A.

Introduction
1. General Considerations
2. Domestic Conflict of Law Rules
 Arts. IV and V, Sec. 1, 1987 Constitution
 Arts. 14, 15, 16, 17, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 829, 1039, 1319, and 1753,
Civil Code of the Philippines
 Arts. 10, 21, 26, 35, 36, 37, 38, 80, 96, 184 and 187, Family Code of the
Philippines
 Art. 2, Revised Penal Code
 Sec. 146, Revised Corporation Code (Read also Secs. 140 - 153)
 Rule 14; Rule 39, Sec. 48; Rule 131, Sec. 3(n); Rule 132, Sec. 25, Rules of
Court

B. Jurisdiction and Choice of Law

1. Choice of Forum: While the parties are free to select the forum for resolving disputes by way of a
choice of forum clause, said clause does not operate to deny or divest jurisdiction from the State.
 Sweet Lines, Inc. v. Teves, et al., G.R. No. L-37750 (19 May 1978)
 For, although venue may be changed or transferred from one province to another by agreement of
the parties in writing pursuant to Rule 4, Section 3, of the Rules of Court, such an agreement will
not be held valid where it practically negates the action of the claimants. The philosophy
underlying the provisions on transfer of venue of actions is the convenience of the plaintiffs as
well as his witnesses and to promote the ends of justice.
 Public policy is “. . . that principle of the law which holds that no subject or citizen can lawfully
do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public good.”
 Under this principle “. . . freedom of contract or private dealing is restricted by law for the good
of the public.”

 Cadalin vs. POEA Administrator, 238 SCRA 721, 774-775 (1994)

 where the laws of the host country are more favorable and beneficial to the workers, then the laws
of the host country shall form part of the overseas employment contract.
 As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be applied in the forum. However, the
characterization of a statute into a procedural or substantive law becomes irrelevant when the
country of the forum has a "borrowing statute." Said statute has the practical effect of treating the
foreign statute of limitation as one of substance.
 The parties to a contract may select the law by which it is to be governed. In such a case, the
foreign law is adopted as a “system” to regulate the relations of the parties, including questions of
their capacity to enter into the contract, the formalities to be observed by them, matters of
performance, and so forth. Instead of adopting the entire mass of the foreign law, the parties may
just agree that specific provisions of a foreign statute shall be deemed incorporated into their
contract “as a set of terms.” By such reference to the provisions of the foreign law, the contract
does not become a foreign contract to be governed by the foreign law. The said law does not
operate as a statute but as a set of contractual terms deemed written in the contract.
 The choice of law must, however, bear some relationship the parties or their transaction.
 a foreign procedural law will not be applied in the forum. Procedural matters, such as service of
process, joinder of actions, period and requisites for appeal, and so forth, are governed by the
laws of the forum. This is true even if the action is based upon a foreign substantive law.
 A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of Laws in the sense that it may be
viewed either as procedural or substantive, depending on the characterization given such a law.
 the characterization of a statute into a procedural or substantive law becomes irrelevant when the
country of the forum has a "borrowing statute." Said statute has the practical effect of treating the
 foreign statute of limitation as one of substance. A "borrowing statute" directs the state of the
forum to apply the foreign statute of limitations to the pending claims based on a foreign law.
While there are several kinds of "borrowing statutes," one form provides that an action barred by
the laws of the place where it accrued, will not be enforced in the forum even though the local
statute has not run against it.
 The courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forum's public
policy.

2. Minimum Contact: The concept of minimum contacts protects the defendant against the burdens of
litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum and it acts to ensure that the States, through their courts, do
not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal sovereigns. (World-Wide
Volkswagen Corporation v. Woodson, 1980)

One basic principle underlies all rules of jurisdiction in international law, a state does not have
jurisdiction in the absence of some reasonable basis for exercising it. To be reasonable, the jurisdiction
must be based on some minimum contacts that will not offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice. (HSBC v. Sherman, G.R. No. 72494, 1989)

A casual presence of a corporation or its agent in a state in single or isolated incidents is not enough to
establish jurisdiction. The activities of its agents in transacting business for the corporation in the forum
state are minimum contacts that make it reasonable and in conformity with the due process clause. The
activities of the corporation in the state were systematic and continuous rather that irregular or casual,
which resulted in large volume interstate business. The corporation received the benefits and protection of
the laws of the state, and therefore established the minimum contacts to be under their jurisdiction.
(International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 1945)

 HSBC v. Sherman, G.R. No. 72494 (11 August 1989)

 A State does not have jurisdiction in the absence of some reasonable basis for exercising it,
whether the proceedings are in rem quasi in rem or in personam. To be reasonable, the
jurisdiction must be based on some minimum contacts that will not offend traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.
 jurisdiction is often defined as the light of a State to exercise authority over persons and things
within its boundaries subject to certain exceptions. Thus, a State does not assume jurisdiction
over travelling sovereigns, ambassadors and diplomatic representatives of other States, and
foreign military units stationed in or marching through State territory with the permission of the
latter’s authorities. This authority, which finds its source in the concept of sovereignty, is
exclusive within and throughout the domain of the State. A State is competent to take hold of any
judicial matter it sees fit by making its courts and agencies assume jurisdiction over all kinds of
cases brought before them.
 a stipulation as to venue does not preclude the filing of suits in the residence of plaintiff or
defendant under Section 2 (b), Rule 4, ROC, in the absence of qualifying or restrictive words in
the agreement which would indicate that the place named is the only venue agreed upon by the
parties.
 A State is competent to take hold of any judicial matter it sees fit by making its courts and
agencies assume jurisdiction over all kinds of cases brought before them.
 whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of the principle of forum non
conveniens depends largely upon the facts of the particular case and is addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial court.
 Saudi Arabian Airlines v. CA, G.R. No. 122191 (8 October 1998)
 The starting point of analysis here is not a legal relation, but a factual situation, event, or
operative fact. An essential element of conflict rules is the indication of a "test" or "connecting
factor" or "point of contact". Choice-of-law rules invariably consist of a factual relationship (such
as property right, contract claim) and a connecting factor or point of contact, such as the situs of
the res, the place of celebration, the place of performance, or the place of wrongdoing.
Considering that the complaint is one involving torts, the "connecting factor" or "point of contact"
could be the place or places where the tortious conduct or lex loci actus occurred.
 In applying the "State of the most significant relationship" to determine the State which has the
most significant relationship, the following contacts are to be taken into account and evaluated
according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue: (a) the place where the
injury occurred; (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred; (c) the domicile,
residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and (d) the
place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.
 Where the factual antecedents satisfactorily establish the existence of a foreign element, the SC
agree with petitioner that the problem herein could present a "conflicts" case.
 A factual situation that cuts across territorial lines and is affected by the diverse laws of two or
more states is said to contain a "foreign element". The presence of a foreign element is inevitable
since social and economic affairs of individuals and associations are rarely confined to the
geographic limits of their birth or conception.
 The forms in which this foreign element may appear are many. The foreign element may simply
consist in the fact that one of the parties to a contract is an alien or has a foreign domicile, or that
a contract between nationals of one State involves properties situated in another State. In other
cases, the foreign element may assume a complex form.
 As to the choice of applicable law, we note that choice-of-law problems seek to answer two
important questions: (1) What legal system should control a given situation where some of the
significant facts occurred in two or more states; and (2) to what extent should the chosen legal
system regulate the situation.
 The starting point of analysis here is not a legal relation, but a factual situation, event, or
operative fact. An essential element of conflict rules is the indication of a "test" or "connecting
factor" or "point of contact". Choice-of-law rules invariably consist of a factual relationship (such
as property right, contract claim) and a connecting factor or point of contact, such as the situs of
the res, the place of celebration, the place of performance, or the place of wrongdoing.

 Hasegawa v. Kitamura, G.R. No. 149177 (23 November 2007)

 In the judicial resolution of conflicts problems, three consecutive phases are involved: (1)
jurisdiction, (2) choice of law, and (3) recognition and enforcement of judgments. Jurisdiction &
choice of law are two distinct concepts.
 Jurisdiction considers whether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state;
 choice of law asks the further question whether the application of a substantive law w/c will
determine the merits of the case is fair to both parties.
 The power to exercise jurisdiction does not automatically give a state constitutional authority to
apply forum law. While jurisdiction and the choice of the lex fori will often coincide, the
“minimum contacts” for one do not always provide the necessary “significant contacts” for the
other. The question of whether the law of a state can be applied to a transaction is different from
the question of whether the courts of that state have jurisdiction to enter a judgment.
 the principles of lex loci celebrationis and lex contractus, and the “state of the most significant
relationship rule are improper grounds for questioning jurisdiction.
  Under the “state of the most significant relationship rule,” to ascertain what state law to apply to a
dispute, the court should determine which state has the most substantial connection to the
occurrence and the parties. In a case involving a contract, the court should consider where the
contract was made, was negotiated, was to be performed, and the domicile, place of business, or
place of incorporation of the parties. This rule considers several contacts and evaluates them
according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue to be resolved.

3. Jurisdiction over the Person: It is the competence of a court to render decision that will bind the parties
to the suit.

The competence or power of a court to render a judgment that will bind the parties involved
« Jurisdiction over the plaintiff: Acquired the moment he invokes the power of the court by instituting
the action by the proper pleading
« Jurisdiction over the defendant: Acquired when he enters his appearance or by the coercive power of
legal process exerted by the court over him  personal or substituted service of summons.
EX: If appearance is for the sole purpose of questioning the jurisdiction of the court.
Note: Question of erroneous service of summons must be raised before judgment is rendered, or this
would be a case of waiver. Defective service may be cured by actual receipt of summons or if in any other
manner, knowledge of the existence of the case

 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945)

 the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in personam is grounded on their de facto power
over the defendant's person. Hence, his presence within the territorial jurisdiction of a court was
prerequisite to its rendition of a judgment personally binding him.
 Due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he is
not present within the territory of the forum, he has certain minimum contacts with it such that
the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
 Since the corporate personality is a fiction, although a fiction intended to be acted upon as though
it were a fact, it is clear that, unlike an individual, its "presence" without, as well as within, the
state of its origin can be manifested only by activities carried on in its behalf by those who are
authorized to act for it.
 "Presence" in the state in this sense has never been doubted when the activities of the corporation
there have not only been continuous and systematic, but also give rise to the liabilities sued on,
even though no consent to be sued or authorization to an agent to accept service of process has
been given.
 it has been generally recognized that the casual presence of the corporate agent, or even his
conduct of single or isolated items of activities in a state in the corporation's behalf, are not
enough to subject it to suit on causes of action unconnected with the activities there. To require
the corporation in such circumstances to defend the suit away from its home or other jurisdiction
where it carries on more substantial activities has been thought to lay too great and unreasonable
a burden on the corporation to comport with due process.
o The activities carried on in the state of Washington on behalf of the Corporation were
neither irregular nor casual. They were systematic and continuous throughout the years
in question. They resulted in a large volume of interstate business, in the course of which
appellant received the benefits and protection of the laws of the state, including the right
to resort to the courts for the enforcement of its rights. The obligation which is here sued
upon arose out of those very activities. It is evident that the operations of the salesmen in
Washington established sufficient contacts or ties with the state to make it reasonable and
just, according to traditional conception of fair play and substantial justice, to permit the
 state to enforce the obligations which appellant has incurred there. Hence we cannot say
that the maintenance of the present suit in the State of Washington involves an
unreasonable or undue procedure. It is enough that appellant established such contacts
with the state that the particular form of substituted service adopted there gives
reasonable assurance that the notice will be actual.
 We are likewise unable to conclude that the service of the process within the state upon an agent
whose activities establish appellant's "presence" there was not sufficient notice of the suit, or that
the suit was so unrelated to those activities as to make the agent an inappropriate vehicle for
communicating the notice. It is enough that appellant has established such contacts with the state
that the particular form of substituted service adopted there gives reasonable assurance that the
notice will be actual. Nor can we say that the mailing of the notice of suit to appellant by
registered mail at its home office was not reasonably calculated to apprise appellant of the suit.
 Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co, 342 U.S. 437, 72 S. Ct. 413 96
(1952)
 The amount and kind of activities which must be carried on by the foreign corporation in the
state of the forum so as to make it reasonable and just to subject the corporation to the
jurisdiction of that state are to be determined in each case.
 The corporate activities of a foreign corporation which, under state statute, make it necessary for
it to secure a license and to designate a statutory agent upon whom process may be served
provide a helpful but not a conclusive test.
o For example, the state of the forum may by statute require a foreign mining corporation
to secure a license in order lawfully to carry on there such functional intrastate
operations as those of mining or refining ore.
o On the other hand, if the same corporation carries on, in that state, other continuous and
systematic corporate activities as it did here—consisting of directors' meetings, business
correspondence, banking, stock transfers, payment of salaries, purchasing of machinery,
etc.—those activities are enough to make it fair and reasonable to subject that
corporation to proceedings in personam in that state, at least insofar as the proceedings
in personam seek to enforce causes of action relating to those very activities or to other
activities of the corporation within the state.

 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp vs. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980)

 Personal jurisdiction may be appropriate if an out-of-state defendant established contact with the
forum state such that it should have reasonably anticipated being brought into court in that state
based on its conduct and connection with it.
 The Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment limits the power of a state court to exercise
personal or in personam jurisdiction against a nonresident defendant. A state court may exercise
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident only so long as there exist "minimum contacts" between
the defendant and the forum state.
 .” The relationship between the defendant and forum must be “reasonable.” The burden on the
defendant is to be balanced against other factors, including the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining
convenient and effective relief.

 The due process clause “does not contemplate that a state may make binding a judgment in
personam against an individual or corporate defendant with which the state has no contacts, ties
or relations.” Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience from being forced
to litigate before the tribunals of another state, even if the forum state has a strong interest in
applying its law to the controversy, and even if the forum state is the most convenient location for
litigation, the Due Process Clause may sometimes act to divest the state of its power to render a
valid judgment.
 Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984)
The Supreme Court held that jurisdiction was proper based upon the effects of their intentional
conduct in California. Respondent's career was centered in California, the article was drawn from
California sources, and the harm was suffered in California. The Supreme Court noted that petitioners
were not charged with untargeted negligence, but rather their intentional, and allegedly tortious,
actions were expressly aimed at California, and under the circumstances, petitioners must have
reasonably anticipated being sued there. The Supreme Court held that petitioners' status as
employees did not shield them from jurisdiction, because their individual contacts with California
were sufficient.

The allegedly libelous story concerned the California activities of a California resident. It impugned the
professionalism of an entertainer whose television career was centered in California. The article was
drawn from California sources, and the brunt of the harm, in terms both of respondent's emotional
distress and the injury to her professional reputation, was suffered in California. In sum, California is the
focal point both of the story and of the harm suffered. Jurisdiction over petitioners is therefore proper in
California based on the "effects" of their Florida conduct in California.

Petitioners argue that they are not responsible for the circulation of the article in California. A reporter
and an editor, they claim, have no direct economic stake in their employer's sales in a distant State. Nor
are ordinary employees able to control their employer's marketing activity. The mere fact that they can
"foresee" that the article will be circulated and have an effect in California is not sufficient for an
assertion of jurisdiction.

Petitioners' analogy does not wash. Whatever the status of their hypothetical welder, petitioners are not
charged with mere untargeted negligence. Rather, their intentional, and allegedly tortious, actions were
expressly aimed at California. Petitioner South wrote and petitioner Calder edited an article that they
knew would have a potentially devastating impact upon respondent. And they knew that the brunt of
that injury would be felt by respondent in the State in which she lives and works and in which the
National Enquirer has its largest circulation. An individual injured in California need not go to Florida to
seek redress from persons who, though remaining in Florida, knowingly cause the injury in California
 Philsec Investment et al v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103493 (June 19, 1997)
While this Court has given the effect of res judicata to foreign judgments in several cases, it was after
the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to repel them on grounds
allowed under the law. This is because in this jurisdiction, with respect to actions in personam, as
distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the
justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary. Rule 39, §50 provides:

Sec. 50. Effect of foreign judgments. — The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country,
having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing;

(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as between
the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the judgment may be repelled by
evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact.

 Pantaleon v. Asuncion, 1105 Phil. 761 (1959)

 Santos v. PNOC, G.R. No. 170943 (23 September 2008)

4. Jurisdiction over the Res

 El Banco-Espanol-Filipino v. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921 (1918)
 Perkins v. Dizon, 69 Phil. 186 (1939)
 Travelers Health Assn. vs. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950)

5. Act of State Doctrine

 French vs. Banco National de Cuba, 295 NY 2d, 422-423 (1968)
 In Re: Philippine National Bank v. United States District Court for the District
of Hawaii, No. 04-71843, D.C. No. MDL-00840-MLR
 Republic v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355, 1361 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1035,109 S.Ct. 1933, 104 L.Ed.2d 404 (1989)
6. Assumption of Jurisdiction vs. Forum non-conveniens
 Gulf Oil Corporation vs. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947)
 K.K. Shell Sekiyu Osaka Hatsubaisho and Fu Hing Oil Co., Ltd. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. Nos. 90306-07 (30 July 1990)

 Communications Materials and Design v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102223

(22 August 1996)
 First Philippine International Bank v. Court of Appeals, 322 Phil. 280 (1996)
 Manila Hotel Corp v. NLRC, G.R. No. 120077 (13 October 2000)
 Pacific Consultants v. Schonfeld, G.R. No. 166920 (19 February 2007)
 Raytheon International Inc. v Rouzie, GR 162894, 26 Feb 2008
7. Law to be applied
 Aznar v. Christensen-Garcia, G.R. No. L-16749 (31 January 1963)
 Cadalin vs. POEA Administrator, 238 SCRA 721, 774-775 (1994)
C. Foreign Law
1. Ascertainment and Proof of Foreign Law; Doctrine of Processual Presumption
 Sy Joc Lieng v. Sy Quia, 16 Phil 137 (1910)
 In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156 (1918)
 Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610 (1930)
 Williamette v. Muzzal, 61 Phil. 471 (1935)
 CIR v. Fisher, G.R. Nos. L-11622 (28 January 1961)
 Pardo v. Republic, 85 Phil. 323 (1950)
 Philippine Commecial and Industrial Bank v. Escolin, 56 SCRA 266 (1974)
 Zalamea vs. Court of Appeals and Transworld Airlines, supra
 Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Guerrero, G.R. No. 136804 (19 February
2003)
 Crescent Problem v. M/V “Lok Maheshwari”, G.R. No. 155014 (11 November
2005)
 EDI-Staff Builders International Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 145587 (26 October
2007)
 ATCI Overseas Corp v Echin, GR 178551, 11 Oct 2010
2. Exceptions to the Application of Foreign Law
 Dacanay v. Florendo, R.R. No. L-2071 (19 September 1950)
 Yao Kee, et al. v. Sy-Gonzales, G.R. No. L-55960 (24 November 1988)
 Bank of America v. American Realty Corporation, G.R. No. 133876 (29
December 1999)