CONFLICT OF LAWS law; and (2) in the absence of such a choice, the apphcable law 1s that of the state that “has me most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties.” Another authority proposed that all matters relating to the time, place, and manner of performance and valid excuses for non-performance are determined by the law of the place of performance or lex loci solutionis, ‘which 1s userut because ir is undoubtedly always connected to the contract in a significant way. In this case, the laws of Iraq bear substantial connection to the transaction, since one of the parties is the Iraqi Government and the place of performance is in Iraq. Hence, the issue of wheter reyponent VPECI defaulted ki its obligations may be determined by the laws of Iraq. However, since that foreign law was not properly pleaded or proved, the presumption of identity or similarity, otherwise known as the processual presumption, comes into play. Where foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as ours. (Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation v. V.P. Eusebio Construction, Inc. Et Al, GR. No. 140047, july 13, 2004) Q: A.a foreign corporation, won a collection case in Jopan against D, a domestic corporation doing business in Japan. A filed a suit for enforcement of the judgment in the RTC of Manila. B assails the judgment on the ground that the Japanese court did not validly acquire jurisdiction over B's person since B was served with summons in the Philippines and not in Japan. Is B correct? A: NO. Its settled that matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the service of process upon adefendant are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum. In this «ase, itis the procedural law of Japan where the judgment was rendered thet determines the validity of the extraterritorial service of process ‘on B. AS to what this aw is a question of fact, not of law. It may not be taken judicial notice of and must be pleaded and proved like any other fact. B did not present evidence as to what that Japanese procedural law is and to show that under it, the assailed extraterritorial service is invalid. Accordingly, the presumption of validity and regularity of the service of summons and the decision thereafter rendered by the Japanese court must stand. (Northwest Orient Airlines, In. v. Court of Appeals and CF. Sharp & Company Inc, GR No. 112573, February 9, 1995) DOMICILE AND CITIZENSHIP GOs ‘Rersonallaw ‘The law which attaches to a person wherever he may go and generally governs his status, capacity, condition, family relations, and the consequences of his actuations. (Sempio-Diy, 2004) Theories of personal law 1. The Nationality Theory or Personal Theory - the status and capacity of a person ig determined by the law of his nationality or rational law. (Sempio-Diy, 2004) NOTE: The Philippines Nationality Theory. follows the 2, Domiciliary Theory or Territorial Theory = the status and capacity of a person is determined by the law of his domicile. (Ibid) 3, Situs or eclectic theory ~ the particular place or situs of an event or transaction is generally thecontrolling law. (Ibid) Problems in applving _the nationality : a It arises from the concurrent application of jus soli and jus sanguinis at birth or from a refusal of certain States to accept a full application of the doctrine of expatriation, from marriage, or from a formal and voluntary act. 1. In matters of status, a person is usually considered by the forum as exclusively its own national. His additional foreign nationality is disregarded. 2, In case litigation arises in a third country, the law most consistently applied is that of the country of which the person is not only a tational but where he also has his domicile or habitual residence, or in the absence thereof, his residence. ‘Theory of effective nationality ‘A third state shall recognize exclusively in its tertitory either the nationality of the country of 7 UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS FACULTY oF CIVIL LAWCivi_ LAW which one is habitually and prindpally a resident, or the nationality of the country with which in the circumstances one appears to be in act most closely connected. (Hague Convention ‘on Conflict Nationality Lawes, Art. 5) @ On February 8, 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant. She stated that she desired to take a pleasure trip to visit her great grand uncie. On the date of her arrival, Asher Cheng filed a bond of P1,000 to undertake that Lau would depart the Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay or within the period as in the discretion of the Commission. of Immigration might properly allow. After repeated extensions, Lau was allowed to stay in the country until February 13, 1962. On January 25, 1962, she contracted a marriage ‘with Moy Ya Lim Yao, a Filipino citizen. As an alien woman, may Lau be considered as a itizen of the Philippines by virtue of her ‘marriage to a Filipino? A: YES. An alien woman may be deemed a citizen of the Philippines by virtue of her marriage to a Filipino citizen only if she possesses all the qualifications and none of the isqualifications specified in the law, because these are the explicit requisites provided by law for an alien to be naturalized. Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law (Commonwealth Act ‘No, 473) provides that "Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully raturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.” Section 15 was obviously to accord to an alien woman, by reason of her marriage to a Filipino, a privilege not similarly granted to ‘other aliens. (Moy Ya Lim Yao “Alias” Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim And Lau Yuen Yeung. Commissioner of immigration, GR. No, L-21289 October 4, 1971) Q: Emesto S. Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of the City of ‘Makati, Manzano won the elections, however his proclamation was suspended because a certain Ernesto Mamaril filed a petition for his disqualification and alleged that Manzano was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the US. COMELEC 2nd Division granted the petition and cancelled the certificate of ‘candidacy on the grounds that dual citizens are disqualified from running any elective nosition under Sec40 of the LGC. But. ‘COMELEC en banc reversed the said decision. Te found that Manzano acquired US Citizenship by operation of the US Constitution. He was also a natural born Filipino Citizen by operation of 1935 Constitution, as his father and mother were Filipinos at the time of his birth, At the age of 6 his parents brought him in the country and registered him as an alien, but this however did not result in the loss of his Phil Citizenship, as he did not renounce his Phil. Citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance to the US. At the age of Majority, Manzano registered himself as a voter and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998, which effectively renounced his US Citizenship under American Law. Is Dual ‘citizenship a ground for disqualification? ‘A: NO. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The phrase “dual citizenship" in RA 7160 must be understood as referring to “dual allegiance”, and persons with dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Dual Citizenship is involuntary, it arises out of circumstances like birth or marriage, while dual allegiance isa result of a person's volition. It isa situation wherein a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to 2 or more states. Also, Manzano upon filing his certificate for candidacy has elected Phil, Citizenship thus terminating his dual citizenship. Particularly, he made these statements: “I am a Filipino citizen... Natural born. I am not a permanent resident of, ‘or immigrant to, a foreign country. | am eligible for the office | seek to be elected..1 will support the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto.” Such statement was sufficient to revoke his ‘American citizenship. (Mercado v. Manzano & COMELEC, GR. No, 135083 May 26, 1999) Q: Teodoro Cruz was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, to Filipino parents making him a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines. However, respondent Cruz was enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and, without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a consequence, he lost his Filipino Citizenship by his naturalization asa US. citizen in connection with his service in the US. Marine Corps. Thereafter, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS 2021 GoLnENNoTESCONFLICT OF LAWS citizenship through repatriation under Kepubic Act No. 203U. He ran for ana was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the 1998 elections. He won over Antonio Bengson IIL, who was then running for reelection. Subsequently, Bengson filed a case with House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) aiming that respondent Cruz was nor qualified to become a member of the House of Representatives since he is not a natural- born citizen as required under Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution. The HRET dismissed the petition for quo warranto and declared respondent Cruz was duly elected ao 4 Represcutative. The HRET alsy denied Bengson’s motion for reconsideration. Can Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship? A: YES. Cruz can still be considered a born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. He may have lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA. No. 2630, Section 1, which provides. “Any person who hed lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other citizenship’. Cruz upon taking the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Rogiatry of Mangatarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original statue before he lost his Philippine citizenship. (Bengson v. HRET and Cruz, G.R. No. 142840. May 7,201) alural- Q: What are the effects of marriages of 1) a citizen to an alien; and 2) analien toa citizen on their spouses and children? ‘A: The following are the effects: 1. Filipino citizens who marry aliens retain their citizenship, unless by their act or omission, they are deemed, under the law, to have renounced it. (1987 Constitution, Art IV, Sec. 4) 2. Sec. 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law provides that a foreign woman who marries a Filipino citizen becomes a Filipino citizen provided she possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for naturalization. Sec. 15 was obviously to accord to an alien ‘woman, by reason of ner marriage to a Filipino, a privilege not similarly granted to other aliens. On the other hand, a foreign man who marries a Filipino citizen does not acquire Philippine citizenship. But under Sec. 3 of the same law, in such a case, the residence requirement for naturalization will be reduced from 10 to 5 Under 1@), Aw WV of the Constitution, the children of an alien and a Filipino citizen are citizens of the Philippines. (Moy Yo Lim Yao “Alias” Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim and Lou Yuen Yeung v. Commissioner of Immigration, GR No, L-21289, October 4, 1971) yeas. ‘See. Pr 7 It is the place to which a person has a settled connection for certain legal purposes, either because his home is there or because that is the place assigned to him by law. Domiciliary or Teuitorial Theory/Lex Domicili ‘The individual's private rights, condition, status, and capacity are determined by the law of his domicile. It is adopted mostly by common law countries with population consisting of different Matlonaliles. Thelt unity say Le aubteved by adopting the law of their domicile. ‘Basic Fundamental princinles of domicile 1. No person shall be without a domicile. 2. A person cannet have two simultaneous domicile. 3. Every natural person, as long as he is free and su juris, may change his domicile at his pleasure 4. A domicile once acquired is retained unless a newoneis gained. 19 UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS FACULTY oF CIVIL LAWCivi_ LAW 5. The presumption isin favor of continuance of domicle, the burden of proof is on the one who alleges that change of domicile has taken place. To acquire a fresh domicile, residence and intention must concur; to retain an existing domicle, either residence there or intention to remain must be present; to abandon a domicile, residence in a new place and intention to abandon the old place must concur. (Gallego v. Verra, G.R. No, L-#8641, November 24, 1941) Bee Se ee es Capacity; ‘Actual physical presence in the place chosen; Freedom of choice; and Provable intent that it should be one’s fixed and permanent place of abode — one's home - hat is, there should be “animus manendi* intent to remain) or: “onimus non: revertendi’ (intent not to return to the original abode), Legal classifications of domicile 1. Domicile of origin - the domicile of 2 person's parents atthe time of birth. 2, Constructive domicile - domicile established by law after birth in case of persons under legal disability, regardless of their intention or voluntary act. i ei are nerson A minor follows the domicile of his parents (Imelda Romualdez-Marcos v. Comelec, GR No 119976, September 18, 1995) His domicile of origin is that of his parents at the time of his etn legitimat et SS separated, the domicile of — the custodial parent, His domicile of origin is that of the mother acre se at_the time of his firth The domidle of his father at the time of hisbirth controls. Da 1. If legitimate, the domicile of both parents. In cace af disagreement, that of the father, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. 2. If illegitimate, the mother. 3. In case of absence or death of either parent, the domicile of the present parent. Even in the case of remarriage of the surviving parent, still his/her domicile determines the constructive domicile of the minor child, 4. 1f the child is adopted the damicile of choice of the adopter is the child’s constructive domicile. INSANES, IDIOTS, IMBECILES ‘The law assigns their domicile to them: 1. If they are below the age of majority, the rules on minors apply to them. 2. If they are of age and have guardians, they follow the domicile of choice of their guardians, 3. If they are of age and have no guardians, their constructive domicile is their domicile of choice before they became 1 The constructive domicile of the wife is the domicile of both ‘Spouses, unless the law allows the wife to have a Ifthe marriage | separate domicile for isvalid valid and compelling 2.1f there is legal separation between the spouses, the wife can have her own domicile UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS 2021 GoLnENNoTES 20CONFLICT OF LAWS of choice, 4. Itthere isa separation de facto, the wife can also have a separate domicile. ‘Apply the same rules when the marriage is valid. However, after annulment, me wire can freely select her own domicile of choice Ifthe marriage 41s voiaante The wife can have a domicile separate from the husband. Ifthe marriage is void OTHER PERSONS. Convict or | HS domicile 1s the one he ae had possessed prior to his a incarceration. their their Their domicile domicile _ before enlistment. Soldiers Their domicile is the one they had before they were assigned elsewhere, unless they voluntarily adopt their place of employment as their pern Public officials or employees abroad (diplomats, etc) went residence, | WOMEN | 1. The ‘constructive domicile of the wife is the domicile of both spouses, unless the law allows the wife to have a separate domicile for valid and compelling If there is legal separation between the spouses, the wife can have her own domicile of choice. 3. Ifthere is a separation de facto, the wife can also have a separate domicile. Ifthe marriage | , is valid Apply the same rules when the marriage is valid. However, after annulment, the wife can treely select her own domicile of choice. Ifthe marriage is voidable The wife can have a domicile separate from the husband. OTHER PERSONS Ifthe marriage isvoid Convict on | His domicile is the one he haa possessed prior to mis prisoorr incarceration. Their domicile is ther Soldiers domicile before their enlistment. Their domicile 1s the one Public officials | they had before they were or employees | assigned —_ elsewhere, abroad unless they voluntarily G@iplomats, | adop: their place of etc) employment as their permanent residence. Q: Does leasing a condominium unit show an intention to establish not just residence but a domicile of choice? A: NO. While a lease contract may be indicative of the petitioner's intention to reside in a place, it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of one’s original domicile. (Agapito Aquino ¥. CUMELEC, Move ‘Makati, Mateo Bedon and Juanita Icaro, GR. No. 120265, September 18, 1995) There are three requisites to acquire a new domicile: (1) Residence or bodily presence in a new locality; (2) An intention to remain there; and (3) Aa intention to abandon the old domicile. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona {fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In other words, there must basically beanimus manendicoupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual. (Poe- Llamanzares v. commission on Elections, G.. Nos. 221697 & 221698-700, March 8, 2016) Q: On January 26, 2010, Enrico Echiverri filed a petition to exclude Luis Asistio from the permanent list of voters of Caloocan City. Echiverri alleged that Asistio is nota resident of Caloocan City, specifically not of 123 Interior P. Zamora St, Barangay 15, Caloocan City, the address stated in his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor in 2010 elections. According to him, he found out that the Asistio’s address is non-existent. In defense, 2 UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS FACULTY oF CIVIL LAWCivi_ LAW Asistio alleged that he is a resident of No. 116, P. Zamaro St, Caloocan City, and a registered voter of Precinct No. 18114 because he mistakenly relied on the address stated in the contract of lease with Angelina dela Torre Tengco. Should Asistio be excluded from the permanent list of voters of Caloocan city for failure to comply with the residency required by law? A: NO. Residency requirements for a voter are one, a least one-year residence in the Philippines; and two, at least, six months in the place where the person intends to two Residence, as used in the law pre-scribing the qualifications for suffrage and for elective office, is doctrinally settled to importing not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention inferable from a person's acts activities, and utterances. mean domicile, Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence where, when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. In the consideration of circumstances obtaining in each articular case, three rules must be borne in mind, namely: (1) that a person must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2) once established, it remains until a new one is acquired; and (3) thata person can have but one residence or domicile ata time. Asistio has always been a resident of Caloocan city for more than 72 years. Asistio served in public office of Caloocan City in 1992, 1995, 1998, 2004 and 2007. In all of these occasions, Asistio cast his vote in the same city. ‘Taking these circumstances, it cannot be denied that Asistio has qualified, and continues to qualify, as a voter of Caloocan city. There is no showing that he has established, or that he had consciously and voluntarily abandoned his residence in Caloocan City. Thus, he should remain in the list of permanent voters of Caloocan city. (Luis Asistio v. Hon. Thelma Canlas Trinidad-Pe Aguirre, GR. No, 191124, April 27, 2010} FAMILY LAW AND PERSONAL CAPACITY Applicable Civil Code Provisions 1. Laws relating to family rights and duties. or to the status, condition, and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. (NCC, Art 15) 2. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6),36,37, and 38. (FG, Art. 26) GR: Under Article 26 of the Family Code, all marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as ‘such, is also valid in the Philippines. XPN: If the marriage is void under Philippine law, the marriage is void even if it is valid in the country where the marriage was solemnized, 1. Those contracted by any party below 18 years of age even with the consent of parents or guardians; (FC, Art. 35 (1)] 2. Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Art. 41, FC; [FC Art 35 4)] 3. Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the other; [FC Art 35 (5) 4. Those subsequent marrioges that are void under Art. 53, FC; (FC, Art. 35 (6)] 5. Marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage: (FC, Art 36) 6. Incestuous marriage; (FC, Art 37) and 7. Void ab initio marriages or reasons of public policy. (FC, Art. 38) Effect_of laws. iudements promulgated or ‘sonventions agreed upon ina foreien country ‘on Philipnine prohibitive laws. GR: Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts, or property and laws which have for their ‘object public order, public policy or good customs are not rendered ineffective by laws, judgments promulgated or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. XPN: Art. 26 par. 2 of the Family Code (FC), on mixed marriages where the foreigner obtained a divorce decree abroad and was thereby UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS 2021 GoLnENNoTES 2CONFLICT OF LAWS capacitated to remarry. Even though divorce is not recognized in the Philippines as a mode of terminating marriage, still the marriage is terminated by virtue of a judgment of divorce and issuance of a divorce decree by a foreign court. @ Genevieve, a rimpino ctuzen, and Tetsusht Toyo (Tetsushi), a Japanese citizen, were married in Quezon City. After 19 years of marriage, the two filed a Notification of Divorce by Agreement, which the Mayor of Konohana-ku, Osaka City, Japan received and was later recorded in Tetsushi’s family register as cerufled by the Mayor of Toyonaka City. Genevieve filed before the Regional Trial Court a Petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry. In support of her Petition, Genevieve submitted a copy of their (1) Divorce Certificate, (2) ‘Tetsushi's Family Register, (3) the Certificate of Acceptance of the Notification of Divorce, and (4) an English translation of the Civil Code of japan. The RTC rendered a Judgment denying Genevieve's Petition noting that the copy of the Civil Code of Japan and its English translation submitted by Genevieve were not duly authenticated by the Philippine Consul in Japan, the Japanese Consul in Manila, or the Department of Foreign Affairs. Are the copy of the Japan Civil Code and its English translation sufficient to prove Japan's law on divorce, requiring no further authentication by the Philippine Consul in Japan, the Japanese Consul in Manila, or the Departmentof Foreign Affairs? ‘A: NO. The English translation submitted by petitioner was published by Eibun-Horei-Sha, Ine, a. private company in Japan engaged in publishing English translation of Japanese laws, wehich came to be known a3 the CHS Law Bulletin Series. However, these translations are ‘not advertised as a source of official translations of Japanese laws;" rather, it isin the KANPO or the Official Gazette where all offic laws and regulations are published, albeit in Japanese. Accordingly, the English translation submitted by petitioner is not an official publication exempted from the requirement of authentication. (Genevieve Rasal Arreza, AKA. “Genevieve Arreza Toyo," v. Tetsushi Toyo, Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the National Statistics Office, G.R. No. 213198, july 02, 219, as penned by j. Leonen) Q: Rhodora Tanaka, a Filipino wife married to Seiichi Tanaka, a Japanese national filed a Petition for Judicial Determination and Declaration of Capacity to Marry with the Regional Trial Court in order to judicially recognize her diverce against her husband. She presented a “Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce" she obtained from Japan, which was issued by the Mayor of Fukaya City, Japan, which was duly authenticated by the Philippine Consul in Japan. Is the “Certificate of Acceptance of the Report uf Divurve” suffiient ww prove Usat site and her husband have legally divorced and capacitated her to marry? ‘A: YES. Under Article 26 of the Family Code, where a marriage between a Fili a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafler validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. The Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce was accompanied by an Authentication issued by Consul of the Embassy of the Philippines in Tohyo, japan. Considering that the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce was duly authenticated, the divorce was validly obtained according to foreign spouse's law. Here, the national law of the foreign spouse states that the no citizen and ‘matrimonial relationship is terminated by divorce. The Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce docs not state any qualifications that would restrict the remarriage of any of the parties, There can be no other interpretation than that the divorce procured by them completely terminates their marital ti. (Rbodora Ilumin Racho, aka. "Rhodora Racho Tanaka,” v. Seiichi Tanaka, Local Civil Registrar of Las Pidas city, and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General ofthe National Statistics Office, GR. No. 199515, june 25, 2016, as penned by J. Leonen) ‘Art. 26 of the Family Code 1. It must be a case of mixed marriage (one party Is Filipino and the other Is an allen 2, The divorce must be obtained by the alien spouse and not by the Filipino spouse; and 2B UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS FACULTY oF CIVIL LAW