G.R. NO.

91359

VETERANS MANPOWER VSCOURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

Veterans Manpower and Protective Services, Inc. (VMPSI) alleges that the provisions of RA 5487(Private
Security Agency Law) violate the provisions of the Constitution against monopolies, unfair competition
and combinations of restraint of trade and tend to favour and institutionalize the PADPAO (Philippine
Association of Detective and Protective Services, Inc.). Furthermore, VMPSI questions the provision on
requiring all private security agencies or company security forces to register as members of any PADPAO
chapter organized within the region. On May 12, 1986, a Memorandum of Agreement was executed by
PADPAO and the PC Chief, which fixed the minimum monthly contract rate per guard for 8hours of
security service per day at P2, 255.00 within Metro Manila and P2, 215.00 outside of Metro Manila.
PADPAO found VMPSI guilty of cut-throat competition when it charged Metropolitan Waterworks and
Sewerage System lower than the standard minimum rates provided in the MOA. As a result, PADPAO
refused to issue a clearance/certificate of membership to VMPSI. VMPSI filed a civil case against the PC
chief and PC-SUSIA (Philippine Constabulary Supervisory Unit for Security and Investigation Agencies).
PC Chief and PC-SUSIA filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the case is against the State which
had not given consent thereto.

ISSUE:

Is VMPSI’s complaint against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA is a suit against the State without its consent.

Ruling:

Yes. A public official may sometimes be held liable in his personal or private capacity if he acts in bad
faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction, however, since the acts for which the PC Chief
and PC-SUSIA are being called to account in this case, were performed as part of their official duties,
without malice, gross negligence, or bad faith, no recovery may be had against them in their private
capacities. The state immunity doctrine rests upon reasons of public policy and the inconvenience and
danger which would flow from a different rule.

The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the Memorandum of Agreement dated May 12,
1986 does not constitute an implied consent by the State to be sued. The consent of the State to be sued
must emanate from statutory authority, hence, a legislative act, not from a mere memorandum. Without
such consent, the trial court did not acquired jurisdiction over the public respondents.

Petition for review is denied and the judgment appealed from is affirmed in toto.
16 S 120
Garcia vs. Chief of Staff
January 31, 1966

Facts:

The plaintiff-appellant, Mariano E. Garcia, alleged on July, 1948 that he suffered injuries while undergoing
the 10-month military training at Camp Floridablanca, Pampanga. Thereafter he filed his claim under
Commonwealth Act 400 and in April, 1957 to the Office of the Adjutant General. On May 2, 1957, he
received a letter disallowing his claim for disability benefits from the latter. On November 24, 1958, after
further demands of the plaintiff, the Adjutant General's Office denied the said claim, alleging that
Commonwealth Act 400 had already been repealed by Republic Act 610 which took effect on January 1,
1950.

The Philippine Veterans Administration and the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces filed separate motions
to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
complaint. The court, on March 2, 1962, rendered an order dismissing the complaint on the ground that
the action has prescribed. However, Motion for reconsideration of the said order having been denied.

Issue:

Ruling: