, not an immediate or intuitive truth.” 25

Rational Presuppositionalism attempts to lay out the set of inferences and

discursive reasoning which demonstrates this maximal clarity to those willing to properly

use reason. Owen Anderson lists out ten steps needed to demonstrate God’s existence: 26

1. Show that there must be something eternal. Show that only some is eternal by
showing:

2. Show that matter exists (vs. spiritual monism, and idealism).

3. Show that matter is not eternal (vs. material monism).

4. Show that the soul exists (vs. material monism and Advaita Vedanta).

5. Show that the soul is not eternal (vs. Dvaita Vedanta and other forms of spiritual
monism).

6. Respond to the problem of evil (moral and natural).

7. Respond to natural evolution (vs. uniformitarianism and materialistic

reductionism).

8. Respond to theistic evolution (the original creation was very good—without

evil).

25
Anderson, Reason and Worldviews, 100.
26
Owen Anderson, The Clarity of God’s Existence: The Ethics of Belief After the Enlightenment (Eugene, Ore:
Wipf and Stock, 2008), 140-141.

11
 9. Respond to deism (the necessity for special revelation).

10. Show that there is a moral law that is clear from general revelation.

By an extensive use of syllogistic argumentation it is urged that clarity is manifested and

the twin problems of skepticism and fideism are avoided. This is important since, as was

discovered in Hume’s Dialogues, the normal course of argumentation pursued in natural

theology fails to demonstrate the kind of clarity needed to bolster inexcusability. A full

articulation and analysis of the above ten steps is beyond the scope of this paper, but a

closer look at the problem of evil is warranted.

Standing within the Calvinistic tradition, RP makes no use of the “free will” defense.

Rather, it affirms a compatibilistic understanding of the human will. Rational

Presuppositionalism utilizes the familiar distinction between “moral” evil and “natural” evil

although it has some specialized nuance to these concepts which provide for a unique

answer to the problem of evil. For comparison, a recent popular-level treatment of the

problem of evil from within the Reformed or Calvinistic tradition defines moral and natural

evil as follows:

Moral evil: “Moral evil is any evil—that is, any significant case of pain and suffering

—which is caused by free person, either intentionally or through culpable neglect of

their responsibilities.”

Natural evil: “Natural evil is any evil that is not moral evil. It is significant pain and

suffering in the world that are not caused by free persons, either intentionally or

through culpable neglect of their responsibilities.”27

27
Greg Welty, Why Is There Evil in the World (And So Much of It)? (Scotland: Christian Focus, 2018), 28-30.

12
Rational Presuppositionalism has a fairly close overlap with its definition of “natural evil.”

For RP, natural evil “consists in toil and strife, and old age, sickness, and death and all

amplification of these in famine, war, and plague.” 28 Furthermore, natural evil is not

original with creation. Rather, creation was originally good without any need for natural

evil.

The concept of “moral evil” within RP is slightly different. Moral evil is defined as,

An act contrary to the nature of one’s being; for man as a rational being it is to
neglect, avoid, resist or deny reason in the face of what it is clear; it is the failure to
seek and to understand and to do what is right.29

Thus, linking this definition with what has been discerned about the clarity of God’s

existence it is understood that moral evil is the failure to use reason (either through

neglect, avoidance, or resistance) to clearly see the existence and nature of God and what is,

therefore, the proper human response to this knowledge. As Gangadean writes:

Evil is the failure to use reason to the fullest, the failure to understand basic things
which are clear. It is the failure to know God. This definition assumes the clarity of
general revelation, that only some is eternal. It is consistent both with the notion of
the objective clarity of general revelation and the inexcusability of unbelief as well
as with the subjective difficulty for anyone who fails to see what is clear to
acknowledge one’s failure.”30

With these conceptions of both moral evil and natural evil, there is an interesting

relationship between the two. Natural evil serves the cause of a “call back.” Since the

unbelief through lack of proper reasoning (moral evil) is primary, natural evil is imposed,

in God’s sovereignty, not as a punishment, but, rather as a call back from moral evil.

Natural evil is a summons to awaken one’s reasoning to confront that which is clear—the

existence and nature of God.

28
Gangadean, Philosophical Foundation, 231-232.
29
Gangadean, Philosophical Foundation, 231.
30
Gangadean, Philosophical Foundation, 111.

13
 This conception of a call back through natural evil is illustrated, it is argued, in

various biblical passages. Genesis chapter three is thought to narrate three different kinds

of “call backs” in response to human sin. First, there is the “inner” call back of shame when

the eyes of Adam and Eve were opened “and they knew that they were naked.” (Genesis

3.7) The second call back is the “outer” call back of God’s voice when he asks them a

number of questions to prompt repentance. The third call back is the “curse” in which the

difficulties of life in work and child-bearing (and rearing) will be increased. This

environment of, what David Hume would call “misery,” is to be the atmosphere in which

people are to be shaken out of their laziness and meaningless with the hopes of reasoning

about the most basic things which are clear to reason.

Another passage which is used to illustrate the relationship between moral and

natural evil, is the famous parable told by Jesus, the prodigal son (and his brother!) in Luke

15.11-32. In leaving his father, the younger son is an example of unbelief in the father’s

character of goodness. This unbelief is inexcusable and evil. The younger son ought to

have seen his father’s character but he refused to do so. He leaves and then the

consequences of natural evil are allowed to take effect. Only when he is the pigsty does the

son begin to clearly think about the reality of his father’s house. This moves him to

repentance and he makes his way home. The older son, who is does not embrace his

younger brother, also is snared in unbelief. He does not enter into his father’s joy at the

mercy shown his brother. He refuses to share in the very clear mercy that is pouring forth

from the father.

With this understanding of moral and natural evil, as well as the Scriptural

illustrations in hand, there can begin to be a more robust understanding of the purposes of

14
evil in human history. In an important paragraph, Surrendra Gangadean lays out this fuller

picture:

Applied to evil in world history, evil as unbelief obscures the clear revelation of
God’s nature and will. It serves also to deepen the revelation of divine justice seen
in the relation of sin and death, and the divine mercy seen in the call back, return,
and restoration. If evil is removed abruptly the revelation will not be deepened; and
if the evil is not removed the revelation will not be seen. The solution is to remove
evil gradually. Evil, in every form of unbelief, and in every degree in combination
with belief, is allowed to come to expression in world history, in the various
civilizations and cultures. In an age-long and agonizing spiritual war between good
and evil, between belief and unbelief, good gradually and eventually overcomes evil.
This applies to mankind as a whole, not to each individual or culture. 31

This articulation combines elements of some traditional theodicies and defenses. For

example, there are element of the “greater-good” defense in which God ordains or allows

evil for the actualization of a state-of-affairs which are in some sense dependent on there

being evil in the world. Greg Welty articulates the general understanding this way:

“Typically, a theodicy has the following structure: there are goods that God is aiming at in

his universe, but because of the kinds of goods God is aiming at, he cannot get them without

permitting various evils.”32 Another theodicy taken up by the above articulation by

Gangadean is a “warfare worldview” theodicy. Gregory Boyd states the view in this way:

Stated most broadly, this worldview is that perspective on reality which centers on
the conviction that the good and evil, fortunate or unfortunate, aspects of life are to
be interpreted largely as the result of good and evil, friendly or hostile spirits
warring against each other and against us.33

Whereas for Boyd, this warfare worldview entails the theology of Open Theism with its

attendant notion of libertarian free will, the RP conception is able to incorporate an “age-

long and agonizing spiritual warfare between good and evil” within its system without

31
Gangadean, Philosophical Foundation, 113.
32
Welty, Why Is There Evil in the World, 42-43.
33
Gregory A. Boyd, God at War: The Bible and Spiritual Conflict (Downers Grove, Ill.: Intervarsity Press,
1997), 13.

15
compromising its Reformed roots. In terms of the “greater-good” defense offered by RP, it

is important to note that this is not the usual notion of “greater-good” which can be left

undefined or posited as merely theoretical. Rather, according to RP, this greater-good has a

very specific feature—it deepens the revelation of both God’s justice and mercy.

This leads to RP’s “ironic solution” to the problem of evil. The following is the

entirety of the argument offered:

The ironic nature of this solution to the problem of evil can now be approached. If
we consider the original statement of the problem of evil with the understanding of
good and evil as explained above, the problem becomes transformed. The problem
is not resolved; rather, it is, ironically, dissolved:

1. Because of all the evil in the world I cannot see how it can be said that
God is all good and all powerful.
2. Because of all the unbelief in the world I cannot see how it can be said
that God is all good and all powerful.
3. Because of all the unbelief in me I cannot see how it can be said that God
is all good and all powerful.
4. Because I have neglected and avoided the use of reason I cannot see what
is clear about God.

Based on the definitions provided by RP, the subsequent lines in the above argument

function as a substitute for the previous line. The conclusion seems to entail the following.

First, by the appropriate use of reason one should come to see that which is inexcusably

clear, namely, the existence of God, his eternal nature, his goodness, and his wisdom.

Second, from this is ought to be clear, not only that such a Being would have good reasons

for the evil he allows, but, also, that moral evil is synonymous with unbelief and that

natural evil serves the cause of God as a call back. All of this is what can be and should be

known by natural theology.

16
 Owen Anderson argues that the contours of Rational Presuppositionalism are to be

found in the book of Job.34 In fact, in a few places Anderson humorously calls Job a “rational

presuppositionalist.”35 Throughout Anderson’s exposition there are references to RP

categories of thought: the relationship between moral evil and natural evil with natural evil

being a “call back,”36 the categories of “self-deception” and “self-justification,” 37 inexcusable

unbelief and clarity of general revelation,38 and the need to “give proofs.”39 Anderson relies

on these RP categories to interpret the book of Job and even chides other commentators for

failing to recognize and use these categories.40

Anderson argues that the purpose of God is to bring Job to a place of repentance.

But, whereas, Job’s three friends—Eliphaz, Bildad, and Zophar—incorrectly accuse Job of

“fruit sins,” God is working redemptively through natural evil to bring Job to a place of

repentance of “root sin”—the failure to know what one should have known about God

through the use of reason. Job’s “root sin” is variously and vigorously described

throughout Anderson’s work.

Pride: “He’s not accusing Job of gross fruit sins, gross violations of sins. It’s coming
back to overcoming that pride, which is the opposite of the fear of the Lord.” 41

34
The following remarks are based on Owen Anderson’s unpublished Job: A Philosophical Commentary
(2020).
35
Anderson, Job, 43 and 48.
36
Anderson, Job, 22, 33.
37
Anderson, Job, 44, 55.
38
Anderson, Job, 44, 68.
39
Anderson, Job, 56.
40
Anderson, Job, 44—“This is a part that I see overlooked in all, even the best-intentioned commentaries—
that includes our self-deception and our self-justification.” Later on page 67, Anderson writes: “Look how
badly these views falter on this excellent book. Those are attempts in a loose sense to be Christian
commentaries… So these aren’t getting it; they’re not getting to the point of it. Why? What happened? How
could they miss the book of Job? Well, I think they’re not seeing this distinction between root and fruit sin,
and they’re not seeing the clarity of general revelation themselves. They can’t then say Job should repent of
something of which they aren’t even aware.”
41
Anderson, Job, 47.

17
 Failure to know God: “It is cognitive; we do know God and we should know God.
And that is the sin that Job is being called back from.”42

Self-deception and self-justification: “There is a presumption that Job has

displayed in his accusations against God. In his self-deception and self-justification
he’s become presumptuous.”43

Failure to find contentment in God: “Here’s how we know Job needed to go further.
Do you remember what he said he had wanted out of life, followed by the famous
‘but now’? [Job chapter 29 and 30.1, “But now…”] … And you find your contentment
in these things. You don’t find your contentment in knowing God. That’s what you
saw Job describing for his sense of what the good like is. And he needs to go further.
And God in his mercy is teaching Job to go further.”44

Lack of self-knowledge: “Job needs to come to know himself. He doesn’t have self-
knowledge. And that was revealed through these trials.”45

Ignorance and unbelief: “What Job did, he did ignorantly and out of unbelief. Do
you remember when Paul says that? Perhaps one of the greatest intellects in human
history, and that very talent was turned on its head and used to try to eradicate the
early church. And he summarizes it by saying, what I did, I did ignorantly, out of
unbelief. God’s exposing that about Job.”46

Failure to see what is clear about God: “I hadn’t seen what is clear and God
brought this to me, this redemptive work of God.”47 “Repent of what? You didn’t see
what was clear about God.”48

God is attempting to “call back” Job from all these of sins by using the terrible trials of Job

chapters one and two. Ultimately, the RP perspective on Job’s sin and repentance fails to

convince. Old Testament specialist Michael Brown accurately notes the critical problem:

Although, in his final penitence he acknowledged his sin, he was not speaking of a
state of guilt prior to his sufferings (contrast the confession of 33:27). In other

42
Anderson, Job, 53.
43
Anderson, Job, 57.
44
Anderson, Job, 64.
45
Anderson, Job, 64.
46
Anderson, Job, 64. Anderson is referencing the words of Paul from 1 Timothy 1.13—“even though I was
formerly a blasphemer and a persecutor and a violent aggressor. Yet I was shown mercy because I acted
ignorantly in unbelief.” Anderson is likening Job to Paul’s pre-conversion state.
47
Anderson, Job, 70.
48
Anderson, Job, 71.

18
 words, the sin he was confessing was not the cause of his trial. Rather, he admitted
to his sinful presumption in daring to speak against God in the midst of his trial.49

The RP paradigm, whatever else may be its strengths, seems to be read into the text of Job

rather than having a firm exegetical basis in the movement of the book.

Rational Presuppositionalism seeks to provide an intellectually rigorous defense of

Christian theism firmly based in natural theology. With its commitment to reason as the

laws of thought and its explication of the notion of clarity, it enters the realm of

philosophical theology and seeks to add another voice to those represented in David

Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Whereas Hume’s discussion partners end

up in skepticism and fideism, Rational Presuppositionalism seeks to provide a clear path of

argumentation which demonstrates the inexcusability of unbelief. Its unique approach to

the problem of evil is situated within this larger philosophical project and attempts to

nullify the entire problem, rendering it incapable of being used as an excuse for unbelief.

SOURCES CITED

Anderson, James N. Hume. Phillipsburg, Penn.: Presbyterian and Reformed, 2019.

Anderson, Owen. The Clarity of God’s Existence: The Ethics of Belief After the Enlightenment.
Eugene, Ore: Wipf and Stock, 2008.

49
Michael L. Brown, Israel’s Divine Healer (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 1995), 178.

19
Anderson, Owen. Job: A Philosophical Commentary. Unpublished draft, 2020.

Anderson, Owen. Reason and Worldviews: Warfield, Kuyper, Van Til and Plantinga on the
Clarity of General Revelation and Function of Apologetics. Lanham, Md.: University Press
of America, 2008.

Boyd, Gregory A. God at War: The Bible and Spiritual Conflict. Downers Grove, Ill.:
Intervarsity Press, 1997.

Brown, Michael L. Israel’s Divine Healer. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 1995.

DeRose, Stephen Lawrence. “Review of Reason and Faith in the Theology of Charles Hodge
by Owen Anderson. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.” Philosophia Christi 19 (2017):
245-248.

Feinberg, John S. “God, Freedom, and Evil in Calvinist Thinking.” Pages 459-483 in The
Grace of God, the Bondage of the Will (vol. 2): Historical and Theological Perspectives on
Calvinism. Edited by Thomas R. Schreiner and Bruce Ware. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker,
1995.

Frame, John. No Other God: A Response to Open Theism. Phillipsburg, Penn: Presbyterian
and
Reformed, 2001.

Gangadean, Surrendra. Philosophical Foundation: A Critical Analysis of Basic Beliefs.

Lanham, Md: University Press of America, 2008.

Hume, David. Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, ed. Stanley Tweyman. New York, N.Y.:
Routledge, 1991.

Welty, Greg. Why Is There Evil in the World (And So Much of It)? Scotland: Christian Focus,
2018.

Williams, Thaddeus J. Love, Freedom, and Evil: Does Authentic Love Require Free Will? New
York: Rodopi, 2011.

Wright, R. K. McGregor. No Place for Sovereignty: What’s Wrong with Freewill Theism.
Downers Grove, Ill.: Intervarsity Press, 1996.

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