The Making of Nation-State and the Rise of Seventy-Three Groups from

Muhammadan Ummah

The term Ummah etymologically comes from Arabic roots amama,

meaning “to seek,” “to go intentionally forward”, and “to seek the right path”
[1] or umm, meaning “mother” [2] and hence seems more likely to refer to
“people and Community” who shares common values. The Ummah, in fact,
refers to a group who is gathered together voluntarily in the tradition, law or
religion, while the ethnic and tribal community who shares common race
and language is denoted by the words of Qawm or Sha‟b.

Ummah is mentioned in several verses of the Noble Quran. In Surah An‟am

6:38, Allah says, “There is not a moving (living) creature on earth, nor a
bird that flies with its two wings but are communities (Ummah) like you. We
have neglected nothing in the Book, then unto their Lord they all shall be
gathered.” Each species of animal is umm. Human beings are single
ummah since it has common mother, In Surah Yunus, Verse 19, Allah
says, “Mankind were but one community (Ummah), then they differed later.
Had not it been for a Word that went forth before from your Lord, it would
have been settled between them regarding what they differed.”

In Surah Baqarah, verse 143, Allah says, “And it is thus that We appointed
you to be the community (Ummah) of the middle way so that you might be
witnesses to all mankind and the Messenger might be a witness to you. We
appointed the direction which you formerly observed so that We might
distinguish those who follow the Messenger from those who turn on their
heels, For it was indeed burdensome except for those whom Allah guided.
And Allah will never leave your faith to waste. Allah is full of gentleness and
mercy to mankind.” In this verse, Ummah is interpreted as balanced
community eventually the best community in Surah Al-Imran 3, verse 110,
which says, “You are the best community ever raised for humanity – you
encourage good, forbid evil, and believe in Allah. Had the People of the
Book believed, it would have been better for them. Some of them are
faithful, but most are rebellious.”

The meaning of Ummah becomes clear to our understanding when we go

back to the time of the Noble messenger as there was a single state where
all Muslims were subjected to. The challenge in understanding Ummah
started when Muslims occupied vast swathes of territories from the eastern
and western part of the globe. Simultaneous with the swift victory of
Muslims far and wide was the power struggle within the Ummah. During the
Abbasid Empire, it was challenged by two prominent Shia dynasties
namely, Buyid and Fatimid. Buyids were able to topple Abbasid dynasty
and reduced the caliph‟s position to a ceremonial one. For a century,
Baghdad was ruled by Shia Buyids. In North Africa, Shia Fatimids rose to
power and uprooted the influences of Abbasids in Egypt including some
part of Sham and Palestine.

Given this, another Sunni dynasty from Central Asia came to uproot once
and for all the Buyids in Baghdad. Though Seljuks were Sunnis, they
maintained the status of the Caliph being ceremonial leader after the defeat
of the Buyids. Ceremonial leader had no day-to-day functions in
government.
To begin with, two discrete meanings are attached with the word ummah.
To some, Ummah is a group of Muslims bonded by faith and religion and to
others it is deemed political group. It has been mentioned in hadith that the
Ummah would be divided into seventy-three groups. Many sects come and
go in the pages of history which becloud the idea of how these seventy-
three would appear. Theologically, there were numerous theological beliefs
that emerged in the sands of time. There were also dozen of schools of
thoughts brought to the light. The question comes to mind whether these
73 groups would exist simultaneously or they would come one after the
other.

I believe that this prophetic tradition was fulfilled during the rise of nation-
states. Granting that it is political division of sort, it would be reasonable for
the following grounds: (1) These 73 groups are all different from one
another in terms of political systems because each one has its unique
characteristics though they are all under democratic system and that (2)
they come at one point in time. Presently, there are more than fifty
independent states in the world plus autonomous regions that would more
or less fit in the number mentioned in the hadith.

The history is still moving toward the direction of fulfillment of the end time
setting. Nation-state is seen as the modern equivalent of ummah while it
has been defied by new Islamist movements in the Muslim world.

The idea of Ummah as the social imaginary that reclaimed by Islamists

never comes without experiences of the past. However, this view should
not fall into the historical determinism that results the fallacy of causal
logics which is in turn making it important the continuity of historical
contents of Islam. [3]

Now then, speaking from sociological point of view, Ummah became the
„transformative concept‟ of Arab tribe after the establishment of the first
Muslim state of Madina in the 7th century. In brief, when Prophet
Muhammad emigrated to Madina, the Arabs were divided into different
tribes. Their first loyalty was to their own tribe. After the foundation of
Prophet Muhammad's „Ummatu-l-Muslimin‟, Al-Ahsan argued, „their
supreme tribal loyalty was shifted to that of a new Islamic identity.‟[4]
Hassan (2006) took this further when he argued, „Ummah became a
transformative concept as it changes the identities of Arab tribes to Muslim
and when Islam began to expand to non-Arab lands; different groups of
Muslims were transformed into a community of believers‟. Ummah had its
political dimension as well. [5]

Politically speaking, Prophet Muhammad established the concept of

Ummah through the formation of the first Islamic state of Madina by the
documentation of Madina Constitution which is also known as the Charter
of Madina. Through the article 1, “this charter establishes Ummah as a
political community.” However, Prophet Muhammad's Ummah was
inclusive not exclusive as the article 30 of Madina Charter states that “the
Jews will be treated as one community with the believers.” It makes the
whole charter inclusive to some degree. Safi (2001) argued that the
Ummah constitution defines the political rights and duties of the members
of the newly established political community, Muslims and non-Muslims
alike. [6] However, Safi also argued that the charter was developed in
several stages and non-Muslims were not in view when it was first written.
He argued that “the Jewish tribes' names are not cited in the early parts of
the document, and as the city of Madina needed to be guarded an offer
was made to the Jewish to make them citizens.” [7]

Furthermore, Mandaville claimed that the Ummah of Madina was a sort of a

„defense pact‟. Mandaville's argument provides some sort of ground to Al-
Ahsan's claim that the Jews were originally not part of the Madina Pact and
initially they were excluded; however, the security reasons forced Prophet
Muhammad to include them. Nevertheless, at the end, Ummah of Madina
included non-believers, by doing so; it can be argued that the original
Ummah of Madina accepted the inclusive vision. [8]

Move to the future, this understanding actually provides a less difficult

timeline that flexibly reveals some sorts of certain episodes of Islamists‟
political campaigns over the discourse of Ummah. In this path, there are
three central points in three different episodes that perhaps can be
underlined regarding the effort of politicizing the discourse of Ummah. The
first is the notion of „al-„urwa al-wuthqa‟ (the tight bond) that promoted by
Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839-1897) and Muhammad „Abduh (1849-1905);
the second is the communitarian idea of Islamic nationalism that endorsed
by Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), Abu al-A‟la al-Maududi (1902-1979) and
Ayatollah Khomeini (1902-1989); the third is the universalist-totalitarian
notion of Islamic state that sponsored by Hizb al-Tahrir (the Liberation
Party) (1953-) and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) (2013-).

They all interpret Ummah in various ways of world view, ideological

tendency, methodology and political interest depend on socio-politico-
cultural factors that shape around them. First, to develop Ummah, al-
Afghani and Abduh perceive that Muslims need a reform in terms of
education. [9] When they control the education of the youth, they will be
able to ensure that the next Muslim generation will be the best social and
political agencies that bring the Islamic resurgence. [10] Here, it is the
meaning of the tight bond of Islam. The second, Sheikh Qutb, Maulana al-
Maududi and Imam Khomeini – with each specificity and peculiarity –
promotes that the best Ummah will be established if they work together
with the identity as Muslims - that declare the „shahadatain‟ (believe in
Allah and Muhammad is the messenger of God) – to solve any social and
political problem in a certain national boundary of Muslim country. [11]

The third, Hizb al-Tahrir and ISIS claims that the enlightenment of Islam
and Muslim Ummah will appear if the political power of the world is
controlled and governed by the caliph of the global caliphate.

Because of this, the nation-state is facing not only the challenge of secular
globalization, but also opposition from religious globalization such as the
one promoted by Islamic fundamentalism. The Islamic fundamentalism
phenomenon attempts to provide alternative ideas and visions to the
current global situations. For example, it offers a vision for constructing a
single global culture under the banner of the global ummah. This vision
certainly challenges the Westphalian form of nation-states as it envisions a
new global citizenship which is based not on ethnicity or nationality, but on
faith. Sayyid Qutb is an ideologue of the Ikhwan al-Muslimin movement,
said that “a Muslim‟s nationality is his religion.” [12]
The vision of a global Islamic state that “divorced from territorial states” has
led Appadurai to view the Islamist fundamentalist identity as “postnational.”
[13] It is called fundamentalist movement because the proponents wanted to
return to the pure and pristine Islam.

Undeniably, the nation-states have limited powers to challenge the

hegemonic, unjust and plethoric economic injustices pursued by institutions
such as the IMF, WB as well as the WTO. Under globalization, the nation-
states‟ sovereignty remains in limbo as power steadily shifts to the most
powerful financial and corporate institutions. Globalization has subjected
the national governments to an atmosphere where they have seen their
sovereignty and control over domestic political and economic affairs rapidly
diminish, whatever sovereignty governments in the developing world
managed to obtain with decolonization are now rapidly eroding.

Neoliberalism has smashed and snatched the nation-states‟ models of

development and replaced them with models, which embrace the needs
and demands of the supranational organizations. Although on paper some
of this development models and theories were supposed to reduce
dependency, reality has it that those in the Global South have no economic
spine to stand on their own, lest they crumble to the ground like an atomic
bomb. The international environment was imposing some compelling
pressure on the Global South to carry out free market reforms and this very
reforms often produce social resistance and political turmoil within the
nation-states‟ boundaries. [14]
Moreover, the spread of Islamist fundamentalism in Arab countries can be
seen as a response to the failure of nation-sate to create national and
regional identity, in addition to its failure to provide economic progress and
political stability. This is exemplified by the idea of Pan-Arabism as a
reaction to colonialism advocated by Egyptian president, Gamal
Abdulnasser, which failed to create Arab unity. This in turn brought about
the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism advocated by the Ikhwan al-
Muslimin led by, among others, Sayyid Qutb. It has risen as a substitute to
the nation-state that failed to establish Arab identity. [15] Simultaneous with
the globalization movement is the rise of Islamist movements aiming for
greater Ummah. They wanted to free themselves from the inability of
nation-state to accommodate Islam.

Furthermore, Hizb al-Tahrir is a political party, whose ideology is Islam and

its goal is to resume the Islamic way of life by establishing the Islamic state
which implements Islam and carries its da„wah to the world. The Hizb has
developed a party culture, which includes Islamic rules about life‟s affairs.
The Hizb calls for Islam as an intellectual leadership from which emanates
systems that address all problems faced by human beings, whether
political, economic, cultural, social, and others. It is a political Hizb whose
members include both men and women. It calls all people to Islam and to
adopt its concepts and systems and views them, no matter what their
nationalities and schools of thought, from the Islamic outlook. It relies on
the interaction with the Ummah to achieve its goal. It stands against
colonialism in all its forms and aims to liberate the Ummah from the
colonialist intellectual leadership and to remove its cultural, political,
military, economic influence from the Islamic lands. It also aims to change
the erroneous and distorted concepts spread by colonialism that restricts
Islam to personal worship and morals. [16]

Hizb al-Tahrir calls for the unification of all Muslim countries into a single
global state of al-Khilafah al-Islamiyyah or the Islamic Caliphate. It rejects
nationalism of all types and the existence of some countries that claim
themselves to be the Islamic states such as Iran and Saudi Arabia
because, in Hizb al-Tahrir‟s claim, they do not meet the necessary criteria
of an Islamic state. However, Hizb al-Tahrir “takes the Arab lands that are a
part of the Islamic lands as a starting point and that it considers the
establishment of an Islamic state in the Arab countries as a nucleus for the
Islamic state as a natural step.” [17]

As a global political organization, Hizb al-Tahrir aims to re-establish the

Islamic Caliphate as a global independent state. The Islamic caliphate is
set up upon mass popular support through non-violent means and strategy.
It encompasses the Muslim world and then disseminates peacefully to
other worlds. It is built upon an elected and accountable global ruler, an
independent judiciary, political parties, the rule of law and equal rights for
minority groups. Citizens of the caliphate have right to get involved in
politics as the caliph‟s role is to serve people and govern with justice. [18]

As a global movement, ISIS assertion of the global Ummah is not really

clear if it is just an ideological rhetoric. In fact, the ISIS leader, Abubakar al-
Baghdadi in several times had emphasized the establishment of the Islamic
caliphate state of Iraq and Syria. It means, it had been limited in a
boundary of state level, not the global-transnational level. Hence, there has
been such inconsistency for this group in dealing with their concept of
Ummah. [19]

While the Hizb al-Tahrir moves in the non-violence political expansion, the
ISIS entirely plays the role of the strategy of violence in its political
maneuvers.

Their interpretation on the concept of Ummah remains unclear. The shape

of Ummah is never completely fixed, although they have a social imaginary
on the idea of “the community of believers.” While al-Afghani and Abduh
rather understand that Ummah is the concept of the ideal „Islamic
community‟, Qutb, al-Maududi and Khomeini tend to view that Ummah is
the national identity of Muslim and the autonomous Islamic state. It is not
quite different from their opinion, in addition, other groups, religious
movements and political parties such as Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the
Islamic Society in Pakistan, the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria and many
others tend to understand that Ummah relatively either as a “society,”
“state” or “group of political elites” in the sense of the oligarchic-
partitocracy. [20]

Islam already has political implications within its foundations. However,

what is commonly understood as Political Islam and its synonym „Islamism‟
is a specific modern interpretation of Islam. It has its roots in social
conflicts: the establishment of autocratic monarchies in the newly
independent Arab countries in the 1950s and 1960s gave rise to social
justice demands which these regimes did not meet. [21] There are waves of
political awareness in the Muslim world that effectively opposed the secular
and autocratic regimes. The first one is the ideology of modern Political
Islam. From the late 19th century until the second half of the 20th century,
scholars such as Jamal al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh, Abul Ala Maududi,
and Sayyid Qutb prescribed a fundamental re-interpretation of Islam as a
genuine base of empowered Arab societies in the face of Western
imperialism – Islam is the solution to political and social problems. [22]

The second one is the ideology of Arab Socialism. According to al-Husri

Dawisa intellectuals like Michel Aflaq and Salahudin al-Bitar developed an
Arab adoption of traditional socialist ideas as a genuine foundation of Arab
societies in order to face political and social demands for power and justice
against imperialism and capitalism. The Baath party, for instance,
subsequently became one of the most influential organizations with
Egyptian president Gamal Abdulnasser as Arab Socialism‟s most influential
proponent. [23]

In his book, “The Great War for Civilization,” Fisk stated that Arab
Socialism became dominant all over North Africa and the Middle East. As
an egalitarian ideology, it was attractive both for the general population, but
also specifically for young and ambitious men from poorer families, who
often sought to climb the social ladder through an army career as an
officer. As a consequence, young officers who claimed to represent the
cause of Arab Socialism led various military coup d‟états against the
monarchies. That was the case in Iraq, Syria, and Egypt. In Algeria, Arab
Socialism came into power with the achievement of independence under
the leadership of the socialist Front de Libération Nationale (FLN). For
Palestinians, Fatah‟s socialist ideology was undisputed. [24]
In the “Handbook of Political Islam”, Akberzade opined that the rise of the
Islamic State boils down to the long lineage of Islamic movements for the
revival of Muslim power and glory, lost after the disintegration of the
Ottoman Empire following World War One and the formal abolition of the
Islamic Caliphate in 1924. The Islamists see historical conspiracies and
secret dealings by the European powers, such as the Sykes-Picot
Agreement of May 1916 and the Balfour Declaration of November 1917, to
dominate and keep the Muslims under control. As for the actual decline of
Muslim power, many scholars have identified deviation from Sharia
(Quranic laws) as the principal reason, and a return to Sharia, they argue,
is the only way to revive the glorious past, restore global leadership, and
lead the world. This is the basic premise of operations by movements like
the Muslim Brotherhood in the Arab world, Jamaat-e-Islami in South Asia,
and al-Qaeda on a global scale. [25]

Abubakar al-Baghdadi‟s Islamic State, like its parent organization al-

Qaeda, is also squarely premised on the same ground – a return to Sharia
and the re-establishment of Islam as a global force. The mayhem in Iraq
following the 2003 US invasion, the internecine Shia-Sunni sectarian war,
the al-Maliki government‟s anti-Sunni policies, and the Syrian civil war
played contributory roles behind what is now the Islamic State.

At present uniform Islamic Constitution for the Muslim Ummah is imaginary

simply because the relation among the Muslim states is not satisfactory
healthy and harmonious. Though the color, culture, language and physical
structure of the Muslims are different in different countries but all Muslims
of the world read the same Quran and Hadith with same honor respect and
religious emotion. So, Muslims should come under one platform of Islam.
Political, economic, social, cultural difference cannot stand on the way of
unification. By upholding the Quran and Sunna firmly Muslim can reach at
the golden age of Islam again as it was done under the leadership of
Prophet Mohammad. Muslims, at present, in the world is about 25%, the
number of states is 56 and about 46% wealth is possessed by the Muslim
states. Under the circumstances, Muslim should be united against non-
Muslims. This idea can help to a great extent, if all the Muslim states enact
their Constitutions according to the provisions of Quran and Sunna. [26]

In the light of the above, the future Islamic ummah will gain strength not as
a unified and unitary community but as a differentiated community
consisting of Ummah representing different Islamic regions. Each regional
ummah will embody the unique character molded by history and the
temperament of its people. It will chart its own course to gain material and
an ideological influence in a global system, and, simultaneously, it will act
as a supportive and effective constituent of Islamic civilization. This trend
will also produce strong liberal and conservative movements, and each
regional Islamic ummah would have to find its unique ways to meet the
challenge these movements will pose. This decentralization of the Muslim
ummah may also be beneficial for the intellectual revitalization in the
Muslim world.

The looming challenge for the Muslim world is not religious, but intellectual.
At present, Islamic ummah is in the doldrums not because of the weakness
of commitment to the faith but because of its intellectual stagnation brought
about by political, social and cultural conditions generated by colonialism,
neo-colonialism and economic underdevelopment, poor governance some
of which can be attributed to the real or imagined influence increasing
devotional religiosity of the masses. This stagnation is most dramatically
manifested in the scientific and technological backwardness of the Muslim
world. [27]

In effect, the prediction of the emergence of seventy three groups in the

Ummah is found its fulfillment in the formation of numerous nation-states in
the Muslim world. As to the last phrase, “all of them will go to hell except
one” is later insertion according to Dr. Yasir Qadhi. Granting that it is not an
insertion, when Allah mentions hellfire, He was employing a threat. Threat
is not necessarily and directly brought into reality. Out of His mercy, He
forgives.

Notes

[1] See Jamaluddin Muhammad b. Mukarram Ibn Manzur, Lisan Al-Arabi,

Bayrut: Da al-Kutub al-ilmiyyah 1990, vol, 1 p. 44-45

[2] Paret, R. “ummah, First Encyclopedia of Islam 1913-1936 (Reprinted)

Leisen, New York Kohenhavn Koln: E.J.Brill 1987, vol. 8, p. 1015

[3] Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power

in Christianity and Islam, Baltimore; London: John Hopkins University
Press, 1993, 29.

[4] Al-Ahsan, A. 1992. Ummah or Nation? Identity Crisis in a Contemporary

Muslim Society. London: The Islamic Foundation.

[5] Hassan, R. 2006. Globalization's Challenge to the Islamic Ummah.

Asian Journal of Social Science 34(2): 311–323.
[6] Safi, L. M. 2001. Islam and the Secular State. URL:
http://louaysafi.com/content/view/61/22/.

[7] Al-Ahsan, A. 1992. Ummah or Nation? Identity Crisis in a

Contemporary Muslim Society. London: The Islamic Foundation.

[8] Mandaville, P. 2002. Reimagining the Ummah? Information Technology

and the Changing Boundaries of Political Islam. In Mohammadi, A. (ed.),
Islam Encountering Globalization (pp. 61–90). London: Routledge.

[9] Sami Abdullah Kaloti, The Reformation of Islam and the Impact of
Afghani and Abduh on Islamic Education, Doctoral Dissertation, Marquette
University, Wisconsin, 1974.

[10] Kaloti, The Reformation of Islam and the Impact of Afghani and Abduh
on Islamic Education; Indira Falk Gesink, “Islamic educational reform in
Nineteen Century-Egypt: lessons for the present,” in Charlene Tan (ed.),
Reforms in Islamic Education: International Perspectives, London; New
York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014. 17-34.

[11] Sayyid Qutb, Ma‟alim fi al-Tariq, 24; Abul A‟la Al-Maududi, Al-Khilafah
wa al-Mulk, 37; Khomeini, Islamic Government: Governance of the Jurist,
18-28.

[12] Khatib, “Communicating Islamic Fundamentalism”, 393; See Khatib,

Lina “Communicating Islamic Fundamentalism as a Global Citizenship”,
Journal of Communication Inquiry, 27, 4 (2003): 389-409.

[13] Arjun Appadurai, Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of

Globalization Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996 as cited in
Khatib, “Communicating Islamic Fundamentalis”, 393.

[14] See the article Globalization and the Nation-State: Sovereignty and
State Welfare in Jeopardy Agreement Lathi Jotia, Botswana, Gaborone,
University of Botswana, US-China Education Review B 2 (2011), 243-250

[15] Khatib, “Communicating Islamic Fundamentalism”, 394; See also

Khatib, Lina. “Communicating Islamic Fundamentalism as a Global
Citizenship”, Journal of Communication Inquiry, 27, 4 (2003): 389-409.
[16] Taqiuddin al-Nabhani, n.d. Concepts of Hizb ut-Tahrir (Mafahim Hizb
ut-Tahrir). London: Khilafah Publications, 76.

[17] Al-Nabhani, Concepts of Hizb ut-Tahrir..., 73; See also Al-Nabhani,

Taqiuddin. Concepts of Hisb ut-Tahrir (MafahimHizb ut-Tahrir). London:
Khilafah Publications, n.d.

[18] Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain, Media Pack, See also Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain,
“Media Information Pack”, www.hizb.org.uk, viewed 10 May 2008.

[19] Peter Mandaville, Global Political Islam, London; New York: Routledge,
2007, 266; Reza Pankhurst, The Inevitable Caliphate?: A History of the
Struggle for the Global Islamic Union, Oxford; New York: Oxford University
Press, 2013, 99-130; Carlos Alberto Torres, Theoretical and Empirical
Foundations of Critical Global Citizenship Education, London; New York:
Routledge, 2017, 154.

[20] Sami Zubaida, “Islam and Nationalism: Continuities and

Contradictions,” Nations and Nationalism, vol. 10, no. 4 (2004), 407–420;
Ranko, The Muslim Brotherhood and its Quest for Hegemony in Egypt:
State-Discourse and Islamist Counter-Discourse, New York: Springer,
2015; Islam, Jamaat-e-Islami in Contemporary India and Bangladesh,
Delhi: Cambridge University and see also Press, 2015; Shahin, “The
Foreign Policy of the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria,” Islam and
Christian-Muslim Relations, vol. 14, no. 2 (2003), 121-143.

[21] Hourani, A. (2005): A History of the Arab Peoples. London: Faber and
Faber.

[22] al-Din al-Afghani, J. (2003). „Islamic Union‟, in Gettlemann, M. and

Schaar, S. (ed.) The Middle East and Islamic World Reader, New York:
Grove Press. See also Quṭb, S. (2007). Milestones, Chicago, IL: Kazi
Publications.

[23] al-Husri, S. (1976). „Muslim Unity and Arab Unity‟, in Haim S. (ed.)
Arab Nationalism: An Anthology. California: University of California Press.
See also Dawisa, A. (2005). Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century:
From Triumph to Despair. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

[24] Fisk, R. (2006). The Great War for Civilisation: The Conquest of the
Middle East. London et al.: Harper Perennial.

[25] Akberzade, S. (ed.) (2012), Routledge Handbook of Political Islam

(London: Taylor and Francis).

[26] Md. Abdul Awal Khan (December 2006) The need of Uniform Islamic
Constitution for the Muslim Ummah: A study of Islamic provisions on the
Constitution ofselected countries, IIUC STUDIES, Vol. – 3, (p 63-72)

[27] Riaz Hassan (2018) RELIGION, MODERNIZATION AND THE

ISLAMIC UMMAH Jurnal Al-Tamaddun, Bil. 13 (1), 2018, 57-64