Categories of Goals in Philosophy for

Children

Anastasia Anderson

Studies in Philosophy and Education

An International Journal

ISSN 0039-3746

Stud Philos Educ

DOI 10.1007/s11217-020-09724-x

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Studies in Philosophy and Education
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11217-020-09724-x

Categories of Goals in Philosophy for Children

Anastasia Anderson1 

© Springer Nature B.V. 2020

Abstract
Philosophy for children is an educational movement that includes diverse goals that are not
always clearly articulated by theorists and practitioners. In order to navigate the multitude
of aims found in the philosophy for children literature I propose distinguishing between the
following categories of goals: aims of education; educational goals of philosophy for chil-
dren (internal and external); goals of a community of philosophical inquiry (procedural,
epistemic, encounter, community, telos); goals of the facilitator; and goals of the children.
The definitions of these various types are given along with some examples of how the dis-
tinctions between them can be of aid in understanding the approaches, criticisms, and prac-
tice of philosophy for children.

Keywords  Philosophy for children · Aims of education · Instrumentalism · Facilitation ·

Community of inquiry

…without continual, reflective discussion of aims, education may become a poor

substitute for its best vision. (Noddings 2005, p. 76)

Introduction

Philosophy for children is a pedagogical movement that began over five decades ago with
the work of Matthew Lipman and Ann Margaret Sharp who argued vigorously and persua-
sively for the importance of introducing philosophy into schools and developing classroom
communities of philosophical inquiry. Their influential theoretical work is widely studied,
and their curriculum materials are still in use today. However, as more people engage chil-
dren in philosophy, the ways of doing so are changing to fit different cultural, political,

* Anastasia Anderson
anastasia.anderson@ufv.ca
1
Department of Philosophy, University of the Fraser Valley, 33844 King Road, Abbotsford,
BC V2S 7M8, Canada

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and philosophical perspectives. The proliferation of distinct approaches to doing philoso-

phy with children has been described as a shift from ‘Philosophy for Children’ as a method
to its current status as a movement with two or three different stages1 (Vansieleghem and
Kennedy 2011; Johansson 2018). These stages are distinguished not only by variations in
elements of practice in the classroom (and other settings2), but also by the differing goals
and epistemological commitments of the practitioners.3 Unfortunately, the diverse aims of
philosophy for children programs that contribute to making them distinct are not always
clearly stated or fully elaborated. The lack of clarity about the goals of philosophy for chil-
dren has the potential to present problems for advocates called upon to defend the move-
ment, for anyone who wishes to understand theoretical and practical differences within it,
and for those who wish to develop and improve their own practice. Gregory (2013) urges
theorists to articulate the objectives and standards of their programs, noting that “there is
no meaningful consensus about the proper aims of precollege philosophy education, and
few of the aims that have been advanced have been studied empirically with regard to the
kinds of materials and methods likely to achieve them.” (2013, p. 6). My contention is that
the most pressing problem is not a lack of consensus about goals, but a lack of recognition
and discussion of the complex and overlapping network of types of goals at play in philos-
ophy for children. These different types are easily elided and have never been fully teased
apart in the literature. The result is that when different goals are expressed by various theo-
rists, it is not always evident whether they are making claims about the same category of
goals and so the extent of their disagreement can be unclear. Moreover, the lack of clarity
about the different types of goals allows for easy misinterpretation and criticism of philoso-
phy for children. Even Lipman, who discusses goals in great detail, is sometimes charac-
terised as holding that the purpose of the program is to enhance and support a particular
political system, but is also taken to be using philosophy as a thinking skills program (e.g.,
see Välitalo et al. 2016, p. 82; Biesta 2017, p. 4). Both understandings are, I believe, cor-
rect, but relate to different types of goals and when treated in isolation without an explana-
tion of how they are connected, can be misleading and result in misdirected criticism.
In a more practical vein, the absence of clearly stated goals and distinctions between
types of goals makes it difficult to understand what counts as better and worse practices of
philosophy for children or even what might make one session better than another within a
single practice. Success is relative to goal. And type of success is relative to type of goal.
The aspects of the children’s dialogue that practitioners keep in mind as they respond to
the children and assess each session are determined by various interconnected aims such as
what the practitioner takes to be the educational value of philosophy, their personal goals
for their practice, and what one should try to accomplish in a single session. Take the fol-
lowing example from my own experience.
During summer camp one year, a group of six to eight-year-old children are discuss-
ing the book, The Gift of Nothing. Their facilitator asks them: Is a gift of nothing a
good present? During the dialogue, the children explore fertile philosophical ground
such as the concepts of “nothing” and “everything,” the importance of friendship,

1
  I refer to the various practices which claim to engage children in philosophy in an educational setting,
‘philosophy for children’, but the focus of my discussion is on those approaches that rely on the use of the
community of philosophical inquiry dialogue.
2
  E.g., camps, after school programs, museum programs, etc.
3
  For discussion of such differences, see, e.g., Vansieleghem and Kennedy (2011), Välitalo et  al. (2016),
Golding (2017) and McCall (2009).

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and what makes a gift valuable. They do a good job of giving reasons, building on
each other’s ideas using phrases such as “I agree with…” and “I disagree with…”
and noting when they changed their minds. When asked how they would feel if they
got an empty box as a birthday present, one camper, Nina, notes that she would not
mind getting such a gift because being with a friend on your birthday is more impor-
tant than getting a present. At lunchtime immediately after the inquiry session, the
facilitator speaks informally with the children near her. She asks again how they
would feel about getting a box of nothing as a birthday present. Nina immediately
says, “Oh, it would be horrible. I would hate it!” The facilitator expresses surprise
and gently reminds her of what she had said during the discussion. The child replies,
pointing to the circle of chairs in the centre of the room where the dialogue took
place, “That is just what I said in there. That isn’t what things are like really.”
Was this philosophy for children session successful? The answer to that question depends
upon the goals of philosophy for children and how one understands their scaffolding.
In order to navigate the goals4 evident in the theory and practice of philosophy for chil-
dren, I propose categorizing them into different types potentially at play in any approach.
This taxonomy of goals is intended to highlight distinctions found in theoretical writing,
some explicitly stated and some implied. I make no claim to it being an exhaustive list of
relevant types of aims, nor is the intention to present every goal that has been stated by
practitioners and theorists. Rather, my modest claim is that attention to these different cat-
egories of goals can be useful in clarifying positions and areas of disagreement, as well as
helpful in providing a guide to research and a touchstone in practice. I begin with the list of
types of goals and in later sections develop my explanation of each kind by using examples
from the philosophy for children literature.
Types of goals:

1. The aims of education.

2. The educational goals of philosophy for children.

(a) Internal.
(b) External.

3. The goals of the community of philosophical inquiry.

(a) Procedural.
(b) Epistemic.
(c) Encounter.
(d) Community.
(e) Telos.

4. The goals of the facilitator.

5. The goals of the children.

4
  I use the words ‘goal’ and ‘aim’ as synonyms.

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The ‘Aims of Education’ and the ‘Educational Goals of Philosophy

for Children’

An inquiry into the aims of philosophy might seem like a natural starting point for a dis-
cussion of the types of goals relevant to philosophy for children. However, such an investi-
gation, while relevant, would be the wrong beginning for the purposes of this article. Phi-
losophy for children is not simply children philosophizing. If we understand philosophy
for children as part of children’s education that requires trained facilitators who bring phi-
losophy to schools and other educational settings and that can be evaluated for success or
lack thereof, we engage in philosophy for children with specific reasons relating to our con-
ception of the goals of education and the educational value of philosophy. Lipman writes
that Philosophy for Children is “educational philosophy (i.e., philosophy functioning edu-
cationally…)” (2008, p. 148). Even those who oppose using any set method and are criti-
cal of having specific aims for doing philosophy for children still hold that space should
be opened in schools for children’s philosophical experiences (e.g., Carvalho and Kohan
2019). This suggests that some form of adult participation in children’s experience with
philosophy is beneficial and that there are good reasons to so engage. Therefore, implicit
in the practice of philosophy for children are views about education and its goals. Adults
have reasons for inviting children to engage in philosophy at school and in other children’s
programs and at least some of those reasons can be cast in terms of the aims and nature of
education. The first distinction between types of goals is, therefore, between what I will
call the ‘aims of education’ and the ‘educational goals of philosophy for children’.
The ‘aims of education’ are the general goals of education to which all educational
subjects and programs are meant to contribute in one way or another. The aims of edu-
cation can be multiple or single, valuable in relation to each other, or each valuable in
its own right. The goals might involve goods for society and/or goods for each individual
being educated. There is no clear agreement about the aims of education among writers
on philosophy for children just as there is little agreement about them among philosophers
of education more generally. Some recent work in philosophy for children has positioned
them in relation to Biesta’s characterization of the functions of education as qualification,
socialisation, and subjectification (E.g., Välitalo 2017; Murris 2016). And while most theo-
rists object to the aims of education that Noddings (2005) disapprovingly sees as prevalent
in the United States, i.e., those of keeping the national economy strong and giving each
child the opportunity to do well financially, some of the reasons given for doing philoso-
phy for children imply the adoption of those goal (Gregory 2013, pp. 9–10). Sharp (1987,
1992) explicitly accepts both autonomy and democratic citizenship as aims of education.
Gregory suggests that “living well must become the primary educational aim to which
other aims should be expected to contribute” (2013, p. 10). In contrast to the aims of edu-
cation are what I will call the ‘educational goals of philosophy for children’. These are the
aims specific to the practice. These goals are the skills, knowledge, dispositions, or some
other benefit that adults hope children take away with them after doing philosophy. These
goals set out the desired impact of philosophy for children. Any discipline or subject matter
that is educational can be understood as supporting the aims of education in some way, but
not all do so in the same way (even if there is overlap).
In the philosophy for children literature one finds many different descriptions of its edu-
cational goals. In Lipman et al. (1980), it is suggested that the aim of education is meaning
and the educational goal of philosophy for children can be very broadly identified as the
development of thinking skills and dispositions. Philosophy, they claim, holds a special

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place in relation to the more general aims of education because it helps other disciplines
become meaningful to children by encouraging them to think for themselves and reflect
critically on the assumptions and procedures of all areas of study. In the philosophy for
children literature more broadly, one finds reference to many educational goals of the prac-
tice including helping students construct a stable (but fallible) worldview, learn canonical
philosophical content, and develop a philosophical ear (Gregory 2013). The Philosophy
Foundation (nd) claims that one goal of doing philosophy for children is to help them learn
intellectual virtues and lists 46 of them. Gregory, who suggests wisdom-oriented objectives
for education, categorizes 21 educational goals of philosophy for children in terms of Eth-
ics, Physics, and Logic. It is also common for theorists and organizations that advocate for
philosophy for children in schools to note that philosophy for children results in improved
test scores in reading and math, general academic success and improved self-esteem; oth-
ers link philosophy for children to peace education and the goal of decreasing violence.5
Because there is a dizzying array of stated educational goals of philosophy for children, it
is helpful to organize them in terms of those that are internal and external to philosophy.

Internal and External Educational Goals of Philosophy for Children

Rondhuis and Van der Leeuw (2000) distinguish between internal and external effects of
philosophy for children. External effects are those found in areas other than philosophical
discussion. Internal effects are those that impact philosophical thinking which they char-
acterize in terms of three tendencies: “one that stresses analytical and reasoning qualities,
one dealing with ambiguities, vaguenesses, or borderline explorations, and one stressing
contact with real life experience.” (2000, p. 30) While the effects of an educational practice
are not necessarily goals (e.g., a university lecture might have the effect of causing some
students to be bored, but it’s hardly the goal), the external effects of philosophy for children
are often offered as reasons to include philosophy in the school curriculum. So, it is worth-
while introducing a distinction between the internal educational goals of philosophy for
children and the external educational goals of philosophy for children. Following Rondhuis
and Van der Leeuw, I call the ‘internal educational goals of philosophy for children’ those
that are directly relevant to the practice of philosophy (philosophizing or living philosophi-
cally) and the ‘external educational goals of philosophy for children’ those that have their
impact outside of philosophy. Thus, generally improved academic performance and higher
test scores in math and reading would count as external goals and intellectual virtues and
the development of a philosophical ear would be internal goals.
What is the value of distinguishing between the aims of education and the educational
goals (internal and external) of philosophy for children? For those interested in the theory
of philosophy for children, the distinctions help clarify criticisms and defenses of it. For
those engaged in the practice of philosophy for children, they raise important questions
about the relationship between goals and practice. For both, these two types of goals deter-
mine the content of many of the other goals at play in philosophy for children. Turning first
to the theoretical use of the distinctions, it is evident that some criticisms of philosophy
for children are explicitly directed toward what are taken to be its goals. The distinctions
are helpful in parsing that criticism and in understanding how theoretical support differs

5
  See, e.g., Topping et al. (2019), Goering et al. (2013) and Lipman (2003).

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or might be improved. For example, Vansieleghem (2005) writes, “The autonomy that the
child gains through Philosophy for Children by critical thinking and dialogue is nothing
more than the freedom to occupy a pre-constituted place in that discourse.” (2005, p. 25).
Relying on Arendt’s analysis of natality, she argues that the emphasis on critical thinking
skills eliminates freedom, thinking, and genuine dialogue because it eliminates the pos-
sibility of something new. She appears to hold that the educational goals of philosophy
for children, which involve a predetermined conception of what counts as good thinking,
do not support freedom and democracy (which she appears to posit as aims of education).
Thus, she can be understood as claiming that in philosophy for children, the educational
goals of the practice conflict with what many theorists themselves hold to be the aims of
education. Biesta, too, raises concerns about the educational goals of philosophy for chil-
dren in relation to the aims of education. He suggests that by focussing on rational argu-
ment and critical thinking skills, the educational goals of philosophy for children do not
contribute to the aim of education concerned with existing in the world and arousing “the
desire in another human being for wanting to exist in the world as subject.” (2017, p. 420).
Biesta warns that philosophy for children is in danger of instrumentalization if its purpose
is to help children develop critical thinking skills useful for getting by in a global capitalist
economy.
Defenders of philosophy for children who deny that it is a form of ‘instrumentalism’
can use the distinction between types of goals to clarify the relationships between them.
In my view, the best way to do this is to be explicit that for philosophy for children the
aims of education are intrinsic goods such as wisdom, happiness, flourishing, or autonomy
and the educational goals of philosophy are internal and identical with at least a subset of
those aims. In other words, the internal educational goals of philosophy for children, those
related to the development of philosophical thinking and philosophical sensitivity, are best
understood as facets of the general aim of education which is to foster wisdom. Philosophy
for children avoids instrumentalism when it explicitly refuses to identify its educational
goals as a set of predetermined skills conceived of instrumentally, such as mastery of gen-
erally accepted rules of logical reasoning or improved reading ability, and instead takes the
goals to be the development of habits and judgments that are part of living thoughtfully or
wisely. Although this understanding of the relationship between types of goals in philoso-
phy for children is not universal, it is part of Lipman and Sharp’s founding approach (Greg-
ory 2011). The thinking skills Lipman et al. (1980) hold as necessary to finding meaning
are later described by Lipman (2003), as critical, collaborative, creative, and caring think-
ing, which are linked with action, moral character, and awareness of self in relation to oth-
ers. These skills are not seen as tools to achieve economic or academic success, rather their
exercise is described as part of what constitutes a meaningful life (Gregory 2011, p. 200;
Sharp 1987, p. 43) or as Gregory (2013) puts it, ‘living well’ or ‘wisdom’.
The distinctions in types of goals are also relevant to practical issues in philosophy for
children. For example, those who encourage schools to include programs in their curric-
ulum can be tempted to emphasize external effects such as improved math and reading
scores, and improved cognitive abilities. These claims can be made in good conscience
because philosophy for children does result in these improvements.6 If philosophy for chil-
dren has these instrumental benefits and they are what lead to the adoption of programs in
schools then, it may be thought, there is no harm in emphasizing them in a ‘sales pitch’.

6
  See, e.g., Trickey and Topping (2007) and EEF ( 2015).

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However, with philosophy for children, this approach has some dangers. If these effects
are taken to be goals, the success of programs will be measured in terms of them. Moreo-
ver, how one facilitates children’s philosophical dialogue turns on what one understands as
goals. Karaba (2012) explores the close relationship between the goals and means of doing
philosophy for children as part of a response to charges of instrumentalism against philoso-
phy for children. Taking Dewey’s understanding of aims as connected to means, he argues
that the aims of education are not abstract, universals external to philosophy for children,
but ways of engaging in philosophy for children. He writes, “This perspective views the
goals of democracy and thinking in P4C as not some general abstraction to be attained,
but as suggestions for P4C educators to focus their observations and guide their actions
while engaged in the activity, i.e. the means, of P4C.” (2012, p. 51). Even if one disagrees
with the details of Karaba’s position, whatever facilitators take as the educational goals of
philosophy for children will determine patterns of salience for them in the community of
inquiry and impact what they take to be the goals of each dialogue. Lack of clarity about
goals and the relationships between them affects how one engages in philosophy for chil-
dren and how its effectiveness is understood.

The Goals of a Community of Philosophical Inquiry

The ‘means’ of philosophy for children most commonly involve the community of philo-
sophical inquiry (CPI) which is the cornerstone of almost all approaches. I will use the
term CPI broadly to include the group of children and adult(s), their philosophical dia-
logue, the presentation of stimulus material, determination of inquiry questions, and other
elements that might be included in a philosophy ‘session’ as support for and part of the
development of the inquiry (e.g., small group talk time, short exercises, art activities). The
CPI used as the actual engagement in the pedagogical practice has the educational goals of
philosophy for children. However, we can distinguish those goals from the specific aims of
an individual CPI. The educational goals of philosophy for children, as I have defined the
term, are outcomes in the sense that they are the lasting effects that educators hope philoso-
phy has on children. Achieving these goals may require significant time as they are often
identified, in my view correctly, as internalized skills, virtues, habits, and stable world-
views. I, therefore, distinguish the educational goals of philosophy for children from the
goals of a CPI. The ‘goals of the CPI’ are goals realizable within that CPI. Some of the
goals of the community of inquiry dialogue may be shared by all communities of inquiry
and can be described in general terms with content to be filled in for each CPI, but others
may be unique, emerge from the context, and exist only for that community at that time.
The goals of the first CPI with a group may differ from those of the tenth. As particular
to each CPI, these goals are distinct from the educational goals of philosophy for children
even though they are generally adopted because they contribute to the realization of the
educational goals and thus are largely determined by them. Having a grasp on the goals of
an individual CPI gives us criteria to use in evaluating it and may be useful in tracking its
progress.7
7
  Reznitskaya (2005) notes the importance of assessing both the discussion (e.g., the use of reasons in the
dialogue) and the educational outcomes of the philosophy for children programs which she characterizes
with the question: “Have students participating in dialogical discussions internalized useful strategies that
would allow them to perform better on reasoning tasks when social support is no longer available?” (p.
8). This implies a distinction between the goals of a CPI and the educational goals of philosophy for chil-
dren.

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Epistemic and Procedural Goals of the CPI

In writing on how children make progress in philosophy for children, Golding distin-
guishes between epistemic progress and procedural progress. Epistemic progress is pro-
gress towards “better ideas, insights or understandings” (2017, p.  65 italics in original)
and procedural progress is characterized in terms of getting better thinking skills, dialogue
skills, communicative practices, habits of mind, and becoming better people. Golding
(2012) maintains that there is a conflation in the literature between the two and that the
literature focuses on procedural progress. He claims, “Both types of progress have edu-
cational value, but it is only epistemic progress that supports the epistemic legitimacy of
inquiry. If students do not develop better answers, judgments, or conceptions, their educa-
tional inquiry is epistemically pointless, regardless of whether they improve their inquiry
skills, get better at dialogical inquiry, or foster communicative practices.” (2012, p.  679)
Golding does not clearly distinguish between what I have called the educational goals of
philosophy for children and the goals of the individual CPI. However, in what follows,
I will call the ‘procedural goals of the CPI’ the goals related to maintaining a particular
method and type of thinking within the community during a particular session. I thereby
shift Golding’s notion of procedural progress by confining procedural goals to the CPI and
including as procedural the method used by a particular approach. So, for example, some
procedural goals of the CPI might include following Lipman (2003)’s steps for creating a
community of inquiry. The procedural goals might be for children to encounter stimulus
material, formulate an inquiry question, engage in facilitated dialogue in which they fol-
low standards of good reasoning as they address the question. We might include within the
procedural goals the practicing of critical, caring, creative, and collaborative thinking and
putting everything, including the procedures, into question (Lipman 2003, p. 84). And, a
goal might be not just to introduce and practice these things but improve on them during
dialogue. The procedural goals include the practicing of skills or actions the internalization
of which might be included in the educational goals of philosophy for children.
The ‘epistemic goals of a CPI’ are the goals related to what is understood as a success-
ful judgment or other cognitive state. Lipman, in writing about the community of inquiry
states, “First I think we need to see that the community of inquiry is not aimless. It is a
process that aims at producing a product -at some kind of settlement or judgment, however
partial and tentative this may be.” (2003, p. 83). The epistemic goals of a CPI are a locus
of disagreement among theorists because a clear statement of them requires commitment
to an epistemological position. Golding maintains that despite this disagreement about the
epistemic aim of the CPI, epistemic progress in most philosophy for children sessions can
be understood in terms of a set of milestones because in practice the epistemic aim of the
CPI is generally some variety of a better understanding, conception, answer or resolution
(2017, p. 69). He argues that epistemic progress should not be measured solely in terms of
whether or not we achieve an end such as a true judgment in answer to the inquiry ques-
tion, but instead should be measured along a continuum which allows for improvement
to be made on the way to the goal. He proposes the following milestones for epistemic
progress: “(1) Identify and articulate a philosophical problem. (2) Hypothesize possible
resolutions to this problem. (3) Elaborate each possible resolution… (4) Critically evaluate
the possible resolutions… (5) Resolve the problem.” (2017, p. 71).
It is tempting to hold that Golding’s milestones for epistemic progress are epistemic
goals of the CPI in many conceptions of philosophy for children. However, there is a prob-
lem if we do this. For many methods, positing these milestones as epistemic goals would

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not adequately distinguish them from what I have called the procedural goals of the CPI.
The milestones are markers along the path of a particular model or method of thinking in
community and so would count as developing and practicing skills that are meant to be
internalized. In other words, the epistemic goals would collapse into the procedural goals.
This is to be expected. If the procedures used in the CPI are designed to give children
practice in following the methods of good thinking and good thinking is defined (at least
in part) in terms of its success in leading to good judgments then good thinking is thinking
that travels the path of Golding’s milestones of epistemic progress as a matter of proce-
dure. Nevertheless, the distinction between the epistemic and procedural goals of a CPI is
conceptually important because it problematizes the relationship between them. The dis-
tinction raises the question of whether epistemic goals for a CPI can be met without the
procedural goals being met and of whether one type of goal should have priority over the
other. For example, if one takes a procedural goal to be allowing children to create and
choose their own inquiry question, is it better to meet that goal than to meet an epistemic
goal such as resolving the problem? Is giving everyone the opportunity to speak more
important than allowing time for an individual to elaborate on a hypothesis? And given that
many philosophy for children sessions are run in 60 minute blocks, the question of what to
prioritize can be pressing.
Of equal importance is that the distinction between epistemic and procedural goals of
a CPI highlights how epistemological commitments inform method. As Murris writes,
“One’s epistemology and ontology (e.g., what is a ‘child’?) alter what counts as progress
or what is valuable in P4C, and therefore directly influence pedagogical interventions.”
(2008, p. 676). McCall (2009) is particularly clear in setting out the different philosophi-
cal commitments of some popular approaches and juxtaposing these with their ways of
doing philosophy for children. For example, in McCall’s own approach which has at its
foundation a realist epistemology and sets the epistemic goal as the elimination of error
and false beliefs, the chair (facilitator) chooses the question and children are encouraged to
state their opinion and also offer possible positions that they do not hold in order to submit
those to critical scrutiny. The chair chooses speakers based on what will move the dialogue
forward most effectively and highlight fruitful disagreements. In the SAPERE practice, as
McCall describes it, which adopts the pragmatist foundations that are at the root of Lip-
man’s model, children vote to determine the inquiry question and are asked to explore their
own responses. The democratic nature of the community of inquiry is of primary impor-
tance and the facilitator does not control the discussion to the same extent as in McCall’s
CoPI method. Thus, a clear statement of the epistemological goals of the CPI understood
as separable from the procedural, allows us to examine the relationship between epistemo-
logical commitments and the procedural goals of the CPI as well as the epistemic com-
mitments of the educational goals of philosophy for children more broadly. If we take, for
example, the educational goal to be wisdom, what is understood by wisdom will involve an
epistemological stance that in turn determines both the procedures used in a CPI and what
counts as epistemological progress.

Encounter Goals of the CPI

Thus far, the discussion of the goals of the CPI has focused on those that are means to
reaching the educational goals of philosophy for children. A goal of a CPI might be for
children to offer reasons for their beliefs during the dialogue because the educational goal

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is for children to develop the habit of paying attention to reasons when determining what to
believe. However, the CPI can have goals that are not educational. The goal might be sim-
ply to invite the children to have an experience that has intrinsic value apart from any edu-
cational goal or impact. The goal of the CPI might be that children encounter and respond
to philosophical perplexity or recognize the force of the perspectives of other children. I
suggest the name ‘encounter goal of the CPI’ to capture the aim of giving children the
opportunity to have a philosophical encounter and leave it open whether reaching this goal
is part of meeting further educational goals. Of course, if the encounter is not conceived
of as relating to educational goals, there needs to be some justification for why it should
occur in schools rather than in other areas of life. Encounter goals and procedural goals
might overlap for theorists who hold that children’s experience of encountering each other
and constructing meaning together is part of the method of the CPI, but others eschew
procedural and epistemic goals altogether and might still accept that there are encounter
goals. Encounter goals might also have political rather than educational motivation. For
example, the encounter might provide an occasion to hear the voices of specific children in
the community and offer a space for the exercise of these children’s legal and moral right to
freedom of expression. The success of a CPI might then turn on whether the goal of offer-
ing children space and opportunity for experience or expression has been adequately met.

Community Goals of the CPI

It is difficult to separate the community from the inquiry in a community of inquiry. The
community forms the way that it does because of the nature of the inquiry and the inquiry
forms the way it does because of the community members. According to Lipman (e.g.,
Lipman 1988), the thinking that occurs within the community is an essential part of learn-
ing to think on one’s own because thinking for oneself is an internalization of thinking in
community. While the educational goals of philosophy for children are often described in
terms of benefits to children as individuals and not to the group that forms the community
of inquiry, many of the goals for the CPI and measures of progress are made for the group
rather than for each individual within the group. It is not only individuals who make epis-
temic and procedural progress during a CPI, but the community as a whole and facilitation
largely focuses on that group progress. When positing goals of the CPI, it is important to
note whether they are goals for each individual in the group, for the group as a whole, or
both. So, the goals of the CPI can be for the community within a CPI even though the edu-
cational goals are for the individual after they leave the community of inquiry. But it is also
possible for some CPI goals to be for the community that exists during the CPI and remains
a community after the CPI is over. I will call the ‘community goals of the CPI’ those that
exist for the specific community simply as that community and not only as a community of
inquiry. I will leave it open whether these goals are educational or not. They could relate
to the aim of developing a more cohesive classroom community, or the creation of a com-
munity of friends or activists. The community goals vary widely given different contexts
and the people in the community. If philosophy for children is done with a group of young
offenders, there might be very different community goals for them than when it is done
with nursery school students or a soccer team (see, e.g., Newby et  al. 2018). The ques-
tion of whether community goals for the CPI exist as distinct from other goals prompts us
to consider the nature of the community of inquiry qua community and the relationship
between philosophy for children and that community.

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Telos of the CPI

The final goal of the CPI that I propose is what I call the ‘telos of the CPI’. If the CPI
is conceived as a practice that has its own internal goods and associated excellences, at
least one of the educational goals of philosophy for children is to help children develop the
excellences of this practice. However, I also think there may be a telos for each CPI which
is not simply the sum of the other goals and might not even require all the other goals to
be met. Reaching the telos is a goal for the community as a whole rather than for indi-
vidual community members. It is a perfection that is relative to each community. The telos
of a community of experienced philosophers would be quite different than that of begin-
ners. In the community of beginners, the ‘procedures’ may not be followed perfectly, little
epistemic progress may be made, even the encounter goals may not be fully accomplished
(depending on what one understands by them) but the community of inquiry may neverthe-
less reach its telos in the sense that a beginner dance performance may reach its own per-
fection. And, perhaps it is difficult for those who have no dance experience to understand
what that means. Those experienced in the practice can recognize that the telos is reached
when outsiders have no idea. The beginner dance performance in which all the dancers
point their toes might be farther away from the telos than the performance in which the
dancers forget their lessons in dance technique. Moreover, to pursue the analogy, the begin-
ner dancers, because of their lack of technique bring something new and totally their own
to their performance that may lead to an entirely new form of dance if it is pursued or is
allowed to inform the dancing of the more experienced. I define the ‘telos of a CPI’ as the
active perfection of that CPI relative to the community members and nature of the inquiry.

Goals of the CPI Considered

Recognizing the various types of goals of a CPI helps to clarify differences in theory and
practice and emphasizes how those goals relate to the educational goals of philosophy for
children. For example, Kohan (2014) appears to reject both procedural and epistemic goals
for the CPI. He holds that philosophy “is an experience of thinking, and that teaching phi-
losophy has to do with promoting such experiences.” (2014, p. 37). As an experience it is
“unique, unrepeatable, and non-negotiable” and philosophical thinking cannot be “normal-
ized, uniformized, or standardized” (2014, p. 37). Following Deleuze, Kohan argues that
thinking must emerge from an encounter with what forces us to think, doubt, question,
what takes us out of our normal attitude. And as such, it is unpredictable. So, where there
are predetermined forms or methods, there will not be philosophical thinking. (2014, p. 38)
Kohan and Carvalho (2019) suggest that if practitioners think in terms of procedures and
method, taking progress to be of central importance in philosophy for children, they might
be making the mistake of embracing a model of education that values process in terms of
outcomes and positioning schools as places where certain kinds of human beings are to
be produced. Kohan and Carvalho suggest that teaching philosophy should be about let-
ting children learn and “opening spaces so that philosophy might be (re)created whenever
children’s experiences call for it.” (2019, p. 286). While they appear to allow that a CPI has
a particular structure [“a structure of its own” (2019, p. 286)], Kohan and Carvalho write
that “Once we realize that the community of philosophical inquiry goes far beyond the
scope of (a) methodology, thinking can no longer be experienced as an isolated routine.”

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(2019, p. 286). This suggests that Kohan and Carvalho would reject the existence of pro-
cedural goals in the CPI or limit them severely. The procedural goals often include those
related to following method in the structure of the CPI, but also goals related to children
practicing specific thinking skills. These are the kinds of goals that are problematic for
Kohan and Carvalho. However, their critical attitude toward method still leaves space for
both encounter goals and a telos for the CPI and, perhaps, even epistemic goals if what
counts as having ‘better ideas’ and ‘good judgment’ does not require pre-determined cri-
teria and an epistemological commitment that eliminates the possibility of newness. The
encounter goal might be to create space where philosophy may be (re)created. They might
also be willing to embrace the telos of a CPI if it is understood as a form of love (the telos
of the CPI could be cast as the active love of thinking together) and not associated with
method.
Murris (2008), too, voices concern about setting rigid procedures or goals in philosophy
for children that imply that thinking can be taught mechanically. However, her concerns
can be understood as ranging across the kinds of goals thus far adduced. She objects to
understanding education as serving the ends of manufacturing citizens, workers or con-
sumers and writes that in philosophy for children, “such instrumentalism can also be at
work when the goals that guide facilitation are predetermined—e.g. the P4C child needs to
become a ‘responsible citizen’, a ‘critical thinker’ and a ‘reasonable person in control of its
emotions’—fixed and defined by the adult world.” (2008, p. 675). This is an objection to
a particular conception of the aims of education, educational goals of philosophy for chil-
dren, and their influence on the goals of the CPI. She allows that community of inquiry dia-
logues have outcomes, but “they are unexpected, provisional, and creative.” (2008, p. 675).
This suggests that the educational goals of philosophy for children should not be fixed and
perhaps neither should the goals of the CPI. However, she appears to accept the idea of
epistemic progress. Here we find an example of a position that might be helpfully clarified
with reference to different types of goals. Murris evidently objects to certain conceptions
of the goal of education and to any educational goal of philosophy for children that is to
create a ‘critical thinker’ or ‘reasonable person’ as defined by adults. However, she allows
for forms of progress within a dialogue and is critical of facilitators who do not understand
the aims of philosophical dialogue.
The final two kinds of goals that I propose are sometimes referred to obliquely in the
literature but are rarely discussed in detail. Nevertheless, consideration of them prompts
reflection on the development of philosophy for children practice and their place in the
network of other goals.

The Goals of the Facilitator

The ‘goals of the facilitator’ are what I call the aims that facilitators have for themselves in
relation to their practice. It might appear that the goals of the facilitator have already been
decided by the various aims outlined above. One could argue that the goal of a facilitator
is to meet the other goals that have been set out. And, of course, the goals of the facilitator
are largely determined by their understanding of those of the CPI, the educational goals of
philosophy for children, the aims of education and, as Välitalo (2017) notes, by attempts
to balance various goals of education in practice. In fact, facilitation is part of the CPI and
so could be included under procedural goals of the CPI. However, there is a great deal of
scope for interpretation of these goals in individual practice, especially in the development

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of stimulus materials, and understanding of how and when the facilitator should intervene.
Facilitators need to consider not only the goals of philosophy for children, but their own
personalities, strengths, and weaknesses in developing a facilitation style. Thus, even indi-
vidual practitioners within the same approach to philosophy for children may have different
goals for their own practice. A facilitator’s choices may be so contextual that any kind of
teaching manual is of little help. For example, there are different understandings of what
constitutes the optimal balance between the facilitator’s presence and absence, as Worley
(2016) puts it. Facilitators need to make quick decisions about how to guide discussion,
when to ask follow up questions, and when to simply allow the children to speak in turn.
The goals of a facilitator can be a source of significant difference and disagreement in phi-
losophy for children.
Some goals of the facilitator may relate to their own attitudes and assumptions. Facilita-
tors are often told that they must remain neutral when facilitating an inquiry and not offer
their own views on an inquiry question in order to avoid leading the group in a particular
direction; and so, this might be adopted as a goal. However, the exact nature of this neutral-
ity is subject to debate. The possibility of some forms of neutrality and particularly the illu-
sion of a neutral, ahistoric understanding of ‘reasonableness’ has recently been questioned
by Chetty (2018) who suggests that it can allow racist assumptions in the practice and in
the CPI to remain unquestioned. He argues that in order to teach reasonableness, the study
of history might also be a requirement. Furthermore, by not responding to underlying racist
or sexist cultural attitudes brought into the inquiry by children, and by relying on minority
children, who are already silenced by the majority culture, to offer a different perspective
to the group, facilitators risk putting minority children at a continued disadvantage and
fail to address racism at play in the room and within the facilitator’s own thinking (Chetty
and Suissa 2017). Rainville (2001) warns, “Even when we set democratic goals within the
classroom, children are still subject to the subtle influences and pressures which shape and
constrain all of our lives. The absence of overt ridicule may be insufficient to overcome
problems associated with low self-esteem or the sense of futility often experienced by
those subjected to prolonged institutional oppression” (p. 69). Thus, facilitators, particu-
larly those racialized as white, may have as a goal for themselves to explicitly engage with
racism.
A further source of hidden assumptions in choices made by facilitators is their under-
standing of childhood. One goal of the facilitator may be to engage in consistent philosoph-
ical reflection on their philosophy of childhood with other practitioners as is suggested by
Kennedy (2015). This would enable reflection on underlying attitudes towards children and
help practitioners to listen to the voices of individual children. Kennedy holds that being a
philosopher of childhood should be understood as a teacher’s ‘vocational identity’. Mur-
ris (2013) recommends embracing epistemic modesty to avoid doing epistemic injustice
to children. Another frequently mentioned goal for the facilitator is to be an appropriate
model for children in the CPI. Lipman (2003) for example, holds that one of the facilita-
tor’s roles is to provide a model of good reasoning (see also Gardner 2015). Kohan, who
rejects modeling because it eliminates difference, still allows that “one positive image that
a teacher can offer is of one who thinks with others—no matter what her age, race or gen-
der—who stages and promotes and facilitates experiences of thinking, who has no models
and promotes no models, who offers others something to think about, who doesn’t obstruct
the road of her students; who propitiates encounters that she cannot herself advance or fore-
see.” (Kohan 2002, p. 10). The goals of the facilitator may be highly individual or generic,
but they do appear to form a set that is at least potentially distinct from the other goals of
philosophy for children even though they are usually constructed with reference to them.

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The Goals of the Children

The final type of goal to be addressed is the goal of the children when they accept the
invitation to engage in philosophy. Here is where I believe there is very little to be said
because, as far as I can tell, children are rarely asked what their goals are in engaging in
philosophy for children. The question may even sound a bit strange because children who
are doing philosophy as part of a school curriculum rarely have a choice about whether or
not to do so. Children who participate in extra-curricular activities might be choosing to do
philosophy, but they might also be given few options or sent to programs by their parents.
So, when children participate in philosophy for children, they usually do not engage on
the basis of a fully free and informed decision. On the other hand, no child is ‘forced’ to
speak beyond the pressure of being asked to do so. It is standard practice to allow children
to ‘pass’ if they would prefer not to speak (standard, but not universal since sometimes
pressure is exerted by the facilitator through targeted questioning of individuals8). A fair
assumption is that children do not have a uniform set of goals any more than practitioners
do. Perhaps the best way to extrapolate children’s goals is by considering what they say
about why they like (or dislike) philosophy. However, what someone likes about something
is not always their goal in doing it. Some might find that the children’s goals in doing phi-
losophy may not be particularly important because those goals are meant to be shaped by
philosophy itself. MacIntyre (1984, p. 188) describes development in the practice of play-
ing chess, with the example of a child starting to learn chess and playing because of a bribe
of candy. Yet, as the child plays and becomes fully immersed in the practice, her under-
standing, goals, and motivation change. Facilitators certainly witness changes in children’s
motivation, as I did recently. At the end of our first CPI, a child ran up to me and moaned,
“When are you going to tell us the answer? I have to know! It is driving me crazy!” But,
at the end of the fifth CPI with the same group when I left them with a question for later
consideration, the child ran up to me and said, “You can’t do that! You can’t ask a question
like that and then leave without letting us talk about it!” If we understand one of the educa-
tional goals of philosophy for children as being the shaping of habits and dispositions, we
need to recognize this as the shaping of emotions and desires. However, this does not mean
that theorists should ignore the goals and desires that children start with or make assump-
tions about the goals and desires they actually walk away with.

Conclusion

I have suggested a framework of different types of goals in the theory and practice of phi-
losophy for children and maintain that the recognition of these types is relevant to both.
In theoretical defenses of philosophy for children, use of the framework helps illuminate
the relationships between various posited aims. When faced with divergent practices the
categories allow us to recognize when the diversity is due to the rejection of certain types
of goals and when it is due to different conceptions within the same category of goal. For
the facilitator or researcher, the assessment of CPIs should also be approached with this
taxonomy in mind. A clear statement of the goals of education, for example, is needed to

8
  For example, in Brenefier’s video recorded philosophy session with high school students https​://www.
youtu​be.com/watch​?v=WqNLl​f7hJk​I. Accessed 07/18/19.

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test whether meeting the goals of the CPI supports them. While the presentation of a theo-
retical defense of philosophy for children or a well-developed assessment tool is far beyond
the scope of this paper, even informal consideration of the various types of goals and their
relationships can prompt a nuanced, evaluative reflection on a CPI. As an example of this,
let’s briefly return to the case of Nina that was described in the introduction and highlight
the use of the types of goals in italics.
In considering the success of the CPI given Nina’s claim that what she said during the
dialogue was not what things are ‘like really’, I need to begin with some understanding
of the aims of education and the educational goals of philosophy for children. If I accept
the aim of education is to help children be successful global citizens and the educational
goal of philosophy for children is to equip children with reasoning and social skills useful
in attaining that success, then Nina’s comment should not be particularly troubling. With
those aims in mind, the goals of the CPI would most likely be related to practicing criti-
cal reasoning and communications skills. She participated in a philosophical dialogue in
which she offered reasons and listened to different perspectives within a group that used
reasoning moves effectively in response to each other. Many of the goals of the CPI would
likely have been met. However, I have suggested that both the aim of education and the
educational goal are wisdom or living well and because of this, my understanding of the
goals of the CPI are different, too. While having the children practice giving reasons and
responding to the reasoning of others are among the goals of the CPI that I accept, another
is for each individual child to respond sincerely in order to offer and test their beliefs as
part of their budding practice in living wisely. But this goal of sincerity is only one of
many goals of the CPI and because the group did not have much experience with CPIs, it
was not a priority for that dialogue. Nevertheless, among my goals as a facilitator is to be
attentive to the goals of the children and her comment indicates that I should think care-
fully about whether I, or something about the cultural assumptions among the group, had
prompted her to say something she did not believe or whether she was simply trying out
an idea to see how others might respond. Also, to me, one important encounter goal of the
CPI is that children have the opportunity to experience the force of a philosophical ques-
tion. Nina’s comment leads me to wonder whether she experienced the perplexity that an
encounter with a philosophical problem can evoke or whether she saw the dialogue as an
empty exercise. I need to consider whether the stimulus material was the right fit for this
community and adjust accordingly. In my evaluation of the CPI, I also must recognize that
I had community goals in mind. This was a group of children who did not know each other
well. One goal was for them to become a group of friends both in and out of the CPI. The
good humor and enthusiastic participation during the dialogue showed success in meeting
one of my community goals of the CPI.
The questions one poses when assessing how well a CPI went and what one can do
better next time are ultimately about one’s aims in opening space for children’s facilitated
philosophical dialogue. In order to understand and organize the various goals that shape
philosophy for children, one must engage in philosophy of education and wrestle with
the nature and content of those aims. The number of questions is not lessened once we
understand the different types of goals at play, but that understanding can help one track
which are being met and which are not and why. In any CPI, there will be goals that are
reached and those that are missed, but adopting the proposed categories of goals gives one
a touchstone for evaluating a CPI against the commitments of one’s practice. I have no
doubt that further distinctions can be made within categories and that other relevant types
of goals may be found, but I believe that even if theorists do not agree on the aims of phi-
losophy for children, the study and practice of philosophy for children can be advanced

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through the use of a common vocabulary and closer attention to the distinctions between
types of goals.

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