INCIPIENT CHINESE BUREAUCRACY AND ITS IDEOLOGICAL RATIONALE: THE

CONFUCIANISM OF HSÜN TZǓ

Author(s): William C. Manson
Source: Dialectical Anthropology, Vol. 12, No. 3 (1987), pp. 271-284
Published by: Springer
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 INCIPIENT CHINESE BUREAUCRACY AND ITS IDEOLOGICAL RATIONALE: THE
CONFUCIANISM OF HS?N TZU
William C. Manson
The causal interrelationship of ideology and
the direction of social change has long been a
subject of theoretical inquiry for social scien?
tists. In Max Weber's sociology, ideational
systems essentially underlie, and provide the
template for, the direction of social action. Thus,
social action can be explicated by causal
analysis - but only through a non-materialist
explanatory approach dependent upon "a prior
grasp of the Subjective meanings' that men
attach to their actions [1]." Contrastingly, in the
materialist perspective outlined by Marx, belief
systems are generally epiphenomena
conditioned by the inexorable contingencies of
daily existence. Marx and Engels' The German
Ideology (1846) provides the classic statement
of this approach:
Morality, religion, metaphysics, all the rest of ideology
and their corresponding forms of independence. They
have no history, no development; but men, developing
their material production and their material intercourse,
alter, along with this their real existence, their thinking
and the products of their thinking. life is not deter?
mined by consciousness, but consciousness by life [2].
The movement of history in the Marxist formula?
tion is the ever-changing trajectory generated by
the dialectical tension between antipodal social
classes for control of material production.
Belief-systems, as Marx and Engels explain, are
correspondingly fashioned by the ascendant
social class to legitimate its material dominance:
The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the
ruling ideas, i.e., the class which is the ruling material
William C. Manson has taught anthropology and sociology
at Rutgers, St John's, and Fairleigh Dickenson universities.
Dialectical Anthropology, 12:271-284 (1988)
? Kluwer Academic Publishers -
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force of society, is at the same time its ruling
intellectual force. The class which has the means of
material production at its disposal, has control at the
same time over the means of mental production .... The
ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression
of the dominant material relationships, the dominant
material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the
relationships which make the one class the ruling one,
therefore, the ideas of its dominance [3].
In the Weberian perspective, Confucianism,
grounded in basic precepts about humanity's
nature and relationship to the universe, outlined
an ethical patterning for conduct, a program for
appropriate social action. In the present paper I
have followed the Marxist supposition that the
successive modifications or recastings of
Confucian ideology were conditioned, to a
significant degree, by historical alterations in the
relations of social classes which characterized
the transition from feudalism to bureaucratic
despotism. The modified Confucianism of the
philosopher Hs?n Tz?, in particular, may be
viewed as a direct precursor to Han Fei Tz?'s
totalitarian "Legalism" - which in turn provided
both an ideological rationale and a practical
methodology for the emergence of the
bureaucratic despotism established with the
Ch'in dynasty in 221 B.C.
CONFUCIUS AND THE DECLINE OF
FEUDALISM
Born in 551 B.C., Confucius lived in the
minor state of Lu, where his family, formerly of
aristocratic heritage, had migrated [4]. An
unsuccessful governmental official, Confucius
established the first private school for higher
272
education in China, accepting pupils from all
social strata solely on the basis of merit - a
concept elaborated much later in the develop?
ment of the civil service examination system [5].
Although generally characterized as a conserva?
tive who idealized the feudal order of the early
Chou sage-kings, Confucious nonetheless
constructed an ideological framework perhaps
uniquely appropriate for the gradual shift from
feudal to bureaucratic institutions [6]. Through
"self-cultivation" in // (propriety), Confucius
held, any man "might become a gentleman, if
his conduct were noble [7]." Thus, the
"gentleman" was more properly distinguished by
moral attributes rather than by hereditary birth
status. Self-cultivation and adherence to //,
Benjamin Schwartz notes, mirrored the
"ordering and harmonizing of the world [8]."
In the Analects, The Great Learning, and
other works, teachings attributed to Confucius
continually emphasize how the "superior man"
may use his knowledge to correct the ills of
society. Homer Dubs maintains that "all ancient
Confuciun philosophy had for its purpose the
furthering of the art of government" [9], and
Schwartz notes the
'idealistic' view of government so peculiar to Con?
fucianism - a view which sees in government primarily
an agency for bringing to bear on society as a whole the
moral influence of superior men through the power of
moral example and of education [10].
Thus, for Confticius, social harmony may
significantly derive from the moral leadership of
the superior-minded ruler whose adherence to
the rules of propriety is manifested in devotion
to truth and sincerity in social relations. The
ruler as normative "role model" is in fact a
ubiquitous theme throughout the Analects. The
ruler effectively leads through the powerful
example of his own virtue, not through the
coercive enforcement of laws: "The Master said,
'When a prince's personal conduct is correct, his
government is effective without the issuing of
orders [11]."' The ruler thus sets the moral
standards of his domain - as illustrated in a
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remarkable passage in the Analects:
Chi K'ang, distressed aboutthe number of thieves in the
state, inquired of Confuciushow to do away with them,
Confucius said, "If you, sir,were not covetous, although
you should reward them todo it, they would not steal"
[12].
Confucius further admonishes Chi K'ang to
substitute moral leadership for capital punish?
ment in controlling "the unprincipled": "The
relation between superiors and inferiors is like
that between the wind and the grass. The grass
must bend, when the wind blows across it [13]."
Elsewhere in the Analects, another metaphor is
employed, the strength of the ruler's virtue
compared to a kind of celestial "center of
gravity": "The Master said, 4He who exercises
government by means of his virtue may be
compared to the north polar star, which keeps its
place and all the stars turn towards it' [14]." The
reversal of the increasing disintegration of moral
conduct in social affairs plainly required a ruler
who had firmly established the rules of propriety
within himself; as the Master remarked, "If he
cannot rectify himself, what has he to do with
rectifying others? [15]."
The foundation of social harmony, according
to the Analects, is an unswerving loyalty to the
family complex - more specifically, as Shryock
notes, "the absolute authority of parents over
their children [16]." Such filial piety - defined
by the Master as "not being disobedient" [17] -
is exemplified in the Analects by Confucius'
insistence on a three-year mourning period at a
parent's death [18]. That such a doctrine of strict
obedience to parental (and essentially paternal)
authority may provide an ideological model for
unquestioning submission to rulers has not gone
unnoticed. Creel, for example, observes that
"Confucius was attracted, in the analogy of the
family with the state, by the fact that it was a
pattern of orderly subordination to authority
[19]." And Wittfogel maintains that Confucius'
insistence on absolute filial piety "forms the
ideal foundation on which to build absolute
obedience to the masters of society [20]."

Significantly, the Analects records the Master as
saying: "The people may be made to follow a
path of action, but they may not be made to
understand why [21]." The superior man as ruler
need not gain expertise in any specialized work,
according to the Analects, because the force of
his moral leadership will prompt the people to
willingly provide services for him [22].
Confucius died in 479 B.C., perhaps a half
century or so before the inception of the
"Warring States" period - two centuries of
chronic warfare and political instability which
brought the almost thousand year-old feudal
Chou dynasty to a close. While Confucious'
ethical formulations undoubtedly reflected the
determination of an increasingly uprooted
nobility to redefine and uphold its social
position in the context of a decaying feudal
order, the later doctrines of Mo Tz? (ca.
480-390 B.C.) outlined a program for proper
conduct modeled on the strict military discipline
of warrior specialists [23]. The book of Mo-tz?
condemns war and espouses a concept of
"universal love," yet at the same time devotes
several chapters to methods of military defense
and advocates a strict subordination of the
individual to an authoritarian ruler. Mo Tz?'s
description of an anarchistic "state of nature"
prior to the origins of government has often been
compared to Hobbes* "war of all against all
[24]." Chronic conflict among men, the Mo-tz?
states, was remedied only with the establishment
of governing authorities with the power to
arbitrate disputes:
Therefore there was a selection of the person in the
world who was virtuous and able, and he was es?
tablished to be Son of Heaven ... When the rulers were
installed, the Son of Heaven issued a mandate to the
people, saying: "Upon hearing good or evil one shall
report it to a superior. What the superior thinks to be
right, all shall think to be right. What the superior thinks
to be wrong, all shall think to be wrong [25]."
Mo Tz? thus advocates a mandatory system of
informants as well as unquestioning obedience
to authority - doctrines augmented by his
strictly utilitarian condemnation of elaborate
ceremony and ritual.
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273
Moism and other non-Confucius doctrines
attained significant influence until the time of
Mencius (ca. 371-288 B.C.), who set himself
the task of renovating Confucian teachings.
However, departing from Confucius' idealiza?
tion of early Chou feudal institutions, Mencius
extolled the "ideal king" ruling on behalf of the
people instead of the feudal Pa representing the
interests of a hereditary aristocracy. Avoiding
the use of coercion in governing, the "ideal
king" should follow the Confucian principle of
ruling by moral example. Nonetheless, the social
order envisioned by Mencius can by no means
be mistaken for an egalitarian democracy. In the
book which bears his name, Mencius repudiates
a doctrine popular in his day that rulers should
labor in the fields to earn their daily bread,
arguing that a division of labor based on class is
inevitable: "Great men have their proper
business and little men have their proper
business [26]." In another passage he is more
explicit: "Those who labor with their minds
govern others; those who labor with their
strength are governed by others. Those who are
governed by others support them; those who
govern others are supported by them [27]." In a
memorable exchange, P'ang K?ng challenges
Mencius to justify his extravagant style of living
- traveling from one noble court to another with
a retinue of dozens of carriages and hundreds of
men - since, unlike a husbandman or carpenter,
he provides no tangible service. Mencius' reply
is significant; he exalts the Confucian scholar,
the "superior man," above the decaying
hereditary aristocracy: "He is of service to you.
He deserves to be supported, and should be
supported [28]." Ch'ii notes the undoubted
element of rationalization in Mencius' rejoinder
[29]. In a sense, then Mencius' cultivated
"superior men" were designated as the new
holders of the ruling position increasingly
vacated with the accelerated disintegration of the
feudal nobility during the late "Warring States"
period. Thus, Confucianism, Balazs explains,
began by expressing the mentality of the feudal lords,
but later it changed into a system that became the
274
organizing power behind the scholar-officials and gave
full expression to their interests, ideas, and ideals. As a
result of this metamorphosis, however, certain
contradictory features developed. Confucianism was
used as a means of defending the interests of the gentry,
and the subtlety, not to say duplicity, with which this
was done has deceived many a scholar. Confucianists
kept up a tenacious struggle for democracy, but for
democracy within the aristocracy - an exclusive
privilege of the ruling class - and were authoritarian to
an extreme degree in their relations with other classes
[30].
Nonetheless, compared to the earlier feudal
order, the Confucian emphasis on virtue and
merit as essential criteria of the "superior man"
introduced at least a modicum of social
mobility; a small percentage of commoners did
indeed become scholar-officials, "the backbone
of the ruling class [31]."
INCIPIENT BUREAUCRACY AND MODIFIED
CONFUCIANISM
During the western Chou period (1122-771
B.C.), control over local territories (hsing) was
shared by members of patrilineal, exogamous
lineages or clans [32]. With the gradual break-up
of feudal institutions, the ancestral hsing slowly
yielded to a new method of territorial division.
Creel writes: "The substitution of the hsien, as
an administrative district governed by an official
... represented the territorial aspect of the
transition from feudalism to centralized
bureaucratic government [33]." Although hsien
administration was sometimes still inherited,
Ch'u rulers largely adopted merit and seniority
as criteria for the appointment of ministers and
officials [34]. In Chin, a state adjacent to Ch'u,
the hsien, although still hereditary in many
cases, can be discerned for as early as 627 B.C.
- and characterized the entire state by 543 B.C.
[35]. But it was in the far western state of Ch'in,
Ch'en Meng-Chia observes, that centralized
bureaucratic administration first gained full
ascendance around 350 B.C.:
The state of Ch'in established two classes of administra
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tive units, called chun (commandery) and hsien
(district). The principles governing the ownership of
land were now radically altered: for the first time,
officials were given salaries by the crown and were not
owners of the land, as in former days, but only overseers
[36].
Over the next century Ch'in rulers built a highly
disciplined and efficient military machine,
emphasizing mobile infantry and cavalry forces
instead of traditional chariot warfare [37].
Corvee labor completed vast hydraulic systems,
most notably the Cheng Kuo Canal in 246 B.C.
- the organization of which further
"consolidated the power of Ch'in [36]." Sig?
nificantly, after visiting Ch'in around this time,
the Confucian philosopher Hs?n Tz? expressed
enthusiasm for the strongly governed state in
which "no one dared" - as Creel puts it - "to do
anything except what was prescribed for him by
the state [39]."
Hs?n Tz?, born in the state of Chao around
312 B.C. [40], studied philosophy and later
served as a district magistrate in Ch'u. Fung Yu
Lan notes that "the Confucian school, which
after Mencius had lacked eminent scholars,
became rejuvenated with Hs?n Tz? [41]." While
Mencius, however, had stressed Confucius'
exemplary moral conduct, Hs?n Tz? most
admired his scholarship [42]. Dubs observes that
Hs?n Tz?, whom he terms "the moulder of
ancient Confucianism," is little-known today
partially because the influential Confucian
scholar Chu Hsi (1130-1200 A.D.) disparaged
his doctrines in favor of those of Mencius [43].
Hs?n Tz? lived during the final period of the
"Warring States"; the number of feudal states
had diminished from 55 to 10 in what was
clearly "the death struggle of the old feudal
systems [44]." Within this context of chronic
political strife, Hs?n Tz? formulated the basic
precept of his modified Confucianism, stated in
the book which bears his name: "The nature of
man is evil; his goodness is only acquired
training [45]." "Considering the cutthroat age he
lived in," Burton Watson remarks, "this is not a
surprising conclusion [46]." Such a doctrine,
Dubs points out, must not be mistaken for a kind

of Calvinist "original sin"; rather, Hs?n Tz?
merely modified and elaborated on the Con?
fucian insistence on the necessity for the
deliberate self-cultivation of proper conduct (fi).
Mencius had derived his concept of man's
intrinsic goodness from the notion of an "ethical
Heaven" of which man was a microcosmic
reflection [47]. In Hs?n Tz?'s naturalistic
cosmology, however, we may discern the
lineaments of a Newtonian universe ordered by
the regularity of mechanical laws. Such a
metaphysical system, Fung explains, embodies
no explicitly ethical principles:
Since Heaven is mechanistic, and lacks any ideal or
ethical principle, nature likewise cannot contain an
ethical principle. Morality is something made by man,
and so is called "acquired" [48].
Thus, Hs?n Tz? anticipated in some respects the
emphasis of later European Enlightenment
philosophers on the powerful influence of
cultural context; like John Locke's
characterization of the mind of the newborn
child as tabula rasa and Montesquieu's
discussion of the relation of environment to
cultural practices, Hs?n Tz? stressed "the power
of the environment in moulding character [49]."
The Hsiin-tzu states:
Nature is the unwrought material of the original; what
are acquired are the accomplishments and refinements
brought about by culture and the rules of proper conduct
(//). Without nature, there would be nothing upon which
to add the acquired. Without the acquired, nature could
not become beautiful of itself [50].
The dialectic between Mencius and Hs?n Tz?
remarkably corresponds to the later ideological
polarity of Rousseau and Hobbes. Like Mencius,
Rousseau insisted upon an intrinsic fellow
feeling of benevolent compassion and
emphasized the necessity to rejuvenate child-like
qualities; in his educational treatise Emile
(1762), he conducts an imaginary boy through a
series of carefully chosen experiences aimed at
avoiding the degenerative influences of civilized
life. Hobbes' political philosophy however, was
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275
anchored in the presupposition of an innate
propensity for anti-social aggression, homo
homini lupus; as aforementioned, his scenario
for humans in the "state of nature" was sig?
nificantly anticipated by Mo Tz? Such anarchis?
tic disorder, according to Hobbes, was remedied
only when peoples joined in a "social contract"
establishing political authority. Book 23 of the
Hsiin-tzu, entitled "The Nature of Man is Evil,"
provides a remarkably similar argument:
The original nature of man to-day is to seek for gain. If
this desire is followed, strife and rapacity results, and
courtesy dies. Man originally is envious and naturally
hates others. If these tendencies are followed, injury and
destruction follows; loyalty and faithfulness are
destroyed ... Therefore to give rein to man's original
nature, to follow man's feelings, inevitably results in
strife and rapacity, together with violations of etiquette
and confusion in the proper way of doing things, and
reverts to a state of violence. Therefore the civilizing
influence of teachers and laws, the guidance of the rules
of proper conduct (Li) and justice (Yi) is absolutely
necessary. Thereupon courtesy results; public and
private etiquette is observed; and good government is
the consequence [51].
Dubs' points out that Hs?n's Tz?'s ethical and
political doctrines are elaborated upon a dis?
tinctly psychological foundation [52]. Hs?n Tz?
divided human nature into the "mind" or "will",
and the "desires" or "emotions" - the former
serving to control or moderate the latter [53].
Yet desires, inextricably embedded in human
nature, cannot be eliminated but merely con?
sciously tempered [54]. As the Hs?n-tz? states:
"Every doctrine of self-control which depends
on the removal of desire has no way of guiding
the desires and is hampered by the presence of
desire [55]." Moreover, the impulse toward
satiation of desire is inexorable - and "does not
depend on whether attainment is possible [56]."
Dubs' comments: "Is not this psychological
analysis startlingly modem? [57]." We may take
Dubs' observation a step further and point to
certain remarkable parallels in Hs?n Tz?'s
psychology and psycholoanalytic theory. For
Freud gratification of instinctive strivings is
inevitably blocked or delayed by the strictures of
276
survival in the social environment:
The ego discovers that it is inevitable for it to renounce
immediate satisfaction, to postpone the obtaining of
pleasure, to put up with a little unpleasure and to
abandon certain sources of pleasure altogether, an ego
thus educated has become "reasonable"; it no longer lets
itself be governed by the pleasure principle but obeys
the reality principle ... [58],
A significant portion of frustrated impluse is
thus re-channeled, or "sublimated," into
socially-approved forms of productive activity.
Similarly, Fung explains Hs?n Tz?'s viewpoint:
The desires need not be wholly eliminated, but only
need to be kept in proper restraint by the mind, through
its power of cogitation. The reason why the mind finds
it possible to restrain the desires, is because it knows
that if they are given free rein, the result will inevitably
be undesirable [59].
Interestingly enough, after the First World War
Freud proffered his theory of an aggressively
destructive "death instinct" - moving even
closer to Hs?n Tz?'s assessment after two
centuries of "Warring States" that "the nature of
man is evil": "Homo homini lupus: Who, in the
face of all his experience of life and of history,
will have the courage to dispute this assertion?
[60]."
Unlike Mo Tz?, whose strict utilitarianism
demanded elimination of unpredictable and
"useless" emotions, Hs?n Tz? acknowledged the
instinctive and affective dimensions of human
existence. The unbridled pursuit of satisfactions,
however, inevitably leads to social strife; thus,
the force of desire must be balanced and
redirected through conscious self-cltivation of //.
The Hsiin-tzu states that "every man's desire to
be good is because his nature is evil [61]." Yet,
as Fung explains, through unremitting efforts, an
individual may strive to become a Superior Man,
perhaps eventually internalizing the rules of
proper conduct which "become like a second
nature" [62].
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THE LEGITIMATION OF SOCIAL STRATIFICA?
TION
Hs?n Tz? maintains that the distinguishing
attribute of humans, separating them from
animals, is the capacity to form social organiza?
tions [63]. Harmonious social organization, the
Hsiin-tzu notes, requires social distinctions
defining the respective rights of various classes:
if men are to live, they cannot get along without
forming a social organization. If they form a social
organization, but have no social distinctions, then they
will quarrel; if they quarrel, there will be disorder; if
there is disorder, people will fail to cooperate...[64].
In the book on "Kingly Government" in the
Hsiin-tzu, the inequality of classes is retrospec?
tively justified on both cosmological and
demographic grounds. Social order and cosmic
order are analogous - since, as Hs?n Tz? states,
"social structure exhibits the same principles as
Heaven and Earth" [65]. Thus, "that the prince
should be treated as prince ... is following the
same principle [66]." But Hs?n Tz? introduces a
practical Malthusian dynamic as well, implicitly
relating population pressure with limited
resources and wealth:
If the classes were equal, there will not be enough for
everybody ... Were people's power and position equal,
and their likes and dislikes the same, there would not be
sufficient goods to satisfy everybody, and hence there
would inevitably be strife ... The ancient kings hated
any disorder, and hence established the rules of proper
conduct (Li) and justice (Yi) to divide the people, to
cause them to have the classes of poor and rich, of noble
and inferior, so that everyone would be under
someone's control - this is the fundamental thing in
caring for the whole country [67].
The cultivation of //, T'ung-Tsu Ch'? observes,
thus serves "to make social distinctions clear and
to regulate men's desires according to their
statuses" - since complete satisfaction of desires
for all is inevitably impossible [68].
Hs?n Tz? advises rulers to govern justly,
rewarding the good and punishing the corrupt.
The Confucian doctrine of the ruler as moral

example is reiterated; the benevolence (Jen) and
justice (Yi) of the righteous king inspire respect?
ful obeisance from all [69]. But Hs?n Tz?'s
advice is ultimately pragmatic, since the ruler's
power and authority are secure only as long as
the common people - the overwhelming
majority of the population - are satisfied with
his government:
It is said: The prince is the boat; the common people are
the water. The water can support the boat, or the water
can capsize the boat - this expresses my meaning [70].
ment of law.
The ruler as a superior man knows that laws
alone cannot substitute for moral principles and
careful decision-making in governmental
administration [71]. And Hs?n Tz? explicitly
advocates, at the very beginning of "Kingly
Government," a merit system for appointing
officials (which was subsequently to become a
crucial feature in Chinese bureaucratic
administration): "Do not regard seniority but
advance he worthy and able; dismiss the
incompetent and incapable without delay [72]."
Yet elsewhere Hs?n Tz? continues the Con?
fucian idealization of the Sage-King of the past,
whose high degree of self-cultivation epitomized
the virtue of the Superior Man: "His virtue was
pure and complete; his wisdom and kindness
was most illustrious .... What was like his acts
was right; what was unlike them was wrong
[73]." Fung notes the similarity to Mo Tz?'s
concept of Agreement with the Superior [74].
Hs?n Tz?'s authoritarianism thus emerges
unmistakably; as the Hsiin-tzu states, while the
wise ruler cannot cause the people to
"understand all the reasons for things," he uses
his coercive authority for their own good [75].
Guiding his people along the Way (Tao), he
"orders things by his decrees, explains things by
his proclamations, and restrains them by
punishments [76]."
In the historical context of chronic warfare
and later totalitarian order, Hs?n Tz?'s Con?
fucianism proved highly influential, eclipsing
Mencius' teachings for a number of centuries
[77]. The doctrine that human nature is evil, and
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277
goodness "an artificial product" [78], provided
an obviously powerful motivational impetus (or
rationale) for the elaboration of the Chinese
educational system [79], as well as for a strong,
centralized government of "law and order". Yet
it was the non-Confucian political theorists
known variously as the "School of Law" (Fa
Chid) or Legalists or Realists who developed a
comprehensive theory of government integrating
centralized authority, bureaucratic administra?
tion, and the uncompromisingly harsh enforce?
THE LEGALIST SYNTHESIS AND ITS CON?
FUCIAN SUBSTRATUM
Although ideological as well as political
opponents, the Confucianists and Legalists
"nonetheless had some points in common [80]."
Significantly, Creel identifies the doctrines of
Hs?n Tz? as forming "a kind of bridge between
Confucianism and legalism" - the doctrine of
intrinsic human ev? in particular tending "in the
Legalist direction [81]." And it is more than an
interesting coincidence that two of Hs?n Tz?'s
pupils, Han Fei Tz? and Li Ss?, became the
leading proponents of Legalist theory and
practice manifested in the eventual
establishment of the despotic Ch'in dynasty
which unified China in 221 B.C.
Despite early, proto-Legalist "schools" which
emphasized various aspects of political authority
which later culminated in bureaucratic
despotism for all of China,
we cannot properly speak (although it is done) of the
"Legalist school," because there was none. This
doctrine, which emphasized authority like no other, was
alone among the philosophies in having no recognized
founder. It is significant that Han Fei Tz?, the greatest
Legalist of all, had as his teacher not a Legalist but
Hs?n Tz?, a Confucian. There were simply various men
and various books that in different ways and varying
degrees espoused the kind of thought we call "Legalism
[82]."
Three independent threads of political theory
278
later converged in the Legalist synthesis of Han
Fei Tz? As previously mentioned, as early as
the seventh century B.C. certain administrative
reforms, most notably the hsien, were instituted
in the states of Ch'i and Chin (later divided into
the states of Han, Chao and Wei around 400
B.C.). As Fung notes, the gradual disintegration
of feudal institutions generated the transition
from "government by customary morality (//),
and by individuals, to government by law [83]."
Proto-Legalist doctrines thus directly responded
to changes in political and social structure [84].
Such theorists departed from the Confucian
perspective of government in relation to the
people, adopting instead the viewpoint of the
ruler (later seen as well in Hs?n Tz?'s advice in
"Kingly Government") - and how, through laws
and efficient administration, he could maintain
his position.
A group of theorists in the fourth century B.C.
led by Shen Tao emphasized the concentration
of unquestionable authority (shih) in the position
of the ruler. Their most important book of
theory, the Kuan-tzii, succinctly states the basic
premise of this doctrine:
The reason why these multitudes of subjects do not dare
to deceive their ruler, is not because they love him, but
because they fear his awe-inspiring power (shih) ... He
rests in an authority (shih) requiring obligatory respect,
so as to keep in order the subjects who must obey him
[85].
A second group focused on the art of
"statecraft" (shu). Their leader, Sh6n Pu-hai,
served as a minister in the state of Han from 351
until his death in 337 B.C., and wrote a widely
circulated book on bureaucratic administration.
Creel observes that this book, although lost in
later times, nonetheless "helped to shape the
administrative practices of the Ch'in (221-207
B.C.) and Han dynasties [86]." Reconstituted
portions, Creel states, indicate
almost purely a philosophy of bureacratic administration
... Shen Pu-hai is concerned, with almost mathematical
rigor, to describe the way in which a ruler can maintain
his position and cause his state to prosper by means of
administrative technique and applied psychology [87].
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Indeed, Creel maintains that Shen Pu-hai's
outline of bureaucratic methods provided the
basic model or "administrative pattern" for the
brief Ch'in dynasty - a pattern which, moreover,
remained largely intact in Han and later imperial
times [88].
Shang Yang, an official in Wei and later
minister in Ch'in during the fourth century B.C.,
was the leading proponent of the third proto
Legalist school, which emphasized the strict
enforcement of law (fa). As an influential Ch'in
minister, Shang Yang introduced reforms
rigorously controlling the individual under the
threat of harsh punishment. Familial ties were
subverted in favor of strict obedience to the
government: joint and extended families were
severely penalized through heavy taxation, and
individuals were enjoined, under threat of being
bodily cut in half, to inform the government of
any wrongdoing by their relatives and friends
[89]. Shang Yang further reduced the already
severely diminished influence of the feudal
aristocracy, building the foundations of a
strongly centralized, militaristic bureaucracy
[90]. After leading Ch'in armies to successful
military victories, Shang Yang was killed by
political enemies in 338 B.C. [91].
It was Han Fei Tz? who, in the middle of the
third century B.C., combined the three schools
into a comprehensive Legalist synthesis -
implicitly anchored in the ethical and
psychological precepts of his Confucian teacher
Hs?n Tz?. Born to the royal family of the state
of Han around 280 B.C., Han Fei Tz? studied
under Hs?n Tz? around thirty years later,
apparently when the Confucian master was
serving as a district magistrate at Lanling in the
Southern Shantung. A fellow pupil, Li Ss?, later
held the office of prime minister to Ch'in Shih
Huang, King of the state of Ch'in (and subse?
quently "First Emperor" of China). Han Fei
Tz?'s writings, originally intended to influence
the King of Han, found a more favorable
reception in Ch'in Shih Huang, undoubtedly
since the state of Ch'in had for a century been
implementing Shang Yang's reformism in

Opposition to Confucian traditionalism. When
the state of Ch'in attacked Han in 234 B.C., the
King of Han sent Han Fei Tz? as an emissary to
the Ch'in court, where he "was received with
delight by the king [92]." Li Ss?, however,
managed to convince Ch'in Shin Huang that
Han Fei Tz? would inevitably remain loyal to
the royal family of Han. Han Fei Tz? was duly
imprisoned; unable to defend himself against
charges, he drank poison - which may have been
"courteously provided" by his rival Li Ss? [93].
Nonetheless, his book served as the ideological
rationale and methodological blueprint - after a
decade of successful military annexations
engineered by Li Ss? - for the unified
bureaucratic despotism of Ch'in Shih Huang-ti:
"Assuming the title of First Emperor, he set
about creating the vast bureaucratic empire that
Han Fei Tz? has envisioned [94]."
The book of Han Fei Tz?, like Hs?n Tz?'s
"Kingly Government," consists of advice
effective ruling; it is, as Burton Watson terms it,
"a handbook for the prince [95]." The ruler is
counseled throughout the work to trust no one;
neither his ministers nor his subjects can be
expected to remain loyal, but will inevitably
seek their own gain. The book is thus "marked
by a drastically low opinion of human nature" -
perhaps reflecting his teacher Hs?n Tz?'s
doctrine that "the nature of man is evil [96]."
As previously discussed, Hs?n Tz? had
advocated the control of individuals' desires
according to respective social position, citing an
inevitable Malthusian constraint: "Were
people's power and position equal, and their
likes and dislikes the same, there would not be
sufficient goods to satisfy everybody [97]." Han
Fei Tz? takes this argument further, examining
the implications of population growth on the
evolution of political institutions. The descrip?
tion in the Han Fei Tz? of the egalitarian gather
ers of prehistory remarkably parallels
anthropologist Marshall Sahlins' "original
affluent society." Although resembling Rous?
seau's later scenario for prehistory in the
Discourse on Inequality (1754), Han Fei Tz?'s
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279
depiction proffers the Malthusian dialectic
between demographic pressure and limited
resources as the primary agent of social conflict,
implicitly necessitating the evolution of social
stratification and government. The Han Fei Tz?
states:
hi olden times, men did not need to till, for the seeds of
grass and the fruits of trees were sufficient to feed them;
beasts were sufficient to clothe them. Thus, without
working hard, they had an abundance of supply. As the
people were few, their possessions were more than
sufficient. Therefore, the people never quarreled. As a
result, neither large rewards were bestowed nor were
heavy punishments employed, but the people governed
themselves. Nowadays, however, people do not regard
five children as many. Each child may in his or her turn
beget five offspring, so that before the death of the
grandfather, there may be twenty-five grand-children.
As a result, people have become numerous and supplies
scanty; toil has become hard and provisions meager.
Therefore people quarrel so much that, though rewards
are doubled and punishments repeated, disorder is
inevitable [98].
Thus, chronic social strife - as each man pursues
his own gain at the expense of others - can be
remedied only by strong government based on
strict enforcement of law; as the Han Fei Tz?
states, "the purpose of enacting laws and decrees
is to abolish selfishness [99]".
While Hs?n Tz? still insisted on the tremen?
dous influence of the role model of a virtuous
ruler in inculcating respectful obedience and
eliminating possible opposition, Han Fei's
viewpoint more realistically reflected the times.
Strong authority, rather than merely moral
example, is far more likely to result in an
obedient and disciplined populace; as noted in
the Han Fei Tz?, "the poeple are such as would
be firmly obedient to authority, but are rarely
able to appreciate righteousness [100]." Con
comitantly, in a time of unending warfare and
political upheaval, the early prescriptions for
good government are plainly inadequate:
Thus, we see that ancients and moderns have different
customs, new and old have different measures. To
govern with generous and lenient regulations a people in
imminent danger is the same as to drive wild horses
 280

without reins or slips. This is a calamity of ignorance other Legalists argued that "there are no moral
[101].
standards, but that everything is conditioned by
its own immediate environment [107]." Hs?n
Yet, despite Hs?n Tz?'s adherence to the
Tz?'s implicit behaviorism is thus elaborated; as
customary Confucian viewpoint on ruling by
the Han Fei Tz? (in a chapter "How to Use
example, the lineaments of Han Fei's
Men") explicitly states, "The intelligent
totalitarianism are still apparent in his
sovereign offers rewards that may be earned and
philosophy. As Dubs notes, the doctrine that
establishes punishments that should be avoided
human nature is evil unquestionably "gave the
[108]." And elsewhere in the book Han Fei
principle of authority a firm basis [102]."
explains the "two handles" - chastisement and
Moreover, the successful cultivation of //,
commendation - which the ruler should control
inevitably achieved by only a minority, creates
and maintains social distinctions between the and manipulate: "To inflict death and torture
upon culprits, is called chastisement; to bestow
superior and the inferior, thus the Sage-King's
encouragements and rewards on men of merit, is
judgment must be followed [103]. And, as we
called commendation [109]." Waley succinctly
have seen, Hs?n Tz? explicitly advocates a
restates this precept in his own terms: "Everyone
consistent merit system, first outlined by
who does what the State wants is rewarded;
Confucius, for hiring, advancing and dismissing
everyone who does what the State dislikes is to
governmental officials [104].
be punished [110]."
Perhaps most significantly, Hs?n Tz?
foreshadows Han Fei's doctrine that behavior The authority of the ruler, Han Fei maintains,
must always dominate and control the actions of
can be environmentally conditioned, particularly
his ministers [111]. Since the ruler and his
by a harshly administered system of rewards and
ministers inevitably have conflicting interests,
punishments. As aforementioned, for Hs?n Tz?
ministers are never loyal [112]; indeed, a chapter
moral standards are man-made, their acquisition
in the Han Fei Tz? is entitled "Ministers Apt to
depending on the specific environmental
influences - and additional conscious effort - of Betray, Molest, or Murder the Ruler." For
ministers who transgress the ruler's ultimate
the individual. Socially disruptive desires are re
channeled (or "sublimated," in the Freudian authority Han Fei advocates no clemency;
remission of punishment, including the death
sense) by the conscious self-restraint engendered
penalty, would be "authority-losing [113]." And
through the cultivation of IL Thus propriety (//),
again, echoing Hs?n Tz?, Han Fei argues that
as Richard Wilhelm explains, becomes a fixed
form which must achieve its aims and effective governing demands a consistent
implementation of rewards and punishments:
reconstruct man with the coercive power of a
law [105]." In "Kingly Government" in the the intelligent ruler neglects no reward and remits no
Hs?n-tz?, the superior ruler is counseled to punishment. For, if reward is neglected, rninisters of
consistently reward good behavior and punish merit will relax their duties; if punishment is remitted,
bad: villainous ministers will become liable to misconduct
[114].
Treat those who are good who come to you, according
to what is right and proper (//); treat those who are not Having demonstrated the requirement for shih
good who come to you, with punishment. When those on the part of the ruler, Han Fei Tz? also lauds
two kinds of people are distinguished, the worthy and Shang Yang's unyielding insistence on the
the unworthy will not be mixed, right and wrong will
enforcement of law (fa), as well as his system of
not be confused ... when right and wrong are not
confused, then the country will be well governed [106].
"joint responsibility" generating a population of
informants:

As Derk Bodde observes, Han Fei Tz? and

Duke Hsiao enforced the Law of Lord Shang to the

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utmost, until at last the people came to know that men
guilty of crimes would be infallibly censured and
informers against culprits became many ... Therefore,
the state became orderly, the army strong, the territory
extensive, and the sovereign honorable. The cause of all
these was nothing other than heavy punishments for
sheltering criminals and big rewards for denouncing
culprits [115].
We may recall Hs?n Tz?'s enthusiasm, after his
visit to Ch'in, for the orderly and obeisant
population he encountered.
In a chapter on "Deciding between two
Legalistic Doctrines" in the Han Fei Tz?, a
hypothetical inquirer wonders which doctrine
Sh6n Pu-hai's emphasis on "statecraft" or Shang
Yang's insistence on "law" - "'is more urgently
needful to the state?' [116]." Clearly apprehend?
ing the complementarity of these proto-Legalist
doctrines, Han Fei Tz?'s answer is succinct:
"neither can be dispensed with: both are imple?
ments of emperors and kings [117]." Thus,
building on the modified Confucian substratum
of basic ethical and psychological doctrines
provided by his teacher Hs?n Tz?, Han Fei
linked and integrated the three proto-Legalist
schools of authoriatarian power (shih), law (fa),
and statecraft (shu). Political theory is implicitly
justified by underlying ethical and psychological
precepts; the desires of the individual, intrinsi?
cally evil and disruptive, must be suppressed,
controlled and redirected - toward ends useful to
the State.
HS?N TZ?: THE JUNCTURE OF CON?
FUCIANISM AND LEGALISM
T'ung-Tsu Ch'? poses a question inextricably
fundamental to any Marxist-oriented interpreta?
tion of the doctrines of Mencius and Hs?n Tz?:
"Do their statements represent the interest of a
privileged group? [118]." Ch'? points out that
even after the virtual dissolution of the feudal
social structure toward the end of the Chou
period, "the sharp demarcation between the
ruling class and the ruled continued to operate"
- refashioned as the dichotomy between superior
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281
scholar-officials and inferior commoners [119].
As previously discussed, Hs?n Tz? designated
"social distinctions" - a static, stratified
hierarchy of classes with differential privileges
and obligations - as the distinguishing attribute
of human society. The inequality of classes, he
maintains, both mirrors the cosmological order
and derives from demographic growth. Such an
assertion, Ch'? observes, "might be either an
explanation of the situation expressed in the
social structure or a rationalization of the
privileges of the ruling class [120]." However, it
seems apparent that even such an "explanation"
serves in the end a function comparable to
"rationalization": the retrospective ideological
validation or legitimation for the authoritarian
control of "inferior" subjects by cultivated
scholar-officials.
The basic template for total obedience to
governmental authority, as numerous scholars
have acknowledged, was undoubtedly the
Confucian doctrine of filial piety. Max Weber
states this point with exceptional clarity:
In a patrimonial state where filial piety was transferred
to all relations of subordination, it can be readily
understood that an official - and Confucius for a time
was a minister - would consider filial piety as the virtue
from which all others issue. Filial peity was held to
provide the test and guarantee of adherence to uncondi?
tional discipline, the most important status obligation of
bureaucracy [121].
Yet Hs?n Tz?, departing radically from Mencius
on the critical question of the nature of human
nature, provided a concomitant ideological
sanction for incipient bureaucratic despotism. As
we have noted, in Hs?n Tz?'s formulation the
unfinished raw material of human nature, prone
to socially disruptive desires, plainly required
both educational cultivation and governmental
restraint.
Although the Confucian emphasis on in?
dividual virtue and merit attained through
conscious self-cultivation of li enabled a number
of commoners to enter the privileged ranks of
officialdom, the vast majority remained
"inferiors" condemned to the increasingly
282
despotic demands of taxation and corvie labor.
Furthermore, the unreliable dependence upon
the individual's own efforts toward the attain?
ment of li eventually yielded to a more efficient
method of behavioral engineering suggested by
Hs?n Tz?, developed by Han Fei Tz?, and
implemented by Ch'in Shih Huang: the harshly
administered system of rewards and
punishments.
In a relentless drive of military conquest,
Ch'in achieved the successful annexation of the
remaining states within the decade beginning in
230 B.C. In 221 B.C. Ch'in Shih Huang es?
tablished the Ch'in dynasty and became "First
Emperor" of a unified China - the year which
"marks the beginning of the empire which
endured until A.D. 1912 [122]." Although the
severely repressive dynasty collapsed under
wide-scale revolt only fourteen years later, the
dismantling of feudal social structure and the
substitution of an imperial bureaucratic ad?
ministration remained its legacy. Significantly,
Hs?n Tz?'s writings were apparently spared
from the burning of all non-technical books
ordered by Li Ss? in 212 B.C.
In the Han dynasty which followed (206 B.C.
- 220 A.D.) Confucian doctrine was firmly
reestablished, becoming the "official state
ideology" in 136 B.C. [123]. As Shryock notes,
the school of Hs?n Tz? unquestionably remained
the most popular of Confucian doctrines during
this time [124]. Freiberg points out that the
"state-Confucianism" installed during the Han
period (and characterizing subsequent dynasties)
was in fact an amalgam of Confucian and
Legalist doctrines [125], Thus Balazs' comment
is singularly appropriate: "the Confucianists
supplanted the state-minded Legalists only to
carry out even more rigorously the doctrines
they had preached [126]." The centralized
bureaucratic state, first established and adminis?
tered through Legalist methods, found emended
ideological validation in the "motivational
values" of Confucianism [127]. Confucian
doctrine, Yang explains,
inculcated moral meaning into imperial power, power
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that had generally been acquired through ethically
unmotivated channels of violence and coercion. The
moralization of power gave stability to the institution of
government which could never have been achieved by
force alone [128]
This singular fusion of modified Confucian
doctrine with Legalist administrative method
underwent further alteration in succeeding
dynasties, yet nonetheless largely prevailed in its
basic form as the ideological counterpart to the
bureaucratic despotism of two thousand years.
NOTES
1. Anthony Giddens, Studies in Social and Political
Theory (New York: Basic Books, 1977), p. 179.
2. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The German
Ideology (New York: International Publishers,
1970), p. 47.
3. Ibid, p. 64.
4. Fung Yu-Lan, A Short History of Chinese
Philosophy (New York: The Free Press, 1960), p. 38.
5. Hu Shih, "Chinese Thought," in H.F. MacNair (ed.),
China (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1940), p. 226.
6. C. K. Yang, "Some Characteristics of Chinese
Bureaucratic Behavior," in D.S. Nivison and A.F.
Wright (eds.), Confucianism in Action (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1959), p. 135.
7. Herlee G. Creel, Chinese Thought From Confucius
to Mao Tse-tung (Chicago: Chicago University
Press, 1953), p. 27.
8. Benjamin Schwartz, "Some Polarities in Confucian
Thought," in D.S. Nivison and A.F. Wright (eds.),
Confucianism in Action (Stanford: Stanford
University press, 1959), p. 52.
9. Homer H.Dubs, Hsuntze: The Moulder of Ancient
Confucianism (Taipei: Ch'eng-Wen Publishing
Company, 1966), p. 242.
10. Schwartz, op. cit.t p. 52.
11. James Legge, The Four Books (New York: Paragon,
1966), p. 178.
12. Ibid.%v. 168.
13. Ibid.
14. p. 12.
15. Ibid., p. 181.
16. John K. Shryock, "Confucianism," in H.F. MacNair
(ed.), China (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1946), p. 247.
17. Legge, op. tit., p. 14.
18. //>/<*., p. 267.
 283

19. Herlee G. Creel, Confucius and the Chinese Way 52. Dubs, op. cit., 1966, p. 177.
(New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1960), p. 127. 53. Ibid.,?. 173.
20. Karl Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism: A Comparative 54. iWa.fp.l71.
Study of Total Power (New Haven: Yale Universtiy 55. Dubs, op. cit., 1928, p. 293.
Press, 1957), p. 151. 56. /Md., p. 294.
21. Legge, op. cit., p. 100. 57. Dubs, op. cit., 1966, p. 176.
22. Ibid.,pp. 177,216. 58. Sigmund Freud, Introductory Lectures on
23. Fung, op. cit., p. 50. Psychoanalysis (New York: W.W. Norton, 1965), p.
24. Creel, op. cit., 1953, p. 59. 357.
25. Fung Yu-Lan, A History of Chinese Philosophy, I 59. Fung, op. cit., 1952, p. 290.
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952), p. 60. Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents
100. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1962), p. 58.
26. Legge, op. cit., p. 626. 61. Dubs, op. cit., 1928, p. 306.
27. Ibid., p. 627. 62. Fung, op. cit., 1952, p. 294.
28. Ibid., p. 659. 63. Dubs, op. cit., 1928, p. 136.
29. T'ung-Tsu Ch'?, "Chinese Class Structure and Its 64. Ibid., p. 137.
Ideology," in J.K. Fairbank (ed.), Chinese Thought 65. Ibid.,?. 135.
and Institutions (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 66. Ibid., pp. 135-36.
1957), p. 242. 67. Ibid.,??. 123-24.
30. Etienne Balazs, Chinese Civilization and 68. Ch'il, op. cit., p. 237.
Bureaucracy (New Haven: Yale Univerity Press, 69. Dubs, op. cit., 1928, p. 130.
1964), p. 7. 70. Ibid.,?. 125.
31. Ch'?, op.cit., pp. 243-45. 71. Ibid., p. 123.
32. Herlee G. Creel, The Origins of Statecraft in China, I 72. Ibid.,?. 121
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), pp. 73. Ibid.,?. 19S.
333-34. 74. Fung, op. cit., 1952, p. 302.
33. Herlee G. Creel, 'The Beginnings of Bureaucracy in 75. Dubs, op. cit., 1928, p. 289.
China," in J.A. Harrison (ed.), China (Tucson: 76. Fung, op. cit., 1952, p. 311.
University of Arizona Press, 1972), p. 24. 77. Shryock, op. cit., p. 249.
34. Ibid., p. 27. 78. Max Weber, The Religion of China: Confucianism
35. Ibid., p. 19. and Taoism (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1951), p. 166.
36. Ch'en Meng-Chia, "The Greatness of Chou (ca. 79. Shryock, op. cit., p. 249.
1027 - ca. 221 B.C.)," in H.F. MacNair (ed.), China 80. Creel, op. cit., 1953, p. 138.
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1946), p. 81. Ibid.,?. 139.
61. 82. Ibid.,?. 140.
37. Marcel Granet, Chinese Civilization (New York: 83. Fung, op. cit., 1952, p. 312.
Barnes & Noble, 1951), p. 95. 84. Ibid.,?. 316.
38. Arthur Cotterell and David Morgan, China's 85. Ibid.,?. 31S.
Civilization (New York: Praeger, 1975), p. 45. 86. Creel, op. cit., 1972, p. 5.
39. Creel, op. cit., 1953, p. 133, 87. Ibid., p. 6.
40. Burton Watson, Basic Writings of Mo Tz?, and Han 88. Creel, op. cit., 1970, p. 4n.
Fei Tz? (New York: Columbia University Press, 89. Creel, op. cit., 1953, p. 142.
1967), p. 3. 90. Ibid.,?. 143.
41. Fung, op. cit., 1952, p. 279. 91. Ibid.,?. 144.
42. Ibid., p. 281. 92. Watson, op. cit., p. 3.
43. Dubs, op. cit., p. xxi. 93. Arthur Waley, Three Ways of Thought in Ancient
44. Ibid., p. 19. China (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor
45. Homer H.Dubs, The Works of Hsuntze (London: Books, 1956), pp. 184-85.
Arthur Probsthain, 1928), p. 301. 94. Watson, op. cit., p. 12.
46. Watson, op. cit., p. 5. 95. Ibid.,?. 5.
47. Fung, op. cit., 1952, p. 286. 96. Ibid.,??. 10-11.
48. Ibid. 97. Dubs, op. cit., 1928, p. 123.
49. Dubs, op. cit., 1966, p. 184. 98. W.K. Liao, The Complete Works of Han Fei Tz?
50. Fung, op. cit., 1952, p. 286. (London: Arthur Probsthain, 1959), vol. II, pp.
51. Dubs, op. cit., 1928, p. 301. 276-77.

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284

99. 7ta*., vol. II, p. 235. 118. Ch'?, op. cit., p. 240.
100. Ibid., vol. n, p. 281. 119. p. 245.
101. Ibid., vol. II, p. 280. 120. /&d.,pp.239-^0.
102. Dubs, op. cit., 1966, p. 102. 121. Weber, op. cit., p. 158.
103. Ibid., p. 109. 122. Teng Ssu-Y?, "From, the Fall of Chou to the Fall of
104. Dubs, op. cit., 1928, p. 121. Tang (ca. 221 B.C. - A.D. 906," in H.F. MacNair
105. Richard Wilhelm, Confucius and Confucianism (ed.), China (Berkeley, University of California
(New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1931), p. 142. Press, 1946), p. 72.
106. Dubs, op. cit., 1928, p. 122. 123. Oded Shenkar, *The Confucian Ethic and the Spirit
107. Derk Bodde, "The Legalist Concept of History," in of Bureaucracy," Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation,
Li Yu-Ning (ed.), The First Emperor of China Faculty of Political Science, Columbia University,
(White Plains, N.Y.: International Arts and Sciences 1981, p. 32.
Press, 1975), p. 313. 124. John K. Shryrock, The Origin and Development of
108. Liao, op. cit., vol. I, p. 270. the State Cult of Confucius (New York: Paragon,
109. Ibid., vol. I, p. 46. 1966), pp. 13-14.
110. Waley, op. cit., p. 158. 125. J.W. Freiberg, "The Dialectic of Confucianism and
111. Liao, op. cit., vol. I, p. 29. Taoism in Ancient China," Dialectical Anthropol?
112. Ibid., vol. H, p. 2. ogy, vol.2 (1977), p. 176.
113. Ibid., vol. I, p. 29. 126. Balazs, op. ciL, p. 10.
114. Ibid., p. 35. 127. Yang, op. cit., p. 135.
115. Ibid.,?. 123. 128. C.K. Yang, Religion in Chinese Society (Berkeley:
116. ibid.,vol.Hp.212. University of California Press, 1967, p. 138.
117. Ibid.

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