Running head: PUTIN’S RUSSIA 1

Putin’s Russia

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Putin’s Russia

Russia, as a country, has always been under Putin's control with aspects of a mafia state ever

since Putin took over as Prime Minister in 1999. “In countries where the levers of power are in

the hands of a state bureaucracy, the monopolistic control over the media, often supplemented by

official censorship, makes it clear that the media serve the ends of a dominant elite (Herman and

Chomsky, 2010).” Under Putin's rule, Russia has elements of nepotism, economic liberalism,

cronyism, and pervasive corruption. In Russia, few people dare to criticize the president as those

who do have faced the consequences (Politkovskaya, 2012). Since Putin holds a superior

position, he gave himself the power to guide Russians on how to solve social issues by appearing

on the television newscast every evening. Many people viewed Putin as an accidental leader who

was not accepted to remain in power for long. The aim of this study is to investigate who

Russian political systems are changing global identity and manipulation shapes society.

When he became president in December 31, 1999, Russian nationals thought he was a

bland bureaucrat who had a career and experience in KGB agency and the head of FSB of the

Russian Federation (Skyten, 2019). After Putin rose to power, he amassed power and authority

by suspending gubernatorial and mayoral elections and reorganization of political parties to form

the United Russia (Skyten, 2019). He reorganized Russia's political parties and created United

Russia the current ruling party; moreover, he took the regional and national politicians under his

wing after that he gained control of Russia's mainstream media. Vladimir Putin's reign has only

recently received coverage from global media that is warranted. Russia is portrayed both as a

large, multi-cultural, powerful country with nuclear power capabilities, and a questionable

'sovereign democracy,' with rampant corruption.

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The Russian narrative developed by Vladimir Putin through his propaganda machine,

since his election in 2000, continues to grow to respond to every action on the global political

platform. Putin uses political language and the propaganda model to frame, prime, and shape the

lenses of the political reality of Russian society to protect his autocratic power while promoting a

false sense of nationalism (Paul & Matthews, 2016). But what happens when Vladimir Putin's

propaganda machine fails and reality comes crashing down? To answer this question, a close

analysis of Vladimir Putin's rise to power, the cogs on which his propaganda machine runs, and

the morality of propaganda is required. The extent of the propaganda Vladimir Putin and the

Kremlin impose on Russian society is unmoral because it shapes an entirely false reality in

which citizens derive their national identity.

After Putin took over, the politics programming in the media intensified, War and

Nationalistic Soviet films where foreign policy was discussed became the interest of the political

elite as the changing values took a conservative turn. According to Putin, if an idea does not suit

his plan, he has the power to change or amend the rule. Putin sought to control media houses in

Russia from adopting the western truth that bases on freedom of speech. The truth of the west

portrayed journalists as the watchdog of society, unlike Russia, where the state shaped the

narrative for all political agendas. The event that propelled Vladimir Putin into a favorable

position in the public eye and eventually into power was a series of bombings in Buynaksk,

Moscow, and Vlogodonsky, September 1999 (Satter, 2016).

These bombings were initially pinned on the Islamic International Brigade, a small-

militarized unit originating from Chechnya, who at the time was trying to invade the Russian

Republic of Dagestan. Previously Russia and Chechnya had fought over the independence of the

state from 1994-1996, which ended poorly for the then-current Russian President Boris Yeltsin
PUTIN’S RUSSIA 4

(Remington, 2009). In 1999, Putin declared an all-out invasion Chechnya in response to these

attacks (Remington, 2009).

How Putin went about justifying his military actions speaks magnitudes to his political

prowess and ability to shape a narrative. Putin told the press conference that the military was

trying to remove terrorists and extremists from that area as he was justifying Russian's

involvement in Chechnya (Penketh, 2000). Putin framed his op-ed piece in a way that could

yield serious benefit from foreign nations, or at least help them rationalize the militaristic

relationship. Instead of calling the military's actions against Chechnya the response to an

independent militant rebellion, Putin's political language spins Russian's involvement as a

reaction to a terrorist threat. He wrote that thousands were injured, some disfigured. Panic

engulfed a neighborhood, then a nation, and that Russians did not have to imagine such a

calamity. He further claimed that more than 300 citizens in Moscow and elsewhere suffered that

fate the previous when bombs detonated by terrorists demolished five apartment blocks. Putin

used this message to evoke emotions of fear in the people and to justify his actions for what he

did.

Graber, an American political scientist, states that “emotional appeal is another important

factor in user-friendliness. As great storytellers throughout history have known stories with

which people can identify on a human basis-about emotion laden issues such as love and hate,

greed and generosity, crime and punishment-are exceptionally appealing to audiences. This

happens since it is easier to store and retain such stories in memory because emotional arousal

releases stimulants into the bloodstream that sensitize perceptions and increases their impact

(Graber & Smith, 2005).” Graber talks about the actual power of the Media in politics and

interest groups desire to control the media. She argues blatant fear-mongering promotes a more
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primal way of thinking and rationalization, mainly a message of self-preservation. Her

explanations explain how Putin tried to justify his involvement in the Chechnya war. There was

strong condemnation of the Chechnya war, which made the United States and European Union

denounce the war; however, the Chinese Foreign Ministry supported Russia's action by claiming

that they were protecting national and territorial integrity. By writing this piece in the New York

Times, Putin had laid the foundations for the consolidation of political power with the

exploitation of terror and ran a successful military venture that would give him the support of the

Russian people.

Following the series of bombings in Buynaksk, Moscow, and Vlogodonsky, Putin, with

his victorious campaign in Chechnya, became President of Russia in December 1999 (Eckel,

2019). There was, however, an alleged controversy that arose after the series of bombings,

Putin's rise to power, and the premature resignation of Boris Yeltsin in December 1999, which

was quickly squashed by the Kremlin right before Putin's election. The Russian Federal Security

Service (FSB) was thought to have been responsible for the bombings, as it provided the pretext

for Putin's invasion and eventual rise to power (Satter, 2016). Unfortunately, the dramatization of

Putin's message in the New York Times spoke louder than the conspiracy theories. Many people

believed that the bombings were orchestrated by Putin's allies to bring him to power. The views

were justified with the number of suspicious events such as bombs planted by FSB agents in

Ryazan, an announcement three days later by Russian Duma, lack of evidence, and denials by

Chechen Government or its allies and poisoning of Alexander Litvinenko. Furthermore, in 2000

the Russian Duma rejected two motions filed by Yuri Shchekochikhin; after that, he and Sergei

Yushenkov were assassinated (Satter, 2016).

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These conspiracy theories tried to explain the Russian government's involvement to win

public support for Putin and precipitate the second Chechen war. These theories claim that a plan

was needed to put in place a successor who would protect Yeltsin and his family, who faced

possible criminal charges. For the plan to succeed, they needed a provocation that would stir the

masses; after the attacks were launched, the war was waged against Chechnya, which garnered

Putin overnight popularity. Later on, Yeltsin resigned, Putin became the president and

guaranteed immunity to Yeltsin from prosecution. These conspiracies might be real since FSB

could not carry out attacks without the sanction of Putin, who was the former FSB head and the

Prime Minister of Russia. Some scholars consider the bombings as a political motivation and

similar to the burning of Reichstag. Furthermore, after Putin became the president, he blamed

Chechens for committing those attacks, launched a military campaign, and propelled public

anger (Felshtinksy, 2012).

Later on, in his first term as president, Putin dealt with more terrorist attacks, which he

used as fuel to aggrandize his political power. The Beslan hostage incident in September 2004 is

when Putin made his most significant move for further autocracy. This crisis is also known as the

Beslan massacre that begun on 1st September 2004 and lasted for three days. The hostage

situation involved the imprisonment of one thousand one hundred people, of which seven

hundred and seventy-seven were children. The crisis began when Islamic militants occupied the

School Number One in Beslan (Walsh and Beaumont, 2004). The siege aimed to attract the

attention of the Russian Government to recognize the independence of Chechen and the

withdrawal of Russia from their affairs. The hostage-takers were Riyad-Us Saliheen sent by

Shamil Basayev, a Chechen warlord. However, on the third day, Russian security forces forced

their entry into the premises with the use of heavy weapons such as incendiary rockets and tanks.
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Unfortunately, the incident ended with the death of three hundred and thirty-four people,

excluding the terrorists (Dolnik, 2007). This event led to political and security changes in Russia

as it contributed to federal government reforms and consolidation of power in the Kremlin and

strengthened capabilities of the President throughout the next 15 years, the cycle of

dramatization of conflict plagues Russian media. The conflicts in Syria, Afghanistan, Ukraine,

and Iraq became tools in which Putin used to retain power. He quieted the Russian people with

fear-mongering through the media; he also provided evidence in the form of nationalism

programs to convince the people that he was protecting, unlike the western world. Putin did this

to maintain power and to stop the people from questioning the morality of his propaganda. As a

ruler, Putin has a superior position; therefore, every evening, he appeared on the television

newscast, telling the Russian people how they should solve social issues. Few people dared to

criticize the president, as those who did face the consequences. After Putin gained control of the

mainstream media, the state-controlled press became hostile towards Non-Governmental

organizations. Since then, the politics of television programming intensified (Dougherty, 2015).

War films and Nationalistic Soviet and talk shows concerning foreign policy base on the

perspective of the politically elite.

Putin used the wars in the small countries to gain control in his mind being strong meant

being taken seriously. He invested in military force by invading the low states; this is due to the

firm belief that more prominent countries have more powers than their smaller counterparts that

are in a subservient position to powerful neighbors. This belief led to the creation of a paradox

whereby Russia strived for equal treatment; its actions were eroding trust in the notion of

equality in international relations. The end goal of Russia is to use its techniques known as

reflexive control or active measures to replace western-style democratic regimes with populist,
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illiberal or nationalist ones (Mckew, 2017). For Putin, power is paramount as he sought to be the

key player in global politics and assert his importance and involvement for important decisions

to be made. As a result, Russia wants to conceal its role in precipitating the Syria and Ukraine

war. The Russian annexation of Crimea led to online battles as people sought to determine

Russia’s role in the Ukrainian war (Asmolov, 2018). Russia used its mainstream media by

creating the narrative that the United States and the European Union as the perpetrators of the

conflict.

After taking over, Russia Putin perceived that as a leader, he needs to be at the center of

the ever-churning machine, processing loads of information at his command. As a former KGB

officer and the agency successor, he knew the value of data, for Putin, whoever owned the media

controlled what was aired. The acquisition of the media became one of President Putin's top

priorities when he took power. Within a few years of becoming president, Putin had taken

control of the largest TV networks in Russia and privately-owned media that was under the

Kremlin influence (Lipman, 2009). Putin's first step in this direction involved getting rid of the

two biggest media tycoons, Vladamir Gusinsky and Boris Nemtsov. Gusinsky’s owned the most

significant private media company, and his crowning achievement of NTV, a national TV

network, got redistributed to Gazprom after he was forced to sell it for his freedom (Lipman,

2009). He was accused of supporting the election Primakov and Luzhkov, the anti-Kremlin

alliance. This marked the beginning of the conflict between Putin, Gusinsky, and the Family. The

family consisted of Yeltsin's relative and influential businessmen, who made Putin the successor

of the president (Rosenberg, 2019).

After Gusissky’s NTV decided to launch an in-depth journalistic investigation to link

FSB to terrorist attacks in Moscow, there were tensions. People started accusing the Kremlin and
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Putin of orchestrating the explosions; thus, the family, Putin, and Gusinsky cut all ties with each

other. After Putin took over, he commenced an investigation against Gusinsky with the intention

of silencing the opposition. The prosecutor of the general office propelled the investigations

against Gusinsky for misappropriation of funds. Gusinsky was arrested and incarcerated on 13

June in the Butyrka Prison. Soon after, Kremlin representatives advised him to sell his network

to Gazprom and accept the price that Gazprom-media sets, which was later known as shares of

freedom (Roxburgh, 2011). Gazprom is a national gas monopoly with strong ties to the Kremlin,

and Putin's political elite (Whalen, 2000). The radio and newspapers quickly followed in the

oligarchical takeover with the same recipe of redistribution. Gusinsky sold his media assets in

July 2000 and immediately left Russia.

Under the leadership of Putin, the initially lively national broadcasting media turned to be

mouthpieces for what Kremlin needed. Putin uses a two-pronged media plan; in Russia, his

government-controlled internal communications, especially Tv that is watched by approximately

90% Russians. Moreover, state-aligned media houses are full of Kremlin's messages, while

independent outlets are subtly pushed to extinction. On the other hand, Putin positions himself as

the renegade through Russian Today to shatter the notion of truth by Western monopolies

(Dougherty, 2015). Executives from the national broadcasting cooperation would meet at the

Kremlin every week to discuss what had been covered during the previous week broadcasts.

It is important to note, according to Gehlbach literature, that not all the stories would be

directed from above as editors and journalists would enjoy some partial autonomy as long as the

story, they were planning to air, was not touching on weighty issues. This strategy of mixing

facts with fiction, pushing the political agenda but allowing some real journalism, kept the
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Russian general public unsure and unaware of bias (Gehlbach, 2014). The state controlled the

only news that touched on the weighty issues.

The Internet took similar hits recently. as the Russian government has passed a variety of

policies that limit online communication. Procedures such as 'Internet blacklists and 'anti-piracy

laws' were used to impose online restrictions (Lipman, 2009). Russia became engaged in

selective Internet filtering in 2010. In 2013, The New York Times reported on Russia's actions of

selectively blocking the internet. Specifically, RIA Novosti, a significant government news

agency, was replaced with the 'international information agency' of Russia Today by 2013.

Following the installation of Russia Today were campaigns of the Kremlin to further compete in

Russian cyberspace, utilizing online propaganda strategies to promote the pro-government

narrative of the Putin regime. By the end of 2016, significant newsrooms such as Forbes, RIA

Novosti, and RBC were suppressed by the government using various techniques. The techniques

were disbanded, and the resources passed to new bodies under the state-control, on the other

hand, through the use of force Rain Tv was removed from TV channels allowed to serve as an

internet-based station.

Lipman, outlines that of the three main national TV channels in Russia, only a single one

was initially being controlled by the government. Fifteen years after 1990, the print media

underwent a drastic change of ownership (Lipman, 2019). The term oligarchs and media

oligarchs were used in Russia to refer to influential business people with close ties to political

powers. Since the election of Putin in 1999, oligarchs loyal to the government were given the

ability to control strategic sectors of the Russian economy, politics, and the information wing

(Hoffman, 2011). Sooner than later, the government constraints were tightened further, with live

political talk shows all remaining closed and political satire eliminated.
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The government also barred numerous popular host shows from the television (Gehlbach,

2014). By 2014, following his re-election, Putin went unchallenged, with no opposition, no

checks or balance, and minimal concerns regarding the aspects of accountability. The country's

television channels were changed into indispensable elements used to achieve political motives.

The media newsrooms practiced self-censorship by avoiding controversial channels that

negatively impacted the image of the authorities. Putin soon marginalized all the unwanted

political parties, amended the legislation to reduce the jurisdiction of the regional governors.

Parliament was subsequently turned into a rubber-stamp that would enact any bill than the

government required to be passed (Duffy, 2015).

There is a propaganda model that was designed by Herman and Chomsky and it address

the five steps that the follow in its operation. The five filters of the model include; Ownership

which is the revenue sector of the media houses, where many media house focus on making

profits. The second is advertising, the media is costly and so it survives on advertisement deals

that they charge for, media helps in pushing products. The third filter is media elite that refers to

the brains behind the operations in the media (Herman & Chomsky, 2010). They have techniques

to brand whatever news they push. The fourth is flak where the media gets into trouble into

publishing and branding narratives that are against the powers and they suffer for their actions.

The last is the common enemy, this refers to the target of the news and narratives being made in

the news rooms. Russia became the embodiment of Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky’s

propaganda model, as each of the theorized filters became strongly evident. The model aims to

explain how propaganda and biases function in mass media; furthermore, the model describes

how manipulation occurs. In addition to that, the model describes how consent for social,

economic, and political rules are instilled in the public mind. The perspective of the propaganda
PUTIN’S RUSSIA 12

model coincides with the Marxian analysis; it states that the media is a wider capitalist system

controlled and managed towards accumulation of capital and profit maximisation in oligopolistic

contexts (Pedro-Caranana, 2019). The Herman and Chomsky model claim that corporate media

bases on advertising, government sourcing, and media ownership that creates a conflict of

interest through propaganda for undemocratic laws. The political elite controlled private media

outlets with the ability to strip advertising revenues, as "No firm would want to displease the

Kremlin by placing its ads in a publication deemed unwelcome by the powers that be” (Lipman,

2014). The Kremlin had such influence that, even though they allowed small nongovernment

media outlets to operate, they virtually controlled all sources of information as the vast majority

of the viewing audience consistently consumed pro-government messages on government-

controlled media networks.

Along with Kremlin's ability to pass legislation, such as the policy of the anti-extremist

law stating that any publications deemed as 'extremist' could be labeled a terrorist and

persecuted. The Kremlin also can incite social movements of being pointedly 'unpatriotic.'

Another example of this is TV Rain, as this nongovernment media network had practically cable

providers drop their contracts after an online survey was deemed ‘unpatriotic’ by Putin’s

government as it brought up topics generally avoided in public discourse. This issue was heavily

publicized, similar to the Pussy Riot case; it showcased not only the ‘unpatriotic’ message but

also an insult to religious believers (Lipman, 2019). This Riot involved 11 Russian women based

in Moscow and ranging from the age of 20-33. The group of women staged unauthorized

provocative video and music performances in public places and later posted them on the internet.

The organized and planned themes were meant to fight for LGBT rights, feminism, and

strong opposition to Putin and his policies. In February 2012, the group became the global
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central focus after staging a performance in the Cathedral of Christ the Savior in Moscow. This

protest was directed to the Orthodox Church leaders by citizens for pledging their support to

Putin during elections. Many government officials went on record condemning TV Rain, and one

of Putin's spokesmen provided the integral comment in its denouncement saying, "As soon as we

begin to show even the slightest tolerance to such polls, our nation, our memory, and the genetic

memory of our people will begin to erode" (Lipman, 2009).

Finally, Putin is operating against Chomsky and Herman’s final filter. Putin used the anti-

communism and fear filter by partly getting rid of the opposition and instilling fear on the rest by

believing that if people become frightened, they will bend towards authority. He silenced the

voices that endanger the interests of the politically elite by sidelining and intimidating critical

journalists and broadcasters into self-censorship. The Kremlin’s media strategy involves a

glorification of the communist movement in Soviet Russia, contrasted with the bastardization of

western ideology as the control mechanism, along with persistent terrorist threats, to unite the

Russian people in hatred and fear.

Even with all the filters of the propaganda model in place, in 2014, nongovernment media

networks could still operate. Foreign agents’ law in 2012 required NGOs to register as foreign

agents if they receive external funding or engage in political activities. However, in 2014 the law

was amended to avoid court battles and to allow the Ministry of Justice to register organization

without their consent. However, since they could not compete with significant government

networks anymore, these nongovernment media networks and the citizens who consumed them

became the vast minority (Lipman, 2009). These networks could only remain if they became

'niche' media sources of the critical minded and politically concerned. Lipman further writes of

the helplessness of nongovernmental media, exposing that more people would question the
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'freedom of the press' if supposed opinion leaders or 'actors' came forward to support the cause.

Lipman would be correct as mass communication theory suggest that opinion leaders would be

most effective at doing this (Nesbitt-Larkin, 2001). The theory suggests that opinion leaders

shape people’s opinions by making sense of screen media messages, filter and interpret messages

before passing them along to the mass. But although nongovernmental media would occasionally

provide examples of government abuse within the press, Lipman writes, "'Actors' who could

follow up on these reports and use them in politically important ways were missing" (Lipman,

2009). It would appear that Lipman suggests that although there are opinion leaders or actors that

could begin a meaningful movement for the 'freedom of the press,' they may be too afraid to act

against Putin's government.

Although recently, there have been various public demonstrations opposing Putin's rule,

unlike the past. We had protests such as the White Ribbon and the 2019 Moscow City Duma

elections. These protests were staged during the election of independent candidates as they

rallied for access to the election. In 2011-2013, there was the snow revolution as people

protested for fair elections and against rigged elections (Ragozin, 2019). Some of the opposition

leaders that currently seem to worry Putin are Alexei Nalvany, Maria Alyokhina, and Ilya

Yashin. Over the years the team used by Putin to spread propaganda has failed and they can no

longer silence the opposition through media narratives.

Unfortunately, this fear is well-founded as examples such as the Litvinenko poisoning,

Litvinenko was a human rights activist who was poisoned for trying to shed light on the

apartment bombing. The murder of Boris Nemtsov, and the death of 29 journalists since Putin

became president provides evidence of questionably unmoral levels of control over the Russian

Media (Reporters Without Borders). The current opposition leaders fight for the rights of the
PUTIN’S RUSSIA 15

people by putting pressure on Putin and his allies to step down from the threshold. Because times

are changing and the youths are adopting the western truth, Putin formed the youth movement

(Ross & Slater, 2012) He did this to gain the approval of the child who was becoming more

inclined to the opposition. Nashi was formed in Russian at a cost of $20m that was provided by

the Kremlin. Nashi has close ties with the Kremlin, with the primary goal of creating a

paramilitary force to harass and attack anti-government critics who were regarded as enemies of

the state. They were protesting outside the American embassy and even beat a journalist who had

written an article that was against Putin. They believed that they would be paid for their loyalty

to the state. In their camps they used expensive electronic gadgets. To hold the movement

together Putin arranged a rally that would put about 30,000 youths together but due to corruption

the funds were mismanaged and only 1,500 youths turned up and slept in the stadiums (Ross &

Slater, 2012). As a punishment a senior Kremlin official was sacked. He later planned another

rally and this time it happened and they had talks that were not aired on televisison.

Along with the narratives of the dramatization of the terrorist threat, and the acquisition

of mass media, the implementation of nationalistic youth camps also contributes to the level of

control Putin has obtained. Nashi is a youth movement supported by Putin’s key political spin-

doctor, Vladislav Surkov, and founded by Yasivly Yakemenko (Atwal & Bacon, 2012).

Officially created in April 2005, Nashi was founded as a pro-Putin regime youth movement

without any political party affiliation (Atwal & Bacon, 2012). Through his centralization of

power with the utilization of the terrorist threat, marginalized political parties had taken to the

streets in protest. As a response to this and further reports of youth's engagement in political

issues, such as the youth movements in the 'colored revolution' in Ukraine, Nashi provided a
PUTIN’S RUSSIA 16

counter pro-authoritarian campaign against the growing power of Nazism (Atwal & Bacon,

2012).

Nashi is one of many youth movements that have arisen in the past ten years, showing

new importance that Putin's government places on street politics. The Nashi movement received

over 200 million (6 million USD) rubles in 2010 in government grants (Atwal & Bacon, 2012).

The youth movements supported by the Kremlin and the political elite are tasked with counter-

protests, creating rallies, spreading the words of Putin, and patriotism. A typical recruitment

theme suggests that those involved in the new youth movements will have the opportunity to

become the new Russian elite (Balmforth, 2019). The exploitation of the youth for Putin’s

political agenda is what pushes his system of propaganda into the versions of the Soviet

Komsomol. The Soviet Komsomol was a Communist political youth organization referred to as

the reserve and helper of the CPSU.

While Putin's government has always claimed that patriotic camps are only meant for

teaching values of ethical behavior like respect and love to the country, as well as to battle out

alcohol and drugs, a campaign against racial intolerance, restore churches, and voluntary work in

orphanages. (Rivera & David,2006). Patriotic programs in Russia only present selfish interest of

the administration, with very minimal aspects of moral education being reported to have gained

the much-needed attention of the general public (Omelchenko & Daria et al., 2015). The

intentions of these camps have always been to weaken the opposition by engaging the youth on

matters of the government at all times.

According to an articles MacFarquhar wrote on the New York Times he defines Putin's

Youth Army as a form of a militarized throwback to the younger pioneers of the Soviet era. He

was a British politician, television and newspaper journalist and also served as a Member of
PUTIN’S RUSSIA 17

Parliament in the 1970s (MacFarquhar, 2018). Currently, he is a Harvard Professor as an

academic orientalist with a particular interest in Chinese affairs. He explains further that the

youths are trained to become politically manipulated, to follow the chain of command, leaving

them with little need to challenge their superiors and the government. Most opposition leaders

are not comfortable with the patriotic camps as they perceive it as a practice aimed at killing the

country's opposition (MacFarquhar, 2018). Propaganda and manipulation are not just a tool for

influencing the opinion of citizens in Russia, but it has developed into a pathway to a kind of

instantaneous participation in political wars by the citizens of Russia.

Political wars refer to the force by governments into coercing an opponent, thereby

gaining an advantage to serve national and military goals. The coercive nature of political

conflicts weakens an opponent's societal, political, and social will, thus forcing actions favorable

to the objectives of the state. Governments have always used manipulation and propaganda to

instantaneously break connections, which could be there between relatives and friends whose

opinions tend to differ. Propaganda here refers to communication formed to manipulate a

targeted population by shaping their attitudes, beliefs, and preferences to obtain behavior in line

with the political objectives of a propagandist.

Currently, Putin uses a new type of Propaganda known as rewired propaganda that aims

to neutralize the internet's ability to challenge and undermine authority and question narratives of

the country (Asmolov, 2019). A strong commitment to manipulation and misinformation

accompanied with the new digital era, a repressive regime gets an advantage to shape the

narrative of the media proactively. As for Putin, he currently uses traditional methods of internet

control such as censorship and filtering. The novelty lies in the preference for innovative models

such as sophisticated manipulation and computational propaganda.

PUTIN’S RUSSIA 18

In a general view, political manipulation and oppression of the opposition have created a

magnitude of negative results (ranging from economic stability to government stability) on its

people. The disadvantages of political manipulation in Russia range from life-threatening

situations to mere inconveniences. In this regime, the rule of law is not applicable, and instead,

the country is ruled in an autocratic way by either a specific group of people or a single

individual like the case of Putin. One of the worst disadvantages of manipulation by the

government is the loss of freedom by the citizens/ people (Pavlovsky, 2016). One cannot freely

speak about the government, as in the case of democracy. Putin is a dictatorial leader but the

Russian citizens have adapted to his style of leadership and it has led to a better nation, however

Putin uses propaganda to put off the opposition that might end up convincing the citizens

otherwise.

An excellent example of how political manipulation and oppression can be used to abuse

the citizen's rights has been demonstrated during Putin's regime. At this time, all the activities

and aspects of life have been on his hands. Since the time of his appointment into the top post of

government, Putin has been eliminating the opposition political parties and have ensured that all

the powers are consolidated within him (Pavlovsky, 2016). His words had since become above

the law. He has used his party to restore the Russian economy through massive military

expenditure. He took this opportunity also to do major constructions, including highways. All

these activities, which aimed at boosting the economy, made him very famous. However, the

citizens and other individuals in the country have suffered significant oppression.

Such oppressions have re-shaped the country's national identity as most countries across

the world view Russia as a place of political intolerance (McKew, 2017). Russia is grouped

among the top countries which are unsafe for politics. The nation's political activities have
PUTIN’S RUSSIA 19

always been treated as malicious, undermining free and fair politics and creating distrust among

the political class, thereby ensuring the survival of an authoritarian regime. As argued, the extent

of the propaganda Vladimir Putin and the Kremlin impose on Russian society is unmoral because

it shapes an entirely deceptive concept in which citizens derive their national identity. The

perceptions constructed through the dramatization of the terrorist threat, the acquisition of the

media, and the political exploitations of the youth. It is unmoral for Vladimir Putin to subject the

Russian people to this false reality because when his propaganda machine fails, yet another

generation of nationalistic determinism and pride will be crushed.

In conclusion, Putin's reign received young Russian institutions that were on their erly

stages of operations and he brought in new dictatorial energy and they have been operating on

his commands. His reign negatively impacted Russia's economic prosperity; as a result, he

distracts Russians by inflating his stern leader image through political wars with the West. Putin

is a leader who does not seem to want to let go of the leadership mantle as he believes that he

knows what is best for Russia. Putin's desire to hold on to power made him change the rules of

politics, thus drawing Russia away from Political equality. Each time he faced opposition, he

made decisions on political reforms by restricting freedom of speech and the right to vote.

Furthermore, Putin never agreed on concessions; instead, he sought to attack his

opponents. Putin subordinated the Russian judiciary to the Kremlin. He demolished the laws and

federative state; later, he re-established Russia as a unitary state where he elected and removed

regional governors by manipulating electoral procedures and rules.

The success of his strategic rule by law strategy has made him recentralize power and

assert administrative control. He crushed the freedom of speech and free media by replacing

information with propaganda. His main aim is to hold on to power to keep people away from
PUTIN’S RUSSIA 20

questioning his leadership abilities. Moreover, Putin stifled civil liberties and promoted

corruption to stir his interest in maintaining an authoritative regime. But in the end, the Russians

are to blame for Putin's policies since a society they chose to show limitless apathy. The

Russians allowed the Checkists to see their fear; therefore, Checkists became entrenched with the

power to control all spheres of their society. The people's fear motivated the secret police to treat

the Russians like cattle as security forces like KGB only respect the strong while devouring the

weak.
PUTIN’S RUSSIA 21

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