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The King’s Gambit: Rationalizing the Fall of the Templars

Gabriel F Benzecry* and Marcus Shera†
Abstract
What led to the fall of the Templars? Though the vast historiographical literature suggests that
King Philip IV’s financial situation was the main reason for the downfall of the Templars, we
contend that it had little to do with Philip IV per se. Rather the Templars were destroyed mostly
due to an institutional shock, which resulted from Pope Clement V’s relocation of the papacy from
Italy to France. Prior to the relocation, a conditional toleration equilibrium persisted for more than
a century where the Templars made loans to more powerful kings, with the reassurance that they
were protected by the Church. The decision of Pope Clement V to relocate the papacy to France
altered the Church’s relationship with the French Crown and imposed substantial constraints on
the Church’s ability to safeguard one of its most important monastic orders, the Knights Templar.
In a dynamic game scenario, we model Clement V and Philip IV’s decision making, emphasizing
important choices that led to the Knights Templar’s demise.

Keywords: Analytic Narrative; France; Papacy; Templars.

* Ph.D. Fellow, Political Economy Research Institute and Department of Economics and Finance at Middle
Tennessee State University.
†
Ph.D. Fellow, Mercatus Center and Department of Economics at George Mason University.

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Introduction
The King’s Gambit is a centuries-old chess opening, which usually results in thrilling games. It

is a great analogy for the aggressive political moves of King Philip IV of France during the late

13th century and early 14th century. To finance his government, Philip IV constantly placed

pressure on the Catholic Church. Nevertheless, there is no reason to believe that Philip IV’s

aggressive actions resulted merely from an impulsive personality, but rather the result of

calculated political action.

Consider a venerable institution from the Middle Ages that is held to a high moral

standard. Not only do the members of this institution exemplify many virtues such as courage,

wisdom, and justice, but they are also portrayed in the public imagination as the ultimate

guardians of Christian civilization. The Knights Templar, despite their reputation in popular

culture, did not outlast the Middle Ages. If one is unfamiliar with the order’s dismissal, it is fair

to imagine their fall in the battlefield, valiant soldiers battling to the death to safeguard and

maintain their principles and beliefs. However, the Templars’ demise is far from glorious.

Rather, their downfall transformed their reputation into a burden of humiliation.

In 1307, Templar leaders were accused by the French Crown of denying Christ, spitting

on the Crucifix, idol worship, homosexuality, and obscenity (Barber 2012). The Templars were

caught in a crossfire, not on the battlefield, but in the political theater of the Middle Ages, a

political battle between church and state. On one hand, there was King Phillip IV of France; on

the other, the pope. There is a great dispute as to what motivated Phillip to persecute the

Templars. One historiographic perspective asserts that Phillip IV acted in accordance with his

faith and that he truly believed the accusations made against the order (Bautier 1978; Brown

1988; Favier 1978). Another perspective is that Phillip IV was more worried about his financial

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predicament, regarding the trial as a chance to seize assets from the Templars and therefore

improve his financial situation (Torre 2010; Barber 2012). While others still argue that Phillip

IV’s acts were influenced by both motivations (Cohn 1975).

The goal of this paper is to employ rational choice theory to understand the political

behavior of both King Philip IV and Pope Clement V. Social scientists can contribute to this

important historical moment by employing techniques capable of explaining not only the

decision making of both players, but also the implications of their choices on the institutional

arrangements of the Middle Ages, an age whose institutions rested on delicate personal

relationships. To do so, we build a simple but robust model which is capable of describing the

contours of the medieval institutions and the resultant behavior.

Our approach deviates from the traditional historiography surrounding the Knights

Templar since it contemplates a complex political game between two agents rather than an

ambiguous dispute with a power unbalance in favor of the king. We perceive Clement V as a

rational and prudent man with the ability to pursue his own interests, rather than a passive

political actor. The Templars were destroyed owing to decisions made not just by Philip IV, but

also by Pope Clement V. Pope Clement V’s decision to move the papacy to France strengthened

the Church’s connection with the French Crown and ensured the continuity of his pontificate.

However, prior to the relocation of the papacy from Italy to France, a conditional

toleration equilibrium persisted for more than a century where the Templars made loans to kings

who were much more powerful with the expectation that the pope would safeguard their

vulnerable position. However, the Church’s capacity to protect one of its most significant

monastic orders, the Knights Templar, was severely hampered by the relocation to France. The

relocation broke the conditional toleration equilibrium, leading to the fall of the Templars.

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The Chessboard

This section provides an overview of three key figures: the Knights Templar, King Philip IV of

France, and Pope Clement V.

Figure 1. Timeline of Important Events

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Figure 1 shows a chronology of significant historical events that will be discussed in this study.

This historical background section will focus on the years before 1305, highlighting the

relationships between the Church and the French Crown.

The Knights Templar

Haag (2010) notes a lack of security in the Holy Land after the conclusion of the First Crusades.

Together, the King of Jerusalem, the Prince of Antioch, the Count of Edessa, and the Count of

Tripoli raised only around 2,000 soldiers (Haag 2010). As a result, the cities were secured, but

there were insufficient personnel to guard the roads. Most likely founded in 1119,‡ following a

slaughter in Jerusalem’s streets, the Knights Templar were created to safeguard Christians in the

area (Barber 2012). As it was noted by Barber (2012, 28), the Templars were founded on a

commitment to the Patriarch of Jerusalem of protecting Christians as a humanitarian deed, living

a “quasi-monastic life of poverty, chastity, and obedience.”

The Templars became a recognized Order of the Catholic Church in 1139 when Pope

Innocent II issued the Omne datum optimum, which officially subordinated the Order to the

pope. The Order had a clear internal governance. The Grand Master was the ruler of the order

and was elected by twelve senior Templars plus a chaplain. By no means did the Grand Master

have unchecked power. The Grand Chapter was composed of senior officials and all major

decisions of the Grand Master required consultation with the chapter. The Seneschal was the

advisor of the Grand Master. The Marshal handled the military logistics such as the purchase of

‡
Most scholars consider 1119 as the year of foundation of the Templars, but it is still possible to find some sources
claiming that the year of 1118 is when the Templars were founded. This divergence is because of William of Tyre,
who claimed that the Templars were founded in 1118. Scholars reject his finding since it lacks historical
documentation (see Haag 2010, 108).

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equipment. The Draper was responsible for redistributing resources like clothes. Then there were

the Regional Commanders of Jerusalem, Acre, Tripoli, and Antioch whose responsibilities

replicated those of the Grand Master but limited to their respective domains. The Provincial

Masters of Apulia, Aragon, England, France, Hungary, Poitou, and Portugal were the

representatives of the Grand Masters. Finally, the knights, sergeants and other men composed the

bottom of the hierarchy (Haag 2010).

The robustness of the internal governance of the Templars, as noticed by Haag (2010),

resembles a modern firm or political bureaucracy. The Templars received a considerable amount

of donations in Europe, but also raised funds through taxes. Due to the property donation and the

taxation, the Templars became very wealthy (Haag 2010). Nevertheless, they also had to bear

extensive costs. Haag (2010) points out that a mounted warrior of the Knights Templar was

expensive, and that the growing responsibilities of the Templars only increased their financial

cost.

The Templars’ assets in Europe and their geographical dispersion provided an alternative

function for the Order, that of bankers. In 1185, Henry II of England started using the Templars’

New Temple in London as a bank (Jones 2017). The New Temple held jewels, coins, and other

valuable items. In addition to the Tower of London, it was another physical bank used to hold

royal valuables. Jones (2017) claims that Henry II was impressed by the security provided by the

Templars. Another major factor was the order’s geographical dispersion, with a physical

presence across Europe. Henry II’s decision to use the Templars as bank suggests that the

monarch was aware of the potential of the order as a financial institution, granting the Templars

the responsibility for collecting taxes (Jones 2017).

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In France, the Templars also had a close relationship with the Crown, and in 1202, a

Templar “was appointed treasurer to the Crown, an arrangement that benefited both parties

equally” (Jones 2017, 199). People employed the Templars’ services to get loans, preserve their

valuables, papers, wills, and, most importantly, move sums across large distances (Jones 2017;

Haag 2010). Furthermore, since the Templars had many properties, they were able to rent out

buildings and collect property taxes and production taxes on wool and weaving. The Templars

were also renting out their mill and selling fishing licenses (Jones 2017).

The Templars’ internal administration, large territorial dispersion, powerful military

infrastructure, ships, and possessions made them an ideal organization for banking. By the early

13th century, banking became their principal purpose. According to Haag (2010), the Templars’

prosperity and financial strength would be one of the causes for their collapse, owing mostly to

King Philip IV’s financial aspirations.

The King of France

On one hand, it is widely agreed among researchers that Philip IV and his court were the primary

architects of the Templars’ persecution (Barber 2012; Haag 2010). The reasons for Philip IV’s

actions, on the other hand, are not widely agreed upon. Regarding the motives underlying Philip

IV’s decision to bring the Templars to trial, there are two competing views.

According to the first view, it is possible that the French monarch really accepted the

character of a righteous and devout king who genuinely thought in his heart that the Templars

were to blame for heresy. In accordance with this argument, Philip IV’s tenacity in his attempts

to punish the Templars might be attributed to his real outrage at the heresy of the Order (Bautier

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1978; Brown 1988; Favier 1978). However, according to the second view, Phillip IV may have

had financial and political motivations for bringing the Templars to trial and seizing their assets

(Barber 2012; Haag 2010; Housley 1986; Marvin 2011).

The case of Philip IV as a faithful judge does not fit in the historical moment of the

Templars’ persecution. The War with Edward I between 1294-1298 called for financial action.

The wars against the English were extremely expensive (Rollo-Koster 2015), especially when

added to the debt inherited by Philip IV from his father (Haag 2010).

Table 1. Public Finance of the Kingdom of France in livre parisis (LP)

Reference: (Torre 2010)

Between 1294 and 1298, Philip IV and Edward I of England engaged in an intense and

expensive war. Table 1 shows that prior to 1294, the finances of the Kingdom of France were

declining, which made a war effort even more financially challenging. The key issue in Anglo-

French relations was that, according to the Treaty of Paris in 1259, the king of England

ultimately possessed Gascony as a vassal of the King of France (Prestwich 2008). The dispute

over the proper jurisdiction of Gascony led to war between the two nations. The war was

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extremely expensive and forced Philip IV of France and Edward I of England to search for

entrepreneurial ways to finance their war efforts.

The French Church was more financially sound than Philip IV. For instance, Torre (2010,

60) points out that the total revenues from the Church in France could be estimated at 10 times

the Kingdom of France’s revenue, and “during the whole of 1289, ordinary royal revenues stood

at 595,318 livre parisis and overall revenues probably close to twice that amount, or 1.2 million

livre parisis.” Torre (2010) also points out that since the King knew that his income was less

than that of the Church, he was strongly inclined to take control of these revenues being

collected within his borders.

Pope Nicholas IV gave King Philip IV the authority to collect a tithe from the Church in

1289 in order to assist funding the crusade activities in Aragon (Torre 2010). Nonetheless, this

was insufficient, and it may have even served as an impetus for King Philip IV to be harsher with

the Church. Due to the paucity of silver and deficits, Philip IV targeted the Lombards in 1292

(Torre 2010). Philip IV initially arrested the Lombards and then sought to seize their wealth.

Barber (2012) emphasizes the difficulties experienced by the Lombards after taking on financial

commitments with Philip IV of France. The Lombards were a group of bankers and merchants

who lived across Italy. Lombards originally referred to people from Lombardy, but the term

became a catch-all for Italians working in finance in European cities. In the early 1290s, the

Lombards were forced to purchase French citizenship, resulting in more than 230,000 livres

tournois of revenue to the French Crown (Torre 2010). In 1297, the Lombards also lent more

than 200,000 livres tournois to the French King (Barber 2012). The monarch, on the other hand,

had no intention of returning the money to the Lombards.

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To finance his military efforts, Philip IV also attempted to tax the Catholic Church

further than Pope Nicholas IV had already allowed (Jones 2017; Haag 2010). Pope Boniface VIII

responded by passing a series of bulls. The bull Clericis laicos prohibited the taxation of the

clergy without papal approval (Rollo-Koster 2015). In 1297, Philip IV made an alliance with

members of the Colonna family to attack “the papal treasury on its way to Rome from the Pope’s

favorite summer residence in Anagni” (Rollo-Koster 2015, 27). Pope Boniface VIII conceded by

allowing the taxation of the clergy. However, Philip IV’s intervention on Church’s affairs

continued, leading Pope Boniface VIII to pass the bull Unam Sanctam§ in 1302 which asserted

the spiritual sovereignty of the Church and allegiance of all men, including monarchs, to Rome

(Jones 2017). Rollo-Koster (2015) considers this bull the strongest statement a pope had ever

made regarding the sovereignty of the Church and its independence from secular powers.

Rollo-Koster (2015, 27) points out that in in September of 1303, following the bull Unam

Sanctam, “the Pope was declared a heretic ‘in return, he excommunicated Philip,’ after which

Philip sent his counselor Guillaume de Nogaret to Anagni to capture Boniface and seize his

treasury.” Due to the popular pressure, Boniface was released, only to die soon after (Théry

2013).

Philip IV also debased the currency (Haag 2010). In 1266, Louis IX inserted the gros

tournois, a coin made of pure silver, which became a stable and trusted currency (Jones 2017).

According to Jones (2017), when first circulated one gros tournois was worth twelve derniers

which was the regular currency of the kingdom.

§
“Both, therefore, are in the power of the Church, that is to say, the spiritual and the material sword, but the former
is to be administered for the Church but the latter by the Church; the former in the hands of the priest; the latter by
the hands of kings and soldiers, but at the will and sufferance of the priest” (Rollo-Koster 2015, 27).

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Table 2 shows the currency debasement in France. In 1295, Philip IV and his ministers

started reducing the amount of silver in the coin and one gros tournois was then worth fifteen

derniers. In 1303, one gros tournois was worth twenty-six derniers, reaching in 1306, the point

where one gros tournois was worth forty-one and a half derniers. Philip IV’s policies “had

crushed the French currency, causing rapid and damaging inflation and reducing the real value of

money more than threefold” (Jones 2017, 304). By the summer of 1306, the French government

was desperately attempting to control the situation by limiting the money supply. However, the

inflation continued to increase.

Table 2. Currency Debasement in the Kingdom of France

Reference: (Jones 2017)

After attempting to tax the Church and debasing the French currency, Philip IV’s next

attempt for financial relief was to persecute the Jewish population. Philip IV was desperately

attempting to increase the supply of silver to stock the royal mint, and on July 22, 1306,

thousands of Jews were arrested and had their financial assets confiscated (Barber 2012; Jones

2017). However, the rise of Italian banking in the late 13th century diminished the importance of

the Jews in royal finance, making the population more vulnerable. To the disappointment of

Philip IV, the confiscation of Jewish assets was not enough to alleviate the financial crisis.

The situation deteriorated, and following severe weather on December 30, 1306, riots

erupted in the French capital. The situation became dangerous enough that Philip IV was forced

to seek refuge in the Templars’ Temple in Paris, believing it to be safer than the royal residence.

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According to Sizer (2015), the rioters targeted the home of the Provost of Merchants Etienne

Barbette, a member of a prominent Parisian banker family. The riots signaled the populace’s

unhappiness and ultimate break with the elites (Sizer 2015). Initially, the kingdom was in full

disarray because of Philip IV’s debt and subsequent financial and monetary policies.

Furthermore, he was highly susceptible to public dissatisfaction with the economic crisis.

Generally, all public failures are attributed to the leader (de Mariana 2018). “Philip the

Fair, King of France, confessed right before his death that he faced the hatred of the people for

no reason other than that the coinage had been debased, and with his last words he commanded

his son Louis ‘Hutin’ to change it” (de Mariana 2018, 156). Philip IV also stated in a letter from

1307 that he was trying to strengthen the currency that he previously debased. Torre (2010, 66)

argues that “this shows that the money extracted from the Jews had not been sufficient to provide

stability.” Torre (2010) also argues that, at that point, the Templars’ fate was sealed since the

Templar treasury was likely the only remaining source of silver capable of strengthening the

coin.

Philip IV’s efforts to take financial assets were all unsuccessful in their attempts to

ameliorate the financial crisis. For example, according to Haag (2010, 221), Philip’s persecution

of the Templars is closely related with Philip’s inability to ameliorate the economic situation in

France:

Philip’s most powerful immediate motive was the desire, indeed the need, to get his hands

on the wealth of the Templars. He had already stolen from Italian bankers and the Jews, he

had debased the currency, and it was his exactions from the clergy that provoked his

confrontation with Boniface VIII.

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The Knights Templar were very wealthy, with hundreds of pounds of silver stored at the Paris

Temple. Rollo-Koster (2015, 37) highlights that “the Templars’ most obvious miscalculation was

to have been, like the Lombards and Jews, with the king’s creditors.”

Nonetheless, the Templars, unlike the Jews, were not an easy target of royal

expropriation. As previously stated, the Templars held significant property holdings, were able to

rent residences, and collected property taxes as well as wool production taxes. Renting out their

mill and selling fishing permits are two of their main sources of income. They were,

nevertheless, a well-respected institution of the Catholic Church. Philip IV’s financial

predicament, along with the confiscation of the Lombards’ and Jews’ financial holdings,

suggests comparable financial incentives for persecuting the Templars. Given the challenge of

targeting a renowned institution, Philip IV would not be able to secure the Templars’ silver.

The Bishop of Rome

Philip IV created an extremely volatile scenario. After attacking Pope Boniface VIII, the tensions

between the Kingdom of France and the Catholic Church reached its peak. It is in this volatile

scenario that Bertrand de Got was elected to the papacy, becoming Pope Clement V. Bertrand de

Got was born in France and was the third son of Béraud de Got, lord of Villandraut, Grayan,

Livran, and Uzeste, and Ida de Blanquefort (Menache 1998). Bertrand’s family was not an

ordinary family. It was linked to the Mauléon, Fargues, Savignac, and Preyssac families, all of

which had significant ties to the area’s religious and governmental authorities. In addition, the

bishop of Bazas (1166–79), was Bertrand’s grandfather’s brother (Menache 1998). Bertrand was

educated in Lot-et-Garonne, France, later studying canon and Roman law at the University of

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Orléans and the University of Bologna (Menache 1998). Bertrand later returned to France to

continue his ecclesiastical endeavors.

In 1289, Bertrand was canon and sacristan in the churches of Bordeaux, Tours, St.

Caprais at Agen and Lyons (Menache 1998). Bertrand was known to be a skilled diplomat. For

instance, the Got family had a great relationship with King Edward I of England which led Pope

Celestine V to nominate Bertrand to a diplomatic mission in 1294 (Menache 1998). The goal of

the mission was to bring peace between King Edward I of England and King Philip IV of France.

Bertrand was tasked with the difficult mission of stopping that same war that was pushing Philip

IV into serious debts. Overall, Bertrand had a great reputation among political and religious

groups. As Menache (1998, 11) points out, “one of his most distinctive traits was to remain on

friendly terms with the chief leaders of the time: Boniface VIII, Philip IV, and Edward I, who

were in a state of continuous conflict or even open war with one another.” As Archbishop of

Bordeaux, Bertrand was able to navigate the turbulent environment (Baumgartner 2003).

Menache (1998) emphasizes the need to avoid portraying Bertrand as a passive political

player. His ability to establish positive ties with a variety of political actors exemplified his

political aptitude. Bertrand often made contentious judgments that, if not handled effectively,

may have exacerbated tensions with other rulers. Bertrand and Philip IV had a good relationship,

but he was by no means a subordinate. Bertrand was a skilled political operative, as shown by an

incident that occurred in 1302 during the Assembly of Paris, “Bertrand demonstrated a resolute

character and much courage when he declared himself exempt from any vassal allegiance to the

king of France” (Menache 1998, 11). Philip IV’s response was not hostile, and he even provided

Bertrand protection from royal officials. As Menache (1998) notes, Philip IV used this action in

order to gain the support of a segment of the Church.

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Bertrand’s political skill was also shown during the confrontation between Pope Boniface

VIII and Philip IV. Bertrand was able to retain his difficult position without fully embracing a

stance. He was present at both the Assembly of Paris, when Philip IV publicly challenged the

Pope, and the Council of Rome, where Pope Boniface VIII publicly challenged Philip IV.

Bertrand’s political skill is often called opportunistic, but it would demonstrate that he was the

perfect man for reestablishing the Church’s relationship with King Philip IV (Menache 1998).

After the death of Pope Boniface VIII, Pope Benedict XI was elected in 1303.

Nevertheless, his papacy did not even last a year. Benedict XI’s election was not intended to

outrage King Philip IV of France. He was Italian but not from Rome. One of his most significant

acts was not publishing the bull excommunicating King Philip IV. That act angered the Romans,

who kicked him out of the city (Baumgartner 2003). He died in the summer of 1304 in Perugia.

A conclave was assembled in Perugia to elect the new pope. Given that Benedict had been the

only neutral cardinal in the dispute between Rome and the French King, they were forced to look

outside the College (Baumgartner 2003). Bertrand was the perfect candidate because he showed

tremendous political ability and because both France and England regarded him well. Every

party agreed that Bertrand was the right choice. Bertrand was elected the new pope, taking the

name of Clement V in 1305 (Baumgartner 2003).

Theoretical Framework: A Conditional Toleration Equilibrium

The institutional assumptions that we make about the modern world don’t readily apply to the

Middle Ages. A merchant could not trust that their contract would always be enforced, nor could

a peasant trust that their land would not be raided by the local baron. The people of medieval

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Europe still had their own limited means of stability. In order to ensure long-distance trade

multilateral enforcement strategies were employed by groups like the Maghribi traders (Greif

1993)**, while in Northern Europe the Hanseatic League were able to offer safety to traders in

the Baltic (Greif et al. 1994). The legitimacy of royalty in Europe was often secured by a

favorable relationship with the Catholic Church. Johnson and Koyama (2019) and Rubin (2017)

describe the exchange between the papacy and the several medieval kingdoms. The pope would

grant legitimacy to the crown, and in exchange the crown would provide resources to the church

and enforce religious prescriptions. If the king ever betrayed the trust of the papacy, the pontiff

could restrict his benefices to the people of the country or excommunicate the king, perhaps

inciting a revolt. For example, when King John of England rejected the appointment of Stephen

Langton as Archbishop of Canterbury, Pope Innocent III placed England under interdict leading

John to yield.

One of the primary bargaining chips between the pope and European kings were

episcopal appointments. Since bishops held serious economic, political, and spiritual weight in

Europe, kings often wanted some degree of control over who was overseeing the church in their

kingdom. De Mesquita (2022) argues that the Concordat of Worms in 1122 significantly shifted

the power to appoint from the pope to kings. The concordat states that if a king did not approve

of a papal appointment, he had the right to take the incomes of the diocese until the pope

provided a candidate he approved. In dioceses with higher incomes, the pope lost more income

the longer they held out and were more willing to quickly promote a candidate in the king’s

favor. The pope expanded his control over monastic orders (such as the Knights Templars) after

**
Edwards and Oglivie (2012) extensively challenge this perspective.

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1122 to counteract the additional power and income that kings had after the Concordat of

Worms.

[The Cistercians] secured favors and privileges from the papacy that insulated them from

the local demands of bishops and lay leaders by the start of the French concordat. The

Knights Templar, created in 1118, were recognized by the pope in 1129 and exempted from

taxation in 1139. The Knights Hospitaller were recognized by Pope Paschal II in 1113, just

after he had been compelled to back down on a potential resolution of the Investiture

controversy in 1111 that culminated in his facing the political wrath of both the Holy

Roman emperor and his own bishops. Here were new orders - military and money making

- that were unlike most of their predecessors among monastic orders both in elements of

their mission and in their unusually close ties to the papacy. (De Mesquita 2022, 128)

Johnson and Koyama speak of two self-reinforcing institutional equilibria that might

prevail in the relationship between church and state; a conditional toleration equilibrium or a

general toleration equilibrium (Johnson and Koyama 2019, 15-19). A conditional toleration

equilibrium is one in which the state enforces rules variably by the personal characteristics of

individuals such as religion or ethnicity. Such rules (called identity rules) are cheaper to enforce

than general rules which apply equally to all. The state will only tolerate marginal religious

groups under certain conditions. Thus, identity rules tend to be employed by weaker states, and

in turn do not set up the incentives to invest in other means of fiscal or legal capacity to grow a

state. A general toleration equilibrium is the opposite dynamic. In a general toleration

equilibrium, the state enforces more costly general rules and in turn is incentivized to invest in

state capacity to continue propagating the more costly general rules.

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We are interested in why European kings developed a credible commitment to not attack

groups such as the Knights Templar. European kings apparently tolerated the existence of their

creditors, the Knights Templar, under certain conditions making the order’s existence part of a

conditional toleration equilibrium. As described in the previous section, Philip IV was able to

attack his other creditors, the Lombards, and the Jews with little to no consequence from the

papacy. The Templars, though they held perhaps the greatest store of silver in Paris, directly

under the nose of Philip IV, were the last of the king’s creditors to be attacked. We are curious

why the kings did not attack the Templars to whom they were indebted and why this equilibrium

broke in 1307 when King Phillip IV attacked the Templars and Clement V disbanded the order.

Ultimately, we conclude that the dependence of European kings on the pope for

legitimacy limited their ability to attack monastic orders such as the Templars. The legitimacy

that the king requires from the pope provides a limited credible commitment to not attack groups

protected by the pope. The credible commitment remains limited by the interests the king has in

maintaining the favor of the pope. As long as the pope remained in Rome, he was relatively

independent of any particular European military power forcing his hand. The geographic

independence of the pope is reminiscent of earlier religious figures that maintained geographic

independence from military powers. The Oracle of Delphi in Greece served as a legitimating

agent for diverse Greek city-states, and it was granted trust due to the fact that no single city-

state had military power over it (Iannaconne, Haight, and Rubin 2011).

Orders such as the Templars will not extend as much credit to the crown as a lender

might under a general toleration equilibrium where they can always expect to remain unharmed.

Since the nature of the relationship between individual popes and kings may change generation

to generation, there always remains an element of uncertainty in the security of the pope’s

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protection. Credible commitments based on personal relationships are less secure than those built

on impersonal institutions. European states were later able to guarantee more secure expectations

that they would pay back creditors leading to a precipitous rise in state power (North and

Weingast 1989).

This paper argues in the style of an analytic narrative (Bates et al. 1998; Crettez and

Deloche 2018; Koyama 2019). We will first provide a game theoretic account of the problem,

and then describe the implications our model would make for the strategic environment. Second,

we will provide narrative evidence that the implications do bear out in the historical narrative.

The Game in Italy

This game begins after the Templars are established as a monastic order and have begun

collecting debts from European kings. If the Templars feel confident enough to extend credit to

royalty that has the military power to crush them, they must believe that the crown is constrained

by other means. We are concerned with only the actions of two players, the pope and the king.

We refer to Pope Clement V and King Phillip IV, though this game can reasonably describe the

strategic environment for all popes and kings. The game is summarized in Figure 2 with the

king’s payoffs first.

Figure 2. Templar Game in Italy

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The first move is by the king, who has the decision to either arrest the Templars or not. If

he arrests them, he cancels his debts 𝐷 > 0. If the king arrests, then the pope is given the option

to challenge the king’s actions or not. If the pope challenges the king, then he imposes a cost 𝐶 >

0 on the king, he also gains the favor of the faithful 𝐼 > 0. Additionally, if the king does not

arrest the Templars, the pope gains the benefit from the order 𝑇 > 0. The subgame perfect

equilibrium can be found by backwards induction. Quite simply, given that the king arrests the

Templars, the pope will always challenge him as 𝐼 > 0. Expecting this move by the pope, if the

king arrests the Templars, he will receive a payoff of −𝐶. Thus, comparing −𝐶 to −𝐷, the king

will not arrest the Templars as long as 𝐶 > 𝐷.

Proposition 1: (Don’t Arrest, Challenge) is a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium if 𝐶 > 𝐷.

In this equilibrium, the Templars have security that the king will not arrest them. The only case

in which the king will still arrest the Templars is if 𝐶 is not greater than 𝐷 meaning that his debts

are inordinately large, or that he does not value legitimacy from the pope. We might infer,

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though this part of the game is unmodelled, that the Templars know the approximate degree to

which the king values legitimacy from the pope and don’t extend their credit past this point to

maintain the condition under which they are not threatened.

The Game in France

In this model, the pope changed the location of his seat. In Figure 3, we modify just one payoff

to reflect the outcomes when the pope is in France.

Figure 3. Templar Game in France

If the pope is in the country of the king who he is challenging, the king will inflict punishment

𝐴 > 0 on the pope for challenging him. This is subtracted from the payoff for (Arrest,

Challenge).

The backwards induction story now changes. Starting with the pope’s decision, he will

only challenge the king in France if 𝐼 − 𝐴 > 0. We assume that 𝐴 > 𝐼, and thus the pope will not

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challenge in France. Next, the king will only arrest if the pope will not challenge as −𝐷 < 0. The

new payoff for the pope in France sets up a new subgame perfect Nash equilibrium described in

Proposition 2.

Proposition 2: (Arrest, Don’t Challenge) is a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium if 𝐴 > 𝐼.

For our narrative, to support these two propositions, we want to argue for the following with our

historical narrative.

● 𝐶 > 𝐷 > 0: If this condition does not hold, we would see many kings attacking their

debtors regardless of how the pope might react.

● 𝐴 > 𝐼 > 0: If this condition does not hold, then we will see the pope acting publicly

against the wishes of the king, even if the king holds direct power over him.

The King’s Gambit

King Philip IV was being extremely aggressive in his efforts to finance his government. It is

worth remembering that King Philip IV had attempted, through force, to tax the Church and even

attacked the vacation home of Pope Boniface VIII, appropriating some of Church’s properties.

From France to Italy

Once Pope Clement V was elected, he faced a volatile situation, inheriting a scenario of tension

between King Philip IV of France and previous popes. As soon as he was elected, Pope Clement

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V needed to decide between returning to Italy for his coronation and staying in France for the

ceremony. This decision was important due to the tension between the French clergy and the

Italian clergy. Zutshi (2021, 147) points out that in “the early months of Clement’s pontificate

were a time of improvisation in the papal chancery, partly occasioned by the fact that Clement

was at Bordeaux when he was elected (5 June 1305), while the conclave that elected him was

held at Perugia.” Following his election, he was expected to go to Rome for his coronation.

Numerous popes have resided outside of Rome throughout history, but not traveling to

Italy and remaining in France for the whole duration of their papacy was uncommon.†† The

decision to stay in France infuriated some members of the Church in Rome. However, Clement

V’s decision to stay in France can be seen as a signal of commitment to the French clergy.

Clement V hoped that, by staying in France, he would acquire a more credible and

prestigious position with Philip IV and the French clergy, which would later help him advance

his interests. The choice to remain in France is predicated on the assumption that doing so would

gain political capital with King Philip IV of France. It is vital to note that Pope Clement V’s

appointment was a signal to pacify the relations between France and Rome. Staying in France

was just a reassurance of Clement V’s commitment to normalization between church and state.

Prison or Freedom?

††
Menache (1998, 23) highlights this point in detail: “Benedict XI (1303–4) left Rome after some five months and
departed for Perugia, where he died. Boniface VIII (1294–1303) spent much of his pontificate in Anagni, Orvieto,
and Velletri. Celestine V (1294) did not come to Rome at all; elected in Perugia, he was crowned in Aquila and
journeyed to Solmona, Capua, and Naples, where he resigned. Nicholas IV (1288–92) spent most of his pontificate
in Rieti and Orvieto. Martin IV (1281–5), who was elected in Viterbo, did not leave Tuscany and Umbria. Nicholas
III (1277–80) spent much time in Sutri, Vetralla, and Viterbo. John XXI (1276–7) did not leave Viterbo at all. After
only two months in Rome, Gregory X (1271–6) traveled to Orvieto and Lyons and sojourned in Provence for a long
period. Gregory IX (1227–41) spent more than eight years out of Rome.”

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The Templars’ popularity was not at its peak, which suited Philip IV’s ambitions. The Siege of

Acre in 1291 was a major loss for the Crusader cause. Soldiers from many European countries,

notably England and France, fought side by side. The ultimate defeat of the Europeans in the

Siege of Acre became a source of discontent. Housley (1986, 262) argues that the destruction of

the Templars was “facilitated by the Order’s unpopularity in the period after the fall of Acre, by

the widespread feeling that the Knights lacked a role.”

In addition, rumors of heresy among the Templars began to spread, providing a perfect

“scapegoat” (Housley 1986, 262) to the fall of Acre and the financial crisis. Read (2000, 263)

points out that some pamphleteers, those aligned with Philip IV, referred to James of Molay, the

grand master of the Templars, as a “stubborn, unimaginative and self-interested old man” after

he opposed the unification of the Templars with the Hospitallers. Philip IV took full advantage of

the social context and the unpopularity of the Templars.

The Templars were accused of renouncing Christ, spitting on the Crucifix, idol worship,

homosexuality, and obscenity (Barber 2012). The allegation of homosexuality in the order is

without merit (Gilmour-Bryson 1996). There are reasons to believe that the rumors that

originated the trial were started by Philip IV’s government. Most of the stories about the

Templars’ involvement in crimes had been circulated by the king of France and his court, likely

spawned by the earlier dispute between Boniface VIII and Philip IV (Théry 2013).

Philip IV also accused Pope Boniface VIII of heresy when attempting to tax the Church.

Courtenay (1996, 577) highlights the capacity of Philip IV to spread propaganda during the

tensions with Pope Boniface VIII, claiming that “the stage of the crisis that produced most of this

documentation was the result of a royal initiative in June 1303 to create and collect tangible

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support for Philip’s claims against Boniface and for the call for a council to judge the Pope.”

Guillaume de Nogaret oversaw the propaganda campaign accusing the pope of heresy.

Heresy was the only charge that Philip IV could use against the Order, precisely because

of a workaround in the legislation that dated back to the period of the Cathars and their trials for

heresy. Templars, Hospitallers, and Saint Bernard’s Cistercians were among the orders that the

inquisitor in France had jurisdiction over when Pope Honorius III delegated authority to him in

1230 (Haag 2010). This transfer of power from the pope to the inquisitor of France was never

revoked and was efficiently exploited by Philip IV’s lawyers. The inquisitor of France,

Guillaume de Paris, was “a creature of the king” (Housley 1986, 262; Haag 2010; Barber 2012).

Guillaume de Paris was a French Dominican closely involved in royal affairs. His proximity to

the king was so clear that Guillaume de Paris held an official position as royal confessor (Barber

2012). The same royal legal team pressed the charges against Boniface VIII and the Templars

(Rollo-Koster 2015).

Guillaume de Nogaret was also the head of Philip IV’s legal team. Guillaume de Nogaret

started collecting and compiling a dossier on the Templars around May of 1307. Jones (2017)

provides details of the building process of the dossier, pointing out that the French minister

started interviewing former members of the order, and common men. The first person to

compose Guillaume de Nogaret’s files was a man named Esquin of Floyran, who according to

the dossier was in prison with a Templar in 1305. During the incarceration, Esquin of Floyran

claims that the Templar shared immoralities involving the ceremony of reception of the knights.

In addition to the story, moles were also placed inside the Paris Temple with the intention of

spreading rumors. The accusations were calculated to exploit their low popularity due to the fall

of Acre (Haag 2010). After finishing the dossier, Guillaume de Nogaret swiftly proclaimed the

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charges against the Templars in front of a huge audience in Paris. The Franciscans disseminated

information via their sermons under the direct order of France’s inquisitor, Guillaume de Paris

(Haag 2010).

In September of 1307, the rumors of heresy spread across the realm forcing Pope

Clement V to investigate the cases. According to Barber (2012) Pope Clement V used his

investigation to delay King Philip IV’s efforts. The Pope suffered stomach pains and asked for

the process to be postponed, allowing him to take some time off to recover (Jones 2017; Read

2000). With the Pope temporarily incapacitated, King Philip IV seized the opportunity and

issued sealed letters to governmental authorities on September 14, 1307, ordering the arrest of

the Templars (Haag 2010; Jones 2017; Read 2000). The arrest, however, was not made

immediately since carrying out the order would need some preparation. At this point, Philip IV

had made his decision.

On October 12, 1307, the Grand Master of the Templars, James of Molay, traveled to

Paris to attend the burial of King Philip’s sister-in-law, Catherine of Courtenay (Read 2000).

That was the ideal time to carry out the arrest, and on October 13, 1307, King Philip IV’s

soldiers encircled the Paris Temple. According to Read (2000, 264), thousands of knights,

sergeants, chaplains, and laborers were “picked up in a single day” throughout France, with

barely two dozen escaping. Read (2000) also reminds that, like the Lombards and Jews, all the

Templars’ possessions were taken.

The tortures endured by the Templars upon their capture are highlighted by Haag (2010)

and Jones (2017). Many of the jailed Templars were not knights, but rather craftsmen, wine

merchants, farmers, and carpenters. The tortures were brutal, with the basic restrictions being

that no blood could flow out and no bones could break (Haag 2010). According to Haag (2010,

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223), tortures included “being kept chained in isolation and fed on bread and water; being drawn

on the rack until the joints were dislocated; being raised over a beam by a rope tied to the wrists

that had been bound behind the victim’s back; and having fat rubbed into the soles of the feet,

which were then placed before a fire.” Under such pressure, many Templars promptly confessed.

Philip IV’s meticulous organization for the arrest shows how strategic he was. Philip IV

made the decision to arrest the Templars likely because of his financial situation, and the

execution of his decision was perfect. Philip IV made use of many different political and

institutional features. Three main features are worth highlighting. First, Philip IV carefully

analyzed the law, likely with help from Guillaume de Nogaret, identifying how he could legally

harm the Templars. Second, after identifying the legal loophole, he ordered Guillaume de

Nogaret to compile a dossier on the Templars around May of 1307. Third, after the material was

ready, he waited for the right opportunity to execute the plan and perform the arrests.

No feature of his actions shows an impulsive and fundamentalist king, but on the

contrary, they show features of a rational and artful political agent. None of Philip IV’s moves

are uncalculated. By September 14, 1307, when Philip IV issued the arrest warrant to the

Templars, he was perfectly aware of his payoff and recognized that he would be able to

appropriate the Templars’ financial resources. In 1307, the Templars’ future was sealed since the

Templar treasure was likely the sole supply of silver capable of reinforcing the currency (Torre

2010). In the game, we represent this by the canceling the payoff −𝐷 < 0 when King Philip IV

arrests the Templars.

Indeed, as highlighted by Torre (2010), Philip IV had little choice but to utilize the

Templars’ financial assets to fund his administration. Nevertheless, what truly sealed the fate of

the Templars was Pope Clement V’s decision to establish his papacy in France. The Templars

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were indeed wealthy, but Philip IV was not the only insolvent king in Europe. Why did other

kings not attack the Templars before? As a matter of fact, some kings did raid the Temple. In the

13th century, different kings raided the London Temple. Those of Aragon also raided local

Temple houses, but as Haag (2010, 144) points out, “these were passing events in desperate

times of need, and restitution was made.” The Templars were essential to the kingdoms’

finances, and they could neither afford to destroy the institution nor alienate them. Additionally,

the cost of publicly challenging the pontiff was simply too great.

The main difference was that none of these kings had the ability to challenge the

authority of the Church religiously or politically. The papacy was secured in Italy, and it

possessed many tools to keep the kings in check. If the king arrests the Templars, then the pope

is given the option to challenge the king’s actions or not. If the pope challenges the king, then he

imposes a cost 𝐶 > 0 on the king. For most kings, the cost of being excommunicated and

sanctioned by the Church was simply too high. The same was true for Philip IV, and he was

always worried about maintaining his legitimacy. Philip IV only attacked Pope Boniface VIII

after his excommunication from the Church. Excommunication was a useful tool of the church to

place secular powers in check. King Philip IV could only do so much without being

excommunicated. If he attacked any institution of the Catholic Church, the pope had a reasonable

tool to push back as long as the condition 𝐶 > 𝐷 > 0 held. When the pope is in Italy, the king’s

cost of canceling his debt and being excommunicated is higher than the cost of the debt itself.

For instance, in a previous scenario, Pope Boniface VIII was in Italy when Philip IV was

excommunicated, and even though the French army attacked the Church, the Italian population

kept him safe. Pope Clement V’s payoff of challenging the king is represented by 𝐼 > 0.

Nevertheless, once Pope Clement V moved the papacy to France, the tool of excommunication

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was not as effective since there was no protection from the French King. Pope Clement V’s

payoff of challenging the king is discounted by 𝐴 > 0 representing the power of Phillip to attack

him. Moving the papacy to France essentially made any challenge to the French king virtually

impossible without serious consequences. Pope Boniface VIII excommunicated Philip IV, and

the French King unsuccessfully attacked the pope as Boniface was in Italy. Pope Clement V did

not have the Italian population to protect him and challenging the French King while in France

would undoubtedly lead to Pope Clement V’s imprisonment and death. In the game scenario, we

represent the pope’s predicament by 𝐴 > 𝐼 > 0.

Challenge or Compliance?

There is no reason to suppose that Pope Clement V was involved in the imprisonment of

innumerable Templars since he voiced his displeasure and condemnation of the arrests in a letter

to Phillip IV (Barber 2012). Nevertheless, after the arrest Pope Clement V needed to calculate

his next move. Although he was initially furious at King Philip IV and expressed his anger

directly to the monarch, he did not immediately go public and challenged the King.

Furthermore, the Chinon Parchment contains a secret papal decision stating that the

Templars were not guilty (Frale 2004). From the 17th to the 20th of August 1308, a Papal inquiry

was held at the fortress of Chinon, which ended with the conclusion that the Templars were not

guilty. Given the social situation and Philip IV’s persistent pressure, the verdict was never

disclosed until 2001 when it was found by Barbara Frale, concluding that “the papal deputies

absolved them completely and ordered that they should receive the sacraments once again”

(Frale 2004, 129). The existence of the Chinon Parchment supports that Pope Clement V could

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not publicly challenge the king. Hence, it supports our contention that 𝐴 > 𝐼 > 0. The Chinon

Parchment also shows that 𝑇 > 0 since Pope Clement V had a preference for the preservation of

the Templars. The pope believed that the Templars were innocent, and under normal

circumstances, he would have absolved the Order.

Haag (2010) highlights the constant pressure on the Pope. On March 2, 1312, Philip IV

sent an ultimatum to Pope Clement V. Finally on March 22, 1312, with the bull Vox in Excelso,

Clement V declared that the Templars, though not condemned, were suppressed because the

defamation made the continuation of the order unfeasible (Haag 2010). Philip IV’s financial

intentions became clear on May 2, 1312, when Pope Clement V, in a last desperate effort to

protect the properties and assets of the Templars, granted the Knights Hospitallers with all the

properties of the Templars. Nevertheless, such an action was in vain since “Philip extracted a

huge sum of money from the Hospitaller in compensation for his costs in bringing the Templars

to trial” (Haag 2010, 235).

The Chinon Parchment shows that, once in France, Pope Clement V had no ability to

challenge King Philip IV. Moving the papacy to France created an entire new political game, and

one of the consequences was the impotency to protect the Templars. Pope Clement V clearly

wanted the Templars to be freed from the persecution, but challenging King Philip risked his

own safety and the further interests of the church in France. Barber (2012, 89) emphasizes this

condition claiming that “Clement was fully prepared to sacrifice the Order for these greater

objectives with the consequence that from this time it became little more than a pawn in the

continuing conflict between pope and monarch.” The Templars were not the only ones at risk but

Clement V’s papacy itself.

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Final Discussion

In this article, we provided an analytic narrative of the Knights Templar’s fall to understand what

actions contributed to the collapse of this centennial Catholic Church organization. We focus on

two major decisions: (1) King Philip IV’s decision to assault the Templars, and (2) Pope Clement

V’s decision not to confront the King. These choices indicate one of the game scenario’s

equilibria that we argue is the case.

We emphasize that Pope Clement V’s establishment of his Papacy in France ultimately

triggered the possibility of the Templars’ fall. The primary contribution of this article is to

demonstrate that the Catholic Church and secular rulers have been engaged in a sophisticated

political game for years, and that the fall of the Templars was just a consequence of a strategic

decision that broke with the previous equilibrium. When the papacy was in Italy, the Church was

able to keep the French Crown’s power in check through important tools such as

excommunication, reassuring the Templars that they were safe to be royal creditors. However,

once the papacy moved to France, excommunication was not as effective.

The Chinon Parchment demonstrates that Pope Clement V did not want the Templars to

perish but rather saw them as a piece on his chessboard. However, it is entirely possible to win a

chess match without your knights. Pope Clement V valued his knights, yet he was prepared to

sacrifice them to win. As previously stated, King Philip IV of France aggressively opposed the

Church and placed the Church’s future in jeopardy. Clement V’s relocation of the papal court to

France created an opportunity to exert control over and ultimately alleviate tensions between

France and the Church, but, as a side effect, it broke with the previous institutional equilibrium.

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