op ef, Bo JOSLOVAKIA’S STANCE ON THE POLISH CAUSE IN 1944 1944 isan important date inthe history ofthe Czechoslovak state Coechoslovak resistance movement Tis is when slate and esstance sentatives began to prepare to seize power, as borne aut by both the Jnorms being developed at that time (presidential decres regulating the ration in berated areas) and malay activites (the Slovak National and the Carpatho-Dukla Offensive). The plans ofthe resistance ers algo included launching a nationwide uprising, The 1944 events marked bythe end ofthe war being anticipated as close and the belief Soviet armies would enter Central Europe, heralding an era of Soviet ny inthe region, The was the reason why a Czechoslovak Soviet of friendship was signed on 12 December 1943, making the Soviet, ‘he key ally and partner for the resurgent Czechoslovak state, How these relations were in no way symmetric spring 1944, the Czechoslovak government started negotiations with Soviet administration s representatives regarding the conditions forthe of areas cleared of Germans. These efforts resulted in a Czecho- Soviet agreement being signed on 8 May 194, shorly after the Red had reached the Czechoslovak borders in north-eastern Carpathian 3a. The fact thatthe United States and the United Kingdom refused clude a similar agreement proves te shifting international position choslovakia, “The major goal of the Czechoslovak resistance movement was the revival Ji its pre-Munich borders—this seemed 29tobe at hand in spring 1944, Significant progress was also made toward baer the rescission ofthe Munich Agreement. Charles de Gaulle’s Provision Government of the French Republi followed on 22 August 1944 the foo. stops ofthe United Kinglom, which had revoked is signature the dealin 1992. Soon afterwards, on 26 September 1944, the Kalin government aly lavaliated the Frst Vienna Arbitration, which had resulted in C2echosl. ‘akia losing territories in Southern Slovakia andthe Carpathian Ruther, However, this suceess came at a moment when Czechoslovak borders ‘began to be questioned again, this time inthe Bast. The situation in Cay pathian Ruthenla became complicated in autumn 1944, where the Son initiated a movement advocating their separation from Czechoslovaki Despite certain cooling, this disturbance in the alliance did not undermine the good relations between Crechoslovakiaand the Soviet Union, Nonethe les, the actual loss of control over Carpathian Ruthenia fuelled fears about the part of lovakia where the Slovak National Council ame to power upon the launch of the uprising, The swiftness with which Czechoslovak units together with the Red Army engaged in combat with the intention of cross {ng the Carpathian mountain ridge and joining the Slovak insurgents an also be explained by the USSR's imperialistic policy. “The Czechoslovak army became much more involved inthe military actions ofits allies, starting from late summer 1944, Apart from the ins ectionary units operating in Slovakia, this chiefly involved the Fest Crecho- slovak Army Coeps forcing its way through the Dukla Pas, the Czechoslo- vak Independent Armoured Brigade which besieging the port of Dunk and tsar force units fightingin the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union ‘All uhese evens had an indirect but significant impact on thelr relations with Poland. Mutual contacts and military cooperation between thee cou tries grew mich weaker in 1944 and neatly ceased during the Slovak Nation al Uprising, However, the Polish factor re-emerged in Ine 1944 and irl 1045, when the Polish Committe of National Liberation was transformed into the Provisional Government of the Republic of Poland and the Soviet Union took determined action towards its acknowledgement. Ths ao purpose ofthis paper isto describe and analyse Czechoslovaki at cto Poland in 1944.1 does not aspire to presen the approach ofthe hroslovak public andi limited to presenting the stances of the London: Czechoslovak government in-xile its subordinate national rsist- ement, the communist movement headed by Moscow's leaders, nally, the so-called anti-BeneS opposition, Most ofthe coverage is dt the foreign centre of power, especially President Edvard Benes, orty ofthe Czechoslovak government-in-exile was fully accepted the country, which sone of the reasons why the national Resistance id only minimum attention to foreign afairs (particularly with regard Sentral Europ). Jen the above contexts, the temporal perspective requires the paper to ent two esental chronological links. Two crucial moments in Polish- hoslovak relation coincide in 1944, A few das before th clock struck ht announcing the New Year of 1944, an important document, the choslovak-Sovict testy offiendship was signed. On the other hand, the end of 1944, and several days later the Czechoslovak government gnsed the representatives fom Lublin asthe Polish government “The analysis of Poish-Czechoslovak relations constitutes an imp ein Czech and Czechoslovak historiography, respectively. Extensive lit has been produced on the topic, including that regarding Czecho- kis’s poston on the Polish cause in 1944. The aim of this paper isto Ise the existing information in new interpretative perspective rather nto enlarge the body of factual knowledge “Among the numerous specialist studies, diplomacy-related publica- should primarily be mentioned, particularly pertaining tothe Polish slovak confederation” and the recognition ofthe Polish government Fah at ene pls nrc 199-1945, Opa 200), pp. 212-21, rt materi & aja for oleh ta atch 1944150, ME Bara eal, Pragu 1985, 7p. 23-2 ova Polk Neston of the Exabahment of Coyeaon and Alle Jed othe involvement and a majo role for Czechoslovakia 9 dh st Sy Vota, Prue 1995, pp. 326-3 280 261from Lublin Concerning the growing dependence of Czechoslovakia on the Soviet Union, the latest edition of international negotiation docurens published in 1999" sof substantial importance. Other recent literature og the subject most notably includes the publication by Jan Némeek of 2003 ‘on Polish-Czechoslovak relations during World War Ul quite righty en: {ed Od spojenectvik roztrce [From Alliance to Quarrel The same shor contributed t the work ProtiBenevi! [Against Bene], which deals with relations between the anti-Benes opposition and the Polish government.” ‘The topic ofthis paper also corresponds to several shorter txt, par ticular two publications by fifi Fried. the fist one from 2002) regards a dispute between Poland and Crachoslovakia over prisoners of war frm CCieseyn Silesia* while the second (of 2014) presents Polish-Czeehosiovak relations afer the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty? Tintur, the 1999 studyby Rudolf Zaéek is dedicated othe attitude of the ‘Czech Resistance towards Poland and the Poles." Considering the extreme importance of President Henes in forming Czechoslovak diplomacy, hist «st biography rom 2008 by JindFich Dejmek is also noteworthy by wsy ofintroduction. Czechoslovak Government-In-Exile in London so-called neo Slavic movement developed during World War It in se to aggressive German nationalism. The Czechs, for cultal and eal reasons, were among the greatest adherents ofthis rend. The views, Czech and, tobe precise, the Crechoslovak Slavic movement was able lly thrive shortly after World War I, though an important publication [been released during the conflict is author was none other han Benes His Uvayo slovanstvé [Esays on Slavonicism), which he finished second hal of 194, summarise his idea of a common Slvic policy. Benes views (exept the communist trend) were accepted among citcles of the Czech society almost without question: 3s such they con- a representative sample of opinion on Crech Slvelom, “the post-war reconfiguration of central and eastern European territories evised to be based on a joint policy for all Slavic states. However, its tn was to solve border disputes through compromise and to build ‘ona concept of nation. The alliance of Slavic countries was not an in itself, being intended to avert aggression from Germany 3 {even the fstures ofthe German nation, strato and uping In the pata el a it lagers and force, wil bay emin serious and constant threat o Save nations (partly Poles, Cech aks and gosta). Dial snd pote Wi iy (Datumenty ed 1 lve, “borat chic prac 43198 a ep 3-58 (Cotooense sn cay» tpraticth jdm 1939-13, Damen. DI 2 Carve 945 ben 1950 | Nemeth, NovthvaSlrike MTejcan raga 1999p. 21-1 Nba, Open rc Veta noon a pa exe rep ace 19391985, Page 203, pp. 238-24 T'Kall, | Nimetck, Pre Bend Cow slvma protiecioné ‘Lond 1939-1945, rage 208, 9p. 523-38 [itll Nowe ane! po = Teka jako pldimdt sora mec pls ‘teva eso dd Lindt protean Crores ae {12361945 (pia este Zon Les, Praga 200 pp. 216-218 » Ty Poet etlnd ade tedeseent-cont mle i). Neck a Cohodnento sod smi 943, Prague 2014 pp 87-7" Mem Va) etoonnajoh a ple ion 2 od vay: NA apse im Cn pols tr rata toh outst Hoek rage 203; pp 157-188. " 2ate, Pt) eon dot oe Poa ra 194 ale 1544 ob Z, ZL Prague 199, 185-173 "Dec Edvard Bone lt Ue Pee pub vide midi oe (45351989), Page 200, pp 12015, fonetheles it shouldbe added that each lave state except Crechoslo found a modus vivendi with National Socialist Germany before the of World War Il though nota long-term one (regarding Poland, refers othe agreement of 193) ‘Wat this “Slavic course" mere motto or a practical gol of Coechoslo: policy? The wording of the Czechoslovak-Soviet treaty of friendship ies tre intention of forming a block of Slave states. The treaty was signed as trilateral, Pland being meant to join. It was written therein an ional protocol that: Bene ay soa, Prague 1947. 9.208yet another obstacle on the way to finalising sch an agreement. In the presidents aforementioned declaration during the tlk in Moscow ‘motivated by the increasingly powerful position othe Czechoslovak sment-in-exile. Czechoslovakia was at that time able to present its own ive to Poland. It wasa proposal, made both directly and indirectly, to into the treaty For example, the Cechoslovak president expressed his ofa rlateral cooperation in his speech of 21 December 194 ‘he Soviet Union [sincerely wishes fr the Crschosorak Republic “tobe strong, united, possi ethnically uniform, and to be tray god ad strong fiend and partner ofthe Soviet maton. express similar wishes with repr to fatrePland, ot oly nthe context of eens tons wih this county but also deep feendship and cooperation betwen Poland and Crechoslovakia This also originates from the protocol to out teat, which expreses a wish thatthe ald testy soon become agrerent betwen the Soviet Union, Poland and Crechoslovki.™ [Jim the event that anythin country bordering the USSRo Cacho. “Slovakia and constatngin thls waran object af German aggression desires to subscribe to this Tey willbe given the opportunity upon the jin agreement of the Governments ofthe USSR snd Caechosbovaki, o sign ‘his treaty, which wil thus acquire the character of tripartite agreement.” Daring Benes’ isi to Moscow, before the treaty was signed, the Polish ‘cause arose several times in negotiations between the president of Cre ‘slovakia and the USSR's party—Joseph Stalin and Vyacheslav Moro, ‘Bene’ renounced the confederation projet ding these talks while speak. ing of Poland rather unfavourably: He noted that it was impossible to con. rect "Two countries with diferent internal structures" Czechoslovakia yas «fully democratic” country in his eyes, whereas he sae Poland as raed by feudalism.® ‘Benes attitude towards the northern neighbour was primarily dictated by pragmatism and Czechoslovakia's security priorities, This is also con firmed bythe issue of post-war territorial solutions. Concerning the future borders of Poland, he advocated the idea of moving its new western border a faras the Lusaian Neise for the sole purpose af shortening the Czech oslovak-German border!™ ‘Talks on the Polish- Czechoslovak confederation dwindled in January 1942 while the president officially dissociated himself rom this idea and so vipat ‘However, the expected result never occured. On the contrary; the treaty factor that reduced cooperation between Poland and Czechoslovakia, Jif Friedl finds, relations between the two countries were hindered by lisparae attitudes tothe Soviet Union,” which prompted Polend to diately suspend the cooperation oftheir inteligence services. During subsequent talks on 2 February 1944 between the Minister for Foreign rs, Hubert Ripka, andthe head ofthe second intelligence division of Ministry of Defence, Col Frantiek Moravec, twas remarked that the slovak side did not rate the work of Polish intelligence specialists ly, and Polish politcal orientation was criticised. The Crechoslovak sie cted a total defeat of Germany on both fronts, whereas the Poles were to believe in.a defeat of the Soviet Union against Germany, which would followed by the victory of Westen ais over Germany.” The changing Neth Ctedoent sont aoa 143, Prague 208, 203 cine of igi document "+ Opnvian Histor Ralf ate baleves that: Bene’ Mono al wit Sin nd Maotor about Poli ene be camer oe the mos lr psd ois Pola are However i wou be wong to accse Benda sry or alto "othe carn superpower He most lft igo sot the mats se! to San and Moloor He ha no acl eso sq partly corec po towards most lsh representatives Tey di ot ike him eve te ie when ‘ance wa sil very acer hey a evrything eee his etn he pal ‘een: (R Za Proj esenoventi pues andres 19) ° Coro sod aly op. yd 38.12 134d hs, "Tens Pun OM Machen noe ikon vis Praga 148, p= 40551 jc, Evade of ip #25, 29, 430, RB. Tet Ses? " edsoren fli rtasic n ponaet 1948-1945 ve nt sr sdvesioh ‘plomatiche dolament, Suds Sg” 0, op. Zaire ean pl koe ci 3 As cli E Benes, Set tex duh nn aly. ti prey «damenty £4 1838-185, Prag 1946p. 2 TF, ok eon da esoovesto-soitaanowrop. tp Tid 5 68 25position on the Polish cause i also evident from the fact that Moravec’ second division soon afterwards started to collet information on Polis, ‘migrés in the United Kingdom and the Mille East? The Czechoslovak side was well aware ofthe fact that the Czechoslovais and the Poles varied in ther approach to the Soviet Union. The aforeney, toned Esays on Sladom contain a comment that Apart from the erste dsp, the ony difetences betwsen the two ‘tons existed in thir views on the Soviet Union and th diferent relations [ut] the Poles and the Cechosovaks had with he Russians, However, it willbe further demonstrated thatthe Czechoslovak govern ‘ment, and most notably Bene’ himself, rejected the territorial dispute, rely ing to consider Cieszy Silesia a problem in relations between the states” ‘The attitude tothe USSR seemed to be the only unresolved issue. Nonethe les, this problem seemed a dificult one to solve in Benes opinion: Ieoncord and defivtv agreement i reached between Poland andthe Soviet Union, divergence over Rasa wil disappear fom Palish-Cescho slovak relations. A door to inmate and comprehensive cooperation wil be henceforth wide open ‘The awareness of different positions on the Soviet Union was accom nied by the certainty that Polish Soviet relations would eventually be rep late. Infact, Bene’ sad during his talks wth tain thatthe Poles would be id p76 Conficts ba epeatlly ase Betneen Poland and Ceechosbvain sine 1918 ve of reorganising Europe ina federated fashion." Thelackof interest ‘confederation isalso exemplified bya Polish informers report onthe ation in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia of March 1944, where ts attitude was thus deseribed | _Canceening confederation with Poland, was implied to the envoy ‘hat the talks had ben launched premature that harms should have been tudo beforehand nd that the parliament would decide onthe future py Aowards Poland similarly to that tows the USSR Apert fom the dominant role of the Czechoslovak government-in-eile, aloof position on the Polish cause resulted from past experience, a dif. political culture and current developments in Czechoslovak Soviet, ns Te ist factor refers tothe echoes of Czechoslovakia being divided the Munich Agreement, which included politcal involvement from Jet ‘The second cause was a disparate politcal culture, incorporated into slogan of Polish arstocratsm and litle democratisn Meanwhile, the "euphoria" that had gripped the state's politicians after signing the let Grechoslovak treaty of friendship, was also spreading among tei ‘members, The awareness of gaining sich anally as the Soviet Union any interest in Poland and the events occursng therein to falter nto inal isue* ‘The same pattern applied to the Ciesryn Silesia region, According to sav Borak relations between the Polish and Czech resistance were aptomatic of lations between the two nations. There was a clear national sin into the Polish and Czech movement that did not cooperate. How: all asuméd that boundaries would be re-dlincated in this complicated lerland region, being ether brought back tothe pre-Munich (Czechs) re-wa sate (Poles). However, the problem ofthe Czech resistance lay fact that it ale to develop its own organisational structure and lim. Atself to maintaining liaison with Czzch resistance groups in the Pro TR Pale, Proj cokers pol honedemce, op. tp 28 sm, Poo estoonemst dri obj Poth, fi 1 i ish-70, usperception of Poland was similar on this point between the demo and the communist resistance movements. Atralleven Benes himself shed the difference between post-war and pre-we Poland (Beck's 3) -In his 1944 Essays on Slavonicsny, he weoe that: “Every good Sav agree that the wrongs done by Beck's Poland must he redressed’ post-war cooperation “in the spirit of new Sladonn” was envisaged new and lasting” The expected fundamental changes othe political were condition, for example tectorate This weakness ofthe Czech resistance may also be explained by the nationally conscious Czechs leaving or, strictly speaking, being farceg to leave Cisryn Silesia afer its occupation by the Poles.” “Theonly rellecton on the eventsin Poland in 1944 concerned the ftlre ofthe Warsaw Uprising. "The elie that if any anti-German uprising was a be launched on the Cvech teretory, it must be first approved by the Soviet ‘Union prevailed among the national Resistance members ove their sym pathy towards the insurgents * ‘Ihave seedy sid hat this willbe avery dic problem for Plant — It would be unwise not to realise internal policy Pod wil be ble to danify its problems ina sir of post-war democracy. It wll be Torced odo so by the ensuing situation These changes will beimmense, but live they must sce forthe sake of Poland's new and sable future ‘Communist Resistance “Theposition of the communist resistance members ws originally in ine with -Moscaw’s position. It was not until when the Polish Committe of National Liberation turned int the Provisional Government thatthe position onthe Polish canse became relevant, However, it shouldbe stressed thatthe only ‘representation of “democratic an brotherly” Poland forthe communis ‘vas the Lublin Committe, which in their eyes constituted adalectica denial of the interwar movement known as Sanja. Jan Sverma, a member ofthe émigré KSC leadership, described the subject asfllows ‘We welcome ourbother Posh ation, with which we are fal [mp sls-ABJonacorsmon path.) The Polish Commit of National Liber tion has ejected the fascist constitution of 1935 andi now bung anew peopl’ democracy. [| he vitry of Polish democracy mean ato CCoschoslovakia Together with democratic Poland and the USSR we wl lke ward off German cashed penetration and secure our fare” ‘he text quoted above also demonstrate thatthe opinions of corama- were influenced by the visions of Slavic reciprocation. Through their sentative, they expressed a view that “The neighbourhood of re, democratic and brotherly Poland, ited ‘withthe Soviet Union and by Cechoslovak bonds af friendship and ance, wil provide a guarantee forall fw that the Pan- Germanic “Drang ‘ach Osten willbe baled and there will never be acter 1938 and 1939.” Anti- Bene Opposition sough it was the London-based government-in-xile that represented the slovak state, not all political trends lined up with it, some of them ing in opposition. Fr this reason relations between the so-called ant Ferlinger subscribed to these words and expressed similar wishes 18 émigrés and the Polish government -in-exile were intensive, though informing London from Moscow about the need to createa“new Poland" 5 i Rorak shone kta poe nsdn off Tsun Vets ra 198 opp. 1606. Zack, Pst tele dodei ooops p17 5 Damenty matey ani keen page ah op. a, Se 0 5,7: © “Anuter trees va ay Thi abut he prt sk etn 3° ‘alan, nich woud nate an USSR (Cakes ea op ‘2, E tench alot. op itp. 27 id,» 25h He expres miata the Ceachodva goverment spec Sesion on 1 anaty 194 See Cohen od aay =o hy ds 7, Demy atresia dhs us m7shifing, he finalisation of the Czechoslovak Soviet treaty in December 194, while Benes opponents were strongly against it wasa trigger fr this Emig fraction to re-establish relations with Poland, The Czech National Commitee ‘of Gen. Lev Prehala published an open letter on 20 January 194 riticising the Soviet-Crechoslovak treaty. By notifying the Polish government of it the general sought support from a country that had helped him in 1939, twasnotan extraordinary act. Asthe authors of Against Bens! pu it, the ‘opposition circles looded the Polish government -in-exle with information about their anti-government activites ** However itdoes not imply thatthe entire ant-Beneé opposition was automatically pro Polish. The standpoint ofthe Social Democratic politician and former head of the state's émigeé ‘National Council, Rudolf Bechyné, most firmly expressed on 19 January 1945 an anti-government oppositions meeting proves this view: Bechyné defended the Soviet policy while criticising that of Pland.°* ‘The termination of diplomatic relations between the Coechoslovak snd Polish governments-in-exil started a new chapter i international relations Itput both Czech (Czechoslovak; to be trict) and Polish émigré politiciansia the situation of opposition entities, Establishing close contacts ws logis ‘move, largely initiated by General Prchala.”” However, ‘quite another research topic German aggression. Czechoslovakias position was also influenced by grievances that reasserted themselves in 1944, the Polish occupation of jm Silesia in 1938 being the strongest one series of political decisions taken by the government-in-eile also ibuted to Czechoslovakia’ stance on the Polish cause in 1944, most tant signing the Czechoslovak Soviet treaty in Desember 1943. This it marked a turnaround in Czechoslovakia’ policy which had already when the Sovietshad sided with the ani-Hitler coalition, The Soviet thereby became the guarantor of Crachoslovaks's sovereignty, which red other countries lke Poland, less important inthe eyes of Czecho- 2's representatives t ean be generally concluded that their position Polish cause invoked previous events, which had slowly but inevi- iyled toa gradual cooling in the Poish-Coechoslovak contacts towards eventual cessation of diplomatic relations with Tomasz Ateiszewsk's n-based government. land also happened to hecomea negative example against which Czech k politicians revised the direction for their county to follow (ensuring ‘of the governmentin-exle, sovereignty ofthe stat’ territory, and Czechoslovakiss position on the Polish cause was chiely pragmatic, [even the propagated idea of Slavic reciprocation could not change that is probably where the deepest rift between rhetoric and practice can nd, The history of Polish-Crechoslovak relations in 1944 has clearly that the following rule of diplomacy applies: no nation has friends, interests ‘onsent tothe pragmatic approach to Poland was feature that all poi jovements in Czechoslovakia had in common, For the government ile, the postion onthe Polish cause was mainly dictated by efforts to ain close relations with the Soviet Union and restore its pre-Munich, Jers. In turn the homeland Resistance was eo ts geographic locaton ‘on other grounds, is issue falls within (Caechoslovakias stance onthe Polish cause in 1944 was co-determine! by ‘oth temporary and long-term concerns. Initial the Tong-te ‘were not the top interest in these mutual relations Resides, Czechoslovaki ‘positon is believed to have been affected both by the different geopolitical ‘outlook on Europe's situation (made particularly manifest in ther attitule (© the Soviet Union) andthe diferent politcal culture (Czechoslovak “emo rats versus Polis aristocrats” and so on), aswell as goa ofthe ress ance movement, which chiefly involved securing Czechoslovakia stated n aspects TR Neto, Pt Benen ps 354 1 anti-Benes opposition also proceeded with its oven praginaic rraee gramme, hoping fr spor fom the Pls mies in London which * mare ly need.lations with Poland are a good llutation of Czechoslovak’ dependence onthe Soviet Union. While Czochoslovakia's postion in 114 was based on the assumption that Poland would soon join the ‘t-Crechoslovak treaty thus sealing the trilateral alliance, the begin 1945 found the Czechoslovak government facing an entirely itferen di ‘na, The dilemma being whether and under what conditions tore the Polish Provisional government. The Sovlet position was the one eventually prevailed in relations with Poland in this regard ‘Czechoslovakia unconditionally recognised the Polis Provisional ecnment under diplomatic pressure from the USSR. Only then Soviet sasion slightly subsided. On the other hand the issue of the state's post ‘borders was raised, afer being rather hushed up during World War I never truly settled. The border dispute broke out anew in spring I complicated Polish-Czechoslovak relations over the next years. There doubt that, in consequence, Czechoslovak politicians prioritised shor ‘benefits over long-term bonds, Czechoslovakia’ Stance on the Polish Cause in 1944 “Thichapar das with th changes in the Czcosonak attade towards Poland WW, Asconding to the author, the situation changed rapidly 1944, and ally between Dacer 1943, when the Ceacosona Save agreement was ‘and January 1945, when Czechoslovakia acknowledged the communist Pro Goverment. The author anaes the changes Czch opinion on Poland, the approach ofthe Czchvak goverment eile with President Edvard and he prpsctv ofthe commas Resistance and Czchaslovak emis ne’ government