14 landmark judgments on Article 14

State of West Bengal v Anwar Ali Sarkar, 1952 AIR 75 SC

The West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950 was instituted to provide
for the speedier trial of certain offences. Section 3 of the Act
empowered the State Government to constitute special Courts and
Section 5, whose constitutionality was impugned allowed these
Special Courts to try such offences according to the directions of the
State Government. Section 5 was challenged on the ground that
there was no object for making the classification between different
offences under the Act.

The Supreme Court invalidated the Act because it conferred arbitrary

powers in the government to classify offences or classes of offences
at its pleasure. The Act did not lay down any policy/guideline for
classification of such offences. As a result of the provision, different
treatment was granted to the appellant. The necessity of a speedy
trial was too vague and uncertain a criterion to form the basis of a
valid and reasonable classification. This case was one of the initial
cases to lay down the foundational principles of Article 14.

Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice Tendolkar, AIR 1958 SC 538

In this case, the Supreme Court describes the jurisprudence of
equality before the law. The very famous “classification test” had
been given in this case. Simply put, it permits the State to make
differential classification of subjects (which would otherwise be
prohibited by Article 14) provided that the classification is founded
on intelligible differentia (i.e. objects within the class are clearly
distinguishable from those that are outside) and has a rational nexus
with the objective sought to be achieved by the classification.

Magan Lal Chaggan Lal v Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay,

AIR 1974 SC 2009
This provided needed clarification to the reasonable classification
test. Here, the court made a distinction between the statute which
themselves make a classification and those which authorize the
executive to make a classification. In the first case, the statute will be
invalid if it fails to meet the reasonable classification test. In the
latter case, if the statute provides guidelines, whether express or
implied, to the executive to make classification, and the executive
fails to meet the test, only the action will be invalid and not the
statute itself.

E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1974 AIR 555

The second test of Article 14 referred to as the “new doctrine” or the
“arbitrariness test”, was propounded by Bhagwati, J. in this case. The
test postulates that the equality envisaged by Article 14 includes a
guarantee against arbitrariness in State action. This test has
subsequently found favour with the Supreme Court and despite its
somewhat vague formulation, has formed the basis on a number of
occasions for State action being declared ultra vires Article 14.

Maneka Gandhi v UOI, (1978) 1 SCC 248

The seven-Judge Bench held that a triumvirate exists between Article
14, Article 19 and Article 21. All these articles have to be read
together. Any law interfering with personal liberty of a person must
satisfy a triple test: (i) it must prescribe a procedure; (ii) the
procedure must withstand the test of one or more of the
fundamental rights conferred under Article 19 which may be
applicable in a given situation; and (iii) it must also be liable to be
tested with reference to Article 14. As the test propounded by Article
14 pervades Article 21 as well, the law and procedure authorizing
interference with personal liberty must also be right and just and fair
and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive. If the procedure prescribed
does not satisfy the requirement of Article 14 it would be no
procedure at all within the meaning of Article 21.

Indra Sawhney v UOI, AIR 1993 SC 477

This is a landmark judgment on aspects of reservation in India. The
Court interpreted the relation between Article 14 and Article 16. It
was held that Article 16(1) is a facet of Article 14. Just as Article 14
permits reasonable classification, so does Article 16(1). A
classification may involve reservation of seats or vacancies. The
principle aims of Article 14 and 16 is equality and equality of
opportunity and Clause (4) of Article 16 is a means of achieving the
very same objective. Both the provisions have to be harmonized
keeping in mind the fact that both are the restatements of the
principle of equality enshrined in Article 14.

Air India v Nargesh Meerza, [1978] 2 SCR 621

Air India, a state-owned company, required female flight attendants
to retire under three circumstances: (1) upon reaching 35 years of
age, (2) upon getting married, or (3) upon first pregnancy. The same
rules were not applicable to male attendants. The Court struck the
rules down, holding that these requirements constituted official
arbitrariness and hostile discrimination in violation of Article 14.

Visakha v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1997 SCC 3011

The judgment sought to enforce the fundamental rights of working
women under Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India.
Sexual Harassment violates the fundamental right of the women of
gender equality which is codified under Article 14 of Indian
Constitution and also the fundamental right to life and to live a
dignified life. The Court held that even though there is no express
provision for sexual harassment at workplace under Indian
Constitution, it is implicit in the various fundamental rights.

National Legal Service Authority [NALSA] v UOI, AIR 2014 SC 1863

This case was filed by the National Legal Services Authority of India
(NALSA) to legally recognize persons who fall outside the
male/female gender binary, including persons who identify as “third
gender”.

While drawing attention to the fact that transgender person were

subject to “extreme discrimination in all spheres of society”, the
Court held that the right to equality (Article 14 of the Constitution)
was framed in gender-neutral terms (“all persons”). Consequently,
the right to equality would extend to transgender persons also.

Harsh Mander v UOI, 2018 Del HC

This judgment decriminalized begging on the ground of right to
equality under Article 14 by removing around 25 sections of Bombay
Prevention of Begging Act, 1959 which criminalized different forms
of begging.

The Court stated that begging is not any form of a disease and this
mindset has led to stigmatization and ultimately towards
criminalization in the society. It was observed that criminalizing
begging is nothing but a direct attack on the fundamental rights of
the poorest of the lot in their process to somehow access the basic
necessities like food and shelter.

State of West Bengal v Anwar Ali Sarkar, 1952 AIR 75 SC

The West Bengal Special Courts Act, 1950 was instituted to provide
for the speedier trial of certain offences. Section 3 of the Act
empowered the State Government to constitute special Courts and
Section 5, whose constitutionality was impugned allowed these
Special Courts to try such offences according to the directions of the
State Government. Section 5 was challenged on the ground that
there was no object for making the classification between different
offences under the Act.

The Supreme Court invalidated the Act because it conferred arbitrary

powers in the government to classify offences or classes of offences
at its pleasure. The Act did not lay down any policy/guideline for
classification of such offences. As a result of the provision, different
treatment was granted to the appellant. The necessity of a speedy
trial was too vague and uncertain a criterion to form the basis of a
valid and reasonable classification. This case was one of the initial
cases to lay down the foundational principles of Article 14.
Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice Tendolkar, AIR 1958 SC 538
In this case, the Supreme Court describes the jurisprudence of
equality before the law. The very famous “classification test” had
been given in this case. Simply put, it permits the State to make
differential classification of subjects (which would otherwise be
prohibited by Article 14) provided that the classification is founded
on intelligible differentia (i.e. objects within the class are clearly
distinguishable from those that are outside) and has a rational nexus
with the objective sought to be achieved by the classification.

Magan Lal Chaggan Lal v Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay,

AIR 1974 SC 2009
This provided needed clarification to the reasonable classification
test. Here, the court made a distinction between the statute which
themselves make a classification and those which authorize the
executive to make a classification. In the first case, the statute will be
invalid if it fails to meet the reasonable classification test. In the
latter case, if the statute provides guidelines, whether express or
implied, to the executive to make classification, and the executive
fails to meet the test, only the action will be invalid and not the
statute itself.

E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1974 AIR 555

The second test of Article 14 referred to as the “new doctrine” or the
“arbitrariness test”, was propounded by Bhagwati, J. in this case. The
test postulates that the equality envisaged by Article 14 includes a
guarantee against arbitrariness in State action. This test has
subsequently found favour with the Supreme Court and despite its
somewhat vague formulation, has formed the basis on a number of
occasions for State action being declared ultra vires Article 14.
Maneka Gandhi v UOI, (1978) 1 SCC 248
The seven-Judge Bench held that a triumvirate exists between Article
14, Article 19 and Article 21. All these articles have to be read
together. Any law interfering with personal liberty of a person must
satisfy a triple test: (i) it must prescribe a procedure; (ii) the
procedure must withstand the test of one or more of the
fundamental rights conferred under Article 19 which may be
applicable in a given situation; and (iii) it must also be liable to be
tested with reference to Article 14. As the test propounded by Article
14 pervades Article 21 as well, the law and procedure authorizing
interference with personal liberty must also be right and just and fair
and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive. If the procedure prescribed
does not satisfy the requirement of Article 14 it would be no
procedure at all within the meaning of Article 21.

Indra Sawhney v UOI, AIR 1993 SC 477

This is a landmark judgment on aspects of reservation in India. The
Court interpreted the relation between Article 14 and Article 16. It
was held that Article 16(1) is a facet of Article 14. Just as Article 14
permits reasonable classification, so does Article 16(1). A
classification may involve reservation of seats or vacancies. The
principle aims of Article 14 and 16 is equality and equality of
opportunity and Clause (4) of Article 16 is a means of achieving the
very same objective. Both the provisions have to be harmonized
keeping in mind the fact that both are the restatements of the
principle of equality enshrined in Article 14.

Air India v Nargesh Meerza, [1978] 2 SCR 621

Air India, a state-owned company, required female flight attendants
to retire under three circumstances: (1) upon reaching 35 years of
age, (2) upon getting married, or (3) upon first pregnancy. The same
rules were not applicable to male attendants. The Court struck the
rules down, holding that these requirements constituted official
arbitrariness and hostile discrimination in violation of Article 14.

Visakha v State of Rajasthan, AIR 1997 SCC 3011

The judgment sought to enforce the fundamental rights of working
women under Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution of India.
Sexual Harassment violates the fundamental right of the women of
gender equality which is codified under Article 14 of Indian
Constitution and also the fundamental right to life and to live a
dignified life. The Court held that even though there is no express
provision for sexual harassment at workplace under Indian
Constitution, it is implicit in the various fundamental rights.

National Legal Service Authority [NALSA] v UOI, AIR 2014 SC 1863

This case was filed by the National Legal Services Authority of India
(NALSA) to legally recognize persons who fall outside the
male/female gender binary, including persons who identify as “third
gender”.

While drawing attention to the fact that transgender person were

subject to “extreme discrimination in all spheres of society”, the
Court held that the right to equality (Article 14 of the Constitution)
was framed in gender-neutral terms (“all persons”). Consequently,
the right to equality would extend to transgender persons also.
Harsh Mander v UOI, 2018 Del HC
This judgment decriminalized begging on the ground of right to
equality under Article 14 by removing around 25 sections of Bombay
Prevention of Begging Act, 1959 which criminalized different forms
of begging.

The Court stated that begging is not any form of a disease and this
mindset has led to stigmatization and ultimately towards
criminalization in the society. It was observed that criminalizing
begging is nothing but a direct attack on the fundamental rights of
the poorest of the lot in their process to somehow access the basic
necessities like food and shelter.

new legal draft

Shayara Bano v UOI, WP (C) 118/2016

On 22nd August 2017, the 5 Judge Bench of the Supreme Court
pronounced its decision in the Triple Talaq Case, declaring that the
practice of instantaneous triple talaq [Talaq-ul-biddat] was
unconstitutional. The Bench observed that the fundamental right to
equality guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution, manifested
within its fold, equality of status. Gender equality, gender equity and
gender justice are values intrinsically entwined in the guarantee of
equality, under Article 14. The conferment of a social status based on
patriarchal values, or a social status based on the mercy of the men-
folk is absolutely incompatible with the letter and spirit of Articles 14
and 15 of the Constitution.
Indian Young Lawyers’ Association v. State of Kerala, WP (C)
373/2006
By a majority of 4:1, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional
the Sabarimala Temple’s custom of prohibiting women in their
‘menstruating years’ from entering the temple premises. Several
review petitions were filed in response to the judgment, some of
which are still pending in the Supreme Court for final review.

Navtej Singh Jauhar v UOI, WP (C) 572/2016

A five-judge Bench of the Supreme Court unanimously struck down
Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code, to the extent that it
criminalized same-sex relations between consenting adults. LGBT
individuals are now legally allowed to engage in consensual
intercourse. The above segment of Section 377 of IPC was held to be
violative of right to equality which equally applied to same sex
couples.

Joseph Shine v UOI, 2018 SCC OnLine SC 1676

A five-judge Bench unanimously struck down Section 497 of the
Indian Penal Code (IPC), thereby decriminalizing adultery. It struck
down Section 497 IPC on the grounds that it violates Articles 14, 15
and 21 of the Constitution. The Bench held that the section is an
archaic and paternalistic law, which infringes upon a woman’s
autonomy and dignity. The Bench also read down Section 198 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC). 198(2) CrPC specifies that
only a husband can file charges for offences under Section 497. In
this process, the bench overruled its judgments in Sowmithri Vishnu,
Vishnu Revathi, and Y Abdul Aziz. These judgments had upheld
Section 497 as constitutionally valid.
This way, over the years, various courts of the country have been
shaping the jurisprudence of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.