(2%) WILLIAM E. DeMARS. Hazardous Partnership: NGOs and United States Intelligence in Small Wars International non-governmental organizations (NGOs) of many stripes and several elements of the United States intelligence community persistently find themselves thrown together on the “front lines of the international response (o small wars and insurgencies in the Third World and former Communist world, Both NGOs and intelligence agencies face (1) leanspareney questions of what information to make public, share discreetly, or conceal; and (2) operational questions af how they infuence the polices of governments and warriors. To function with minimal effectiveness in the dangerous and fui environment of small wars, NGOs increasingly realize they must have an information strategy,” and inteligence offeials an “NGO strategy.” The most successful warriors have both The convergence of NGOs and USS. intelligence at the crossroads of small wars has rarely been the harmonious encounter envisioned by some theorists of early warning and conflict prevention. Despite serious efforts in the 1990s to institutionalize it the relationship has remained hazardous for all the partners—NGOs, American intelligence, and the watriors themselves. Most relevant academic and policy Iierature fils to address the real issues in this hazardous partnership, Dr. William E. DeMars is Visiting Assistant Professor af Government at the University of Notre Dame, South Bend, Indiana. He previously taught in the Department of Political Sctence at the American University in Calr, Feypt. An earller version of this article was prepared for the anual ‘mecting of the International Studies Assoclatin, Los Angeles, California, 17 March 2000, mo cowreRireLence LUNG 4 munsR 2 189194 uuan € 900A THE PARTICIPATING RELATIONSHIP Whether or not U.S, troops are on the ground in small wars and humanitarian operations, a surprisingly broad range of institutions ffom the American intelligence community are involved, ditectly or indirectly, either monitoring or guiding policy. Included are elements of the National Intelligence Council, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Security Agency (NSA), National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), intelligence officers in the National Security Couneil (NSC), the Bureau of Intellience and Research (INR) in the Department of State, and certain US. embassies. Information is brought to bear that originates as imagery intelligence, signals intel intelligence, diplomatic reporting from embassies, open source information, and gray information, Tnaddition, more than a hundred distinct ternational NGOs may become engaged atthe peak ofa large, widely publicized humanitarian emergeney like Bosnia or Somalia, While acknowledging the variability and Muidity of the NGO world, it is possible to sketch the major categories and more prominent’ organizations. For gathering and analyzing informatio, particularly important are NGOs such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty Intemational on human rights, Refugees International and the US. Committee for Refugces on refugee issues, and the Carter Center and the Community of Sant” Egidio on confit resolution. The rubric of relief and development covers the largest number of NGOs, most of which fall into several families of "sister agencies” that share normative afiniies but are organized independently and based in difTerent countries. Secular NGO families inchide Oxfam, CARE, Save the Children, and Médecins Sans Frontizres (Doctors Without Borders). Church-linked NGO families include Cartas (Catholic), Lutheran World Federation, World Council of Churches (mainline Protestant), and World Vision (evangelical Protestant. ‘The International Committee of the Red Cross, which is neither an NGO hor an intergovernmental organization but combines features of both, is ‘also deeply. involved in small wats. Sometimes active are NGOs addressing environmental issues, and democratization and civil society Finally, # few NGOs have boen founded and designed for the specific purpose of carly waming and coafiet prevention. The four most prominent are International Crisis Group, Center for Preventive Action, FEWER, and International Alert The “isue-atea” boxes into which NGOs place themselves are impor for organizational identity and funding, but they are less. important operationally. Indeed, one of the defining features of international policy 1, human evemamona oom oF wreLuaencezoo PANTHERS; HOS AND UNTED STATES ELGENCE SHALL WARS 198 toward small wars and humanitarian catastrophes, particulary snes 1990, is that NGOs and United Nations (LIN) agencies ftom many different issue reas ate thrown together, engaging the same populations in the same seographical areas ‘Pethaps most importantly, international NGOs link societal and political partners in more than one country.” NGOs are as much partner-driven as Principledriven. This single feature of NGOs should be Kept in. mind {when considering their relations to intelligence in small wars. The flow of Jnformation on the ground in “complex emergencies” passes between and throvgh NGO partners, 'NGOs and the United States intelligence community ate likely to become engaged wherever warfare generates, or threatens 10 generat, humanitarian crisis on a large scale, perhaps involving famine, mass migration, or gross violations of human rights. To list only the most prominent cases since 1990: In AMieaSudan, Euhiopia/Erirea, Somalia, Liberia, Siersa Leone, Angola, Rwanda, Zaire/Democratic Republic of Gongo (DRC). In Europe—the former Yugoslavia and Chechnya. Tn the Middle East Iraq, Algeria, and. the West Bank and Gaza In Asia—Afghanistan,” Si Lanka, and East Timor. In Latin ‘America-—Mexico (Chiapas), Peru, and Colombia ACADEMIC ANALYSES SKEWED ‘What is at stake? The academic and policy literatures tend (o mislead. Two poliey literatures are considered “here: on conflict prevention and intelligence policy. "The imperative toward “easly warning and conflict prevention” emerged in the aftermath of failed international efforts to respond to confit in Somalia and Bosnia in the early 1990s, and especially the Rwandan senocide of April to July, 1994* The relevant literature describes the prominent role of NGOs, along with governments and multilateral ‘rganizations, in attempting to prevent confct rather than respond after it has escalated, The role of intelligence, and particularly the US. intelligence community, is given oaly passing comment. Moreover, mach of the literature is buill on two assumptions that have not been borne out by events. The first is that the end of the Cold War has forged a reliable harmony of interests in favor of conflict prevention among major power governments, well as between those governments and humanitarian Srganizations of all stripes, The seoond assumption is that effective fonflct prevention can be achieved at an acceptable level of economic, political, and military cost.196 uu seman The relevant intelli ated questions: How 10 provi nce policy literature concentrates mainly on two intelligence support for American or in small wars, and when and how ‘ultlateral military Forces intevenin fo share sanitized U.S. intelligence with the United Nations and mottlateral pariners! The literature hardly mentions NGOs, and. the harrow focus doss not do justice to the actual range of intelligence activities vsvi-vis NGOs. Several dimensions of itera treated elsewhere in the intelli {tention by NGOs and the intligen tion documented and analyzed here are not nce literature: the general convergence of ‘community toward the phenomena ff small wars and humanitarian erses, NGO roles in intelligence Collection and. analysis (not merely disemination), and the we of Sntermediary Insitutions for indirect contact between the different worlds fof NGOS and intelligence Due tothe nature of the topi, available data paint an incomplete picture. At the same time, it may be safe to assume that the patterns of action point to far broader phenomena that are not yet vealed. This article draws from NGO and academic Uteratres, and interviews since 1995 with NGO staff in the United States and Africa, and With officials in the USS. national security bureaueracy and intelligence Community. Due to the sensitivity of the material, some of the ke not be named, documented he CONVERGENCE OF ATTENTION 1 NGOs, taken cumulatively, embody a global network of information and capacity for action, even if flows of information are unpredictable and action is rarely coordinated. The US. intelligence community, and the national security bureaucracy within which itis embedded, command an operational capacity of similar seope. ‘This shared global scope ereates opportunities to pool information and cootdinate policy with international NGOs. The search for cheap, global Teach to manage small ware is spurting new forms of collaboration between these two realms ‘Al the same time, the two realms retain significant diferences of structure and mission. that’ militate against collaboration. The U.S, security fappatatus organized in a hierarchical structure under the President. International NGOS interat as a fluid and decentralized mix of thousands fof independent organizations, Organizational mission is an even more important basis for differentiation. International NGOs define their serving universal human interests based in a global civil Hundreds of internation renin cur oF eLUaeNCEusn00u8PAAERSHP: Hes AND UNITED STATE INTELUGENGE I SHBLL WARS society. The mission ofthe U.S. national security apparatus isto pursue the in an “anarchical society" of states.” Even American national inter When relaxed. in practice, these features temsin constitutive for their Fespecive institutional realms. rom these divergent stating points, the NGO community is intrested in Aiscovering the military and poll causes of humanitarian crises, while the intelligence community is interested in predicting the humanitarian consequences. of eivl wars. Hence, the (wo groups have experienced a nee of attention toward analyzing the causal linkages between war and_ humanitarian crisis. This convergence i not a passing fad ependent on a particular politica party of administration in Washington, is likely to persist as long as small wars fuel humanitarian disasters fovernments prefer cheap policy options, and NGOs are available 10 Fespond Under Republican of Democratic presidential administrations, he convergence of attention will probably endure while expressing ise i changing forms ‘On the NGO side, the global humanitarian network includes t organizations that have evolved historically in five distinct sectors, Addressing human rights, refugee and migration, relief and development Nictim of war, and conflict resolution. Since 1990, both NGOs and UN igencics from all five humanitarian sectors routinely operate side-by-side Sethin the borders of most countries undergoing. civil wars Several [roups of NGOs have taken independent initiauves to deepen their causal Tihalyses of the poliesl and military roots of humanitarian crisis. North ‘American relief and development NGOs analyze how theit operations ther prolong internal confits or help to resolve them. European evelopment NGOs conduct sophisticated studies of the local political economy of violence in particular conficts. Refugee organizations are Concemed. with predicting and preventing movements of internally fisplaced. persons in civil wars. Human rights NGOs seek 10 provide ‘more timely information that can influence dynamic U.S, government policy toward internal conficts." ‘On the other side of the convergence, inteligence analysis aims to understand the eavsal processes at work in situations that may threaten ‘American interests. In the wake of the Cold War, US. leaders have perecived “transnational” social processes as security threats. The Georg FLW. Bush administration responded with military action to problems of drug trafficking in Penama, mass migration in northern Iraq after the Gulf War, and famine in’ Somalia. The Bill Clinton administration fexpanded the National Intelligence Council by adding @ National Intelligence Officer for Global and Multilateral Issues to address such198 ue seas matters 95 humanitarian emergencies, refugees, snd environmental problems. The State Department launched an’ Early Waring and Preventive Actions Initiative in 1994 10 identify one eisis-prone country each month, and evaluate alternative policy responses. The series was abandor which included. Zaire, the Spratly Islands, and the Arabian peninsula." The rhetoric of “transnational threats" quickly fll out of fashion after boeing introduced in the fist Clinton administration, Two independent appraisals of U.S. intelligence in 1996 gave short shrift. to. broad extensions of the concept of security 10 inchde transnational processes. But both appraisals recognized the utility of sharing U.S intelligence information with United Nations "agencies." The Brown-Rudman Commission chided the experimental initiatives of the early 1990s: “Intelligence agencies touted new forays in areas such as inteligence on the environment, leading any observers t0 conclude that they had lost focus and were searching for reasons to just Etfors at Improvement Whatever the policy Fashion, the politic! forens that generate the convergence of attention have not disappeared. The intelligence community in Washington has made a series of elfors to establish dialogue with the NGO community with a view toward greater istitutionalization of the relationship. The fact that cach initiative has been disappointing has apparently not discouraged subsequent attempts. ‘The National Intelligence Council has produced an annual national intelligence estimate on “global humanitarian emergencies” since 1994, The inteligence estimate (“intelligence community assessment” in current terminology) is classified, but it is based laegely on open sour information such as interviews and published reports from humanitarian ‘organizations.® Information moves ftom the NGOs to. the intelligence ‘community, where it is analyzed in secret, out of reach of the ‘organizations that supplied moch of the original data, A pastil corrective ‘was organized in September 1994, when the national intelligence officer responsible for assembling the 1995 estimate provided an unclassified draft to a group of NGO representatives in Washington and invited their critique and comment in a conference format.” This meeting was factory for participants, but proved difficult to. instutionalize NGO that cosponsored the meeting, planned‘ mzunuou PATERSON ND NTE STATES TELIA SAL WS 199 , , more with les The intensified imperative since PDD 35 to stretch monitor numerous, diffuse processes must have increased pressure at all levels of the intelligence community to somehow utilize the Information held by NGOs. Tn June 1999 a new attempt was made to institutionalize the conve attention. Lieutenant General Patrick Hughes, Director of the Defense Inteligence Agency, hosted a consultation of NGOs, DIA, CIA, and State | Department INR. officials at Meridian House to diseuss the ned to | ance mutually beneficial collaboration, Five. months carl General Hughes had testified to Congress that some of the security 1228 cc of facing the United Stats fell under an “emerging treat paradigm” including Emergency circumstances .., generally involving bumanitarian rei ace operations’ her operations stort of Wa, natura disasters that require the application o operatens, various id environmental of Despite the serious need for collaboration between the intelligence community and NGOs, the high-level dialogue at Meridian Howse did not Tend to the intended results of follow-up meetings and practical proposals” One persistent obstacle to insitutionaizing the relationship is the unspoken norm of reciprocity that pervades the decentralized networks ‘of NGOs. The intelligence community i hard pressed to offer anything 0 NGOs in return for the information they provide to the U'S. government. "How can the convergence of attention be understood in greater dept? What isreally at stake? In recent debate on intelligence reform, the very definition of intelgence has been contested, between the view that it includes all information for decision makers, and the view that it comprises only secrets for competition between states proposed alternate definition of intelligence, particularly appropriate to situations of internal war, may be ‘ny information that gives oulside actors potential leverage over who200 mua xan rules To prevent others from gaining such leverage is the reason governments and insurgents keep secrels. In comparison, humanitarian organizations her and analyze information in ofder t0 gain leverage over who tives. Humanitarian actors may use this information to deliver aid to starving people, monitor human rights abuses, or prevent migration, The erux ofthe convergence of attention is that in situations of small wars, information about who lives and information about who. rules is increasingly the same information, In regions with the weakest slate structures, including some of sub-Saharan Africa and former Commanist countries, low technology mass violence is often the tactic of choive for slits competing for power. For these regions, understanding the militar strategies of the adversaries is necessary for understanding the causes of hhumanitarian isis, For such environments, humanitatian NGOs and the US, ite in bardly avoid dealing with e atleast using each other's information ‘OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT OF SMALL WARS The multifaceted “retreat of the state” isthe broad context for the small wars tnd humanitarian disasters in which NGOs and American intelligence have ound themsetves operating since Cold War? But, state Fetreal means different things in different regions of the world; not all Sates retreat equally or in the same respects. In developed countries, the government devolves responsibilty and funding to private forces in the market and! non-profit sector. This privatization affects the foreign policies Of the developed countries as well as their domestic policies.” Among the weakest states of the Third World and former Communist areas, however stale retreat produces much more radical changes. ‘These can be understood as two broad shifts: in the nature of both war and intemational tions Fist, inthe absence of external state patrons, weak state structures collapse and fragment. In such collapsed states war is primarily internal, fought between multiple warlords” Second, the international relations of weak states bocome privatized in several respects, Politicians and warlords stl Took to the interational system for hard currency income, but the increasingly significant sources of income are private corporations and organized criminal enterprises rather than foreign aid. from states oF international organizations. Security and force are also. privatized ‘rough the operation of international mercenary companies and security wren sum OF MELEEasaonu PARES WEDS O UNITED STATES MTELIGNEE WY SL WAS 201 Welfare and citizenship rights are privatized and internationaized {hrough the pervasiveness of NGOs.” Finally, some aspects of international intelligence are being privatized. * The operational implications of thes ‘levelopments are profound, and can only be sketched ere, Even the most powerful international force, the United States government, is unable to coatrol the multitude of others involved. Yet, in many of these settings the United States has no vita stratepic interests at slake, Tt sooks a minimal level of engagement while preserving the option either to act of refiain from acting. In such an environment, intel ‘premium. IF itis more Welkinformed than ‘others, the United States ean opt not to act, choose ted partners for joint action, or disseminate information to empowe actors or processes, For NGOs—the least powerful international organizations implications are different. Each NGO possescs pices of information that may be sought by others, but leks a general overview of the situation Most of all, NGOs ate insecure and seek alliance with partners that can provide them physical and financial security NGOs AND INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION INGOs, individually and cumulatively, know some things that the intelligence community does not know from other sources. Typieally, a variety 0 NGOs are there on the round in war-prone repions, often working in remote areas and int ‘with diverse populations. In addition, these NGOs maintain channels of communication from the field to the capital city to their organizational headquarters. The loose, global network of NGOs constitutes a significant source of information for the US. intelligence community and the broader national security bureaucracy. The information roles played by NGOs take on many subtle permutations, however. To begin, there is a straightforward role by which NGOs collect information and disseminate it in the public domain. ‘The intelligence community often claims that most of its NGO information comes in this form, as open source information." ‘Some truth is present in this claim. For example, the genocide of 800,000 people in Rwanda from April through July 1994 was reported in real time by human rights NGOs with sources in Rwanda. Als specialized on Rwanda for Human Rights Watch/Afvica. Throughout the genocide, Des Forges relied on telephone reports from an extensive network of personal contacts in Rwanda, Which she hed accumulated over two decades of residence in and travel to the country. She personally202 ua seas briefed rep US. Nationa statves of UN Security Couneil members in New York, and Security Advisor Anthony Lake and his staff, high level State Department offiials, and members of Congress in Washington. Her information was edited as accurate by the UN Security Council fmembers. and the US. government.” The absence of a decisive international response to the genocide was not due to lack of information. ‘Briefings for US. government officials during the Rwandan genocide constituted true open source information, because Human Rights Watch feleased the same information to journalist and the general public. But most of the information t sans from NGOs is the US. government hot publicly avilable, Service-providing NGOs, particularly in the sectors the most numerous and widely fof emergency reli’ and development, a Sisiibuted. Though touted as the “eyes and ears of the internation community,” they are very careful with whom they share what they see tnd hear. In public reports their political analysis is usually anodyne and Conventional, "Much more revealing. and. timely are “ip reports” by fonsultants into remote areas, and “siteps” (situation reports) transmitted periodically from the country director to the desk officer at headquarters, Phont for weekly channel for informal information. The most sensitive topics are feserved for unrecorded personal conversations between field and headquarters staff during feequent meetings. The written portion of this communication constitutes a “Turtive hterature” that is not consistently gvailable to journalists, scholar, and other organizations, and is subject 10 Selective transparency. The unrecorded portion can be gained only by participating in the conversations, of eavesdropping on them. In shor most NGO information is not open source material in the stiet sense. How do the US. intelligence community and security bureaucracy gain avoess to this gray information held by NGOs? Any American NGO that fccepts US. government funding reposts regularly to its donor ageney both through the U.S. embassy in the field and the appropriate offices in Washington. All this information is potentially available (o American intelligence agencies. In addition, during the Cold War the largest ‘American relie! NGOs tended to reeruit top executives from the ranks of former US. foreign service officers, whose personal contacts in the State Department were useful for monitoring the currents of American national security interests, and for finecuning NGO strategy to both insulate it fom undue U.S. government influence and harmonize operations with hose interests. This practioe Was part of the extensive process of personal networking and lobbying between NGO stafT and government ofiials in Washington conversations between field office and headquarters provide a daily remunona.cuRN oF rELUGENCEnoo PARTAERSHP GOS 1 UTED STATES WTELIENCE ALL Ws 200 Personal networking was and is an informal process of direct, but often ‘official, consultation between individuals. That the Africa Bureau of the Siate Department and the Africa section of the CIA are more open to NGO information than the otber regional bureaus is widely known, Career paths in. Washington often pereprinate between government and the nonprofit sector, particularly when the poliial party out of power fains control of the Presidency or a house of Congress, In another patter, non-governmental institutions and think tanks provide staf sons to government agencies. In 1999, the National Security Council {Under Samuel Berger consisted of 99 policy assistants, 35 of whom were Scconded from the non-profit sector.” Whether moving from NGO to government ot in the opposite direction, individuals retain their networks Of iusted personal contacts who may be consulted and counseled as foreign policy decisions are made ‘Although the intimacy between NGOs and the foreign policy bureaucracy is perhaps more intense under Democratic administrations, it not limited to them. In the Bush administration, for example, several directors in the National Security Council developed customized, fuid networks of NGO information sourees.® The teems of reciprocity entailed, on the one hand, the NSC offcia's need for multiple sources of information to suppor decisions and fight bureaucratic batts, and, on the other hand, the NGO's hope that asuzse would influence US. policy. Gonoraly speaking the NSC official controled the relationship. OOF course, alternative means exist for the intelligence community to collet the gray information held by NGOs but not published in open Sources. The most obvious is to spy on NGOs. The extent t0 wl this occurs. isnot publicly known, although reports on_the global Signals intelligence system known as “Echelon” argue that Western allies intercept the telecommunications of some charitable and human Fights NGOs” rescinding from the ethical end political questions that may be raised by the practice of spying on NGOs, in purely professional intelligence terms. such raw NGO information is not very useful. The vast majority of NGOs collect information that is narrowly focused, peosraphically fragmented, and politically superfcial.* Raw NGO information is fully intelligible only to persons immersed in the local politcal context in the fic, Ia short, even if the intelligence eommunity were to go to the trouble of collecting vast quantities of NGO information, it would be unable to analyze it effectively from a central point, Hence, the problem of collection is closely linked to the problem of analysis. wo couveRNTELUGENEE VOLE 1 NUMMER 2208 WL ons NGOs AND INTELUGENCE ANALYSIS Fr the intelligence community, the value added! by NGO information lies Inainly. inthe opportunity to analyze backward. from humanitarian Consequences {0 theit political and military causes. inthe quarter century orn Biafa t9 Bosnia. NGOs contributed to this process inadvertently, if ar all. NGO professionals are heavily socialized by their backgrounds, and powerfully conditioned by the political contexts in which they o Tow their own information in terms of the question, Who lives? and not ‘Who rules? Most NGOs are simply incapable of conducting ed analysis of the politcal content of thelr own information Networks of NGOs operating in the Horn of Arica during the 1980s and facly, 1990s argued for years about the “root causes” of famine in Ethiopia, Sudan, and Somalia before a few individuals arrived at fine-grained analyses of the deep political economy of violence tha created famine in each country.” the questo 2 sophisti The “carly warning and confit prevention” agenda of recent years has attempted to make purposeful and effective the process of conflict analysis that networks of NGOs performed inadvertently and sluggishly belore 990. Nevertheless, at a 1999 roundtable discussion in Washington, D.C Several NGOs contineed to express familiar misunderstandings of the political context of their operations in small wars.” In brief, three Taritions can be heard from NGO headquarters, Most aid ageneics tnd fo understand carly warning information entirely in terms of technical data on material needs and logistical capacity. Advocacy groups are Shing to accase and pressure the perpetrators of violence, but cling to a Yolunfarstie assumption that leaders are free to stop the violence without jeopardizing their interests and conflict strategies. Other NGOs, enamored EP the insight that “all aid is political,” think small wars ean be resolved by NGOs throwing their weight to one adversary, or by calling in the US. Marines. 'NGOs in the field have their ovm interpretations. Aid NGOs seek “earl warning” information they can se for public fundraising at home, in Crier to maintain independence from government and mulilateral donors Others seek information to. facilitate program redesign as conflict ‘conditions shift!” Both of these information priorities center on the imerests of the organization itself, not the dynamics of the conflict in which itis operating Exceptions to the rule of NGO incapacity for timely, penetrating analysis of violence and confit can be cited. The Arms Project of Human Rights Watch has produced several hard-hitting reports exposing the international arms emu OWL JUAN OF RTEWIBOEEsao PRTAERSHP RODS UNITED STATES RTELIGNEE SLL WARS 205 sales that bolstered perpetrators of human rights violations In some cases, csearchers have revealed secret arms flows that were crucial to the survival of particular adversaries, This is information about who ‘and who ru ral problems are inherent in this NGO strategy Firs, very few individuals with the combination of skills 10 go into a dangerous situation with no cover (HRW ules), discover secret information, get it out of the country, and protect sources are available The best informants on arms issues are “bad guys” within the military organization that_is committing the abuses, But most human rights Activists are experienced in meeting and interviewing the victims, not the Petpetritors. Second, the strategy cteates tension within Human Rights Watch, because exposing secret arms sources offen severs its working relationship and dialogue with the 2 whose policies of violence the NGO is seeking to moderate. Finally, if Human Rights Watch were consisteatly successful in exposing crucial sources of arms, the organization would fee more consistent hostility among the governments itis trying to influenc ‘When most successful, the Arms Project discovers, analyzes, and reveals to the publie secret information that would qualify as intelligence by any ‘efinition, Conceptvalized in these terms, the Tine of reasoning leads directly to the question of counterintelligence. The NGO researcher Advantages of porous, Thied World security institutions, or eludes the target's counterintelligence capacity. Either way, this could be a dangerous business Just how dangerous is indicated by the story of Frederick Cuny in Chechnya. A veteran disaster relief specialist, Cuay designed humanitarian ‘operations in eivl wars and other disasters, starting in Bia it the late 1960s. In the 1990s he rebuilt the city water system of Sarajevo while it was under siege. Early in 1995 he set off for a humanitarian assessment mmission to Chechnya, where the Russian army wat fighting « nationalist ‘movement, Cuny traveled extensively, talking with humanitarian officals land military commanders on both sides of the conflict. Next he published f brilliant analysis of the war in the New York Review of Books Aescribing in detail how the militaty strategies of both adversaries would lead to a sores of prodictable humanitarian disasters if the war were allowed to rage along its logical course" This was high stakes “early warning.” He castigated the Russians in particular by revealing that most Of the civilians killed by Russian shells in Grozay were Russian nationals, 1d he accused the general staff in Moscow of scutling a cease-fire that had boen initiated by field commanders on both sides ofthe war nm couwrerTELucen—— WLUME 1 munneR 2206 ua onan CCuny was traveling in Chechnya when the artile appeared on 6 April 1995, He disappeared two days later. An extensive search and high-level inguities by the U'S. government fae to discover Cuny's body or reveal firm evidence of his fate After several months, family members accused Russian ineligence of spreading rumors that Cuny was antilslamic and that members of his entourage were spies in order to set him up for assassination by the Chechen rebels Another theory suggests that Cuny may have discovered nuclear materials thatthe Chechens had obtained from Russian sources Most accounts agree that Russian counterintellgence took sufficient interest in Cuny 40 spread disinformation about his mission, and that Checlien counterinteligence units probably held him for some period. For whatever reasons, Cuny clearly provoked a reaction from the counterintellgence apparatus of both adversaries The tentative conelusion that Cuny’s analysis of humanitarian information concerning who live impinged on information that eould influence who rules is reasonably a Other warriors have learned the lessons of counterintelligence against NGOs and United Nations investigators, In Kinshasa, Congo, under Laurent’ Kabifa, expatriate NGO staff ate routinsly detained while thir notes and documents are copied—by hand. The process can require several days In Chechnya, Cuny combined multiple roles that are usually separated mong several institutions ina division of labor, He coliected field information of a range of humanitarian and military realities, analyzed i, published is conclusions, and lobbied officials in Washington on the brutality of Russian military tactics. Against the advice of his employer the time, the Soros Foundation, he insisted on returning to Chechnya with Peace plan to change the course of the conflict, with himself acting 35 a mediator. Centtlizing all these tasks in himself, Cuny lost the protection that derives from dividing labor among many others.” Separating roles imparts politcal protection through the use of infermediaries. between NGOs and government, INTERMEDIARIES BETWEEN NGOs AND AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE Perhaps the most promising avenue for intitutionalizing interaction between NGOs and US. national security and intelligence institutions Ties in a range of experiments that are more public and formal than the personal networks of individuals, yet present less risk of erasing the boundary between the humanitarian and intelligence realms than bold. ventures in NGO reporting uremuion. sun oF wreLucenceceaoos PATE NGOS AD UTE STATES INTELIENCE SLL aS zor To place the recent experiments in contest, several models Fr interaction petwezn NGOs and the intelligence community used during the half fentury, before 1990 should be recalled. Collaboration. between the fntemational nonprofit sector and American security agencies has a fon and convoluted history. During World War Ml the Office of Strategic Serviees incorporated hundreds of academics to quickly build up an intelligence capability, an intimate relationship between “cloak and zon hat continued through the 19503." For two decades aftr its found Toa7, the Cenital Intelligence Agency maintained links with a wide range ff American professions abroad, including business, labor, churches, nes media, and charitable organizations, Some of these links funneled covert Tunding through selected foundations that in cura supported NGOs. The international activities of these professionals and organizations provided fources of ineligence information, and also constituted part of the Fnfrasttucture” of persons who might be recruited for covert action.” Starting in the late 1960s, these activities were exposed in a series of aclations by joumalists and US. congressional committers, By the tnid-1970s American intelligence had severed most ofthese links.” Today this hand-in-glove relationship is decidedly unattractive to both the intelligence community and NGOs as 1 model for the future. But, another tmode of linkage carried over from the Cold War era is more promising Tn eitcal epions that combine humanitarian crisis with intense American politzal interests, the Refugee Bureau of the U.S. State Departmen Seplays special ref bein plave at any one time. They facilitate humanitarian aid to particu Populations of refugee or internally displaced persons by bringing to bear Cxpeetise, money, and politcal influence, Refugee coordinators can also act as iveligence interm talyzing information from un array of humanitarian organizations about the confict that is pwning the refugee etisis. Conveyed through diplomatic cables to the State Department and various receivers in the intelligence commonity, this ‘gray source information can supplement or sometimes surpass that available from standard intelligence Sources. In the mid-1980s, a ref coord in Khartoum provided some of the most detailed information on the ‘course ofthe evil wat in Ethiopia Diplomatic reporting of information gleaned from humanitarian personnel in the field is distinct ftom raw, open source data collected cirestly from NGOs and sent to CIA headquarters for analysis. Embassy cable traffic Goes not normally contain information directly attributed to NGO Sources" Instead, it combines material collected from both open and say analyzes this information in the field, and conveys conclusions to ce coordinators. Eight or nine “ref coords” ma Haris by collecting and a no coumenureiucenee _ voL208 oes the intelligence community in Washington, An initiative based inthe Refugee and Human Rights thematic bureaus of the State Department aims to © officers to be more alert to collecting and train US. foreign serv reporting information on refugee fows and human rights violations. Th addition to refining traditional diplomatic eporting, other experiment sve moved in the dirsetion of “privatizing” diplomatic. reporting NGOs in the feld, In one episode from the complex Great Lakes exsis in central Aftica, an NGO established a relationship with the U.S. National Security Council for reciprocal exchange of NGO field reporting for sanitized USS. intelligence. Afler the Rwandan genocide ended in July 1994 swith the rebel Tutsi army capturing the capital city of Kigal, the neat unexpected phase of the crisis was a refugee flow, The former government and “army of Roanda—incliding the architects of the fenocide—fled to refugee camps in Zaire with up to one million ethn Hutu refugees as human shields from international punishment. The U.S. fovernment chose to respond to the refugee flow with a massive airlift of Supplies to camps in Zaire, The Washington-based NGO Refugees International (RI) sent a represeatative to Goma, Zaire to report an t frst Nlows of refugees to RI offices in Washington, which refaced the sports to hundreds of NGOs, journalists, and government offices. One of the receivers in this faxnet was the Diector of African Affairs at the National Security Council, who reciproeated by providing RI with US. intelligence assesaments of the scale and direction of mass migrations o internally displaced persons within the boundaries of Rwanda. These ssesments, based on analysis of satellite im: also provided t0 UN consumers through other channel Tn this situation, the NSC's Afra Director acted as the intermedia between an NGO and the intelligence community. The compatibility between the terms of the humanitarian issve as framed by the NGO and the terms of U.S. interests as framed by the NSC allowed the exchange to proceed with reciprocity and semictransparencs. In contrast with traditional exchanges between NGOs and the U.S. government, this reciprocity was based on trading information for information, rather than NGOs providing information forthe possibility of infue Several new NGOs were created in the 1990s to specialize in early warning In their management of information they reproduce in the NGO world the dilemmas of ineligence collection and analysis, and they interact withthe intelligence community ‘One of these NGOs is the International Crisis Group (ICG), based in Brussels. In early 2000 the group chose & new president, Gareth Evans, vith eight years experience as Australia's Foreign Minister. Evans defined lareRATONAL JOB OF MMELIGEEEusnonsPRTAERSMP: GIS AHO UNITED STATES MTELIGECE SAL WS 200 the ICG mission explicitly as filing the gap in politcal reporting and analysis that has developed as foreign ministries downsize and shift resources to rade and commercial issues Even if we do stuff that some ofthe big counties do for themselves, at least we are doing it from a fssh pespestie that can ether maybe reinforce their judgments, or make them rethink the judgments they a presence, we fla major gp. ‘We willbe doing what a goad foreign offee would do iit had th revourees and made the decion to allocate then in 4 Gely fashion in the areas of potential blow-up. 0 ICG relics on individuals in the fl to collect and analyze information on confliets, In its first five years, the organization focused attention on the former Yugoslavia, Algeria, Central Africa, and Cambodia. Duc to the sensitivity of the organization's information, "Some of its reporters and ‘analysts in these countries are not identified for ther own sate ‘Although ICG was not formally launched until July 1995, thr after Fred ‘Cuny disappeared in Chechaya, Cuny was one of the key architects of the organization, along with his associates Morton ‘Abramovitz, Mark Malloch Browa, and Lionel Rosenblatt” According to fan NGO insider. 1G was envisioned to be “Fred writ large.” Today, it ‘seeks (0 institutionalize Cuny's approach of gathering information on the ground, and developing a comprehensive stratepy for response, I ppublcizes conclusions through the media anda Website (owerisisweb org), and conducts hih-level advocacy through prominent ‘members of the ICG board TCG also offers “Private briefing sessions with senior officials and legislators." "The practice of conveying information and recon mendations through both public and private channels suggests that th forganization faces a dilemma. There’ is no. evidence that the private briefings to government officials contain information that #8 not also released 0 the public. But if the information is the same, how ean the ‘organization claim to fil the diplomatic reporting ay? From another point of view, why should government analysts attend ICG briefings they can get the same information off the Website a few days later? To this point NGOs have been examined as sources of information, collected by various means and routes, for the US. intelge community and security bureaucracy, and as being in the position of receiving conclusions of intelligence analysis that are also shared broadly with UN organizations and journalists. In these 10 modes, inform vo cOUMTERITELUGENCE VUE nUWOER2210 wu ona from NGO sources and intelligence sources is mixed ether secretly within the USS. government, of transparently outside the goverment in the public domain. There is a third possible model, in which American intelligence information is pooled with information from other actors, including INGOs, but the pooling is carried out secretly outside the U.S. government POOLING INTELLIGENCE AND NGO INFORMATION In January 1995, four NGOs initiated the Burundi Policy Forum as an experiment in sharing information and brainstorming. policy options fo ameliorating the multiple disasters of the Burundi/Rwanda. region. Meeting monthly at a non-governmental site in Washington, D.C., the forum typically attruots about a hundred people. U.S, government officials from the State Department, the US. Ageney for Intemational Development (USAID), the Pentagon, and the intelligence community often attend; as well as NGO activists in the fields of human rights, emergency relief, refugee lemocratization, and conflict, Fesolution. (A parallel forum based in London has drawn European NGO land government representatives.) According to one of the sponsors, “Th Forum is alo unique in that it has fostered a calture of communication ‘and coordination between the NGO and government communities.” This ‘culture of communication” uses transparency as a tool to encourage horizontal flows of information in both directions between NGO std ‘government. Outside reporters and academies are permitted to attend ‘under a rule of no quotations by name. “The transparency had certain limits, however, Parallel tothe Burundi Policy Forum, a Butundi Security Forum met twice « month for several years in a closed meeting with a much smaller, restricted attendance. Io this seting, offi from the State Department, USAID, the Pentagon, and the CIA ould pool information with representatives” of NGOs, including Search for Common Ground, Refugecs International, and Human Rights Watch, fn sensitive security topics such as how to monitor and impede arms flows to Rwandan refugecs in Zaire (before 1997), and how to focus sanctions on extremist leaders in Burundi The Burundi Security Forum reflected a carefully calibrated degree of semitransparency. Its existence, dates of meetings, topics discussed, and the identities of organizations that regularly sent representatives were open information, But certain information was restricted, inching the names fof the government officals who attended (NGO representatives were more ‘open about their attendance), the detailed information discussed, and any policy changes that resulted from the exchange.aRoou PATTER: NGOS UTED STATES MELIENC SL WS The main significance of the Burundi Policy Forum and parallel Burundi Security Forum was that the existence of the former legitimized the ‘opportunity for pooling informacion in the latte The more transparent Policy Forum provided a normative authorizaion for other contacts between NGO and intelligence community officials between month meetings, including at the Security Forum. The governing assumption was thal anyone who attended the larger Policy Forum shared in a harmony of interests between humanitarians and the US, government to prevent “another Rwan boring Burundi. In hate 1996, as political realities in the region shifted rapidly, the name of the Washington c¢ to Great Lakes Policy Forum. More significantly, the security Forum stopped meeting just_as serious poli Aisputes erupted among NGOs and between them and the US. nelave was chang A much more complex process of pooling American intelligence and NGO information hes played out since. 1995 concerning the documentation of atrocities and. War crimes in the former Yugoslavia. Information flowed, and been restricted, among four groups: NGOs, journalists, US. intelligence, and the International War Crimes Tribunal for the former ‘Yugoslavia, A specific issue concerning the emergeace of information on he Srebrenica mas killings in July 1995 is explored he Srebrenica was the first of six United Nations “safe areas” declared by Security Council resolutions in April and May 1993. The areas harbored Muslim populations who had evaded being ethnically cleansed out of Serb-controlled areas of Bosnia, and were occupied by contingents of United Nations troops. Srebrenica was the frst such atea 10 tnd captured by the Bosnian Serbs in 1995, Who had the first information fon mass killings of people Irom Srebrenica-reporters, NGOs, or American intelligence? 'NGOs had! taken the lead in compiling information on atrcites in the former Yugoslavia from the beginning of the war in 1991. Largely in response to NGO information and agitation, the United Nations tstablished the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in early 19932” Ametican intelligence became part of the public story only in March 1995, when three American officials separately leaked to the New York Times the contents of a highly classed CIA. assessment of atrocities in Bosnia, The assessment reportedly concluded that “0 percent Of the aets of ‘ethnic cleansing” were carried out by Serbs and that leading snp CouTERHTELUMENEE VOLUME 1 NUMBER?22 ua os ca role in the crimes. Serbian politicians almost certainly pla process ‘within the Clinton administration tht led © the request for this sessment js not known. ‘Reportedly, US: intelligence didnot foresee the 10 July Ser attack on the Srebrenica enclave, and American intelligence officials claim in hindsight that “their best information came from human rights groups, the United Nations and the press, not from spies, satellites or eavesdropping." The UN. peveekesping troops in Srebrenica, themselves Jeft unprotected by thir commander and upper kvels of the UN, covered up theit knowledge fof massacres instead of revealing it, The frst humanitarian reports, from Gn NGO worker for Médecins Sans Frontiéres in Srebrenica, and the sfice of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), aimed the issue as massive, forced movement of people. But these early ports did not indicate mass killings. Survivors who fled. from Srebrenica accounts. At first, women and children who had ‘of their menfolk, and later male survivors of the UN safe area at Tuzla and spoke ave the frst itnessed_ kiln massacres, made their way 1 another fo reporters who flocked there from The large wave of international reporting from Tuzla about Srebrenica appears 10 have been medisied in the usual way, by. humanitarian Grzanizations. Reporters typically rely on UNHCR to gather displaced Bons together, and on NGOs providing direct service in the camps {0 lead the reporters to victims who aze willing and able w0 talk. This JS a_standard mode. of operation for reporters in. humanitarian fof hoth news stories and NGO reports fail to. reveal the full extent of symbiosis between their two Communities. A characteristic relation of mutual dependence occurred fo Kosovo. during. mi-1998, when researchers from Human Rights Watch traveled with reporter Jane Perlez. The quid pro quo was that lez provided seats in an armored car, while the NGO researchers Shared their contacts in the country." Ia short, the typical pattern is that the journalists publish frst, but the NGOs ate there first and lead the journalists to the story Tn mid-1995, after the NGO and journalistic reporting on Srebrenica had atready reached a high pitch, American intelligence shaped and channeled the reporting to serve a mix of humanitarian and political purposes.” A ies of political events paved the way for ths intelligence involvement. Oo 2 duly, ata meeting of Western allies in London, the Europeans finally agreed to use air strikes against the Serbs if they persisted in attacking UN designated safe areas, On 26 July, the safe area of Zepa fell i the Serbs. On 27 July, a U-2 spy plane photographed mass graves near Gisasters. Frequently, the texts vermin um oF wELUGENCEIwonaoou PTHERSHP: WS ARO UTED STATES TELIGEEE SAL WS 218 Srebrenica, but the film was not shipped to the US. until 30 July. On that day John Shattuck, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights, was in Bosnia interviewing survivors of the massacre There is no public data on what administration decisionmaking le to an apparently more active search for information about the massacres. A. easonable guess is that the Allis’ 21 July decision to allow bombing would have mobilized the U.S. intelligence community to prepare to support American military action (hence, the U-? fights), and may have (so unsbackled the Human Rights Buteau at State to directly and publicly highlight the Serb massacres in order to lestinize the military ction. Shattuck would not have visited Bosnia without prior certainty ible witnesses to interview, That he Was 2 ts NGOs is alzo'a reasonable guess wwth the arrival of that he would find er his interviewees by umn ti Tm any case, Shattuck’s return to Washington conc he U2 photos of mass graves, and with pressure on the intelligence ‘community to corroborate the efugee accounts. On 2 August, “An fnalyst with the CIA's Balkans Task Force stayed up al night, looking throvgh thousands of images,” to match the U2 photos of Feshiy turned faith with satellite photos of hundreds of men held. at gunpoint in the same fields on 13 July ‘On 4 August, the combination of information, pooled from satelite photos, U-2. photos, and survivor interviews, was reviewed by top Advisors to President Clinton at the White House. On the same day the Croatian government began Operation Flush and Operation Storm, with assistance’ fromthe private American security. company Military Professional Resources, Ine. (MPRI}.”” MPRI is licensed for particular contracts by the State Department, which is therefore aware of its fctivities. This offensive “ethnically cleansed” Serbs ont of a region of Croatia, and later helped to convince the Serbs to come 10 the negotiating table at Dayton. The Clinton administration Iauached a coordinated public relations ‘campaign to accuse the Bosnian Serbs of primary responsibility for the most egregious human rights violations in Bosnia. Ambassador Madeleine Albright presented the satelite photos to the UN Security Councilon 8 August, during the Croatian offensive against the Serbs—to confirm refugce reports that the Bosnian Serbs had massacred hundreds or thousands of Muslims after overrunning Stebrenica. U-2 spy plane photos of “possible mass graves" near Srebreniea were released {0 the press. And a CIA official told a Senate hearing that “American inteligence has found a clear pattern of ‘ethnic cleansing’ by the Bosnian Serbs since 1992."214 uu oon (On 16 August, Christian Scionce Monitor reporter David Rohde entered Bosnian Serb territory “with a faxed copy of the satelite photo of th suspected graves in hand,” and proceeded to find those graves.” His 18 August story was the first eyewitness reportage on the grave. Wit is subsequent reporting, Rohde earned the Pulitzer Prize. Even this heroic journalism followed the established pattern. Researchers Ivan Lupus and Laura Pitter from Human Rights Watch were in Bosnia at the sume time as Rohde searching For mass graves.” What is the significance of the way that information from NGOs, journalists, and Amerian inteligence Was pooled concerning Srebrenic: ‘The US. government's public relations campaign against the Bosni Serbs, involving the pooling of intelligence and NGO information, was med to. gain international snd domestic support for a new American peace initiative for the Balkans. The selective disclosure of American Frelligence. information also. served as a prelude to, and political justification for, the NATO bombing of Bosnian Serb military targets a few weeks later, ‘The bombing, in combination with the Croatia texpulsion of the Serbs, is widely viewed as responsible for convincing the Serbs that they would have a better chance (@ consolidate their gains at the peace table A fimilar luster of issues and dilemmas surrounds the ongoing controversy over how much intelligence information the United States SHIl Share with the War Ctimes Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia The ‘Tribunal has instituted secure procedures for pooling such inteligence information with information gathered by NGOs, journalists, und its owt investigations, The Clinton adminstration pledged to tam ver “all_appropriate information” bat withheld some intelligence fequested ty the Tribunal, including. signals intellgen Conversations between Bosnian Serb commanders.” AL issue is not only the problem of concealing the precise scope and capacity of American technical intelligence. There is also the likelihood that the United States toes both the selective release of intelligence to the Tribunal, and the threat to release such intelligence, as bargaining chips in relation to the parties to the confit in former Yugosiavia. COLLABORATIVE EXPERIMENTATION TO CONTINUE Many NGOs and the U.S intelligence community clearly want to pres ‘option af motual cooperation, atleast when the structure of particular issues tnd. cases. permits, This collaboration may be at arm's Tength, but thvemanona ou oF TEEENCEcyano PARTNERSHIP RGD Ao UTED STATES ELLEN SHALL WARS a5 attempis to facilitate tare key to continue, due to the enduring convergence of attention by both communities to the causal Tinkages between war and humanitarian suffering The physical insecurity of NGO staff in the field leads them to seek the security information that the U.S. government may be able 49 provide, but to avoid a profile of close association with the American inteligence community which may jeopardize their reputation for poliial neutrality On the NGO side, lives cam be put at risk, either by lacking information or by being perceived as possessing too much information The hazards for the intelligence community are more quotidian. The bureaucratic problem of being spread. too thin to keep track of the multitude of small wars and collapsed states is one. of the prime motivators for intelligence agencies to turn to NGOs or security companies to privatize the collection and analysis of information, The collaboration resists insittionalization, however, for iwo reasons. Fits only & partial avd unreliable harmony exists between the humanitatian interest in saving lives and US. national interests, NGOs that once cooperated with the inteligence community may turn against it in a campaign that undermines public support for intelligence institutions, Second, the intelligence community often has nothing to offer in reciprocal tuade for NGO. information, ‘The NGO world is structured as a decentralized, uid, and competiive network in which teciprocity ie expecied in any collaboration Experimentation is likely to continue in pooling information, and inventing new forms of intermediary relationships positioned between NGOs and American intelligence. The intermediaries’ themselves may be structured cither as NGOs, forproft private companies, parts of governments, or international organizations. REFERENCES, For useful surveys by issue area, see Willam Kory, NGOs and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (New Yorks St. Martins Press, 1998). Gil Lescher, Beyond Charity: International Cooperation andthe Global Refugee Criss (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993) Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, eds, Herding Cats: Muliparty Mediation ma Complex: World (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1999), Teeje Tvedt, Angels of Mercy or Development Diplomats? NGOS and Foreign did (Trenton, NI: Alrien World Press, 1998); Thomas Princen and Matthias Finget, Environmental NGOs in World Politis: Linking the Locel ad the Global (New York: Routledge, 1994), David P. Forsythe "Choices More Ethical Than Leak The International Community of the Red Cross ‘oo counrenreLucence —voLUMe 1, numnen 2216 ane onan aod Human Right,” Ehies and fernasiona Affairs, vol. 7 1983, pp. 131-151 and. Lawty Diamond, Promoting Democracy tt the 19804: tors ond Trsruments,Tswues and Imperatives (New York: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Confit, 1995). 2 For an uncoaventional theory of NGO action across iasue-areas, see Wiliam E DeMars, "NGOs in World Politics: A Stuctural Approsch,” unpublished manuscript, February 2000, “there is no precise defiition of “complex emergency.” Consider this exchange an Oxford meeting onthe role of media im disasters: “*When reporters don Know what is happening.” remarked the journalist Lindsay Hisum, “they ell anarchy" "And when ail workers dont know what 3 happening,” Mark Duet add “they call t a complex emergeny."” David Keen and John Role, “Editorl: The Fale of Information ia a Disaster Zone.” Disasters, Val. 20, No. 3, September 1986, p. 170 The broad potizy movement for early waring confit prevention can be dated from the launching of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing, Deadly Confiet in May, 1996, and the Washington, D.C. conference on “Manag {Chaoe" in Dacciber, 1994, sponsored hy the United Sats lastitte of Peace Ser Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Confit, Preventing Deadly vflet Foal Report (Catnegie Corporation of New York, 1997) Chester A Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, eis, Managing Globa Chaos Sources of and Responses to International Confict (Washington, DC nied States towitute of Pease Press, 1998) Junie Leatheeman,, Willi DeMars, Patrik Oalfvey, and Raimo Viynen, Breaking Cycles of Violence Confer Prevention in Intvatiate Crises (West Hartford, CY: Kumaran Pres 3), Bruce W. fendeson, ., Opnortanities Missed, Opporaniies St Prenntve Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World (New York: Cares Commission on Preventing. Deadly Confit, 1999), Barnett R- Rubin ed Canes and Sivavegies for Preventive Acton (New York: Century Foundation Pres, 1998), John Prendergast, Frontine Diplomaey: Humanitarian aid and Confer in Africa (Boulder, CO: Lynne Renner, 1996); Michel S. Lund Preventing Violent Conflicts: A” Siateey for Preventive Diplomacy (Washington, DC: United States Intute of Peace Press, 1996 Robert Rotberg ed, Vigilance and Vengeance: NGOs Preventing Evie Confit in Dinced Societies (Washington. DC: Brookings. lestitution Pres, 1996) Wiliam DeMars, “Waiting for Early Warning: Humanitarian Acton After he Cold War.” Journal of Refugee Studies, Vo. 8, No.4 (1995), pp. 390-10. 5 For example, see Hugh Sith, “Intlignce and Peacekeeping," Survival, Vol. 36 (Autumn 199, pp. 174-92; Pir Eriksson, “Intligence in Pescskeeping Operations,” International Jounal of Intligence and a Countertntligence, Val 10, No, 1, Spring 1997, pp. 1-18; Bernard F. MeMahon, "Low-Inteniy eremanow Jon oF WTELIGECEaseo0U PATMERSMP: oa 18 UNITED STATES MTELLIGNEE WSL WARS 27 Confit: The Pentagon's Foible.” Orbs, Val 34, Winter 1990, pp. 3-24; and Alaa E. Goodman and Bruce D. Derkovitz, “Pisoning Insllgence After the (Cold War,” Intligence and National Secarty, Vo. Apri 194, pp. 30-42 ‘setirey T. Ricelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community, Third Edition (Boulder CO: Wesiview Pres, 1995). Ronnie D. Linschutz, “Reconstructing World Politics The Emergence of Gta Civil Society” Millenniom: Journal of International Studies, Volo 2 Nox 3, 1092, pp. 389-420, Hedley Bull. The Anarchcal Soviet)" A Study of Order i World Pots (New York: Cokubia University Pres, 1977. * william DeMars, “Contending Neutraites: Humanitarian Organizations and War in the Horn of Africa" in Jackie Smith, Charles Chats and Re Psgnocco, eds, Transnational Social Movements ond "Global Potties, Salldartiy Beyond the State (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Pres 197) Foanna Macrae and Anthony Zoi, ods. Wor and flanger: Rethiting Inernavanal Responses ta Com ences (Londo Ze Books, 1394) Lary Minear and Thomas G. Weiss, Arey Under Fire: War and the Global Humanitarian Community (Moulder, CO: Wes ® Mary B, Anderson, Do No Ha CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999) How Aid Can Southwestern Sudan, 1983-1989 (Prnccton, NJ- Princeton University Press, 1994): Lionel “A” Rosenblatt and Lary Thompson, "Humanitarian 1995. pp. 91-109, . pvervew with Holly Burkhalter, Human Rights Watch, Washington, D.C, 29 September 1595, Defense inteltigence Journal, Vol 3.1994, pp. 5-19. "Lori FslerDannrosch, ed, Enforcing Rest at Collective Intervention in Internal Cones (New York: Counc on Foreign Relations Press, 193) "Joseph 8. Nye, Jr, “Peering Into the Future,” Foreign affais, Vo. 73, No.4 1094, p. 86. The positon has since been recast asthe National Inlligence ice for Global sues and Economie Security 5 Because the proces Was orginized by the Bure of International Organizations, and rerearched by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research it ran inf0 resistance from regional buresus and particular embassies within the State Department, Interviews with Don Krumm, USAID, Washington, D.C, 23 Februay 1999, and Harold Fleming, Department of State, Washington, D.C 29 September 1995, (©Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Inteligence Community, Preparing for the 2st Centery: An Appraisal of ©. Iielligence (Washington, DC: Commission on the Roles and Capabilities ofthe United218 ue semas ‘tates tntellgence Community, 1996), pp. x¥, 130-1; Independent Task Fore Making Intligence Smarter: The Future of US. Incl ce (New York Preparing fr the 2st Century, p. xv. Whatever thet merit, some of the new Sout thveats ented and analyzed by US intligence—such 26 the rapid nh Spread of water hyacinths in. Lake Vietoria—seemed. 10 invit Pos Cold Wat itatives to make American ssteligence appear more fi rad useful the public, but which ate Bot the specie Toews include release of Spy sitelite photos from the 19605 and Navy archives of physical data on the oceans for envionmental research, and intelligence Zapport for federal management of natural disasters on US. teritory. See ‘Steten Greenhouse, “The Gresing of American Diplomacy,” The New York Times, 9 October 1995, Willa J. Broad, "Navy is Releasing Treasure of Steet’ Data on World's Oceans” The New York Times, 28 November 1995 Dana Calvo, “American Public to Heae Story of “Spy. in the St Raroiaed Press, 27 November 1995; and Donald M. Rothberg, “CIA Spy Equipment Helps Track Natural Disasters,” Associated Pres, 20 October 1995 "National Intligence Council, Globo! Mamanitarion Emergencies, 1995 (Declasiied Version, New York United States Mission to. the United Nations, 1995), Re leffey Smith, “Demand for Humanitarian Aid May Skyrocket,” The Washington Pot, 17 Deesmber 1994 1 tnervew with Eid CB, Schoste, Nationa Inelgence Offer for Global and Muitioteral Affairs, Washington, D.C. 28 September 1995 2” Presentation by Jack Davis, CIA Directorate of Intelligence, atthe Annual Meeting ofthe International Studies Assocation, San Diego, CA, 17 April 1996 Patick M. Hughes, “Global Threts snd Challenges: The Ltenant Gene s Ahead,” 29 Jan 2 tnteriews with Defense Inteligence Agency ofcals, and present and past tifcialn of the Department of Sute, Washington, D.C, Febroary 1998. 2 Jennifer Sims, "What is Intlienss? Information for Decision Makers,” and brat Stulsky, “What Is Intligence? Secrets and Competition Amon States,” both in Roy Godson, Ernest R, May, and Gury Schmit, eds, U.S. Intelligence at the Crossroads: Agendas for Reform (Washington, D.C Brassey's, 1995), 24 Under this defiaton, intelligence information is conceptualized as more closely finked to policy ation than under traditional deftions, S Susan Strange, The Rereat of the State: The Diffusion of Power inthe World eonom (Cambridge: Cambridge Universi Press, 199) switlam P. Ryan, “The New Landscape for Nonprofits" Harvard Business Review, January February 1999, pp. 127-136; William Reno, "The Clinton Adminisiaton and Afric; Private Corporate Dimension,” Ise: A Journal ‘Opinion, Vol. 26, No. 2, 1998, pp. 23-2 remo, sue oF ELUCENCEasaonu PATHERSHP:oos UNITED STATES NTELUQENEEWSHIL WS 219 7 Wiliam Reno, Warlord Politics and African States (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rien 1998}, Wiliam Zartman, ed, Coflaped States: The. Ditepration and Restoration of Legitimate Authrtty Boulder, CO: Lynne Raenner, 1095). 26H, Richard Friman and Peter Andres ed, The flit Global Economy and State Power (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Litlsil, 1989), Danict Yerin, Th Prise: The Eple Quest for Ol, Money, and Power (New York: Simon and ® David Shearer, Prisate Armies and Miltry Intervention, Adelphi Paper 316, International Insitute for Strategie Stes, 1998 Herber M. Howe, "Private Security Forces and African Stability The Case of Executive Outcote, Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 36, No. 2, 1998, pp. 307-31 Adel-Fatau Mush and J. "Kayode Fayemi, ed, Mercenaries! tn dfican W Mark Dufiel, “The Political Exonomy of Internal Was: Asst Transte, Complex Emergencies and Intemational Aid,” in Joanna Macrae and Anthony Zvi, eds, Wor and Hunger” Rethinking Inersaional Responses fo Complex Emergencies (London Zed Books, 1998) andrew Rathmell, “The Privatisation of Tneligence: A Way Forward for European Intelligence Cooperation,” Paper for the WEU Insutule for Sccurly Studies conferenre on “Towards a Europea Inteligence. Policy Paris, 13-14 March 1997 (wwnksl.ac orgies weupaper htm). See also, Bjorn Willa, "From Kosove to Chechnya, Selling Images From Above, % According to the Report ofthe Commission on the Roles and Capabilities of the United States Intelligence Community, "In CIA alone, the amount of open source information has grown by a factor of tea over the past four years Preparing for the 21st Century, 8S Presentation by Alison Des Forges and Monique Mujawamariy, Conference on Non-Governmental Organizations, Early Warning, and Preventive Diplomacy Harvard. University, 8 Apri 1995, See also Alison Des Forges, “Making Noise Effectively: Lesson from the Rwandan Catastrophe,” in Robert Rotberg ed Vigilance and Vengeance: NGOs Preventing Eihnie Conf é Divided Soccer (Washington, D.C: Brookings Insitute. 1997), and. Alison Human Rights Watch, 199), pp. 624-644 Obstacles to an effective international military response included lack of public or congressional interest inthe United States, opposition bythe US. military sek to avoid another Somalia, obstaction in the UN by Francs, and mismatch between available military capacity and the tactical demands of the mision See Holly J, Burkhalter, "The Question of Genocige: ‘The Clinton Administeation and Rwanda," World Policy Journal, Vol. IL, No. 4, 1995, pp. 44-54; and Alan J. Kuperman, “Rwanda in Retrospet,” Foreign afiis, Vol 7, No. 1, January-February 2000, pp 94-118220 ua € oes S jane Psler, “Who Rules orsign Polieys Roos” International Herat! Tibuve 15 December 199, >6tpterviews with Robert Frasure, Director of African Affairs, National Security Counei, Washington, D.C. 20 August 199 and Nancy Bearg Dyke, former NSC Director of International Programs and Public Diplomacy, 1989-1993, Washington, D.C, 28 September 1955. > Joseph Fitchet, "No Monopolies on Goverament Eavesdropping.” International Herald, Tribune, 28 February 2000; Nicky Hager, “Exposing the Global ‘Scrvitance Sysiem,”" Covert detion Quarterly, No, 59, Winer 1996-1997 °SWitliam DeMats “The Edge of Innoosnce:Inlernational NGOs and Confit Prevention” in E. Wayne Nafriger and Raimo Vayryuen, od, War a Devttutin: The Prevention of Himovitarian Emergencies (London Macrullan, 2000), See the essys by Mask Duffield, David Keen, and Alex de Wath, in Joann Macrae and Anthony Zwviy ed War and Hunger: Rethinking International Response to. Complex Emergencies (London: Zed Books, 1994). See also Devld’ Keen, The Benefits of Famine: A Political Leanomy of Famine and Relief in Southwestern Sudan.” 1983-1989 (Priocetom, N: Princston University Press, 1994), and Alex de Waal, Ev! Days: 30" Years of War and Famine in Eihiopa, An Aisa Watch Report (New York: Human Rights Wateh Projest 1991), D.C. 20 February 1989. 4 Joterviews with international NGOs in Nairobi, Kenya, September 199. © For example ee Arming Rovandae The Arma Trade and Human Rights Abuses fhe Rwandan War (New York: Horan Rights Watch Ans Project January 1994), Ruwanda/Zaire’ Rearming. With Impuasy (New York: Human, Rights Watch Arms Project, May 1995); and_ Colombia's Killer Nenworks: The Miltery-Paramiltary Partnership and the United States (New York: Human Rights Watch Ariss Projet, November 1996), 6 tyerviews with staff and consultants of Human Rights Watch, Washington, DC, February 1998, “4 Frederick C, Cuny, "Killing Chechnys,” The New York Review of Books, 6 Apri 1985, pp. 1517 8 get Anderson, The Man Who Tried 1o Save the Word (New York: Doubedey 1999). Wiliam Shaweross, “A Hero for Our Time,” The New York Revlew of Books, 30 November 1995, pp. 38-39. Scott Anderson, “Last in Chechnya," The New York Times Mi February 1996, pp. 42-86 eremrou sum OF WRELUEENE‘Moamogs FARTWERSHP: EDs WNTED STATES MELUSENE SAL was 221 "a August 1996, Russian authorities mysteriously “discovered” passports and identity papers for Cuny and his thee companions, but not thelr bodies. Fo Some of Cuny’s former colleagues, this sueests that he was led by the Russians, Interviews in Washington, DC, February 1999, ® tnerviews at Refugees International, Washington, DC, 25 February 1999. Andrew Natsios advocates the separation of these various roles in confit situations: Andsew Nalsios, Panel on "NGO Burdens and Needs as Confiet Managers" 30 ‘November 1984. at "Managing “Chaos Coping. With International Confit into the 21s Century,” conference sponsored by United Sates Insitute of Pesce, Washington, DC SI Robin W. Winks, Cloak and Gonn: Schilrs in the Secret War (New York Wiliam Morrow, 1987), ® Roy Godson, "Covert Action: Nether Exceptional Tool Nor Magi Bul Roy Godion, Emest R. May, and Gary Schmit, eds, US tllicence a the CGrosiroods: Agendas for Reform (Washington, D.C: Brassey’, 1995). 16S, ® uansfeld Turner, Secrecy and Democracy: The CIA in Transition (Boston Houghton Miffin, 1983), p40; Thomas B Ross, "Surreptitis Enty” The CIA's Operations in the United State,” ia Robert L- Borosage and John Marks, eds. The CTA File (New York: Grossman, 1976), p. 103 nerview with Charles Sykes and Judith Mayotte, Bureau of Population Refugees, and Migration, US. Depariment of Slate, Washington, DC. 3 SStatervew with Frank Moss, former Refugse Coordinator and Cross-Border Relic Officer in Khartoum, Sudan, 1985-1987, Washington, D.C, 3 October 1995, Sintersiow with MacArthur Deshazer, Director of African Affuirs, National Security Council, Washington, D.C, 4 October 1995, inerview with Naney Ely-Rapbel, Bareaw of Democracy, Human Rights nd Labor, U.S. Departinent of State, Washington, D.C, 4 Oxtber 1995, * laurview with Masia D'Albert, Refuges Internation, Washington, D.C. 29 September 1995, 9 Deshazer interview “parry James, "Crisis Group Aims to Fill Diplomatic Reporting Gap, International Herald Tribune, 11 ana 2000 bi © sito usteate the inluene of personal networks al four men were involved in the intensely politicized role! operations around the Thal-Cambodian border during 1979-1981, and their activities were chronicled by journalist William Shaweross, who aso serves on the board of ICG. See William Shawoross, "A evo for Our Tine,” (In. 29); sé Wilk Shaveross, The Quai of Merc Cambodia, Holocaust and Modern Conscience (Glasgow: Willam Coline Sons, 1985), WO COUMTERITELIGENCE VOLUME 1 nan?22 uaa € oases ® International Criss Group brochure, 195% ‘The Burundi Policy Forum was orginally sponsored bythe Ceater for Preventive ‘Aston atthe Council on Forign Relations, Search for Common Ground, Refugecs Internationa, and the Aftean-American Insit Interviews with government and NGO officials in Washington, DC Sepcmber-s October 1995, 6 4 window ito the dispte from the point of view of one of the NGOs most rite (US. government policy, i Refuges Intrnaional, The Last Refugees: Herded fand Hanted In Eastern Zave (Washington, D.C: Refugees Intemational, Stpecmber 19) © Human Rights Watch, The War Crimes TH Human Rights Wate, February, 1998) 6 Roger Cohen, “CLA. Report Finds Secs Guilty of Majority of Bosnia War Grimes." The New York Tomes, 9 March 1995 “© Stcphen Engelberg and Tim Weiner, “Srebrenica: Tae Days of Slaughter,” Th so vank Tones 29 October 1998. pnal: One Year Later (New York ® For example, Antony Lloyd "Srebrenica Files Tell Grmly Familiar Stories of Mude" he Times, (London) 15 uly 199: Interview with EJ. Hagendoorn, Human Rights Watch, Washington, D.C., 25 Febroay 1999 Unless otherwise noted, the following chronology i from Engsbers and Weiner, ‘Srebrenict: The Days of Slaughter ‘Yves Goulet, “Washington's Freelance Advisors" Jane's inetligence Keto Va 10, No. 7, July 1998, pp. 38-4 cited in Wiliam Reno, “The Clinton [Adminisiation and AMiien: Private Corporate Dimension,” Ise: 4 Zoural 7 Opinion, Val. 26, No, 2, 1988, . 24 Schmit, Spy Photos Indicate Mass Grave at Serb-Held Town, US. Say, The New York Times, 10 August 1995; Barbara Crossetts, “US, Seeks to Prove Mass Killings.” The New York Times, 11 August 1995, ' David Rohde, Endgame: The Betrayal ond Fall of Srebrenica (Boulder, CO: on, pK Hagendoorn interview ” Blaine Scolino, “U.S. Says its Witholng Data from War Crimes Court.” The New York Tines, § November 1995; Robert Burns, “US. Troops to Aid War CCimies Pre,” Associated Press | Api 1996, remus sua oF weLuceNCE