MOOT COURT

Before

THE HOUNARABLE COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MUMBAI

In matter of

Large and others Plaintiff

v.

Haggis Defendant

MEMORIAL for PLAINTIFF

1|Page
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATION ……………………………………………………………… 3

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES……………………………………………………………… 3

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ……………………………………………………... 4

STATEMENT OF FACTS ……………………………………………………………….. 5-6

ISSUES RELATED……………………………………………………………………….. 7

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS…………………………………………………………. 8-10

PLEADINGS……………………………………………………………………………… 11-14

PRAYER …………………………………………………………………………………. 15

2|Page
 LIST OF ABBREVIATION

HON’BLE: HONOURABLE

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

Sr
List of Cases
No.

1. STANSBIE v TROMAN [1948] 2 KB 48

2. HAYNES v HARWOOD [1935] 1 KB 146, CA

3. CHADWICK v BRITISH RAILWAYS BOARD [1967] 1 WLR 912

4. KING v PHILCOX (2015) 255 CLR 304

5. JAENSCH v COFFEY (1984) 155 CLR 549 AT 570

6. TAME v NEW SOUTH WALES (2002) 211 CLR 317

7. HOMSI v HOMSI [2016] VSC 354

CIVIL LIABILITY ACT 2002 - SECT 32 (NEW SOUTH WALES

8.
CONSOLIDATED ACTS)

3|Page
 STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The petitioner namely, Mandy Large, Nessie Haggis and Sam Byrne, appealed to the Court of
Appeal in 1996 based on the judgement given by Hon’ble Judge, Copout J to the Haggis
estate, holding:

1. That there is no duty of care to avoid causing psychiatric damage:

i) Attached to the negligent infliction of injury to oneself;
ii) Arising from a particular susceptibility of a plaintiff.

2. That there is no duty of care owed to a professional rescuer;

That the viewing of a tragedy on television constitutes a novus actus interveniens.

4|Page
 STATEMENT OF FACTS

ALEX HAGGIS

Alex Haggis is a professional snooker player who was incensed that the regulatory body of
the sport has suspended him from participating in the tournament, that lasts for eighteen
months. At the end of the 1996 World Snooker Championship, Alex Haggis concluded that
he would lodge a protest. Alex dashes from the audience while the evening session is being
televised live to an expected audience of nine million people, holding a massive home-made
firework display.

After lighting the fuse, Alex makes the following statement, “This protest is to highlight the
vicious and unjustified ban imposed upon me, the People's Champion, and to remind the
viewing public that, in these days of automated, acne-ridden clones who masquerade as
players, I am the only person who is still capable of producing fireworks on a snooker
table.”

Alex was tragically consumed by the flames after the firework bursts while he was still
holding it after the speaker tragically botches the timing of his statement. Five days later, Mr.
Haggis passed away in the hospital.

MANDY LARGE

Mandy Large, who is a model by profession, was also present at the tournament. She
witnesses the horrific event from her seat in the audience. Ms. Large was also carrying the
unborn child of Alex Haggis and was also his girlfriend up until about five weeks ago. The
pregnancy was also confirmed recently.

Mandy sustained damage to her mental health because of the horrific event she witnessed. As
a result of this, she miscarries.

5|Page
NESSIE HAGGIS

Nessie Haggis is Alex’s mother, who was watching the live telecast of the competition from
her house. She also sustained damage to her mental health. Additionally, she also experienced
psychiatric harm.

SAM BYRNE

Sam Byrne is an off-duty fireman. Upon seeing Alex burn, Sam rushed from the audience to
try to put out Alex’s fire. As a result, Sam also sustained psychiatric damage.

THE ORDINANCE

The psychiatric damage that Maggie endured would not have been experienced by an
observer who was not pregnant, and as a result, there is no need to take into consideration the
closeness of her relationship to the person who passed away;

That there were no reports of Nessie being in the area at the time of the accident;

That as a fireman, Sam should have been able to demonstrate sufficient fortitude to bear any
hardship, and so it was not reasonably foreseeable that he would suffer psychological
impairment under the circumstances described.

6|Page
 ISSUES RAISED

ISSUE 1: Under what circumstances does an organization owe another duty of care in the
Torts of Negligence.

ISSUE 2: Whether compensation can be awarded for mental agony suffered by the Plaintiffs
under Nervous Shock in Negligence.

7|Page
 SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

ARGUMENT 1

When determining whether or whether not an action constitutes negligence, the duty of care
is the single most significant factor to consider. This indicates that the law imposes a legal
duty of care upon a person towards the other or upon others when a person is executing a
given act in order for the person to take reasonable care to prevent such injuries that might
reasonably be predicted by the person performing the act. The organization has violated its
duty of care because it is responsible for the security system throughout the entire
tournament. As we can see at every match that we go to, they have certain restrictions in
place, such as not carrying combustible materials, so that everything stays in order. However,
the organization has violated its duty of care because they were responsible for the security
system throughout the entire tournament. Alex Harris, the individual who passed away, was
carrying a firecracker inside the stadium, which should have been impossible because the
organizations should have been aware of the tight crowd at the championship and should
have increased security to ensure that such items are not being brought inside, and this clearly
shows negligence on their part.

Stansbie v Troman1 is a good example of the duty of care in action. Stansbie, a decorator,
was hired by Troman to decorate his house. After he finished his work, Stansbie left the
house without locking the doors and without informing anyone, which made it easier for a
thief to steal some of the plaintiff's (Troman) property. The court ruled out in favour of
Troman and Stansbie was held liable for breach of duty of care and negligence. This situation
led to the legal action described in the present case.

1
Stansbie v Troman [1948] 2 KB 48

8|Page
In Haynes v Harwood2, Haynes (a police officer; respondent herein) was awarded damages
for personal injury by the defendant, Harwood (the owner of horse van; appellant herein).
The court ruled out that neither novus actus interveniens nor volenti non fit injuria would
apply in this case as this is a RESCUE CASE.

ARGUMENT 2

Whether or not the plaintiffs in a case of negligence may be given compensation for the
mental anguish they endured as a result of the nervous shock they experienced. Shock to the
nerves and brain components of the body is what the term "nervous shock" refers to literally.
It is possible to file a claim for damages while experiencing nervous shock even if there is no
evidence of direct contact or a fear of imminent physical injury.

It is possible for the defendant's words or actions to have caused the nervous shock.
Witnessing (or hearing about) a personal injury (or an accident) or the damage of the
plaintiff's property that was caused by the defendant's illegal conduct might cause the plaintiff
to suffer from nervous shock.

In the event that the plaintiff is alleging nervous shock, they are required to establish the
following things:

1) He is responsible for demonstrating the requisite chain of causation between his

mental condition and his criminal behaviour;
Nervous shock as well as the resulting death or injury of one or more unrelated third
parties as a result of the the wrongdoing of the defendant;
Injuring yourself is not required in any way.

2) The plaintiff does not need to be in a position where he has suffered actual bodily
harm to himself; it is sufficient that because of the position he is in, he is in danger of
receiving a shock as a result of anything he sees or hears. To put it another way, the
plaintiff has to be in a position where they may sustain harm from a nervous shock.

2
Haynes v Harwood [1935] 1 KB 146, CA

9|Page
 3) The plaintiff will need to demonstrate that they have a close connection with the
defendant that is characterized by love and affection. Principal victim as well as the
fact that his closeness to the tragedy was near enough in time and the room. In this
particular scenario, Alex's girlfriend, Mandy Large, as well as Alex's mother, Nessie
Haggis, were both there who displayed a deep connection with the deceased,
including love and affection towards him.

On the other hand, Sam Byrne, who was an off-duty fire fighter did not have a particularly
close relation with Alex Haggis, but in the case Chadwick v British Railways Board3, it
was held that the primary victim need not be a near relative of the plaintiff. Thus, a man who
came up on a scene of serious accident for acting as a rescuer, when suffered a nervous
shock, was allowed to claim damages.

It was further authorized for the rescue worker who had experienced nervous shock to file a
claim for damages.

3
Chadwick v British Railways Board [1967] 1 WLR 912

10 | P a g e
 PLEADINGS

I. Owing another Duty of Care in the Torts of Negligence.

1. In Haynes v Harwood (1935)4, the plaintiff, a police constable, was on duty inside a
police station on a street with a significant number of people, including children, at
the time of the incident. He raced out and ultimately halted the defendants' runaway
horses with a vehicle attached as they came down the street, receiving injuries as a
result. The court held that:
a) that the defendants' servant was negligent in leaving the horses alone in a busy
street, based on the facts;
b) that because the defendants must or should have anticipated that someone might
try to stop the horses to prevent injury to life and limb, and because the police had
a general duty to intervene to protect life and property, the plaintiff's actions and
injuries were the natural and probable consequences of the defendants' negligence;
and;
c) The plaintiff's recovery was not barred by the adage "volenti non fit injuria."

2. In King v Philcox (2015)5, it was ruled out that, “The tortfeasor may owe a duty of
care to family members who suffer psychological impairment as a result of a
negligently inflicted injury to a close relative but do not witness the occurrence.
This has been referred to as the negligent party's obligation to a 'secondary victim,'
with the principal victim being the person murdered or seriously injured.”

4
Supra at 2
5
King v Philcox (2015) 255 CLR 304

11 | P a g e
\

II. Whether compensation can be awarded for mental agony suffered

by the Plaintiffs under Nervous Shock in Negligence.

For a considerably long time, it has been established that some groups of people are more
vulnerable to psychiatric harm than others, and hence are entitled to compensation for mental
injury if a close family is wounded or died as a result of someone else's negligence.

1. In Jaensch v Coffey (1984)6, Mrs. Coffey’s husband was seriously injured by the
negligent driving of Jeansch. After seeing her husband in hospital and being told that
he would probably not make it, Mrs. Coffey suffered a nervous shock. Mr. Coffey
survived, but the damage was done.
Mrs. Coffey commenced proceedings against Jeansch in the Supreme Court of South
Australia, seeking compensation for the nervous shock and loss of consortium she
suffered.
The court held that, it was more than reasonable foreseeability, proximity was also
relevant, and Mrs. Coffey satisfied this test. Moreover, the Doctrine was extended
beyond those who actually see the event, to those who perceive its direct aftermath.
And, it is necessary to actually perceive the aftermath, not just learn about it.
The court stated that, “Where the relationship between the person killed or
physically injured and the person who suffers nervous shock is close and intimate,
not only is there the requisite proximity in that respect, but it is readily defensible
on grounds of policy to allow recovery.”

2. In Tame v New South Wales (2002)7, the Australian High Court rejected the idea
that plaintiffs had to establish that they had experienced a ‘nervous shock’; that they
had a familial link with the lead victim; that they were physically close to the primary
victim, or that the claimant was an individual of 'normal fortitude' apart.

6
Jaensch v Coffey (1984) 155 CLR 549 at 570
7
Tame v New South Wales (2002) 211 CLR 317

12 | P a g e
 3. Section 32 of the Civil Liability Act 20028, states that:
i) A person (‘the defendant’) does not owe a duty of care to another person (‘the
plaintiff’) to take care not to cause the plaintiff mental harm unless the defendant
ought to have foreseen that a person of normal fortitude might, in the
circumstances of the case, suffer a recognised psychiatric illness if reasonable care
were not taken.
ii) For the purposes of the application of this section in respect of pure mental harm,
the circumstances of the case include the following:
a) whether or not the mental harm was suffered as the result of a sudden shock,
b) whether the plaintiff witnessed, at the scene, a person being killed, injured or
put in peril,
c) the nature of the relationship between the plaintiff and any person killed,
injured or put in peril,
d) whether or not there was a pre-existing relationship between the plaintiff and
the defendant.

Now, as mentioned under (ii)(a) of Section 32 of the Civil Liability Act 2002, it is more than
obvious that Mandy Large and Nessie Haggis did suffer mental harm due to sudden shock.
Further, under (ii)(b) it can be noted that Mandy Large was present at the tournament and was
sitting in the audience while Alex began his protest. When the unfortunate event took place
with Alex Haggis, Mandy Large did witness it at the scene.

Under (ii)(c), the nature of relationship between Alex Haggis and the plaintiff (Nessie
Haggis, herein) was purely based on love and affection. Nessie was Alex’s mother and seeing
her son burn down on a live telecast, impacted her mental health and well-being adversely.

Under (ii)(d), even though, as per the facts stated, Mandy Large and Alex Haggis had called
their relationship off, five weeks prior to the untimely demise of Alex Haggis, it is very
crucial to note that Mandy Large was still carrying Alex’s unborn child and further it can be
very well assumed that she was present at the tournament to support him, not knowing the
fact that Alex would end up in a misfortunate situation.

8
CIVIL LIABILITY ACT 2002 - SECT 32 (New South Wales Consolidated Acts)

13 | P a g e
 4. In Homsi v Homsi (2016)9, Justice Forest J pointed that, “another difficult situation
of foreseeability happens when a person dies or injures oneself at work or in a
motor vehicle or any other reasonable place, setting in motion a chain of events
that harms his or her family members, whether or not they were there at the time of
the disaster.”
In general, psychological injury produced by direct apprehension of harm to oneself
or a close family member as a result of another's tortious behaviour is recoverable,
according to Justice Forrest.

9
Homsi v Homsi [2016] VSC 354

14 | P a g e
 PRAYER

Wherefore, in the light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, it is
most humbly prayed and implored before the Hon’ble Court that it may be graciously pleased
to adjudge and declare a compensation to the Plaintiffs (Mandy Large, Nessie Haggis and
Sam Byrne, herein) on the grounds of breach of duty of care and suffering nervous shock and
psychiatric damage, as a consequence.

Also, pass any other order that it may deem fit in the favour of the PETITIONER in the light
of equity, justice and good conscience.

For this act of Kindness, the PETITIONER shall be duty bound forever pray.

sd/-

Counsel for Petitioner

15 | P a g e
 RESEARCH NOTE

The present case is a very well proclaimed example of Nervous Shock suffered by due to the
Breach of Duty of Care by and Negligence of a tortfeasor. According to one definition of
negligence, it is either the act of failing to do something that a prudent or reasonable man
would do or act of doing something that a prudent or reasonable man would not do. In order
to be found guilty of the tort of carelessness, one must generally be in possession of six
primary elements. Only if all the conditions, which are listed below, are met may an action be
considered negligent. These conditions are as follows:

1. An obligation of care;
2. The responsibility must be owed to the plaintiff;
3. A breach of the duty to use reasonable care;
4. Actual cause or cause in fact;
5. Proximate cause;
6. Damages that will be incurred by the plaintiff consequently.

Further, the following categories may be applicable to describe the damage:

a. Bodily harm;
b. Damage to the individual’s reputation;
c. Damage to private property;
d. Financial loss;
e. Mental harm.

Only after such damage has been proven, the defendant is required to pay the plaintiff
compensation for the damages that have been incurred.

Nervous Shock, as mentioned under Law of Torts, is a reasonably foreseeable negligence

consequence. A claim for damages can be filed under ‘nervous shock’ without demonstrating

16 | P a g e
direct impact or the threat of immediate personal (bodily) injury. As a result, it provides relief
when a person sustains physical damage as a result of nervous shock caused by what he/she
sees or hears, rather than an impact such as a stick, bullet, or other object. Moreover, it is not
enough to cause nervous shock to make it an actionable tort; there must be some injury or
disease as a result of emotional disturbance, anxiety, or sadness.

The logic here is that the nervous system controls the body, and if the actions of the body are
hampered and it is prevented from operating normally as a result of an acute shock to the
nervous system, there is a definite “bodily injury”. The shock must be a ‘sudden’ and not a
‘gradual’ assault on the claimant’s nervous system.

For a case under nervous shock, the plaintiff has to prove the following things:

1. Necessary chain of causation between nervous shock and the death or injury of one or
more parties caused by the defendants’ wrongful act;
2. Plaintiff is required to prove shock caused to him by seeing or hearing something.
Physical injury is not necessary;
3. His/her proximity to the accident was sufficiently close in time and space.

As mentioned under the facts of the case, in my opinion, the World Snooker Championship
owed a duty of care to the audience, players and every other individual present at the
tournament. The organization definitely breached its duty of care to every individual present
there at the moment, by letting Alex Haggis enter the tournament with firecrackers, which is
a combustible item, and it is the most basic duty of care owed by any tournament organizer or
any other organizing body to not allow anybody enter the premises with any combustible
item by keeping the security intact and present with full-force.

Secondly, owing to the fact that Mandy Large was present at the tournament and even though
her and Alex Haggis had separated five weeks prior to the misfortunate demise of Alex
Haggis, she was still carrying the unborn child of Alex Haggis. It is evident that she
witnessed Alex’s burning due to the untimely bursting of the firecrackers and suffered
nervous shock and as a consequence miscarriages. Upon referring to the Judicial Precedents,
it has been ruled out that although there was a pre-existing relationship between Mandy Large
and Alex Haggis, she is entitled to compensation for the damages suffered due to nervous
shock. Further, a person of normal fortitude might not suffer the psychiatric damages suffered
by a pregnant lady and again stands the grounds for compensation. Moreover, in my opinion,

17 | P a g e
Alex Haggis also owed a duty of care towards Mandy Large, as her being the mother of her
unborn child, and to his unborn child and his well-being.

Thirdly, Nessie Haggis witnessed the whole incident on live telecast and suffered psychiatric
harm upon watching her son burn. As ruled out by Justice Forest J in Homsi v Homsi (2016),
the psychiatric harm suffered by the family member or any other close relative of the primary
victim by witnessing it, on-sight or off-sight, is allowed for a compensation. The proximity of
Nessie’s relationship with Alex was purely based on love and affection. And hence, stands
the grounds for damages as relief.

Finally, in the case of Sam Byrne, it is clearly mentioned under the facts of the case that he
was a rescue worker. In Haynes v Harwood (1935), the court held that, “because the
defendants must or should have anticipated that someone might try to stop the horses to
prevent injury to life and limb, and because the police had a general duty to intervene to
protect life and property, the plaintiff's actions and injuries were the natural and probable
consequences of the defendants' negligence.” Based on the given judgement, it is evident that
Sam Byrne is also entitled to compensation due to the negligent act of Alex Haggis.

Towards the end with a neutral tone, based on all the case laws reviewed and the judicial
precedents, I would state that based on all the facts and arguments summarized so far, all
three plaintiffs (Mandy Large, Nessie Haggis and Sam Byrne; herein) are definitely entitled
to compensation for the breach of duty of care on the defendants’ part and as a consequence
suffering nervous shock due to the negligence of the tortfeasor.

18 | P a g e