I.

No. Social Justice, in the implementation of the CARP, does not apply only to poor
landless farmers.
Under the CARP, “the welfare of the landless farmers and farmworkers will receive the
highest consideration to promote social justice”. In a prevailing jurisprudence, in a case of
reasonable doubt, the court is called upon to tilt the balance in favor of the poor simply because
they are poor, to whom the Constitution fittingly extends its sympathy and compassion. But
never is it justified to prefer the poor simply because they are poor, or to eject the rich simply
because they are rich, for justice must always be served, for poor and rich alike, according to the
mandate of the law. Another jurisprudence provides that Social justice in the land reform
program also applies to landowners, not merely to farmers and farmworkers.
What these means is that social justice is not only accorded to the poor landless farmer
but what they do have is the highest consideration when it comes to the application of the said
law. Not just because they are poor landless farmers that they will be given advantages that will
in turn unduly deprive the landowners of their rights and put them in a gross disadvantage like
claiming lands in which the poor landless farmers are not entitled to. The rule of law and justice
must always prevail.
II.
No. DAR’s contention is incorrect.
Under the CARP, Private lands actually, directly and exclusively used for prawn farms
and fishponds shall be exempt from the coverage of the said act: Provided, That said prawn
farms and fishponds have not been distributed and Certificate of Land Ownership Award
(CLOA) issued to agrarian reform beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program.
In this case, Ramon and his children are using their property exclusively in prawn
farming. The law explicitly provides that lands that are exclusively being used for prawn farms
are exempted from the coverage of the CARP. In addition, the property in question has not yet
been distributed before and no CLOA has been issued to agrarian reform beneficiaries. The
DAR’s contention is incorrect. Thus, they cannot pursue Ramon’s property for agrarian reform.
III.
No. The sale is invalid.
Under the CARP, as amended, lands subject to CARP shall first undergo the land
acquisition and distribution process of the program and that landholdings of landowners with a
total area of five (5) hectares and below shall not be covered for acquisition and distribution to
qualified beneficiaries.
In this case, the landowner sold 5 hectares of his 25-hectare agricultural land without
DAR clearance. The law provides that what are not covered for acquisition and distribution to
qualified beneficiaries are landholdings with a total area of 5 hectares and below. Even if the
landowner only sold 5 hectares, his total landholding is 25 hectares. Thus, for the sale to be
valid, DAR clearance should be secured first before the sale because the landholdings in question
are subject to CARP and in turn should undergo the land acquisition and distribution process.
IV.
No. There is no tenancy relationship between the parties.
Under the prevailing jurisprudence, the Court enumerated the essential requisites of a
tenancy relationship, thus: (1) The parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) The subject is
agricultural land; (3) There is consent; (4) The purpose is agricultural production; (5) There is
personal cultivation; and (6) There is sharing of harvests. Tenancy status arises only if an
occupant of a parcel of land has been given its possession for the primary purpose of agricultural
production.
In this case, Francis has allowed Mark to utilize the former’s property to expand his
coconut shell business. The facts of the case point out that the Mark was only allowed by the
owner out of benevolence to utilize his land for the coconut shell business. There is no personal
cultivation on the part of Mark and the purpose is not for agricultural production. Coconut shell
is an agricultural waste and not an agricultural produce. There is also no sharing of harvests
because Mark just provides Francis coconut shell charcoal whenever he has a party at home. The
essential requisites of a tenancy relationship are not present. Thus, there is no tenancy
relationship between the parties.
V.
Yes. The contention of LBP is untenable.
Under the prevailing jurisprudence, in Section 57 of R.A. No. 6657, Congress expressly
granted the Regional Trial Court (RTC), acting as Special Agrarian Court (SAC), the original
and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to
landowners. Only the legislature can recall that power. The DAR has no authority to qualify or
undo that and considering that the payment of just compensation is an obligation created by law,
it should only be ten (10) years from the time the landowner received the notice of coverage.
In this case, Arvin received the Notice of coverage on June 1, 2012. He has until 10 years
from that date to file a petition before the SAC for the determination of just compensation in
which he availed when he filed an action with RTC-SAC on June 15, 2020. The fact that
PARAD had already issued a resolution that agreed with the valuation of the LBP and the 15
days had already passed from its receipt is immaterial because the law expressly granted the
RTC acting as SAC to have original and exclusive jurisdiction over petitions for the
determination of just compensation to landowners. Thus, LBP’s contention is untenable.
VI.
 Yes. Gino committed acts of sexual harassment in a work-related environment.
Under the prevailing jurisprudence, the Supreme Court held that it is not necessary that
the demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor be articulated in a categorical oral or
written statement. It may be discerned, with equal certitude, from the acts of the offender. As
long as the offender creates an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment for the victim,
there could exist sexual harassment.
In this case, Gino said that he can give Dani a favorable endorsement that will help her
land a lucrative post after a physical contact or act that may create a sexual tension between
them. In doing so, even if Gino did not explicitly demand or requested a sexual favor to Dani, he
created a hostile environment for her. Thus, he committed acts of sexual harassment in a work-
related environment.
VII.
No. Myra is not entitled to a parental leave under these circumstances.
Under the IRR of RA 8972, a solo parent shall be entitled to parental leave provided that:
(a) He/She has rendered at least one (1) year of service whether continuous or broken at the time
of the effectivity of the Act; (b) He/She has notified his/her employer of the availment thereof
within a reasonable time period; and (c) He/She has presented a Solo Parent Identification Card
to his/her employer. Under the RA 13061 or Domestic Workers Act, an employer refers to any
person who engages and controls the services of a domestic worker and is party to the
employment contract.
Based on the facts of the case, the second requirement is not present because Myra was
not able to notify her employer of the availment of the parental leave within a reasonable time.
Myra asked not her employers but Marco, minor son of her employers, if she could avail her
parental leave for 7 days. Marco is not a party to the employment contract between Myra and his
parents. Thus, under these circumstances, Myra is not entitled to a parental leave.
VIII.
No. The management is not justified in not promoting Neil as project manager.
Under the Anti-Age Discrimination in Employment Act, to deny any employee’s or
worker’s promotion or opportunity for training because of age is unlawful on the part of the
employer.
In this case, the management maintains that the reason why the persons were promoted
because they are all above forty years of age and mature enough to handle the projects. It is very
clear that the only reason why the persons were promoted is because of their age even if Neil is
qualified, if not more than qualified than them. This is the type of discrimination that the law
wants to prevent in the work environment. Thus, the management is not justified in not
promoting Neil.
IX.
 No. The spouses are not justified in denying Billy’s request.
Under the law, if the duration of the domestic service is not determined either in
stipulation or by the nature of the service, the employer or the domestic worker may give notice
to end the working relationship five (5) days before the intended termination of the service and it
shall be unlawful for the employer or any person acting on behalf of the employer to place the
domestic worker under debt bondage.
In this case, Billy, as an in-house cook, is covered by the Domestic Workers Act. Since
there is no written contract between Billy and the Spouses Gabo and Rio, the duration of the
domestic service is undetermined. The spouses can not also require Billy to continue to work for
them just to pay for her existing debt to them for an indefinite period or undefined length and
nature of services. Thus, Billy can ask for the termination of her services and the spouses are not
justified in denying Billy’s request.
X.
Yes. Ellen is entitled to maternity benefits.
Under the law, maternity leave with full pay shall be granted even if the childbirth,
miscarriage, or emergency termination of pregnancy occurs not more than fifteen (15) calendar
days after the termination of an employee’s service, as her right thereto has already accrue.
In this case, Ellen’s services were terminated on December 15, 2019 and ten days after,
or on December 25, 2019, she gave birth to her child. Ellen’s right, under the law, to avail the
maternity leave had already accrued even if she was terminated 10 days before giving birth. The
fact that she had illicit relationship with a married man is immaterial in this case because the law
does not provide that having this kind of relationship will disqualify a woman of her right to
avail maternity benefits. Thus, she is entitled to maternity benefits.