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Synopsis of

Rachels Elements of Moral


Philosophy

Submitted by: John Patrick D. Rivas


AB Polscie 1
Chapter 1
What is Morality?

The first chapter of James Rachels' "Elements of Moral Philosophy" begins by


conceptualizing morality, which is a difficult task due to the numerous possible and vying
definitions. As a result, the common ground can be defined as only the "minimum conception,"
and although it is not instantly defined, the reader of "Elements of Moral Philosophy" is provided
with examples involving handicapped children to demonstrate.

The first case given in James Rachels' "Elements of Moral Philosophy" involved "Baby
Theresa," who was born without any auxiliary brain functions other than those that helped her
breathe. Despite the fact that most of these pregnancies should be terminated in the case of such
a large deformity, especially since many of the infants are stillborn or die shortly after birth, the
parents chose to have Baby Theresa in the hopes that her organs could be repurposed to aid other
children in need. This created a lot of discussion, and ethicists raised a lot of questions about it.
On one side, the pro's argument said that her organs would be useless and that she would be
unable to live a normal life. This side argued that life is meaningless without the ability to
connect with others and the environment, and that biological existence is worthless. The other
side claimed that it was unethical to utilize a human life to meet the demands of another human
life, and that Baby Theresa's autonomy must be protected, even if she is unable to understand or
act for herself. Usually, it is wrong to kill one person to save another, but not always. Another
possibility exists. Perhaps we should consider Baby Theresa to be deceased. If this sounds
absurd, keep in mind that our understanding of death has evolved over time. Death, according to
American law, occurs when the heart stops beating. However, once a heart stops beating, it
degrades swiftly and is no longer viable for transplant. As a result, it was unclear if any hearts
could be legally obtained for transplantation under American law. As a result, American law
evolved. We now recognize death as an occurrence not when the heart stops beating, but when
the brain ceases working: "brain death" is the new criterion for death. This solved the problem
about transplants, because a brain-dead patient can still have a healthy heart, suitable for
transplant. Although anencephalic people do not match the technical criteria for brain death as
currently defined, the definition could be amended to include them. Because they lack a
cerebrum and cerebellum, they have no possibility of living a conscious life. It would acclimate
to the idea that these unlucky infants are born dead, and that harvesting their organs does not
require killing them if the definition of brain death were recast to include anencephalic. The
Wrongness of Killing Argument would then be moot. Overall, the reasons in favor of
transferring Baby Theresa's organs appear to be stronger than those against.

Another case included “Conjoined Twins”, Mary and Jodie were conjoined at the lower
abdomen. Their spines were fused together, and they shared a single heart and lungs. Jodie, the
stronger of the two, was giving her sister blood. They mature into adults and then marry and
raise a family. However, Mary and Jodie's prospects were bleak. The physicians predicted that if
nothing was done, the girls would die in six months. An operation to separate them was the only
hope. This would save Jodie, but Mary would die immediately. The operation was opposed by
the parents, who were devoted Catholics, since they believed it would prolong Mary's death.
They think that nature should take its course, and that if it is God's will, none of their children
should live, they will accept it. However, in order to rescue Jodie, the hospital petitioned the
courts for authorization to proceed with the operation. The procedure was carried out once the
courts consented. Jodie survived and Mary died, as expected. In considering this case, we must
distinguish who should make the decision from the question of what the decision should be. Is
that the parents should have made the decision and that the courts should not have intervened.
However, the question of what would be the best choice for the parents (or anybody else)
remains unanswered. Is it correct or incorrect to separate the twins? The side of "we should save
as many as we can" is represented by the reasoning behind splitting the twins because of the
option between saving one child and allowing both to die. Many people jump to the conclusion
that the twins should be separated without additional consideration. The Ladies' Home Journal
commissioned a poll during the height of the controversy to find out what Americans thought.
The operation received 78 percent approval in the poll. People were clearly persuaded by the
idea of saving as many as possible. However, Jodie and Mary's parents believe there is a stronger
justification on the opposite side. The argument from the sanctity of human life, on the other
hand, asserts that the idea that all human life is valuable, regardless of age, race, socioeconomic
class, or handicap, lies at the heart of Western moral tradition. It makes no difference if the
killing is for a good cause; it simply cannot be carried out. For an unexpected reason, the judges
who heard the case did not believe so. They claimed that the surgery would not kill her but her
body's vulnerability would. As a result, the morality of murdering has no bearing. The
Argument from the Sanctity of Life, on the other hand, faces a more obvious objection. It is
possible that killing innocent people is not always wrong. When three conditions are met, such
killings may be justified: (a) the innocent human has no future because she will die soon
regardless; (b) the innocent human has no desire to live, perhaps because she has no desires at
all; and (c) this killing will save others, who will be able to live full lives. The death of the
innocent may be justifiable in some exceptional situations.

For the last case, it involves a man murdering his daughter who had cerebral disability
and was barely functioning. The jury found him guilty of merely second-degree murder and
advised the court to disregard the required 10-year sentence. The judge agreed and sentenced
him to a year in prison followed by a year of farm confinement. However, the Supreme Court of
Canada intervened, ruling that the required punishment must be carried out. Robert Latimer was
arrested in 2001 and released in 2008. Tracy's life was ethically valuable, hence Mr. Latimer had
no right to kill her, according to one viewpoint. Tracy's health was so bad, in his justification,
that she had no chance of having a "life" in any sense other than biological. Because her life had
been reduced to senseless pain, killing her was a kind act. Given those factors, Robert Latimer
looks to have acted responsibly. His detractors did, however, make other points. According to the
argument from the wrongness of discriminating against the handicapped, Handicapped persons
should be treated with the same respect and rights as everyone else. Nobody has the right to
decide my life is worth less than yours. That’s the bottom line. Tracy was murdered because she
was disabled, which is unethical. They consider Tracy Latimer's death to be an example of
handicapped prejudice. Tracy's cerebral palsy, however, was not the issue, according to Robert
Latimer. As a result, Mr. Latimer denied that Tracy was killed because of her disability; rather,
she was killed because she was in pain and had no hope. While on the idea of the slippery slope,
it would have been the slippery slope, and allowing others to make decisions who ought to live
and who ought to die. This concept was shared by other disability advocates. It's hazardous to
think like this because if people accept any kind of compassion killing, they'll be sliding down a
"slippery slope" where all life will be considered worthless. If Tracy’s life is not worth
protecting, what about the lives of other disabled people? What about the elderly, the infirm, and
other "useless" citizens? Reasonable individuals may argue regarding the consequences of
allowing mercy killing in cases like Tracy Latimer's. Those who wish to support Mr. Latimer
could find the terrible forecasts implausible, while those who want to condemn him might argue
that they are reasonable. This type of disagreement can be damaging and difficult to resolve. It
should be noted, however, that slippery slope arguments are often abused. If you don't have any
good arguments against anything, you can always make up a prediction about what it could lead
to, and no one can prove you wrong, no matter how ridiculous your prediction is. As a result,
such debates should be treated with caution.

Moral judgments must be based on good logic, and morality necessitates the unbiased
evaluation of all parties concerned, as these anecdotes demonstrate. This results in a complete
"minimum notion" of morality that combines these two dimensions of moral decision-making.
Baby Theresa, Jodie and Mary, and Tracy Latimer are all examples that are likely to provoke
intense emotions. Such emotions are frequently indicative of moral seriousness and might be
admired. They can, however, come in the way of discovering the truth: when we have strong
feelings about something, it's tempting to think that we already know what the truth is, without
even considering opposing views. Unfortunately, no matter how powerful our feelings are, we
cannot rely on them. Our emotions could be unreasonable; they could be the result of prejudice,
greed, or cultural conditioning. As a result, if we wish to discover the truth, we must allow our
minds to wander. Reason should guide feelings to the extent feasible. This is morality's essence.
The morally right thing to do is always the thing best supported by the arguments. On the other
hand, if someone claims that anything is morally wrong, he must provide reasons, and if his
reasons are valid, others must respect his authority. By the same rationale, if he says something
without a valid reason, he's just creating noise, and we can ignore him. Of course, not every
reason that may be advanced is a good reason. There are bad arguments and good arguments,
and much of the skill of moral thinking consists in discerning the difference.

The concept of impartiality appears in almost every major moral theory. This is the belief
that everyone's interests are equal and that no one should be treated differently. Simultaneously,
impartiality necessitates that we do not treat members of particular groups as inferior, and hence
it rejects prejudice. Impartiality is linked to the notion that moral judgments must be based on
sound reasoning. Discrimination is unacceptably arbitrary if there is no good rationale for
treating individuals differently.

We may now state the minimum conception: Morality is, at the very least, the effort to
guide one’s conduct by reason —that is, to do what is best for everyone involved—while giving
equal weight to each person affected by one's decision. This depicts the reality of what it means
to be a moral agent with conscience. The conscientious moral agent is someone who is
concerned impartially with the interests of everyone affected by what he or she does; who
carefully sifts facts and examines their implications; who accepts principles of conduct only after
thoroughly scrutinizing them to ensure that they are justified; who is willing to "listen to reason,"
even if it means revising prior convictions; and who, finally, is willing to act on the results of this
deliberation. Not every ethical theory accepts "minimum", as one might assume. This portrayal
of the moral agent has been debated in numerous ways. Theories that deny the minimum
conception, on the other hand, are fraught with problems. Philosophers in general recognize this,
and as a result, most moral theories include it.
Chapter 2
The Challenge of Cultural Relativism

Different cultures have unique customs and ways of thinking, as expressed by James
Rachels in this chapter "Elements of Moral Philosophy," and it may be difficult for someone
from one culture to comprehend these differences, which describes cultural relativism—different
cultures have different moral codes, and it would be incorrect to judge one culture's way of life
as better than another because they are all just different, and every standard is bound to the
particular culture. According to Cultural Relativism, there is no such thing as universal truth in
ethics; there are simply distinct cultural rules and nothing more. The belief in the objectivity and
universality of moral truth is challenged by Cultural Relativism.

All of the following claims were made by cultural experts. Relativists believe that: (a)
Different societies have different moral codes; (b) A society's moral code determines what is
right within that society; that is, if a society's moral code says that a certain action is right, then
that action is right, at least within that society; and (c) There is no objective standard that can be
used to judge one society's code as better than another's. There are no universal moral principles
(d) The society's moral code has no unique status; it is only one among many (e) It is arrogant for
us to pass judgment on other cultures. We must constantly be patient with them. These five
assertions may appear to be related, but they are distinct, meaning that some of them may be true
while others are not. Indeed, two of the hypotheses appear to be mutually inconsistent. The
second asserts that a society's norms dictate what is right and wrong; the fifth asserts that one
should always be accepting of other cultures. When properly understood, Cultural Relativism
maintains that a culture's norms reign supreme within the culture's boundaries.

To emphasize this description, the Greek concept of burying the father vs the Callatians'
ritual of eating the father are diametrically opposed, as are popular perceptions of the Eskimos'
infanticide practice. The issue with cultural relativism is that it makes no sense as an argument.
In his book "Elements of Moral Philosophy," James Rachels also points out that there are two
sides to the issue, and that taking it too seriously can have negative consequences. For example,
if another culture commits genocide, under the concept of cultural relativism, we would simply
see it as something culturally diverse, which could obviously cause serious problems. The
Cultural Differences Argument attempts to deduce a substantial conclusion about a topic from
the fact that people disagree. This, however, is impossible. This point must not be misinterpreted.
We are not claiming that the argument's conclusion is incorrect; after all, Cultural Relativism
could still be correct. The argument is that the conclusion is unrelated to the premise. The
Cultural Differences Argument is therefore flawed. As a result, the argument fails.

Even if the Cultural Differences Argument is unsound, Cultural Relativism might still be
valid. The essence of Cultural Relativism is stated by William Graham Sumner. "The notion of
right is in the folkways," he argues, adding that the only measure of right and wrong is one's
society's standards. It is not from outside of them, and it has been brought to put them to the test.
Whatever is, according to folklore, is correct." However, the following consequences follow: (a)
We can no longer declare that other civilizations' practices are morally inferior to our own; (b)
We can no longer criticize our own society's code; and (c) The concept of moral growth is
questioned. Many people have rejected Cultural Relativism because of these three factors. We
wish to emphasize that slavery is immoral wherever it exists, and that one's own community can
achieve significant moral progress. Cultural relativism cannot be correct because it suggests that
these judgments are illogical.

Many factors come together to create a society's customs. Not only do the ideals of a
society matter, but so do religious views, factual beliefs, and the physical environment. As a
result, we cannot conclude that two communities have different values simply because their
customs differ. After all, customs can differ for a variety of reasons. As a result, there may be
less moral disagreement than apparent. Another viewpoint is that some moral principles must be
followed by all cultures since they are required for society to exist. For instance, there are laws
banning lying and murder. In fact, we find similar norms in use across all cultures. Cultures may
disagree over what constitutes an acceptable exception to the rules, but this debate is set against a
broad consensus. As a result, we shouldn't exaggerate the degree to which cultures differ. Not
every moral rule can be changed from one community to the next.
In the process of judging a cultural practice to be undesirable, a 17-year-old named
Fauziya Kassindja landed at Newark International Airport in New Jersey and asked for asylum.
She had fled Togo, in West Africa, to avoid "excision," as it is known there. The debate was not
about her treatment in America, but about how we should accept the rituals of other civilizations.
Excision is brutal and should be condemned, according to a series of essays published in The
New York Times. Others were hesitant to pass such harsh judgment. They suggested to live and
let live, because our culture is probably just as weird to foreigners. Excision is harmful in a
variety of ways. It is excruciatingly painful and leads to a lifelong loss of sexual pleasure. Its
short-term consequences can be devastating. Hemorrhage, tetanus, and septicemia are examples.
It can sometimes result in death. Chronic infection, scars that make walking difficult, and
ongoing pain are all possible long-term consequences. There are no evident social benefits to the
practice. It is not vital for group survival, unlike Eskimo infanticide. It's also not a religious
issue. Excision is carried out by Islam and Christianity are among the religions represented.

Despite this, it contains a lot of arguments. It would be easy, and perhaps a bit arrogant,
to dismiss these arguments. However, notice one essential feature: they attempt to explain
excision by arguing that it is beneficial— men, women, and their families are stated to be better
off when women are excised. As a result, we might consider whether excision is beneficial or
harmful in general. However, this appears to be the type of moral standard that Cultural
Relativism forbids. It is a single criterion that may be used to assess the practices of every
culture, at any period, including our own. Of course, because all cultures respect human
satisfaction, people will not regard this notion as being "brought in from the outside" to evaluate
them.

For three reasons, many people who are outraged by excision are hesitant to denounce it.
First, there is an understandable fear of interfering with other people's social customs. Second,
many individuals believe, correctly, that we should be accepting of different cultures. Tolerance
is undeniably a virtue—a tolerant person may coexist peacefully with individuals who hold
opposing viewpoints. Tolerance, on the other hand, does not imply that all views, faiths, or social
systems are equally admirable. On the contrary, if we didn't believe that certain things were
better than others, we wouldn't be able to accept anything. Finally, people may be hesitant to
pass judgment because they do not want to show disdain for the society under scrutiny. But, once
again, this is misguided: condemning a specific activity does not imply that the society as a
whole is repulsive. After all, the culture may still have many redeeming qualities. Most human
cultures, we should suppose, are a blend of good and poor habits. One of the negative
consequences is excision.

Returning to the five claims made earlier, the first is undoubtedly correct, yet there are
some values that all cultures share, such as the necessity of telling the truth, caring for the young,
and abstaining from murder. When customs diverge, the fundamental reason is frequently due to
the cultures' factual views rather than their values. For the second claim, contrast between what a
society believes about morals and what is really true. A society's moral code is inextricably
linked to what its citizens perceive to be correct. That code, as well as those individuals, could be
incorrect. We previously looked at the practice of excision, which is deemed cruel in many
cultures. It's tough to think of ethical rules that apply to everyone at all times for the third one.
However, if we are to critique slavery, stoning, or genital mutilation, and if such practices are
honestly and truly immoral, we must appeal to universal values. One such concept, which was
proposed earlier, is that it always matters whether a practice supports or inhibits the welfare of
those who are affected by it. The fourth point is accurate; our society's moral code has no unique
status. After all, our civilization does not have a divine halo surrounding it, and our ideals do not
have any special status simply because they are ours. To state that one's own society's moral code
"is just one of many" appears to indicate that all moral codes are the same—that they are all
more or less equally excellent. In truth, whether a given code "is only one among many" is an
open question; it could be among the best or among the worst. The last claim is partially true, but
the point is exaggerated. When we criticize other cultures, we can be arrogant, and tolerance is
generally a good thing. However, not everything should be tolerated. Human cultures have done
terrible things in the past, and it is a sign of development when we can state that they are no
longer happening.

Despite some of the flaws in the cultural relativism argument, some points should be
considered. For example, all cultures share some moral and ethical principles in common. For
example, we are concerned about our children, do not condone murder, and respect honesty. For
civilization to exist, universal rules are required. It's tough not to make judgments based on our
own cultural beliefs of good and wrong. When we put this into a debate, however, it becomes
evident that seeing things in a more culturally open way has both positive and negative
implications.
Chapter 3
Subjectivism in Ethics

This chapter of James Rachels' "Elements of Moral Philosophy" focuses on the definition
and evolution of the term and meaning of ethical subjectivism. In general, ethical subjectivism
holds that everyone has an opinion, but that opinions are only thoughts and feelings, not facts,
and that no one is entirely correct. In general, this theory claims that our moral beliefs are
founded on feelings, and that as a result, there is no universal statement we can make that
conveys a verifiable or correct position. Ethical Subjectivism is a theory that has evolved in this
manner. It all started with a simple idea—that morality is a matter of sentiment rather than
reality, as David Hume put it. However, as challenges to the idea were aired and proponents
attempted to respond, the theory got increasingly sophisticated.

"Elements of Moral Philosophy" uses the debate over homosexuality to show how certain
statements about the issue are all moral opinions, rather than straight facts, and thus no one can
be right. Ethical subjectivism has evolved over time. As James Rachels points out in "Elements
of Moral Philosophy," the first evolution of the theory was developed by Hume, who stated that
morality is merely sentience. Simple Subjectivism is the name for this philosophy, yet it is far
from perfect. If it were correct, it would declare that we are all incapable of being incorrect,
which is illogical because not everyone can be correct.

Also, it cannot account for ethical disagreements, and in order to do so, it evolved into
"Emotivism," as Stevenson describes it. In general, emotivism looks at the same issues on the
level of language. When we express a moral opinion, it is just that: an opinion. While we may
wish to persuade someone with our language and make them feel our perspective, we must
remember that all of these assertions are still merely sentiments. This raises the question of
whether moral facts exist, and we discover that they do only when facts exist to support them.
We must make decisions and consider moral concerns based on more than feelings; they must
also be proven and supported by solid facts rather than opposing ideas.
A moral judgment, or any value assessment for that matter, must be based on sound
reasoning. Any good ethical theory should be able to explain how reasons might help us make
moral decisions. There are two things to take away from this. The small lesson is that a particular
moral theory, Emotivism, is flawed. This puts doubt on Ethical Subjectivism as a whole. The
greater lesson is the significance of reason in ethics. If we study wicked actions—"willful
murder, for example," according to Hume—we will find no "matter of fact" that corresponds to
the wickedness. There are no such facts in the universe, other than human attitudes. Because we
can be wrong about what reason recommends, we can be wrong about what is good or bad.
Regardless of our ideas or desires, reason says what it says.

The practice of providing reasons could be extended much farther. The rule requiring
truthfulness is important for society to survive since communication would be impossible
without it, and society would fall apart if communication was unattainable. So we can justify our
conclusions and explain why those conclusions are important. Even though it is absurd to
suggest that ethical judgements are nothing more than "opinions" in light of all of this, the notion
that moral judgments are "unprovable" persists. When proof is required, people frequently expect
scientific proof. They desire experimental verification, but since ethical judgements cannot be
evaluated in this way, they claim there is no proof. The fact that ethical reasoning differs from
scientific reasoning does not imply that it is less effective. Second, we prefer to think of the most
challenging topics when we consider justifying our ethical judgments. It's easy to assume, "Well,
that argument didn't work," when your argument fails to persuade your audience. But the
argument could have failed simply because your audience was stubborn, biased, or not paying
attention. Your argument may have been perfect as a proof.

It's not just about who you have sex with when you're homosexual; it's also about who
you fall in love with. Straight people and gay people fall in love in the same way. And, like
straights, gays want to be with the person they love, live with them, and make a life with them.
To imply that gays should not pursue their passions is to condemn them to a life of frustration. It
should be noted that being straight does not eliminate the frustration for LGBT people. Once
they reach a certain age, both homosexuals and heterosexuals discover who they are; no one
chooses which sex they are attracted to.
The most common criticism against homosexuality is it is "unnatural," which could be
linked to the concept of a thing's purpose. Many individuals believe that because homosexuality
is not natural, it must be sinful. Regardless, it is a flawed argument. Every interpretation of it
fails. Another issue to consider is that homosexuality is forbidden in the Bible. They believe that
challenging the Bible means challenging God's word. And they believe this is an act of arrogance
on the part of beings who should be grateful to the Almighty. Thoughts like this, on the other
hand, cannot hold us back. Philosophy is about challenging entire lives. When someone makes
the claim that homosexuality must be sinful because the Bible says so, this claim must be
evaluated on its own merits. The issue with this argument is that it does not appear to be a
dependable guide to morality when we look at other things the Bible teaches. All of this is not
meant to belittle the Bible; it does, after all, contain much that is accurate and insightful.
However, cases like these show that the Bible is not always correct. We can't conclude that
homosexuality is an abomination just because Leviticus says so because it isn't always correct. In
any case, nothing can be ethically right or wrong just because someone else says so. If a sacred
text's precepts aren't arbitrary, there must be a rationale for them—we should be able to ask why
the Bible condemns homosexuality and receive a response. That response will then provide the
actual reason for the problem.

However, the focus of this chapter is not on homosexuality. The main argument is on the
nature of moral reasoning. Moral reasoning and moral behavior are based on weighing and
following arguments. However, being guided by reason is not the same as following one's
feelings. When we have strong feelings, we may be inclined to disregard logic and follow our
instincts. However, we would be opting out of moral thought entirely. That is why Ethical
Subjectivism appears to be heading in the wrong way by emphasizing on attitudes and feelings.
Chapter 4
Does morality depend on religion?

This chapter of James Rachels' "Elements of Moral Philosophy" finally addresses one of
the most pressing concerns in any discussion of morality and ethics in general: religion. It
criticizes the fact that much of the American concept of ethics and morality is based on what
clergy and religious officials believe, which distinguishes the country. However, things appear to
be completely different from a religious standpoint. According to Judaism and Christianity, the
earth was created by a loving, all-powerful God to provide a place for humans to live. People
were then made in his image and raised as his children. As a result, the world has meaning and
purpose. Instead, it is the arena where God's purposes are carried out. What could be more
natural, then, than to consider "morality" to be a part of religion, whereas values have no place in
an atheist's world?

Christians, Jews, and Muslims all believe that God has given humanity specific moral
guidelines to follow. These rules are not imposed by God. He created humans as free agents,
allowing them to make their own decisions. People must follow God's laws if they are to live as
they should. The Divine Command Theory has developed from this concept. God, in essence,
determines what is right and wrong. Morally needed behaviors are those that God orders;
morally incorrect actions are those that God forbids; and all other actions are permitted or
morally neutral. This concept faces a number of challenges; (1) This moral concept is confusing.
In concept, it is simple to comprehend how physical objects are created. Making sincerity
correct, on the other hand, is not possible by changing objects in the actual world. No one knows
how that could be accomplished (2) God's commands become arbitrary in this view of morality.
People believe that God does things for good causes. But suppose God declares honesty to be
correct. He could have given alternate commands just as easily, according to this theory. He
could have ordered everyone to lie, and then lying, rather than truthfulness, would be acceptable.
After all, there are no reasons for or against lying before God gives his commands—God is the
one who generates the reasons. As a result, God's commands are arbitrary from a moral
standpoint. He had complete control over everything. This outcome may appear not just
unsatisfactory, but also impious from a religious standpoint (3) This morality presents the
incorrect justifications for moral standards First, consider what the argument implies: child abuse
would not be illegal if God did not exist. After all, if God didn't exist, there would be no one to
stop child abuse. Child abuse, on the other hand, would remain malevolent and hence illegal. As
a result, the Divine Command Theory falls short. Second, even the most devout believer may
have legitimate doubts about what God has instructed. After all, religious writings contradict one
another, and even within a single scripture, there appear to be discrepancies. As a result, a person
may be unsure about God's true will.

Many religious people believe that refusing to accept a theological understanding of right
and wrong would be sacrilegious. They have the impression that if they believe in God, good and
wrong must be defined in terms of God's will. However, our arguments show that the Divine
Command Theory is not only unworkable, but also impious. For this reason, some of
theologians' best thinkers have rejected the theory.

This "divine command theory" states that ethics decisions should be founded on God's
rule rather than personal impulses, but what about atheists, as the author points out, and what if
these are simply arbitrary laws, as "Elements of Moral Philosophy" suggests? Even if we do not
believe they are, God's instructions can be perceived as arbitrary in this way. There are an
unlimited amount of barriers to overcome in thinking when examining morality based on
religious theory. When we really stop to consider what is being said, it does not seem reasonable
to base our moral opinions solely on religious teachings, according to some of the conjecture put
forth in "Elements of Moral Philosophy," because we leave ourselves open to a lack of
reasoning, as ancient Greek authors such as Socrates point out.

The Divine Command Theory has never been the mainstream ethical theory in Christian
philosophy. Instead, the Theory of Natural Law receives this honor. The Natural Law Theory is
based on a particular worldview. The world, according to this viewpoint, has a logical order,
with values and purposes embedded into its fundamental essence. As a result, the world is a well-
ordered, rational structure, with everything in its proper position and fulfilling a specific purpose.
As a result, values and purposes were considered as part of the divine plan. The "laws of nature"
define not only how things are, but also how they should be, according to this style of thought.
When things serve their natural purposes, the world is in balance. Things have gone wrong when
they don't or can't. However, there are ramifications for human behavior. Moral rules are now
seen as stemming from natural laws. Some behaviors are considered "natural," while others are
considered "unnatural," and "unnatural" acts are considered morally bad. However, natural-law
theory has been employed to defend more difficult moral positions. The Theory of Natural Law
is frequently invoked by religious thinkers to support their condemnation of "deviant" sexual
behaviors. The Theory of Natural Law has few supporters today outside of the Catholic Church.
It is commonly dismissed for three reasons. To begin with, the notion that "what is natural is
good" appears to be vulnerable to obvious counterexamples. Second, the Theory of Natural Law
appears to conflate the terms "is" and "ought," and third, the Theory of Natural Law is now
widely rejected since its worldview contradicts modern science. The theory's third section
addresses the issue of moral knowledge. People must consult God's commandments, according
to the Divine Command Theory. The Natural Law Theory provides a different answer. The
"natural rules" that govern human behavior are laws of reason, which we can comprehend
because God has given us the ability to comprehend them. As a result, the Theory of Natural
Law supports the well-known notion that the correct thing to do is whichever action has the best
justifications.

This indicates that religious believers do not have privileged access to moral truth.
Believers and nonbelievers are both in the same boat. Everyone has been given the ability to
listen to reason and follow its commands. This separates morality from religion in a significant
way. Religious belief has no bearing on determining what is best, and the outcomes of moral
inquiry are religiously "neutral." Despite their differences in religion, believers and nonbelievers
share the same moral worldview. Although the notion of natural law appears to be more rational,
it nevertheless has flaws. Many people appear to find it difficult to conceive about morality in
terms of nature and science, and as a result, the notion has fallen out of favor. Personally, I
believe this is the most sensible option when it comes to moral decision-making. It takes into
account human nature and is not dependent on a collection of prohibitions that could be random
or arbitrary.
Some religious individuals will be disappointed by the previous discussion. For them, the
connection between morality and religion is a practical, urgent problem centered on specific
moral issues. It makes no difference whether right and wrong are defined in terms of God's will
or moral principles are natural laws. What is important are one's religion's moral teachings.

People are frequently wrong when they claim that their moral beliefs are derived from
their faith. This is what's actually going on. They make up their minds about moral matters and
then interpret the Scriptures, or church tradition, in a way that supports their predetermined
conclusions. Is it accurate to say that the person is "following the moral teachings of the Bible''
when something occurs? Is it more correct to say that he has studied the Scriptures in support of
a moral viewpoint that he already holds, and then read the intended conclusion into the
Scriptures? Every generation interprets its history in order to reinforce its moral beliefs. One
example of this is abortion. The Church's moral viewpoint appears to be imposed on the Bible
rather than derived from it.

The arguments in this chapter all lead to the same conclusion: right and wrong are not to
be understood in terms of God's will; morality is a matter of reason and conscience, not religious
faith; and, in any case, religious considerations do not provide definitive solutions to the majority
of moral problems we face. In a nutshell, morality and religion are not the same. Religious
beliefs, of course, can have an impact on moral dilemmas. Morality and religion have a
convoluted relationship, yet it is a relationship between two distinct subjects.

The arguments stated don't imply that Christianity or any other theological system is
wrong; rather, they demonstrate that, even if it is, morality remains a separate issue.
Chapter 5
Ethical Egoism

This chapter of James Rachels' "Elements of Moral Philosophy" raises an interesting


question about our motivations and willingness to commit selfless acts. It begins with a heroic
story of a Swedish official who helped many Jews flee Nazi death camps, and it appears for a
brief moment that this chapter will deal with our innate ability and desire to help our fellow
humans.

Some believe we have no obligations to others. According to their viewpoint, known as


Ethical Egoism, each person should only seek his or her own self-interest. This is selfish
morality. It asserts that our sole responsibility is to do what is best for us. Other individuals are
only important if they can help us. However, psychological egoism is defined towards the end of
the first section of "Elements of Moral Philosophy," which suggests that we are probably not as
altruistic as we appear—that many of our seemingly selfless activities are actually for our own
benefit and selfish interest.

Psychological egoism is not an ethical theory; rather, it is a psychological theory.


However, ethicists have always been concerned about it. If Psychological Egoism were correct,
moral philosophy would be rendered useless. People will not do whatever it is that they "ought"
to do. It may be naive to believe that our moral theories can make a difference in the real world.
We may assume we are noble and self-sacrificing, but it is merely an illusion, according to
Psychological Egoism. We simply care about ourselves in reality.

"Every act you've ever performed since the day you were born was performed because
you desired something," said Dale Carnegie, who saw desire as the key to understanding human
behavior. When we define one person's activity as altruistic and another's action as self-
interested, we may be neglecting the truth that each individual is simply doing what he or she
most desires. However, this argument is flawed. We do certain things not because we want to,
but because we feel obligated to. A second flaw exists in the reasoning. Assume, in this situation,
that we always act on our strongest desires. Simply acting on your own desires does not imply
that you are looking out for yourself; it all depends on your desires. If you solely care about
yourself and don't consider others, you're acting selfishly; yet, if you want other people to be
happy, you're acting in their best interests. You are not based on that desire. As a result, this
argument fails in almost every possible manner: the premise is false—we don't always do what
we want to do—and even if it were, the conclusion would not flow from it.

The second argument for Psychological Egoism relies on the fact that so-called altruistic
behaviors give the performer a sense of self-satisfaction. The real aim of acting "unselfishly" is
to make people feel good about themselves. Everyone knows that people appear to act
altruistically at times; but, if we dig further, we may discover something else. And it's typically
pretty difficult to figure out that the "selfless" activity is linked to some sort of gain for the
person who performs it. We might not have any self-interested motives in some cases of
altruism. Wesley Autrey, a 50-year-old construction worker, is the best example of this. He
saved the man's life while never bothering about his own safety.

There is a universal lesson to be gained here about the nature of desire. We seek a variety
of things—money, friends, fame, a new car, and so on—and we may gain joy from obtaining
these things. The sense of contentment, however, is rarely the target of our desire. We only care
about the money, the friends, the fame, and the car. It's the same when it comes to helping others.
Our drive to help others frequently comes first; the positive feelings we may experience are only
a side effect. Finally, despite the fact that Psychological Egoism is unrealistic, many intelligent
people have been drawn to it because of the theory's cynical view of human nature. Others might
like its simplicity. It would be wonderful if a single factor could account for all human behavior.
But humans appear to be far too complex for that. Psychological egoism is an unreliable theory.
As a result, Psychological Egoism poses no threat to morality. Given our ability to be affected by
compassion for others, debating whether or not we should help our neighbors is not meaningless.
Moral reasoning does not have to be a naive activity based on a distorted understanding of
human nature.
Ethical egoism is the belief that each person should only pursue his or her own self-
interest. Ethical Egoism is the radical view that all of one's commitments are accounted for by
the principle of self-interest. Ethical Egoism, on the other hand, does not advise you to forgo
helping others. When your interests match with the well-being of others, you will be able to help
them as well. It does not prohibit such behavior; in fact, it may encourage it. Only in such
instances, according to the notion, is the benefit to others what makes the conduct right. Rather,
the action is right because it benefits you. Ethical Egoism also does not suggest that you should
always do what you desire or what gives you the most immediate pleasure when pursuing your
interests.

According to the self-defeating argument, (1) we should do whatever will best promote
everyone's interests, (2) the best method to promote everyone's interests is for each of us to
pursue our own interests exclusively, and (3) as a result, each of us should pursue our own
interests exclusively. If we accept this logic, we are no longer Ethical Egoists. Even if we act
egotistically, our ultimate principle is one of beneficence: we want to serve everyone, not just
ourselves. We turn out to be altruists with a distinctive vision of what advances the general
welfare, rather than egoists. For Ayn Rand’s Argument which is not read much by philosophers
according to the author. He saw "altruism ethics" as a completely damaging concept, both in
society as a whole and in the lives of people who were caught in by it. According to her, altruism
leads to a denial of the individual's worth. It tells a person that their life is only a commodity to
be traded. If a man embraces the ethics of altruism, she claims, his first concern is how to
sacrifice his life, not how to live it. Those who promote altruistic principles are parasites who,
rather than trying to establish and sustain their own lives, take advantage of those who do. The
third argument, Ethical egoism as compatible with commonsense morality, takes a different
approach. Ethical egoism is frequently offered as a revisionist moral philosophy, i.e., a
philosophy that claims that our ordinary moral beliefs are incorrect. However, Ethical Egoism
might be interpreted as a system that supports conventional morality. Ethical egoism isn't such a
far-fetched concept. It does not question common sense morality; rather, it attempts to explain
and standardize it.
As the chapter from James Rachels' "Elements of Moral Philosophy" continues, we learn
that the Swedish official and even Mother Theresa, the epitome of altruism, had selfish
motivations for their actions, shattering everything we thought we knew about heroic deeds and
demonstrating that psychological egoism is a viable theory in general.

As stated in this book, we rarely do anything without some form of self-interest—even if


we are not entirely aware of it. We might, like the Swedish official, want to feel like we're living
a more significant and meaningful life, so we volunteer at a homeless shelter or perform some
other random act of kindness to feel better about ourselves. Even pity cannot be excluded from
this equation, because, as Hobbes points out, pity is so powerful because it allows us to
"experience" another person's sorrow by imagining how we would react in a similar scenario.

The ego is never absent, and even when we believe we are acting altruistically, it must be
taken into account. It's difficult for me to agree with James Rachels' argument in "Elements of
Moral Philosophy" that this theory is flawed because we believe it is irrefutable and then turn
everything around to make it seem provable. I'm not sure I agree with this, because there are
always counterarguments to be made.
Chapter 6
The Social Contract Theory

For a brief while, it appeared that ethical and psychological egoism were quite similar
concepts in chapter 6 of James Rachels' "Elements of Moral Philosophy," except that they dealt
with different stages of the process of identifying selfish needs. Despite the fact that they are
different theories, it is important to note that none excludes the fulfillment of one's selfish desires
first and foremost, and both seem to regard this as a normal occurrence, even if we acknowledge
our moral obligation.

Thomas Hobbes, a famous 17th-century British philosopher, attempted to demonstrate


that morality is not dependent on God, natural purpose, or altruism. Instead, morality should be
viewed as a solution to a problem that develops in the lives of self-interested humans. We all
want to live as comfortably as possible, but we need a peaceful, cooperative social order to do it.
And without rules, we can't have one. Those rules are moral laws; morality is a set of principles
that we must adhere to in order to reap the benefits of social living. That is the key to
understanding ethics, not God, inherent purposes, or altruism. We must seek a means to
collaborate in order to escape the state of nature. We can generate more vital products and
distribute them more rationally in a stable and cooperative society. However, building such a
community is difficult. To manage their interactions, people must agree on rules. They must
agree not to harm one another or break their vows, for example. As a society, we obey certain
laws and have mechanisms to enforce them, which Hobbes refers to as the "social contract."

The Social Contract Theory describes what morality and governance are for. The goal of
morality is to enable social interaction; the goal of government is to enforce important moral
rules. The social contract view of morality can be summarized as follows: Morality is a system
of rules guiding behavior that rational individuals will accept if others accept them as well. And
rational people will only accept a regulation if they believe they will benefit from it. As a result,
morality is based on mutual benefit; you and I are only ethically obligated to follow a law if we
would be better off living in a community where that rule is commonly observed.

The Prisoner's Dilemma case is more than a brilliant puzzle. Although the story it tells is
made up, the pattern it represents occurs frequently in real life. It is, in fact, a Prisoner's
Dilemma, despite the fact that there are no prisoners. It can demonstrate why it should pursue the
selfish strategy: (1) Other people will either respect your interests or they will not. (2) If they do
respect your interests, you will be better off not respecting theirs, at least when it is in your best
interests. This is the ideal situation—you get to be a free rider. (3) If they don't respect your
interests, it's pointless for you to respect theirs. That will put you in the worst conceivable
situation—you will receive the sucker's payment (4). As a result, regardless of what others do,
you should adopt a policy of watching out for yourself. You should be self-centered. Now comes
the catch: other individuals can, of course, reason in the same way, and as a result, we'll end
ourselves in Hobbes' state of nature. Everyone will be self-centered, ready to stab anyone who
stands in their way. Each of us would be worse off in that situation than if we all worked
together. To get out of this dilemma, we'll need yet another legally binding agreement, this time
to follow the standards of mutually acceptable social living. Cooperation will not always produce
the best results for each individual, but it will always be preferable to non-cooperation. We can
do so by enacting laws and social norms that protect the interests of all parties concerned.

Morality, according to the Social Contract Theory, consists of rules that rational
individuals will accept if others do as well. It would be illogical, though, to reach an agreement
that we don't expect others to follow. Even if they have vowed to be, most individuals will not be
so nice. We can't because people's fear of death is likely to outweigh their fear of punishment. As
a result, the degree of self-sacrifice that the social contract can expect has a natural limit: rational
people will not agree to norms that are so demanding that others will not follow them. The Social
Contract Theory explains an aspect of morality that other theories may ignore in this way.

Moral theories should assist us in comprehending specific moral concerns. The Social
Contract Theory, in particular, should aid our understanding of difficulties with social
institutions—after all, one of the theory's key goals is to explain the appropriate function of those
institutions. The Indian independence movement headed by Mohandas K. Gandhi and the
American civil rights movement led by Martin Luther King Jr. are two of the most famous
modern examples of civil disobedience. We are obligated to obey the law, according to the
Social Contract Theory, since we all engage in a social structure that provides more benefits than
obligations. The advantages are the benefits of social living: we escape nature and live in a
society where we are safe and have basic rights. To obtain these advantages, we must agree to
support the institutions that enable them. This requires us to follow the law, pay our taxes, and so
on—these are the costs we accept in exchange. If social contract is not being honored, they will
ask the disadvantaged group to obey the law and respect society’s institutions and ask them to
accept the burdens of social living while being denied its benefits. For socially disenfranchised
groups, this line of reasoning argues that civil disobedience is not an undesirable "last resort."
Instead, it is the most natural and reasonable way of protesting. When the poor are denied the
advantages of social life, they are released from the contract that would otherwise bind them to
society's laws. The Social Contract Theory clearly and forcefully gives the most compelling
rationale for civil disobedience.

One of the primary options in contemporary moral philosophy is the Social Contract
Theory. It's simple to see why; the theory appears to explain a lot about moral behavior.
However, there have been some criticisms. The Social Contract Theory is believed to be founded
on historical fiction. However, such a response to the first issue is useless. When you join a game
in progress, it is clear that you chose to do so, because you might have just walked away. As a
result, you must follow the rules of the game or you will be considered a nuisance. The premise
that morality is dependent on an agreement is rejected in this argument of the Social Contract
Theory. It does, however, adhere to the notion that morality is based on mutually beneficial
norms. The second point is more concerning. Some people are unable to help us. As a result,
according to the Social Contract Theory, these individuals have no claim on us, and we are free
to disregard their interests while drafting societal rules. As a result, the moral rules will allow us
to treat these people anyway we want. This theory's implication is unacceptable.
This criticism isn't about a minor point in the theory; it goes right to the heart of the
matter. Because the Social Contract Theory is based on self-interest and reciprocity, it appears
unable to comprehend our moral obligations to those who cannot benefit us.

Many people's beliefs are contradicted by ethical egoism, especially in a country where
we like to think of ourselves as helpful and kind. Our entire responsibility, according to ethical
egoism, is to look after ourselves. Many people would probably cringe at the concept since it
seems a little harsh, but as the author points out, it is far more difficult to argue when the
argument is based on logical and sensible arguments rather than loud emotional appeals. One of
the most powerful arguments for ethical egoism is also one of the most difficult to consider,
especially in our society. It's the fact that altruism is counterproductive. This goes against the
popular belief that helping others is beneficial to both the individual (in terms of self-worth, for
example) and the community as a whole. When you think about it, though, there are some
serious flaws in the argument. We cannot know the needs of others as well as we know our own,
we do not want to intrude on others' privacy, and, in the case of charity, this degrades those who
receive it.

Of course, these are all debatable points, but they are sound and worth exploring. I was
particularly impressed by the notion that many of our "moral duties," such as not lying, keeping
promises, and not harming others, are simply promoting our own selfish interests.
Chapter 7
The Utilitarian Approach

After reading these chapters in "Elements of Moral Philosophy," Bentham's ideas about
utility and how we choose the best possible outcome for everyone involved seem incredibly
optimistic, and they don't appear to take into account the issues raised by psychological or ethical
egoism. Why does it appear to be a contradictory thought, especially in modern culture, if the
ideal course of action, morally speaking, is to do what would promote the greatest amount of
happiness for everybody involved? Despite the absence of any references to religious morality,
this is a problematic and potentially incorrect idea. Even if it promotes social reformers'
objectives, it appears hopelessly outdated and unrealistic. One simply cannot ignore those
questions about altruism versus self-interested behavior discussed previously.

Jeremy Bentham developed a strong basis for a new moral philosophy. He emphasized
that morality is not about pleasing God or following abstract principles. Morality, on the other
hand, is concerned with making the world as happy as possible. The Principle of Utility,
according to Bentham, was the highest moral principle. This idea requires us to provide the
greatest amount of happiness possible in all circumstances. Bentham was the leader of a group of
philosophical revolutionaries whose goal was to implement utilitarian reforms in England's laws
and institutions. The Principle of Utility may not appear to be a radical idea at first glance; in
fact, it may appear too apparent to state. Consider what the Principle of Utility leaves out of
morality: any references to God or abstract moral standards "written in the heavens" are gone,
and morality is no longer regarded as adherence to some divinely provided code or set of rigid
rules. Rather, the objective of morality is the happiness of beings in this world, and nothing
beyond; and we are free—even obligated—to do whatever it takes to ensure that happiness. This
was a ground-breaking concept.

The utilitarians were both philosophers and social reformers. They wanted their concept
to have an impact not only in theory but also in practice. To demonstrate this, we'll look at the
implications of their views for three real-world issues: euthanasia, marijuana, and nonhuman
animal treatment. These are not all of Utilitarianism's practical applications, nor are they
necessarily the ones that utilitarians would deem most pressing. They do, however, offer us a
good idea of how utilitarians think about moral dilemmas.

In the first case of euthanasia, the famous psychologist Sigmund Freud was diagnosed
with oral cancer after a lifetime of cigar smoking. He went to his personal physician and
requested that he be injected with a drug to end his life. All of this points to a lenient judgment.
However, according to the prevalent code of morality, what his friend did was morally wrong.
Our culture has a tradition. That tradition is Christianity. According to Christianity, human life is
a gift from God, and only God has the authority to end it. The early church prohibited any
killing, believing that Jesus' teachings did not allow for exceptions. Some exceptions, like as
capital punishment and war killing, were later acknowledged by the church. Suicide and
euthanasia, however, remained illegal. This idea has affected Western perceptions toward the
morality of killing more than any other. As a result, we may be hesitant to forgive. Max Schur
was his friend, despite his great intentions. He killed an innocent person on purpose, so what he
did was wrong, according to our tradition. The utilitarian approach is much different. It asks,
"What activity would have achieved the best balance of happiness over misery if Max Schur had
it?" Sigmund Freud was the individual whose happiness was most at risk. Freud would have
gone on in excruciating torment if Schur hadn't killed him. How much anguish would this have
caused? It's difficult to say for sure, but Freud's health was so severe that he desired death. His
suffering was ended by killing him. As a result, utilitarians have determined that euthanasia is
ethically acceptable in this situation.

Bentham believed that if the faithful saw God as benevolent, they would support the
utilitarian viewpoint. The majority of religious people disagree with Bentham, and Christianity
has influenced not only our moral tradition but also our legal tradition. Only a few countries in
Western have legalized euthanasia. Bentham was a lawyer who saw the Principle of Utility as a
guidance for legislators as well as ordinary people. He believed that the law's goal was to
promote the wellbeing of all citizens. The law should limit people's freedom as little as possible
to achieve this goal. No action, in particular, should be prohibited unless it is damaging or
hazardous to others. Thus, laws against euthanasia are unjustified restrictions on people's
capacity to govern their own lives, according to classical utilitarians. Max Schur was helping
Sigmund Freud in ending his life in the manner that Freud had planned. Because no one else was
harmed, it was none of their business.

In the second situation, marijuana, people appear to believe that pleasure is unrelated to
morality. However, utilitarians oppose this. For them, the only question is whether marijuana
makes people happier or not. And utilitarians don't believe in "bad pleasures," believing that if
something feels nice, it is good to some level. More people would use marijuana if it were legal,
raising numerous concerns: society as a whole would be less productive; taxpayers would be
stuck with the medical expenditures of heavy users; and more people would drive while high. It
should be mentioned, however, that marijuana only marginally decreases driving ability because
stoned drivers drive cautiously and defensively. As a result, practically all utilitarians support
marijuana legalization. Marijuana is often less dangerous than alcohol or cigarettes, which are
currently tolerated in Western countries. However, utilitarians must be adaptable; if new data
arises that shows marijuana is more damaging than previously considered, the utilitarian
viewpoint may shift.

Nonhuman animals are the third case. Animal treatment has long been dismissed as a
minor consideration. Christians believe that only humans are created in God's image, and that
animals lack souls. As a result of the natural order of things, we can treat animals whatever we
like. People and animals are thus divided into two moral groups. Animals have no moral status of
their own, thus humans can treat them anyway we like. Yet, with a little thought, we can realize
how much of our behavior is actually driven by this doctrine. We eat animals; we use their skins
for clothing and their heads as wall ornaments; we make them the objects of our entertainment in
circuses and rodeos; and we seek them down and kill them for sport. Many secular ones have
been proposed by Western philosophers. Animals are not rational, lack the ability to
communicate, or are simply not human, according to philosophers, all of which are reasons why
their interests are outside the scope of moral concern. The utilitarians, on the other hand, were
not having it. It doesn't matter to them if an animal has a soul, is logical, or anything else. It
doesn't matter whether it can experience happiness or sadness. If an animal can suffer, we have a
responsibility to consider this while making decisions. The utilitarian case is straightforward.
Actions should be judged right or wrong based on whether they increase happiness or decrease
happiness. This approach does not imply that all animal experimentation is unethical. Rather, it
advises that each be judged on their own merits. However, the utilitarian principle implies that
experiments that inflict a lot of pain require a lot of reason. We cannot just presume that
everything goes when interacting with nonhumans.

The idea that nonhuman animals' interests matter is the most novel aspect of all of this.
We commonly presume that only human beings are morally significant. Utilitarianism refutes
this presupposition, arguing that the moral community should be broadened to encompass all
creatures whose interests are affected by our actions. Human beings are unique in many ways,
and a good morality must recognize this. However, we are not the only creatures in the world,
and a proper morality must recognize this.

Overall, especially in light of the examples presented in this chapter, this appears to be a
limiting theory that ignores the possibility of self-interest. It seeks the good of the whole rather
than the good of the individual, and hence is less feasible than the other ideas. It may make sense
in a twisted evolutionary sense, but it contradicts popular beliefs about life and death.
Chapter 8
The Debate Over Utilitarianism

Everyone is equal in moral terms. An activity is right, according to Classical


Utilitarianism, if it results in the greatest overall balance of happiness over unhappiness. The
three propositions of classical utilitarianism are as follows: (a) The morality of an action is
completely determined by its results; nothing else counts. (b) The repercussions of an action are
only important if they affect the pleasure of persons. (c) Each individual's happiness is given
"equal consideration" in the assessment of consequences, which indicates that equal amounts of
happiness always weigh equally; nobody's pleasure is valued more simply because he is wealthy,
powerful, or attractive.

Utilitarianism has had a significant impact on modern thinking. However, most moral
philosophers reject the theory. Is Pleasure All That Matters? is the first argument. The question
What things are good? is different from the question What actions are right? Utilitarianism
responds to the second question by referring back to the first. The most helpful actions are those
that are performed properly. Happiness, on the other hand, is what the utilitarian considers to be
good. Happiness, according to the utilitarians, is pleasure. Pleasure is defined broadly by
utilitarians to include all pleasurable mental states. A sensation of accomplishment, a delectable
taste, and the heightened awareness experienced at the conclusion of a thrilling film are all
examples of pleasure. Hedonism is the ancient belief that pleasure is the only ultimate good and
pain is the only ultimate evil. In philosophy, the idea that things are good or terrible based on
how they make us feel has always been popular. However, a little thought appears to uncover
faults in this idea. Most modern utilitarians reject Hedonism's classical presupposition. Some of
them avoid the topic of what is good by simply stating that proper behaviors provide the best
results, whichever that is defined. Although Hedonism has been largely abandoned,
contemporary utilitarians have found it rather easy to continue.

Are Consequences All That Matter? is the second argument. Utilitarians believe that the
best way to judge if an action is right is to consider what will happen as a result of it. The
philosophy revolves around this concept. Utilitarianism is flawed if things other than
consequences are significant in evaluating what is right. At this point, there are three counter-
arguments against the idea.The first is justice, which mandates that we treat others fairly, based
on their individual circumstances. Utilitarianism, in McCloskey's case, necessitates that we treat
someone unfairly. As a result, utilitarianism cannot be right. The second is the concept of rights.
According to utilitarianism, an individual's rights can always be trampled on if enough people
benefit from it. Utilitarianism has thus been accused of advocating "majority tyranny": if the
majority of people would enjoy someone's rights being violated, then those rights should be
violated because the majority's pleasure exceeds the one's pain. However, we do not believe that
our individual rights should be seen as morally insignificant. The concept of an individual right
is not utilitarian. On the contrary, it is a concept that establishes restrictions on how an individual
can be treated, regardless of the good that may be accomplished. Backward-Looking Reasons is
the last one. Only utilitarianism is concerned about the consequences of our actions. However,
we usually believe that historical concerns are also relevant. Because it eliminates such
backward-looking reasoning, utilitarianism appears to be flawed. Utilitarianism appears to be
problematic since it ignores the past.

The last part of Utilitarianism states that we must treat everyone's happiness equally—or,
as Mill phrased it, "as scrupulously impartial as a disinterested and beneficent spectator." While
this sounds reasonable in theory, it has unsettling implications in practice. One issue is that the
"equal concern" requirement places an undue burden on us; another issue is that it interrupts our
personal relationships.

Utilitarianism is accused of being too demanding. The issue isn't just that Utilitarianism
would oblige us to give away the majority of our possessions. It would also make it impossible
for us to go on with our lives. We all have objectives and pursuits that give significance to our
lives. However, an ethic that demands us to promote the common good would compel us to
abandon those efforts. After all, if you spent your time in other ways, you could accomplish a lot
more good. Utilitarianism is accused of disrupting our personal relationships. You miss out on
intimacy, love, affection, and companionship when you are impartial. Utilitarianism appears to
have lost contact with reality at this moment. The concept is absurd; not only does it go counter
to typical human feelings, but it also implies that love relationships cannot exist without
particular responsibilities and obligations.

Both justice and individual rights appear to be unimportant to utilitarianism. Furthermore,


it is incapable of accounting for backward-looking reasons. If we believed that if we followed the
philosophy, we would become destitute and lose our love for our family and friends. As a result,
most philosophers have abandoned utilitarianism. However, some philosophers continue to
defend it. They accomplish this in three ways. The first line of defense, disputing the
consequences, is ineffective. While it is true that the majority of false witness and similar acts
have negative repercussions, this cannot be said of all such acts. At least once in a while, doing
something against moral common sense can provide a positive effect. As a result, utilitarianism
will clash with common sense in at least some real-life situations. Furthermore, anti-utilitarian
arguments would retain their power even if they had to rely on false cases. Utilitarianism, for
example, is intended to apply to all situations, including hypothetical ones. As a result,
demonstrating that Utilitarianism has unacceptable consequences in hypothetical situations is a
fair means of criticizing it. The first line of defense is so weak. The Second Defense: The Utility
Principle Is Used to Select Rules, Not Acts. To distinguish it from the original theory, now
known as "Act-Utilitarianism," Rule-Utilitarianism does not respond to anti-utilitarian
arguments; like Act Utilitarianism, Rule-Utilitarianism tells us to incriminate the innocent,
betray our agreements, spy on individuals in their homes, and so on. This version of Rule-
Utilitarianism isn't truly utilitarian. Utilitarians are only concerned with happiness and
consequences, but they are also concerned with following rules. As a result, the theory is a
hybrid of utilitarianism and something completely different. As a result, we can't use it to argue
Utilitarianism. The Third Argument: "Common Sense" Is Incorrect. Finally, some utilitarians
have responded to the issues in a totally different way. This type of utilitarian—hard-nosed and
unapologetic—can respond to anti-utilitarian arguments in three ways. The First Response:
Utilitarianism underlies all values. Critics of utilitarianism argue that it fails to explain some of
our most essential values, such as the importance we place on honesty, keeping promises,
respecting others' privacy, and loving our children. Utilitarianism is not incompatible with
common sense in this way of thinking; rather, utilitarianism justifies our commonsense ideals.
The Second Reaction: When Cases Are Exceptional, We Can't Trust Our Gut Reactions. While
certain instances of injustice serve the common good, these are the outliers. Lies, broken
promises, and invasions of privacy almost always result in unhappiness, not happiness. Another
utilitarian reaction is based on this insight. As a result, we automatically detest all lies. Our
intuitive skills are misfiring when we criticize lies that are advantageous. We have learned to
dislike lies because they make us unhappy. However, we are now criticizing lies that make
people happier. Perhaps we should trust the Principle of Utility more than our gut instincts when
confronted with unique circumstances. The third response is that we should pay attention to all of
the consequences. When we're asked to think about a "despicable" behavior that promotes
happiness, the action is frequently presented in a way that encourages us to focus on the negative
consequences rather than the positive consequences. Instead than focusing on the act itself,
utilitarianism becomes more reasonable. Despite the utilitarian considerations, most people will
criticize his actions. As Smart points out, utilitarianism and common sense are incompatible. It's
unclear whether the idea needs to be reconciled with common sense. Many reasons other than
utility appear to be ethically important when we consult what Smart calls our "common moral
consciousness." Smart is correct in his warning that "common sense" should not be believed.
That could be utilitarianism's most important contribution. When we think about it, the flaws in
moral common sense become clear.

Chapter 9
Are There Absolute Moral Rules?

Harry Truman and Elizabeth Anscombe were the subjects of this chapter. Harry S.
Truman will always be known as the president who made the decision to bomb Hiroshima and
Nagasaki with atomic weapons. Using the atomic bomb on one or two Japanese towns may
finish the war quickly, obviating the need for an invasion. Truman was hesitant to deploy the
new weapon at first. The problem was that one bomb would destroy a whole city, including
hospitals, schools, and homes, in addition to military targets. Although the Allies had previously
attacked cities, Truman felt that the new weapon made the issue of noncombatants more
pressing.The target would be strictly military not women and children, he said." It's difficult to
know what to make of this, given that Truman knew the bombs would obliterate entire cities.
Despite this, it is apparent that he was concerned about noncombatants. Truman likewise
appeared to be certain about his decision. Elizabeth Anscombe, who died in 2001, was a 20-year-
old student at Oxford University when World War II began. She co-authored a controversial
pamphlet at the time saying that Britain should not go to war because countries at war inevitably
end up battling unfairly. She was detained late in life while demonstrating outside a British
abortion clinic. She also adopted the church's teaching on how to conduct war ethically, which
put her at odds with Truman. Elizabeth Anscombe and Harry Truman crossed paths. In exchange
for America's wartime assistance, Oxford University planned to award Truman an honorary
degree, and those proposing the distinction thought it would be uncontroversial. However,
Anscombe and two other faculty members were against it. Despite losing, they forced a vote on
what would have been a rubber-stamp approval otherwise. Anscombe then knelt outside the hall,
praying, while the degree was being conferred.

Anscombe published another pamphlet, this time claiming that Truman was a murderer
for ordering the Hiroshima and Nagasaki attacks. Of course, Truman thought the bombings were
justified since they had cut the war short and saved lives. This was insufficient for Anscombe.
Anscombe's point was that some things simply cannot be done. Anscombe held a number of
similar beliefs. We may not kill innocent people on purpose, worship idols, make a false
profession of faith, engage in sodomy or adultery, punish one person for the actions of another,
or commit treachery, which she defines as "gaining a man's confidence in a grave matter by
promises of trustworthy friendship and then betraying him to his enemies." Peter Geach,
Anscombe's husband, agreed with her. Anscombe and Geach were two of the most prominent
advocates of absolute moral rules in the twentieth century.

It's difficult to justify the premise that moral rules have no exceptions. It's simple to argue
why we should disobey a rule—just point to situations where observing the rule will have
disastrous repercussions. Immanuel Kant was a renowned philosopher who believed in the
absoluteness of moral norms. He claimed that lying is wrong in any situation. He didn't rely on
theological arguments; instead, he claimed that lying is always prohibited by reason. Kant
observed that the term ought is frequently misused. Many of our actions are guided by such
"oughts." We have a desire; we realize that taking a certain course of action would assist us
achieve our goal; and so we carry out the plan. These are known as "hypothetical imperatives"
because they instruct us what to do if we have the relevant desires. Because the "ought's" binding
force is dependent on having the relevant desire, we can free ourselves from it by letting go of
the desire. Moral requirements, on the other hand, are independent of personal preferences.
Moral obligations take the form of categorical duties, such as "You ought to do such-and-such,
period," rather than "If you desire so-and-so, then you ought to do such-and-such." Instead, the
guideline is that you should help others regardless of your own desires.

Hypothetical "oughts" are simple to grasp. They simply tell us to do whatever it takes to
attain our goals. On the other hand, categorical "oughts" are mysterious. Categorical "oughts" are
possible because we have reason, just as hypothetical "oughts" are possible because we have
desires. Kant claims that categorical oughts are drawn from the Categorical Imperative, a
premise that every rational individual must embrace. This concept can be used to determine
whether an action is morally acceptable.

So, according to Kant, universal laws, or moral rules that apply in all circumstances,
should guide human behavior. Many such exceptionless rules were held by Kant. We'll
concentrate on Kant's emotions concerning the rule against lying. He claimed that lying in any
scenario is "the obliteration of one's dignity as a human being." Kant presented two arguments in
support of an absolute prohibition on lying. The Categorical Imperative is key to his argument.
Kant claimed that we couldn't have a universal law that allows us to lie since it would be self-
defeating. People would stop believing each other as soon as lying became commonplace. Lying
would be pointless and, in a way, impossible because no one would pay attention to what you
said. As a result, Kant reasoned, lying could not be tolerated. As a result, it is prohibited in all
circumstances.There is a fault in this reasoning. Despite agreeing with Kant's conclusion,
Anscombe was eager to point out a flaw in his logic. The second is that many of Kant's
contemporaries thought his insistence on absolute principles was odd, and they expressed their
dissatisfaction. We're tempted to make exceptions to the rule against lying because we believe
the consequences of honesty will be negative and the consequences of lying would be positive in
some situations. However, we can never be assured of the outcomes—we can never be positive
that good things will follow. The consequences of lying could be disastrous. As a result, the ideal
approach is to avoid the well-known evil of lying and let the consequences play out. Even if the
outcomes are negative, we will not be held responsible because we did our job.

Truman's decision to launch the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki could be
compared to this. The bombs were dropped in the hopes of hastening the end of the conflict.
Truman, on the other hand, had no guarantee that this would happen. Even if the Japanese had
hunkered down, the invasion would have been necessary. So Truman was risking the lives of
hundreds of thousands of people in the expectation of favorable outcomes. The argument is
based on an overly gloomy perspective of what we can learn. We can sometimes be pretty
certain of the outcomes of our actions, in which case we do not need to be concerned about the
unknown. Furthermore, and this is more philosophically significant, Kan appears to imply that
we are morally responsible for any negative consequences of lying, but not for any bad
consequences of telling the truth.

Consider the case where it is maintained that doing X in any condition is absolutely
wrong, and doing Y in any circumstance is equally completely wrong. So, what if someone had
to pick between doing X and doing Y? This type of conflict appears to demonstrate that moral
principles are not absolute. This form of reasoning is strong, but it is also constrained. It can only
be used for pairs of absolute moral principles; the conflict must be created by two rules. The
argument will not persuade someone to believe in a single, absolute norm. Everyone does, in a
way. "Do what is right," we all believe, and there are no exceptions. Doing what is right should
always be our goal. This rule, on the other hand, is so formal that we take it for granted because
it says nothing. It's not the kind of absolute moral norm Kant, Geach, and Anscombe were
advocating.

Kant's Categorical Imperative is defended by few contemporary philosophers. However,


it may be early to reject it. Remember that Kant considered the Categorical Imperative to be
compulsory on rational agents solely because they are rational; in other words, anyone who
rejects this principle is not only immoral, but also irrational. This is an intriguing concept. It
would be irrational to reject the Categorical Imperative since a moral judgment must be
supported by good reasons—if it is true that you should (or should not) do something, then there
must be a reason for doing so. The Kantian twist is that if any considerations are accepted as
reasons in one circumstance, they must likewise be accepted as reasons in other cases. It's
pointless to declare that you can accept reasons sometimes but not always, or that others must
respect them but not you. Moral considerations, if they are valid, bind all persons at all times.
This is a consistent condition, and Kant was correct in believing that no rational individual could
dispute it.

This insight has major consequences. It means that a person cannot perceive herself as
unique from a moral standpoint: she cannot continuously believe that she is allowed to act in
ways that others are not, or that her interests are more important than others'. Kant was not the
first to discover this, but he was the first to make it the foundation of a completely developed
moral framework. But Kant went even further, claiming that consistency necessitates laws with
no exceptions. It's easy to see how his insight pushed him in that direction; nonetheless, the extra
step was unnecessary, and it has thrown his idea into chaos.

Anyone in President Truman's position could argue that dropping the bomb was justified.
Thus, Kant's arguments do not prove that Truman was wrong. One could argue that dropping the
bomb was a mistake because Truman had better alternatives. Perhaps he should have
demonstrated the bomb's strength by dropping it on an unpopulated location, allowing for
successful discussions. Alternatively, even without a Japanese surrender, the Allies may have
declared victory at that stage in the conflict.

Chapter 10
Kant and Respect for Persons

Since ancient times, people have believed that they are fundamentally distinct from all
other living things—and that they are even superior to them. Humans have actually historically
believed that they are rather amazing. Immanuel Kant believed that humans have a unique place
in creation. In his opinion, people are worth more than anything else due to their "intrinsic
worth" or "dignity." Kant did condemn animal mistreatment, but not because it would do harm to
the animals. Instead, he expressed concern for us, saying that "He who is unkind to animals
likewise becomes hard in his dealings with men."

It wasn't just rhetoric when Kant asserted that people are worth "above all price." Kant
intended that persons cannot be replaced. A tragedy occurs when a child passes away, and the
sorrow persists even if a new child is born into the same family. However, "mere things" are
interchangeable. According to Kant, people possess a "dignity" that mere things do not. First of
all, because humans have desires, they may value goods that fulfill their desires. Contrarily,
"mere things" are only valuable insofar as they serve human purposes. Kant believed that mere
animals are too primitive to have conscious desires and objectives. As a result, they are "mere
things," but unlike Kant, we are more awed by the mental lives of animals today. We think that
animals do have goals and desires. Therefore, there may be Kantian justification for the claim
that animals are not "mere things." Animals would not be affected by Kant's second justification,
nevertheless. Because they are rational agents—that is, free individuals capable of making their
own decisions, defining their own goals, and being guided by reason—people have "an intrinsic
worth, i.e., dignity," according to Kant. Only when rational beings act out of a good will, that is,
when they understand what they ought to do and act out of a sense of obligation, can moral
goodness exist. The only rational beings on Earth are humans; nonhuman animals lack free will
and cannot "direct their actions by reason" due to the limitations of their rational faculties. The
moral aspect of the world would also vanish if individuals disappeared.

Therefore, in Kant's opinion, people are not just one valued item among many. Humans
are the ones who value things, and what is morally valuable are their genuine actions. The realm
of things is dwarfed by humans. Kant's moral philosophy is based on these ideas. According to
Kant, the Categorical Imperative, which he called the ultimate principle from which all of our
obligations can be deduced. People are so valuable that morality demands that we treat them
"always as an end and never as a means only," which, on the most basic level, means treating
them well. But Kant's theory also has a deeper implication. We must work to advance their
welfare, protect their rights, keep them safe, and generally "endeavor, so far as we can, to further
the ends of others." Respect for others is a prerequisite for treating them as means. Therefore, no
matter how admirable our goals may be, we cannot manipulate or "exploit" people to get what
we want.

Respecting people's rational capacities and treating them as means has other implications.
Adults should be allowed to make their own decisions rather than being coerced into doing
things against their will. Therefore, rules that are designed to protect citizens from themselves
should be avoided. Not to mention, we must remember that in order to respect others, we must
first respect ourselves. Kant's moral system is difficult to grasp. Let's look at how Kant applied
his theories to the reality of criminal punishment to better comprehend it. This chapter's
remaining is devoted to the illustration.

According to Retribution and Utility in the Theory of Punishment, punishment is always


accompanied by some form of harm done to the person receiving it. As a society, we punish
people by penalizing them money, sending them to jail, or occasionally even by killing them. In
order to "pay back" the culprit for his evil deed, punishment is justifiable. Criminals should be
appropriately punished for their actions. Justice dictates that if you harm someone else, you must
also suffer the consequences. According to the philosophy of Retributivism, this is the basic
rationale of punishment, "An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth." As a result, punishing
people might lead to more suffering in the world, but that's okay because those who truly deserve
it are suffering the extra burden. Bentham believed that retributivism was a fundamentally
unacceptable theory since it encourages the infliction of suffering without any corresponding
increase in happiness. Retributivism wants us to make the world more miserable rather than less
miserable. Kant readily welcomed this notion because he was a retributivist.
A totally different approach is used by utilitarianism. Utilitarianism asserts that our
obligation is to take any action that will increase the quantity in the world of contentment. Only
when the benefits outweigh the drawbacks can punishment be deemed appropriate. And
historically, utilitarians have believed that it does. Punishing someone who violates the law
might have a number of advantages. First, punishment gives victims and their families comfort
and satisfaction. People strongly believe that no one should be allowed to walk free after
robbing, raping, or assaulting them. When victims are aware that their offender has eluded
capture, they also experience fear. Second, we remove criminals from society by imprisoning or
killing them. There will be less crime if there are fewer criminals on the streets. Prisons
safeguard society in this way, which lowers unhappiness. Third, punishment discourages
potential offenders, which lowers crime. If they are aware that they could be penalized, someone
who is inclined to commit a crime may decide against it. It is clear that the threat of punishment
is not always effective because occasionally people still breach the law. However, if
consequences are implied, there will be less wrongdoing. Fourth, a well-crafted penal system
may aid in the rehabilitation of wrongdoers. Criminals frequently struggle with mental and
emotional issues. They frequently lack education, are illiterate, and are unable to keep down
occupations. This change in American justice was more retributive than utilitarian in nature, and
it resulted in substantially more inmates.

Numerous people oppose the utilitarian notion of punishment. Critics claim that prison
reform is ineffective. However, the majority of the opposition is founded on theoretical
arguments that at least date back to Kant. Because the theory, in Kant's opinion, is incompatible
with human dignity, he detested "the serpent-windings of Utilitarianism." First of all, it makes us
think about how to use people as means to achieve our goals. One individual "ought never to be
treated with just as a tool subordinate to the objective of another," according to Kant, which is
violated by this. Furthermore, rehabilitation is basically just an effort to shape individuals into
the people we desire. As a result, it infringes on their freedom to choose what kind of individuals
they will be. While we do have the right to "pay them back" for their wickedness, we do not have
the right to violate their integrity by attempting to influence their behavior.
As a result, Kant would not accept utilitarian justifications. Instead, he contends that there
should be two guiding principles for punishment. First and foremost, criminal offenses should be
punished solely on the basis of the crime itself. Second, the severity of the crime should be
reflected in the punishment. Because only death is fitting as a response to murder, Kant's second
principle leads him to support the death penalty. A Kantian must be in favor of the death
sentence in theory, but she may be against it in reality. In reality, the concern is the possibility of
unintentional deaths of innocent individuals. Kantians must therefore weigh the unfairness of the
odd, fatal error against the injustice of letting murderers live when considering whether to accept
a policy of the death penalty.

A general philosophy of punishment is outlined by Kant's two principles: wrongdoers


must be punished and the sentence must be appropriate for the offense. The Christian principle of
turning the other cheek is completely at odds with this theory. Kant's view that punishment is a
question of justice was previously mentioned. According to him, justice cannot be served if the
guilty are not made to pay. One argument is that. We also talked about Kant's opposition to the
utilitarian interpretation of punishment. This extra argument, however, is Kant's contribution to
the theory of retributivism and is founded on his idea of regarding people as "ends-in- itself." On
the face, it appears doubtful that we could characterize punishing someone as "respecting him as
a person" or as "treating him as an end"; for Kant, to regard someone "as an end" is to treat him
as a rational being, who is accountable for his actions.

Both animals with no sense of reason and humans suffering from mental illness who lack
self-control are not accountable for their acts. Because they are not accountable for any good or
bad that they cause, we are unable to properly feel gratitude or hatred toward them. Furthermore,
neither we nor they are capable of understanding the reasons behind our behavior toward them.
Therefore, rather than dealing with them as rational beings, we are left with little choice except
to manipulate them. A rational being, on the other hand, is free to make decisions based on his or
her own ideas of what is best. Because rational creatures are accountable for their actions, they
are responsible for their behavior. When they act well, we might feel grateful, and when they act
poorly, we might feel resentful. The natural expressions of gratitude and resentment are reward
and punishment, not "training" or other forms of manipulation. As a result, when we punish
someone, we are holding them accountable for their acts in a way that is impossible with just
animals. We are responding to them as individuals who voluntarily selected their wicked conduct
rather than as people who are "ill" or who lack self-control. Additionally, while interacting with
responsible agents, we may legitimately permit their behavior to influence, at least in part, how
we react to them. You can be generous in return for someone's kindness, and you can consider
how they treated you negatively when deciding how to react.

This final point receives a unique twist from Kant. When we make a decision after
considering our own beliefs, we are essentially stating that this is the kind of action that should
be taken. Therefore, when a rational creature decides to treat people in a specific manner, he
decrees that in his opinion this is the way people are to be treated. In Kant's phrase, we are
proposing that our conduct be converted into a "universal law." As a result, if we treat him the
same way in return, we are simply treating him the way he has determined that people should be
treated. We are following his own judgment if we treat him poorly and he treats others poorly.
By letting it dictate how we treat him, we are in a very real sense respecting his judgment. Thus,
according to Kant, "His own wicked deed pulls the punishment upon himself" for the offender.

What we ultimately believe of Kant's idea may be influenced by how we perceive


criminal behavior. The utilitarian paradigm will appeal to us if we view criminals as victims of
circumstance who ultimately lack control over their own behavior. On the other hand, Kantian
Retributivism will appeal to us much if we consider criminals to be rational agents who freely
decide to cause harm. Thus, whether we believe that people have free will or that external
circumstances have such a profound influence on human conduct that our freedom is an illusion
may determine how this important dispute is resolved. But since the discussion of free will is so
complicated and involves topics unrelated to ethics, we won't get into it here. In philosophy, this
type of dialectical scenario is frequent: when you carefully examine a subject, you frequently
discover that it is dependent on other factors. Unfortunately, that additional thing frequently
proves to be just as challenging as the initial set of issues.
Chapter 11
Feminism and the Ethics of Care
In the past, prejudice against women has been excused by the notion that men and women
thought in different ways. Women are naturally dominated by men because, according to
Aristotle, they lack the same level of reason as men. Immanuel Kant concurred and added that
women should not participate in public life since they "lack civil individuality." By highlighting
the fact that men and women simply have different virtues, Jean-Jacques Rousseau attempted to
put a positive spin on this. However, it soon became clear that men's virtues best suit them for
leadership, while women's virtues suit them for the home and hearth. It was dismissed as a mere
stereotype that men are intellectual and women are emotional. It was formerly believed that there
is no mental or moral difference between the sexes in nature, and any apparent distinctions only
exist because women have been socialized by a patriarchal system to act in more "feminine"
ways.

However, the majority of feminists today hold that women do think differently than
males. However, they point out, neither are women's thought processes inferior to those of men,
nor do these distinctions support any form of bias. Instead, the perspectives of women offer
insights that have been overlooked in fields where men predominate. We can therefore advance
topics that were stagnant by paying attention to the unique perspective of women. One of the top
candidates for this treatment is reportedly ethics.

The "Heinz's Dilemma" problem was used by Kohlberg to examine the moral growth of
children in his book, Stages of Moral Development. Using a variety of challenges and questions
aimed at eliciting their thoughts, Kohlberg questioned kids of different ages. Kohlberg came to
the conclusion that moral development occurs in six stages after studying their answers. So, if
everything goes as planned, we start life with a selfish desire to escape punishment and end it
with a set of impersonal moral precepts. But according to Kohlberg, only a small proportion of
adults reach stage 5.

Kohlberg's humanistic, cognitive approach sought knowledge in a more alluring way in


Gilligan's Objection. His fundamental thesis, nonetheless, was wrong. It is appropriate to
research how people think at different ages; if kids think differently at 5, 10, and 15, it is
information that should be known. Finding the right ways to think is also important. But these
initiatives are unique. The first involves observing how kids actually think, while the second
involves rating different ways of thinking as better or worse. There is no reason to presume in
advance that the findings will be consistent because different types of evidence are pertinent to
each investigation. It may turn out that age does not necessarily offer wisdom, contrary to what
many older people believe.

From a feminist standpoint, Kohlberg's theory has also received criticism. Jake's response
will only be deemed "at a higher level" if one accepts Kohlberg's premise that an ethic of
principle is superior to an ethic of intimacy and caring. When faced with Heinz's Dilemma, Amy
responds to the personal aspects of the situation, as females typically do, whereas Jake, thinking
like a male, sees only "a conflict between life and property that can be resolved by a logical
deduction." The "male way of thinking," which appeals to impersonal rules, obscures the
specifics that give each circumstance its own flavor. Gilligan claims that it is more difficult for
women to disregard those facts. Gilligan contends that caring—specifically, "taking care" of
others in a personal way—represents women's fundamental moral compass, as opposed to
merely caring about people in general. Other feminists have taken these ideas and shaped them
into a distinctive view of ethics, arguing that "women's moral weakness, manifest in an apparent
diffusion and confusion of judgment, is thus inseparable from women's moral strength, an
overriding concern with relationships and responsibilities."

Numerous psychological studies on gender, emotions, and morality have been done since
the publication of Gilligan's book. These investigations highlight some distinctions between men
and women. On exams that gauge empathy, women typically perform better than males.
Additionally, according to brain scans, women are less likely than males to appreciate seeing
those who have treated them unfairly punished. This is possibly because women empathize even
with those who have harmed them. Finally, women appear to value close relationships more than
males do larger networks of unreliable ties.
It's likely that men and women have distinct ethical perspectives. However, these
variations cannot be extremely significant. Not that men or women are incapable of
understanding the judgments made by any gender. Even if they need to be reminded
occasionally, men can recognize the importance of loving relationships and can concur with
Amy that the happiest outcome for Heinz's dilemma would be for the two guys to resolve their
differences. Women, on the other hand, are unlikely to disagree that human life is more valuable
than money. And when we examine people as individuals, we see that while some women place
a strong emphasis on abstract ideas, some males are particularly compassionate. It is obvious that
the moral universes of the sexes are the same.

Maybe we can learn anything from Charles Darwin's theory of evolution. The Darwinian
"fight for survival" can be viewed as a race to pass on the most of one's genes to the following
generation. Future generations will tend to carry features that support this, while they will tend to
lose those that hinder it. According to the theory, modern individuals possess the emotions and
behavioral characteristics that allowed their ancient ancestors to thrive and procreate. Different
reproductive methods are used by males and females. The best course of action for guys is to
conceive as many women as they can. After doing that, he is unable to spend much time with any
one youngster in particular. The best course of action for women is to put a lot of money into
each child and to only engage in sexual activity with individuals who are prepared to stick
around. This causes conflict between men and women and may be the reason why the views of
the sexes have changed over time. It famously explains why men have more sex desire than
women. It also explains why women may be more drawn to the principles of the nuclear family,
particularly the principle of caring, than men. This form of justification is frequently
misinterpreted. The key issue is not that individuals intentionally plan how to pass on their
genes; nobody does that. The issue isn't that people should compute this way; rather, they
shouldn't form an ethical one. Simply explaining what we see is the goal. Not all feminists are
female philosophers, and not all feminists subscribe to the ethics of care. However, the ethics of
care are directly related to contemporary feminism. Asking what difference it would make in
practice can help you grasp an ethical viewpoint.

On the other hand, the ethics of care is ideal for describing such relationships. The ethics
of care do not consider "obligation" or "duty" to be fundamental, nor does it demand that we
pursue everyone's interests equally and impartially. Instead, it starts with the idea that a moral
life is a web of connections with particular individuals, and that "living well" means taking care
of those people, meeting their needs, and earning their trust. These perspectives result in various
assessments of what we might accomplish. From a neutral stance, it is our responsibility to
advance the interests of everybody. But few of us share that opinion. An ethic of care seems
more tenable than an ethic of principle since it validates the importance we naturally place on our
family and friends. The ethics of care seems to do a fair job of understanding the nature of our
moral relationships with friends and family, which is of course not surprising. After all, its main
source of inspiration is those relationships.

This would lead a classical ethic of principles, like utilitarianism, to draw the conclusion
that we have a significant obligation to help UNICEF. The justification is simple: Most of us
spend money on pleasures. Luxury is not as important as AIDS prevention for children. As a
result, we ought to donate at least some of our funds to UNICEF. Of course, this argument would
become complicated if we tried to fill in all the details.But the basic idea is clear enough. Since
we should care for those underprivileged kids, one could assume that an ethic of care would
come to a similar conclusion. That, however, is not the point. An ethic of caring emphasizes
close-knit, intimate connections. "Caring" cannot exist if there is no such bond.

The person being cared for must be able to acknowledge and accept the care at a least
during a private, one-on-one interaction. Noddings comes to the conclusion that we are under no
obligation to assist "the destitute in the far regions of the globe" since there is no potential of
fulfillment in the other case. Many feminists consider Noddings's position to be overly severe. It
seems as foolish as neglecting human relationships completely to treat them as the entirety of
ethics, as she does. The ethical life encompasses both compassionate interactions with others and
a care for humans in general, which might be a preferable way. Using this method, we may read
the ethics of care as enhancing rather than superseding conventional ideas. These arguments will
be disregarded if the ethic of caring is considered to constitute the entirety of morality. However,
the arguments from principle will be quite persuasive if caring is simply one aspect of morality.
Not because of our compassionate relationship with them, but for other reasons, livestock may
fall under the purview of moral concern.
In public life, where interactions are frequently impersonal and contractual, men have
historically dominated. When interests diverge in politics and business, relationships can even
become hostile. As a result, we bargain, negotiate, and make deals. Additionally, when making
judgments in public, a sizable number of people we do not know may be impacted. Therefore,
we might attempt to determine which choices will result in the best overall situation for the most
number of people.

Justice and goodness are required in public life, while love and compassion are required
in private life. Therefore, it may be easiest to understand the ethics of care as a subset of the
ethics of virtue. This is how many feminist philosophers see it. Although Virtue Ethics is not a
feminist initiative altogether, Annette Baier refers to its male proponents as "honorary women"
because of how closely it is linked to feminist concepts. The validity of a more comprehensive
conception of the virtues may eventually determine the ethics of care.

Although this chapter of "Elements of Moral Philosophy" begins with an implied


comment about how those "old" ideas about how men and women think differ, the author fails to
acknowledge that these prejudices are still very much in use despite recent feminist criticism like
that described. In fact, I would contend that they have a stronger hold than feminist claims that
women simply have different perspectives or take into account ideas that males could have
overlooked. Assuming that women are different due to social conditioning sounds pretty
straightforward and logical. Women are educated to be the nurturers and the objects of the social
system from a young age. This is difficult to prove without a unique control study in which both
sexes are raised independently of social factors.

Chapter 12
Virtue of Ethics
In the discussions, "the virtues" took center stage. Aristotle covers virtues including
courage, self-control, generosity, and truthfulness after stating that a good man is an activity of
the soul in conformity with virtue. But as time went on, this way of thinking was forgotten. A
fresh set of concepts evolved with the advent of Christianity. Christians and Jews both believed
that God was a lawgiver, and that following those commandments was the path to live a
righteous life. The Greeks believed that the pursuit of virtue and the pursuit of reason were
connected. However, Saint Augustine, a significant fourth-Christian thinker of the nineteenth
century who rejected reason and held that moral excellence relied on submitting to divine will
God. Therefore, the "theological virtues" of faith, hope, charity, and obedience were in the
spotlight as medieval philosophers analyzed the virtues in the context of Divine Law.

Though moral philosophy once more became more secular after the Renaissance,
philosophers did not adopt the Greek style of thinking. The Moral Law, which was supposed to
originate from human reason rather than from God, was a set of principles defining which
activities are right, and it was used to replace the Divine Law. It was argued that it is our
responsibility as moral beings to abide by these laws. Because of this, contemporary moral
philosophers tackled their subject by formulating a fundamentally different query than the
ancients. They went a different way as a result of this. They continued to build ideas of rightness
and obligation rather than virtue: Ethical egoism, the idea that everyone should act in their own
best interests. In accordance with the Social Contract Theory, one should follow the laws that
reasonable, self-interested people would agree to uphold for their mutual benefit. According to
utilitarianism, one should act in a way that will maximize happiness. According to Kant's theory,
it is our responsibility to uphold laws that we could accept as universal laws—that is, laws that
we would be willing for everyone to uphold in all circumstances. Since the 17th century, these
doctrines have dominated moral philosophy.

However, a radical concept has recently been put out by a number of philosophers.
According to Anscombe, moral philosophy is dead and we should return to Aristotle's method of
thinking. She thinks that contemporary moral philosophy is flawed because it is based on the
absurd idea of a "law" without a lawgiver. She claims that this self-contradictory idea is
inextricably linked to the basic notions of obligation, duty, and rightness. So instead of
considering responsibility, duty, and rightness, we ought to go back to Aristotle's perspective.
The qualities ought to prevail once more on the main stage. After Anscombe's article, a deluge of
books and articles on the virtues arose, and Virtue Ethics quickly returned to being a popular
choice.

A theory of virtue should include a definition of what a virtue is, a list of the virtues, an
explanation of what each virtue entails, and a justification for why these traits are beneficial. The
theory should also clarify if the qualities are universal to all people or whether they vary from
one person to another or from one culture to another. According to Aristotle, a virtue is a
personal quality that shows up in habitual behavior. It's crucial to note the word "habitual" here.
However, this does not distinguish between virtues and vices because vices are also character
qualities that show themselves in repetitive behavior. The term also includes an evaluation:
virtues are good, whereas vices are bad. A virtue is therefore an admirable quality of character
that shows via consistent behavior. Of course, saying this doesn't tell us which character traits are
good or harmful. Which virtues are important depends on the reasons we look for people. As a
result, we can describe a moral virtue as a personal quality that is beneficial for everyone to
possess and shows up in habitual behavior.

These virtues consist of the following four: (1) Courage, which is a middle ground
between cowardice and foolishness—it is cowardly to flee from any danger, but foolish to take
unwarranted risks. Because soldiers so visibly need courage, courage is frequently referred to as
a military virtue. However, not just military personnel require courage. We all need courage, not
just when we have to deal with an immediate threat like an enemy soldier or grizzly bear.
Sometimes we have to have the guts to put ourselves in uncomfortable situations. "Courage in an
unworthy cause is no virtue; far less is courage in a bad cause," says Peter Geach. Geach's
argument is clear to see. We don't want to celebrate a terrorist's performance by calling him
"courageous" On the other hand, it doesn't seem entirely accurate to suggest that he lacks guts
given how he responds to danger. Maybe we could just state that he exhibits two moral qualities
—one good and one bad —to address this dilemma. He is brave, as Maher stated, and bravery is
a virtue; nevertheless, because his bravery is being used for such a horrible goal, his behavior is
generally quite wicked (2) Generosity, the readiness to lend a helping hand. One can be kind
with any of their resources, even their time. Jesus of Nazareth, another ancient teacher, advised
us to share everything we have with the less fortunate. The modern utilitarians are the moral
heirs of Jesus in this matter. We should continue to give until we are the most deserving
recipients of the funds still in our possession. We would become impoverished if we did
this.Such a policy would make it impossible for us to live normal lives. Projects and
relationships make up the majority of our lives, and they demand a large investment of time,
money, and effort. We would have to give up our daily lives in order to live up to an unrealistic
ideal of "generosity." We would have to lead a religious life. We should use our resources as
generously as we can while still living our normal lives. However, even this view raises a
confusing question. Think of a wealthy individual who has gotten accustomed to lavish lifestyles
to understand how expensive some people's "regular lives" are. If he isn't willing to sell his yacht
to feed the hungry, this individual can't possibly be generous. It would appear that an excessively
wealthy lifestyle precludes the virtue of generosity. Therefore, our idea of what constitutes
"normal living" must be overly expensive in order to make this understanding of generosity
"fair." (3) Honesty. An honest individual, first and foremost, does not lie. However, deceiving
people is not always done through lying. Geach asserts that lying is always prohibited and that
someone who values honesty will never even consider it. Since honest people do not lie, they
must find alternative means of achieving their objectives. On a smaller basis, we expose
ourselves to others when we believe them when they say they are. Everything will be fine if they
are honest. However, if they lie, we develop inaccurate beliefs, and if we act on those beliefs, we
make dumb decisions. They betrayed our trust even though we trusted them. Manipulative
behavior is lying. Honest people, on the other hand, respect other people. If these theories are
correct, then lying and telling "deceptive truths" are equally unethical. After all, the same
justifications apply to why both kinds of lying are unacceptable. Both lie and deceive with the
intention of giving the listener a false impression, which is their common objective. (4) Loyalty
to loved ones and friends. A good life depends on friendship. No one would prefer to live
without friends, even if they had access to all other benefits, according to Aristotle. Of all,
friendship has many advantages beyond helping one out financially. Without our friends, we
would be lost psychologically. Without friends to celebrate our victories with, they seem hollow,
and when we fail, we need more of our friends. Friendships provide us the security we need to
feel good about ourselves since they validate our value as people by returning our affection. If
we want to be friends, we must possess the necessary traits. Loyalty ranks quite high on the
ranking. Of course, there are boundaries; sometimes the painful truth about ourselves may only
be revealed by a friend. However, since we are aware that our friends are not rejecting us, we can
accept criticism from them. None of this negates the fact that we have obligations to others,
including strangers. But these obligations are linked to various virtues. Although it may involve a
lot, generalized beneficence does not demand the same amount of compassion for strangers as it
does for friends. Another such virtue is justice, which demands that everyone be treated equally.
The demands of justice are, however, weaker when friends are involved since friends are devoted
to one another. We may be more loyal to and partial toward family members since we are closer
to them than we are to friends.

Virtues are essential. Character qualities that are beneficial for people to possess are
called virtues. We require courage to face danger, thus having it is a positive thing. Since there
will always be individuals in need of assistance, generosity is a virtue. Sincerity is essential
because without it, relationships between individuals would suffer in a variety of negative ways.
Friendships require loyalty since they stick together even when others would reject them. This
implies that every virtue has value for a certain reason. We are sociable beings who seek the
companionship of others on a fundamental level. As a result, we reside in neighborhoods with
our family, friends, and acquaintances. To properly engage with others in this situation, one
needs traits like loyalty, justice, and honesty. We might work and pursue specific interests on a
more personal level. Other qualities like tenacity and diligence may be required for those
undertakings. Finally, it is necessary to have courage and self-control because it is a part of the
human condition to occasionally face danger or temptation. As a result, the virtues all share the
same fundamental value: they are all traits required for leading meaningful lives.

We might wonder if all people would find a particular set of characteristics appealing.
Should we refer to the excellent person as if they all fit into a single mold? There is a clear way
in which individual qualities may vary. The traits of character that enable people to thrive may
vary since people lead various types of lifestyles, have various types of personalities, and play
various social roles. In conclusion, it may be true that different activities may be considered to
satisfy a virtue in different communities, and it may also be true that the value of a character trait
varies from person to person and from society to society. However, it is incorrect to imply that a
character trait's virtue or vice is determined by societal traditions. The main virtues come from
the fact that we are all human.

Virtue Ethics is often said to have two selling points; (1) Moral motivation. Virtue Ethics
is appealing because it provides a natural and attractive account of moral motivation (2) Doubts
about the “ideal” of impartiality. A dominant theme in modern moral philosophy has been
impartiality—the idea that all persons are morally equal, and that we should treat everyone’s
interests as equally important.

Theories that place a strong emphasis on moral behavior appear lacking because they
ignore the issue of character. By placing character at the forefront of its concerns, virtue ethics
solves this issue. However, as a result, Virtue Ethics could end up lacking in the other way.
However, some authors contend that Virtue Ethics should be viewed as a rival to the other
systems. According to these authors, virtue ethics is a full moral theory in and of itself.
Anscombe asserts that it "would be a big improvement" if we ceased using ideas like "morally
right action," even though some philosophers have argued that we should do away with them.
According to her, using such terms enables us to communicate our entire message.

Radical Virtue Ethics is mostly criticized for being lacking in some areas. It appears to
be lacking in three different ways. First of all, Radical Virtue Ethics does not fully account for
every situation. The third brings to mind Social Contract Theory, whereas the second is
utilitarian. Radical Virtue Ethics won't be able to tell us whether the virtues hold true in
challenging situations if it doesn't explain why something is a virtue. Being kind requires us to
consider another person's best interests, yet Radical Virtue Ethics does not specify what those
interests are. The theory's inability to fully interpret the virtues is the second aspect in which it
falls short. The precise time they apply is not known. Radical Virtue Ethics appears to be little
more than a collection of cliches like "be nice, be honest, be patient, be generous," etc. Platitudes
are ambiguous, so when they disagree, we must search elsewhere for direction. The resources of
a bigger theory are necessary for radical virtue ethics.
It appears preferable to consider virtue ethics as a component of our general theory
rather than as a full theory in and of itself, ethics. The description of all the factors would be
included in the whole theory that are taken into account when making practical decisions, as well
as the underlying justifications. Whether such a hypothesis is true is the question can support
both an appropriate view of moral behavior and a similar idea of moral character. I fail to see
why not. Imagine, for instance, that we subscribe to the utilitarian theory of right conduct, which
holds that one should act in a way that will make them as happy as possible. Morally speaking,
we would prefer a society in which everyone leads contented lives. Then, we could inquire as to
what courses of action, social programs, and personal traits are most likely to produce that
outcome. From that larger perspective, one could then investigate the nature of virtue.

Chapter 13
What would a Satisfactory Moral Theory be like?
The history of moral philosophy is extensive and fascinating. Since they were created by
thinkers of undeniable genius, it should come as no surprise that almost all classical theories
contain elements that are tenable. However, there are inconsistencies among the many ideas, and
most of them are open to grave challenges. Since we don't always know the absolute truth about
most things, moral philosophy isn't substantially worse off than any other subject in this regard.
However, given what we do know, speculating on what a compelling moral theory would look
like might not be rash.

A plausible theory would consider how humans fit into the larger scheme of things. In
geological time, we arrived only yesterday. But as soon as our ancestors arrived, they started to
believe that they were the peak of creation. Some of them even believed that the cosmos itself
was created only for them. They therefore believed that safeguarding their own interests had
some sort of ultimate and objective value when they started to build ideas of good and wrong.
They believed that they were meant to use the rest of creation. But we are wiser now. We now
understand that we are one species among millions on a tiny speck of an incredibly large galaxy,
existing by evolutionary accident. The details of this image are updated annually when new
information is found, although the broad strokes are generally known. Some of the old
mythology still holds true: humans are still the most intelligent creatures we are aware of and the
only ones who speak. These facts, however, cannot support a total worldview that centers on us.

Humans have developed into rational beings. We are able to use some facts as
justifications for certain behaviors because we are rational beings. We can articulate those
reasons and think about them. Therefore, we consider something to be a reason to do it if it
would help us fulfill our needs, wants, and so forth—in other words, if it would advance our
interests. These facts may be the source of our notion of "ought." We wouldn't need such a
concept if we were unable to think critically. Now, we discover that we are motivated to act in
particular ways as a result of deliberate action—as a result of considering our actions and their
effects. We employ the word ought to denote this new aspect of the situation: We ought to act in
accordance with the most compelling arguments. Another crucial point becomes clear when we
consider morality to be an issue of acting based on reason. We can be consistent or inconsistent
in our thinking when deciding what to do. Because racism is an offense against logic, it violates
morals. Similar criticisms are applicable to other ideologies that categorize people as morally
favored or despised, such as nationalism, sexism, and classism. The conclusion is that reason
requires impartiality: We should act to advance the interests of all people equally.

This would imply that reason asks more of us than we can handle if Psychological
Egoism were true—if we could just care about ourselves. However, psychological egoism is
untrue; it paints a distorted portrait of human nature and the state of the human race. We have
developed into social animals that live in groups, enjoy each other's company, depend on each
other for assistance, and are capable of showing concern for one another's well-being. Therefore,
there is an agreeable "fit" between (a) what reason demands, namely impartiality; (b) the
requirements of social living, namely adherence to laws that benefit everyone's interests, if fairly
applied; and (c) our innate tendency to care about others, at least to a moderate extent. Together,
the three of them make morality for people not only conceivable but also natural.

When used to fight racism, the notion that we should "advance the interests of everyone
alike" is appealing. However, there are situations when treating people differently is justified—
there are moments when some people deserve to be treated better or worse than others. Humans
are logical entities with the capacity for free will. People who choose to treat others well deserve
to be treated well, and people who choose to treat others poorly can expect to be treated poorly.
It goes beyond simply rewarding friends and holding grudges toward enemies in order to treat
people as they have chosen to treat others. It involves recognizing people as responsible agents
who, based on their prior behavior, demand specific reactions. For instance, we would be
preventing people from earning favorable treatment from other people. This is important. We all
live in communities, therefore our success is influenced by both our own actions and the actions
of others. We need others to treat us nicely if we're going to thrive. We have a means to do that,
which is to offer individuals the ability to control their own destinies through a social system that
recognizes deserts. We may envision a system where a person could only obtain favorable
treatment through force, luck, or acts of charity. But acknowledging deserts is done differently
today. It provides individuals control over whether other people treat them favorably or
unfavorably. "You will be entitled to good treatment from others if you act well," it instructs
children. Respecting others is the foundation of acknowledging deserts. You will have earned it.

There are other instances in which it appears that the concept of "supporting the interests
of everyone alike" falls short of including all aspects of morality. Unbiased compassion for
others should, of course, occasionally drive people. But there are other ethically admirable
reasons as well. Even though these motivations are typically not seen as "moral," we shouldn't
try to banish them from human existence. Taking pride in one's work, striving to produce
something of value, and many more noble goals all contribute to one's happiness as well as the
wellbeing of society as a whole. We shouldn't want to get rid of them any more than we want to
get rid of friendship and love.

However, it could be possible to identify connections between these disparate issues. On


the surface, it would appear that treating people according to their unique needs is fundamentally
different from attempting to advance the interests of all. But when we questioned why deserts
were significant, the response was that if acknowledging deserts was not a part of our social
structure, we would all be in a far worse position. And the reason that love, friendship, artistic
creativity, and pride in one's profession are so vital is that they make our lives so much richer.
Human welfare may therefore be the only moral criteria. The goal should be to make as many
people as happy as possible. This criteria can be applied to judge a wide range of items, such as
actions, rules, social norms, laws, and character attributes. However, this does not imply that we
should always want to make people as happy as we can. Instead, if we just love our children,
appreciate our friends, take pleasure in our work, honor our promises, and so forth, our daily
lives will flow more smoothly. This conclusion will be supported by an ethic that prioritizes "the
interests of everyone alike."

Given our circumstances, personalities, and abilities, there is some combination of


virtues, motivations, and decision-making techniques that is best for us. This combination is
"best" in the sense that it will maximize the chances that one will have a good life while also
maximizing the chances that other people will also have good lives. Call this best-case scenario a
combination. We must behave in accordance with the best plan since that is the correct thing to
do. One's best plan can be very similar to yours. They must both contain prohibitions on
murdering, stealing, and lying, as well as guidelines for when exceptions to such prohibitions
should be made. Both of them will contain qualities like self-control, kindness, and patience.
Both of them might have advice on how to raise kids, including how to instill certain virtues in
them. Our great plans need not, however, be the same. Different people have various
personalities and skills. As a priest, one person may find fulfillment while another may never be
able to. As a result, we may encounter various types of interpersonal connections throughout our
lives and require the development of numerous virtues. Some people are wealthy, while others
are destitute, some are privileged, and some are subject to persecution. People also live in
various environments and have access to various resources. The best ways to live will therefore
vary. To determine which strategy is the best in each situation, it will be necessary to evaluate
how effectively it advances the interests of all parties. Therefore, even though it regularly
supports motives that do not appear utilitarian at all, the theory as a whole is utilitarian.

We should care about everyone whose welfare may be impacted by what we do since we
are moral beings. Although it may sound like a religious platitude, this idea can actually be
difficult to follow. The community of moral concern embraces everyone. We would be
compelled to alter our behavior if the interests of all children, regardless of where they resided,
were treated seriously. If the moral community is not restricted to a specific location or time, it is
also not restricted to a specific population. It doesn't matter if our activities have an impact on
people today or in the future. All of their interests must be taken into account equally. We also
need to broaden our idea of the moral community in another way. In this world, we are not alone.
Other sentient animals, or those that have the capacity to experience both pleasure and suffering,
also have interests. They suffer suffering when we mistreat them or murder them, just as people
might suffer such harm. So, the single moral standard is not human welfare, but sentient welfare.
It has been said that utilitarianism is unfair and unjust. Punishment is a point of criticism.
We may think of situations where framing an innocent individual would benefit society as a
whole. Even though such a deed would be obviously unfair, utilitarianism would seem to
demand it. In general, utilitarians are delighted to "employ" criminals to further the goals of
society, as Kant noted. We might feel uneasy about a theory that supported manipulation as a
proper moral tactic, even if those aims are worthy. However, our theory views punishment
differently than utilitarians typically do. In fact, our perspective resembles Kant's. We are
treating that person less favorably than we treat others when we penalize him. However, this is
justified by the individual's own prior actions because it is a reaction to what he has done.
Because the innocent individual did nothing to merit such treatment, framing them is not
appropriate. But justice encompasses more than just the doctrine of punishment. Anytime one
person is treated differently from another, questions of justice emerge.

Nothing other than a person's own acts can support a departure from the "equal
treatment" standard. This goes against the common thinking on the matter. People frequently
believe that it is proper to praise people for traits like great intelligence, personal appearance, and
other qualities that are largely the result of having the correct DNA and being reared by the
appropriate parents. And in reality, people frequently have better jobs and more money simply
because they were born into wealthy families with better natural talents. However, after some
thought, this does not seem correct. People's native endowments are not something they merit;
they are just a result of what John Rawls refers to as "the natural lottery." Multiple-Strategies
Utilitarianism holds that we should live in a way that maximizes the interests of all sentient
beings. However, making such a suggestion calls for modesty. Philosophers have developed and
defended a wide range of moral theories over the ages, and history has always discovered holes
in their presuppositions. However, there is still hope—if not for my plan, then for a different one
in the future. A few thousand years ago, civilization only just began. The future of ethical
research is promising as long as we do not destroy it.

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