Morales v.

CA
Preliminary Injunction
G.R. No. Ponente Date
217126-27 PERLAS-BERNABE, J. 10 NOVEMBER 2015
Petitioners Respondents
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, in her capacity COURT OF APPEALS (SIXTH DIVISION) and
as the Ombudsman JEJOMAR ERWIN S. BINAY,JR.

DOCTRINE:

I. FACTS:
● On July 22, 2014, a complaint/affidavit was filed by Atty. Renato L. Bondal and Nicolas
“Ching” Enciso VI before the Office of the Ombudsman against Binay, Jr. and other public
officers and employees of the City Government of Makati (Binay, Jr., et al.), accusing them
of Plunder and violation of RA 3019 (The AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act) in connection
with the 5 phases of the procurement and construction of the Makati City Hall Parking
Building.
● Ombudsman constituted a Special Panel of Investigators to conduct a fact-finding
investigation, submit an investigation report, and file the necessary complaint, if warranted.
Pursuant to the Ombudsman’s directive, on March 5, 2015, the 1st Special Panel filed a
complaint (OMB Complaint) against Binay, Jr., et al., charging them with 6 administrative
cases for Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service, and 6 criminal cases for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019,
Malversation of Public Funds, and Falsification of Public Documents (OMB Cases).
● First Term: Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award for Phases III, IV, and V of the park
building project Hilmarc’s Construction COmpany and executed the contract without the
required publication and architectural design, and approved the release of funds.
● Second Term: He approved the release of funds for the remaining balance of the
contract for the Phase V with Hilmarc’s and approved the release of funds for the
remaining balance of the contract with MANA Architecture & Interior Design Co.
● Ombudsman created another Special Panel of Investigators to conduct a preliminary
investigation and administrative adjudication on the OMB Cases. Thereafter, on March 9,
2015, the 2nd Special Panel issued separate orders for each of the OMB Cases, requiring
Binay, Jr., et al. to file their respective counter-affidavits.
● Before Binay, Jr., et al.’s filing of their counter-affidavits, the Ombudsman, upon the
recommendation of the 2nd Special Panel issued the subject preventive suspension order,
placing Binay, Jr., et al. under preventive suspension for not more than 6 months without
pay, during the pendency of the OMB Cases. The Ombudsman ruled that the requisites for
the preventive suspension of a public officer are present, finding that:
o (a) the evidence of Binay, Jr., et al.’s guilt was strong given that the losing bidders
and members of the Bids and Awards Committee of Makati City had attested to the
irregularities attending the Makati Parking Building project; the documents on record
negated the publication of bids; and the disbursement vouchers, checks, and official
receipts showed the release of funds;
o (b) Binay, Jr., et al. were administratively charged with Grave Misconduct, Serious
Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service;
o (2) said charges, if proven to be true, warrant removal from public service under the
Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS), and
o (3) Binay, Jr., et al.’s respective positions give them access to public records and
allow them to influence possible witnesses; hence, their continued stay in office may
prejudice the investigation relative to the OMB Cases filed against them.
● Ombudsman directed the DILG, through Secretary Roxas, to immediately implement the
preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr., et al., upon receipt of the same.
● CA:
o Binay contends that could not be held administratively liable for any anomalous
activity attending any of the 5 phases since: (a) Phases I and II were undertaken
before he was elected Mayor of Makati in 2010; and (b) Phases III to V transpired
during his first term and that his re-election as City Mayor of Makati for a second
term effectively condoned his administrative liability therefor, if any, thus rendering
the administrative cases against him moot and academic.
o He claimed that the preventive suspension order failed to show that the evidence of
guilt presented against him is strong, maintaining that he did not participate in any of
the purported irregularities.
● On the morning of March 16, 2015, Secretary Roxas caused the implementation of the
preventive suspension order. At around 9:47 a.m., Makati City Vice Mayor Romulo V. Peña,
Jr. took the oath and assumed office as Acting Mayor. At noon, the CA issued a Resolution
 granting Binay, Jr.’s prayer for a TRO, notwithstanding Peña, Jr.’s assumption of duties as
Acting Mayor earlier that day.
● Ombudsman manifested that the TRO did not state what act was being restrained and that
since the preventive suspension order had already been served and implemented, there
was no longer any act to restrain.
● SC: In view of the CA’s supervening issuance of a WPI, the Ombudsman filed a
supplemental petition, arguing that the condonation doctrine is irrelevant to the
determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong for purposes of issuing preventive
suspension orders. The Ombudsman also maintained that a reliance on the condonation
doctrine is a matter of defense, which should have been raised by Binay, Jr. before it during
the administrative proceedings, and that, at any rate, there is no condonation because
Binay, Jr. committed acts subject of the OMB Complaint after his re-election in 2013.

II. Issue/s
1. Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction to issue a TRO and/or WPI
enjoining the implementation of a preventive suspension order issued by the
Ombudsman (YES)
2. Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in issuing the TRO and eventually,
the WPI in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 enjoining the implementation of the preventive
suspension order against Binay, Jr. based on the condonation doctrine (NO)

III. Ratio/Legal Basis

● Section 1, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court defines a preliminary injunction as an order
granted at any stage of an action prior to the judgment or final order requiring a party,
court, agency, or person to refrain from a particular act or acts. It may also require the
performance of a particular act or acts, in which case it shall be known as a
preliminary mandatory injunction. Section 3 of the same Rule provides the grounds for
the issuance of

IV. Disposition
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 20 May 2014
and the Resolution dated 5 May 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 04008-
MIN..

V. Notes (OPTIONAL)