IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE 17TH

JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF IN AND FOR

BROWARD COUNTY, , FLORIDA

STATE OF FLORIDA
PLAINTIFF

v.
CASE NO: 2000546CF10A
JUDGE: BARBARA R DUFFY
KAREEM FOREMAN
DEFENDANT
______________________

MOTION TO SUPPRESS PHYSICAL EVIDENCE

KAREEM FOREMAN, pursuant to Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.190. g, (1).A moves the Court to suppress
all evidence seized as a result of an unlawful search and seizure. The evidence to be suppressed is: Baggie
of white stuff. The following grounds are asserted in support of this motion:

OFFICER MILLER’S ACCOUNT

On Tuesday, January 17, 2022, Officer Nicholas Miller alleges that while on routine patrol, I was
directly behind the vehicle in transport westbound in the 2700 block of NW 16th St. The driver of the
vehicle, who is also the defendant, lowered the driver window and I saw his hand and arm emerge. The
DEF made a throwing motion. He saw Foreman had discarded a clear plastic baggie in front of residential
property officer Miller then stopped his patrol vehicle and never lost sight of the baggie, retrieved the
baggie, which he stated was clear of any other debris. The baggie contained 11.5 grams of a chunky white
rock-like substance. Officer Miller recognize this substance to be MDMA or street name, Molly. Miller
allegedly later conducted a field test of this substance which field-tested positive for MDMA using a
NARK 11 test kit. Miller then re-entered his patrol vehicle and conducted a traffic stop on the vehicle in
the 2400 block of NW 16th ST. Arresting Mr. Foreman immediately noting he was found to be in
possession of $366 in various dominations ($20x18,$1x6). at which point he noticed Foreman’s windshield
was tinted. Officer Miller then alleges Mr. Foreman post Miranda stated he thinks the substance was
Molly but wasn’t sure and denied throwing it, despite him on viewing it. He’s been charged Mr. Foreman
with trafficking in MDMA in the first degree and tampering with evidence also a citation for the tint on his
windshield.
 FACTS FROM ASSESSMENT

1. Officer Miller is the only person we can consider a witness in this case.

2. Officer Miller made the accusatory statement that he saw Mr. Foreman with the baggy

3. Officer Miller claims he was on patrol but charged Mr. Foreman with tampering with evidence
4. Officer Miller initiated the encounter from behind noticing his windshield post arrest

5. Officer Miller was actively investigating/pursuing Mr. Foreman hence the tampering charge

6. Officer Miller articulated no reasonable suspicion for investigation or pursuit

7. Officer Miller noticed Mr. Foreman’s windshield after arrest negating cause for stop

8. Noticing no probable cause for an investigation state dismissed the tampering charge

9. Mr. Foreman was identified as possessor of said evidence by the people or witness

10. The witness relieved Mr. Foreman’s obligation to state claim and standing of evidence

11. Mr. Foreman has the right to challenge with standing to personal and possessory interests

12. Mr. Foreman‘s right to due process was violated by interrogation without counsel

13. Mr. Foreman was not booked at the Fort Lauderdale police station he was a trophy

14. The tampering charge indicates intent its dismissal indicates unlawful nature activity

15. Mr. Foreman has standing provided by the people as witness

16. Mr. Foreman at no point waived any rights provided by Florida or US Constitution

17. Active investigations without probable cause or reasonable suspicion are unlawful

18. Abandonment coerced by unlawful police encounters are forced ex compliance statements

19. Investigations include pursuit, observing, searches, seizures, and interrogation

20. Me. Foreman has standing to challenge property seizure, traffic stop, arrest, questioning

21. Tampering with evidence usually involves fleeing attempting to elude or resisting arrest

22. State Attorney dismissing a charge doesn’t negate the matter of facts or implications

23. Light off pursuits are illegal dangerous and grossly negligent to all without probable cause

24. Officer Danielle Lamparelli (1966) not on scene yet signed arrest affidavit as notary
 MATTER OF FACT ASSESSMENT

Foreman car was spotted driving perhaps taking a friend home or searching for a parade as it
was MLK day. Particulars of the matter aren’t clear nevertheless he was not in commission of a crime
and in a residential area. Officer Miller on patrol in this area somehow or another ended up behind
Foreman. The encounter must have been prolonged Miller most likely ran the license plate. A level of
recognition had to occur as it seems he was following Foreman and from the events that occurred post
arrest knew he was a person of interest to his coworker Lamparelli. Foreman’s vehicle apparently
attempt to evade the unwanted attention within the confines of rode regulations as no violations were
committed or reported. Officer Miller continued to follow the vehicle in an attempt to instigate a direct
confrontation. Foreman’s vehicle most likely sped up and made several turns in an attempt to be let
alone officer Miller continued to pursue to the level of a chase by his account hence the tampering
with evidence allegation with his lights off in hot pursuit. Realizing the harassment would not end
favorably.
Foreman’s vehicle discarded the alleged baggie after a sharp turn most likely after gaining
enough distance officer Miller still on the heels of the vehicle was able to spot the item. Miller stopped
to retrieve presuming it illicit as his target accelerated around the curb on that particular street. Likely
all potential occupants exigently absconded as Foreman was only a street away when backup blocked
him in for Miller seizure. Foreman still yet to commit a traffic infraction submitted and called his
family in fear for his life. If Miller had followed protocol his primary inquiry about passengers
would’ve been audible as well as his coworker officer Torres jokes of Foreman’s display of fear and
refute during a search she exacted previous weeks prior. From the video it seems Foreman was having
an anxiety attack drenched in sweat as he was led to Miller's patrol vehicle. The two then went to Ft
Lauderdale police station where Miller wrote the affidavit and waited for Lamparelli to arrive and
deride for a final round degradation and contempt before booking. Miller realizing he hadn’t activated
the patrol lights in pursuit wisely omitting any fleeing or eluding allegations or details of his conduct
settling for tampering with evidence instead. But a reasonable person can would infer the preemptive
nature of that allegation and actions requisite the offense.
 I. ARGUMENT AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW

Mr. Foreman as a natural born American Floridian, enjoys all rights of the Florida and United
States Constitution, non more sacred than the 4th stating The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized without a warrant these actions
presumptively unreasonable and invalid. See, e.g. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967);
Hornblower v. State, 351 So.2d 716 (Fla. 1977). Therefore, when an individual or property is seized
without a warrant, the State has the burden to produce evidence that the detaining officer had, at a bare
minimum, a “reasonable and articulable suspicion” to detain the accused. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
16 (1968); D’Angostino v. State, 310 So.2d 12 (Fla. 1975). These rights extend to his property as well
unless willfully relinquished . Thus, abandonment of property within the law of search and seizure is
relevant to the voluntary relinquishment or waiver of a known right United States v. Blalock, 255F. Supp.
268, 269-70 (E.D. Pa. 1966.
The issue raised, then, is whether the disclosure of the evidence was the product of, and was
prompted by, unreasonable activity under the fourth amendment, thereby necessitating its suppression
under the exclusionary rule. One court stated “ A virtual intentional throwing away of it. It is not
presumed. Proof supporting it must be direct or affirmative or reasonably beget the exclusive inference of
the throwing away.” Foulke v. New York Consol. R.R., 228 N.Y. 269, 127 N.E. 237, 238 (1920)
(emphasis added), quoted with approval in United States v. Cowan, 396 F.2d 83, 87 (2d Cir. 1968).
Additional it has also been recognized that rights secured by the fourth amendment are not governed by
local property law. E.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961); see Jones v. United States,
362 U.S. 257, 266-67 (1960). There is the risk that the discarded property will fall within the "plain view"
doctrine, in which event no issue of search is presented. For representative example of such an approach,
see Burton v. United States, 414 F.2d 261, 263 (5th Cir. 1969) in the cases, the answer appears to be that
the disposal of the property will not undercut the individual's right to complain. eg Moss v. Cox, 311 F.
Supp. 1245, 1249, 1250 (E.D. Va. 1970). People v. Jones, 174 A.D.3d 1532 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019)
The court reasoned discarding of property in the face of "impending discovery" should not
preclude subsequent objection to the legality of official conduct which prompted such action. Id. at 1249.
To deny standing to an individual so situated, reasoned the court, would be to indulge in a "fiction" and
would effectively preclude access to exclusion, which is "aimed at official improprieties." Id. Although
the situation in Moss dealt with imminent discovery, no sound reason appears to limit the rule to that
situation, and the rule announced should apply to any discard. Otherwise, a court will be deprived of the
opportunity to ascertain the true factual situation.
 I. STANDING AND BURDEN OF PROOF

By its very nature, the issue of abandonment will arise only in situations involving warrantless
activity, for otherwise, the prosecution ould seek justification in the authority conferred by a warrant.
Therefore, the question of burden of proof will be deter- mined by reference to the rule pertaining to
warrantless searches or seizures. As with consent, the burden rests with the prosecution to justify either a
warrantless arrest or search. People v. Edwards, 71 Cal. 2d 1096, 1099, 458 P.2d 713, 715, 80 Cal. Rptr.
633, 635 (1969). Thus, although the accused initially carries the burden of establishing warrantless activity.
The law presumes the existence of a warrant. People v. Lyons, 87 Cal. Rptr. 799, 801 (Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
Once he has succeeded in this, the burden will shift to the prosecution to show proper justification for the
challenged police conduct. People v. Whitehurst, 25 N.Y.2d 389, 391, 254 N.E.2d 905, 906, 306 N.Y.S.2d
673, 674 (1969). It has been explicitly recognized that the burden rests with the prosecution to establish
abandonment. E.g., United States v. Robinson, 430 F.2d 1141, 1143 (6th Cir. 1970). It is now appropriate to
summarize the differing rationale of the cases finding abandonment or reasonable seizure.

III. AUTHORITIES FINDING ABANDONMENT

In United States v. Lewis 227 F. Supp. 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). the court reasoned that since defendant
had no constitutionally protected right of privacy in either an apartment roof from which a federal agent
observed her toss out a package of heroin from her window, or the courtyard where it landed, she could not
complain of any invasion of privacy Id. at 436.. And, in Hobson v. United States 226 F.2d 890 (8th Cir.
1955), the court argued that one of the reasons why the contents of the discarded bag of heroin should have
been suppressed was that it had landed within the curtilage of defendant's home an area protected under the
fourth amendment. Id. at 894 One case has even gone so far as to hold that police officers may validly seize
abandoned property after gaining illegal entry to private premises, pro. vided they did not force the discard
by means of exploitation of their entry. United States v. Martin, 386 F.2d 213, 215 (3d Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 893 U.S. 862 (1968).
The main element of distinction between these cases and those finding abandonment appears to lie
in the primary emphasis placed upon the activities of the police. Thus, in Fletcher v. Wainwright,42 the
court ruled that since defendants discarded stolen jewelry from their motel window in response to an
unlawful attempt by the police to gain entry to their room, no true abandonment had been intended. Id. at 64.
Id. at 64. As the Supreme Court has said: The premise that property interests control the right of the
Government to search and seize has been discredited. * * * We have recognized that the principal object of
the Fourth Amendment is the protection of privacy rather than property, and have increasingly discarded
fictional and procedural barriers rested on property concepts. "To hold otherwise would abort the deterrent
policy behind the exclusionary rule."Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 804 (1967).
 The focus in Fourth Amendment cases today is on privacy rather than on property rights." Brett v.
United States, 412 F.2d 401, 406 (5th Cir. 1969); accord, Faubion v. United States, 424 F.2d 437, 440 (10th
Cir. 1970). As is the case with Mr.Foreman the amendment protects people, and not simply areas, Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) If perhaps Mr. Foreman exposed this evidence to the public
willingly without coercion would be a different matter. As it stands his rights follow wherever he harbors a
reasonable expectation of privacy, without regard to the public or private nature of the situs of his presence,
he is entitled to be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
Officer Miller’s unwarranted observation and subsequent actions approximates to an active pursuit his
subsequent intent and actions would lead any reasonable person to infer that Mr. Foreman attempted to
evade observation before the evidence was discarded hence the tampering with evidence charge. Each
participant assessed the situation similarly as a chase.
If the officer does nothing, or if he simply places the individual under surveillance, in the belief that
he may possibly witness some criminal activity, then there will be no issue of unreasonableness. If, however,
the officer, without benefit of probable cause, and acting strictly on a "hunch," or because of suspicion based
upon personal knowledge or hearsay, decides to follow the individual, and proceeds to hound him in a
harassing manner, hoping that the individual will panic in the belief that he had better "ditch the stuff"
before there is a shakedown, then an issue of major constitutional proportions will arise. But this is a far cry
from the overweening coerciveness inherent in a situation where a police officer hounds and harasses an
individual into a discard. Such action, which effectively prompts a reaction, cannot be considered immaterial
to the critical issue of intent, nor can it serve to divest the individual of his right to privacy; for only when
exposure is knowingly and intentionally accomplished, may it be considered beyond the pale of fourth
amendment protection. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). Because wherever an individual
may legitimately be, he carries with him expectations of privacy with regard to the integrity and dignity of
his person. State v. Dias, 470 P.2d 510, 514 (Hawaii 1970); see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
Expectation of privacy is the essence of the decision in Katz v. United States. There, in discarding
the "trespass" doctrine announced in Olmstead v. United States and in exalting privacy over property, the
Supreme Court held that wherever the individual harbors a reasonable expectation of privacy, he is
guaranteed freedom from unreasonable governmental intrusion. Id. at 351, 359. Thus, if he walks down a
public street, the fourth amendment walks with him, so as to preserve his body from unreasonable invasion.
There is no meaningful distinction of constitutional significance between unreasonable search and
seizure activity, and harassing official conduct outside the legitimate investigative sphere which prompts an
individual to reveal what would otherwise be impermissible for the police to seek by means of a search of
his person. In short, the police may not do indirectly what is denied to them directly. In either event, they
will be engaging in conduct equally unreasonable under the fourth amendment, which, apparently, has been
recognized by both the Supreme Court and several lower courts. In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968),the
Justice sounded a warning to the police to reasonably limit their on-the-street activities to "the legitimate
investigative sphere." Id. at 15. As the court admonished: “Nothing we say today is to be taken as indicating
approval of police conduct outside the legitimate investigative sphere. Under our decision, courts still retain
their traditional responsibility to guard against police conduct which is overbearing or harassing, or which
trenches upon personal security without the objective evidentiary justification which the Constitution
requires. When such conduct is identified, it must be condemned by the judiciary and its fruits must be
excluded from evidence in criminal trials.”
Therefore, if overbearing conduct outside the realm of legitimate investigation falls beyond the pale
of the fourth amendment, any attempt to exploit it'by retrieving its fruits for subsequent use in a criminal
prosecution should be condemned and suppressed under the same authority. A cogent argument can also be
made for suppression under the privilege against self-incrimination, that privilege broadly applies to only
testimonial communications, either in oral or documentary form. E.g., Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263,
266 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 222-23 (1967) It is not reasonable to conclude a person
would incriminate himself by voluntarily exposing to a police officer contraband he has previously taken
pains to conceal. The ultimate focal points of inquiry must be the manner of intrusion into the individual's
zone of privacy, and its motivating purpose.
 CONCLUSION
The evidence in this case was therefore obtained as a result of an unlawful and warrantless search
and seizure in violation of the Respondent's rights guaranteed by the Fourth, Fifth and the Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution, Article I, Section 12, of the Florida Constitution (1968)
and an unlawful "stop and frisk" of the Respondent in violation of Section 901.151, Florida Statutes
(1995). Any evidence obtained as a result of this unlawful, warrantless "stop and frisk" and coerced self
incrimination must be suppressed under the "Fruit of the Poisonous Tree" doctrine, Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
WHEREFORE, the Respondent requests this Court to enter an order suppressing the
aforementioned evidence and any reference thereto during the trial of this cause.
I CERTIFY