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INTRODUCTION
The competition act of 2002 was passed by the parliament of India so as to form a commission to
oversee the business operations of companies and individuals in the country following fair practices of
competition and economic growth of the country. Competition Law for India was triggered by Articles 38
and 39 of the Constitution of India.These Articles are a part of the Directive Principles of State Policy.
Based on the Directive Principles, the first Indian competition law was enacted in 1969 and was labeled
the MONOPOLIES AND RESTRICTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT, 1969 (MRTP Act).
Articles 38 and 39 of the Constitution of India mandate, inter alia, that the State shall strive to promote
the welfare of the people by securing and protecting as effectively, as it may, a social order in which
justice – social, economic and political – shall inform all the institutions of the national life, and the State
shall, in particular, direct its policy towards securing:
1. That the ownership and control of material resources of the community are so distributed as best to
sub serve the common good; and
2. that the operation of the economic system does not result in the concentration of wealth and means
of production to the common detriment
One of the main goals of the MRTP Act was to encourage fair play and fair deal in the market besides
promoting healthy competition. They seek to afford protection and support consuming public by
reducing Monopolistic, Restrictive and Unfair Trade Practices from the market Globalization has the
fundamental attributes of relying significantly in the market forces,ensuring competition and keeping
market functioning efficiently.
In the Pre-1991 Reforms period, India’s planned strategic and economic development stressed the
broad policy objectives of;
1. The development of an industrial base with a view to achieving self reliance and
The MRTP Act has become obsolete in certain areas in the light of international economic developments
relating to competition laws and hence focus was shifted from curbing monopolies to promoting
competition .In October, Central government appointed high level committee under the chairmanship
of Mr. Raghavan, the aim of the committee was to formulate the competition law in tune with economic
reforms and international development. The committee presented its report on May 2000, The draft
competition law was presented on November 2000. After certain amendments the parliament passed
the new law, called completion Act 2002. The act came into force on January 2003.The Act was
amended by the Competition Amendment Act, 2007 and became fully operational from 1 June 2011.
Section 3 of the Competition Act, 2002 - The Act provided for in Section 3(1) precludes any undertaking
or organization from entering into any arrangement that causes or is likely to cause significant adverse
effects on competition (AAEC) within India. The Act specifically provides for the nullity of an
arrangement that is contrary to Section 3(1)
Section 3 of the Act specifies that the above conditions shall not extend to joint ventures entered into
with a view to enhancing the efficiency of the production, procurement, delivery, acquisition and control
of products or services.
VERTICAL AGREEMENTS- Vertical agreements are agreements signed between two or more
undertakings operating at different production levels. Between manufacturers and distributors, for
example. Other examples of vertical deals that are anti-competitive include:
Tie-in-Arranges
There must be two goods that can be tied together by the seller. In addition, there must be a sale or an
agreement to sell one product or service on condition that the other product or service is purchased by
the buyer. The condition, in other words, is that the purchase of a product relies on the purchase of
another commodity.
In order to appreciably limit free competition in the market for the tied product, the seller must have
ample market power in relation to the tied product. That is, the seller must have such authority in the
tying product market that it can compel the buyer to buy the tied product; and
A "not insubstantial" volume of exchange must be affected by the tying agreement. Tying deals are
normally not viewed as anti-competitive because there is no effect on a large portion of the market.
⦁ Direct the person, enterprise or association involved in the agreement to discontinue or re-enter
such agreement;
⦁ Impose such penalties on person enterprise or association, as it deems fit. Such penalties shall
not exceed ten percent of the average turnover for the preceding three financial years
⦁ In cases of cartels the penalties mentioned above shall extend to each producer, seller,
distributor, trader or service provider included in that cartel and the amount of penalty could extend
upto either three times of its profit for each year of the agreement’s continuance or ten percent,
whichever is higher.
⦁ Direct for modification of the agreement to the extent and in the manner as may be specified in
the order of the commission.
⦁ Payment of cost and issuing of directions to the enterprise to comply with the orders.
As per explanation affixed to Section 4 of the Competition Act, 2002, dominant position implies the
quality of an endeavor in the significant market in India which empowers the enterprise to work
autonomously of serious powers winning in the market and to influence the customers or contenders or
the market in support of it.
⦁ a market share.
⦁ the size and assets of the undertaking.
Relevant Market
The first thing to be resolved in quite a while of supposed abuse of dominant position is the ‘relevant
market’ in which the accused party has a predominant position. The reason served by depicting a
relevant market is to characterize the degree inside which the situation of an endeavor is to be tried for
strength and misuse thereof.
The ‘relevant market’ is characterized as ‘product’ and ‘geography’, in other words, the applicable
market recognizes the specific item/administration or class of items created or benefits rendered by an
enterprise(s) in a given geographic territory.
Consumer preference
In the case of Bijaya Poddar v. Coal India Ltd, Case No. 59 of 2013, it was held that these are
territories or areas where demand and supply of products of administrations can be said to be
homogenous and discernable from markets in neighboring regions.
Similarly, in the case of Atos Worldline v Verifoneindia, Case No. 56 of 2012, it was held that
naturally, a few factors at that point, as regulatory trade barriers, local detail necessities,
national acquirement approaches, satisfactory conveyance offices, transport costs go under the
domain of thought. Consequently, if every such factor were uniform all through the nation
versus an item, the entire nation would be the relevant geological region.
WHAT IS COMBINATION:
Combination within the Competition Law is the merger between two or more enterprises or
firms or the business sector acquisitions (such as companies or firms) by other business
enterprises. The Government controls combinations or mergers and acquisitions within the
country to promote competition and thereby seeing to that small scale establishments are not
overshadowed and swallowed by more reputed industries. This is because the merger of big
shot companies not only reduce competition but also make it difficult and almost impossible for
smaller firms to grow or profit from their business. The accumulation of wealth in certain
sectors of business and the consumer concerns can lead to major economic and social
discrepancies within the nation.
Regulation of Combinations
Section 6 of the Act provides for the law relating to regulating Combinations. It prescribes that
all transactions qualifying as a Combination should be notified to the Competition Commission
of India in Form I (short form application) or Form II (long form application) as applicable.
Section 6 further provides that a Combination shall not be given effect to until approved by the
Commission or until 210 days have passed from the date of notifying to the Commission
whichever is earlier. The CCI may either approve the Combination or may approve subject to
modifications in the structure of the Combination or not approve the Combination.
The Allegation:
A case was filed by M/s Best Xerox Centre through its sole proprietor Smt.Sunder Jain against
Xerox Modi India Limited under Section 26(2) of the Completion Act,2002
According to the informant the opposite party illegally used its dominant position by
unilaterally changing the terms of arbitration. The allegation was that the abuse of dominant
position is for coercing Best Xerox Centre (BXC) to sign the Full Service Maintenance Agreement
(FSMA) with an arbitration clause in which Xerox Modi (Xerox) had the exclusive right to
appoint the arbitrators.
The informant had purchased a Xerox machine at a price of Rs8,05,800 from the Xerox Modi
India Limited in 1997.The grievance of the informant was regarding the condition of
appointment of arbitrator and venue of arbitration was changed by the opposite party in the
Full Service Maintenance Agreement (FSMA) on 11/12/1997.The conditions were different than
the one mentioned in the sale invoice dated 30/09/1997 and 21/11/1997.
The information provided by to the Smt .Sunder Jain to Competition Commission of India to
substantiate their claim in its written submission is as follows:
The arbitration clause as per the sale invoice dated 30/09/1997 and 21/11/1997 stated that if
there was a dispute or a difference in opinion arising between the two parties then it would be
referred to the arbitration of board of arbitrators which would comprise of on nominee each
from MX and Best Xerox Centre and an umpire. The venue would be Hemkunt Tower ,New
Delhi-110019
Now the amended clause of FSMA stated that if there was a dispute or a difference in opinion
arising between the two parties then it would be referred to the arbitration of a sole person
appointed by the Chairman of board of the directors of MX.I t also stated that all proceedings of
such arbitration would be governed by the Arbitration & Conciliation Act,1996. The venue was
the same – Hemkunt Tower ,New Delhi-110019
This showed that there was a difference in the clauses of the invoices.So, it was alleged that the
opposite party was trying to misuse its dominant position which was apparently clearly
comparing the sale invoices and in the FSMA. The informant also alleged that the opposite
party had deliberately incorporated very liberal terms to lure them ( M/s Best Xerox Centre)
into purchasing the machine.
But now since the machine was already bought by the informant, the opposite party
incorporated very restrictive terms in the service agreement, so as to discourage the consumer
(M/s Best Xerox Centre) from raising any dispute to after sales service.
The informant also alleges that the opposite party was trying to take advantage as it held
monopoly in the market of Xerox machines. The technical service engineer and spare parts
were also not available in the open market. So, the consumer was left with no option but to
agree with the conditions stated in the FSMA.
Request by the informant was to penalize the opposite party for unfair trade practices and
abuse of dominant position.
So, the verdict of the Commission was that that the informant was not able to place any
credible or cogent evidence or material to show or establish any infringement of Section 3 or 4
of the Competition Act,2002.
The allegations were therefore unsubstantiated and uncorroborated. Thus the commission was
of the view that no prima facie case was made out for making a reference to the Director
General for conducting investigation and the proceedings were therefore closed.
BIBLIOGRAPHY:
(Regulations of combination),available at www.legalserviceindia.com