2021 CAMPANILLA Pre-Week Materials

2021 UPDATES ON CRIMINAL LAWS
WITH LEONEN CASES

BY JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA
Note: The dissenting opinions of Justice Leonen are included in these

materials since cases with his dissent may be a source of bar examination
questions. However, the dissenting opinions of Justice Leonen are not controlling
principles. For purpose of the bar exam, the majority opinions should be followed.
2021 CRIMINAL LAW BAR REVIEW MATERIAL BY JUDGE CAMPANILLA
Warning: This is an intellectual property of Judge Marlo Campanilla. Copying any parts of this work in
writing materials or book for publication without proper attribution is prohibited by law.
Pre-Month: 2-Day Lecture (October); Pre-Week: 2-Day Lecture (Nov. 11,12,13,14&15); Last Minute: 3-
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TERRITORIALITY - For purpose of venue under the Rules of Criminal

Procedure and territoriality principle in Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code, the
place of commission of the criminal act and the place of occurrence of the effect
of such act, which is an element of the offense, shall be considered. If one pulled
the trigger of his gun in Quezon City and hit the victim in City of Manila, who
died as a consequence, Quezon City and City of Manila, which are the places of
commission of the criminal act and the occurrence of the criminal effect, are
proper venues. If the psychological violence consisting of marital infidelity
punishable under RA No. 9262 is committed in Singapore but the psychological
effect occurred in the Philippines since the wife of the respondent, who suffered
mental anguish, is residing in the Philippines, our court can assume jurisdiction
(see: AAA vs. BBB, G.R. no. 212448, January 11, 2018). However, if the
commission of the criminal act consummates the crime and the effect thereof is
not an element thereof, the place of occurrence of the effect shall not be
considered for purpose of venue and territoriality rule. Bigamy committed in
Singapore is beyond the jurisdiction of our court although the offended spouse
is residing in the Philippines since the psychological effect of bigamy to her is not
an element thereof.
Convention of the law of the sea - Under the Convention on the Law of
the Sea, the flag state of a foreign merchant vessel passing through the 12-mile
territorial sea of another state has jurisdiction over crimes committed therein.
However, a coastal state such as the Philippines can exercise jurisdiction over
any crime committed on board such ship in the following cases: (1) if its
consequences extend to the coastal State; (2) if it disturbs the peace of the
country or the good order of the territorial sea; (3) if the ship master or a
diplomatic or consular officer of the flag State requested assistance from the local
authorities; or (4) if it is for the suppression of traffic in narcotic drugs or
psychotropic substances. Murder or serious physical injuries committed in a
foreign vessel anchored in a Philippine port against a passenger thereof is within
the jurisdiction of the Philippine court since this crime disturb the peace of the
country.
Regime of islands - Under the principle of territoriality, the court has also
jurisdiction over crime committed in Kalayaan Islands or Scarboruogh Shoal
because the Baseline Law (RA No. 9522) declares that the Philippines exercise
sovereignty and jurisdiction over it.
200-mile exclusive economic zone - The Philippines has no sovereignty

over the 200-mile exclusive economic zone. Under the convention of the law of
the sea, the Philippines has sovereign right to fish and to exploit the natural
resources in the zone. This sovereign right is not equivalent to sovereignty. Under
the convention, foreign states have the freedom of navigation and overflight over
the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines. Freedom of navigation and
overflight cannot be exercised in a place where a State has sovereignty such as
such its 12-mile territorial water. Under the convention, the Philippines has
limited jurisdiction over crimes committed within the exclusive economic zone
such as those involving fiscal, custom, immigration, health and safety. A State
has absolute jurisdiction over crimes committed in a territory over which it has
sovereignty subject only to a few exceptions under international laws. The
recognition of freedom of navigation and overflight and the limited jurisdiction
over crimes committed in the exclusive economic zone militate against the
concept of sovereignty.
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The term “universal Pre-Month: 2-Day Lecture (October); Pre-Week: 2-Day Lecture (Nov. 11,12,13,14&15); Last Minute: 3-
jurisdiction” refers to
the idea that a
national court may
prosecute individuals
for serious crimes
against international
law — such as If a Chinese fishing vessel deliberately bumped a Filipino vessel in the West
crimes against
h u m a n i t y, w a r
Philippines Sea covered by the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines, and The flag state of a
as a consequence, several Filipino fishermen died, the Philippines’s jurisdiction the jurisdiction under
merchant vessel is
crimes, genocide,
and torture — based
on the principle that over the crime of murder cannot be based on the theory that the Philippines has wvessel hose laws the
is registered
such crimes harm
the international sovereignty over the zone. Other principles must be used to justify its jurisdiction ord e licensed,
emed
and is
the
community or
international order
over murder committed within the zone such as flag state rule or universality nationality of the
vessel. A merchant
itself, which
individual States
principle. vessel must be
registered and can
may act to protect.
only be registered in
Generally, universal
jurisdiction is PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY - Under Article 14 of the Civil Code, penal laws one jurisdiction, but
may change the
invoked when other,
traditional bases of shall be obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in the Philippine territory. This is register in which it is
registered.
criminal jurisdiction
are not available, for the generality principle. Hence, a person regardless of his citizenship, religion,
example: the
defendant is not a political position or any other status can be criminally prosecuted and convicted
national of the State,
the defendant did as long as he is living or sojourning in the territory of the Philippines.
not commit a crime
in that State’s
territory or against its Under the US Constitution, American citizen has the right to bear firearms.
nationals, or the
State’s own national Even though an American citizen is in possession of US license to carry firearm,
interests are not
adversely affected. he can be prosecuted for illegal possession of loose firearm if a failed to obtain
permit from PNP to carry it. RA No. 105911 on loose firearm is obligatory to him
regardless of his foreign characteristic. (People v. Galacgac, C.A., 54 O.G. 1027)
The American constitutional provision on firearm is not operative in the
Philippines.
However, penal laws shall not be obligatory upon a person, who enjoys
criminal immunity from suit. In October 21, 2015, a Chinese diplomat and her
husband killed two Chinese diplomats in Cebu. The Philippines authorities did
not prosecute the killers for murders because of diplomatic immunity protected
by the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. The case was referred to
China. They will be prosecuted under Chinese Law.
Under the Section 7, Article VII of the 1973 Constitution, the President
shall be immune from suit during his tenure. However, there is no provision on
presidential immunity under the 1987 Constitution. But despite the present
Constitution has not adopted the rule on presidential immunity under the
Marcos Constitution, case law or jurisprudence recognizes this immunity.
Because of this immunity, penal laws are not obligatory to the President.
The President of the Philippines is entitled to immunity from suit subject

to the following conditions: (1) the immunity has been asserted; (2) during the
period of his incumbency and tenure; and (3) the act constituting the crime is
committed in the performance of his duties. Presidential immunity will assure
the exercise of presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or
distraction, considering that the Chief Executive is a job that demands undivided
attention. (Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001)
In the 1982 case of Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the US Supreme Court further held
that the immunity of the President from civil damages covers only "official acts."
Recently, the US Supreme Court had the occasion to reiterate this doctrine in
the case of Clinton v. Jones where it held that the US President's immunity from
suits for money damages arising out of their official acts is inapplicable to
unofficial conduct. Thus, non-function related crimes such as rape, robbery, and
kidnapping are not covered by the immunity.
During the period of his incumbency and tenure, President Aquino cannot
be charged with reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicides in
connection with the Mamasapano incident where 44 SAF members were killed
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because of his presidential immunity. His decisions concerning the handling of

the police operation leading to the tragic event are official acts. However, after
the tenure of the President, he can be criminally charged since the presidential
immunity is not anymore invocable. But, in Nacino v. Office of the Ombudsman,
G.R. Nos. 234789-91, October 16, 2019, the Supreme Court found no probable
cause to charge President Aquino for reckless imprudence resulting in multiple
homicides in connection with the Mamasapano incident. It was held that Aquino
participated in the planning of Oplan Exodus to arrest Marwan and Usman by
approving the suggested alternative date of execution and ordering the increase
in the number of troops and coordination with the AFP. However, these acts
barely qualify Aquino as an active player in the entire scheme of the operations,
more so point to any criminal negligence on his part.
Vice-presidential immunity - It is submitted that a Vice President is not

immune from criminal prosecution. The job of the Vice President, unlike the head
of the executive department, does not demand undivided attention. Hence, the
circumstance, on which the presidential immunity is based, is not obtaining if
the position is vice-presidential.
Pacifico Agabin, former dean of the University of the Philippines College of

Law and an expert on the Constitution said that the vice president is not immune
from suit. The Constitution does not guarantee the vice president’s immunity, he
said: “It’s only the President who is immune [from suit] and that is based on
tradition, because he is busy handling affairs of the state. But that cannot be
said for the vice president.” Fr Joaquin Bernas SJ, one of the framers of the 1987
Constitution, also categorically said that Binay is not covered by executive
immunity. “No, the vice president is not immune…The Constitution doesn’t say
he is immune”. (See: Rappler article entitled Vice-president does not enjoy
immunity published on June 5, 2015)
Some experts are saying that criminally prosecuting a vice-president will

violate Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution, which mandates that the Vice
President may be removed from office only through an impeachment proceeding.
It is submitted however that there is no constitutional violation since in case of
conviction, he can function as Vice President while serving sentence in prison.
However, accessory penalty of disqualification, which involved removal from
office, is not implementable since the enforcement thereof will offend the
impeachment provision.
MALA IN SE AND MALA PROHIBITA - Criminal law has long divided

crimes into acts wrong in themselves called "acts mala in se," and acts which
would not be wrong but for the fact that positive law forbids them, called
"acts mala prohibita." This distinction is important with reference to the intent
with which a wrongful act is done. The rule on the subject is that in acts mala in
se, the intent governs, but in acts mala prohibita, the only inquiry is, has the law
been violated? When an act is illegal, the intent of the offender is immaterial.
(Estrella vs. People, G.R. No. 212942, June 17, 2020)
To classify a crime as malum in se or malum prohibitum, the nature thereof

and the law that punishes it must be considered.
1. Intentional felony — Intentional felony under the Revised Penal Code is

committed by means of dolo. Since dolo or criminal intent is an element of
intentional felonies, they are mala in se. However, there is an exception; technical
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malversation is an intentional felony, and yet, the Supreme Court declared it as

malum prohibitum.
In Ysidoro v. People, G.R. No. 192330, November 14, 2012, the mayor, who
applied 10 boxes of food appropriated for feeding program to the beneficiaries of
shelter assistance program, is liable for technical malversation. Mayor’s act, no
matter how noble or miniscule the amount diverted, constitutes the crime of
technical malversation. Criminal intent is not an element of technical
malversation. The law punishes the act of diverting public property earmarked
by law or ordinance for a particular public purpose to another public purpose.
The offense is malum prohibitum, meaning that the prohibited act is not
inherently immoral but becomes a criminal offense because positive law forbids
its commission based on considerations of public policy, order, and convenience.
It is the commission of an act as defined by the law and not the character or
violated. Hence, malice or criminal intent is completely irrelevant. Dura lex sed
lex.
2. Offense under special law – If the offense punishable under special

law is not inherently wrong in nature, it shall be classified as malum prohibitum.
The following offenses under special laws are mala prohibita for not being
inherently evil in character: violation of BP Blg. 22 (Amada vs. People, G.R. No.
177438, September 24, 2012); Illegal recruitment (People vs. Sison, G.R. No.
187160, August 9, 2017); crimes involving dangerous drugs (Pang vs. People,
G.R. No. 176229, October 19, 2011); and possession of loose firearms (People vs.
Peralta, G.R. No. 221991, August 30, 2017).
If the offense punishable under special law is inherently evil, there are
two views on the standard in classifying a crime as malum in se or malum
prohibitum.
First view - The first view is that if the offense is punishable under
special law, it will be treated as malum prohibitum.
Fencing is a concept substantially similar to that of theft or robbery

committed by an accessory. Same as theft or robbery committed by an accessory,
fencing is wrong in character. However, since fencing is punishable under special
law, the Supreme Court in Cahulugan vs. People, G.R. No. 225695, March 21,
2018 and Estrella vs. People, G.R. No. 212942, June 17, 2020 declares it as
malum prohibitum.
Hazing where the victim died or was raped is for obvious reason evil in
nature. However, the congressional deliberation shows that the legislators
considered hazing as malum prohibitum. Because of the legislative treatment of
hazing as malum prohibitum, the Supreme Court in Villareal v. People, G.R. No.
151258, February 1, 2012 declared it as malum prohibitum.
Sexual harassment is wrong in nature. However, in Escandor vs. People,

G.R. No. 211962, July 06, 2020, the Supreme Court through Justice Leonen
declared sexual harassment as malum prohibitum since RA No. 7877 is a special
criminal statute. In this case, the defense of respondent that he never intended
to violate RA No. 7877 was rejected. It was held that in prosecuting an offender
for sexual harassment, intent is immaterial. Mere commission is sufficient to
warrant a conviction. Even without intent, sexual harassment is penalized. His
attempt to kiss petitioner was a flagrant disregard of a customary rule that had
existed since time immemorial — that intimate physical contact between
individuals must be consensual. Respondent's defiance of custom and lack of
Page 5 of 115
respect for the opposite sex were more appalling because he was a married man.
Respondent's act showed a low regard for women and disrespect for petitioner's
honor and dignity.
Second view - The second view is that even although the offense is
punishable under special law, if the same is inherently evil it will be treated as
malum in se.
In Napoles vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 224162, November 7, 2017, the

legislative declaration in RA No. 7659 that the crime of plunder under RA No.
7080 is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. For when the acts
punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se and it
does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially since in
the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would
be absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder as though they are mere prosecutions
for violations of BP Blg. 22 or of an ordinance against jaywalking, without regard
to the inherent wrongness of the acts. (Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
148965. February 26, 2002)
In Dungo v. People, G.R. No. 209464, July 1, 2015, a common

misconception is that all mala in se crimes are found in the Revised Penal Code,
while all mala prohibita crimes are provided by special penal laws. In reality,
however, there may be mala in se crimes under special laws, such as plunder
under R.A. No. 7080. Similarly, there may be mala prohibita crimes defined in the
Revised Penal Code, such as technical malversation. The better approach to
distinguish between mala in se and mala prohibita crimes is the determination of
the inherent immorality or vileness of the penalized act. If the punishable act or
omission is immoral in itself, then it is a crime malum in se; on the contrary, if it
is not immoral in itself, but there is a statute prohibiting its commission by
reasons of public policy, then it is malum prohibitum.
Sexual abuse and child abuse are both punishable under RA No. 7610,
and yet, the Supreme Court classified them differently.
Sexual abuse under Section 5 (b) of RA No. 7610 is considered by the

Supreme Court as malum prohibitum simply because it is punishable under
special law. In sum, the first view was applied in this case. (People vs. Udang,
G.R. No. 210161, January 10, 2018, Justice Leonen, People vs. Caoili, G.R. No.
196342, August 08, 2017; People vs. Caballo, G.R. No. 198732, June 10, 2013,
Imbo vs. People, G.R. No. 197712, April 20, 2015, and Malto vs. People, G.R. No.
164733, September 21, 2007)
Child abuse under Section 10 of RA No. 7610 was considered by the

Supreme Court in People vs. Mabunot, G.R. No. 204659, September 19, 2016 as
malum in se. However, in Lucido vs. People, G.R. No. 217764, August 7, 2017,
the Supreme Court through Justice Leonen declared child abuse as malum
prohibitum. In the latest case of Patulot vs. People, G.R. No. 235071, January 7,
2019, the Supreme Court considered child abuse as malum in se. Accordingly,
when the acts complained of are inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se,
even if they are punished by a special law. Physical abuse of a child under RA
No. 7610 is inherently wrong; hence, criminal intent on the part of the offender
must be clearly established with the other elements of the crime. In sum, the
second view was applied.
For purpose of the bar exam, if the crime is sexual abuse under Section 5 of
RA No. 7610, fencing, hazing, or sexual harassment the first view must be
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followed because the Supreme Court says so. Thus, they are mala prohibita since
they are punishable under special laws. On the other hand, if the crime is child
abuse under Section 10 of RA No. 7610, plunder, carnapping, piracy or highway
robbery/brigandage under PD No. 532, trafficking in person or terrorism, second
view must be observed. Thus, they are mala in se since they are wrong in nature.
Partakes the nature of malum prohibitum – Section 3 (g) of RA No. 3019

punishes a public officer, who have entered, on behalf of the government, into
a contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
government. Violation of this provision partakes of the nature of malum
prohibitum. (Luciano vs. Estrella, G.R. No. L-31622, August 31, 1970; Villa vs.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 87186, April 24, 1992) Lack of benefits from the
contract is not a defense on the part of the public officer.
Private individuals, who benefitted from the contact, which is grossly and
manifestly disadvantageous to government, will be held liable under Section 4(b)
of RA No. 3019. In other words, notwithstanding the allegation of conspiracy with
public officer to violate Section 3(g), the liability of these private individuals will
be based on Section 4 (b), which punishes any person for knowingly inducing or
causing the public officers to commit Section 3(g). In violation of Section 4 (b),
criminal intent must necessarily be proved. This is in clear recognition that
Section 3(g), a malum prohibitum specifically applies to public officers only. (Go
vs. Fifth Division, Sandiganbayan, G.R. NO. 172602, September 3, 2007) In sum,
violation of Section 4 (b) is malum in se.
Section 3 (d) of RA No. 3019 punishes a public officer or any member of

his family, who accept employment in a private enterprise with whom such public
officer has a pending official business with during the pendency thereof or within
one year from its termination as it is considered a corrupt practice. In Villanueva
vs. People, G.R. No. 237864, July 8, 2020, Supreme court declared violation of
Section 3 (d) as malum prohibitum. It was held that mere acceptance by wife of a
TESDA officer, of employment with RACE, with pending business with TESTA,
renders them liable under the law.
In Luciano case, the Supreme Court declared violation of Section 3 (g) of

RA No. 3019 as crime which partakes of the nature of malum prohibitum. On the
other hand, in Villanueva case, it considered violation of Section 3 (d) as malum
prohibitum.
Settled in the rule that violation of RA No. 3019 partakes of the nature of
malum prohibitum. However, the offense under Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 may
be committed either by dolo, as when the accused acted with evident bad faith or
manifest partiality, or by culpa, as when the accused committed gross
inexcusable negligence. (Plameras v. People, G.R. No. 187268, September 4, 2013)
Since malice, evident bad faith or manifest partiality is an element of violation of
Section 3 (e) of RA No. 3019, this crime also partakes the character of malum in
se.
Malversation and technical malversation - Malversation is either an

intentional felony (or malum in se) or a culpable felony. It can be committed by
means of dolo or culpa. Hence, public officers, who commits malversation, can
be held liable for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA No. 3019 for causing damage to
the government through evident bad faith or manifest partiality (dolo) or gross
inexcusable negligence (culpa). (Pajaro, G.R. Nos. 167860–65, June 17, 2008).
On the other hand, technical malversation is malum prohibitum (Ysidoro v.
People, G.R. No. 192330, November 14, 2012), which can be committed without
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dolo and culpa. Manifest partiality and gross inexcusable negligence are not
elements of technical malversation. Hence, public officers, who commits
technical malversation, may not be held liable for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA
No. 3019 (Villarosa vs. Hon. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 221418, January 23, 2019)
unless additional circumstance establishes manifest partiality, evident bad faith
and gross inexcusable negligence.
In Villarosa vs. Hon. Ombudsman, supra, using tobacco fund to finance

the regular operations of the municipality, which are not in accordance with the
law creating such fund constitutes technical malversation. However, it was held
that the mere act of using government money to fund a project which is different
from what the law states you have to spend it for does not fall under the definition
of manifest partiality nor gross inexcusable negligence. It must always be
remembered that manifest partiality and gross inexcusable negligence are not
elements in the crime of technical malversation.
ABERRATIO ICTUS – If the crimes committed against the target victim

and third person, who was hit by reason of aberratio ictus, were produced by a
single act, the accused is liable for a complex crime. Thus, single act of throwing
a grenade killing one and injuring another constitutes a complex crime of murder
and attempted murder. (People v. Julio Guillen, G.R. No. L-1477, January 18,
1950; People vs. Bendecio, G.R. No. 235016, September 08, 2020) However, the
accused is liable for separate crimes despite the application of the aberratio ictus
rule, and not a complex crime in the following cases:
1. If the bullet that killed the target victim is different from the bullet that
killed the third person, who was hit by reason of aberratio ictus (People v. Flora,
G.R. No. 125909, June 23, 2000; People v. Adriano, G.R. No. 205228, July 15,
2015; Cruz vs. People, G.R. No. 216642, September 8, 2020);
2. If the crime committed against the third person, who was hit by reason
of aberratio ictus, is merely a light felony such as slight physical injuries (People
v. Violin, G.R. Nos. 114003-06, January 14, 1997);
3. If the components of a complex crime are alleged in two different

information. (People v. Umawid, G.R. No. 208719, June 9, 2014);
4. If the crime committed against the third person, who was hit by reason
of aberratio ictus, is child abuse, which is an offense punishable under special
law (Patulot vs. People, G.R. No. 235071, January 7, 2019) Components of
complex crime must be felonies.
Accused consciously poured hot cooking oil from a casserole on CCC,

consequently injuring AAA (3 years old) and BBB (2 months old) burning their
skins and faces. Accused is liable for child abuse involving infliction of physical
injury although there is no intent to degrade, debase or demean the intrinsic
worth and dignity of AAA and BBB as human beings. In fact, the intention of the
accused is merely to inflict injury on CCC but because of aberratio ictus or
mistake of blow, AAA and BBB were also injured. In sum, because of Article 4 of
RPC, accused is liable for the wrongful act done (child abuse against AAA and
BBB) although it differs from the wrongful act intended (physical injuries on
CCC). This is not a complex crime. Accused is convicted of two counts of child
abuse. (See: Patulot vs. People, G.R. No. 235071, January 7, 2019) He should
also be held liable for physical injuries.
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CONSUMMATION OF THREAT - The crime of grave threat is consummated

as soon as the threats come to the knowledge of the person threatened or as soon
as the victim heard accused utter his threatening remarks. (People vs. Bueza,
G.R. No. 242513, November 18, 2020)
PASSION - There is no uniform rule on what constitutes a considerable

length of time. The provocation and the commission of the crime should not be
so far apart that a reasonable length of time has passed during which the accused
would have calmed down and be able to reflect on the consequences of his or her
actions. What is important is that the accused has not yet "recovered his normal
equanimity" when he committed the crime. Passion and obfuscation as a
mitigating circumstance need not be felt only in the seconds before the
commission of the crime. It may build up and strengthen over time until it can
no longer be repressed and will ultimately motivate the commission of the crime.
(People vs. Oloverio, G.R. No. 211159, March 18, 2015, Justice Leonen)
SELF-DFENSE – Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material

unlawful aggression; and (b) imminent unlawful aggression. Actual or material
unlawful aggression means an attack with physical force or with a weapon, an
offensive act that positively determines the intent of the aggressor to cause the
injury. Imminent unlawful aggression means an attack that is impending or at
the point of happening; it must not consist in a mere threatening attitude, nor
must it be merely imaginary, but must be offensive and positively strong (like
aiming a revolver at another with intent to shoot or opening a knife and making
a motion as if to attack). Imminent unlawful aggression must not be a mere
threatening attitude of the victim, such as pressing his right hand to his hip
where a revolver was holstered, accompanied by an angry countenance, or like
aiming to throw a pot. (Ganal, Jr. vs. People, G.R. No. 248130, December 2,
2020)
INSANITY - The defense of insanity is in the nature of a confession or

avoidance because an accused invoking it admits to have committed the crime
but claims that he should not be criminally liable therefor because of insanity,
which is an exempting circumstance. Consequently, the accused is tried on the
issue of sanity alone, and if found to be sane, a judgment of conviction is rendered
without any trial on the issue of guilt. An accused invoking the exempting
circumstance of insanity bears the burden of proving it with clear and convincing
evidence because every person is presumed sane. For the defense of insanity to
prosper, it must be proven that the accused was completely deprived of
intelligence, which must relate to the time immediately preceding or
simultaneous to the commission of the offense with which he is charged. (People
vs. Mirana, G.R. No. 219113, April 25, 2018)
In order for the accused to be exempted from criminal liability under a plea
of insanity, he must successfully show that: (1) he was completely deprived of
intelligence; and (2) such complete deprivation of intelligence must be
manifest at the time or immediately before the commission of the offense. The
defense failed to prove its plea of insanity under the requirements set by law.
Although accused underwent out-patient consultation for his diagnosed
condition of schizophrenia from August 2006 until 13 June 2009, this evidence
of insanity may be accorded weight only if there is also proof of abnormal
psychological behavior immediately before or simultaneous with the commission
of the crime (on November 9, 2009). The evidence on the alleged insanity must
refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment of
execution. (People vs. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 227997, October 16, 2019)
Page 9 of 115
IMBECILITY AND MINORITY – Mental retardation includes (a) idiot,

whose mental age is two-year old; (b) imbecile, whose mental age is seven-year
old; (c) moron or feebleminded, whose mental age is twelve-year old and (d)
borderline intelligence. (People vs. Butiong, G.R. No. 168932, October 19, 2011;
People vs. Bayrante, G.R. No. 188978, June 13, 2012; People vs. Gilles, G.R. No.
229860, March 21, 2018) For purpose of statutory rape, there is no difference
between actual age and mental age.
Having sexual intercourse with the offended party, who is under 12 years
of age, is statutory rape under Article 266-A (d) of RPC. The word “age” in this
provision includes chronological age and mental age. Hence, having sexual
intercourse with idiot, imbecile, or feebleminded is statutory rape under Article
266-A (d) (People vs. Daniega, G.R. No. 212201, June 28, 2017; People vs.
Labordo, G.R. No. 239033, February 13, 2019; People vs. XXX, G.R. No. 243988,
August 27, 2020). However, having sexual intercourse with a person with
borderline intelligence is not statutory rape under Article 266-A (d) because his
mental age is above 12 years.
Having sexual intercourse with the offended party, who is deprived of

reason, is rape under Article 266-A (b) of the Revised Penal Code. Mental
retardation is within the contemplation of deprivation of reason. Hence, having
sexual intercourse with idiot, imbecile, feebleminded or person with borderline
intelligence is rape of a person deprived of reason under Article 266-A (b) (People
vs. Butiong, G.R. No. 168932, October 19, 2011; People vs. Bayrante, G.R. No.
188978, June 13, 2012).
The word “age” in the phrase “person below 18 years of age” in Section 3
of RA No. 7610 is either chronological or mental. A person who has a cognitive
disability would be considered a child under RA No. 7610 based on his or her
mental age, not chronological age. For purpose of Section 3 of RA No. 7610, there
is no difference between actual age and mental age. Thus, a mentally-retarded
adult (24 years of age), who had a mental age of an 8-year-old, is a child protected
by RA No. 7610. (Versoza vs. People, G.R. No. 184535, September 03, 2019) Since
the concept of a child in RA No. 7610 is adopted by RA No. 9208, a mentally-
retarded adult is a child within the context of qualified trafficking in person.
(People vs. Ybanez, G.R. No. 220461, August 24, 2016)
Under Section 5 (b) of RA No 7610, when the child subjected to sexual

abuse is under 12 years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted for rape and
acts of lasciviousness under RPC. The word “age” in the phrase “when the victim
is under twelve (12) years of age” in Section 5 (b) of RA No. 7610 is either
chronological or mental. For purpose of Section 5 (b) of RA No. 7610, there is no
difference between actual age and mental age. Hence, the victim whose actual
age is 12 years old but her mental age is 9 years old, is considered as a victim
under 12 year of age within the contemplation of Section 5 (b). (People vs. Pusing,
G.R. No. 208009, July 11, 2016, Justice Leonen)
In exempting circumstance, there is a difference between actual age and

mental age. In exempting circumstance of imbecility, what is important is the
mental age of the accused. An idiot, whose mental age is 2 years, and imbecile,
whose mental age is 7 years old (People vs. Butiong, G.R. No. 168932, October
19, 2011, Bersamin) are exempt from criminal liability. A feebleminded, whose
mental age is 12 years old, is not exempt from criminal liability since he is not
an imbecile (People vs. Nunez, G.R. No. 112429-30, July 23, 1997) but he is
entitled to mitigating circumstance of mental illness (People vs. Formigones, G.R.
No. L-3246, November 29, 1950). In exempting circumstance of minority under
Page 10 of 115
Section 6 of RA No. 9344, what is important is the chronological or actual age of

the accused.
If the actual age of the accused is 18 years old and mental age is 9 years
old, the exempting circumstance of minority and imbecility shall not be
appreciated because he is neither a minor nor an imbecile (People vs. Roxas, G.R.
No. 200793, June 04, 2014).
Page 11 of 115
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES - There are new guidelines on how to

allege aggravating or qualifying circumstance in the Information. In cases where
law uses a broad term to embrace various situations in which may exist, such as
but are not limited to (1) treachery; (2) abuse of superior strength; (3) evident
premeditation; (4) cruelty, alleging in the information the name of the modifying
circumstance e.g. treachery is not enough. The information must state the
ultimate facts relative to such circumstance e.g. alleging that the accused
surreptitiously stabbed the victim at his back to ensure that he cannot defend
himself. In case of failure to comply with the rule on allegation of ultimate facts,
the Information may be subject to a motion to quash or a motion for a bill of
particulars. Failure of the accused to avail any of the said remedies constitutes
a waiver of his right to question the defective statement of the aggravating or
qualifying circumstance in the Information, and consequently, the same may be
appreciated against him if proven during trial. Alternatively, prosecutors may
sufficiently aver the ultimate facts relative to a qualifying or aggravating
circumstance by referencing the pertinent portions of the resolution finding
probable cause against the accused, which resolution should be attached to the
Information. (People vs. Solar, G.R. No. 225595, August 6, 2019)
The Information for murder alleged that the killing of the victim is qualified
by the circumstances of treachery and abuse of superior strength. This information
is defective since the prosecution failed to allege facts on which treachery and
abuse of super strength are based. (The prosecution to comply with Solar
principle may allege that accused to render the victim defenseless surreptitiously
stabbed in at his back) It was held that: Accused did not question the supposed
insufficiency of the Information filed against him through either a motion to
quash or motion for bill of particulars. He voluntarily entered his plea during the
arraignment and proceeded with the trial. Thus, he is deemed to have waived any
of the waivable defects in the Information, including the supposed lack of
particularity in the description of the attendant circumstances. (People vs. Solar,
supra)
Justice Bersamin in his dissenting opinion said that the accused had no
duty or obligation to remind the State by motion to quash (or motion for bill of
particular) on what charge he should be made to answer to. The information did
not charge murder, but only homicide. Justice Leonen joined the dissenting
opinion of Justice Bersamin. (People vs. Solar, supra)
PARTIAL RESTITUTION - The payment, indemnification, or

reimbursement of, or compromise on the amounts or funds malversed or
misappropriated, after the commission of the crime, does not extinguish the
accused's criminal liability or relieve the accused from the penalty prescribed by
the law. At best, such acts of reimbursement may only affect the offender's civil
liability, and may be credited in his favor as a mitigating circumstance analogous
to voluntary surrender. Accused enjoys the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender, due to his partial restitution of the amount malversed (Valenzuela vs.
People, G.R. No. 205693, February 14, 2018)
CONSPIRACY – The fact that accused prevented preventing Oliva from

reporting the shooting incident to the police is not an indication that he conspired
with co-accused in killing the victim. Mere knowledge, acquiescence, or approval
of the act, without cooperation or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to
constitute one a party to a conspiracy. There must be intentional participation
in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and
Page 12 of 115
purpose. The shooting incident transpired during a heated argument in a

drinking spree. There was no showing that accused actively participated in the
furtherance of the common design or purpose since the shooting transpired and
was consummated even without his cooperation or assistance. (De Los Santos
vs. People, G.R. No. 231765, August 24, 2020). However, he could be held liable
for obstruction of justice.
If there is conspiracy, the act of the public officer in violating RA No. 3019
is imputable to the private individual although they are not similarly situated in
relation to the object of the crime. Moreover, Section 9 of RA No. 3019 provides
penalty for public officer or private person for crime under Section 3. Hence, a
private individual can be prosecuted for violation of RA No. 3019 (Go vs. The Fifth
Division, Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 172602, April 13, 2007). Even if the public
officer, with whom the private individual allegedly conspired, died, the latter can
still be prosecuted for violation of RA No. 3019. Death extinguishes the criminal
liability but not the crime. Hence, if there is proof of the crime and conspiracy
between the dead public officer and private individual, the latter can still be
convicted of violation of RA No. 3019 (People vs. Go, GR No. 168539, March 25,
2014; Canlas vs. People, G.R. Nos. 236308-09, February 17, 2020). However, if
the public officer with whom the private individual allegedly conspired is
acquitted, the latter should also be acquitted (Marcos vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R.
No. 126995, October 6, 1998).
While the primary offender in violation of RA No. 3019 and plunder are
public officers, private individuals may also be held liable for the same if they are
found to have conspired with said officers in committing the same. This proceeds
from the fundamental principle that in cases of conspiracy, the act of one is the
act of all. In this case, Janet Napoles engaged in the illegal hemorrhaging of
Senator Enrile's PDAF. Thus, they are rightfully charged as a co-conspirator for
corruption and plunder. (Napoles vs. Carpio-Morales, G.R. Nos. 213542-43, March
15, 2016; Justice Leonen concurred)
Private persons acting in conspiracy with public officers may be indicted

and if found guilty, be held liable for the pertinent offenses under Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 3019. (Granada vs. People, G.R. No. 184092, February 22, 2017,
Justice Leonen) When a contract that is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous
to the government is entered into, the persons involved—whether public officers
or private persons—may be charged for violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act and suffer the same penalty if found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt. (Garcia-Diaz vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 193236, September 17, 2018,
Justice Leonen)
If a contract with the government involved an overprice products or

services, the public officers are liable for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA No. 3019
for causing undue injury to the government or giving undue advantage to the
overpaid private individual through manifest partiality and evident bad faith; or
violation of Section 3 (g) for entering into a contract, which is manifestly and
grossly disadvantageous to the government. The overpaid private individual is
also liable for violation of Section 3 (e) or (g) of RA No. 3019 on the basis of
conspiracy and Go vs. Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan. (Santillano vs. People,
G.R. Nos. 175045-46, March 03, 2010; Uyboco vs. People, G.R. No. 211703,
December 10, 2014; Granada vs. People, supra, Justice Leonen) If the overpaid
private individual is a corporation, the responsible officers are liable for violation
of RA No. 3019. When the separate juridical personality of a corporation is used
to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, the
law will regard the corporation as an association of persons. There is sufficient
Page 13 of 115
basis to pierce the corporate veil, and responsible corporate officers e.g. president
should be held equally liable as her co-conspirators. (Granada vs. People, supra,
Justice Leonen)
A municipal mayor allegedly obstructed and stopped the execution of the

Municipal Trial Court's valid writs of execution and demolition of the structure
illegally constructed on the lot owned by the wife of the complainant. The
Sandiganbayan convicted the mayor of violation of Section 3 (g) of RA No. 3019
by giving unwarranted benefit to the defendant in that civil case. However, his
criminal liability was extinguished by reason of his death. The two accused,
municipal administrator and private secretary of the mayor, were present when
the mayor intervened in the demolition site. But there is no evidence showing
their participation in the intervention committed by the mayor. Passive presence,
knowledge or approval of the crime, or companionship is not an evidence of
conspiracy. (Dela Cruz vs. People, G.R. No. 197153, October 9, 2019)
FENCING – Fencing is a malum prohibitum, and PD No. 1612 creates a prima

facie presumption of Fencing from evidence of possession by the accused of any
good, article, item, object or anything of value, which has been the subject of
robbery or theft; and prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of the
property. (Cahulugan vs. People, G.R. No. 225695, March 21, 2018)
Actual knowledge that the property is stolen is not required. Fencing is

committed if the accused should have known that the property is stolen taken
into consideration the attending circumstances such as (1) the price of the
property is so cheap; (2) expensive jewelry is being offered for sale at midnight in
a street; (3) accused knew that the car he bought was not properly documented
(Dimat vs. People, supra); or (4) new tires are being peddled in the streets by an
unknown seller (Ong vs. People, supra). Furthermore, mere possession of stolen
property shall be prima facie evidence of fencing (Section 6 of PD No. 1612).
The accused should have been forewarned that the soft drinks came from
an illegal source, as his transaction with the thief did not have any accompanying
delivery and official receipts, and that the latter did not demand that such items
be replaced with empty bottles, contrary to common practice among dealers of
soft drinks. He should have known that the goods are stolen. He was convicted
of fencing. (Cahulugan vs. People, G.R. No. 225695, March 21, 2018)
If the information alleged that the accused “knows” that the property is
stolen, he cannot be convicted of fencing on the ground that he “should have
known” that the same was derived from the proceeds of theft because of his
constitutional right to be informed (Lim vs. People, G.R. No. 211977, October 12,
2016).
In Lim vs. People, G.R. No. 211977, October 12, 2016, the clearance stated
in Section 6 of PD No. 1612 is only required if several conditions, are met: first,
that the person, store, establishment or entity is in the business of buying and
selling of any good, articles item object, or anything of value; second, that such
thing of value was obtained from an unlicensed dealer or supplier thereof;
and third, that such thing of value is to be offered for sale to the public. In the
present case, the first and third requisites were not met. Nowhere was it
established that accused was engaged in the business of buy and sell. Neither
was the prosecution able to establish that accused intended to sell or was
actually selling the subject grader to the public.
Page 14 of 115
ROBBERY WITH HOMICDE - In robbery with homicide, all other felonies

such as rape, intentional mutilation, usurpation of authority, or direct assault
with attempted homicide are integrated into this special complex crime. This
special complex crime is committed as long as death results by reason or on
occasion or robbery without reference or distinction as to the circumstances,
causes or modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime (People
vs. De Leon, GR No. 179943, June 26, 2009; People vs. Jugueta, G.R. No.
202124, April 05, 2016).
There is no special complex crime of robbery with homicide and frustrated

homicide. The offense should have been designated as robbery with homicide
alone, regardless of the number of homicides or injuries committed. (People vs.
Labuguen, G.R. No. 223103, February 24, 2020)
Homicide component – A special complex crime of robbery with homicide

takes place when a homicide is committed either by reason, or on the occasion,
of the robbery. To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the prosecution
must prove the following elements: (1) the taking of personal property belonging
to another; (2) with intent to gain; (3) with the use of violence or intimidation
against a person; and (4) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime
of homicide, as used in its generic sense, was committed. A conviction requires
certitude that the robbery is the main purpose, and [the] objective of the
malefactor and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob
must precede the taking of human life but the killing may occur before, during
or after the robbery. Homicide is said to have been committed by reason or on
occasion of robbery if, for instance, it was committed: (a) to facilitate the robbery
or the escape of the culprit; (b) to preserve the possession by the culprit of the
loot; (c) to prevent discovery of the commission of the robbery; or (d) to eliminate
witnesses in the commission of the crime (People vs. Balute, G.R. No. 212932,
January 21, 2015)
If the original design is to kill the victim (e.g., there is motive to kill), and
accused killed him, and took his property as an afterthought, the crimes
committed are homicide or murder and theft (People v. Atanacio, No. L-11844,
November 29, 1960) or robbery. (People vs. Natindim, G.R. No. 201867,
November 4, 2020)
In robbery with homicide, it is immaterial that the victim of homicide is a

bystander (People vs. Barut, G.R. No. L-42666 March 13, 1979), a responding
policeman (People vs. Pelagio, G.R. No. L-16177, May 24, 1967) or one of the
robbers. (People vs. Casabuena, G.R. No. 246580, June 23, 2020)
The victim was shot while accused was robbing the passengers of a jeepney.
Even if victim's bag was not taken, accused are liable for special complex crime
of robbery with homicide. In this special complex crime, it is immaterial that the
victim of homicide is other than the victim of robbery, as long as homicide occurs
by reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof. (People vs. Madrelejos, G.R.
No. 225328, March 21, 2018)
Collective responsibility – Case law establishes that whenever

homicide has been committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery, all
those who took part as principals in the robbery will also be held guilty as
principals of robbery with homicide although they did not take part in the
homicide, unless it appears that they sought to prevent the killing. (People v. Dela
Cruz, G.R. No. 168173, December 24, 2008; People v. Castro, G.R. No. 187073,
March 14, 2012; People vs. Labagala, G.R. No. 221427, July 30, 2018; People vs.
Page 15 of 115
Bongos, G.R. No. 227698, January 31, 2018; People vs. Casabuena, G.R. No.
246580, June 23, 2020)
Once conspiracy is established between several accused in the commission

of the crime of robbery, they would all be equally liable for the rape committed
by anyone of them on the occasion of the robbery, unless anyone of them proves
that he endeavored to prevent the others from committing rape. (People v. Suyu,
G.R. No. 170191, August 16, 2006; People v. De Leon, G.R. No. 179943, June 26,
2009; People vs. Madrelejos, G.R. No. 225328, March 21, 2018; People vs.
Sanota, G.R. No. 233659, December 10, 2019)
However, in fine, the long line of jurisprudence on the special complex

crime of robbery with rape requires that the accused be aware of the sexual act
in order for him to have the opportunity to attempt to prevent the same, without
which he cannot be faulted for his inaction. (People vs. Agaton, G.R. No. 251631,
August 27, 2020) If there is no evidence that the accused is aware of the
commission of rape, he could not have prevented the rape. Hence, the accused
is only liable for robbery and not robbery with rape. (People v. Canturia, G.R. No.
108490, June 22, 1995)
Canturia principle where lack of awareness is a defense is applicable to

kidnapping with rape (People v. Anticamaray, G.R. No. 178771, June 8, 2011),
kidnapping with homicide, robbery with homicide (People v. Corbes, G.R. No.
113470, March 26, 1997) and robbery with arson.
RAPE WITH HOMICIDE - The phrase “by reason of the rape” obviously
conveys the notion that the killing is due to the rape, which is the crime the
offender originally designed to commit. The victim of the rape is also the victim
of the killing. In contrast, the phrase “on the occasion of the rape” as shown by
Senate deliberations refers to a killing that occurs immediately before or after,
or during the commission itself of the rape, where the victim of the homicide may
be a person other than the rape victim. (People vs. Villaflores, G.R. No. 184926,
April 11, 2012; People vs. Laog, G.R. No. 178321, October 5, 2011)
For the crime of robbery with rape, the law does not distinguish whether
the rape was committed before, during, or after the robbery, but only that it
punishes robbery that was accompanied by rape. (People vs. Salen, G.R. No.
231013, January 29, 2020, Justice Leonen)
ARBITRARY DETENTION AND MURDER - If the victim dies or is killed as

a consequence of detention, the offender is liable for special complex crime of
kidnapping with homicide. If the victim dies or is killed in the course of arbitrary
detention, the offender is not liable for special complex crime. Neither is he liable
for complex crime. These two crimes were not produced by a single act. Arbitrary
detention was not used as a necessary means to commit murder. Hence, the
offenders are liable for separate crimes of murder and arbitrary detention even if
they were indicted of a complex crime in the Information. It was improper for the
prosecutor to have charged them of a complex crime as the offenses were separate
and distinct from each other and cannot be complexed. (People vs. Dongail, G.R.
No. 217972, February 17, 2020)
INCIDENTAL DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY – Accused committed robbery

inside a factory. Before they could leave the premises after the commission of the
robbery, the police authorities were already at the scene of the crime. Since they
cannot escape, they detained 21 victims. After 22 hours of captivity, the hostages
were rescued. Since the principal intention of the accused is to rob the victims,
Page 16 of 115
and the deprivation of their liberty is just incidental to the prevention of the
responding police officers from arresting them, the crime committed is robbery,
which absorbed incidental kidnapping and serious illegal detention. (People v.
Astor, G.R. Nos. L-71765-66, April 29, 1987)
AAA lived rent-free in a house owned by accused. Accused intercepted AAA

at the garage area and held a knife to her back and dragged her to his room and
raped her. Shortly after, police authorities arrived; but accused refused to release
her and detained her for a period of time. Although the initial (forcible) abduction
of AAA may have been absorbed by the crime of rape, the continued detention of
AAA after the rape cannot be deemed absorbed in it. Likewise, since the detention
continued after the rape had been completed, it cannot be deemed a necessary
means for the crime of rape. Hence, the accused is convicted of rape and slight
illegal detention (People vs. Concepcion, G.R. No. 214886, April 04, 2018, Justice
Leonen) or serious illegal detention with the qualifying circumstance that the
victim is a female.
The Astor case is not compatible with Concepcion case. However, for
purpose of the bar exam, Astor case should be applied to robbery and detention
while Concepcion case should be applied to rape and detention. In sum, if the
robbers held hostages the victims to prevent the policemen form arresting them,
the crime committed is robbery, which absorbs illegal detention. On the other
hand, if the rapist held hostage the victim to prevent the policemen from arresting
him, the crimes committed are rape and serious illegal detention.
SPECIAL MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE – Under Article 64 (5), when

there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no aggravating
circumstances are present, the court shall impose the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by law. This is called as special mitigating circumstance. The title of
Article 64 is rules for the application of penalties which contain three periods.
Penalties containing three periods are called divisible penalties.
Under Article 63, par. 2 (3), when there are some mitigating circumstances
and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty (of reclusion
perpetua) shall be applied. The title of Article 63 is rules for the application of
indivisible penalties. Death and reclusion perpetua are indivisible penalties.
Article 63, par. 2 (3) is only applicable cases in which the law prescribes a penalty
composed of two indivisible penalties. There is only one penalty composed to two
individual penalties, and that is, reclusion perpetua to death.
If the accused is convicted of parricide where the law prescribes the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death, and there are two mitigating circumstances (e.g.
voluntary surrender and confession), there are two views on which provision is
applicable.
First view is case of People vs. Genosa, G.R. No. 135981, January 15, 2004.
The Supreme Court appreciated special mitigating circumstance under Article
64. Hence, reclusion perpetua to death was graduated to reclusion temporal.
Second view is the case of People v. Takbobo, G.R. No. 102984, June 30,
1993. Article 64 (5) on special mitigating circumstance that requires the
graduation of penalty is only applicable if the penalty contains three periods.
Reclusion perpetua to death prescribed for parricide is not a penalty containing
three periods. The applicable provision is Article 63 par. 2 (3) on the rule involving
a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties. Hence, the lesser penalty shall
Page 17 of 115
be applied. Reclusion perpetua is lesser than death. Hence, the accused shall be
sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua.
It is submitted that the correct view is the Takbobo case. In People vs.
Brusola, G.R. No. 210615, July 26, 2017, the court convicted the accused of
parricide, and found the mitigating circumstances of passion and surrender.
Accused citing Genosa case argued that reclusion perpetua to death should be
reduced to reclusion temporal by reason of the special mitigating circumstance.
However, the Supreme Court through Justice Leonen refused to apply the
Genosa principle. It was held that considering that the penalty for parricide
consists of two indivisible penalties (reclusion perpetua to death), Article 63, and
not Article 64, is applicable. Thus, the penalty of reclusion perpetua was properly
imposed.
PENALTIES UNDER SPECIAL LAWS - When a special law adopts the

technical nomenclature of the penalties (e.g. prison mayor) in RPC, the intention
of the law is to adopt the provisions under this Code on imposition of penalty
(People v. Simon, G.R. No. 93028, July 29, 1994). Special aggravating
circumstance of organized/syndicated crime group (People v. Esparas, G.R. No.
120034, July 10, 1998); The privileged mitigating circumstance of minority
(People v. Montalaba, G.R. No. 186227, July 20, 2011; People v. Musa, G.R. No.
199735, October 24, 2012); and special aggravating circumstance of quasi-
recidivism (People v. Salazar, G.R. No. 98060, January 27, 1997) were appreciated
in malum prohibitum crime where the law punishing it adopts the technical
nomenclature of the penalty of RPC. The penalty for illegal possession of loose
firearm shall be applied in its minimum period because of the mitigating
circumstance of confession (Jacaban v. People, G.R. No. 184355, March 23, 2015),
and the penalty for sexual abuse (Malto v. People, G.R. No. 164733, September
21, 2007), that for fencing (Cahulugan vs. People, G.R. No. 225695, March 21,
2018) and that for violence against woman (Melgar vs. People, G.R. No. 223477,
February 14, 2018) shall be applied in its medium period in the absence of
modifying circumstance.
If the special law has not adopted the technical nomenclature of penalties in
the Revised Penal Code, the intention of the law is not to adopt the provisions of
this Code on imposition of penalties. Moreover, modifying circumstances cannot
be appreciated since the penalty not borrowed from the Code has no periods. The
crime has no attempted or frustrated stage since this penalty cannot be
graduated one or two degrees lower.
For example, the accused confessed to an offense where the special law
prescribes the penalty of not more than 10 years of imprisonment but not less
than 5 years (American penalty). Under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, if
there is a mitigating circumstance such as confession, the penalty shall be
applied in its minimum period. However, confession cannot be appreciated since
the penalty prescribed by law, which is not borrowed from the Code, has no
minimum period.
Penalty under RA No. 9165 - The Simon principle is not applicable if the
crime committed involved dangerous drugs because R.A. No. 9165 has a special
rule on the application of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code. Under Section
98 of R.A. No. 9165, notwithstanding any law, rule or regulation to the contrary,
the provisions of RPC shall not apply to the provisions of this Act, except in the
case of minor offenders.
Page 18 of 115
R.A. No. 9165 has not adopted the technical nomenclature of the penalties
of RPC (e.g. the penalty for possession of dangerous drugs involving shabu of less
than 5 grams is imprisonment of 12 years and 1 day to 20 years). If the accused
is a minor, the penal system of RPC shall apply because Section 98 of R.A. No.
9165 say so. To apply the penal provisions of the Code, the penalty for R.A. No.
9165 must be converted into a Spanish penalty. For example, the penalty for sale
of dangerous drugs or importation of dangerous drugs is life imprisonment to
death. If the accused is a minor, this penalty shall be converted into reclusion
perpetua to death. Taking into consideration the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority, reclusion perpetua to death shall be reduced to
reclusion temporal. (People v. Montalaba, G.R. No. 186227, July 20, 2011; People
v. Musa, G.R. No. 199735, October 24, 2012).
However, even though Section 98 of RA No. 9165 mandates the application

of the provisions of RPC in a case where the offender is a minor, if the penalty for
a crime involving dangerous drugs cannot be converted into a Spanish penalty,
the penal provisions of RPC shall not apply. For example, the penalty for use of
dangerous drugs committed by a first-time offender is rehabilitation. Even if the
offender is a minor, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority shall not
be considered because this penalty of rehabilitation cannot be converted into
Spanish penalty, and thus, it cannot be reduced one degree lower.
American penalty – Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, for offense

punishable under special law the imposed minimum penalty shall not be less
than the minimum penalty prescribed by law while the imposed maximum
penalty shall not be more than the maximum penalty prescribed by law.
Possession of shabu involving less than 5 grams, or marijuana involving

less than 300 grams is punishable by imprisonment of 12 years and 1 day to 20
years. Applying the ISLAW, the minimum penalty shall not be less than 12 years
and 1 day while the maximum penalty shall not be more than 20 years. Thus,
the court can sentence the accused to suffer 12 years and one day of
imprisonment as minimum to 14 years as maximum. (Felomino vs. People, G.R.
No. 245332, October 16, 2019)
Possession of shabu involving 5 grams or more but less than 10 grams, or

marijuana involving 300 grams or more, but less than 500 grams is punishable
by imprisonment of twenty (20) years and one (1) day to life imprisonment.
Applying Section 1 of ISLAW, the minimum penalty shall not be less than
20 years and 1 day. Under Section 2 thereof, the rule on indeterminate sentence
will not apply if the penalty is life imprisonment. Hence, the maximum penalty
must be less than life imprisonment. (Concurring opinion by Justice Peralta,
People vs. Obias, G.R. No. 222187, March 25, 2019). A penalty of more than 40
years shall be considered as life imprisonment. Hence, the maximum penalty
must be 40 years of imprisonment or less such as 30 years. Thus, the court can
sentence the accused to suffer 20 years and one day of imprisonment as
minimum to 30 years as maximum. (People vs. Pis-an, G.R. No. 242692, July
13, 2020)
The Obias case and Pis-an case departed from the case of People vs.
Badilla, G.R. No. 218578, August 31, 2016 where the Supreme Court did not
apply the ISLAW where the penalty is 20 years and 1 day to life imprisonment.
Page 19 of 115
GOOD CONDUCT ALLOWANCE – There are three benefits given by the

controversial RA No. 10592, to wit: (1) credit of preventive imprisonment; (2)
GCTA for preventive imprisonment; and (3) GCTA for imprisonment.
1. Credit for preventive imprisonment - Credit of preventive

imprisonment is governed by Article 29 of RPCas amended by RA No. 10592.
Under this provision, offenders who have undergone preventive imprisonment
shall be credited in the service of their sentence except in the following cases: (1)
when they are recidivists, (2) when they have been convicted previously twice or
more times of any crime; and (3) when upon being summoned for the execution
of their sentence they have failed to surrender voluntarily.
2. GCTA for preventive imprisonment - GCTA for preventive

imprisonment is governed by Articles 29 and 97 of the Code as amended by RA
No. 10592. Under Article 29, whenever an accused has undergone preventive
imprisonment for a period equal to the possible maximum imprisonment of the
offense charged, he shall be released immediately; for purposes of immediate
release, the computation of preventive imprisonment shall be the actual period
of detention with GCTA. However, the entitlement of GCTA for preventive
imprisonment is subject to a qualifying proviso, which is quoted as follows:
“Provided, finally, That recidivists, habitual delinquents, escapees and persons
charged with heinous crimes are excluded from the coverage of this Act.”
3. GCTA for imprisonment – GCTA for imprisonment is governed by

Article 97 of the Code as amended by RA No. 10592. Unlike Article 29 on GCTA
for preventive imprisonment, Article 97 on GCTA for imprisonment does not
provide an exclusionary or disqualification clause or qualifying proviso.
The last paragraph of Article 29 contains provisions on GCTA for preventive

imprisonment. The phrase subsequent to the words “provided finally” in Article
29 is a proviso, which contains the exceptions to the rule under the provision.
Settled is the rule that a proviso containing the exceptions will merely qualify the
provision containing the general rule that immediately preceded it.
In People vs. Tulugan, G.R. No. 227363, March 12, 2019, it was held that
the office of the proviso qualifies or modifies only the phrase immediately
preceding it or restrains of limits the generality of the clause that it immediately
follows. A proviso is to be construed with reference to the immediately preceding
part of the provisions, to which it is attached, and not to the statute itself or the
other sections thereof.
Applying the Tulugan principle, the proviso in Article 29 on “the exclusion

of heinous criminals, habitual delinquents, recidivists and escapes from the
coverage of RA No. 10592” merely qualifies the provision in Article 29 on GCTA
for preventive imprisonment. The qualifying effect of the proviso under Article 29
cannot extend to the provision under Article 97 on GCTA for imprisonment.
Hence, the author of this book humbly submit that heinous criminals, habitual
delinquents, recidivists and escapes are disqualified from the benefit of GCTA for
preventive imprisonment; but they are not disqualified from the benefit of GCTA
for imprisonment.
COMMUNITY SERVICE - RA No. 11362, which is approved on August 8,

2019, has introduced a new provision on community service, and that is, Article
88-a of Revised Penal Code. Community service is not a penalty but a mode of
serving the penalty of arresto menor or arresto mayor. Article 88-a of the Code
provides:
Page 20 of 115
“Article 88a. Community Service. The court in its discretion may, in lieu of
service in jail, require the penalties of arresto menor and arresto mayor be served
by the defendant by rendering community service in the place where the crime was
committed, under such terms as the court shall determine, taking into consideration
the gravity of the offense and the circumstances of the case, which shall be under
the supervision of a probation officer: Provided, That the court will prepare an order
imposing the community service, specifying the number of hours to be worked and
the period within which to complete the service. The order is then referred to the
assigned probation officer who shall have responsibility of the defendant.
“The defendant shall likewise be required to undergo rehabilitative

counseling under the social welfare and development officer of the city of
municipality concerned with the assistance of the Department of Social Welfare
and Development. In requiring community service, the court shall consider the
welfare of the society and the reasonable probability that the person sentenced
shall not violate the law while rendering the service.
“Community service shall consist of any actual physical activity which

inculcates civil consciousness, and is intended towards the improvement of a
public work or promotion of a public service.
Page 21 of 115
“If the defendant violates the terms of the community service, the court shall
order his/her re-arrest and the defendant shall serve the full term of the penalty,
as the case may be, in jail, or in the house of the defendant as provided under
Article 88. However, if the defendant has fully complied with the terms of the
community service, the court shall order the release of the defendant unless
detained for some other reason.
The privilege of rendering community service in lieu of service in jail shall

availed of only once.”
IMMUTABILITY OF FINAL JUDGEMENT - Under the doctrine of finality

of judgment or immutability of judgment, a decision that has acquired finality
becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact
and law, and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest
Court of the land. Nonetheless, the immutability of final judgments is not a hard
and fast rule as the Court has the power and prerogative to relax the same in
order to serve the demands of substantial justice. (People vs. Layag, G.R. No.
214875, October 17, 2016)
If the death of the accused happened prior to the finality of the judgement
convicting him of rape and acts of lasciviousness, but the Supreme Court was
belatedly informed of such death only after the finality of such judgment, the
case will be re-opened for purposes of dismissing the case. (People vs. Layag, G.R.
No. 214875, October 17, 2016) If the penalty imposed by the trial court is outside
the range prescribed by law, the Supreme Court can re-open a final and
immutable judgement to impose the correct penalty under the law. (Bigler vs.
People, G.R. No. 210972, March 19, 2016; Aguinaldo vs. People, G.R. No.
226615, January 13, 2021) If the new law prescribes a lesser penalty for the
crime of which the accused was previously convicted by final judgement, the
Supreme Court can re-open a final and immutable judgement judgment to
impose the lesser penalty under the new law. In sum, the new law shall be given
a retroactive effect. (Hernan vs. Honorable Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 217874,
December 5, 2017). Layag case, Bigler and Hernan case are exceptions to the
immutability of final judgment rule.
REVOCATION OF TRILLANES AMNESTY - Proclamation No. 75 issued

by President Aquino on November 24, 2010 and concurred in by Congress
granted amnesty to the participants of July 27, 2003 Oakwood Mutiny, the
February 2006 Marines Stand-Off and the November 29, 2007 Manila Peninsula
Incident. Under Section 2 of Proclamation No. 75, they have to apply with the ad
hoc committee of the Department of National Defense (DND) to be entitled to the
benefit of the amnesty proclamation. In the case of Vera v. People, G.R. No. L-
18184, January 31, 1963, it was held that even though an amnesty proclamation
does not expressly impose this admission of guilt as condition, it is still necessary
for the accused to admit the commission of the crime charged to be entitled to
the benefits of amnesty proclamation.
The DND through Secretary Voltaire Gazmin on January 21, 2011 issued
certificate of amnesty in favor of Senator Trillanes.
President Duterte on August 31, 2018 issued Proclamation No. 572

declaring the granting of amnesty to Senator Trillianes as null and void for failure
to file application and as required in Section 2 of Proclamation No. 75 and admit
his guilt, which is an inherent condition to avail of amnesty.
Page 22 of 115
Validity of delegation of implementing authority - On

September 9, 2018, Chief Presidential Legal Counsel Salvador Panelo said he
believes that former defense secretary Voltaire Gazmin may be held liable for
usurpation of authority when he recommended and approved the amnesty
granted to Senator Antonio Trillanes IV. On September 7, 2018, President
Duterte explained that the power to grant amnesty is a presidential prerogative
and cannot be delegated to anybody else.
Legislative, executive and judicial powers belong to the people because

“sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from
them”. When the people ratified the 1987 Constitution, they delegated these
powers to the three main branches of government by vesting legislative power,
executive power and judicial power in Congress, the President and Supreme
Court and other lower courts, respectively. Since the people entrust these powers
to these organs of government, as a rule they may not re-delegate it to others.
Re-delegation of these powers is a betrayal of the trust reposed to them by the
people.
This principle of non-delegability of power is in conformity with the Latin

maxim of “Potestas delegata non potest delagari”, or delegated authority cannot
be delegated. The basis of this doctrine is the ethical principle that such a
delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty that the delegate must
perform through his own judgment without intervention from another.
However, the principle of non-delegability of power is not an absolute rule.

It is subject to several exceptions. Congress in passing legislation is allowed to
authorize an agency under the Executive Branch to issue implementing rules
and to determine the existence of certain facts in connection with the
implementation of the law. The conferment of quasi-legislative power and quasi-
judicial power to an implementing executive agency by Congress is not a violation
of maxim of “potestas delegata non potest delagari.” Thus, Congress can make a
tax amnesty and require the Bureau of Internal Revenue to determine whether a
tax payer, who filed a tax amnesty application, is entitled to the benefit of the
law.
Under Amnesty Proclamation no. 8, dated September 7, 1946 issued by

President Roxas and concurred by Congress, declares amnesty in favor of
persons, who committed felony in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy
during the Japanese occupation. The proclamation tasked the Amnesty
Commission to determine if the crime is committed within the terms thereof. In
Vera vs. Nanadiego, G.R. No. L-26539, February 28, 1990, the Supreme Court
recognized the amnesty extended by the Commission to amnesty applicant.
It is submitted that the President Aquino may validly delegate to the DND
the authority to implement the Amnesty Proclamation No. 75. The standing of
this writer is the same as that of the Court of Appeals in People vs. Soriano and
Trillanes, CA-G.R. SP No. 159217, May 31, 2021. In that case, it was held that:
“There was no undue delegation to the DND of the power of the

President to grant amnesty, with the concurrence of a majority of all the
members of the Congress. Instead, what was delegated was the
implementation of the grant of amnesty, including the processing of the
applications to determine whether they complied with the conditions of the
amnesty. It is clear that Secretary Gazmin is not guilty of usurpation of
official functions. Considering that there was no undue delegation of the
Page 23 of 115
presidential power to grant amnesty to the Committee, it thus follows that

Secretary Gazmin did not usurp the President's official functions.”
Revo
cation of certificate of amnesty - Amnesty proclamation issued by a former
President under express authority of the Constitution and concurred in by
Congress has the nature, force, effect, and operation of a law (People vs.
Macadaeg, G.R. No. L-4316, May 28, 1952). Hence, an incumbent president
cannot unilaterally revoke the bilateral acts of the former President and Congress
in making an amnesty proclamation. Same as a law, amnesty proclamation can
only revoke by concurrent actions of the President and Congress. Moreover,
amnesty extinguishes the criminal liability of the amnesty beneficiary. Hence,
revocation made after the criminal extinction will not prejudice the amnesty
beneficiary.
Some experts in social media are saying that President Duterte cannot
unilaterally revoked the Amnesty Proclamation No. 75 issued by President
Aquino and concurred in by Congress. With due respect to their opinions, it is
submitted that President Duterte through Proclamation No. 572 did not revoke
Amnesty Proclamation No. 75; he merely declared as null and void the granting
of amnesty in favor of Trillanes for failure to apply as required in Section 2 of
Amnesty Proclamation No. 75, and for not admitting his guilt. In sum, the
President was actually nullifying the granting of the benefit of the amnesty by
DND through Secretary Gazmin to Senator Trillianes. Proclamation No. 572 is an
attack against the decision of DND granting amnesty and not against the bilateral
acts of President Aquino and Congress in issuing Proclamation No. 75. By basing
his declaration of nullity of the granting of amnesty on failure to file an
application, the President is in effect invoking Section 2 of Amnesty Proclamation
No. 75; and by invoking Section 2 thereof, he is in effect, validating this amnesty
proclamation rather than revoking it. The opinion of this writer is the same as
the position of the Court of Appeals in People vs. Soriano and Trillanes, CA-G.R.
SP No. 159217, May 31, 2021. It was held in this case that:
“The general grant of amnesty by Proclamation No. 75 was not revoked or

repealed by Proclamation No. 572. Only the individualized grant to the
petitioner was revoked.
Presidential power to revoke conditional amnesty - President Duterte

can revoke the certificate of amnesty issued by DND through Secretary Gazmin
in favor of Trillanes for failure to file application for amnesty as an express
precondition to the granting of the benefit under an amnesty proclamation and
failure to admit his guilt. The DND is under the control power of the President.
Hence, he can nullify its decision granting amnesty benefit for failure of the
beneficiary to comply with required conditions. This is also the legal conclusion
of the Court of Appeals in People vs. Soriano and Trillanes, CA-G.R. SP No.
159217, May 31, 2021. In that case, it was held that:
“The grant of conditional amnesty to the petitioner was subject to,

among others, the pre-conditions of application and admission of guilt or
criminal culpability in writing. If it is then found and known that he indeed
failed to fulfill these conditions originally, then the grant of amnesty
becomes susceptible to revocation.
“The legal effects of non-compliance with the procedural formalities

required by a conditional amnesty law are akin to the effects of that of a
conditional pardon. When the grant of pardon is made subject to conditions,
Page 24 of 115
compliance first with all the basic requirements is a must. If the condition
is violated or not fulfilled, the State can recommit the pardonee.
“Since the power to ultimately grant an individualized amnesty is

lodged in the President, the authority to revoke a conditional one can be
logically ceded to that office in the absence of any provision that
locates the authority to revoke in some other office.
“Proclamation No. 572 is a valid exercise by the President of his

Constitutional power of control over all executive departments, bureaus,
and offices.”
The granting of amnesty by the President is subject to congressional

concurrence, but the revocation of amnesty by reason of non-compliance with
required conditions is not subject to the power of Congress to concur. In People
vs. Soriano and Trillanes, CA-G.R. SP No. 159217, May 31, 2021, the Court of
Appeals ruled:
“To the idea that the authority to revoke must also be concurred in by
Congress, just as when the President exercises the power to grant amnesty,
the Court can only say, why not? To be sure, however, the Constitution
requires no such concurrence. The absence of a concurrence from Congress
cannot dilute, diminish or dissolve an exercise of executive prerogative that
is sourced by necessary implication from a clear grant of power to grant
reprieves, pardon, parole and amnesty.”
Double jeopardy - There is no double jeopardy where the dismissal of the

case was made with express conformity of the accused. If the accused moved for
the dismissal of the case due to criminal extinction by reason of amnesty, reviving
the case on the ground of a valid revocation of the granting of amnesty does not
violate the rule on double jeopardy. In People vs. Soriano and Trillanes, CA-G.R.
SP No. 159217, May 31, 2021, it was held that:
“Private respondent and his co-accused, invoking the amnesty

conferred upon them, filed a Motion to Dismiss with the RTC which it granted
in an Order dated September 21, 2011. Thus, the dismissal of the case was
with the express consent of private respondent. X x x Therefore, first
jeopardy has not yet attached upon the dismissal of the coup d'etat case,
and the continuation of the prosecution against private respondent does not
constitute double jeopardy.”
Judicial review - If an accused complied with the conditions required to

avail the benefits of Amnesty Proclamation, he has the remedy of raising the issue
of criminal extinction by reason of amnesty in court (People vs. Macadaeg, G.R.
No. L-4316, May 28, 1952). It devolves on the court to protect his right to be
entitled to the benefits of Amnesty Proclamation (Tolentino vs. Catoy, G.R. No. L-
2503, December 10, 1948).
The
President may revoke the amnesty granted to a beneficiary for failure to comply
with required conditions. However, if the court in a petition questioning the said
revocation of amnesty finds that amnesty beneficiary made an application,
admitted his guilt therein and complied with other conditions, if there are any,
and the DND properly approved the application, it may reverse the presidential
revocation.
Page 25 of 115
In People vs. Soriano and Trillanes, CA-G.R. SP No. 159217, May 31,
2021, the Court of Appeals found that the petitioner utterly failed to prove that
Trillanes failed to comply with the conditions of Proclamation No. 75. The
evidence tends to show that Trillanes complied with the said conditions by filing
his application for amnesty, and admitting his guilt for the crimes enumerated
under Proclamation No. 75. The Court declares that it cannot be said that the
grant of amnesty in favor of Trillanes was validly revoked. As a result, the charges
against Trillanes in connection with the offenses “forgotten” or forgiven by the
amnesty must be necessarily dropped. In other, words, the RTC Order dismissing
the coup d'etat case against Trillanes on the ground of amnesty is valid.
CONSTRUCTIVE DISCOVERY - The 10-year prescriptive period for

falsification of document shall commence to run on the date of recording of the
falsified deed of sale in the Registry of Deeds because of the constructive notice
rule under the Torren system (People vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 74226, July 27, 1989).
The accused falsified a notarized Secretary's Certificate by making it

appear that a certain member of the board participated in the meeting where in
fact he is already dead. On the basis of this Certificate, and Deed of Sale, the
Registry of Deeds cancelled the title of the corporation’s property and a new one
was issued. Under RPC, the period tor the prescription of offenses commences
from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the
authorities, or their agents. However, the offender party constructively
discovered the crime upon registration of the Secretary Certificate with the Deed
of Sale in the Registry of Deeds because of the rule on constructive notice to the
entire world; hence, the period for prescription commences on the date of
registration of the falsified document. The case was dismissed since the 10-year
period of prescription for falsification lapsed because the information was filed
more than 10 years from the registration of the document. (Lim vs. People, G.R.
No. 226590, April 23, 2018)
The 15-year prescriptive period for bigamy shall commence to run on the
date of actual discovery of the bigamous marriage and not from the registration
of bigamous marriage in the Office of the Civil Registrar. The law on Civil Registry
and the Family Code, which governed registration of marriage, do not provide a
rule on constructive notice (Sermonia vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109454,
June 14, 1994).
PRESCRIPTION FOR OFFENSE – As a general rule under Act 3326,

prescription for offense punishable under special laws begins to run from the
date of the commission of the offense, if the date of the commission of the
violation is known. However, if the necessary information, data, or records based
on which the crime could be discovered is readily available to the public, the State
is to be presumed to know that the crime has been committed. Hence,
prescription begins to run from the date of the commission of the offense.
There is an exception. Prescription for offense punishable under special

laws begins to run from the date of discovery thereof, if the date of the
commission of the violation is not known. However, if the necessary information,
data, or records based on which the crime could be discovered is not readily
available to the public, there is no way for the State to know that the crime has
been committed. Hence, prescription begins to run from the date of the discovery
of the offense. This is the blameless ignorance doctrine. Under this principle, the
State and private complainant should not be blame for failure to institute the
case immediately after the commission of the crime if they are ignorant or has no
reasonable means of knowing the existence of a crime.
Page 26 of 115
In sum, in determining whether it is the general rule or the exception that

should apply in a particular case, the availability or suppression of the
information relative to the crime should first be determined. (People vs. Parba-
Rural, G.R. No. 231884, June 27, 2018).
Under the law, SALNs are accessible to the public for copying or inspection
at reasonable hours. Under the circumstances, the State is to be presumed to
know of her omissions during the eight-year period of prescription set in Act No.
3326. (People vs. Parba-Rural, supra). Hence, the general rule applies;
prescription begins to run from the date the accused failed to file SALN.
Considering that during the Marcos regime, no person would have dared
to assail the legality of the transactions involving cronies (such as behest loans
or transaction involving the construction of nuclear power plant, it would be
unreasonable to expect that the discovery of the unlawful transactions was
possible prior to 1986. (Disini v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 169823-24 and
174764-65, September 11, 2013) Hence, the prescriptive period for violation of
R.A. No. 3019 commenced from the date of its discovery in 1992 after the
Committee made an exhaustive investigation. (Presidential Ad hoc Fact-finding
Committee v. Hon. Desierto, G.R. No. 135715, April 13, 2011) To rule otherwise is
to let the period of prescription run and yet the State could not interrupt it prior
to the EDSA revolution.
Necessary information, data, or records based on which the crime

committed by cronies during the Marcos regime are not readily available to the
public. The martial law prevented the filing of criminal cases. The information
about the violation was suppressed, possibly through connivance. Thus, the
exception applies and the period of prescription shall be reckoned from the date
of discovery thereof. (People vs. Parba-Rural, supra)
INTERRUPTION OF PRESCRIPTION – Hypothetical problem: Complaints

for preliminary investigation for violation of ordinance, violation of BP Blg. 22
and simple oral defamation are filed with the prosecutor’s office. These cases are
covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure. Does the filing of these complaints
interrupt the running of period of prescription?
1. The filing of complaint involving violation of ordinance with the

prosecutor’s office does not interrupt the running of period of prescription.
The proceedings mentioned in Act No. 3326 are “judicial proceedings.”
Preliminary investigation, which is not a judicial proceeding contemplated in Act
3326, will cause a prescriptive interruption. (Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr., G.R. No.
102342, July 3, 1992) The provision in the Rules on Criminal Procedure
regarding the interruption of prescription by institution of criminal action is not
applicable to violation of ordinance because case involving this crime is covered
by the Rules on Summary Procedure. (Jadewell Parking Systems Corp. vs. Lidua,
Sr., G.R. No. 169588, October 7, 2013, Justice Leonen)
2. The filing of complaint involving violation of BP Blg. 22 with the

prosecutor’s office interrupts the running of period of prescription. Under Act No.
3326, the running of the prescription of offense punishable under special law
shall be interrupted when “judicial proceedings for investigation and punishment”
are instituted against the guilty person. The proceeding is described as “judicial”
since when Act No. 3326 was passed on December 4, 1926, preliminary
investigation of criminal offenses was being conducted by justices of the peace.
Page 27 of 115
Considering that preliminary investigation in criminal case for purposes of

prosecution has become the exclusive function of the executive branch, the term
“proceedings” should now be understood either as executive or judicial in
character: executive when it involves the investigation phase and judicial when
it refers to the trial and judgment stage. Hence, institution of proceeding, whether
executive or judicial, interrupts the running of prescriptive period. (Panaguiton v.
Department of Justice, G.R. No. 167571, November 25, 2008, People v.
Pangilinan, G.R. No. 152662, June 13, 2012)
Note: The Jadewell case is not compatible with Panaguiton case, which
is affirmed in Pangilinan case, and other cases, because the former expressly
reaffirmed the Zaldivia principle while latter expressly abandoned it. For purpose
of the bar exam, the Jadewell principle should be applied if the case involved
violation of ordinance. Jadewell should not be applied to offenses under special
laws even they are covered by the rules on summary procedure.
In People vs. Lee, G.R. No. 234618, September 16, 2019, the Supreme Court
said that Jadewell presents a different factual milieu as the issue involved
therein was the prescriptive period for violation of a city ordinance, unlike in
the Pangilinan and other related cases, where the issue refers to prescription of
actions pertaining to violation of a special law. For sure, Jadewell did not
abandon the doctrine in Pangilinan as the former even acknowledged existing
jurisprudence which holds that the filing of complaint with the Office of the City
Prosecutor tolls the running of the prescriptive period.
3.
The filing of complaint involving simple oral defamation with the prosecutor’s
office interrupts the running of period of prescription. Article 91 of the Revised
Penal Code provides “the period of prescription shall be interrupted by the filing of
the complaint or information.” The filling of compliant for preliminary investigation
if the fiscal’s office interrupts the running of prescription of simple slander
because Article 91 does not distinguish whether the complaint is filed in the
Office of the Prosecutor for preliminary investigation or in court for action on the
merits. (Francisco vs. CA, G.R. No. L-45674, May 30, 1983)
Note: It should be noted that simple slander is covered by the Rules on

Summary Procedure. In People vs. Bautista, G.R. No. 168641, April 27, 2007,
the Supreme Court applied the Francisco principle to slight physical injuries,
which is also covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure.
Jadewell case cannot be applied to prescription of felonies although they are

covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure. Jadewell is interpreting Act No.
3326, which governs violation of ordinance while Francisco and Bautista are
interpreting Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, which is rule on prescription of
felonies such as oral defamation and slight physical injuries.
For corruption under R.A. No. 3019 as amended by R.A. No. 10910, the
prescriptive period is 20 years. For sexual harassment under RA No. 7877, the
prescriptive period is 3 years. Act No. 3326 does not apply to corruption and sexual
harassment with regards to the rules on period of prescription since R.A. No. 3019
and R.A. No. 7877 provide a special rule on the period of prescription. However, Act
No. 3326 on the rule of commencement and interruption of the running of prescriptive
period is still applicable to corruption under R.A. No. 3019, and sexual harassment
under RA No. 7877. Thus, the period of prescription will be interrupted upon the
Page 28 of 115
filing of complaint for preliminary investigation for violation of RA No. 3019 with
the Ombudsman (Disini v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 169823-24 and 174764-65,
September 11, 2013) for sexual harassment with the prosecutor’s office. (People vs.
Lee, G.R. No. 234618, September 16, 2019)
PROBATION - Accused is charged of sale of dangerous drugs. Pursuant to

a plea-bargaining agreement, he pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of possession
of drug paraphernalia, which is punishable 6 months and 1 day to 4 years. Sale
of dangerous drugs is not probationable. However, in applying for
probation, what is essential is not the offense charged but the offense to which
the accused is ultimately found guilty of. In sum, in determining the eligibility of
the accused for probation, the court shall consider possession of drug
paraphernalia for which he pleaded guilty, and not sale of dangerous drugs with
which he is charged. Possession of drug paraphernalia is probationable since the
penalty prescribed for it does not exceed 6 years of imprisonment. Under Section
24 of RA No. 9165, any person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing cannot
avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law. However, possession of drug
paraphernalia is not considered as drug trafficking or pushing. Hence, the
accused is eligible to apply for probation. (Pascua vs. People, G.R. No. 250578,
September 07, 2020)
Offense where the penalty is more than 6 years of imprisonment is non-

probationable. In Colinares vs. People, G.R. No. 182748, December 13, 2011, the
accused, who was convicted by the lower court of a non-probationable offense of
frustrated homicide, but on appeal was found guilty of a probationable offense of
attempted homicide, may apply for probation. In Villareal vs. People, G.R. No.
151258, December 1, 2014, accused was convicted of homicide, a non-
probationable crime, by the trial court. However, the SC found them liable for
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, which is a probationable crime,
because of lack of dolo. They can still apply for probation. RA No. 10707 has
amended Section 4 of PD 968 by adopting the Colinares and Villareal. Under this
provision, when a judgment of conviction imposing a non-probationable penalty
is appealed or reviewed, and such judgment is modified through the imposition
of a probationable penalty, the defendant shall be allowed to apply for probation
based on the modified decision before such decision becomes final. This
notwithstanding, the accused shall lose the benefit of probation should he seek
a review of the modified decision which already imposes a probationable penalty.
In Hernan vs. Honorable Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 217874, December 5,

2017, accused was convicted of malversation and sentenced to suffer a penalty
of 11 years, 6 months and 21 days of prision mayor, which is non-probationable.
The judgment becomes final prior to the effectivity of RA No. 10951. Under Article
217 of RPCas amended by RA No. 10951, the penalty for malversation involving
an amount of not exceeding P40,000 is only prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods. Despite the immutability of a final judgment, the
Supreme Court reduced the penalty to 3 years, 6 months and 20 days of prision
correccional in accordance with RA No. 10951, which penalty is now
probationable. It was stated that because of RA No. 10951, not only must
sentence of the accused be modified respecting the settled rule on the retroactive
effectivity of favorable laws, she may even apply for probation. In sum, applying
Section 4 of P.D. No. 968, as amended by R.A. No. 10707, since the judgment of
conviction imposing a non-probationable penalty is modified through the
imposition of a probationable penalty, she is now allowed to apply for probation
based on the modified decision before such decision becomes final. (see:
Aguinaldo vs. People, G.R. No. 226615, January 13, 2021)
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PIRACY - Under Section 2(a) of PD 532, "Philippine waters" is defined as

bodies of water, such as but not limited to, seas, gulfs, bays around, between
and connecting each of the Islands of the Philippine Archipelago, irrespective of
its depth, breadth, length or dimension, and all other waters belonging to the
Philippines by historic or legal title, including territorial sea, the sea-bed, the
insular shelves, and other submarine areas over which the Philippines has
sovereignty or jurisdiction. Thus, a river in a municipality is considered as part
of Philippine waters for purpose of piracy (People vs. Dela Pena, G.R. No. 219581,
January 31, 2018).
DIRECT ASSAULT – Simple assault (e.g., punching) upon an agent of a

person in authority (e.g., police officer) while engaged in the performance of duty
constitutes simple resistance and not direct assault because there is no intent to
defy the law and its representative at all hazard, which is an element thereof (U.S.
vs. Tabiana, G.R. No. 11847, February 1, 1918; U.S. vs. Agustin, G.R. No. 13083,
December 11, 1917; People vs. Lapitan, G.R. No. 38226, November 17, 1933).
But serious assault upon agent of a person in authority while engaged in the
performance of duty constitutes direct assault (U.S. vs. Cox, G.R. No. 1406,
January 6, 1904; U.S. vs. Samonte, G.R. No. 5649, September 6, 1910).
Simple assault (e.g., punching) upon a person in authority (e.g., mayor or

chief of police) while engaged in the performance of duty constitutes qualified
direct assault. The law does not distinguish between serious and simple “laying
of hands” upon a person in authority as a qualifying circumstance. Hence, a
simple laying of hands upon a person in authority constitutes qualified direct
assault. The Tabiana principle is only applicable if the victim is an agent of a
person in authority (U.S. vs. Gumban, G.R. No. 13658, November 9, 1918).
The accused, an America soldier, seized the complainant, a police officer,

by the throat, threw him to the ground, and struck him several blows with the
club which he succeeded in wresting from the policeman. He was convicted of
direct assault. (United States v. Cox, supra) Police officers including the
complainant rushed to stop the fight between groups of women. However,
accused, intoxicated, shouted at them, "Wala kayo pakialam sa akin, hindi aka
sasama sa inyo." She then grabbed complainant by the collar, slapped his cheek,
and kicked his legs several times. Complainant suffered minor injuries. The
accused was convicted of simple resistance although he was charged with direct
assault. Simple resistance is necessary included in the charge of direct assault
(Mallari vs. People, G.R. No. 224679, February 12, 2020, Justice Leonen)
If the person in authority or his agent is engaged in the actual performance

of duties at the time of the assault, the motive for the assault is immaterial. Direct
assault is committed even if the motive (such as non-payment of loan) was totally
foreign to victim’s official function (Sarcepuedes vs. People, G.R. No. L-3857,
October 22, 1951).
The phrase "on occasion of such performance" used in Article 148 of RPC
means "by reason of the past performance of official duty because the purpose of
the law is to allow them to discharge their duties without fear of being assaulted
by reason thereof (People vs. Renegado, G.R. No. L-27031, May 31, 1974).
Attacking a judge on the street by reason of past performance of duty (such as
citing the accused in contempt) constitutes qualified direct assault (U.S. vs. vs.
Garcia, G.R. No. 6820, October 16, 1911). But attacking a retired judge by reason
of past performance of duty is not direct assault since he is not a person in
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authority at the time of the assault. Note: The mandatory retirement age of a
judge is 70 year.
The status of lawyer as persons in authority remains even the assault is

committed outside the court room as long as it is perpetrated by reason of the
performance of their professional duties (Records of the Batasan, Volume Four,
1984-1985 of BP Blg. 873, which amended Article 152 of RPC).
Page 31 of 115
Attacking a third person who comes to the aid of a person in authority,

who is a victim of direct assault, is liable for direct assault upon an agent of a
person in authority. Attacking a third person who comes to the aid of an agent of
person in authority, who is a victim of direct assault, is liable for indirect direct
assault. Attacking a third person who comes to the aid of an agent of person in
authority, who is a victim of simple resistance, is liable for physical injuries.
Slapping and pushing a public-school teacher, a person in authority,

against a wall divider, while engaged in the performance of duty is direct assault.
Accused initiated her tirades against the teacher. The fact that the teacher
retaliated by similar verbal invectives against the accused, does not mean that
she as a person in authority already descended to the level of a private person. If
the victim suffered abortion, the offender is liable for complex crime of direct
assault with unintentional abortion since single act of assaulting a person in
authority constitutes two crimes. However, in this case, the prosecution failed to
prove that the proximate cause of the abortion is the commission of direct assault
since no doctor, who examined her, was not presented as witness to testify on
the causal connection between the two (Gelig vs. People, G.R. No. 173150 July
28, 2010).
Killing a mayor or police officer while in the performance of his duty

constitute a complex crime of direct assault with murder (People vs. Siega, G.R.
No. 213273, June 27, 2018) or homicide. (People vs. Pitulan, G.R. No. 226486,
January 22, 2020, Justice Leonen)
BRIBERY - Plaintiff gave money to the judge, who in consideration thereof

subsequently rendered an unjust decision in favor of the former. The judge is
liable of direct bribery (Mangulabnan vs. People, G.R. No. 236848, June 8, 2020)
and rendering unjust decision, while the plaintiff is liable of corruption of public
officer. But if the plaintiff gave money to the judge, who subsequently rendered
a decision against the former, the crime committed by the judge is indirect
bribery while the plaintiff is liable of corruption of public officer. The judge is not
liable of direct bribery since rendering a decision against the corruptor indicates
that the former did not receive the money in consideration of rendering a decision
in favor of the latter. It seems that the plaintiff merely gave the money to the
judge by reason of his position as such.
MURDER - The killing of a child is characterized by treachery

even if the manner of the assault is not shown in the Information, as the
weakness of the victim due to his tender age results in the absence of any danger
to the accused. Hence, the mere allegation of the victim's minority is sufficient
to qualify the crime to murder. (People vs. Enojo, G.R. No. 240231, November 27,
2019)
RAPE – There are two kinds of rape: (1) rape through sexual intercourse;
and (2) rape through sexual assault. However, the Supreme Court in People vs.
Tulugan, G.R. No. 227363, March 12, 2019 said that rape through sexual
intercourse should be called as “rape” while rape through sexual assault should
be called as “sexual assault.”
Rape, which is commonly denominated as “organ rape” or “penile rape,” is

committed by a man by having carnal knowledge with a woman. This is a gender
crime since the offender must be a man while the victim must be a woman.
On the other hand, there are three kinds of sexual assault, to wit: (1)
instrument or object sexual assault, which is committed by inserting an
Page 32 of 115
instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of another person; (2) sexual
assault through oral intercourse, which is committed by inserting his penis into
another person’s mouth; and (3) sexual assault through sodomy, which is
committed by inserting his penis into another person’s anal orifice. In sexual
assault, the gender of the offender and the victim is not material. That is why
this crime is called “gender-free sexual assault.” (see: People v. Soria, G.R. No.
179031, November 14, 2012) However, the modes (e.g., intimidation) or
circumstances (e.g., demented victim) in committing the crime and the qualifying
circumstances are the same whether the crime is rape or sexual assault.
It is already a settled rule that a finger or tongue is an instrument or object;

hence inserting a finger or tongue into genital orifice is sexual assault (People v.
Chingh, G.R. No. 178323, March 16, 2011; (People vs. Bonaagua, GR No. 188897,
June 6, 2011). However, Justice Leonen in his dissenting opinion in People v.
Caoili, G.R. No. 196342, August 8, 2017 said that nonconsensual insertion of a
finger in another's genitals is rape by carnal knowledge; the finger, when used in
a sexual act, is not an instrument or an object. It is as much a part of the human
body as a penis; When consensual, it can be used to give sexual pleasure. When
forced, it can be used to defile another's body; Equating the finger to a separate
instrument or object misunderstands the gravity of the offense.
Absorption rule - If the accused commits rape and acts of lasciviousness,

the latter is absorbed by the former (People vs. Dy, G.R. Nos. 115236-37, January
29, 2002). But the doctrine of absorption is not applicable to rape and sexual
assault. Inserting lighted cigarette into the genital orifice and anal orifice of the
victim and raping her constitutes two separate crimes of sexual assault and rape
(People vs. Crisostomo, GR No. 196435, January 29, 2014). Inserting the penis
into the mouth of the victim and into her genital orifice constitutes separate
crimes of sexual assault and rape (People vs. Espera, G.R. No. 202868, October
2, 2013; People vs. Dereco, G.R. No. 243625, December 2, 2020)
Withdrawal of consent - Where the woman consents, but then withdraws

her consent before penetration, and the act is accomplished by force, it is rape.
(People v. Butiong, G.R. No. 168932, October 19, 2011) But if the woman tacitly
consents to have sexual intercourse with the accused, but then withdraws
her consent in the course of sexual intercourse because she felt pain, and the act
is not rape. It would be unfair to convict a man of rape committed against a
woman who, after giving him the impression thru her unexplainable silence of
her tacit consent and allowing him to have sexual contact with her, changed her
mind in the middle and charged him with rape (People vs. Tionloc, G.R. No.
212193, February 15, 2017).
Stealthing - Where a woman offers to allow a man to have intercourse

with her on certain conditions and he refuses to comply with the conditions, but
accomplishes the act without her consent, he is guilty of rape. (People v. Butiong,
supra)
Stealthing is the removal of condom by the man during sex without consent
of the woman. In Germany, stealthing is a crime, which is different and distinct
from rape. In sum, stealthing under German Law is not within the contemplation
of the word “rape.”
In our country, there is no crime of stealthing in the book of statutes.

Moreover, stealthing is not equivalent to rape since lack of consent as an element
of this crime pertains to sex and not to the removal of the condom. Nullum crimen,
nulla poena sine lege. However, if the woman expressly and categorically required
Page 33 of 115
the use of condom as a condition to sex, and made it clear that she would not
give her consent to a sexual intercourse without a condom, stealthing may
constitute fraudulent machination, which is a mode of committing rape. But
absolute lack of consent must be shown to make the man liable for rape through
fraudulent machination. If the woman failed to resist the continued sex, or
register a strong objection upon knowing that the man already removed the
condom from his penis, rape must be ruled out. Rape is a serious crime
punishable by reclusion perpetua. Hence, the acts committed by the accused
must be clearly within the contemplation of the statute on rape; otherwise, he
must be acquitted of rape based on the pro reo principle.
Tenacious resistance - Among the amendments of the law on rape

introduced under RA No. 8353 is Section 266-D, which provides “Any physical
overt act manifesting resistance against the act of rape in any degree from the
offended party, or where the offended party is so situated as to render her/him
incapable of giving valid consent, may be accepted as evidence in the prosecution
rape” (People vs. Sabadlab, G.R. No. 175924, March 14, 2012). The legislators
agreed that Article 266-D is intended to soften the jurisprudence on tenacious
resistance (People vs. Dulay, G.R. Nos. 144344-68, July 23, 2002). Indeed, failure
to offer tenacious resistance does not make the submission by the victim to the
criminal acts of the accused voluntary. What is necessary is that the force
employed against her be sufficient to consummate the purpose which he has in
mind (People vs. Olesco, G.R. No. 174861 April 11, 2011; People vs. Nachor, G.R.
No. 177779, December 14, 2010). It is not necessary for the victim to sustain
physical injuries. She need not kick, bite, hit or scratch the offender with her
fingernails to prove that she had been defensive (People vs. Torres, G.R. No.
134766, January 16, 2004). Well-settled is the rule that where the victim is
threatened with bodily injury, as when the rapist is armed with a deadly weapon,
such as a pistol, knife, ice pick or bolo, such constitutes intimidation sufficient
to bring the victim to submission to the lustful desires of the rapist (G.R. No.
176740 June 22, 2011, People v. Dumadag).
Resistance against sexual advance may establish lack of consent. Hence,

rape is committed. On the other hand, lack of resistance may sometimes imply
consent. However, that is not always the case. While it may imply consent, there
are circumstances that may render a person unable to express her resistance to
another's sexual advances. Thus, when a person has carnal knowledge with
another person who does not show any resistance, it does not always mean that
that person consented to such act. Lack of resistance does not negate rape.
(People vs. Ibanez, G.R. No. 231984, July 6, 2020)
Intimidated person and retarded person - If the information alleged force,

threat, or intimidation without averment of any mental disability on the part of
the victim, the accused can still be convicted provided that sexual congress and
mental incapacity, i.e. the incapacity to give consent, are proven by clear and
convincing evidence (People vs. Quintos, G.R. No. 199402, November 12, 2014;
Justice Leonen; People vs. Gilles, G.R. No. 229860, March 21, 2018). Having
sexual intercourse with a mentally retarded person is equivalent to having sexual
intercourse with a person through intimidation. If the Information alleged
intimidation as a mode of raping the victim, but the evidence merely proves her
mental retardation, the accused can be convicted of rape through intimidation.
(People v. Balatazo, G.R. No. 118027, January 29, 2004)
Person deprived of reason and demented person - There are two victims
in rape with mentally disability, to wit: (1) persons deprived of reason; and (2)
demented person. The concept of the terms “deprived of reason” is comprehensive
Page 34 of 115
since it includes demented or insane person and mentally retarded person. On

the other hand, the term "demented" is confined to insane person. If the victim
is insane, the accused can be charged with rape of person deprived of reason or
demented person. If the victim is mentally retarded, the accused should be
charged with rape of a person deprived of reason (People vs. Eleuterio, G.R. No.
219957, April 4, 2018) or statutory rape of a person under 12 years of age (People
v. Daniega, G.R. No. 212201, June 28, 2017).
Retarded person and demented person - Describing a mentally retarded

person in the information as demented is improper. A mentally retarded person
is not insane or demented. However, describing the victim in the information as
a "mentally defective woman” (People vs. Martinez, G.R. No. 226394, March 7,
2018), or “a demented person whose mental age is below 7 years old” (People v.
Caoile, G.R. No. 203041, June 5, 2013) is sufficient compliance with the
constitutional mandate that an accused be informed of the nature of the charge
against him.
If the Information alleged the victim of rape is demented, but the evidence
merely proves her mental retardation, the accused cannot be convicted of rape
unless the accused failed to raise the mistake in the Information as an objection
(People v. Ventura, Sr., G.R. No. 205230, March 12, 2014; People vs. Eleuterio,
G.R. No. 219957, April 04, 2018)
Deaf-mute - Information alleged that accused had sexual intercourse with

the complainant, who suffered physical defect (hearing impaired) against her will.
The Information does not validly charge the crime of rape or any offense at all.
Surely, being a deaf-mute does not necessarily take the place of the element of
force or intimidation or having been deprived of reason, unconscious, or
demented. (People vs. Cubay, G.R. No. 224597, July 29, 2019)
Qualifying circumstance - If the relationship between the accused and

the victim of rape is uncle and niece, the Information must allege that the
offender is “a relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree”
because there are niece-uncle relationships which are beyond the third civil
degree. However, a sister-brother relationship is obviously in the second civil
degree. Consequently, it is not necessary that the Information should specifically
state that the accused is a relative by consanguinity within the third civil degree
of the victim (People vs. Ceredon, G.R. No. 167179, January 28, 2008).
Assuming that accused and victim had a romantic relation, carnal

knowledge with victim, even if consensual, would amount to rape due to her
mental disability. Knowledge victim's mental retardation is not an element for the
charge of rape. However, knowledge of her mental condition is important for
purposes of qualifying the charge of rape. (People vs. Martinez, G.R. No. 226394,
March 7, 2018)
Knowledge of the mental disability of the victim is not an element of rape

(People vs. Caoile, GR No. 203041, June 5, 2013) but it is an ingredient of the
qualifying circumstance of mental disability, which must be alleged in the
information (People vs. Obogne, GR No. 199740, March 24, 2014; People vs.
Lascano, G.R. No. 192180, March 21, 2012; People v. Madeo, G.R. No. 176070
October 2, 2009)
Relationship or minority alone is not enough to qualify rape. In qualified

rape, there must be a concurrence of relationship and minority. Relationship
includes the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity in order to qualify rape.
Page 35 of 115
In this case, the accused is the cousin of the victim's father. Their relationship is
fifth degree. Hence, the crime is only simple rape. (People vs. XXX, G.R. No.
232308, October 7, 2020)
In qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship in rape and

special aggravating circumstance in sexual abuse under RA No. 7610, the
Page 36 of 115
guardian must be a person who has legal relationship with his ward. He must
be legally appointed was first (People vs. Flores G.R. No. 188315, August 25,
2010).
The accused and victim have step-relationship if the former and mother of
the latter is married; without marriage, their relationship is common-law. If the
information alleged that the accused is the step-father of the victim, but the
evidence shows he is the common law husband of her mother there being no
marriage certificate presented, the qualifying circumstance of relationship and
minority cannot be appreciated in rape. (People vs. Tuyor, G.R. No. 241780,
October 12, 2020; People vs. XXX, G.R. No. 240441, December 04, 2019)
Marital rape - Husband can be held liable for marital rape. Article 266-A
of RPC uses the term “man” in defining rape without regard to the rapist’s legal
relationship with his victim. Under Article 266-C of RPC, in case it is the legal
husband who is the offender, the subsequent forgiveness by the wife as the
offended party shall extinguish the criminal action. RA No. 8353 has eradicated
the archaic notion that marital rape cannot exist because a husband has
absolute proprietary rights over his wife’s body and thus her consent to every act
of sexual intimacy with him is always obligatory or at least, presumed (People vs.
Jumawan, G.R. No. 187495, April 21, 2014).
Maria Clara rule - The Maria Clara or women’s honor doctrine is a

standard used by the court in assessing the credibility of a rape victim. Under
this principle, women of decent repute, especially Filipinos, would not publicly
admit that she has been sexually abused, unless that is the truth, for it is her
natural instinct to protect her honor. However, the factual setting in 1960 when
the “women’s honor” doctrine surfaced in our jurisprudence is that it is natural
for a woman to be reluctant in disclosing a sexual assault. However, the women
today have over the years transformed into a strong and confidently intelligent
and beautiful person, willing to fight for her rights. Thus, in assessing the
credibility of a rape victim, the Maria Clara standard should not be used. The
testimony of the victim must be evaluated without gender bias or cultural
misconception. It is important to weed out the Maria Clara notions because an
accused may be convicted solely on the testimony of the victim. (People v.
Amarela, G.R. Nos. 225642-43, January 17, 2018)
In People vs. Perez, G.R. No. 201414, April 18, 2018, and People vs. ZZZ,
G.R. No. 229209, February 12, 2020, the Supreme Court through Justice
Leonen affirmed the Amarela principle, which abandoned the Maria Clara
principle. Justice Leonen also cited the Amarela principle in People vs. Tulugan.
For purpose of the 2021 Bar Exam, it is advisable that the Amarela principle
should be followed.
Non-decriminalization of acts of lasciviousness - Under Article 336 of

the Revised Penal Code, acts of lasciviousness is committed by any person upon
other persons of either sex, under any of the circumstances mentioned in the
preceding article. The words “preceding article” in Article 336 pertains to Article
335 on old version of rape. According to Justice Leonen, Section 4 of RA No.
8353 (the Anti-Rape Law) expressly repealed Article 335 of the Revised Code on
rape. Since the circumstances under which acts of lasciviousness is committed,
are sourced from a repealed Article 335 of the Code, Article 336 of the Code on
acts of lasciviousness has been rendered incomplete and ineffective by RA No.
8353.
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The opinion of Justice Leonen is not a controlling rule. Several cases

rendered by the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of the accused for acts of
lasciviousness. In other words, RA No. 8353 did not decriminalize acts of
lasciviousness on the basis of prevailing jurisprudence. According to the
Supreme Court in People vs. Tulugan, G.R. No. 227363, March 12, 2019, it is
erroneous to claim that acts of lasciviousness can no longer be prosecuted under
the Revised Penal Code. The decriminalization of acts of lasciviousness, as per
Justice Leonen's theory, would not sufficiently be supplanted by RA No.
7610 and RA No. 9262. Section 4 of RA No. 8353 did not expressly repeal Article
336 of the Code; it only states that Article 336 of the Code inconsistent with or
contrary to the provisions thereof are deemed amended, modified or repealed,
accordingly. There is nothing inconsistent between the provisions of Article 336
of the Code, and RA No. 8353, except some acts of lasciviousness (e.g. sodomy)
are now punishable as sexual assault. Article 336 of the Code is still a good law
despite the enactment of RA No. 8353 for there is no irreconcilable inconsistency
between their provisions. When the lascivious act does not constitute rape or
sexual assault under RA No. 8353, then Article 336 of the Code on acts of
lasciviousness is applicable.
Variance rule - If the crime charged is rape, but the crime proven is acts
of lasciviousness, the accused will be convicted of the latter because of the
variance rule. Acts of lasciviousness is a lesser crime, which is necessarily
included in the charge of rape.
If the crime charged is rape, but the crime proven is sexual assault, the
accused cannot be convicted of the latter. The variance rule is not applicable
since sexual assault is not necessarily included in the charge of rape. The
elements of these two crimes are materially and substantially different. (People
vs. Dereco, G.R. No. 243625, December 02, 2020) In such case, the accused will
be convicted of acts of lasciviousness (People vs. Pareja, GR No. 202122, January
15, 2014; People vs. Caoili, G.R. No. 196342, August 08, 2017); or acts of
lasciviousness under RPC in relation to RA No. 7610 (People vs. Dagsa, G.R. No.
219889, January 29, 2018); or lascivious conduct under RA No. 7610 (People vs.
ZZZ, G.R. No. 224584, September 04, 2019). Acts of lasciviousness or lascivious
conduct is necessarily included in the charge of rape.
If the crime charged is acts of lasciviousness, but the crime proven is

sexual assault, he will be convicted of the lesser crime of acts of lasciviousness.
Sexual assault is a crime undoubtedly greater than acts of lasciviousness. While
it is true that the crime of acts of lasciviousness is necessarily included in the
crime of sexual assault, the crime of sexual assault however is not subsumed in
the crime of acts of lasciviousness. (People vs. Jagdon, Jr., G.R. No. 242882,
September 09, 2020)
If the information alleged the elements of both sexual assault and rape,
and the crime proven is sexual assault, the accused can be convicted of sexual
assault. In People vs. Fruelda, G.R. No. 242690, September 3, 2020, AAA
testified that while accused was moving his finger in and out of her private part
through the opening of her pants' zipper, he took out his penis and massaged
the same. Shortly thereafter, AAA lost consciousness. When she woke up, she
was seated on the floor with her underwear and pants pulled down to her knees.
Based on the foregoing, the crime committed by accused is sexual assault.
Although it is possible that accused had carnal knowledge of AAA while the latter
was unconscious, he cannot be convicted of the crime of rape by carnal
knowledge based on a mere possibility. Note: In this case, the information alleged
the elements of sexual assault and rape.
Page 38 of 115
Double jeopardy - The Regional Trial Court convicted the accused of

attempted rape. Finding that there is no intent to have sex, the Court of Appeals
modified the decision of the lower court and downgraded the conviction to acts
of lasciviousness. By convicting the accused of acts of lasciviousness, the Court
of Appeals technically acquitted the accused of attempted rape, which is already
final and unappealable. Thus, double jeopardy has already set in and Solicitor
General is already barred from assailing his acquittal of attempted rape. (People
vs. Arcega, G.R. No. 237489, August 27, 2020) In sum, the Supreme Court
cannot upgrade the conviction from acts of lasciviousness to attempted rape if
the petition for review was filed by the people through the Office of the Solicitor
General.
The Regional Trial Court convicted the accused of sexual assault with the
qualifying circumstance that the victim is under 7 years old. Finding lack of
insertion of the finger of the accused into the vagina of the victim, the Court of
Appeals downgraded the conviction to attempted qualified sexual assault, and
sentenced him to suffer a maximum penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision
correccional. Finding lack of intent to insert his finger into her vagina, the
Supreme Court convicted the accused of acts of lasciviousness under RA No.
7610 and sentenced the accused to suffer a maximum penalty of 15 years, 6
months and 20 days of reclusion temporal (Lutap vs. People, G.R. No. 204061,
February 5, 2018) Since the penalty for acts of lasciviousness under RA No. 7610
is higher than that for attempted qualified sexual assault, the Supreme Court in
effect upgraded the conviction of the accused. In sum, the Supreme Court can
upgrade the conviction if the petition for review was filed by the accused.
Accused should not appeal for the shake of appealing. If the accused
through his counsel appealed his case or filed a petition for review, he is waiving
his right against double jeopardy and exposing himself to a possible upgrading
of his conviction. In the case of Lutap, the Supreme Court increases the penalty
from a probationable penalty of prision correccional to a non-probationable
penalty of reclusion temporal.
DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY - Failure to judicially charge within the

prescribed period renders the public officer effecting the arrest liable for the crime
of delay in the delivery of detained persons under Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code. If the warrantless arrest was without any legal ground, the arresting
officers become liable for arbitrary detention under Article 124. However, if the
arresting officers are not among those whose official duty gives them the authority
to arrest, they become liable for illegal detention under Article 267 or 268. If the
arrest is for the purpose of delivering the person arrested to the proper
authorities, but it is done without any reasonable ground or any of the
circumstances for a valid warrantless arrest, the arresting persons become liable
for unlawful arrest under Article 269. (Duropan vs. People, G.R. No. 230825, June
10, 2020, Justice Leonen)
Offender in arbitrary detention and illegal detention - Arbitrary

detention is committed by a public officer, who has the authority to arrest and
detain a person. Thus, a police officer, judge or mayor can commit arbitrary
detention. On the other hand, illegal detention is committed by private individual.
A public officer (e.g., stenographer) who has no authority to arrest or detain a
person, is a private individual for purpose of illegal detention since he committed
the act in his private capacity. (Duropan vs. People, G.R. No. 230825, June 10,
2020, Justice Leonen) But although a public officer (e.g., police officer) has the
authority to arrest and detain a person, he can be considered as a private
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individual for purpose of illegal detention if the crime is committed in his private
capacity. (People v. Santiano, G.R. No. 123979, December 3, 1998)
The accused can be held liable for arbitrary detention if the following
circumstances concur (1) he is a public officer, who has the authority to arrest
or detain a person; (2) he committed the act in his official capacity; (3) the mind
of the accused police officer is to investigate or prosecute the victim for being a
criminal suspect; and (4) the arrest was made without legal grounds in violation
of the constitutional right of the suspect against unreasonable seizure. If the
mind of the police officer is to kill or kidnap the criminal suspect for ransom, he
is not liable for arbitrary detention. Detention will be treated has having been
committed in his private capacity.
The element of “in pursuit of his duty to arrest” in arbitrary detention is

present if the purpose of the arrest is: (1) To deliver the suspect to judicial
authority (U.S. v. Gellada, G.R. No. L-5151, January 31, 1910); (2)To conduct
criminal investigation (U.S. v. Agravante, G.R. No. 3947, January 28, 1908); or
(3) To determine if the victim committed a crime. (U.S. v. Hawchaw, G.R. No. L-
6909, February 20, 1912)
Thus, a police officers, who detained a suspected drug trafficker and

demanded ransom payment, committed the criminal act in their private capacity.
(People v. Gonzalez, Jr., G.R. No. 192233, February 17, 2016) Detaining any
private person for the purpose of extorting any amount of money could not, in
any way, be construed as within their official functions of police officers. Their
badges or shields do not give them immunity for any criminal act. (People vs.
Popionco, G.R. No. 200512, June 07, 2017, Justice Leonen) Hence, they are
liable for kidnapping for ransom and not arbitrary detention. Even the
subsequent prosecution of the kidnapped victim for sale of dangerous drugs does
not negate the criminal liability of the accused for the crime the latter committed
against the former. (People vs. Borja, G.R. No. 199710, August 02, 2017, Justice
Leonen).
In People v. PO1 Trestiza, G.R. No. 193833, November 16, 2011, the public
prosecutor filed a motion to withdraw information for kidnapping before the trial
court and filed a new one for robbery. According to the public prosecutor, the
accused, a police officer, cannot be charged with kidnapping because the crime
may only be committed by private individuals. The trial court denied the motion
to withdraw. It examined the Pre Operation/Coordination Sheet presented by the
defense and found that it was neither authenticated nor its signatories presented
in court. The defense failed to show proof of a "legitimate police operation" and,
based on Santiano, the accused were deemed to have acted in a private capacity
in detaining the victims. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of the police
officers for kidnapping.
In People v. Santiano, G.R. No. 123979, December 3, 1998, it was held that
the fact that they are police officers would not exempt them from the criminal
liability for kidnapping instead of arbitrary detention. Taking the prisoner to a
secluded place for purposes of detaining and maltreating him constitutes
kidnapping and serious illegal detention qualified by the circumstance of serious
physical injuries. Arbitrary detention is not committed since the accused did not
commit the act in furtherance of official function or in the pursuit of authority
vested in them. In sum, they committed the act in their purely private capacity.
In Osorio v. Navera, G.R. No. 223272, February 26, 2018 (Justice Leonen),
it was held that it is not impossible for a public officer to be charged with and be
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convicted of kidnapping as Santiano and Trestiza illustrated. Thus, a soldier, who

abducted a UP student and detained her at military camps, barangay hall and a
resort or safehouse, can be charged with kidnapping and serious illegal
detention. The civil court and not military court has jurisdiction over the case
since this crime is not service connected. Kidnapping should never be part of the
functions of a soldier. It cannot be done in a soldier's official capacity.
Other view: In People vs. Dongail, G.R. No. 217972, February 17, 2020,
accused, policemen taken the victims, who were the subject of surveillance for
alleged involvement in the illegal drug trade. The victims were brought of various
motels and interrogated them before finishing them off. It was held: The victims
were detained for fifteen days before getting killed. Hence, when the three were
abducted and placed in the custody of accused, the felony of arbitrary detention
had already been consummated. The elements of arbitrary detention were
present because accused were police officers who deprived the three victims of
liberty on a mere surveillance and without legal grounds. Thereafter, when they
were boxed, kicked, pistol-whipped and ultimately shot at a close range, while
being handcuffed and without means to defend themselves, another separate
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crime of murder was committed. Therefore, a conviction for the separate crimes
of arbitrary detention and murder was in order.
Dongail case is not compatible with Trestiza case, Santiano case, Osorio
case. If the principle in Trestiza, Santiano, and Osorio was followed in the Dongail
case, the accused should have been charged and convicted of special complex
crime of kidnapping with murder.
ARREST – Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he

may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. It is "an actual
restraint of a person to be arrested, or by his submission to the custody of the
person making the arrest. There need not be an actual restraint for curtailment
of liberty to be characterized as an "arrest. Although denominated as requests,
invitations from high-ranking officials to a hearing in a military camp were
deemed arrests. (Duropan vs. People, supra, Justice Leonen)
Arrest and invitation - Although denominated as requests, invitations

from high-ranking officials to a hearing in a military camp were deemed arrests.
This Court characterized them as authoritative commands which may not be
reasonably expected to be defied. (Sanchez vs. Demetriou, G.R. Nos. 111771-77
November 9, 1993)
When the accused is in an environment made hostile by the presence and

actuations of law enforcers where it can be reasonably inferred that they had no
choice except to willingly go with them, then there is an arrest. The subjective
view of the accused will be relevant—which includes among others—their station
in life and degree of education. (Duropan vs. People, supra, Justice Leonen)
In People v. Milado, G.R. No. 147677, December 1, 2003, accused was

carrying bricks of marijuana in his backpack aboard a jeepney. Acting upon an
information that there was a person transporting marijuana in the jeepney, the
police officers set up a checkpoint. In the checkpoint, the police identified
accused and told him to stay inside the jeepney. They subsequently brought him
to the police station, where they ordered him to open his bag where the marijuana
was kept. Although no "formal arrest" had yet been made, it is clear that
appellant had already been deprived of his liberty and taken into custody after
the policemen told him to stay inside the jeepney and instructed the driver to
drive them to the police station. The term "invited" may have been used by the
police, but it was obviously a command coming from three law enforcers who
appellant could hardly be expected to defy.
An arrest although described as a mere invitation to the police station, can

be a source of unlawful arrest or arbitrary detention.
Arrest with legal grounds - If a person arrested another person with legal
ground, he is not committing a crime since the apprehension is made in
accordance with Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Arrest without legal grounds - Intent to deliver a person to judicial

authority is established if the offender brought him to the police station for
investigation. In other words, arresting a person or arresting in the form of
invitation is an evidence that the offender has the intention to make a judicial
delivery of the arrestee. If the offender, arrested a person without legal grounds,
the crime of illegal detention should be ruled out. The act of conducting the
apprehended persons to the proper authorities takes the offense out of the crime
of illegal detention. (Duropan vs. People, G.R. No. 230825, June 10, 2020,
Page 42 of 115
Justice Leonen) However, the person, who arrested the suspect without legal
grounds, is liable for arbitrary detention or unlawful arrest.
If the offender is a public officer with authority to arrest and detain a

person, the crime committed is arbitrary detention. (U.S. v. Gellada, G.R. No. L-
5151, January 31, 1910; U.S. v. Agravante, G.R. No. 3947, January 28, 1908) If
the offender is a private individual or a public officer without authority to arrest
and detain a person, the crime committed is unlawful arrest.
In US vs. Fontanilla, G.R. No. 4580, September 7, 1908, accused found

complainant, and several laborers tilling his land. One of the complainants
insisted that the land was his brother's. A fight ensued, which ended when
accused captured and tied complainants with a rope. He then brought them to
the municipal jail. It was held that the fact that the accused, after he had
apprehended the complainants, immediately conducted them to the municipal
jail, and thus turned them over to the authorities, takes the offense out of that
provision on illegal detention and brings it within the purview of provision on
unlawful arrest.
In Duropan vs. People, supra, (Justice Leonen), Accused were barangay

kagawad and barangay tanod. Complainants are members of Alimango
cooperative, which is authorized to develop, utilize, and protect a mangrove-nipa
area. Its members cut, gather, and weave nipa palms. Accused saw complainants
harvesting nipa palm and asked them who gave authority to harvest. Pacis, one
of the complainants, replied that they were Alimango members. The accused
arrested them and brought them to Police Station. They are liable for unlawful
arrest. Barangay kagawad and barangay tanod are person in authority and agent
of a person in authority, respectively. They are not the public officers whose official
duty is to arrest or detain persons. They arrested complainants without legal
grounds. Upon hearing a reasonable explanation as to why Pacis was harvesting
the nipa leaves, accused had no reason to suspect any wrongdoing. Accused
knew Pacis and are familiar with ALIMANGO. Since it was easy to verify if he was
indeed a member of the group, prudence dictated that they first investigate. Had
it turned out that he was not a member, a warrant of arrest could have been
obtained as they witnessed the commission of the crime.
FALSIFICATION – Commercial documents such as promissory note and

check are, in general, documents or instruments which are "used by merchants
or businessmen to promote or facilitate trade or credit transactions (Tanenggee
vs. People, G.R. No. 179448 June 26, 2013).
Falsification of a public document is consummated upon the execution of

the false document. What is punished in falsification of public document is
principally the undermining of the public faith and the destruction of truth as
solemnly proclaimed therein. The fact that accused did not benefit from, or that
the public was not prejudiced by the falsified resolution is not a defense (Goma
vs. CA, G.R. No. 168437, January 08, 2009).
Making it to appear - In Constantino vs. People, G.R. No. 225696, April

08, 2019, Justice Leonen accused, a notary public, was charged of falsification
of document by making it appear that Dr. Asuncion participated in execution of
the acknowledgement of the will and testament by signing it as a witness, where
in fact he did not sign it. However, it was established that DR. Asuncion at the
urging of Ferrer, his son-in-law, signed the acknowledgement after the
notarization. Therefore, it was not accused who made it appear that Dr. Asuncion
participated in the execution of the Joint Acknowledgment, but Ferrer and Dr.
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Asuncion himself. Accused is not liable for falsification of document. However,

accused should be administratively sanctioned for failure to cross out Dr.
Asuncion's name when he notarized the Joint Acknowledgment, which has
allowed Dr. Asuncion to still sign the document despite not having participated
in its due execution.
Alteration - The local chief executive may veto the ordinance and submit
his objections to the sanggunian. However, the accused, a mayor, neither
approved nor vetoed the ordinance. He intervened in the process by changing the
wordings of the whereas clause of the municipal ordinance. This is falsification
of document by making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document
which changes its meaning. (Tadena vs. People, G.R. No. 228610, March 20,
2019)
Untruthful statement - Accused, a public officer, issued Temporary

Operating Permit to his own son, and made an untruthful statement on the
birthday of his son to make it appear that his son is of legal age. Accused insists
on his plea that he had no malicious or wrongful intent to injure a third person.
He was convicted of falsification of public document. Intent to gain or intent to
injure is not an element of the crime of falsification of public document. Thus,
lack of intent to gain or injure is not a valid defense. (Liwanag vs. People, G.R.
No. 205260, July 29, 2019)
Prosecution need not identify a specific law under which the accused has
the obligation to disclose the truth. To convict the accused for falsification of
document involving making an untruthful statement, what is important is that
he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth. In Manansala vs. People, G.R. No.
215424, December 9, 2015, the accused made an untruthful statement in petty
cash replenishment report of a private corporation. The accused was convicted
of falsification of private document because he has a legal obligation to disclose
the truth in a report.
Notary public - The element that “the notary public takes advantage of his
official position” is presumed when the falsity allegedly committed by him
pertains to the notarization, since only notaries public have the duty and
authority to notarize documents. (Constantino vs. People, G.R. No. 225696, April
Bank officer - If the accused is an employee or officer of the bank other

than the president, e.g., bank manager, and he made a fictitious loan by falsifying
loan application, check and other commercial document, he is liable for complex
crime of estafa by means of false pretense through falsification of commercial
documents. (Tanenggee v. People, G.R. No. 179448, June 26, 2013)
If the accused is a president of the bank, and he made a fictitious loan by

falsifying loan applications and other commercial documents, he could be held
liable either for (1) complex crime of estafa by means of false pretense through
falsification of commercial documents; or (2) complex crime of estafa by
misappropriation through falsification of commercial documents.
In Soriano vs. People, G.R. No. 240458, January 8, 2020, the bank
president made fictitious loans by falsifying loan applications and other
commercial documents. The accused used the proceeds thereof for his personal
benefit. He falsified commercial documents by making it appear that a fictitious
borrower is securing loan from the bank. He used these falsified documents to
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defraud the bank to release the money. He is liable for complex crime of estafa
by means of false pretense through falsification of commercial documents.
In People v. Go, G.R. No. 191015, August 6, 2014, the bank president made
fictitious loans by falsifying loan applications and other commercial documents.
The accused used the proceeds thereof for his personal benefit. The bank
president has obligation to administer the bank fund in a fiduciary capacity. The
bank is still the owner of the money despite the transfer thereof to the accused.
By using the money to pay his creditors, he committed estafa through
misappropriation. Since falsification of commercial documents is a necessary
means to misappropriate the money, he was convicted of a complex crime of
estafa by misappropriation through falsification of commercial documents.
Estafa through falsification of document - When the offender commits

on a public, official or commercial document any of the acts of falsification
enumerated in Article 171 as a necessary means to commit another crime like
estafa, theft or malversation, the two crimes form a complex crime proper
(Tanenggee vs. People, G.R. No. 179448 June 26, 2013; Arias vs. People, G.R.
Nos. 237106-07, June 10, 2019)
Assistant Director of the Bureau of Equipment of DPWH, falsified official

documents to defraud the DPWH into paying the claims for fictitious emergency
repairs or purchase of spare parts. Malversation is not committed since the
accused is not an accountable officer. Falsification of document is a necessary
means to commit estafa through false pretense since the accused used the
falsified official documents to defraud DPWH. Accused is liable for complex crime
of estafa through falsification of public document. (Arias vs. People, G.R. Nos.
237106-07, June 10, 2019)
The falsification of a public, official, or commercial document may be a

means of committing estafa, because before the falsified document is actually
utilized to defraud another, the crime of falsification has already been
consummated, damage or intent to cause damage not being an element of the
crime of falsification of public, official or commercial document. In other words,
the crime of falsification has already existed. Actually, utilizing that falsified
public, official or commercial document to defraud another is estafa. But the
damage is caused by the commission of estafa, not by the falsification of the
document. Therefore, the falsification of the public, official or commercial
document is only a necessary means to commit estafa (Tanenggee vs. People,
G.R. No. 179448 June 26, 2013; People v. Go, G.R. No. 191015, August 6, 2014;
Dela Cruz vs. People, G.R. No. 236807, January 12, 2021)
In complex crime of estafa through falsification of a commercial, public or

official document, before the falsified document is actually used to defraud the
victim, the crime of falsification has already been consummated since damage or
intent to cause damage not being an element of the crime of falsification of public,
official or commercial document. In other words, the crime of falsification has
already existed. Using that falsified public, official or commercial document to
defraud another is estafa. But the damage is caused by the commission of estafa,
not by the falsification of the document. (Desmoparan vs. People, GR. No.
233598, March 27, 2019)
FALSIFICATION AND OTHER CRIMES – If the offender committed

falsification of document and other crimes, the following rules should be
observed:
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1. Complex crime - When falsification of public, official or commercial

document is a necessary means to commit malversation (People vs. Barbas, G.R.
No. L-41265, July 27, 1934), estafa (Ilumin vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 85667,
February 23, 1995; Intestate Estate of Gonzales vs. People, G.R. No. 181409,
February 11, 2010; Ambito vs. People, G.R. No. 127327, February 13, 2009,
Tanenggee vs. People, G.R. No. 179448, June 26, 2013) or theft (People vs.
Salonga, G.R. No. 131131, June 21, 2001), offender is liable for a complex crime
under Article 48 of RPC.
2. Separate crimes – When falsification of public, official or commercial

document is not a necessary means to commit other crimes, this is not a complex
crime. Thus, when falsification of public, official or commercial document is a
merely a means to conceal malversation (People vs. Sendaydiego, G.R. Nos. L-
33252-54, January 20, 1978; People vs. Villanueva, G.R. No. 39047, October 31,
1933), estafa (People vs. Monteverde, G.R. No. 139610, August 12, 2002; People
vs. Benito, G.R. No. 36979, November 23, 1932) or theft, the crimes are separate.
3. Common element doctrine – Under the common element doctrine, the

use of damage as an element of falsification of private document precludes the
re-use thereof to complete the elements of estafa, and vice versa.
Damage is an element of estafa; damage is also an element of falsification

of private document; hence, the comment element principle is applicable since
damage is a common element of both crimes. Damage is an element of estafa;
however, damage is not an element of falsification of public, official or commercial
document; hence, the comment element principle is not applicable since damage
is not a common element of both crimes. Damage is an element of falsification of
private document; however, damage is not an element of malversation; hence,
the comment element principle is not appliable since damage is not a common
element of both crimes. In sum, common element doctrine is only applicable if
the crimes committed are falsification of private document and estafa.
In Zoleta v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 185224, July 29, 2015, the Governor
caused the falsification of private letter requesting for financial assistance. He
was able to use this falsified private document to release public funds to a
fictitious beneficiary. Applying Article 48, since falsification of private document
is a necessary means to commit malversation, he is liable for complex crime of
malversation through falsification of private document. Note: The Supreme Court
did not apply common element doctrine since damage is not an element of
malversation.
If the common element principle is applicable, the accused is liable for

falsification of private document or estafa. When falsification of private document
is a necessary means to commit estafa, the crime committed is falsification.
When falsification of private document is not a means to commit estafa, the crime
committed is estafa. (People vs. Co, G.R. No. 233015, October 16, 2019)
If the falsification of a private document (demand letter, letter of guarantee,

payroll of private company or billing statement) is committed as a means to
commit estafa, the crime committed is falsification only. Under the common
element doctrine, the use of damage as an element in falsification of private
document precludes the re-use thereof to complete the elements of estafa. Hence,
estafa is not committed because the element of damage is not present. There is
no complex crime of estafa through falsification of private document. (Batulanon
vs. People, G.R. No. 139857, September 15, 2006; U.S. vs Chan Tiao, G.R. No.
Page 46 of 115
12609, October 30, 1917; People vs. Reyes, G.R. No. L-34516, November 10,
1931; People vs. Co, G.R. No. 233015, October 16, 2019)
If a person commits falsification of private document (e.g., unofficial

receipt) to conceal estafa, the crime is estafa only. Under the common element
doctrine, the use of damage as an element in estafa precludes the re-use thereof
to complete the elements of falsification. Hence, estafa is not committed because
the element of damage is not present (See: People vs. Beng, 40 O.G. 1913).
USE OF FALSIFIED DOCUMENT - The crime of use of falsified document,

the person who used the forged document is different from the one who falsified
it. If the one who used the falsified document is the same person who falsified it,
the crime is only falsification and the use of the same is not a separate crime.
Falsification of a public document and use of false document by the same person
who falsified it constitute but a single crime of falsification. (Jayme vs. People,
G.R. No. 248827, August 27, 2020)
MALVERSATION - For purpose of malversation, national officer shall be

considered as an accountable officer if he has custody or control of public
property by reason of the duties of his office (Government Auditing Code of the
Philippines). The Local Government Code expanded the concept of accountable
local officer. Local officer shall be considered as an accountable officer if he has
possession or custody of local government funds because of the nature of their
functions such a treasure or has participated in the use or application of thereof.
All public officials whose signatures were necessary for disbursement of funds
are accountable officers.
The signatures of Vice-Governor and Provincial Accountant are needed to

disburse funds of local government. Hence, they are accountable officers. (Zoleta
vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 185224, July 29, 2015) The management and audit
analyst of the province certified that the supporting documents were complete,
the provincial treasurer certified the availability of funds and approved the
disbursement, and the Governor signed them before a check could be approved
for disbursement. Hence, they are accountable officers. (Escobar vs. People, G.R.
No. 205576, November 20, 2017, Justice Leonen) A mayor, whose signature is
needed to disburse municipal funds, is an accountable officer. (Manuel vs. Hon.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 158413, February 08, 2012)
Under Government Auditing Code of the Philippines, a management and

audit analyst of the province, whose duty is to certify that the supporting
documents for the disbursement of funds are complete is not an accountable
officer because he has no custody or control of the provincial fund. However,
under the Local Government Code, he is an accountable officer because he will
participate in the use or application of this fund.
In Escobar vs. People, G.R. No. 205576, November 20, 2017 (Justice
Leonen), the governor, treasurer, management and audit analyst, administrator,
board member and executive assistant are charged with malversation through
falsification of documents (disbursement voucher and supporting documents e.g.
request for financial assistance). The governor, treasurer and management and
audit analyst are accountable officers since they participated in the
disbursement of public funds. On the other hand, administrator, board member
and executive assistant are not accountable officers. If there is conspiracy
between the accountable officers and non-accountable officers, they are liable for
complex crime of malversation through falsification of documents. However, in
this case there is no conspiracy. The accountable officers (governor, treasurer,
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management and audit analyst) were not aware that the beneficiary of financial
assistance is fictitious. Hence, they are liable for malversation through negligence
since they participated in disbursement of funds without verifying the
authenticity of the documents despite the fact that the payee in the voucher is
different from the one who requested financial assistance. They are not liable for
falsification of documents since they are not aware that the supporting
documents are falsified. The administrator, board member and executive
assistant are not liable for malversation since they are not accountable officers.
However, they are liable for complex crime of estafa through falsification of
documents. They falsified documents (request letter and project proposal) in
support of the disbursement of funds as a necessary means to defraud the
Province. Although they are charged with malversation through falsification of
documents, they can be convicted of estafa through falsification of document
because the latter is necessarily included in the former.
Malversation is committed either intentionally or by negligence. The dolo or

the culpa is only a modality in the perpetration of the felony. Even if the mode
charged differs from the mode proved, the same offense of malversation is still
committed. (Mesina vs. People, G.R. No. 162489, June 17, 2015) A possible
exception would be when the mode of commission alleged in the particulars of
the indictment is so far removed from the ultimate categorization of the crime
that it may be said that due process was denied by deluding the accused into an
erroneous comprehension of the charge against him or her. Here, the said
exception is not present. Accused was not prejudiced nor does it appear that she
failed to comprehend the crime charged against her. Thus, accused was not
deprived of due process. (Corpuz vs. People, G.R. No. 241383, June 08, 2020)
TUMULTUOUS AFFRAY - Physical injuries inflicted in a tumultuous affray

is committed by person or persons identified as responsible for using violence
upon a participant of a tumultuous affray, who suffered serious or less serious
physical injuries committed by an unidentified person in the course thereof.
(Article 252 of RPC)
The provision on physical injuries inflicted in tumultuous affray is an

evidentiary measure designed to remedy a situation where the participant
thereof, who inflicted serious or less serious physical injuries upon the victim,
was not identified because of the confusion. Since there is uncertainty on
whether the one, who employed violence against the victim, committed serious
or less serious physical injuries or merely slight physical injuries, the former will
be punished for physical injuries inflicted in a tumultuous affray with a penalty
lesser than that for serious or less serious physical injuries.
Failure to identify the offender who inflicted less serious physical injury upon
victim is an important element of physical injuries inflicted in a tumultuous
affray. If the accused is positively identified as a person, who inflict the injuries
on the victim, the former is not entitled to the lesser penalty prescribed for
physical injuries inflicted in a tumultuous affray. In such a case, there is no
confusion, which is the essence of tumultuous affray. Hence, accused is liable
for the graver crime of less serious physical injuries (Lacson vs. People, G.R. No.
243805, September 16, 2020)
ESTAFA – The return by the accused of money belonging to the private

complainant will not reverse a consummated act of Estafa. Quite the contrary,
such action may even uphold a conviction. Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court states that in criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses or
criminal negligence or those allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of
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compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied admission

of guilt. In this case, Arriola's initial attempts to reimburse Del Rosario through
checks, coupled with the actual return of the latter's money after the RTC issued
its judgment of conviction, may all be considered as unequivocal gestures to
compromise and which can be measured against Arriola as his implied admission
of guilt. (Arriola vs. People, G.R. No. 199975, February 24, 2020)
OTHER DECEIT - For one to be liable for “other deceits” under Article
318, it is required that the prosecution must prove the following essential
elements: (a) false pretense, fraudulent act or pretense other than those
enumerated in Articles 315, 316, and 317; (b) such false pretense, fraudulent
act or pretense must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud; and (c) as a result, the offended party suffered damage
or prejudice. It is essential that such false statement or fraudulent
representation constitutes the very cause or the only motive for the private
complainant to part with her property. (Guinhawa v. People, G.R. No. 162822,
August 25, 2005)
Article 318 includes any kind of conceivable deceit other than those
enumerated in Articles 315 to 317 of the Revised Penal Code. It is intended as
the catchall provision for that purpose with its broad scope and intendment.
(Guinhawa v. People, ibid.) In estafa under Article 315, the false representation is
committed by using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power,
influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary
transactions, or by means of other similar deceits. Following the principle of
ejusdem generis, other deceit as a means to commit estafa must be similar to
pretending to possess power, imaginary transaction etc. If the deceit is not similar
to pretending to possess power or imaginary transaction, the crime committed is
other deceit under Article 318.
In Guinhawa v. People, supra, fraudulent representation of the seller that

the van to be sold is brand new constitutes other deceit under Article 318. On
the other hand, in People v. Rubaton, C.A., 65 O.G. 5048, issue of May 19, 1969,
false representation that accused has a palay by reason of which the victim
parted his money in consideration of the palay constitutes estafa under Article
315. Unlike in the Guinhawa case, the transaction in Rubaton case is imaginary.
In Osorio vs. People, G.R. No. 207711, July 02, 2018 (Justice Leonen),
Accused as an agent of Philam Life was authorized to solicit money for investment
purposes. However, he misrepresented to private complainant that the latter's
money would be invested in Philam Life Fund Management and that its proceeds
may be utilized to pay for private complainant's insurance premiums. Private
complainant parted with her funds because of the representation that her
investment's earnings would be conveniently channeled to the payment of her
insurance premiums. The false representations committed by accused is not
within the contemplation of the words “other similar deceits" in Article 315 of
RPC on estafa estafa. Same as the case of Guinhawa, the misrepresentation is
not similar to imaginary transaction. However, he is criminally liable for the crime
of other deceit under Article 318 of RPC. Article 318 is broad in scope intended
to cover all other kinds of deceit not falling under Articles 315, 316, and 317.
Hypothetically, if the accused is not an agent of Philam Life, but he falsely

represented himself as agent, he is liable for estafa since the investment
transaction is imaginary.
Page 49 of 115
THEFT – A tenant is entitled to the products of the land he or she

cultivates. The landowner's share in the produce depends on the agreement
between the parties. Hence, the harvesting done by the tenant is with the
landowner's consent. The existence of the DARAB Decision adjudicating the issue
of tenancy between accused and complainant negates the existence of the
element that the taking was done without the owner's consent. The DARAB
Decision implies that accused had legitimate authority to harvest the abaca. The
prosecution, therefore, failed to establish all the elements of theft. (Ligtas vs.
People, G.R. No. 200751, August 17, 2015, Justice Leonen)
Value of the stolen property - The value of jewelry is not a matter of

public knowledge nor is it capable of unquestionable demonstration and in the
absence of receipts or any other competent evidence besides the self-serving
valuation (P1 million) made by the complainant, the courts may either apply the
lowest penalty under Article 309 or fix the value of the property taken based on
the attendant circumstances of the case. In this case, the court imposed the
lowest penalty (People vs. Mejares, G.R. No. 225735, January 10, 2018, Justice
Leonen).
Domestic servant - The rationale for the imposition of a higher penalty

against a domestic servant is the fact that in the commission of the crime, the
helper will essentially gravely abuse the trust and confidence reposed upon her
by her employer. After accepting and allowing the helper to be a member of the
household, thus entrusting upon such person the protection and safekeeping of
the employer's loved ones and properties, a subsequent betrayal of that trust is
so repulsive as to warrant the necessity of imposing a higher penalty to deter the
commission of such wrongful acts. (People vs. Mejares, G.R. No. 225735, January
THEFT AND ROBBERY - Snatching of the shoulder bag without violence

or intimidation constitutes the crime of theft, not robbery. For the requisite of
violence to obtain in cases of simple robbery, the victim must have sustained less
serious physical injuries or slight physical injuries in the occasion of the robbery.
The fact that the necklace was "grabbed" did not automatically mean that force
attended the taking. (Del Rosario vs. People, G.R. No. 235739, July 22, 2019)
THEFT AND ESTAFA THROUGH MISAPPROPRIATION –

Misappropriation of property may constitute theft or estafa depending upon the
character of the possession.
Physical possession - If the accused received the property with the

consent of the owner but he merely acquired physical possession in doing so,
misappropriation shall be considered as taking without consent; hence, the crime
committed is theft (U.S. v. De Vera, G.R. No. L-16961, September 19, 1921) or
qualified theft (People v. Tanchanco, G.R. No. 177761 April 18, 2012).
A franchise holder must personally operate the motor vehicle. That is the
reason why government regulation prohibits operator of motor vehicle from
leasing it. In the eye of the law the driver of taxi or passenger jeepney under
boundary arrangement was only an employee of the owner rather than a lessee.
For being an employee, his possession of the jeepney is physical (People v. Isaac
G.R. No. L-7561, April 30, 1955), and thus, misappropriation thereof is
carnapping (People vs. Bustinera, G. R. No. 148233, June 8, 2004).
Legal possession - If the accused received the property with the consent
of the owner and he acquired legal possession in doing so by virtue of trust,
Page 50 of 115
commission, administration or obligation involving the duty to make delivery or

return such as lease, deposit, commodatum, or quasi-contract, misappropriation
shall be considered as estafa through conversion or misappropriation (Chua-Burce
vs. CA, G.R. No. 109595, April 27, 2000; D’Aigle vs. People, G.R. No. 174181, June
27, 2012).
Employee - As a rule, the possession of the employee such as bank teller,

collector or cash custodian is only physical. Hence, misappropriation of property
is qualified theft. Abuse of confidence is present since the property is accessible
to the employee (Chua-Burce vs. CA, G.R. No. 109595, April 27, 2000; People vs.
Tanchanco, G.R. No. 177761 April 18, 2012; People vs. Santos, G.R. No. 237982,
October 14, 2020). However, if the employee is an officer of the company with
discretion on how to use property or fund of the company to further its interest,
his possession is juridical; hence, misappropriation thereof is estafa. Thus, the
following officers are liable for estafa for misappropriating company property: a.
A bank president who held the money in trust or administration for the bank in
his fiduciary capacity with discretion on how to administer such fund (People vs. Go,
G.R. No. 191015, August 6, 2014); b. A corporate treasurer who received the
money for safe-keeping and administration (U.S. vs. Sevilla, G.R. No. 18056,
March 16, 1922; c. A corporate officer with discretion option on how to use
bending machine without the participation of the corporation (D’Aigle vs. People,
G.R. No. 174181, June 27, 2012). However, in Remo vs. Devanadera, G.R. No.
192925, December 9, 2016, the Supreme Court ruled that the directors of a
corporation have no juridical possession over the corporate funds.
Partner - Misappropriation by the industrial partner of the share of the

capitalist partner (People vs. Clemente, CA, 65 OG 6892) or the partnership fund
to be used in buying and selling mango (People vs. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 21732,
September 3, 1924) is estafa. Theft is not committed (US vs. Reyes, G.R. No.
2867, September 11, 1906) because possession of the industrial partner over the
same is juridical (People vs. Tan Tay Cuan, CA, 57 OG 6964).
In US vs. Clarin, G.R. No. 5840, September 17, 1910, four individuals
entered into a contract of partnership for the business of buying and selling
mangoes. When one of the partners demanded from the other three the return of
his monetary contribution, the Supreme Court ruled that "the action that lies
with the capitalist partner for the recovery of his money is not a criminal action
for estafa, but a civil one arising from the partnership contract for a liquidation
of the partnership and a levy on its assets, if there should be any. Simply put, if
a partner demands his money back, the duty to return the contribution does not
devolve on the other partners; the duty now belongs to the partnership itself as
a separate and distinct personality.
In 1997, a case with circumstances similar to the Clarin case was decided
differently. In Liwanag v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114398 October 24, 1997,
three individuals entered into a contract of partnership for the business of buying
and selling cigarettes. They agreed that one would contribute money to buy the
cigarettes while the other two would act as agents in selling. When the capitalist
partner demanded from the industrial partners her monetary contribution
because they stopped informing her of business updates, this time, this Court
held the industrial partners liable for estafa.
In Orbe vs. Miaral, G.R. No. 217777, August 16, 2017, the Supreme Court
ruled that said the OCP erred gravely when it dismissed the case based on
the Clarin case, which has already been superseded by Liwanag case. Liwanag
applies to the partnership agreement executed between petitioner and
Page 51 of 115
respondent. Petitioner's initial contributions were all for specific purposes: for
the buying and selling of garments and for the salaries of the factory workers,
respectively. When respondent failed to account for these amounts or to return
these amounts to petitioner upon demand, there is probable cause to hold that
respondent misappropriated the amounts and had not used them for their
intended purposes. The Information for estafa should thus proceed. Even
assuming that a contract of partnership was indeed entered into by and between
the parties, when money or property had been received by a partner for a specific
purpose and he later misappropriated it, such partner is guilty of estafa.
Ownership - If the accused received the property with the consent of the
owner and he acquired ownership in doing so by virtue of a contract such as sale,
mutuum or loan, failure to perform obligation under such contract is neither
theft nor estafa since the same is purely civil in character (People vs. Montemayor,
G.R. No. L-17449, August 30, 1962).
In Ibanez vs. People, G.R. No. 198932, October 09, 2019, With the
transaction entered into by the parties being a sale, the accused as the vendee
did not receive the property subject of the sale in trust or under an obligation to
return. The parties' agreement to transfer the title upon payment of the purchase
price rather placed the accused in the position of an owner and made him liable
to the transferor as a debtor for the agreed price; he was not merely an agent who
must account for the proceeds of a resale. The failure on the part of the accused
to pay the consideration in full only resulted to the complainants being unpaid
vendors. The former did not thereby incur criminal liability for estafa, for the
right of the complainants as unpaid vendors was only to demand the fulfilment
or the cancellation of the obligation.
Seller failed to return advance payment to the buyer after having incurred
delay in the performance of obligation under a contract of sale. The seller cannot
be held liable for estafa through misappropriation. In estafa through
misappropriation, the offender must have the obligation to return the very
property that he received. The seller acquired ownership over the money received
as advance payment. In case of failure to perform obligation under a sale contact,
the seller has no obligation to return to the buyer the very moneys with the same
serial numbers received as advance payment. In returning the advance payment,
the seller can use moneys with different serial numbers. Hence, his obligation to
return the advance payment is merely civil in character. (People vs. Salazar, G.R.
No. 149472, August 18, 2004) The Salazar case involved estafa through
misappropriation. Hence, the accused cannot use the Salazar principle in a case
involving estafa through false pretense. In this case, accused misrepresented
that he is authorized to sell a land owned by Candelaria (a third person) to the
complainant, where in fact he is not authorized. He was convicted of estafa
through false pretense. (Arriola vs. People, G.R. No. 199975, February 24, 2020)
Variance rule - In Chua-Burce vs. CA, G.R. No. 109595, April 27, 2000,
Reside vs. People, G.R. No. 210318, July 28, 2020, and Linunao vs. People, G.R.
No. 194359, September 02, 2020, accused are charged in the information with
estafa through misappropriation. However, the crime proven by evidence is
qualified theft since the accused in these three cases are employee, whose
possession over the money of his employer is merely physical. Thus, the accused
cannot be held liable for estafa through misappropriation because juridical
possession, which is an indispensable element thereof, is lacking.
The facts in these three cases are the same. In these cases, the Supreme
Court acquitted the accused of estafa. But their treatments on convicting the
Page 52 of 115
accused for theft are different. In Chua-Burce case, the accused was not held
liable for qualified theft. In sum, the Court did not apply the variance rule.
However, in Reside case, the Supreme Court applied the variance rule and
convicted the accused of qualified theft. It was held it is proper to hold accused
guilty of qualified theft because the latter crime was necessarily included in the
crime charged in the information. Qualifying circumstance of abuse of
confidence, which is alleged in the information, was appreciated. In Linunao case,
the accused was convicted of simple theft since the Information filed against her
sufficiently alleged all the elements of theft. Qualifying circumstance of abuse of
confidence was not appreciated since the same was not alleged in the
information.
In my submission, the Chua-Burce case is the correct principle. In these

three cases, their respective informations do not allege “taking without consent
of the owner,” which is an indispensable element of theft. Hence, it is improper
to convict the accused of theft, simple or qualified. Moreover, People vs. Balerta,
G.R. No. 205144, November 26, 2014, and People vs. Benabaye, G.R. No. 203466,
February 25, 2015, the Supreme Court re-affirmed the Chua-Burce principle.
Since in Reside case and Linunao case, the Supreme Court is not sitting En Banc,
it cannot abandon the Chua-Burce case, Balerta case and Benabaye case.
However, for purpose of the 2021 Bar Examination, since Reside case and
Linunao case are recent Supreme Court decisions, it is advisable to follow these
cases.
CATTLE RUSTLING - Not all of the elements of cattle-rustling were proven

by the prosecution. The carabao transported by accused was not sufficiently
proven to be the same carabao owned by complainants. Complainant’s
description of the carabao is too generic. He did not mention any distinguishing
mark on the carabao that accused allegedly stole. In other cases involving cattle-
rustling, the identity of the stolen cattle was proven with certainty because of
distinguishing marks on the cattle. (Lopez vs. People, G.R. No. 212186, June 29,
2016, Justice Leonen)
SYNDICATED ESTAFA - The elements of syndicated estafa under P.D. No.

1689 are: 1. Estafa or other forms of swindling under Articles 315 to 318 of RPCis
committed; 2. It is committed by a syndicate of five or more persons; and 3.
Defraudation results in the misappropriation of moneys contributed by
stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperative, “samahang nayon,” or
farmers’ associations, or of funds solicited by corporations/associations from the
general public. (People v. Tibayan, G.R. Nos. 209655-60, January 14, 2015)
Syndicate - A syndicate is defined as consisting of five or more persons

formed with the intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal act, transaction,
enterprise or scheme. In illegal recruitment, trafficking in person and child
pornography, a syndicate is only composed of at least three offenders. In
syndicated/organized crime group, a syndicate is composed of at least two
offenders.
In order for any group to be considered a syndicate under P.D. No. 1689,
the perpetrators of an estafa must not only be comprised of at least five
individuals but must have also used the association that they formed or managed
to defraud its own stockholders, members or depositors. (Home Development
Mutual Fund vs. Sagun, G.R. No. 205698, July 31, 2018)
Page 53 of 115
The swindling syndicate used the association that they manage to defraud
the general public of funds contributed to the association. Indeed, PD No. 1689
speaks of a syndicate formed with the intention of carrying out the unlawful
scheme for the misappropriation of the money contributed by the members of the
association. In other words, only those who formed or manage associations that
receive contributions from the general public who misappropriated the
contributions can commit syndicated estafa. (Home Development Mutual Fund
vs. Sagun, supra)
There are three requisites to consider a group of swindlers as a syndicate

under PD No. 1689: 1. They must be at least five in number; 2. They must have
formed or managed a rural bank, cooperative, "samahang nayon," farmer's
association or any other corporation or association that solicits funds from the
general public; 3. They formed or managed such association with the intention of
carrying out an unlawful or illegal act, transaction, enterprise or scheme i.e., they
used the very association that they formed or managed as the means to defraud
its own stockholders, members and depositors. (Home Development Mutual Fund
vs. Sagun, supra)
In Home Development Mutual Fund vs. Sagun, supra, there are only four
officers of Globe Asiatique charged for syndicated estafa. The fifth respondent,
which will complete the requirement of at least five swindlers in syndicated
estafa, is Atty. Alvarez. However, Atty. Alvarez was officer of HDMF whose only
connection with Globe Asiatique was by reason of his having rendered notarial
services for the latter. Since Atty. Alvarez was not related to Globe Asiatique
either by employment or by ownership, he could not be considered as part of the
syndicate supposedly formed or managed to defraud its stockholders, members,
depositors or the public. Hence, respondents should not have been charged with
syndicated estafa. Justice Leonen dissented to the view of the majority.
Funds Solicited from the General Public - The fact that the entity involved
was not a rural bank, cooperative, samahang nayon or farmers’ association does
not take the case out of the coverage of P.D. No. 1689. The law applies to other
corporations or associations operating on funds solicited from the general public.
(People v. Balasa, G.R. No. 106357, September 3, 1998) Thus, the entity can be a
commercial bank. (Galvez v. Hon. CA, G.R. No. 187919, February 20, 2013)
If the money misappropriated is not solicited from the general public, the
crime committed is simple estafa under the Revised Penal Code. (Hao v. People,
supra)
There are three parties involved in syndicated estafa, to wit: (1) the
corporation or association; (2) general public such as stockholders and members
of the association; they are the victims and (3) the owners and members of the
association, who used such association to defraud the general public; they are
the offenders. The association or corporation can neither be a victim nor the
offender in syndicated estafa. The association is just an instrument used by the
offenders to defraud the victim. A bank cannot charge its employees with
syndicated estafa for misappropriating its money. (Galvez v. Hon. CA, supra) The
crime committed by a bank employee or officer is estafa or theft depending upon
the nature of their position.
In Home Development Mutual Fund vs. Sagun, G.R. No. 205698, July 31,
2018, based on evidence, GLOBE ASIATIQUE (GA) allegedly recruited "special
buyers," who are not members of Pag-ibig. For a fee, these “special buyers” would
apply membership in Pag-ibig, and then, they would obtain housing loans from
Page 54 of 115
Pag-Ibig but they will not occupy the housing units involved. Then GA will sell
the units to real buyers, who would assume the balance on the loan of the
"special buyer." Because of this complex scheme involving fraudulent buyers, a
huge amount of money was transferred from the coffers of the Pag-ibig fund by
HDMF, and released to the GA. Officers of GA including Delfin Lee were charged
of syndicated estafa. In this crime, it must be established that GA solicited funds
from the general public and at least five swindlers used GA to defraud its
members or stockholders. However, in this case, GA did not solicit funds from
the general public. The HDMF, the complainant, was not itself a stockholder or
member of GA. It was the HDMF itself, not GA, that had solicited (Pag-ibig) funds
from its members. The funds supposedly misappropriated did not belong to GA's
stockholders or members, or to the general public, but to the HDMF. Thus,
respondents did commit syndicated estafa. However, they should be charged with
simple estafa.
Swindling may fall within the ambit of P.D. No. 1689 if it is

committed through an association. On the other hand, estafa is committed
regardless of the number of the accused when: (a) the entity soliciting funds from
the general public is the victim and not the means through which the estafa is
committed, or (b) the offenders are not owners or employees who used the
association to perpetrate the crime. (Home Development Mutual Fund vs. Sagun,
supra)
MALICIOUS MISCHIEF - Assuming that accused owned the property in

controversy, he and his co-accused were not justified in summarily destroying
the improvements built thereon by complainant. They unlawfully took the law
into their own hands when they surreptitiously entered complainant's enclosed
lot and destroyed its fence and foundation. Evidently, accuseds' actions were
made out of hatred, revenge or evil motive. They were convicted of malicious
mischief (Grana vs. People, G.R. No. 202111, November 25, 2019)
ARSON – Destructive arson is characterized as heinous crime; while simple

arson under PD No. 1613 is a crime manifesting a lesser degree of perversity.
Simple arson contemplates the malicious burning of property not included in
Article 320 of the RPC (People vs. Macabando, GR No. 188708, July 31, 2013).
Burning of inhabited house or dwelling or personal property is simple arson
under Section 3 of P.D. No. 1613 because it is not included in Article 320 of RPC.
Intent to kill - If the main objective is to kill the victim in a building, and
fire is resorted to as the means to accomplish such goal, the crime committed
is murder only. Murder qualified by means of fire absorbs arson since the latter
is an inherent means to commit the former (People vs. Cedenio, G.R. No. 93485,
June 27, 1994). Single act of burning the building to kill two persons constitutes
compound crime of double murders (People vs. Gaffud, G.R. No. 168050,
September 19, 2008; People vs. Mercado, G.R. No. 218702, October 17, 2018)
One has deliberately set fire to a building is presumed to have intended to

burn the building (People vs. De Leon, G. R. No. 180762, March 4, 2009). Since
intent to burn is presumed, intent to kill must be established beyond reasonable
doubt. Failure to show intent to kill, the accused shall be convicted of arson with
qualifying circumstance of resulting death and not murder (People vs. Baluntong,
G.R. No. 182061, March 15, 2010).
Intent to burn - If the main objective is to burn the building, but death
results by reason or on the occasion of arson, the crime is arson with qualifying
circumstance of resulting death (People vs. Enriquez, G.R. No. 248372, August
Page 55 of 115
27, 2020). The resulting homicide is absorbed (People vs. Villacorta, G.R. No.
172468, October 15, 2008) since it will be considered as a modificatory
circumstance.
In People v. Villacorta, G.R. No. 172468, October 15, 2008 and People v.
Jugueta, G.R. No. 202124, April 5, 2016, the Supreme Court described arson with
the qualifying circumstance of resulting death as special complex crime of arson
with homicide. However, People vs. Dolendo, G.R. No. 223098, June 3, 2019, the
Supreme Court said that the Court of Appeals correctly modified appellant's
conviction from arson with homicide to simple arson conformably with prevailing
jurisprudence.
For purpose of the bar examination, if the accused burned burning the
building without intent to kill, and as a consequence, death results, the crime
should be designated as simple arson under PD No. 1613 (Dolendo case) or
destructive arson under the Revised Penal Code with the qualifying circumstance
of resulting death (Abayon case)
Intent to conceal - If the objective is to kill, and in fact the offender has
already done so, and arson is resorted to as a means to cover up the killing, the
offender may be convicted of two separate crimes of either homicide or murder,
and arson (People vs. Cedenio, G.R. No. 93485, June 27, 1994).
BIGAMY – Declaration of nullity of the first marriage is not a defense in

bigamy. After the consummation of bigamy, subsequent declaration of nullity of
the first marriage is not a defense since it is not a mode of extinguishing criminal
liability listed in Article 89 (Jarillo vs. People, GR No. 164435, September 29,
2009). To avoid criminal liability, the declaration of nullity of the first marriage
must be made previous to the consummation of bigamy, which is required by
Article 40 of the Family Code that provides: The absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void. A declaration of the absolute
nullity of the first marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action
or a ground for defense in bigamy (People vs. Teves, G.R. No. 188775, August 24,
2011).
In Vitangcol vs. People, G.R. No. 207406, January 13, 2016 (Justice
Leonen), aAs early as 1968, this court held in Landicho v. Relova that parties to
a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only
competent courts having such authority; prior to such declaration of nullity, the
validity of the first marriage is beyond question; a party who contracts a second
marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. The commission
that drafted the Family Code considered the Landicho ruling in wording Article
40 of the Family Code: which provides that the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Should the requirement of
judicial declaration of nullity be removed as an element of the crime of bigamy,
Article 349 of Revised Penal Code becomes useless. All that an adventurous
bigamist has to do is to contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy
charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is void and that the subsequent
marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the
first.
Declaration of nullity of the second marriage is not a defense in bigamy.

After the consummation of bigamy, subsequent declaration of nullity of the
Page 56 of 115
second marriage is not a defense since it is not a mode of extinguishing criminal

liability listed in Article 89 (Jarillo vs. People, GR No. 164435, September 29,
2009). To make declaration of nullity of second marriage after the consummation
of the crime of bigamy as a defense would render the State’s penal laws on bigamy
completely nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each
marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape liability for
bigamy. (Tenebro vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150758, February
18, 2004) Note: Article 40 of the Family Code is not applicable if what is involved
is declaration of nullity of the second marriage.
In Sarto vs. People, G.R. No. 206284, February 28, 2018, in a bigamy case,
accused alleged that complainant, his wife, acquired Canadian citizenship,
obtained a divorce, and thereafter, remarried. By raising divorce, it is incumbent
upon the accused to show that it was validly obtained in accordance with
complainant's national law (e.g. Canadian law) prior to the celebration of the
second marriage. In this case, accused presented a certificate of divorce allegedly
issued by the registrar of the Supreme Court of British Columbia. The defense
was rejected. First, the divorce decree required to prove the fact of divorce is the
judgment itself as rendered by the foreign court and not a mere
certification. Second, assuming the certificate of divorce may be considered as
the divorce decree, it was not accompanied by a certification issued by the proper
Philippine diplomatic or consular officer stationed in Canada, as required under
Section 24 of Rule 132. Lastly, no copy of the alleged Canadian law was presented
by the defense. Thus, it could not be reasonably determined whether the subject
divorce decree was in accord with complainant's national law. Accused was
convicted of bigamy.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly

celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him/her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law. (par. 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code) This rule
includes cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the
marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as
a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise
be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage. (Republic v. Orbecido III, G.R. No. 154380, October
5, 2005) However, Orbecido case will not apply if there is no competent evidence
concerning naturalization of the alien spouse and the divorce decree, which
capacitated the alien spouse to remarry. (Sarto vs. People, supra)
ILLEGAL MARRIAGE – A priest, who performed a marriage ceremony

despite knowledge that the couple had no marriage license, is liable for illegal
marriage. The law sets the minimum requirements constituting a marriage
ceremony: first, there should be the personal appearance of the contracting
parties before a solemnizing officer; and second, their declaration in the presence
of not less than two witnesses that they take each other as husband and wife
(Ronulo vs. People, G.R. No. 182438, July 02, 2014).
LIBEL - In Manila Bulletin Publishing Corporation vs. Domingo, G.R. No.

170341, July 5, 2017, the accused published an article where he stated that
these national employees should be commended for bringing into the open this
garbage that has piled up in their own backyard. To Joe Con's successor, the
chopping board is ready. All you need is a Muslim kris! Palakulin mo, Pare ko!.
This is not libelous. On the first statement, accused is merely commending the
DTI employees who brought into the open their complaints against the private
complainant in this case, a DTI officer. This is a fair remark. The last three
Page 57 of 115
sentences merely meant that heads should roll at the DTI office, which does not
ascribe something deprecating against complainant. Moreover, the statement
does not refer to an ascertained or ascertainable person.
In Belen vs. People, G.R. No. 211120, February 13, 2017, accused filed a
motion for reconsideration of resolution dismissing a complaint for estafa with
irrelevant and defamatory statement against the investigating prosecutor was
filed with the OCP of San Pablo City and copy furnished to the respondent in the
estafa complaint, and the Office of the Secretary of Justice. Despite the fact that
the motion was contained in sealed envelopes, it is not unreasonable to expect
that persons other than the one defamed would be able to read the defamatory
statements in it. Hence, the element of publicity in libel is present.
In Belen vs. People, G.R. No. 211120, February 13, 2017, accused filed a
motion for reconsideration of resolution dismissing a complaint for estafa. The
accused alleged in the said motion the public prosecutor who dismissed the case
is corrupt, stupid, imbecile, mentally dishonest and bereft of intellectual ability.
This is not covered by the absolute privilege communication rule since the
defamatory allegations in the motion are not relevant to the issue of whether or
not the motion for reconsideration should be granted because there is probable
cause to charge the respondent in the preliminary investigation for estafa. In his
dissenting opinion, Justice Leonen expressed his view that libel ought to be
decriminalized; it is inconsistent with the constitutionally protected right to
freedom of speech; there is no state interest served in criminalizing libel; civil
actions for defamation are sufficient to address grievances without threatening
the public's fundamental right to free speech.
Before Article 360 of RPC was amended, the rule was that a criminal action
for libel may be instituted in any jurisdiction where the libelous article was
published or circulated, irrespective of where it was written or printed.
Experience had shown that under that old rule the offended party could harass
the accused in a libel case by laying the venue of the criminal action in a remote
or distant place. To forestall such harassment, RA No. 4363, which amended
RPC, lays down specific rules as to the venue of the criminal action so as to
prevent harassment arising from out-of-town libel suits. (People vs. Macasaet,
G.R. No. 196094, March 5, 2018) As a general rule, venue for libel is either
province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where
any of the offended parties actually resided at the time of the commission of the
offense. However, if the offended party is a public officer, there is a third optional
venue, and that is, province, city or Manila where he held office at the time of the
commission of the offense. In all cases, the criminal action shall be filed in the
Regional Trial Court.
Information alleged that publisher and writer of Malaya with address at

Port Area, Manila City defamed private complainant by writing and publishing a
defamatory article in the Malaya. The Port Area, Manila is the editorial and
business offices of Malaya. This is a compliance with the rule requiring allegation
in the information of the place where the alleged defamatory article was printed
and first published. The Information need not parrot the provisions of Article 360
of the RPC and expressly use the phrase "printed and first published." If there is
no dispute that the place of publication indicated in the Information is the place
where the alleged defamatory article was "printed and first published," then the
law is substantially complied with. After all, the filing of the Information before
an RTC of Manila would forestall any inclination to harass the accused. (People
vs. Macasaet, G.R. No. 196094, March 5, 2018)
Page 58 of 115
In De Leon v. People, G.R. No. 212623, January 11, 2016, complainant, a

policeman, pointed his gun at his jogging buddy, the accused. During the hearing
on administrative case, the accused stated “walang hiya, mangongotong na pulis,
yabang mo.” The statement is defamatory since it imputes to complainant the
crime of robbery. However, since the statement was made a mere product of an
emotional outburst because of the gun-pointing incident, the crime is only
classified as simple slander. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Leonen said the
accused's words could not be considered as having been driven by the intent to
ridicule or humiliate, but were a mere expression of his disappointment over
complainant’s actions as a police officer.
RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE – Two (2) prosecution witnesses testified that

they heard a thud, felt the jeepney tilt, and saw a man lying flat on the ground;
thus, they concluded that the jeepney petitioner was driving hit the man. Another
prosecution witness testified to hearing a loud thud and then hearing some
passengers inside a jeepney shout that someone got hit. The same witness also
testified that he saw a man lying on the ground near the jeepney. No one testified
as to the manner by which petitioner was driving before he supposedly hit
Jaquilmo, or of personally witnessing the jeepney hit Jaquilmo. The prosecution
was able to prove that Jaquilmo died on the bridge, but it failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that petitioner's imprudence in driving the jeepney was the
proximate cause of his death. (Valencia vs. People, G.R. No. 235573, November
09, 2020)
BP BLG. 22 – It is of no moment that the subject checks were issued as a

guarantee and upon the insistence of private complainant. What is significant is
that the accused had deliberately issued the checks in question to cover accounts
and those same checks were dishonored upon presentment, regardless of the
purpose for such issuance. The legislative intent behind the enactment of B.P.
22, as may be gathered from the statement of the bill's sponsor when then
Cabinet Bill No. 9 was introduced before the Batasan Pambansa, is to discourage
the issuance of bouncing checks, to prevent checks from becoming "useless
scraps of paper" and to restore respectability to checks, all without distinction as
to the purpose of the issuance of the checks. Said legislative intent is made all
the more certain when it is considered that while the original text of the bill had
contained a proviso excluding from the law's coverage a check issued as a mere
guarantee, the final version of the bill as approved and enacted deleted the
aforementioned qualifying proviso deliberately to make the enforcement of the
act more effective. It is, therefore, clear that the real intention of the framers of
B.P. 22 is to make the mere act of issuing a worthless check malum
prohibitum and, thus, punishable under such law. (Ongkingco vs. Sugiyama and
People, G.R. No. 217787, September 18, 2019)
What sets apart the crime of estafa from the other offense of this
nature (i.e., Batas Pambansa Bilang 22) is the element of deceit. To constitute
estafa, deceit must be the efficient cause of the defraudation, such that the
issuance of the check should be the means to obtain money or property from the
payer resulting to the latter's damage. In other words, the issuance of the check
must have been the inducement for the surrender by the party deceived of his
money or property. (Abalos vs. People, G.R. No. 221836, August 14, 2019)
There is no showing whatsoever that accused had knowledge of the

insufficiency of funds of the check he endorsed to private complainant.
Admittedly, the checks received by private complainant were checks issued and
paid to accused by a certain Ham. Upon notice that the subject checks were
dishonored, accused immediately searched for Ham but the same proved to be
Page 59 of 115
futile considering that the latter already left the country. The business
relationship between private complainant and accused is already 16-year, and
the former had the practice of accepting the checks of clients of the latter, even
if he did not personally know them. Thus, there is no need for the accused to
assure the complainant that the subject checks would be sufficiently funded
upon maturity before accepting the same. Clearly, private complainant was not
deceived to accept the subject checks but did so out of a standard procedure
which he and accused developed over the years. (Juaquico vs. People, G.R. No.
223998, March 05, 2018)
Page 60 of 115
CHILD ABUSE – As a general rule, in a case where the victim is a minor,

accused should not be charged with a felony such as grave threat or robbery with
rape in relation to RA No. 7610. If the information charged the accused with a
felony in relation to RA No. 7610, the court must delete the correlation. (People
vs. Bueza, G.R. No. 242513, November 18, 2020) Felonies and crimes under RA
No. 7610 are different and independent from each other. However, there are
occasions where a felony defined under Revised Penal Code is punishable by a
penalty prescribed by RA No. 7610. Section 5 and 10 of RA No. 7610 prescribe
penalties for: (1) acts of lasciviousness committed against a child exploited in
prostitution or other sexual abuse, who is under 12 years of age, and (2)
homicide, other intentional mutilation and serious physical injuries committed
against a child under 12 years of age. In such a case, correlation of RPC to RA
No. 7610 in charging the accused is allowed.
In Cruz vs. People, G.R. No. 216642, September 08, 2020, the accused
was convicted of homicide committed against a 9-year-old child. He was
sentenced to suffer a maximum penalty of 12 years and 1 day of reclusion
temporal. With due respect to the Supreme Court, under Section 10 of RA No.
7610, the penalty for homicide where the victim is under 12-years of age is
reclusion perpetua.
Section 10 (a) of RA No. 7610 is a "catch-all" provision which penalizes

other acts of child abuse not specifically addressed by other provisions of RA No.
7610 and the Revised Penal Code. (Talocod vs. People, G.R. No. 250671, October
07, 2020) This provision punishes four distinct acts, to wit: (a) child abuse, (b)
child cruelty, (c) child exploitation and (d) being responsible for conditions
prejudicial to the child's development. Accused can be convicted under Section
10 (a) if he commits any of the four acts therein. The prosecution need not prove
that the acts of child abuse, child cruelty and child exploitation have resulted in
the prejudice of the child because an act prejudicial to the development of the
child is different from the former acts. (Patulot vs. People, G.R. No. 235071,
January 7, 2019)
Physical injury – Child abuse (Section 10 of RA No. 7610) includes

maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child. Maltreatment includes
psychological and physical abuse (Section 3) or infliction of physical injury such
as lacerations, fractured bones, burns, internal injuries, severe injury or serious
bodily harm suffered by a child (Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and
Investigation of Child Abuse Cases) such as banging the heads of the minor
students by their teacher (De Ocampo v. The Hon. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No.
147932, January 25, 2006)
Child abuse includes disciplinary acts by the father such as belting,

pinching, and strangulating his 8-year-old child, which caused her to limb
(Lucido vs. People, G.R. No. 217764, August 7, 2017, Justice Leonen) or by
teacher such as slamming him on the floor which caused him to lost
consciousness (Rosaldes v. People, G.R. No. 173988, October 8, 2014). Intent to
discipline student is not a defense since Article 233 of the Family Code prohibits
the infliction of corporal punishment by teacher. (Rosaldes v. People, supra)
Degrading the dignity of the child – In Bongalon v. People, G.R. No.

169533, March 20, 2013, accused saw the victim and his companions hurting
his minor daughters. Angered, accused struck minor-victim at the back with his
hand and slapped his face. Since the accused committed the act at the spur of
the moment, they are perpetrated without intent to degrade the dignity of the
Page 61 of 115
victim. Without such intent, the crime committed is not child abuse under R.A.
No. 7610 but merely slight physical injuries.
In Jabalde v. People, G.R. No. 195224, June 15, 2016, the accused was
informed that her daughter's head was punctured, and whom she thought was
already dead. The accused slapped, struck, and choked a minor as a result of
the former's emotional rage. Absence of any intention to debase, degrade or
demean the dignity of the child victim, the accused's act was merely slight
physical injuries.
In Escolano vs. People, G.R. No. 226991, December 10, 2018,

complainants, who are minors, threw ketchup sachets against the daughter of
the accused. But it was the accused, who was hit by the sachets twice. Accused
exclaimed, "Putang ina ninyo, gago kayo, wala kayong pinag-aralan, wala kayong
utak, subukan ninyong bumaba dito, pakakawalan ko ang aso ko, pakakagat ko
kayo sa aso ko."
Uttering “putang ina” to the minors in the heat of anger is not child abuse.
The expression "putang ina mo" is a common enough utterance in the dialect that
is often employed, not really to slander but rather to express anger or
displeasure. In fact, more often, it is just an expletive that punctuates one’s
expression of profanity.
Threatening to release her dog to chase and bite the minors made in the
heat of anger is not child abuse. Accused merely intended that they stop their
rude behavior. Absence of any intention to degrade the dignity of minors, accused
is only liable for other light threats.
The statement "putang ina mo" and making hacking gestures with a bolo,
which are directed against the mother of two children, are not constitutive of
child abuse involving degrading the dignity of a child. Since the threatening acts
are not directed against the children, intent to degrade, debase or demean their
dignity is not established.
In Talocod vs. People, G.R. No. 250671, October 07, 2020, as his
playmates were bothering passing motorists by throwing sand and gravel on the
road, AAA (11-years of age) berated and told them to stop. Upset by AAA's
reprimand, one of the children, reported the incident to her mother, the accused.
The accused immediately confronted AAA about his behavior, and while pointing
a finger at the latter, furiously shouted: "Huwag mong pansinin yan. At putang
ina yan. Mga walang kwenta yan. Mana-mana lang yan!" Accused is not
criminally liable for child abuse. There is no showing that the utterance was
specifically intended to debase, degrade, or demean AAA's intrinsic worth and
dignity as a human being. To the contrary, it appears that accused's harsh
utterances were brought about by the spur of the moment, particularly, out of
her anger and annoyance at AAA's reprimand of her child.
In Bongalon case and Jabalde case, accused were convicted of slight

physical injuries instead of child abuse. In Escolano case, accused was convicted
of other light threat instead of child abuse. In Talocod case, accused was not held
liable for child abuse or any other crime.
In People vs. Javarez, G.R. No. 248729, September 03, 2020, accused, a
teacher, was not shown to have intended to debase, degrade, or demean BBB's
intrinsic worth and dignity as a human being. For while hitting BBB with a
broomstick is reprehensible, accused did so only to stop BBB and another
Page 62 of 115
classmate from fighting over pop rice. Thus, he is liable for slight physical
injuries, and not child abuse. As for AAA, records show that in his effort to stop
his two (2) other students from fighting over food during his afternoon class,
accused got to push AAA, one of the onlookers, as a result of which, AAA fell on
the floor with his face down. Surely, accused did not intend to maltreat nor
debase AAA's dignity as a human being. He was in all honesty simply trying to
stop his students from fighting. He cannot therefore be held liable of child abuse.
Neither is he liable for slight physical injuries. Accused as a teacher was merely
trying to stop two of his students from fighting over food during the class. AAA,
a mere onlooker, was not involved in the fight. There was no evidence showing
accused ever intended to harm him in any way. It was possible though that as
an onlooker, AAA stood too close to the protagonists such that when accused
stepped in to disengage the protagonists, necessarily AAA was also pushed back,
and as result, fell to the ground.
The Bongalon principle is inapplicable if the accused did not assault a child
in the heat of anger or as spontaneous reaction to his misbehavior. In Delos
Santos vs. People, G.R. No. 227581, January 15, 2020, AAA, a minor and
Daluro were on their way to her house when accused and his group confronted
them. Bob, brother of the accused, said "nag-iinit na ako," as he wanted to punch
Daluro. Bob attempted to hit Daluro with a rock, but AAA apologized to prevent
a commotion. Accused attempted to punch Daluro, but he dodged it and AAA
was hit on the right cheek instead. Bob punched AAA on the chest causing her
to hit a wall. AAA asked companions of accused to call her mother for help, but
Bob interrupted and said "tama lang yan sa inyo pagtripan dahil dinemanda n'yo
kami." Accused hurled invectives at AAA, who was calling her mother on her way
to her house with Daluro. The Supreme Court finds the Bongalon case
inapplicable and convicted the accused of child abuse. The accosting and laying
of hands are deliberately intended by accused and his group. The word
"pagtripan" signified an intention to debase or degrade that did not result from
an unexpected event. The acts of accused were offshoots of an intent to take
revenge arising from the conflict existing between his mother and AAA's mother.
Accused did not lose his self-control and the acts were not done at the spur of
the moment.
In Torres vs. People, G.R. No. 206627, January 18, 2017 (Justice Leonen),
in the middle of argument in a barangay conciliation proceeding, AAA suddenly
interjected that accused damaged his uncle’s multicab and accused him of
stealing his uncle’s fish nets. Accused told AAA not to pry in the affairs of adults.
He warned AAA that he would whip him if he did not stop. However, AAA refused
to keep silent and continued his accusation. Infuriated with AAA’s meddling,
accused whipped AAA on the neck using a wet t-shirt. Accused continued to hit
AAA causing the latter to fall down from the stairs. Whipping AAA on the neck
with a wet t-shirt is an act that debases, degrades, and demeans the intrinsic
worth and dignity of a child. It is a form of cruelty. Being smacked several times
in a public place is a humiliating and traumatizing experience for all persons
regardless of age. Accused, as an adult, should have exercised restraint and self-
control rather than retaliate against a 14-year-old child.
The Bongalon principle is inapplicable if the accused inflicted serious

physical injuries on a child. In Patulot vs. People, G.R. No. 235071, January 7,
2019, throwing boiling cooking oil, which directed against the mother of a baby
and 3-year-old child, which consequently burned the faces and skin of the
minors, is not constitutive of child abuse involving degrading the dignity of a
child. Since throwing boiling oil is not directed against the children, intent to
Page 63 of 115
degrade, debase or demean their dignity is not established. However, the accused
is still liable of child abuse involving infliction of serious physical injury.
Vasectomy – Doctor performed vasectomy on Larry, a mentally-retarded,

whose mental age is 8 years, with consent of his guardian. Complaint for child
abuse involving cruelty was filed against the doctor and the consenting guardian
since Larry for being a mentally retarded is not capable of giving consent to
vasectomy. Since the case was dismissed on technical ground, the Supreme
Court in Versoza vs. People, G.R. No. 184535, September 03, 2019 did not tackle
the issue on whether conducting vasectomy on a mentally retarded is a violation
of RA No. 7610. However, individual Justices presented their views on the matter.
According to Justice Leonen, the vasectomy on someone with cognitive

disability, without his' or her consent, is both an act of cruelty and an act
prejudicial to the person's' development. Larry's legal guardians, instead of
acting only for his best interests, substituted his consent with their own under
the guise of "protection." There were other options for Larry who, in time, could
have children of his own. But this was taken away from him by the people who
should have acted in Larry's best interest. To deprive him of all the options his
life had to offer is an act of cruelty. It was an act borne out of selfishness, not
love. It was not for them to conclude that Larry cannot become a parent or care
for someone other than himself.
However, Justice Coaguio opined that there is no shred of evidence offered

to show that the guardians and doctor were impelled by any ill-motive in
facilitating the vasectomy procedure. No specific intent to debase, degrade or
demean intrinsic worth Larry as a human being had been convincingly shown,
thereby negating respondents' criminal liability under Section 10(a) of RA 7610.
Justice Peralta agreed with this view. According to Justice Jardeleza, RA 7610
does not criminalize vasectomy. Justice Reyes stated that Larry's guardians have
the right to decide what is best for the child they took in and raised as their own;
and such decision is clothed with the presumption of good faith. The right of
parents or guardians to provide consent for medical procedures on behalf of
intellectually disabled persons who are unable to provide such consent is part
and parcel of their parental authority over their children or wards.
Child abuse includes neglect. Neglect may be typified as: (1) physical; (2)
educational; (3) emotional; and (4) medical. Physical neglect refers to the failure
to provide a child's basic needs, which consists of food, clothing, and shelter.
Educational neglect consists in the failure to ensure that the child receives proper
and adequate education. Emotional neglect is the failure to nurture by, among
others, ignoring or isolating the child. Medical neglect pertains to the failure to
provide proper healthcare to a child, as when, for instance, one ignores medical
recommendations.
Neglect has also been expanded to recognize environmental neglect and

supervisory neglect. Environmental neglect pertains to a situation where a child
is left in a hazardous or unclean location. Supervisory neglect refers to a situation
where a child is abandoned or left under the custody of an inappropriate
substitute. (Opinion of Justice Leonen; Versoza vs. People, G.R. No. 184535,
September 03, 2019)
SEXUAL ABUSE – Children in EPSOSA are those exploited in prostitution

or subject to other sexual abuse. (Concurring opinion of Justice Leonen in
People vs. Tulugan, G.R. No. 227363, March 12, 2019)
Page 64 of 115
Having sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child constitutes

child prostitution if committed for money, profit, or any other consideration
(People vs. Jalosjos, G.R. Nos. 132875-76, November 16, 2001); or sexual abuse
is committed under coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group. In
child prostitution, the victim is called child exploited in prostitution while in
sexual abuse the victim is called child subjected to other abuse (Section 5 of RA
No 7610). Coercion is either physical or psychological. Taking advantage of
ascendency as a swimming instructor over student is psychological coercion
(People vs. Larin, G.R. No. 128777, October, 7 1998).
Child vs. child - Accused (15 years of age) inserting his finger into vagina
of complainant (11 years old). The crime committed is sexual assault under the
RPC. Section 5 of RA No. 7610 prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporal in its
medium period if the lascivious conduct is committed against a child subject to
sexual abuse, who is under 12 years of age. RA No. 7610 is not applicable since
the accused is also a minor. RA 7610 was enacted in order to protect children
from abuse, exploitation, and discrimination by adults and not by persons who
are also children themselves. Section 5 of RA 7610 expressly states that a child
is deemed to be sexually abused when coerced or influenced by an adult,
syndicate, or group. (BBB vs. People, G.R. No. 249307, August 27, 2020)
Third person in sexual abuse – In coercion or influence as an element of

sexual abuse is exerted against child is clearly exerted NOT by the offender who
is liable for sexual abuse or child prostitution under Section 5 (b) of RA No. 7610,
but by the adult (syndicate, or group), who is liable for promoting, facilitating or
inducing child prostitution under Section 5 (a) thereof. (People vs. Tulugan, G.R.
No. 227363, March 12, 2019) This view in the Tulugan case is not controlling.
Several cases affirmed the convictions for sexual abuses of the accused, who
themselves employed coercion or influence in order for the minor victims to
submit themselves to lascivious conduct. (See: Rarang vs. People, G.R. No.
226760, August 14, 2019, Satur vs. People, G.R. No. 245375, June 19, 2019,
People vs. Veron, G.R. No. 239028, April 10, 2019; People vs. LCU, G.R. No.
234319, April 10, 2019, and De Joan vs. People, G.R. No. 232957, September
25, 2019)
In Quimvel vs. People, G.R. No. 214497, April 18, 2017, participation of a
third person is not essential in sexual abuse. It is immaterial whether or not the
accused himself employed the coercion or influence to subdue the will of the child
for the latter to submit to his sexual advances for him to be convicted of sexual
abuse. Sexual abuse can be committed by "any adult, syndicate or group" without
qualification.
Sex with a child per se is not a crime – There are several cases where
sex with a child constitutes crime. Sexual intercourse with a child under 12 years
of age is statutory rape. Influencing the child in having sex constitutes sexual
abuse. In Caballo v. People, G.R. No. 198732, June 10, 2013, the assurance of
love, guarantee that she would not get pregnant by using the withdrawal method
and the promise of marriage were classified as psychological coercion and
influence within the purview of Section 5 of R.A. No. 7610 used by the accused
to convince his minor girlfriend to have sex with him. Hence, accused is guilty of
sexual abuse.
However, sex with a child per se is not a crime. What is punishable under
R.A. No. 7610 is sexual abuse with a child. Sexual abuse is more than a mere
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child. (see: People v. Hon. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 171863, August 20, 2008)
Page 65 of 115
Consent is immaterial in cases involving sexual abuse under R.A. No. 7610
where the offended party is below 12 years of age. However, consent is material
when the offended party is a child, who is 12 years old or above. In such a case,
consent of the child is a defense in cases involving sexual abuse. Consent as a
defense is either express or implied. Consent is implied if the prosecution failed
to prove that the child had sex with accused due to money, profit or
consideration, or coercion or influence. (People vs. Tulugan, G.R. No. 227363,
March 12, 2019)
Under the Civil Code, all individuals under 18 years of age have no capacity
to act or the power to do acts with legal effects. The law limits, to varying degrees,
the capacity of an individual to give consent. While in general, under the civil law
concept of consent, in relation to capacity to act, the same concept cannot be
applied to consent within the context of sexual predation. Under civil law, the
concept of "capacity to act" under civil law limits the capacity to give a valid
consent which generally refers to the meeting of the offer and the acceptance
upon the thing and the case which are to constitute the contract. Capacity to act
under civil law cannot be equated to capacity to give sexual consent for
individuals between 12 years old and below 18 years old. Sexual consent does
not involve any obligation within the context of civil law and instead refers to a
private act or sexual activity that may be covered by the Revised Penal Code and
R.A. 7610. (People vs. Tulugan, supra)
The age of sexual consent in the Philippines is 12 years old. According to

United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund, this is "one of the
lowest globally and the lowest in the Asia-Pacific region." The average age of
consent is 16 years old. The age of majority, however, is 18 years old. Minors, or
those below 18, have no capacity to enter into any contracts or marriage. Yet,
strictly reading the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, any minor above 12
years old may validly consent to sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct with
an adult. (Concurring opinion of Justice Leonen in People vs. Tulugan, supra)
In Bangayan vs. People, G.R. No. 235610, September 16, 2020, it is now
clear that consent is a material factor in determining the guilt of accused, who is
charged with sexual abuse against a child whose age is 12 years and one month.
In Monroy (G.R. No. 235799, July 29, 2019), then 28-year-old accused was
charged with violation of Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610 for inserting his penis into
the vagina of a 14-year-old. The Court acquitted the accused on reasonable
doubt, finding that the sexual intercourse that transpired between the accused
and the 14-year-old was consensual and that the case against the accused is
based merely on trumped-up allegations meant as retaliation. In Monroy, the
accused was 14 years older than victim yet the Court found that she was not
subjected to other sexual abuse due to the coercion of an adult as they were in a
relationship. Similarly, in the present case, the accused was more or less 15 years
older than AAA. While difference in age may be an indication of coercion and
intimidation and negates the presence of sexual consent, this should not be
blindly applied to all instances of alleged sexual abuse cases. In this case, there
are special circumstances that reveal the presence consent of AAA. The sexual
congress between accused and AAA was not limited to just one incident. They
were in a relationship even after the incident alleged in the Information and had
even produced two (2) children. It is clear that AAA, who is capable to discern
good from evil, give consent to the sexual act. Accused was acquitted. Justice
Leonen in his dissenting opinion stated with the greatest respect, I cannot accept
that our laws can be interpreted so that a 12-year-old girl, barely in the sixth
Page 66 of 115
grade, can give her mature consent to sexual intercourse. Sexual intercourse is
a complex act which is not only physical or sensual.
New designation of sexual abuse - Since time immemorial the Supreme

Court is using the title of a penal provision, and not a word in the body to describe
a crime. For example, the crime under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code is
called homicide since the title of this provision is homicide. Although the word
“kill” is found in the body of this provision, there is no occasion where the crime
under Article 249 is described as “killing.”
The title of Article 5 of RA No. 7610 is “child prostitution and other sexual
abuse.” However, the word “lascivious conduct” is found in the body of Section 5
(b) of RA No. 7610. In People vs. Larin, G.R. No. 128777, October, 7 1998 and
other cases, the Supreme Court described the crime involving lascivious conduct
under Section 5 (b) of RA No. 7610 as sexual abuse. It is submitted that this is
the correct name of the crime. However, in the case of the Tulugan case, proper
nomenclature of the offense involving lascivious conduct under Section 5 (b) is
now “lascivious conduct” under RA No. 7610. (People vs. Molejon, G.R. No.
208091, April 23, 2018; ZZZ vs. People, G.R. No. 243467, April 08, 2019; De
Joan vs. People, G.R. No. 232957, September 25, 2019; People Vergara, G.R. No.
242477, September 2, 2019) For purpose of the bar examination, the Tulugan
case should be followed.
SEXUAL ABUSE AND FELONY - If the acts constitute sexual abuse, and
rape, sexual assault, or acts of lasciviousness, the offender shall be prosecuted
either under RPC or R.A. No. 7610 (People vs. Abay, G.R. No. 177752, February
24, 2009), whichever prescribes a graver penalty. (Dimakuta v. People, G.R. No.
206513, October 20, 2015; Justice Leonen concurred; People vs. Tulugan, G.R.
No. 227363, March 12, 2019) The higher penalty under either law must be
applied for the minor victim’s benefit. Imposing a lower penalty for the offender
is undeniably unfair to the child victim. (People v. Pusing, G.R. No. 208009, July
11, 2016).
1. Sexual abuse and rape - If the acts constitute sexual abuse under RA
No. 7610, and rape, the perpetrator shall be prosecuted under RPC. The penalty
under RPC for rape is graver than that prescribes by RA No. 7610. Rape is
severely penalized because it may lead to unwanted procreation; or to paraphrase
the words of the legislators, it will put an outsider into the woman who would
bear a child, or to the family, if she is married. (People vs. Tulugan, supra) Where
a minor is raped, RPC ought to prevail over RA 7610. (People vs. Ejercito, supra)
Moreover, RA No. 8353, which amended RPC on rape, is the more recent and
special penal legislation and this law strengthens the policies of RA No. 7610.
(People vs. Briones, G.R. No. 240217, June 23, 2020)
If the acts constitute sexual abuse under RA No. 7610, and special complex
crime of sexual assault with homicide, the perpetrator shall be prosecuted under
RPC. The penalty under RPC for sexual assault with rape is graver than that
prescribes by RA No. 7610.
2. Sexual abuse (now lascivious conduct), and sexual assault or acts of

lasciviousness – If the acts constitute sexual abuse (now lascivious conduct)
under RA No. 7610, and sexual assault or acts of lasciviousness, the perpetrator
shall be prosecuted under RA No. 7610. The penalty for sexual abuse (now
lascivious conduct) under RA No. 7610 is graver than that for acts of
lasciviousness or sexual assault under RPC.
Page 67 of 115
3. Special rules if the child is under 12 years of age - There are special
rules under Section 5 (b) of RA No. 7610 if the child exploited in prostitution or
sexual abuse is under 12 years of age. A demented person (idiot, imbecile, and
feebleminded), whose metal age is under 12 years, is covered by these rules.
(People v. Pusing, supra; People vs. Tulugan, supra) If the acts constitute sexual
abuse under RA No. 7610, and rape or acts of lasciviousness, the perpetrator
shall be prosecuted for statutory rape under RPC, or acts of lasciviousness under
RPC in relation to RA No. 7610.
a. rape - Under Section 5 (b) of RA No. 7610, that when the child exploited
in prostitution or sexual abuse is under 12 years of age (or demented), the
perpetrators shall be prosecuted for statutory rape.
Sexual abuse under RA No. 7610 is separate and distinct from statutory
rape under RPC. Aside from being dissimilar in the sense that the former is an
offense under special law, while the latter is a felony under the Code, they also
have different elements. Nevertheless, sexual intercourse with a victim who is
under 12 years of age or is demented is always statutory rape, as Section 5(b) of
R.A. No. 7610 expressly states that the perpetrator will be prosecuted under
Code. (People vs. Tulugan, supra)
Even if the girl who is below twelve (12) years old or is demented consents
to the sexual intercourse, it is always a crime of statutory rape under the Revised
Penal Code, and the offender should no longer be held liable under R.A. No. 7610.
For example, a nine (9)-year-old girl was sold by a pimp to a customer, the crime
committed by the latter if he commits sexual intercourse with the girl is still
statutory rape (and not child prostitution), because even if the girl consented or
is demented, the law presumes that she is incapable of giving a rational consent.
(People vs. Tulugan, supra)
b. Acts of lasciviousness – Under Section 5 (b) of RA No. 7610, that when

the child exploited in prostitution or sexual abuse is under 12 years of age (or
demented), the perpetrator shall be prosecuted for acts of lasciviousness with the
penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period. In sum, he shall be
prosecuted under the Revised Penal Code but the imposable penalty is that
prescribed under RA no. 7610. Thus, the proper nomenclature of this crime is
acts of lasciviousness under RPC in relation to RA No. 7610. (People vs. Tulugan,
supra)
If the accused committed acts of lasciviousness against a child exploited in

prostitution or sexual abuse, who is under 12 years of age or demented, the
former shall be prosecuted for acts of lasciviousness under RPC with the penalty
of reclusion temporal in its medium period under RA No. 7610. (People vs.
Molejon, G.R. No. 208091, April 23, 2018; Granton vs. People, G.R. No. 226045,
October 10, 2018; Francisco vs. People, G.R. No. 241452, March 25, 2019; People
vs. ZZZ, G.R. No. 232500, July 28, 2020)
To apply the penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period pursuant

to the second proviso, the requisites of acts of lasciviousness must be met in
addition to the requisites for sexual abuse or child prostitution. (Quimvel v.
People, supra; Ramilo vs. People, G.R. No. 234841, June 3, 2019; People vs.
Basa, G.R. No. 237349, February 27, 2019)
The accused is charged of acts of lasciviousness against an under-12-year-

old child. The information alleged “force and intimidation,” which is an element of
acts of lasciviousness under RPC but it does not aver "coercion or influence,”
Page 68 of 115
which is an element of sexual abuse under RA No. 7610. But it was ruled that
the term "coercion and influence" is broad enough to cover "force and intimidation”
as alleged in the information. Committing lascivious conduct against an under-
12-year-old child is statutory acts of lasciviousness. Committing lascivious
conduct against a child under coercion or influence is sexual abuse. Since the
elements of acts of lasciviousness and those of sexual abuse are proven, the
accused is convicted of acts of lasciviousness under RPC in relation to RA No.
7610. (Quimvel v. People, supra)
c. Simple sexual assault – If the accused committed sexual assault

against a child exploited in prostitution or sexual abuse, who is under 12 years
of age or demented, will the court impose the penalty of prision mayor for sexual
assault under RPC as amended by RA No. 8353, or reclusion temporal in its
medium under Section 5 (b) of RA No. 7610? In this situation, the court in
convicting the accused for sexual assault must impose the graver penalty under
RA No. 7610 on the following reasons:
1. To impose the lighter penalty under RPC is unfair to the victim. To

prevent unfairness, the court must impose graver penalty under R.A. No. 7610.
(People v. Chingh, G.R. No. 178323, March 16, 2011)
2. R.A. No. 7610 is a special law which should clearly prevail over R.A.
8353, which is a mere general law amending the Revised Penal Code. (Granton
vs. People, G.R. No. 226045, October 10, 2018; Ricalde v. People, G.R. No.
211002, January 21, 2015, Justice Leonen, and People vs. Adajar, G.R. No.
231306, June 17, 2019; Miranda vs. People, G.R. No. 232192, June 22, 2020,
Justice Leonen; People vs. Sumayod, G.R. No. 230626, March 09, 2020, Justice
Leonen)
In this situation, the crime should be called as “sexual assault” under RPC
in relation to RA No. 7610. (People vs. Tulugan, supra; Ramilo vs. People, G.R.
No. 234841, June 3, 2019; People vs. XXX, G.R. No. 230981, July 15, 2020)
In People v. Chingh, G.R. No. 178323, March 16, 2011- the accused the
force inserted his finger into the genital orifice of a child, who is 10 years old. The
victim is a child exploited in sexual abuse since the element of coercion is
present. Since the victim is under 12 years of age, the crime committed is
statutory sexual assault. The penalty for sexual assault under RPC is prision
mayor. On the other hand, the penalty for lascivious conduct under second
proviso of Section 5 (b) RA No. 7610 is reclusion temporal in its medium period.
To impose the lighter penalty under RPC is unfair to the victim. To prevent
unfairness, the Supreme Court imposed the graver penalty under R.A. No. 7610.
In sum, the accused is convicted of simple sexual assault under RPC in relation
of RA No. 7610.
d. Qualified sexual assault – The crime is qualified sexual assault if

qualifying circumstance such as relationship and minority is present. If the
accused committed qualified sexual assault against a child exploited in
prostitution or sexual abuse, who is under 12 years of age or demented, will the
court impose the penalty of reclusion temporal for sexual assault under RPC as
amended by RA No. 8353, or reclusion temporal in its medium under Section 5
(b) of RA No. 7610? In this situation, the court in convicting the accused for
qualified sexual assault must impose the graver penalty under RPC. Since
rationale of unfairness to the child victim that Chingh case wanted to correct is
absent because RPC already prescribes the high penalty, there is no need to apply
the penalty under RA No. 7610. (People v. Bonaagua, G.R. No. 188897, June 6,
Page 69 of 115
2011)
Accused inserted his penis into the mouth of his foster child, whose actual
age is above 12 years old, but her mental age is 9 years old. The crime committed
is statutory sexual assault. The qualifying circumstances of minority and
guardianship, and mental disability are present. Since the mental age of the
victim is under 12 years, first proviso Section 5 (b) of RA No. 7610 is applicable.
Under this provision, if the perpetrator had lascivious conduct with a child
exploited in sexual abuse, who is under 12 years old, the former shall be
prosecuted for rape under RPC, which includes qualified sexual assault. (People
v. Pusing, G.R. No. 208009, July 11, 2016, Justice Leonen)
Summary - If the victim of sexual offense is a child in EPSOSA (exploited

in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse), the following rules should be
observed.
1. Rape - If the act constitutes rape under RPC and sexual abuse RA No.
7610, the accused shall be prosecuted under RPC, since this law prescribes a
higher penalty. If the act constitutes statutory rape and sexual abuse, the
accused shall be prosecuted under RPC, since Section 5 (b) of RA No. 7610 says
so.
2. Acts of lasciviousness - If the act constitutes acts of lasciviousness

under RPC and sexual abuse under RA No. 7610 committed against a child, who
is 12 years of age or above, the accused shall be prosecuted under RA No. 7610,
since this law prescribes a higher penalty. The crime will be designated as
lascivious conduct.
If the act constitutes acts of lasciviousness under RPC and sexual abuse
under RA No. 7610 committed against a child, who is under 12 years of age, the
accused shall be prosecuted for acts of lasciviousness under RPC but the penalty
of reclusion temporal in its medium period under RA No. 7610 shall be imposed.
The crime will be designated as acts of lasciviousness under RPC in relation to RA
No. 7610.
3. Sexual assault - If the act constitutes sexual assault under RPC and
sexual abuse under RA No. 7610 committed against a child, who is 12 years of
age or above, the accused shall be prosecuted under RA No. 7610, since this law
prescribes a higher penalty. The crime will be designated as lascivious conduct.
If the act constitutes sexual assault under RPC and sexual abuse under
RA No. 7610 committed against a child, who is under 12 years of age, the accused
shall be prosecuted for sexual assault under RPC but the penalty of reclusion
temporal in its medium period under RA No. 7610 shall be imposed. It is not the
intention of RA No. 8353, which introduces sexual assault in RPC, to disallow
the penalty under RA No. 7610. To impose the lesser penalty of prison mayor
under RA No. 8353 for sexual assault is unfair to the child. The crime will be
designate as sexual assault under RPC in relation to RA No. 7610.
If the act constitutes qualified sexual assault under RPC and sexual
abuse under RA No. 7610 committed against a child, who is under 12 years of
age, the accused shall be prosecuted for qualified sexual assault with the penalty
of reclusion temporal under RPC. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its
medium period under RA No. 7610 shall not be imposed. In sum, the Chingh
principle will not apply since RPC already prescribes a graver penalty. The
Page 70 of 115
circumstance of unfairness, which the Chingh case sought to correct, is not

present in this case. The crime will be designate as qualified sexual assault.
Coercion and influence - The term "coercion and influence" is broad

enough to cover "force and intimidation”. In fact, as these terms are almost used
synonymously, it is then of no moment that the terminologies employed by RA
7610 and by the Information are different. (Quimvel v. People, G.R. No. 214497,
April 18, 2017; People vs. Ejercito, G.R. No. 229861, July 2, 2018; People vs.
Tulugan, G.R. No. 227363, March 12, 2019)
The accused is charged of acts of lasciviousness. The information alleged

“force and intimidation,” which is an element of acts of lasciviousness under RPC
but it does not aver "coercion or influence,” which is an element of lascivious
conduct under RA No. 7610. The accused may be convicted of the graver crime
of lascivious conduct under RA No. 7610. (People vs. Molejon, G.R. No. 208091,
April 23, 2018)
Double jeopardy - If the acts constitute sexual abuse (or child

prostitution), and rape or acts of lasciviousness, the offender cannot be
prosecuted for both crimes because of the rule on double jeopardy.
The essence of sexual abuse and rape or acts of lasciviousness is having

sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a victim without her consent, or
capacity to give consent. Since these crimes are identical, the Supreme Court in
People vs. Abay, G.R. No. 177752, February 24, 2009 ruled that the accused
cannot be held liable of both crimes because his right against double jeopardy
will be prejudiced.
Other view: In People vs. Udang, G.R. No. 210161, January 10, 2018, the
Supreme Court, Third Division, through Justice Leonen ruled that offender can
be liable for rape and sexual abuse because they are separate crimes with distinct
elements. It seems that Udang case is a stray decision. The Abay principle is
controlling since it was affirmed by the Supreme Court in several cases such as
People vs. Dahilig, G.R. No. 187083, June 13, 2011; People vs. Matias, G.R. No.
186469, June 18, 2012; Alberto vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 182130,
June 19, 2013; People vs. Ejercito, G.R. No. 229861, July 02, 2018; People vs.
Jaime, G.R. No. 225332, July 23, 2018; People vs. Mabalo, G.R. No. 238839,
February 27, 2019 and People vs. Tulugan, supra.
Sexual abuse and child abuse – Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 specifically

applies in cases of sexual abuse committed against children, which
includes lascivious conduct; whereas, Section 10 (a) thereof punishes other
forms of child abuse not covered by particular provisions of RA 7610. Evidently,
the offense will not fall within the purview of Section 10 (a) of RA 7610 if the same
is specifically penalized by a particular provision, such as Section 5 (b).
(Encinares vs. People, G.R. No. 252267, January 11, 2021)
The petitioner's acts of putting AAA's penis inside his mouth and playing
with it for ten (10) minutes constitute lascivious conduct under Section 5 (b) of
RA 7610. As such, it was an error for the courts a quo to have convicted him
under Section 10 (a) of the same Act. True, the Information filed against petitioner
charged him under Section 10 (a) of RA 7610. However, it is a well-settled rule
that the facts alleged in the body of the information, not the technical name given
by the prosecutor appearing in the title of the information, determine the
character of the crime. (Encinares vs. People, supra)
Page 71 of 115
SEXUAL HARASSMENT - The elements of the crime of sexual harassment

in a work-related or employment environment under RA No. 7877 are:
1. The offender has authority, influence or moral ascendancy over victim;

and
2. The authority, influence or moral ascendancy exists in a work

environment;
3. (a) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the employment or continued

employment of victim or in granting her favorable terms or privileges; or
(b) The refusal to grant the sexual favor results in her discrimination or
impairment of her rights or privileges; or
(c) the demand for sexual favor would result in an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive environment for the employee.
The elements of the crime of sexual harassment in a education or training

environment under RA No. 7877 are:
1. The offender has authority, influence or moral ascendancy over victim;

and
2. The authority, influence or moral ascendancy exists in a work

environment;
3. (a) The sexual favor is made a condition to the giving of a passing grade,
or the granting privileges; or
(b) when the sexual advances result in an intimidating, hostile or offensive

environment for the student, trainee or apprentice.
Authority or Ascendency - The key elements which distinguish sexual

harassment, as penalized by Republic Act 7877, from other chastity-related and
vexatious offenses are: first, its setting; and second, the person who may commit
it. As to its setting, the offense may only be committed in a work-related, training-
related, or education-related environment. As to the perpetrator, it may be
committed by a person who exercises authority, influence, or moral ascendancy
over another. (Escandor vs. People, G.R. No. 211962, July 06, 2020, Justice
Leonen)
The gravamen of the offense in sexual harassment is not the violation of

the employee's sexuality but the abuse of power by the employer. (LBC vs. Palco,
G.R. No. 217101, February 12, 2020, Justice Leonen)
Sexual harassment is not a trivial offense. Its essence lies not in the- simple
violation of a victim's sexuality, but in a superior's undue exertion of power over
the victim. Inherent in this predatory act is the assailant's perverted use of power
to dominate his or her subordinate for sexual favors. Sexual harassment in the
workplace is not about a person taking advantage of another person by reason
of sexual desire; it is about power being exercised by a superior officer over his
or her subordinates. The power emanates from the fact that the superior can
remove the subordinate from his or her workplace if the latter would refuse his
or her amorous advances. (Talens-Dabon vs. Arceo, A.M. No. RTJ-96-1336, June
Page 72 of 115
02, 2020, Concurring Opinion by Justice Leonen; Philippine Aeolus Automotive

United Corp. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 124617, April 28, 2000) Alegria v. Duque, A.M. No.
RTJ-06-2019, April 4, 2007)
Sexual harassment can be committed by an employer, employee, manager,

supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher, instructor, professor, coach, trainer
or any other person, who has authority, influence or moral ascendancy over
victim. It can also be committed against one who is under the care, custody or
supervision of the offender or against one whose education, training,
apprenticeship or tutorship is entrusted to the offender. (Section 3 of R.A. No.
7877) Moral ascendancy as an element of sexual harassment is present if the
respondent recommended complainant to her present position. (Alegria v. Duque,
A.M. No. RTJ-06-2019, April 4, 2007)
A process server cannot commit the crime of sexual harassment against a

janitress of a private company assigned in the Hall of Justice since the former
has no moral ascendency over the latter. However, he can be held administrative
liability for committing an immoral act. (Lamsis v. Sales, A.M. No. P-17-3772,
January 10, 2018) Moreover, the process server can be held criminally liable for
gender-based sexual harassment under RA No. 11313 (Safe-space Act). Under
RA No. 11313, the crime of gender-based sexual harassment may also be
committed between peers and those committed to a superior officer by a
subordinate, or to a teacher by a student, or to a trainer by a trainee.
The Safe Spaces Act does not undo or abandon the definition of sexual
harassment under the Anti-Sexual Harassment Law of 1995. The gravamen of
the offenses punished under the Safe Spaces Act is the act of sexually harassing
a person on the basis of the his/her sexual orientation, gender identity and/or
expression, while that of the offense punished under the Anti-Sexual Harassment
Act of 1995 is abuse of one's authority, influence or moral ascendancy so as to
enable the sexual harassment of a subordinate. (Escandor vs. People, G.R. No.
211962, July 06, 2020, Justice Leonen)
Work or Training, or Education Environment - Sexual harassment

under RA No. 7877 can only be committed in a work, training, or education
environment. If an offender sexually harassed his neighbor in a street, the crime
committed is not sexual harassment under RA No. 7877 but gender based sexual
harassment under RA No. 11313 (Safe-space Act), acts of lasciviousness, sexual
abuse or any other crime.
Gender-based sexual harassment under RA No. 11313 is committed in

a public space (e.g. schools, churches, restaurants or streets) or through on-line.
(Section 3 and 4 of RA No. 11312) Sexual harassment in a private place is not
punishable under RA No. 11313. For example, Pedro inside his house uttered to
Maria, his cousin, “Palaki ng palaki wetpu mo, papisil naman.” Since a private
house is not within the contemplation of the word “public spaces” under RA No.
11313, the crime committed is unjust vexation, and not gender-based sexual
harassment.
Demand, Request or Require Sexual Favor - In sexual harassment, the

offender demands, requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor from the
victim. Sexual harassment is committed regardless of whether or not the
demand, request or requirement for sexual submission is accepted by the victim.
Hence, sweetheart defense cannot be upheld in favor of offender in sexual
harassment case.
Page 73 of 115
In Jacutin v. People, G.R. No. 140604, March 6, 2002, complainant was

seeking employment in the city health office headed by the accused. While the
appointing authority is the mayor, the recommendation of the accused has a
good weight. Accused demanded from complainant that she should expose her
body and allow her private parts to be mashed and stimulated by him as a
condition for her employment. He was convicted of sexual harassment.
1. Implied Demand – R.A. No. 7877 calls for a “demand, request or

requirement of a sexual favor.” But it is not necessary that the demand, request,
or requirement of a sexual favor be articulated in a categorical oral or written
statement. It may be discerned, with equal certitude, from the acts of the
offender. (Bacsin v. Wahiman, G.R. No. 146053, April 30, 2008; Domingo v.
Rayala, supra; Escandor vs. People, G.R. No. 211962, July 06, 2020, Justice
Leonen)
In Bacsin v. Wahiman, supra, even without an express demand from

respondent, a school teacher, his act of mashing the breast of his student was
sufficient to constitute sexual harassment.
Accused committed several acts of harassment such as grabbing hand

of complainant, kissing, engaging in improper conversations, touching her
thigh, giving her gifts, telling her that "she was the kind of girl he really wants,"
asking her out on dates, and sending her text and Winpop messages telling her
that he missed her, that she looked beautiful, and that he loved her. These acts
undoubtedly amount to a request for sexual favors. (Escandor vs. People, supra,
Justice Leonen)
If the offender has moral ascendency over the victim and the former
committed sexual advances on the latter, implied request or demand for sexual
favor is present. Hence, sexual harassment is committed.
In Narvasa v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 169449, March 26, 2010, during a field
trip, respondent, a municipal assessor, pulled complainant, a bookkeeper,
towards him and attempted to kiss her. Complainant resisted and was able to
escape the clutches of respondent. His act of grabbing complainant and
attempting to kiss her without her consent was an unmistakable manifestation
of his intention to violate R.A. No. 7877 that specifically prohibited sexual
harassment in the work environment.
In Gonzales v. Serrano, G.R. No. 175433, March 11, 2015, Atty. Jacinto
Gonzales, direct superior of the complainant, forcibly kissed her lips in the
restaurant in front of her officemates and other customers. She tried to ward off
Atty. Gonzales by pulling her head away from him, but he persisted on kissing
her against her will. After releasing her, Atty. Gonzales said: “Ang sarap pala ng
labi ni Maila.” Atty. Gonzales violated R.A. No. 7877.
In Aquino v. Acosta, A.M. No. CTA-01-1, April 2, 2002, the case for sexual
harassment against a judge was dismissed for failure to show that he demanded,
requested or required any sexual favor from complainant in exchange for
favorable compensation, terms, conditions, promotion or privileges. Thus, it
appears that sexual demand, request or requirement is an essential element of
sexual harassment. However, Domingo vs. Rayala, G.R. No. 155831, February
18, 2008, the Supreme Court ruled that it is not essential that the demand,
request or requirement be made as a condition for continued employment or for
promotion to a higher position. It is enough that the respondent’s acts result in
creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment for the employee. In
Page 74 of 115
this case, the intimidating and hostile environment for complainant is clearly
shown by the fact that she reported the matter to an officemate and, after the
last incident, filed for a leave of absence and requested transfer to another unit.
Respondent found to have committed sexual harassment.
2. Friendly Kiss – In Aquino v. Acosta, A.M. No. CTA-01-1, April 2, 2002,

Atty. Susan M. Aquino, personnel of Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), charged CTA
Judge Ernesto Acosta with sexual harassment under R.A. 7877. In one occasion,
respondent kissed her on her cheek after greeting her. In another occasion,
respondent shook her hand and greeted her, “Merry Christmas” and then, he
embraced her and kissed her. When the Senate approved the bill on expanded
jurisdiction of the CTA and while complainant and her companions were
congratulating and kissing each other, respondent suddenly placed his arms
around her shoulders and kissed her. According to the Supreme Court, the
conducts of respondent in kissing the complainant are casual gestures of
friendship and camaraderie, nothing more, nothing less. There is no indication
that respondent was motivated by malice or lewd design. Evidently, she
misunderstood his actuations and construed them as work-related sexual
harassment under R.A. No. 7877. (Cited in the case of Escandor vs. People,
Justice Leonen)
Page 75 of 115
A mere casual buss on the cheek of the complainant during festive or special
occasions in front of several persons is not a sexual advance within the purview
of sexual harassment under R.A. No. 7877. (Aquino v. Acosta, supra) But a kiss
on her lips of the complainants (Atty. Mona Lisa Buencamino v. Judge Armando
De Asa, Adm. Matter No. MTJ-98-1144, July 22, 1998; Narvasa v. Sanchez,
supra) even in a public place (Gonzales v. Serrano, supra); or holding and
squeezing complainant’s shoulders, running his fingers across her neck and
tickling her ear, and the inappropriate comments made in privacy (Domingo v.
Rayala, supra) constitute sexual harassment within the contemplation of R.A.
No. 7877.
The case of Aquino is different from Domingo. While in Aquino, the Court
interpreted the acts (of Judge Acosta) as casual gestures of friendship and
camaraderie, done during festive or special occasions and with other people
present, in Domingo, Rayala’s acts of holding and squeezing Domingo’s
shoulders, running his fingers across her neck and tickling her ear, and the
inappropriate comments, were all made in the confines of Rayala’s office when
no other members of his staff were around. More importantly, and a
circumstance absent in Aquino, Rayala’s acts produced a hostile work
environment for Domingo, as shown by her having reported the matter to an
officemate and, after the last incident, filing for a leave of absence and requesting
transfer to another unit.
RA No. 7877 does not require that the victim had acceded to the sexual
desires of the abuser. (Anonymous complaint against Atty. Unitian, A.C. No.
5900, April 10, 2019) Mere demand or request for sexual favor consummates the
crime of sexual harassment. Actual commission of sexual advances is not
required for the consummation of this crime. However, if the offender, who has
ascendancy over the victim, already performed sexual acts upon her, he shall be
exposed to criminal liability for a grave crime such sexual abuse under R.A. No.
7610, acts of lasciviousness, or rape by means of grave abuse of authority. In
People v. Larin, G.R. No. 128777, October, 7 1998, a swimming instructor was
convicted for sexual abuse under R.A. No. 7610 for performing cunnilingus on
her, licking her breast, touching her genitalia, and forcing her to hold his sexual
organ.
Discrimination or impairment of her rights - Transferring a

subordinate to place without telephone for refusal to submit herself to the sexual
desire of her superior, which impaired her privilege as an employee, constitutes
sexual harassment (Philippine Aeolus Automotive United Corp. v. NLRC, G.R. No.
124617, April 28, 2000)
Intimidating, hostile or offensive environment - It is not essential

that the demand, request or requirement be made as a condition for continued
employment or for promotion to a higher position. It is enough that the
respondent’s acts result in creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive
environment for the employee. (Domingo v. Rayala, supra) In sum, creating an
intimidating, hostile or offensive environment is an element of sexual
harassment, which is an alternative to sexual demand, request or requirement.
In 1964, in the United States, the Civil Rights Act prohibited acts of
discrimination on the basis of sex, among others. American jurisprudence
subsequently recognized two (2) categories of sexual harassment: first, quid pro
quo; and second, hostile environment sexual harassment. Quid pro quo
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harassment conditions employment or job benefits on sexual favors; while hostile

environment sexual harassment results from sexual advances which make the
working environment hostile or abusive to the employee. The two types of sexual
harassment recognized in American jurisprudence are akin to sexual harassment
as defined under RA no. 7877. Section 3(a)(l) similarly recognizes that sexual
harassment is committed when a sexual favor is made a condition for
employment or for the grant of certain benefits. Likewise, Section
3(a)(3) recognizes sexual harassment as committed when the offender's advances
result in an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment for the employee.
(Escandor vs. People, Justice Leonen)
In Domingo v. Rayala, supra, intimidating and hostile environment for

complainant is clearly shown by the fact that she reported the matter to an
officemate and, after the last incident, filed for a leave of absence and requested
transfer to another unit.
In Bacsin v. Wahiman, supra, complainant testified that she felt fear at the
time respondent touched her. The act of respondent of fondling one of his
students is against R.A. No. 7877 since such sexual advances result in an
intimidating, hostile or offensive environment to her. Dal recounted that in one
of her recitations during respondent's class, she clarified a question propounded
to her saying "Sir, come again?" Respondent retorted "What? You want me to
come again? I have not come the first time and don't you know that it took me
five minutes to come, and you want me to come again?" She later learned that
respondent would narrate the said incident to almost all of his classes. Dal felt
offended that she was subjected to such sexually charged language and the fact
that her embarrassment was retold in other classes.
Respondent's conduct towards his student created a hostile and offensive

environment which has no place in a learning institution. Respondent's
statement to complainant during her recitation in class cannot be categorized as
an innocent joke only meant to lighten the mood of the class. It is readily
apparent that the remark is tasteless, vulgar and crude and has no place in any
academic setting. It is not a clever word play or a mere statement with sexual
innuendos as its intended meaning is obviously discernable. Respondent's
attempt at humor miserably fails as his words clearly refer to him needing five
minutes to ejaculate again. Respondent's statements made Dal uncomfortable
and embarrassed in front of her classmates as it went beyond an innocent joke
and was instead a gross, graphic and an insensitive remark. (Anonymous
complaint against Atty. Unitian, A.C. No. 5900, April 10, 2019)
Prescription - Acts of sexual harassment by the accused persisted up to

the time that complainant’s employment ended. By the time she filed her
Complaint-Affidavit, only about nine (9) months had lapsed. This is well-within
the three (3) years permitted by Section 7 of RA No. 7877 within which an action
under the same statute may be pursued. (Escandor vs. People, Justice Leonen)
Civil liability – Criminal liability for sexual harassment notwithstanding,

the offended party may pursue a separate civil action. Section 6 of RA No. 7877
provides that nothing in this Act shall preclude the victim of work, education, or
training-related sexual harassment from instituting a separate and independent
action for damages and other affirmative relief. Being independent from criminal
action, the conviction or acquittal of the accused is not a bar to an independent
suit for damages in a civil action. In fact, an independent action for damages
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against the accused is allowed despite the existence of an ongoing criminal case.
(Escandor vs. People, Justice Leonen)
Under Section 5 of RA No. 7877, the employer is only solidarity liable for
damages with the perpetrator in case an act of sexual harassment was reported
and it did not take immediate action on the matter. This provision thus illustrates
that the employer must first be informed of the acts of the erring managerial
officer before it can be held liable for the latter's acts. Conversely, if the employer
has been informed of the acts of its managerial staff, and does not contest or
question it, it is deemed to have authorized or be complicit to the acts of its erring
employee. (LBC vs. Palco, G.R. No. 217101, February 12, 2020, Justice Leonen)
TERRORISM - Before terrorism is punishable under RA No. 9372 or the

Human Security Law. However, Section 56 of RA No. 11479 expressly repeals RA
No. 9372. Terrorism is now punishable under RA No. 11479.
Under Section 4 of RA No. 11479, terrorism is committed by any person

who, within or outside the Philippines, regardless of the stage of execution:
(a) Engages in acts intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to any
person, or endangers a person's life;
(b) Engages in acts intended to cause extensive damage or destruction to
a government or public facility, public place or private property;
(c) Engages in acts intended to cause extensive interference with, damage
or destruction to critical infrastructure;
(d) Develops, manufactures, possesses, acquires, transports, supplies or
uses weapons, explosives or of biological, nuclear, radiological or chemical
weapons; and
(e) Release of dangerous substances, or causing fire, floods or explosions
when the purpose of such act, by its nature and context, is to intimidate the
general public or a segment thereof, create an atmosphere or spread a message
of fear, to provoke or influence by intimidation the government or any
international organization, or seriously destabilize or destroy the fundamental
political, economic, or social structures of the country, or create a public
emergency or seriously undermine public safety.
Composition of terrorism - Terrorism is composed of criminal act and

criminal intention (or purpose). For example, engaging in acts intended to cause
death person is the criminal act while intimidating the general public is the
criminal intention.
Intent to intimidate the general public - Pedro out of jealousy threw

hand grenade at her wife and paramour at Luneta. As a consequence, the victims
died. Several persons at Luneta were terrified. This is not terrorism but a
complex crime of parricide and murder. The reason behind the killings is
personal. There is no intention to intimidate the general public, create an
atmosphere or spread a message of fear, or provoke or influence by intimidation
the government.
Pedro detonated a time bomb in LRT, and caused death and serious bodily
injury to several persons, endangers the life of others, and causes extensive
damage a critical infrastructure. By its nature and context, the bombing
intimidated the general public and created an atmosphere or spread a message
of fear. This is terrorism. Direct evidence that the purpose of Pedro is to
intimidate the general public is not required. The phrase “by its nature and
context” means that the court can determine that the purpose of the offender in
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detonating a bomb is to intimidate the general public by taking into consideration

nature and context of criminal act.
In terrorism under RA No. 9372, a predicate crime such as murder must

create a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the
populace. However, under RA No. 11479, widespread fear to the populace is not
an element of terrorism since this crime can be committed although the intention
of the terrorists is merely to intimidate “segment” of the general public.
Intimidate the government or international government - The word

“government” in RA No. 11479 which the terrorists intend to provoke or influence
by intimidation includes foreign government. The law uses the word
“government” without making a distinction between Philippine government and
foreign government. It is a well known maxim in statutory construction that
where the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish.
The word “international organization” in RA No. 11479 which the terrorists

intend to provoke or influence by intimidation refers to an organization
established by a treaty or other instrument governed by international law and
possessing its own international legal personality. United Nation and World
Health Organization are international organizations.
Pedro, a member of Al-Qaeda, detonated a time bomb in US Embassy,

Manila, and caused death and serious bodily injury to several persons, endangers
the life of others, and causes extensive damage to an US government facility. Al-
Qaeda claimed responsibility and demanded that the U.S. government should
not to interfere with the affairs of the Muslim. This is terrorism since the purpose
of Pedro is to influence the US government by intimidation.
To constitute terrorism under RA No. 9372, murder must create a condition
of fear and panic among the populace in order to coerce the government to give
in to an unlawful demand. In terrorism under the old law, creating fear to the
general public by committing murder, and intent to coerce the government must
concur. However, under RA No. 11479, the intention of the terrorist is either to
intimidate the general public, or to influence the government through
intimidation. The concurrence of intent to intimidate the public and intent to
influence the government is not required in terrorism under the new law.
Pedro detonated a time bomb in LRT, and caused death and serious bodily
injury to several persons, endangers the life of others, and causes extensive
damage a critical infrastructure. This is not terrorism under RA No. 9372
because there is no showing that Pedro detonated the bomb in order to coerce
the government to give in to an unlawful demand such secession of Mindanao
from the Philippines. However, this is terrorism under RA No. 11479 since by its
nature and context, the bombing intimidated the general public and created an
atmosphere or spread a message of fear.
Destroying fundamental political, economic, or social structures -

Committing a criminal act described in Section 4 of RA No. 11479 such as acts
intended to cause death to person for purpose of seriously destabilize or destroy
the fundamental political, economic, or social structures of the country is
terrorism.
Members of the CPP-NPA wage a civil war to overthrow the government, and
replace it with communist government. Since there is public and armed uprising
to remove the territory of the Philippines allegiance of the Filipino people to
present government and its laws, they are liable for rebellion. If members of the
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CPP-NPA detonated time bomb in LRT for purpose of destroying the political and
economic structure of the country from democratic and capitalist government to
dictatorial and communist government, they are liable for terrorism.
Creating a public emergency or seriously undermine public safety -

Release of dangerous substances such a biological weapon that creates a public
emergency or seriously undermine public safety is terrorism.
Terrorism is committed regardless of stage of execution - Pedro, a

member of Al-Qaeda, set a time bomb in US Embassy, Manila, to explode after
two hours. However, the authorities discovered the bomb and defused it. Even
though the stage of executing the criminal design to bomb the US Embassy is
merely attempted, the crime committed is terrorism.
Exclusionary proviso - Terrorism under RA No. 11479 shall not include

advocacy, protest, dissent, stoppage of work, industrial or mass action, and other
similar exercises of civil and political rights, which are not intended to cause
death or serious physical harm to a person, to endanger a person's life, or to
create a serious risk to public safety.
Mass action which caused incidental destruction of properties and killing of

police officers will not make the participators liable for terrorism. However, if the
organizers deliberately organized mass action to cause death or serious bodily
injury to any person, extensive damage or destruction to a government or public
facility, public place, or private property or critical infrastructure to influence by
intimidation the government, the crime committed is terrorism.
Non-mutually exclusive crimes - In Lagman vs. Medeldea, G.R. No.

231658, July 04, 2017, the Supreme Court stated that there is nothing in Article
134 of RPC and RA No. 9372 which states that rebellion and terrorism are
mutually exclusive of each other or that they cannot co-exist together. RA No.
9372 does not expressly or impliedly repeal Article 134 of the Code. And while
rebellion is one of the predicate crimes of terrorism, one cannot absorb the other
as they have different elements.
TRAFFICKING IN PERSON – The elements of trafficking in person are as

follows:
1. The act of recruitment, transportation, transfer or harboring, or receipt

of persons with or without the victim's consent or knowledge, within or across
national borders;
2. The means used which include "threat or use of force, or other forms of
coercion, abduction, fraud, deception or abuse of power or of position, taking
advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of
payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over
another; this means as an element can be dispensed with when the victim is a
minor; and
3. The purpose of trafficking is exploitation which includes "exploitation or

the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or
services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs. (People vs. De Dios,
G.R. No. 234018, June 06, 2018; (Santiago vs. People, G.R. No. 213760, July 01,
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1. Acts of trafficking – a. Maintaning - If the accused is regularly offering

the sexual service of the child in exchange for money, the crime committed is not
anymore child prostitution. Maintaining or hiring the child as purpose of
prostitution constitutes qualified trafficking in person because the former took
advantage of vulnerability of the latter as a child and as one who need money.
Minority is qualifying circumstance (People vs. Casio, G.R. No. 211465,
December 03, 2014, Justice Leonen; People vs. Hirang, G.R. No. 223528,
January 11, 2017).
b. Transporting - Accompanying a child and offering her sexual services

in exchange for money constitutes child prostitution. The accused who offered
the victim to the one who raped her is not liable for rape as principal
indispensable cooperation since bringing the victim to the rapist is not
indispensable to the commission of the crime of rape (People vs. Dulay, GR No.
193854, September 24, 2012). It is submitted that the accused in Dulay case,
can be prosecuted for trafficking in person instead of child prostitution.
Recruiting and transporting a child for sexual service for money constitutes
qualified trafficking in person. In People v. Aguirre, G.R. No. 219952, November
20, 2017, accused lured several minors into prostitution to have sex with
foreigners with the promise of financial benefit, the chance to use shabu and to
travel abroad. The girls were brought at an apartment and were instructed to
primp themselves to look good for the foreigners. Accused was convicted of
qualified trafficking in persons since the accused recruited and transported the
minors for purposes of prostitution. The victim’s consent is not a defense in
qualified trafficking in person.
Accused recruited AAA, a minor, and transported to Saigon Disco for the
purpose of engaging her to perform illicit work, i.e., as a GRO and perform lewd
acts thereat and with customers even outside the establishment. She is liable for
qualified trafficking in person. (People vs. Garcia, G.R. No. 240692, July 15,
2020)
c. Recruitment - In Young vs. People, G.R. No. 213910, February 03,

2016, petitioners allegedly recruited and hired the AAA Group and, consequently,
maintained them under their employ in Jaguar for the purpose of engaging in
prostitution. Accused can be properly charged with trafficking in person.
Recruiting without license a person, child or adult, to work as a prostitute

abroad constitutes the crime of trafficking in person and illegal recruitment.
Syndicate is qualifying circumstance in both crimes. Even if the accused is less
than three, but the allegation and evidence show that there are at least three
traffickers and recruiters, syndicated can be appreciated as qualifying
circumstance (People vs. Lalli, G.R. No. 195419, October 12, 2011; People vs.
Hashim, G.R. No. 194255, June 13, 2012).
2. By means of trafficking – a. Fraud and deception - The accused

deceived victim by saying that her work in Malaysia would be as restaurant
entertainer, when in fact, she would be working as a prostitute. This is trafficking
in person. Fraud and deception are means to commit trafficking in person. (People
vs. Lalli, G.R. No. 195419, October 12, 2011)
b. Taking advantage of vulnerability - It is apparent from this case that

no threat, force or coercion was employed by accused in the trafficking of the
victims. However, they took advantage of the vulnerability of the victims to secure
the consent of their parents. They are vulnerable in the sense that they are
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underprivileged and it is apparent that they needed to earn money. Considering

that the victims came from poverty-stricken families, it renders the victims
vulnerable to trafficking. Trafficking in persons can still be committed even if the
victim gives consent. (People vs. Leocadio, G.R. No. 237697, July 15, 2020)
c. Minor victim - Acts of trafficking committed for exploitive purpose

against a child, or when the adoption is induced by any form of consideration,
shall also be considered as ‘trafficking in persons’ even if they do not involve any
of the means to commit trafficking.
Since the victims are minor, means to commit trafficking such as threat or
use of force, coercion, or fraud need not be established by evidence. Even without
the use of coercive, abusive, or deceptive means, a minor’s consent is not
recognized by law, (People v. Aguirre, G.R. No. 219952, November 20, 2017) or
shall not be considered as having been given out of his or her own free will.
(People vs. Ramirez, G.R. No. 217978, January 30, 2019, Justice Leonen)
3. Exploitive Purpose - The act of trafficking is committed for any of the

following purposes: (a) Sexual exploitation such as prostitution or pornography;
(b) Labor exploitation such forced labor or services, slavery, servitude; and (c)
Organ exploitation such as removal or sale of organs.
Section 3 of RA No. 9208 in defining trafficking in person used the phrase

“for the purpose of exploitation.” Hence, the third element of this crime is exploitive
purpose. Recruiting, hiring or transferring the victim through the required means
such as taking advantage of her vulnerability for purpose of exploitation such as
prostitution consummates the crime of trafficking in person. Actual exploitation
is not necessary for purpose of consummation thereof.
Accused approached PO1 Nemenzo and offered him the sexual services of
four girls, two of whom were minors, for P2,400.00. The police operation had
been the result of previous surveillance. Both minor victims testified that this
incident was not the first time that accused pimped them out to customers. It
was held that the crime of trafficking in person involving prostitution is
considered consummated even if no sexual intercourse (or no actual sexual
exploitation) had taken place since the mere transaction consummates the crime.
(People vs. Ramirez, G.R. No. 217978, January 30, 2019, Justice Leonen)
The fact that there were no actual indecent shows that were performed by
the victims, except for BBB, is immaterial. It is not necessary that the victims
have performed or are performing the act of prostitution or sexual exploitation at
the time when the perpetrators were apprehended. The material fact in the crime
charged is that the purpose of the perpetrators is to engage the victims in the
said act of prostitution or sexual exploitation. (People vs. Leocadio, G.R. No.
237697, July 15, 2020)
Labor exploitation - Accused deceived 5 complainants, who were mostly

minors, for they are made to believe that they will be working as house helpers
in Cagayan De Oro City with an enticing salary of P1,500.00 per month. She told
them that they would be allowed to go home once a week. However, the
complainants were transported to Marawi City. The complainants would not have
agreed or would not have been allowed by their parents if accused would directly
offer them work at Marawi City. The accused deliberately fabricated a story to
delude her victims and their parents. When complainant asked for their salary,
they were told that it had already been given to accused. This is slavery. Accused
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was convicted of trafficking in person qualified by the circumstance of minority

and large scale. (People vs. Nangcas, G.R. No. 218806, June 13, 2018)
Accused and his minor son invited the latter's three (3) schoolmates who
were also minors, namely AAA, BBB, and CCC, to their house. It was then
revealed that the purpose of the meeting was to discuss plans of accused to
commit robberies with the help of AAA, BBB, and CCC. Upon learning about this,
CCC expressed his desire to leave but accused got angry and punched him; thus,
he was forced to join the group. The children subsequently committed series of
robberies against various people. Accused was also the driver of their getaway
tricycle. Accused is liable for qualified trafficking in person. He recruited
minors by taking advantage of their vulnerability as minors, particularly through
enticement, violence, and use of force and coercion for purpose of forced labor,
or involuntary servitude. Forced labor and slavery is defined as the extraction of
work or services from any person by means of enticement, violence, intimidation
or threat, use of force or coercion. (Arambullo vs. People, G.R. No. 241834, July
24, 2019)
Not valid defenses – The following are not valid defenses in trafficking in
person:
1. Trafficking in person can be committed with or without the victim’s

consent or knowledge. Thus, consent of the victims, who are minors, to engage
in prostitution is not a defense in trafficking in persons involving recruitment
and transportation of trafficked victims. (People v. Aguirre, G.R. No. 219952,
November 20, 2017)
Victim's consent is rendered meaningless due to the coercive, abusive, or

deceptive means employed by perpetrators of human trafficking. Even without
the use of coercive, abusive, or deceptive means, a minor's consent is not given
out of his or her own free will. (People vs. Bandojo, G.R. No. 234161, October 17,
2018)
2. The fact that there was no person to whom accused endorsed or

recruited his victims is of no moments. Neither the presence of the trafficker's
clients is required to support a finding of trafficking. To be sure, the gravamen of
the crime of trafficking is the act of recruiting or using a fellow human being for
sexual exploitation. (People vs. Estonilo, G.R. No. 248694, October 14, 2020)
3. Sexual intercourse with the victims is not required to support a finding

of trafficking. To be sure, the gravamen of the crime of trafficking is the act of
recruiting or using a fellow human being for sexual exploitation. (People vs.
Estonilo, G.R. No. 248694, October 14, 2020)
4. The accused had already been involved in the illegal trafficking of women
even prior to the entrapment operation and arrest. The accused was not forced
or induced to commit the crime. In fact, accused readily agreed to procure girls
for the poseur-buyers and in his active recruitment of the victims. Thus, his
defense of instigation has no merit. This is a valid entrapment. (People vs.
Amurao, G.R. No. 229514, July 28, 2020)
Qualifying circumstance of syndicate or large scale - Qualified

trafficking in person is committed when the crime is committed by a syndicate,
or in large scale. Trafficking is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out
by a group of 3 or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It
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is deemed committed in large scale if committed against 3 or more persons,

individually or as a group (People vs. Kelley, G.R. No. 243653, June 22, 2020)
There are as many crimes of trafficking in person as there are victims of

trafficking. In People vs. XXX, G.R. No. 235652, July 09, 2018, XXX and YYY
were convicted of three counts of qualified trafficking in persons for making their
three biological children (minors) perform acts of cybersex in pornographic
websites for different foreigner customers in exchange of money or ordering them
to dance naked in front of the computer with internet connectivity while
facilitating the webcam sessions and chatting with a certain customer. XXX is
convicted of another count of qualified trafficking in person for transporting and
providing her own minor biological child to a foreigner in Makati City for the
purpose of prostitution.
It is submitted however, that if the accused is charged with trafficking in

person with the qualifying circumstance of large scale involving three trafficking
victims, he should be held liable of one count of qualified trafficking in person.
Qualifying circumstance of minority – Minority cannot be appreciated as

a qualifying circumstance in trafficking in person if not alleged in the
information. (People v. Aguirre, G.R. No. 219952, November 20, 2017)
To appreciate the qualifying circumstance of minority of the victim in

trafficking in person, knowledge of the accused with regard to her minority is
inconsequential (People vs. Bandojo, G.R. No. 234161, October 17, 2018)
Promoting trafficking in person – The person, who knowingly leases or

subleases, uses or allows to be used any house, building or establishment for the
purpose of promoting trafficking in persons is liable for promoting trafficking in
person (Section 5 of RA No. 9208). The pimp is liable for trafficking in person
(Section 4). The customer of the trafficked prostitute is liable for use of trafficked
victim (Section 11). The trafficked prostitute is exempt from criminal liability for
the crime of prostitution (Sections 17 and 32)
In People vs. Saxo, G.R. No. 227704, April 10, 2019, accused owned a house
where its room was offered for lease for every paying customer of the
complainants, who engaged in sex for a fee. Accused is aware of these
prostitution activities since he cleaned the room after the complainant and her
customer finished using it. Moreover, he sold condoms to complainant's male
customers before using the room. The trial court trial court convicted him of
qualified trafficking in person for knowingly leasing his house for the purpose of
promoting trafficking in persons under Section 5 of RA No. 9208. The Supreme
Court said that the trial court committed a serious error. The crime under Section
5 of RA 9208 must be properly denominated as “acts that promote trafficking in
persons,” and not qualified trafficking in person.
The qualifying circumstance of minority under Section 6 of RA No. 9208 can

be appreciated if the crime is trafficking in person under Section 4. The
circumstance of minority cannot qualify promoting trafficking in person under
Section 5. (People vs. Sayo, supra)
ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT - An employee may be held liable with his

employer, if the former actively and consciously participated in illegal
recruitment. The employee cannot escape liability by claiming that she was not
aware that before working for her employer in the recruitment agency, she should
first be registered with the POEA. Illegal recruitment in large scale is malum
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prohibitum, not malum in se. Good faith is not a defense (People vs. Valenciano,
G.R. No. 180926, December 10, 2008).
The fact that no receipt was issued by appellant is not fatal to the
prosecution's cause, more so in this case where the respective testimonies of
private complainants clearly narrated appellant's involvement in illegal
recruitment activities. (People vs. Imperio, G.R. No. 232623, October 05, 2020)
Illegal recruitment involving failure to deploy is different from illegal

recruitment involving failure to reimburse. An officers of licensed recruitment
agency cannot be held liable for failure to deploy complainants in the absence
independent evidence from the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) to
establish the reason for non-deployment, such as the absence of a proper job
order. However, they can still be held liable for failure to make reimbursement.
Section 6(m) of RA 8042 criminalizes the failure to reimburse documentation and
processing expenses incurred by the applicant in case of non-deployment, and
not the failure to deploy, which is covered by a different provision. The law thus
makes it incumbent upon recruitment agencies, under pain of criminal sanction,
to promptly reimburse applicants when they are not deployed without their fault.
(People vs. Espiritu, G.R. No. 226140, February 26, 2020)
DANGEROUS DRUGS – The sheer volume of the seized drugs consisting of

almost eight (8) kilograms renders the defense of frame-up difficult to believe; the
large quantity of drugs seized reduces, if not eradicates, the possibility of planting
or tampering of evidence. (People vs. Wai Tang, G.R. No. 238517, November 27,
2019)
Transportation - Since the crime of transportation of dangerous drugs

is malum prohibitum, it is inconsequential to prove that the illegal drugs were
delivered or transported to another person. The only thing that had to be proven
was the movement of the illegal drugs from one place to another. (People vs.
Amago, G.R. No. 227739, January 15, 2020)
Under RA No. 9165, transportation of dangerous drugs can be committed

regardless of the quantity. However, if the quantity of the drugs is not
considerable or commercial, the offender, who is transporting drugs, can be
charged and convicted of possession of dangerous drugs. In Asuncion v. CA, G.R.
No. 125959, February 1, 1999, the accused was driving a car with 0.1216 gram
of shabu. In Sales v. People, G.R. No. 191023, February 6, 2013, the accused
was caught in possession of 0.23 gram of dried Marijuana at the departure area
of NAIA. In De Villa vs. People, G.R. No. 224039, September 11, 2019, the
accused was driving a motorcycle with 0.12 gram of shabu. The quantities of
drugs in Asuncion case, Sales case and De Villa case are not considerable or
commercial, which indicate that they possessed the same for consumption
purpose. Hence, they were charged with and convicted of possession of
dangerous drug and not the graver crime of transportation of dangerous drugs.
Importation - Accused were caught by police authorities on board a

speedboat carrying shabu. Since it was not proven that the drugs came from
China or foreign country they were convicted of possession of dangerous drugs,
which is necessarily included in the charge of importation (People vs. Chan Liu,
G.R. No. 189272, January 21, 2015). The accused can also be held liable of
transportation of dangerous drugs since the place of origin is inconsequential in
this crime.
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Sale - Even if the police transacted for the sale of shabu, the fact that the
seized drugs are ephedrine, will not warrant a reversal of the finding of guilt of
the accused. In any case, the charge in the information was clearly for violation
of Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165. It is immaterial whether the allegation was
for shabu or ephedrine, since both are dangerous drugs. Further, the purpose of
the laboratory examination is to confirm that the seized items are indeed
dangerous drugs. The police officers cannot be expected to conclude with
certainty whether the suspected dangerous drugs are shabu or ephedrine just by
visual inspection. What matters is that the prosecution was able to prove that
the seized items are indeed dangerous drugs and are the ones presented in court.
(People vs. Ming Tat, G.R. No. 246577, July 13, 2020)
Attempted sale or transportation - Poseur-buyer showed shabu for sale

to poseur buyer. The sale was aborted when the police officers immediately
placed accused under arrest. The crime committed is attempted sale (People vs.
Figueroa, G.R. No. 186141, April 11, 2012).
Accused intended to transport dangerous drugs to Malaysia through the

use of drug couriers in the person of the confidential informant and IO2 Alarde.
Confidential informant and IO2 Alarde were summoned to be given instructions
regarding the transportation of certain luggage to Malaysia. The confidential
informant and IO2 Alarde were brought by accused to a Hostel, where the
prohibit drugs were discovered. At that point, the crime of transportation of
prohibited drugs is already at its attempted stage. Even in the absence of actual
conveyance, an attempt to transport prohibited drugs is meted the same penalty
prescribed for the commission thereof under Section 26 of R.A. 9165. (People vs.
Runana, G.R. No. 229055, July 15, 2020)
The accused cannot be convicted of attempted transportation of dangerous

drugs where he was caught in possession thereon inside his car, which is not in
transit. The theory of the prosecution that there is clear intent to transport the
drug is speculative. (San Juan v. People, G.R. No. 177191, May 30, 2011) But
intent to transport illegal drugs is presumed whenever a huge volume thereof is
found in the possession of the accused until the contrary is proved. Here, five
hundred fifty-two (552) grams or half kilo of shabu is by no means a minuscule
amount indicating as well intent of the accused to deliver and transport them in
violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165. (People vs. Macaspac, G.R. No.
246165, November 28, 2019)
In People v. Burton, G.R. No. 114396, February 19, 1997, the accused came
from a hotel in Parañaque, where he stayed before he checked in at the NAIA and
was bound for Sydney, Australia. At the departure area of the airport, authorities
discovered dangerous drugs in the two pieces of luggage of the accused. It was
held that it is apparent that he wanted to bring the prohibited drug from
Parañaque to Sydney. However, because he was not able to pursue his trip, he
should be considered only to have attempted to transport the prohibited drug to
Sydney.
In People v. Dimaano, G.R. No. 174481, February 10, 2016, Justice Leonen,
the accused, who was caught in possession of dangerous drugs at the departure
area of Manila Domestic Airport was also convicted of attempted transportation
of dangerous drug. However, in People v. Jones, G.R. No. 115581, August 29,
1997, the accused was also caught in possession of dangerous drugs at the
departure area of NAIA, and yet, he was convicted of consummated
transportation of dangerous drugs. At any rate, the penalty prescribed for
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transportation of dangerous drugs is the same as that for attempted

transportation of dangerous drugs.
Drug den - Before a person may be convicted of visiting drug den, it must
be shown that he or she knew that the place visited was a drug den, and still
visited the place despite this knowledge. True, the drug test results sufficiently
proved that accused had used drugs some time before their arrest. However, the
positive result of the drug test cannot be used as a basis to assume that accused
used drugs at the drug den or that they were aware of the nature of the suspected
drug den before visiting it. Accused were not in possession of drugs. Nobody was
found in the act of using, selling or buying illegal drugs, nor packaging nor hiding
nor transporting the same. There is no evidence, which would tend to show that
the accused were familiar with the nature of the place as a drug den. Accused
were acquitted. (Coronel vs. People, G.R. No. 214536, March 13, 2017, Justice
Leonen)
Protector or coddler – P/Supt. Borromeo's participation was not limited

to merely protecting the violators nor facilitating their escape. His co-conspirators
regularly reported to and updated him of the operations in the shabu laboratory.
He monitored all the illegal activities through Dante, who acted under his control
and carried out specific instructions coming from him. These acts sufficiently
established his pivotal role in the conspiracy. Thus, there was no logical reason
for the CA to downgrade his liability from that of a co-conspirator to a mere
coddler or protector. Although the prosecution, at the time of the filing of the
Information, used the words "protector" or "coddler" to specify Borromeo's
participation in the conspiracy, the terminology is immaterial there being a clear
finding of conspiracy. The use of the words "protector" or "coddler" should not be
taken to mean that his liability as co-conspirator is automatically negated or
reduced. (People vs. CA, G.R. No. 227899, July 10, 2019)
Possession of drugs – Possession of different kinds of dangerous drugs in

a single occasion constitutes a single offense of possession of dangerous drugs
(David vs. People, G.R. No. 181861, October 17, 2011).
Section 13 of RA 9165 prescribes a higher penalty if a person is found

possessing any dangerous drug during a party, or at a social gathering or
meeting, or in the proximate company of at least two (2) persons. To qualify the
crime, the law does not require that possession is intended for the purpose of
using illegal drugs or that the accused is having a pot session with two persons.
In fact, under Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165, the phrase
"company of at least 2 persons" was defined to "mean the accused plus at least
two (2) others, who may or may not be in possession of any dangerous drug."
(Plan, Jr. vs. People, G.R. No. 247589, August 24, 2020)
The purpose of Section 13 is to deter the proliferation of prohibited drugs

to other persons. Possession of dangerous drugs is a crime in itself; but when the
possessor is found in a situation where there is a tendency or opportunity to
proliferate drugs to other persons, either through direct peddling or even some
indirect influence, the gravity of the crime is exacerbated. In addition, when one
possesses dangerous drugs, there is always a chance that the possessor uses
and consequently, becomes "under the influence." Thus, in the circumstances
stated in Section 13, the possessor does not only become an imminent threat to
his own safety and well-being, but also to other people within his close proximity;
hence, the stiffer penalties. (Plan, Jr. vs. People, G.R. No. 247589, August 24,
2020)
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Use of dangerous drugs – Use of dangerous drugs is committed by a

person apprehended or arrested, who is found to be positive for use of any
dangerous drug, after a confirmatory test. Where the person tested is also found
to have in his possession, he shall be charged of possession of dangerous drugs
and not use of dangerous drugs (Section 15 of RA No. 9165).
Where residue of dangerous drugs is found and there is a positive

confirmatory test result, the accused should be charged with use rather than
possession of dangerous drugs. This would be in keeping with the intent of the
law to rehabilitate first time offenders of drug use and provide them with an
opportunity to recover for a second chance at life (People vs. Matinez, G.R. No.
191366, December 13, 2010).
To be held liable for use of dangerous drugs, two distinct drug tests are
required: a screening test and a confirmatory test. A positive screening test must
be confirmed for it to be valid in a court of law. The test conducted on the urine
specimen of the accused was a Thin Layer Chromatography or TLC - a screening
test. When the urine sample recovered from accused yielded a positive result, the
specimen should have been subjected to a second test - the confirmatory test. It
is the second or further analytical procedure to more accurately determine the
presence of dangerous drugs in the specimen. The records are silent on any
reference to a second, more specific, examination on the urine sample. Accused
was acquitted. (People vs. Lopez, G.R. No. 247974, July 13, 2020)
Positive confirmatory test is an element of use of dangerous drugs.

However, the absence of such test cannot be raised as an issue for the first time
on appeal (Ambre vs. People, G.R. No. 191532. August 15, 2012).
Coordination with PDEA - Section 86 of RA No. 9165, which declares

PDEA shall be the "lead agency" in the investigations and prosecutions of drug-
related cases, is more of an administrative provision. It is silent as to the
consequences of failure on the part of the law enforcers to seek the authority of
the PDEA prior to conducting a buy-bust operation (People vs. Berdadero, G.R.
No. 179710 June 29, 2010). Lack of coordination with the PDEA will not
invalidate a buy-bust operation. Such coordination is not an indispensable
requirement in buy-bust operations (People vs. Mendosa, G.R. No. 189327,
February 29, 2012).
Chain of custody - The chain of custody refers to recorded authorized

movements and custody of confiscated dangerous drugs. It involves testimony on
every link in the chain - from the confiscation of the illegal drugs to its receipt in
the forensic laboratory up to its presentation in court. It is necessary that every
person who touched the seized item describe how and from whom he or she
received it; where and what happened to it while in the witness’ possession; its
condition when received and at the time it was delivered to the next link in the
chain. Generally, there are four links in said chain of custody: 1) the seizure and
marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug confiscated from the accused by the
apprehending officer; 2) the turnover of the seized drug by the apprehending
officer to the investigating officer; 3) the turnover by the investigating officer of
said item to the forensic chemist for examination; and, 4) the turnover and
submission thereof from forensic chemist to the court (People vs. Gajo, G.R. No.
217026, January 22, 2018).
Inventory and photography – Under Section 21 of RA No. 9165, the

apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph
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the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items
were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory
and be given a copy thereof.
Under Section 21 of RA No. 9165 as amended by RA No. 10640, the

inventory and photography of the seized items must be made in the presence of
“at least three persons”, to wit: (1) the accused or the person from whom such
items were confiscated or his representative or counsel; (2) any elected public
official, and (3) the media or representatives of National Prosecution Service. RA
No. 9165 as amended uses the disjunctive “or” in the phrase “the National
Prosecution elected public official Service or the media.” Thus, a representative
from the media and a representative from the National Prosecution Service are
now alternatives to each other (People vs. Que, G.R. No. 212994, January 31,
2018; People vs. Baluyot, G.R. No. 243390, October 05, 2020)
The original version of Section 21 of RA No. 9165 did not provide the effect
of non-compliance of the rule on inventory and photography of the confiscated
item. Section 21 of RA No. 9165 as amended by Republic Act No. 10640, now
includes a proviso that sanctions noncompliance under "justifiable grounds":
Provided, finally, That noncompliance of these requirements under justifiable
grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and
invalid such seizures and custody over said items (People vs. Que, G.R. No.
212994, January 31, 2018). The justifiable ground for non-compliance must be
proven as a fact, because the Court cannot presume what these grounds are or
that they even exist. Moreover, for the above-saving clause to apply, the
prosecution must explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses, and that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized evidence had nonetheless been
preserved (People vs. Paz, G.R. No. 229512, January 31, 2018).
The following are justifiable grounds for failure to comply with the three-
witnesses rule:
1. The attendance of elective official and media or NPS representative was

impossible because the place of arrest was a remote area;
2. The safety of these required witnesses during the inventory and

photograph of the seized drugs was threatened by an immediate retaliatory action
of the accused or any person acting for and in his behalf;
3. The elected official themselves were involved in the punishable acts

sought to be apprehended;
4. The time constraints and urgency of the anti-drug operations, which

often rely on tips of confidential assets, prevented the law enforcers from
obtaining the presence of the required witnesses even before the offenders could
escape; or
5. Earnest efforts to secure the presence of these required witnesses within

the period required under Article 125 of RPC prove futile through no fault of the
arresting officers, who face the threat of being charged with arbitrary detention.
(People vs. Lim, G.R. No. 231989, September 4, 2018)
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The police were able to explain the failure to conduct an inventory and take
photographs of the seized items. This is because of the intervening fact that one
Illuminado Acosta was shot at the time of the buy-bust operation (People vs. Flor,
G.R. No. 216017, January 19, 2018).
In People vs. Lim, supra, an agent testified that no members of the media
and barangay officials arrived at the crime scene because it was late at night and
it was raining, making it unsafe for them to wait at the house of the accused.
Another agent similarly declared that the inventory was made in the PDEA office
considering that it was late in the evening and there were no available media
representative and barangay officials despite their effort to contact them. He
admitted that there are times when they do not inform the barangay officials prior
to their operation as they might leak the confidential information. These
justifications are unacceptable as there was no genuine and sufficient attempt to
comply with the law. The prosecution likewise failed to explain why they did not
secure the presence of a representative from the DOJ. Accused was acquitted.
Justice Leonen concurred with the acquittal of the accused.
In People v. Lim, supra, the Supreme Court, En Banc, expressly required

that the police officers must in the sworn statements state their compliance with
the requirements of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 or the justification for non-
compliance thereof and steps taken to preserve the integrity of the confiscated
dangerous drugs; otherwise, the investigating fiscal must not immediately file the
case before the court. Instead, he must refer the case for further preliminary
investigation. If the investigating fiscal filed the case despite such absence, the
court may exercise its discretion to either refuse to issue a commitment order or
warrant of arrest or dismiss the case outright for lack of probable cause.
The policeman failed to comply with the rule on three-witnesses and did
not offer justifiable grounds for such non-compliance. However, the issue of non–
compliance with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 cannot be raised for the first time
on appeal. Hence, the defense of the accused should be rejected (People v. Badilla,
G.R. No. 218578, August 31, 2016)
When the quantity of the confiscated substance is miniscule (e.g. 0.03

grams of shabu), the requirements of Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, must be
strictly complied with. (People vs. Saragena, G.R. No. 210677, August 23, 2017,
Justice Leonen)
Place where inventory and photography shall be conducted - Section

21 of RA No. 9165 as amended by RA No. 10640 includes a specification of
locations where the physical inventory and taking of photographs must be
conducted. The amended section uses the mandatory verb "shall." If there is a
search warrant, the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the
place where the warrant is served. In case of warrantless seizures, the physical
inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the nearest police station or at
the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable
(People vs. Que, G.R. No. 212994, January 31, 2018).
Plea bargaining – Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby

the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of
the case subject to court approval. It usually involves the defendant's pleading
guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts of a multi-count
indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that for the graver charge. The
basic requisites of plea bargaining are: (1) consent of the offended party; (2)
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consent of the prosecutor; (3) plea of guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily
included in the offense charged; and (4) approval of the court. (Fernandez vs.
People, G.R. No. 224708, October 02, 2019)
Section 23 of RA No. 9165, any person charged under any crime involving
dangerous drugs regardless of the imposable penalty shall not be allowed to avail
of the provision on plea-bargaining. However, this provision was declared as
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unconstitutional for contrary to the rule making authority of the Supreme Court
(Estipona, Jr. vs. Lobrigo, G.R. No. 226679, August 15, 2017). Following this
pronouncement, the Supreme Court issued A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC providing for
a plea-bargaining framework in drugs cases, while the Secretary of Justice issued
DOJ Circular No. 27 on plea bargaining. The Supreme Court guidelines on
acceptable plea bargaining are different from those provided by the DOJ.
Department of Justice Circular No. 27 does not violate the rule-making

power of this Court. A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC and Office of the Court Administrator
Circular No. 90-2018 are not part of the Rules of Court. They are, like
Department of Justice Circular No. 27, internal guidelines for plea bargaining in
drug offenses. Mere conflicting provisions among these issuances will not
necessarily render the executive issuance unconstitutional. A prosecutor's duty
is to prosecute the proper offense based on the sufficiency of the evidence.
Consent to a plea of guilty to a lower offense is solely within prosecutorial
discretion. Courts do not have the discretion to mandate what offense the
prosecution should prosecute. (Concurring opinion of Justice Leonen in Sayre
vs. Xenos, G.R. Nos. 244413 & 244415-16, February 18, 2020)
Plea bargaining is also called as a plea-bargaining agreement because it is

actually an agreement between the accused, the offended party, and the public
prosecutor where the former will be allowed to enter a plea to a lesser offense. In
a victimless crime or where the offended party failed to appear despite notice,
plea bargaining agreement can be entered into between the accused and the
public prosecutor.
The court is not a party to a plea-bargaining agreement. Same as in a

compromise agreement in a civil case, the function of the court is to approve or
to reject a plea-bargaining agreement. Without conformity of the public
prosecutor to a plea bargaining involving a victimless crime such as sale of
dangerous drugs, there is technically no plea-bargaining agreement that the
court can approve. The court cannot approve a unilateral plea bargaining, or one
made by the accused without consent of the fiscal. The word “bargaining”
presupposes that there are at least two persons negotiating on the terms of a
transaction. Obviously, a single person cannot bargain or negotiate with himself.
In fact, Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure requires the
conformity of the public prosecutor to a plea bargaining.
In People vs. Reafor, G.R. No. 247575, November 16, 2020, the Supreme
Court ruled: The RTC gravely abused its discretion in granting respondent's
motion to plea bargain notwithstanding the prosecution's opposition to the same
which is grounded on DOJ Circular No. 27. Effectively, respondent's plea of guilty
to a lesser offense to which he was convicted of was made without the consent of
the prosecution. Since respondent's plea of guilt and subsequent conviction for
a lesser offense clearly lack one of the requisites of a valid plea bargain, the plea
bargaining is void. Resultantly, the judgment rendered by the RTC which was
based on a void plea bargaining is also void ab initio and cannot be considered
to have attained finality for the simple reason that a void judgment has no legality
from its inception.
RA No. 3019 – Corruption is an independent crime. Section 3 of R.A. No.

3019 reads: “In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized
by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public
officer.” It is clear then that one may be charged with v3019iolation of R.A. No.
3019 in addition to a felony under RPC for the same act. (Ramiscal, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 169727–28, August 18, 2006) Thus, the offender in
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addition to violation of Section 3 of R.A. No. 3019 can be held liable for
falsification of document by public official (Suero v. People, G.R. No. 156408,
January 31, 2005); or malversation through falsification of document (People vs.
Pajaro, G.R. Nos. 167860–65, June 17, 2008) or failure to render an accounting.
(Lumauig v. People, G.R. No. 166680, July 7, 2014); or plunder (See: Senator
Revilla vs. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 212427-28, December 6, 2016)
SECTION 3 (C) - Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 3019 is committed by a public

officer who shall directly or indirectly request or receive any gift, present or other
pecuniary or material benefit, for himself or for another, from any person for
whom the public officer, in any manner or capacity, has secured or obtained, or
will secure or obtain, any Government permit or license, in consideration for the
help given or to be given.
Under the last paragraph of Section 3, the person giving the gift, present,
share, percentage or benefit in Section 3(c) shall, together with the offending
public officer, be punished.
In Lucman vs. People, G.R. No. 238815, March 18, 2019, DENR officer
demanded P2,500,000.00 and actually received P1,500,000.00 from private
complainants in consideration of the grant of their applications for free patents
is liable under Section 3 (c).
SECTION 3 (D) – For one to be found guilty under Section 3 (d) of RA No.
3019, the following elements must be present: (a) the accused is a public officer;
(b) he or she accepted or has a member of his or her family who accepted
employment in a private enterprise; and (c) such private enterprise has a pending
official business with the public officer during the pendency of official business
or within one year from its termination.
Wife of accused, a TESDA officer, accepted employment in RACE, Inc., a

private enterprise, which has a pending official business with TESDA. Accused
in his official capacity approved TESDA accreditation of RACE. Accused in
conspiracy with his wife, is liable for corruption under Section 3 (d) of RA No.
3019. Because of conspiracy, his wife is also liable. Moreover, under Section 9
(a), private person committing any of the unlawful acts under this law shall also
be punished. (Villanueva vs. People, G.R. No. 237864, July 08, 2020)
The fact that RACE is a non-stock and non-profit educational association

is immaterial. Regardless if the enterprise is for profit or not, stock or non-stock,
the law does not distinguish. It is an elementary rule in statutory construction
that: where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not distinguish.
(Villanueva vs. People, supra)
Violation of Section 3 (d) of RA 3019 is considered malum prohibitum. Mere

acceptance by co-accused, a family member, of employment with RACE renders
accused liable under the law. (Villanueva vs. People, supra)
SECTION 3 (E) - The following are the essential elements for violation of
Section 3 (e) of RA 3019: (1) The accused must be a public officer discharging
administrative, judicial or official functions; (2) He must have acted with manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and (3) That his action
caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or giving any
private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of
his functions. (Office of the Ombudsman vs. Prudente, G.R. No. 201830,
November 10, 2015; PCGG vs. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 194159, October 21, 2015)
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Public bidding - A mayor, who purchased medical supplies, without public

bidding, is liable for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA No. 3019 for giving
unwarranted preference and benefit to the seller. (Cabrera vs. People, G.R. Nos.
191611-14, July 29, 2019; People vs. Austria, G.R. 243897, June 08, 2020)
Permit to construct - Accused, an Administrator of Intramuros

Administration, acted with gross inexcusable negligence when he knowingly
allowed OCDC to commence construction on the Intramuros Walls without the
required permits or clearances. By his actions, he gave unwarranted benefits to
a private party, i.e., OCDC, to the detriment of the public insofar as the
preservation and development plans for Intramuros are concerned. He is liable
for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA No. 3019 (Ferrer vs. People, G.R. No. 240209,
June 10, 2019)
Notice to proceed - Accused gave unwarranted benefits and advantage to

several contractors by allowing them to deploy their equipment ahead of the
scheduled public bidding. Under law, a public contract shall be awarded to the
lowest prequalified bidder. The successful bidder may be allowed to commence
work only upon receipt of a Notice to Proceed. They are liable for violation of
Section 3 (e) of RA No. 3019. (Abubakar vs. People, G.R. No. 202408, June 27,
Disbursement of fund for unauthorized travel - Accused, a Mayor of

Municipality of Taal, travelled to Manila, without securing permission from
Governor prior to his departure. As Mayor, he approved disbursement of funds
representing reimbursement for travel expenses. When audit was conducted, he
obtained travel approval from the Governor. A travel is unauthorized because the
accused did not obtain a written permission from the governor prior to his
departure as required by law. Subsequent approval of the travel by the Governor
will not validate the travel. Unauthorized travel is not a violation of Section 3 (e)
of RA No. 3019. But approving disbursement of public fund for reimbursement
of expenses for unauthorized travel violates this provision since it caused undue
injury to Municipality of Taal through bad faith. (Cabrera vs. People, G.R. Nos.
191611-14, July 29, 2019)
Donating in good faith - It cannot be denied that the transfer of the

vehicles to SFWD was made to ensure the success of the implementation of the
waterworks projects in the province. The Deed of Donation expressly provided
that the subject vehicles shall be used for the said purpose. There is no showing
that the accused acted in bad faith in donating the vehicles. Accused was
acquitted of violation of RA No. 3019 (Bustillo vs. People, G.R. No. 160718 May
12, 2010).
Erroneous interpretation of the law - Five percent (5%) of the total

PhilHealth honoraria was allocated to the non - health professionals OR staff of
the PCB Provider. As to who these non-health or professionals mentioned, they
were not specifically identified. The rule does not expressly indicate whether they
need be part of the official roll of employees of the Municipal Health Office. Non-
health professionals include the rank and file employees or administrative staff
of the Municipal Health Office who are not among the front liners providing
access to health care. It also covers volunteers and community members of
health teams. This led accused to honestly believed, albeit mistakenly, that the
office of the municipal mayor which exercises control and supervision over the
Municipal Health Office and its personnel, may likewise be covered by the term
"non-health professional." Consequently, he acted in good faith when he received
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the P17,512.50 honorarium, anchored as it was on the honest belief that he was
legally entitled to the benefit. Otherwise stated, accused did not act in bad faith
when he mistakenly interpreted Section V (G) of PhilHealth Circular No. 010 s.
2012. Erroneous interpretation of a provision of law, absent any showing of some
dishonest or wrongful purpose, does not constitute and does not necessarily
amount to bad faith. (People vs. Bacaltos, G.R. No. 248701, July 28, 2020)
Under Section 138 of Local Government Code, permit to extract sand,

gravel and other quarry resources shall be issued exclusively by the provincial
governor. However, under Section 444 of the same, a municipal mayor has a
general authority to issue licenses and permits. Believing that applicability of
Section 444, the accused, a municipal mayor issued extraction permits. He was
charged of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA No. 3019. According to Justice Leonen
in his Dissenting Opinion, the brazen act of granting permits without any basis
in law gives rise to a presumption of bad faith. However, the Supreme Court
acquitted the accused. From the tenor of his letter to provincial officers, accused
was very emphatic in his belief and reasoning, albeit mistakenly, that, under the
Local Government Code, he as municipal mayor has authority to issue the
permits. Although he committed a mistake in interpreting the law, such mistake
is not tantamount to evident bad faith, manifest partiality or gross inexcusable
negligence under Section 3(e) of RA 3019. (Villarosa vs. People, G.R. Nos. 233155-
63, June 23, 2020)
Demolition without due process of law - In Cuerpo vs. People, G.R. No.
203382, September 18, 2019, members of Samahan occupied lands in Quezon
City as squatters. In an ejectment case, they agreed to voluntarily vacate the
properties. They planned to relocate in Rodriguez, Rizal, but the accused,
municipal mayor, refused to allow squatters to relocate therein. Samahan bought
a property therein but Office of the Municipal Engineer refuse to process the
application for building permit. Because of the writ of demolition issued by the
Court of Quezon City, members of the Samahan were forced moved to their
purchased lot and built temporary shelters made of lumber and tarpaulin despite
the lack of building. Accused caused the demolition the makeshift homes and
took away lumber, tarpaulin, plywood, and appliances. Accused is liable for
violation of Section 3 (e) of RA No. 3019 for causing undue injury to the members
of Samahan through manifest partiality and evidence bad faith.
Under the Constitution, urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted
nor their dwellings demolished, except in accordance with law and a just and
humane manner. Members of Samahan are urban poor dwellers, and yet, they
were evicted in disregard of the law.
Under RA No. 7279, summary eviction and demolition are also allowed in
cases pertaining to identified professional squatters, squatting syndicates and
new squatter families. "Professional squatters'" refer to individuals or groups who
occupy lands without the express consent of the landowner and who have
sufficient income for legitimate housing. They are persons who have previously
been awarded homelots or housing units by the Government but who sold, leased
or transferred the same to settle illegally in the same place or in another urban
area, and non-bona fide occupants and intruders of lands reserved for socialized
housing. The term shall not apply to individuals or groups who simply rent land
and housing from professional squatters or squatting syndicates. "Squatting
syndicates", on the other hand, refers to groups of persons engaged in the
business of squatter housing for profit or gain. While "new squatter" refers to
individual groups who occupy land without the express consent of the landowner
Page 95 of 115
after March 28, 1992. Members of Samahan are not squatters because the
construction of makeshift homes was made on their own property.
Under RA No. 7279, eviction or demolition, however, may be allowed under

the following situations: (a) When persons or entities occupy danger areas such
as esteros, railroad tracks, and other public places such as sidewalks, and parks;
(b) When government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to
be implemented; or (c) When there is a court order for eviction and demolition.
None of these circumstances is obtaining in this case.
Granting that the shanties of members of Samahan were constructed

without the necessary building or development permits, this fact does not
automatically necessitate the summary demolition. Property rights are involved,
thereby needing notices and opportunity to be heard as provided for in the
constitutionally guaranteed right of due process. Without compliance with the
laws allowing for eviction and demolition, accused was not justified in employing
procedural sidesteps in displacing them from their property by a mere
Memorandum ordering for summary demolition issued by accused. Accused
should have undergone the appropriate proceeding as set out in the law.
Gross inexcusable negligence - In Reyes vs. People, G.R. No. 237172,

September 18, 2019 (Justice Leonen), accused, a governor, was charged of
violation of Section 3 (e) of RA No. 3019 for renewing the small-scale mine permit
of Olympic Mines. Since the renewal of permit was not exclusively granted to
Olympic Mines, manifest partiality as an element of this crime is not present.
There is no evident bad faith since the law existing at the time did not expressly
prohibit the renewal of small-scale mining permits before their expiration.
However, accused committed gross inexcusable negligence when he approved the
permit considering that Olympic Mines violated the terms and conditions of old
permit. Accused, as the local chief executive, had the duty to act within the best
interests of his constituents and to safeguard the environment's natural
resources. Olympic Mines disregard the dry metric ton threshold set by the law.
This law ensures that small scale mining activities will not result in
environmental damage. His gross inexcusable negligence, thus, caused undue
injury to Palawan, as it exposed the province to various environmental threats
resulting from irresponsible mining.
Arias principle -In Arias v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 81563 and 82512,
December 19, 1989, the property bought by the City is overpriced. When the
accused was appointed as treasurer, the sale of the property had already been
consummated. Accused was charged with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019 for causing damage to the government through manifest partiality and
evident bad faith. The only evidence presented by the prosecution is his signature
on the voucher. He was acquitted. Heads of offices can rely to a reasonable extent
on their subordinates on preparation of bids, purchase of supplies, or
negotiations. Any executive head agencies or commissions can attest to the
volume of papers that must be signed. Thus, executive head cannot be convicted
on the sole basis of signature or approval appearing on a voucher. To sustain a
conspiracy charge and conviction, evidence must be presented other than her
signature on the voucher.
The principle in the Arias case is not applicable in the following cases:
a. If other than the accused’s signature on the voucher, circumstances

show evident bad faith, or manifest partiality such as: (a) Where the accused has
foreknowledge of existing anomaly – e.g., mayor signed the inspection report and
Page 96 of 115
the disbursement voucher despite the fact that he had foreknowledge that the
materials delivered by Guadines have already been confiscated by the DENR
(Escara v. People, G.R. No. 164921, July 8, 2005); or (b) where accused approved
the voucher without indication of the retention money required by law, and he
even inspected the construction site of hospital boat being constructed, in which
he should have noticed the financial weakness of the contractor and the defective
works (Rivera v. People, G.R. No. 156577, December 3, 2014);
b. If other than the accused’s signature on the voucher, circumstances

show gross inexcusable negligence such as where there is deviation from ordinary
procedure, which necessitate further investigation – e.g., mayor issued and
encashed municipal checks despite the facts that the disbursement vouchers
were in the name of Kelly Lumber but the checks were payable to another person
and not to Kelly Lumber (Cruz v. The Hon. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 134493,
August 16, 2005);
In Lihaylihay vs. People, G.R. No. 191219, July 31, 2013, the accused in
his capacity as Chairman of the Inspection and Acceptance Committee, signed
the 16 certificates of acceptance, inventory, and delivery of articles despite its
incompleteness or lack of material dates, while co-accused certified to the
correctness of the Inspection Report Forms even if no such deliveries were made.
Since there are reasons for the heads of offices to further examine the documents
in question, accused cannot seek refuge by invoking the Arias doctrine.
The Arias doctrine cannot exonerate accused from criminal liability

because there were circumstances that should have prompted them to make
further inquiries on the transactions subject of this case e.g. the irregular
mobilization of contractors prior to the scheduled public bidding, and contract
which contains a patently illegal stipulation and advance payment without
appropriate documents such as purchase orders and delivery receipts to support
this disbursement. (Abubakar vs. People, G.R. No. 202408, June 27, 2018,
Justice Leonen)
c. If the public officer acting in his capacity as head of office has not relied
on his subordinates but on officers of equal rank such as heads of the Office of
the City Treasurer and, the Office of the City Accountant in approving the cash
advances in the amount of P18 million to paymaster despite of the failure to
liquidate previous cash advances (Jaca v. People, G.R. No. 166967, January 28,
2013); and
d. If the documents involving the release of funds are not so voluminous

so as to preclude him from studying each one carefully. (Santillano v. People, G.R.
Nos. 175045–46, March 3, 2010)
Malversation can be committed intentionally or through dolo. Hence, the

Arias principle cannot be applied as a defense in a case involving malversation if
there is evidence of negligence on the part of the accountable officer.
Where there are circumstances that should have alerted heads of offices to
exercise more diligence in the performance of their duties, they cannot escape
liability by claiming that they relied on good faith on the submissions of their
subordinates. There were discrepancies in the voucher and the check, which
should have prodded. The governor, treasurer, management and audit analyst to
examine the supporting documents for the fund disbursement. Thus, Arias is
not applicable. They are liable of malversation through negligence. Escobar vs.
People, G.R. No. 205576, November 20, 2017, Justice Leonen
Page 97 of 115
Actual damage - In causing undue injury to the government or any party

under Section 3 (e) of RA No. 3019, offended party must sustain actual loss or
damage, which must exist as a fact and cannot be based on speculations or
conjectures. The loss or damage need not be proven with actual certainty.
However, there must be some reasonable basis by which the court, can measure
it. Aside from this, the loss or damage must be substantial. It must be more than
necessary, excessive, improper or illegal. In giving unwarranted benefits,
advantage, or preference to a private party, proof of the extent or quantum of
damage is not thus essential. It is sufficient that the accused has given
unjustified favor or benefit to another. (Cabrera vs. People, G.R. Nos. 191611-14,
July 29, 2019)
SECTION 3 (G) - The elements of violation of Section 3 (g) are: (a) that the
accused is a public officer; (b) that he entered into a contract or transaction on
behalf of the government; and (c) that such contract or transaction is grossly and
manifestly disadvantageous to the government. (PCGG vs. Gutierrez, G.R. No.
194159, October 21, 2015)
Unlike Section 3 (e) of RA No. 3019, Section 3 (g) does not require the giving
of unwarranted benefits, advantages or preferences to private parties who
conspire with public officers, its core element being the engagement in a
transaction or contract that is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the
government. (PCGG vs. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 193176, February
24, 2016)
Behest loan – Granting of behest loan by government bank or entity to

private individual violates Section 3 (g) of RA No. 3019 by entering into a contract
or transaction on behalf of the government, which is grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government; or Section 3 (e) by giving unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference to private party.
The following criteria may be utilized as a frame of reference in determining

a behest loan: (1) it is under-collateralized; (2) the borrower corporation is
undercapitalized; (3) direct or indirect endorsement by high government officials
like presence of marginal notes; (4) stockholders, officers or agents of the
borrower corporation are identified as cronies (of high government officials); (5)
deviation of use of loan proceeds from the purpose intended; (6) Use of corporate
layering; (7) non-feasibility of the project for which financing is being sought; and
(8) extraordinary speed in which the loan release was made. (See: PCGG vs.
Desierto, G.R. No. 139296, November 23, 2007)
The amount and number of loans (P16 million) obtained from the
government bank by the private company despite being undercapitalized (P7
million capital stock) and absence of any action by the bank to collect full
payment are showing that the contract, which is manifestly disadvantageous on
the part of the government, violates Section 3 (g) of RA No. 3019. The private
individual, who obtained that loan, and the responsible bank officers are liable
for the crime of corruption. Private persons may likewise be charged with
violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 if they conspired with the public officer in
consonance with the avowed policy of this law, which is to repress certain acts of
public officers and private persons (Singian, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos.
195011-19 September 30, 2013).
SECTION 3 (H) - Violation of Section 3 (h) of RA No. 3019 is committed by

a public officer, who directly or indirectly have financial or pecuniary interest in
Page 98 of 115
any business, contract or transaction in connection with which he intervenes or

takes part in his official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution
or by any law from having any interest.
In People vs. Hon. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 233280-92, September 18,

2019, the accused is a TESDA director. The Bids and Award Committee members
recommended the award to supplies materials to CDZ Enterprises owned by the
sister of the accused. TESDA had several purchase orders from this company.
Accused was acquitted of the crime of violation of Section 3 (h) of RA No. 3019.
In this case, the prosecution merely assumed the pecuniary interest of the
accused when her sister's company, CDZ Enterprises, was able to submit the
lowest price quotations for the contracts due to the accused's intervention. The
existence of relationship per se does not automatically translate to having direct
or indirect financial interest in the subject contracts. The prosecution was not
able to present evidence that the accused received any financial benefit from
these transactions. Mere allegation that the parties are related to each other is
not conclusive proof of such pecuniary interest.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Leonen argued that accused, a TESDA

director, has the burden to contradict the presumption that she indirectly
benefitted financially from the transaction of her sister with TESDA. When a
person assists her sibling in obtaining an award, that person will indirectly
benefit financially following the ordinary course of life in the Filipino family.
Article 291 of the Civil Code provides for the obligation of brothers and sisters to
render support to each other.
Majority of the justices disagreed with Justice Leonen. Indirect pecuniary

benefit cannot be presumed from the mere fact of assistance being rendered by
accused to her sister in obtaining the award at TESDA. Article 291 of the Civil
Code cannot be made to apply in this case, since the record is bereft of proof that
accused was obliged to financially support or that she was, in fact, providing
financial support to her sister or that the latter was financially dependent on the
former. Since her sister is the registered owner of CDZ Enterprises, it is presumed
that she is financially independent from accused.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Leonen argued that the accused should
have be convicted based on the case of Republic vs. Tuvera, G.R. No. 48246,
February 16, 2007, where it was expressly found that a relationship, in and of
itself, can establish the indirect pecuniary interest of someone charged with
violation of Section 3 (h) of RA No. 3019.
Majority of the Justices disagreed with Justice Leonen. In the Tuvera

case, the respondent, who is the Presidential Executive Assistant of President
Marcos, is the father of the principal stockholder of Twin Peaks. Acting on the
request of Twin Peaks, President Marcos granted Timber License Agreement in
favor of the company. There was no public bidding. They failed to comply with
the requisites for the grant of such agreement by negotiation. Twin Peaks was
not legally capacitated to be granted such agreement because it has insufficient
logging equipment to engage in the logging business. According to the Supreme
Court in Tuvera case, certainly, the circumstances presented by the evidence of
the prosecution are sufficient to shift the burden of evidence to respondent in
establishing that he did not violate the provisions of RA No. 3019 in relation to
the Twin Peaks' request. The burden was shifted to respondent because he
waived his right to present evidence to disprove that he violated the allegations
against him.
Page 99 of 115
None of the foregoing circumstances in Tuvera case were present in the

case of People vs. Hon. Sandiganbayan. Unlike in the Tuvera case where the
totality of the prosecution evidence created a presumption of indirect pecuniary
benefit against the accused, the prosecution in People vs. Hon. Sandiganbayan
failed to show the connection of Zurbano to CDZ Enterprises or how Zurbano's
intervention led to her acquisition of any financial interest or benefit. The
assistance rendered to a sibling maybe by reason of love or some other concept
of familial duty, without not necessarily contemplating any monetary gain.
INORDINATE DELAY DOCTRINE – Inordinate delay in resolving a

criminal complaint is violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right to due
process and to the speedy disposition of cases, which warrants the dismissal of
the criminal case. Delay prejudices the accused or respondent and the State just
the same. Prejudice should be assessed in the light of the interest of the
defendant that the speedy trial was designed to protect, namely: to prevent
oppressive pre-trial incarceration; to minimize anxiety and concerns of the
accused to trial; and to limit the possibility that his defense will be impaired. Of
these, the most serious is the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately
to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system. There is also prejudice
if the defense witnesses are unable to recall accurately the events of the distant
past.
In Coscolluela, the fact that it took the Ombudsman eight years to resolve
a case under preliminary investigation was considered violative of the right to
speedy disposition of cases. In Cervantes, it took the OSP six years from the filing
of the initiatory complaint before deciding to file an information; this was struck
down as well. In Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, a three-year delay in the termination
of the preliminary investigation by the Tanodbayan was considered violative of
the right. In Lopez, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman, the preliminary investigation
was resolved close to four years from the time all the counter- and reply-affidavits
were submitted to the Ombudsman, and this was similarly struck down.
In People v. Sandiganbayan, the fact-finding investigation and preliminary
investigation by the Ombudsman lasted nearly five years and five months, which
the Court considered an inordinate delay. The same is true in Angchangco,
Jr., and Roque v. Office of the Ombudsman, where the delay involved a period of
six years, more or less. In Licaros, the failure of the Sandiganbayan to decide the
case even after the lapse of more than 10 years after it was submitted for decision
was declared to involve "more than just a mere procrastination in the
proceedings. In this case, the preliminary investigation proceedings in said case
took more than 11 long years to resolve. Thus, the case against petitioner should
be dismissed (Almeda vs. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 204267, July 25,
2016; Magbaet vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 230869-70, September 16, 2020)
The prosecution's sheer inaction means that it has failed to diligently and timely
pursue its case. Such failure amounts to a violation of an accused's
constitutional rights, warranting the "radical relief' of putting an end to the
proceedings. Concurring opinion by Justice Leonen in People vs. Pagal, G.R. No.
241257, September 29, 2020).
RA No. 6713 - In order to sustain a conviction for violation of Section 7 (d)

of RA 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standard for Public Officials), the
following elements must be proved with moral certainty: (a) that the accused is a
public official or employee; (b) that the accused solicited or accepted any loan or
anything of monetary value from any person; and (c) that the said act was done
in the course of the accused's official duties or in connection with any operation
Page 100 of 115

being regulated by, or any transaction which may be affected by the functions of
his office.
In this case, the prosecution was able to establish all the foregoing
elements, considering that: (a) at the time the subject loans were obtained,
accused was a public official; (b) she solicited and accepted the subject loans
from CABMPCI, which was a cooperative that was being regulated by her office;
and (c) the subject loans were obtained from CABMPCI, the transactions and
operations of which are regulated by the functions of the office of the
accused. The Cooperative Code makes membership in cooperatives available to
all individuals regardless of their social, political, racial or religious background
or beliefs. However, this law does not accord accused, by virtue of the functions
of her office, complete freedom in any of her personal transactions with any
cooperative despite her membership therein. The limitation of CDA officials and
employees to obtain loans from cooperatives is but a necessary consequence of
the privilege of holding their public office. (Villanueva vs. People, G.R. No.
237738, June 10, 2019)
Receiving gift – Receiving gift by public officer (e.g policeman) per se is

not a crime.
Under Section 3 (d) of RA No.6713, "receiving any gift" includes the act of
accepting directly or indirectly, a gift from a person other than a member of his
family or relative as defined in this Act, even on the occasion of a family
celebration or national festivity like Christmas, if the value of the gift is neither
nominal nor insignificant, or the gift is given in anticipation of, or in exchange for,
a favor.
If the value of the gift is nominal or insignificant, or the gift is not given in
anticipation of, or in exchange for, a favor, the police officer, who received such
gift, is not liable under Section 7 (d) of RA No. 6713.
In Mabini vs. Raga, A.M. No. P-06-2150, June 21, 2006, complainant
presented a letter signed by Branch 28 employees, including respondent,
thanking Governor Roño for his “donation” of P1,500.00. However, there is no
proof whatsoever that a solicitation took place. The cash gift of P1,500.00 was
received not by respondent Lilia alone, but together with eleven other employees
of Branch 28, to purchase lechon for their Christmas party; hence, the individual
benefit of the employees may be considered nominal. Neither does it appear from
the evidence that the nominal gift was given in anticipation of, or in exchange
for, a favor. Thus, respondent Lilia cannot be held liable under Republic Act No.
6713 because the governor’s gift, aside from being unsolicited, was also nominal
or insignificant in value; and not given in anticipation of, or in exchange for, a
favor. The receipt of the gift does not fall within the ambit of Section 7 (d) of RA
No. 6713, in relation to Sections 3 (c) and (d).
Section 14 of RA No. 3019 recognizes as lawful receipt of unsolicited gift of

insignificant value of a gift given as a token of gratitude. This provision provides:
Unsolicited gifts or presents of small or insignificant value offered or given as a
mere ordinary token of gratitude or friendship according to local customs or usage,
shall be excepted from the provisions of this Act.
PLUNDER - Plunder is committed by any public officer who shall amass,

accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt
or criminal acts (predicate crimes) in the aggregate amount or total value of at
least P50,000,000.00 by himself or in connivance with other persons.
Page 101 of 115

Predicate crimes - The predicates of plunder are as follows:
1. Misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or

raids on the public treasury;
2. Receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage,
kickback or any other form of pecuniary benefits from any person and/or entity
in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office
or position of the public officer;
3. Illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to
government;
4. By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of
stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including the promise
of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;
5. By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other
combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit
particular persons or special interests; or
6. By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection
or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the
damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
The concept of malversation as a predicate crime of plunder is the same

as that of malversation under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. (Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo v. People, G.R. No. 220598, July 19, 2016)
The plunderer must be benefitted from the raid on public treasury to consider
this predicate crime of plunder as present. The interpretation of the term “raid
on a public treasury” should be made in association with the words that
immediately preceded it, and that are “misappropriation, conversion, misuse
or malversation of public funds.” All of these predicate crimes presuppose that
the plunderer benefitted from them. (See: Gloria Macapagal Arroyo v. People,
supra) Justice Leonen in his dissenting opinion said that persona benefit is not
an element of plunder.
In Valencia vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 220398, June 10, 2019, the
information for plunder alleged that the accused diverted the funds
and converted the same, withdrew and received and unlawfully transferred the
proceeds into their possession and control, and that they took advantage of their
respective positions to enrich themselves. The defense filed a motion to quash
because accused only allegedly amassed the amount of P13.3 million which was
way below the P50 million threshold for plunder. Sandiganbayan denied the
motion to quash since there was sufficient evidence to convict him of
malversation, which is predicate crime of plunder. The denial was elevated to the
Supreme Court. It was held that in averring the predicate act of malversation,
the State did not sufficiently allege the aforementioned essential elements of
malversation in the information. The omission from the information of factual
details (e.g. the accused is an accountable officer) descriptive of the
aforementioned elements of malversation highlighted the insufficiency of the
allegations. Consequently, the position of the Sandiganbayan is entirely
unfounded.
Note: Valencia principle is not be applied where the elements of

malversation as a predicate crime of plunder are sufficiently alleged in the
information.
Page 102 of 115

Identification of the main plunderer - If there are several accused in

plunder case, who acted under a single conspiracy, or wheel conspiracy, or chain
conspiracy, the main plunderer must be identified. The law on plunder requires
that a particular public officer must be identified as the one who amassed,
acquired or accumulated ill-gotten wealth in the amount of at least P50 million.
Surely, the law requires in the criminal charge for plunder against several
individuals that there must be a main plunderer and her co-conspirators. (See:
Arroyo vs. People, G.R. No. 220598, April 18, 2017)
In Arroyo vs. People, supra, a case for plunder involving the misappropriation
of PCSO funds amounting to P360 million was filed against ten (10) accused
including President Arroyo. However, the information did not identify President
Arroyo or any other accused as the principal plunderer. Hence, the case was
dismissed. It was held that because plunder is a crime that only a public official
can commit by amassing, accumulating, or acquiring ill-gotten wealth in the
aggregate amount or total value of at least ₱50,000,000.00, the identification in
the information of such public official as the main plunderer among the several
individuals thus charged is logically necessary under the law itself. The
individuals charged therein were 10 public officials; hence, it was only proper to
identify the main plunderer or plunderers among the 10 accused who herself or
himself had amassed, accumulated, or acquired ill-gotten wealth with the total
value of at least ₱50,000,000.00.
With due respect to the Supreme Court, it is submitted that identification of

main plunderers among the accused is not indispensable in the prosecution for
plunder since all accused can be the plunders. If 3, 5 or 9 accused out of 10 can
be the main plunders, it follows that 10 out of 10 or all accused can be the
plunderers. The information in the Arroyo case alleged that accused are all public
officers conspiring with one another amass, accumulate and
acquirePHP365,997,915.00 through any or a combination or a series of overt or
criminal acts. Thus, the information identified them all as main plunderers. In
fact, Justice Leonen and Justice Serena dissented. But for purpose of the bar
examination, the majority ruling in Arroyo case should be followed.
Single plunderer - Plunder can be committed by the public officer acting

alone (Ejercito v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 157294-95, November 30, 2006,
Concurring opinion of Justice Panganiban)
Conspiracy in Plunder - Plunder can be committed by the public officer

in connivance with other persons. If the public officer committed plunder in
connivance with other persons, the “other persons” or the participants
(secondary offenders) are also liable on the basis of conspiracy. Moreover, the
participants, with whom the public officer connived in committing plunder, are
liable under R.A. No. 7080. Under Section 2 of this law, any person who
participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense
contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense.
Where the public officer connives with other persons in committing plunder,
their liabilities are subject to single conspiracy or multiple conspiracies. There
are two structures of multiple conspiracies, namely: wheel or circle conspiracy
and chain conspiracy.
Single Conspiracy - In single conspiracy, the public officer conspired

with a single individual or group in committing plunder. The main plunderer in
this case must be a public officer. But the participants in this case can be public
officers or private individuals.
Page 103 of 115

Hypothetical problem: A Senator conspired with private individual, Maria, in

acquiring ill-gotten wealth through a series of misappropriation of his pork barrel
amounting to P80 million. They agreed to equally divide the money. On the basis
of conspiracy, the total amount of ill-gotten wealth acquired by the conspirators
shall be considered for purposes of determining if P50-million threshold amount
had been reached. In this case, since total amount of ill-gotten wealth acquired
by Senator and Maria is P80 million, they are liable for plunder. Although the
Senator merely acquired ill-gotten wealth in the amount of P40 million, the act
of Maria in acquiring ill-gotten wealth amounting to P40 million shall be treated
as the act of the Senator due to conspiracy. Because of the collective
responsibility rule, the ill-gotten wealth acquired by the Senator shall be
considered as P80 million, although in reality he merely acquired P40 million.
Since the Senator is liable for plunder, Maria, with whom the Senator connived,
is also liable for plunder although she is a private individual. In Juan Ponce Enrile
v. People, G.R. No. 213455, August 11, 2015, in the crime of plunder, the amount
of ill-gotten wealth acquired by each accused in a conspiracy is immaterial for as
long as the total amount amassed, acquired or accumulated is at least P50
million.
In single conspiracy involving plunder, the main plunderer must be

identified. (see: Gloria Macapagal Arroyo v. People, supra) In the above-stated
hypothetical problem, the principal plunder is the Senator.
Hypothetically, if in the case Gloria Macapagal Arroyo v. People information

properly alleged, and evidence established that single conspiracy among the ten
accused existed, and that President Arroyo is the main plunderer while the nine
accused are secondary offenders, they could be held liable for plunder even
without showing the particular amount of ill-gotten wealth acquired by each
accused out of the P360 million. Because of conspiracy, the collective acts of all
of the ten accused in acquiring P360 million shall be considered as the acts of
President Arroyo although she merely acquired certain portion of this amount.
Wheel Conspiracy - Under the wheel or circle conspiracy, there is a

single person or group (the hub) dealing individually with two or more other
persons or groups (the spokes). (Fernan, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 145927, August
24, 2007) In wheel conspiracy involving plunder, the public officer (main
plunderer or the hub) amasses, accumulates and acquires ill-gotten wealth in
connivance with others (the spokes). The rim that enclosed the spokes was the
common goal in the overall conspiracy, i.e., the amassing, accumulation and
acquisition of ill-gotten wealth.
Hypothetical problem: Pedro, the President of the Philippines, conspired with

A, private individual, in connection with his shares on the jueteng collections in
the amount of P40 million; and with B, private individual, in connection with his
P40 million commission pertaining to transaction where GSIS and SSS bought
the share of belly corporation on his order. A and B received P20 million each out
of these transactions. This is not a single conspiracy because the conspiracy of
the President with A in connection with jueteng collections is different from his
conspiracy with B in connection with his commission. This is a wheel conspiracy
since the President is dealing with A and B individually. The President is the hub
while A and B are spokes. Since there is wheel conspiracy in this case, the total
amount of P80 million acquired by the President, A and B shall be considered for
purposes of determining if P50-million threshold amount had been reached.
Page 104 of 115

Since the total amount of ill-gotten wealth acquired by President, A and B is P80
million, they are liable for plunder. Although the President merely acquired ill-
gotten wealth in the total amount of P40 million, the act of A in acquiring P20
million and the act of B in acquiring P20 million shall be treated as acts of the
President. Because of the collective responsibility rule due to wheel conspiracy,
the ill-gotten wealth acquired by the President shall be considered as P80 million
although in reality he merely acquired P40 million. Since the President is liable
for plunder, A and B, with whom the President connived, are also liable for
plunder although they are private individuals.
In wheel conspiracy involving plunder, the main plunderer must be

identified. (see: Gloria Macapagal Arroyo v. People, supra) In the above-stated
hypothetical problem, the principal plunder is the President.
USE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY - Use of information and

communications technologies in committing felony or offense under special law
is a qualifying circumstance under Section 6 of RA No. 10175.
Under Section 6 of RA No. 10175, the penalty for crimes punishable under
special laws committed through and with the use of information and
communication technologies shall be one degree higher than that provided the
law. However, this provision requires the application of the rules on graduation
of penalties under the Revised Penal Code. Hence, Section 6 finds application
only if special law involved has adopted the technical nomenclature of the
penalties of Revised Penal Code.
CYBEL LIBEL - Content-related offenses includes cyber libel, cybersex and

cyber child pornography. A prosecution for cybercrime offenses shall be without
prejudice to any liability for violation of any provision of RPC or special laws
(Section 7). Despite of Section 7, the offender cannot be prosecuted for cyber libel
or cyber child pornography under RA No. 10175 in addition to libel under RPC
or child pornography under RA No. 9775 since this will offend the constitutional
rule on double jeopardy (Disini vs. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335,
February 11, 2014).
Libel is not a constitutionally protected speech and that the government

has an obligation to protect private individuals from defamation. Indeed, cyber
libel is actually not a new crime since Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the
Revised Penal Code, already punishes it. Online defamation constitutes “similar
means” for committing libel (Disini vs. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 20335,
February 18. 2014).
Prescription for cyber libel - One of the cybercrimes defined under Section
4 of R.A. No. 10175 is cyber libel. Section 8 of R.A. No. 10175 prescribes
penalties for all cybercrimes under Section 4 except cyber libel. It seems that
through oversight Congress failed to provide a penalty for cyber libel. Hence, an
offender, who committed libel through the internet, cannot be prosecuted for
cyber libel under Section 4 of R.A. No. 10175 simply because there is no penalty
under Section 8 for committing it.
However, libel through the internet is still punishable under Article 355 of
the Revised Penal Code. Section 6 of R.A. No. 10175, using information or
communication technology in committing a crime will upgrade the penalty for it
by one degree. In sum, one, who committed libel through the internet shall be
prosecuted for libel under RPC with the qualifying circumstance under R.A. No.
10175. He cannot be prosecuted for libel under Section 6 of R.A. No. 10176 since
Page 105 of 115

this provision does not define a crime but merely provides a modifying
circumstance that will adjust the penalty one degree higher for a crime
punishable under the Revised Penal Code.
Since an offender in committing internet libel can only be prosecuted for libel
qualified by the circumstance of using information or communication technology
under RPC in relation to RA No. 10175, Article 90 of the Code on prescription
applies.
Page 106 of 115
By the same token, the period of prescriptive for homicide with the special
aggravating circumstance of use of loose firearm under Section 29 of RA No.
10883 is still governed by Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, and not by Act
3326.
In Tolentino vs. People, G.R. No. 240310, August 06, 2018, the Supreme
Court apply Article 90 of RPC to cyber libel.
Under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of libel shall prescribe
in one year while crime punishable by prision mayor shall prescribe in 15 years.
In my submission, the one-year prescriptive period for libel under Article 90 shall
apply. However, the Supreme Court in Tolentino vs. People, supra, applied the
15 years rule. In the said case, the Supreme Court ruled:
“Anent petitioner's claim that the action has prescribed, although Republic
Act (RA) No. 10175, or the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, does not
categorically state the prescriptive period for such action, the new prescriptive
period for the crime of libel in relation to RA No. 10175 can be derived from the
penalty imposed on the said crime. Section 6 of RA No. 10175 provides that the
"penalty to be imposed shall be one (1) degree higher than that provided for by
RPC(RPC), as amended, and special laws, as the case may be." As such, the former
penalty of prision correccional in it its minimum and medium periods is increased
to prision corrreccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum
period. The new penalty, therefore, becomes afflictive, following Section 25 of the
RPC. Corrolarily, following Article 90 of the RPC, the crime of libel in relation to RA
10175 now prescribes in fifteen (15) years. Thus, respondent Eva Rose Pua's filing
of the complaint on August 8, 2017 against petitioner's Facebook post dated April
29, 2015 was well within the prescriptive period for libel in relation to RA 10175.”
HAZING - Hazing refers to any act that results in physical or psychological

suffering, harm, or injury inflicted on a recruit, neophyte, applicant, or member
as part of an initiation rite or practice made as a prerequisite for admission
or a requirement for continuing membership in a fraternity, sorority, or
organization. Hazing includes paddling, whipping, beating, branding, forced
calisthenics, exposure to the weather, forced consumption of any food, liquor,
beverage, drug or other substance, or any other brutal treatment or forced
physical activity which is likely to adversely affect the physical and
psychological health of such recruit, neophyte, applicant, or member.
Hazing shall also include any activity, intentionally made or otherwise, by
one person alone or acting with others, that tends to humiliate or embarrass,
degrade, abuse, or endanger, by requiring a recruit, neophyte, applicant, or
member to do menial, silly, or foolish tasks. (Section 2 of RA No. 8049 as
amended by RA No. 11053)
The elements of the crime of hazing are: (1) That there is initiation rite or
practice made as a prerequisite for admission or a requirement for
continuing membership in a fraternity, sorority, or organization; (2) That during
the initiation rite or practice, physical or psychological suffering, harm, or injury
is inflicted on a recruit, neophyte, applicant, or member of the fraternity, sorority
or organization; and (3) as a consequence of the hazing, death, rape, sodomy, or
mutilation results.
Initiation or initiation rites refer to ceremonies, practices, rituals, or

other acts, whether formal or informal, that a person must perform or take part
in order to be accepted into a fraternity, sorority, or organization as a full-fledged
Page 107 of 115

member. It includes ceremonies, practices, rituals, and other acts in all stages
of membership in a fraternity, sorority, or organization. (Section 2 of RA No.
8049 as amended by RA No. 11053)
Organization refers to an organized body of people which includes, but is

not limited to, any club, association, group, fraternity, and sorority. This term
shall include the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), the Philippine
National Police (PNP), the Philippine Military Academy (PMA), the Philippine
National Police Academy (PNPA), and other similar uniformed service-
learning institutions. (Section 2 of RA No. 8049 as amended by RA No. 11053)
The Philippine Merchant Marine Academy is included in the term organization
within the meaning of the law. People v. Bayabos, G.R. No. 171222, February 18,
2015) Company or private corporation is covered by the hazing law. Under RA
No. 8049, in no case shall hazing be made a requirement for employment in
any business or corporation.
Failure to allege that the physical or psychological harm were employed as

prerequisite for admission (or a requirement for continuing membership)
would prevent the successful prosecution of the criminal responsibility of the
accused, either as principal or as accomplice, for the crime of hazing. Plain
reference to a technical term “hazing” is insufficient and incomplete, as it is but
a characterization of the acts allegedly committed and thus a mere conclusion of
law. (People v. Bayabos, supra) However, in Villarba vs. CA, G.R. No. 227777,
June 15, 2020, the Supreme Court through Justice Leonen did not follow the
Bayabos principle. It was held that the lack of the phrase "prerequisite to
admission" does not make the Information invalid. Even with its absence, the
alleged facts, which include the controlling words 'fraternity,' 'initiation,' 'hazing,'
and 'recruit, ' would have reasonably informed accused of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him.
Prior to RA No. 11053, the crime of hazing is confined to a situation where

the infliction of physical or psychological harm is a prerequisite for admission
in a fraternity, sorority, or organization. However, there are occasions where the
organization will first admit the neophyte as member, and then, hazing will be
made as post-requisite for admission. Thus, RA No. 11053 expanded the concept
of hazing by covering initiation rite or practice made not only as a prerequisite
for admission but also as a requirement for continuing membership in a
fraternity, sorority, or organization.
Prior to RA No. 11053, the hazing is punishable under RA No. 8049 if as a

consequence of hazing, death, rape, sodomy, mutilation or serious, less serious
or slight physical injuries results. RA No. 8049 does not prescribe penalty for
mere infliction of psychological harm. RA No. 8049 as amended by RA No.
11053, declares all forms of hazing shall be prohibited in fraternities, sororities,
and organizations. Section 14 thereof prescribes for penalties for all forms
of hazing. However, the penalty is higher where death, rape, sodomy,
mutilation results from hazing.
a. Malum Prohibitum - Prior to R.A. No. 8049, good faith is a defense in

homicide where the victim is killed during hazing. The consent of the victim and
lack of intent to kill of the accused would negate dolo, which is an important
element of homicide. Hence, the crime committed is only reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide. (Villareal v. People, G.R. No. 151258, February 1, 2012)
Now, the participants of the hazing with or without dolo are liable for violation of
R.A. No. 8049 if the neophyte died as a consequence thereof.
Page 108 of 115

Instead of amending RPC which penalizes mala in se, where good faith is a
defense, the Congress created a special law on hazing, founded upon the
principle of mala prohibita where good faith is not a defense.
The deliberation of the Senate shows that what is important is not the
intention to kill the neophyte during the hazing but the result of the act of hazing.
Recognizing the malum prohibitum characteristic of hazing, RA No. 8049 as
amended, provides that any person charged with the said crime shall not be
entitled to the mitigating circumstance that there was no intention to commit so
grave a wrong.
Also, the framers of the law intended that the consent of the victim to be
injured shall not be a defense in hazing. The very act of inflicting physical or
psychological pain is a punishable act. Death is just an aggravating circumstance
(Dungo v. People, G.R. No. 209464, July 1, 2015) Section 12 of RA No. 11053
provides that the defense that the recruit, neophyte, or applicant consented to
being subjected to hazing shall not be available to persons prosecuted for
hazing. Any form of approval, consent, or agreement, whether written or
otherwise, or of an express waiver of the right to object to the initiation rite or
proceeding, which consists of hazing, made by a recruit, neophyte, or
applicant prior to an initiation rite that involves inflicting physical or
psychological suffering, harm, or injury, shall be void and without any binding
effect on the parties.
b. Presence - Generally, mere presence at the scene of the crime does not
in itself amount to conspiracy. (Dungo v. People, supra) However, under RA No.
8049 as amended by RA No. 11053, mere presence can be a source of criminal
liability. Section 14 punishes all persons who are present in the conduct of
the hazing. However, the penalty is higher if the persons, who are present
during the hazing, are (1) officers of the fraternity, sorority, or organization;
(2) former officers, nonresident members, or alumni thereof; and (3) members
thereof who are intoxicated or under the influence of alcohol or illegal drugs.
c. Actual participation - The penalty for hazing is also higher if the

person actually participated in the conduct of the hazing. The actual
participants are liable for hazing even if they are not members of the
fraternity, sorority, or organization.
R.A. No. 8049 as amended by RA No. 11053 presents a novel provision

that introduces a disputable presumption of actual participation; and which
modifies the concept of conspiracy. Section 14 thereof provides that the
presence of any person, even if such person is not a member of the
fraternity, sorority, or organization, during the hazing is prima facie evidence
of participation therein as a principal unless such person or persons prevented
the commission of the acts punishable herein or promptly reported the same to
the law enforcement authorities if they can do so without peril to their person
or their family.
This provision is unique because a disputable presumption arises from

the mere presence of the offender during the hazing, which can be rebutted by
proving that the accused took steps to prevent the commission of the hazing or
promptly reports the same to the authorities.
Generally, mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount
to conspiracy. Exceptionally, under R.A. No. 8049, the participation of the
offenders in the criminal conspiracy can be proven by the prima facie evidence
Page 109 of 115

due to their presence during the hazing, unless they prevented the commission
of the acts therein or reported the matter to the authorities. (Dungo v. People,
supra; 2018 Bar Exam)
d. Planning – The law punishes all persons, who actually planned the
conduct of the hazing. The original version of RA No. 8049 merely punished
officers, former officers, or alumni of the fraternity, sorority or organization, who
actually planned the hazing. Under this law as amended by RA No. 11053, any
person including a non-member is criminally liable for planning the conduct of
hazing. Even though these planners were not present when the acts constituting
hazing were committed, they shall still be liable as principals.
e. Adviser – The law also punishes the adviser of a fraternity, sorority, or

organization who is present when the acts constituting the hazing were
committed and failed to take action to prevent the same from occurring or
failed to promptly report the same to the law enforcement authorities if such
adviser or advisers can do so without peril to their person or their family.
The liability of the adviser arises, not only from his mere presence in the hazing,
but also his failure to prevent the same. (Dungo v. People, supra)
f. Inducement – Officers or members of a fraternity, sorority, or

organization, who knowingly cooperated in carrying out the hazing by
inducing the victim to be present thereat, are liable for hazing. These officers
or members are penalized, not because of their direct participation in the
infliction of harm, but due to their indispensable cooperation in the crime by
inducing the victim to attend the hazing (Dungo v. People, supra; 2018 Bar Exam).
However, this rule is only applicable if the inducer is an officer, or member of
a fraternity, sorority, or organization.
The accused claim that the information avers a criminal charge of hazing
by actual participation, but the only offense proved during the trial was hazing
by inducement. The information alleged that the accused during a planned
initiation rite and being then officers of APO fraternity used personal violence
upon a neophyte resulting to his death. The “planned initiation rite” as stated in
the information included the act of inducing victim to attend it. Accused not only
induced victim to be present at the resort, but they actually brought him there.
The hazing would not have been accomplished were it not for the acts of the
petitioners that induced the victim to be present. Hence, they are liable for
hazing. (Dungo v. People, supra)
g. Incumbent officers - The incumbent officers of the fraternity,

sorority, or organization concerned shall be jointly liable with those members
who actually participated in the hazing.
h. Owner or lessee – The law punishes the owner or lessee of the place
where hazing is conducted as principal for hazing, when he has actual
knowledge of the hazing conducted therein but failed to take any action to
prevent the same from occurring or failed to promptly report the same to the
law enforcement authorities if they can do so without peril to their person or
their family. (2018 Bar Exam)
Under the old version of RA No. 8048, only owner of the place of hazing
is liable. However, under this law as amended by RA No. 11053, a lessee can
be held also be held liable for hazing. Under the old rule, such owner is only
liable as an accomplice. Now, he is responsible as principal. Moreover, under
the new rule, promptly reporting the matter to the authorities is an additional
defense for such owner.
Page 110 of 115

i. Parents – Under the law, if the hazing is held in the home of one of
the officers or members of the fraternity, sorority, or organization, the parents
shall be held liable as principals for hazing when they have actual knowledge
of the hazing conducted therein but failed to take any action to prevent the
same from occurring or failed to promptly report the same to the law
enforcement authorities if such parents can do so without peril to their person
or their family.
Under the old version of RA No. 8048, parent is only liable as an

accomplice. Under this law as amended by RA No. 11053, he is responsible
as principal. Moreover, under the new rule, promptly reporting the matter to
the authorities is an additional defense for such parent.
j. School authorities - School authorities including faculty members

as well as barangay, municipal, or city officials shall be liable as an accomplice
for hazing conducted by fraternities, sororities, and other organizations, if
it can be shown that: (1) the school or barangay, municipal, or city officials
allowed or consented to the conduct of hazing; or (2) where there is actual
knowledge of hazing, but such officials failed to take any action to prevent
the same from occurring or failed to promptly report to the law enforcement
authorities if the same can be done without peril to their person or their
family.
Even though school authorities and faculty members have had no direct
participation in hazing, they may nonetheless be charged as accomplices if it is
shown that (1) hazing occurred; (2) the accused are school authorities or faculty
members; and (3) they consented to or failed to take preventive action against
hazing in spite actual knowledge thereof (People v. Bayabos, supra) or to report
the matter to the authorities.
The corresponding responsibilities of the principal, accomplice, and

accessory are distinct from each other. As long as the commission of the offense
(hazing) can be duly established in evidence, the determination of the liability of
the accomplice can proceed independently of that of the principal. (People v.
Bayabos, supra)
Under Section 7 of RA No. 8049 as amended by RA No. 11053, the

faculty adviser or advisers, who accepted his role after being selected
by an accredited fraternity, sorority, or organization, shall be responsible
for monitoring the activities of the fraternity, sorority, or organization. In
case of violation of any of the provisions of this Act, it is presumed that the
faculty adviser has knowledge and consented to the commission of any of the
unlawful acts stated therein.
Under Section 4, 5, 10 and 11 of RA No. 8049 as amended by RA No.

11053, initiation rites are allowed the fraternity, sorority or organization
obtained approvable from school authority, or punong barangay, or city or
municipal mayor, authorities upon written application undertaking that no
harm of any kind shall be committed. During approved initiation rites, at least
two school or barangay, city or municipal representatives must be present. If
hazing is still committed despite their presence, no liability shall attach to them
unless it is proven that they failed to perform an overt act to prevent or stop the
commission thereof.
Page 111 of 115

Failure to provide school representatives during the approved initiation

rites is also punishable.
Res inter alios rule - Res inter alios acta provides that a party's rights
generally cannot be prejudiced by another's act, declaration, or
omission. However, in a conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all, rendering all
conspirators as co-principals "regardless of the extent and character of their
participation. Under Rule 130, Section 30 of the Rules of Court, an exception to
the res inter alios acta rule is an admission by a conspirator relating to the
conspiracy. Hazing often involves a conspiracy among those involved, be it in the
planning stage, the inducement of the victim, or in the participation in the actual
initiation rites. The rule on res inter alios acta, then, does not apply. (Fuertes
vs. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 208162, January 07, 2020, Justice
Leonen)
Constitutionality of presumption of innocence - Under the

Constitution, the accused in a criminal case shall be presumed innocent until
the contrary is proved. Since an accused is presumed to be innocent, the
evidentiary standard to convict him of the crime charged is high. Under the Rules
on Evidence, the prosecution must establish by evidence the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. If there is doubt on whether the accused is guilty or
innocent, the court must acquit him.
The constitutional rule on presumption of innocence does not however

prohibits Congress from enacting a law on presumption of guilt. However, in
crafting a provision on presumption of guilt, Congress must identify facts to be
proven by the prosecution on which the presumption will be based. For example,
Section 5 of P.D. No. 1612 provides that mere possession of stolen properties
shall be prima facie evidence of fencing. This is a rule on presumption of guilt.
The fact to be proven by the prosecution is possession of the stolen property by
the accused. From this fact, the accused will be presumed to have committed the
crime of fencing. In other words, the accused is presumed to be guilty of fencing
once the prosecution establishes that he is in possession of the stolen property.
If the accused cannot present clear and convincing evidence to overcome or rebut
the presumption of guilt, he will be convicted.
Ordinarily, the prosecution to cause the conviction of the accused must

prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. However, if the law provides a
presumption of guilt, the prosecution will only prove beyond reasonable doubt
the facts on which the presumption will be based. While the burden of proof and
evidence lies on the prosecution, once the facts on which accused will be
presumed to be guilty are proven, the burden of evidence is shifted to the
accused. To avoid conviction, he must present clear and convincing evidence that
he is innocent.
Presumptions of guilt under the law are constitutional. The constitutional

presumption of innocence is not violated when there is a logical connection
between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed. When such prima facie
evidence is unexplained or not contradicted by the accused, the conviction
founded on such evidence will be valid. (Fuertes vs. Senate of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 208162, January 7, 2020, Justice Leonen)
In Dizon-Pamintuan, G.R. No. 111426, July 11, 1994, the Supreme Court
affirmed the constitutionality of Section 5 of P.D. No. 1612, which provides
presumption of guilt in the crime of fencing. It is constitutional because there is
Page 112 of 115

a logical connection between the fact proved (possession of stolen property) and
the ultimate fact presumed (commission of fencing).
Presumption of guilt under the law is not offensive to the presumption of

innocence under the Constitution. These two presumptions are compatible since
they will be applied successively, and not simultaneously. In a criminal
prosecution, the accused is initially presumed to be innocent. The Constitution
cannot be disregarded. Presumption of innocence is always the general rule.
However, this presumption is not conclusive. It can be overcome or rebutted.
Hence, the prosecution may present evidence to establish beyond reasonable
doubt the fact of accused’s guilt or the fact on which the accused will be
presumed to be guilty under the law. If the prosecution establishes the factual
basis of the legislative presumption, the presumption of innocence will be
procedurally replaced by presumption of guilt.
Presence at the scene of the crime can be a basis of presumption of guilt

under the law. Section 14 RA No. 8049 as amended by RA No. 11053 provides
that the presence of any person, even if such person is not a member of the
fraternity, sorority, or organization, during the hazing is prima facie evidence of
participation therein as a principal unless such person or persons prevented the
commission of the acts punishable herein or promptly reported the same to the
law enforcement authorities if they can do so without peril to their person or their
family.
Section 14 of RA No. 8049 provides a presumption guilt. If the prosecution

proves beyond reasonable doubt that the accused is present during the hazing,
it will be presumed that he participated in the hazing as principal. In sum, he is
presumed to be guilty of hazing.
As a general rule, mere passive presence of a person at the scene of the

crime does not make him a co-conspirator. (People v. Silvestre and Atienza, G.R.
No. L-35748, December 14, 1931). However, Section 14 of RA No. 8049 provides
exceptions. First, this law punishes a person who is present during hazing.
Second, the law provides a presumption of participation on the basis of presence
of the accused during the hazing. The penalty for participating in hazing is higher
than that for being presence during the hazing.
In Fuertes vs. Senate of the Philippines, supra, Justice Leonen, the

Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of Section 14 of RA No. 8049 on
presumption of guilt because the accused fails to show that there is no logical
relation between the fact proved (presence of a person during the hazing) and the
ultimate fact presumed (their participation in the hazing as a principal). Neither
has it been shown how Section 14 of the Anti-Hazing Law does away with the
requirement that the prosecution must prove the participation of the accused in
the hazing beyond reasonable doubt.
Constitutionally, Congress can amend RA No. 9165 (Dangerous Drugs Law)

to include provisions on presumption of guilt.
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN - Psychological violence is an indispensable

element of violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262. Equally essential is the
element of emotional anguish and mental suffering, which are personal to the
complainant. Psychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator,
while emotional anguish or mental suffering are the effects caused to or the
damage sustained by the offended party. The law does not require proof that the
victim became psychologically ill due to the psychological violence done by her
Page 113 of 115

abuser. Rather, the law only requires emotional anguish and mental suffering to
be proven. To establish emotional anguish or mental suffering, jurisprudence
only requires that the testimony of the victim to be presented in court, as such
experiences are personal to this party. (Araza vs. People, G.R. No. 247429,
September 8, 2020; XXX vs. People, G.R. No. 243049, October 05, 2020)
Section 5 (i) of RA No. 9262 on psychological violence against woman is a

catch-all provision.
Physical violence and psychological violence -Physical violence against

woman is punishable under Section 5 (a). However, if physical violence caused
mental or emotional anguish to the victim, the offender may be prosecuted for
psychological violence against woman under Section 5 (i). Physical violence will
be considered as an element of psychological violence.
In Dinamling v. People, G.R. No. 199522, June 22, 2015, accused’s acts of
publicly punching, kicking and stripping the victim of her pants and underwear,
although obvious acts of physical violence, are also instances of psychological
violence since it was alleged and proven that they resulted in her public ridicule
and humiliation and mental or emotional distress. Accused was convicted of the
Page 114 of 115
psychological violence against woman. Physical violence was treated as a mere

element of the graver crime of psychological violence against woman.
Economic violence and psychological violence -Deprivation of financial

support is punishable as economic violence against woman under Section 5 (e).
(Melgar vs. People, G.R. No. 223477, February 14, 2018) However, if the
deprivation of financial support caused mental or emotional anguish to the
offended woman, the offender may be prosecuted for both psychological violence
against woman under Section 5 (i) and economic violence against woman under
Section 5 (e) (Reyes vs. People, G.R. No. 232678, July 03, 2019)
In Melgar vs. People, G.R. No. 223477, February 14, 2018, accused has a
dating and sexual relationship with AAA resulting in BBB's birth. He failed to
provide BBB support ever since the latter was just a year old. Accused is charged
with psychological violence against woman under Section 5 (i) of RA No. 9262 for
failure to give support which "caused mental or emotional anguish, public
ridicule or humiliation to AAA and BBB. No evidence was presented to show that
deprivation of support caused either AAA or BBB any mental or emotional
anguish. However, the accused can be convicted of economic violence against
woman under Section 5 (e), which is necessarily included in the charge of
psychological violence against woman under Section 5 (i) of RA No. 9262.
Deprivation or denial of support, by itself and even without the additional element
of psychological violence, is already specifically penalized therein as economic
violence.
Felony and psychological violence - Concubinage and bigamy are

punishable under the Revised Penal Code. However, if concubinage or bigamy
caused mental or emotional anguish to the offended wife, the offending husband
may be prosecuted for psychological violence against woman.
In AAA v. BBB, G.R. No. 212448, January 11, 2018, the accused was
prosecuted for psychological violence against woman under Section 5 (i) for
having an illicit affair with a Singaporean that causes mental or emotional
anguish to his wife.
In Araza vs. People, G.R. No. 247429, September 8, 2020, accused left his
wife and decided to stay in Zamboanga City where he maintained an illicit affair.
He intentionally left his wife groping in the dark. Without any explanation or
mature conversation with his wife, he simply left his wife causing the latter
emotional and psychological distress. Accused committed the crime of
psychological violence, through his acts of marital infidelity, which caused
mental or emotional suffering on the part of his wife.
- END -
GOODLUCK TO ALL THE BAR

TAKERS FROM JUDGE MARLO
CAMPANILLA!!!
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2021 CAMPANILLA Pre-Week Materials

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2021 UPDATES ON CRIMINAL LAWS

WITH LEONEN CASES

Note: The dissenting opinions of Justice Leonen are included in these

TERRITORIALITY - For purpose of venue under the Rules of Criminal

200-mile exclusive economic zone - The Philippines has no sovereignty

The President of the Philippines is entitled to immunity from suit subject

because of his presidential immunity. His decisions concerning the handling of

Vice-presidential immunity - It is submitted that a Vice President is not

Pacifico Agabin, former dean of the University of the Philippines College of

Some experts are saying that criminally prosecuting a vice-president will

MALA IN SE AND MALA PROHIBITA - Criminal law has long divided

To classify a crime as malum in se or malum prohibitum, the nature thereof

1. Intentional felony — Intentional felony under the Revised Penal Code is

malversation is an intentional felony, and yet, the Supreme Court declared it as

2. Offense under special law – If the offense punishable under special

Fencing is a concept substantially similar to that of theft or robbery

Sexual harassment is wrong in nature. However, in Escandor vs. People,

In Napoles vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 224162, November 7, 2017, the

In Dungo v. People, G.R. No. 209464, July 1, 2015, a common

Sexual abuse under Section 5 (b) of RA No. 7610 is considered by the

Child abuse under Section 10 of RA No. 7610 was considered by the

Partakes the nature of malum prohibitum – Section 3 (g) of RA No. 3019

Section 3 (d) of RA No. 3019 punishes a public officer or any member of

In Luciano case, the Supreme Court declared violation of Section 3 (g) of

Malversation and technical malversation - Malversation is either an

In Villarosa vs. Hon. Ombudsman, supra, using tobacco fund to finance

ABERRATIO ICTUS – If the crimes committed against the target victim

3. If the components of a complex crime are alleged in two different

Accused consciously poured hot cooking oil from a casserole on CCC,

CONSUMMATION OF THREAT - The crime of grave threat is consummated

PASSION - There is no uniform rule on what constitutes a considerable

SELF-DFENSE – Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material

INSANITY - The defense of insanity is in the nature of a confession or

IMBECILITY AND MINORITY – Mental retardation includes (a) idiot,

Having sexual intercourse with the offended party, who is deprived of

Under Section 5 (b) of RA No 7610, when the child subjected to sexual

In exempting circumstance, there is a difference between actual age and

Section 6 of RA No. 9344, what is important is the chronological or actual age of

AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES - There are new guidelines on how to

PARTIAL RESTITUTION - The payment, indemnification, or

CONSPIRACY – The fact that accused prevented preventing Oliva from

purpose. The shooting incident transpired during a heated argument in a

Private persons acting in conspiracy with public officers may be indicted

If a contract with the government involved an overprice products or

A municipal mayor allegedly obstructed and stopped the execution of the

FENCING – Fencing is a malum prohibitum, and PD No. 1612 creates a prima

Actual knowledge that the property is stolen is not required. Fencing is

ROBBERY WITH HOMICDE - In robbery with homicide, all other felonies

There is no special complex crime of robbery with homicide and frustrated

Homicide component – A special complex crime of robbery with homicide

In robbery with homicide, it is immaterial that the victim of homicide is a

Collective responsibility – Case law establishes that whenever

Once conspiracy is established between several accused in the commission

However, in fine, the long line of jurisprudence on the special complex

Canturia principle where lack of awareness is a defense is applicable to

ARBITRARY DETENTION AND MURDER - If the victim dies or is killed as

INCIDENTAL DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY – Accused committed robbery

AAA lived rent-free in a house owned by accused. Accused intercepted AAA

SPECIAL MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE – Under Article 64 (5), when

PENALTIES UNDER SPECIAL LAWS - When a special law adopts the

However, even though Section 98 of RA No. 9165 mandates the application

American penalty – Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, for offense

Possession of shabu involving less than 5 grams, or marijuana involving