01 Judgments STD June Latest New For Magazine

(2021) 20 STD ABC 1
Number of Judgments : 26
[2021] 125 taxmann.com 71 (SC)

(2021) 20 STD ??
In the Supreme Court of India
Dy. Commissioner of Income Tax
v.
Bajaj Allianz Life Insurance Company Ltd.
Shri Ashok Bhushan and Shri M.R. Shah, JJ.
SPL (C) Diary No. 17857 of 2020
18th January, 2021
Facts not available to ascertain the nature of SLP- Article 136 of Constitution
of India-Held-The special leave petition is dismissed. We have not entered
into the merits of the questions involve in this petition.
Final outcome – SLP Dismissed

Relevant Provisions : Article 136 of Constitution of India.
Relevant Period: A.Y.
Counsel :
– N. Venkataraman, ASG, Manish Pushkarna, Adv., Anmol Chandan, Adv.
and Mrs. Anil Katiyar, AOR for the Petitioner.
ORDER
1. Delay condoned.
2. The special leave petition is dismissed. We have not entered into the
merits of the questions involve in this petition.
3. Pending application stands disposed of.
_____________
[2021] 123 taxmann.com 344 (SC)
(2021) 20 STD ??
Beghar Foundation
v.
Justice K.S. Puttaswamy
Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, Shri A.M. Khanwilkar, Shri Ashok
Bhushan, Shri S. Abdul Nazeer and Shri B.R. Gavai, JJ.
Review Petition (Civil) No. 3948 of 2018, 22, 31, 377 and 924 of 2019
2 Supreme Court Tax Decisions (2021) 20 STD
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 494 of 2012, 829 of 2013,
231 of 2016, 342, 1014 and 1058 of 2017
Review Petition Civil Diary Nos. 45777 and 48326 of 2018
11th January, 2021
Review Petitions-Held- The present review petitions have been filed against
the final judgment and order dated 26.09.2018. We have perused the review
petitions as well as the grounds in support thereof. In our opinion, no case for
review of judgment and order dated 26.09.2018 is made out. We hasten to add
that change in the law or subsequent decision/judgment of a co-ordinate or
larger Bench by itself cannot be regarded as a ground for review. The review
petitions are accordingly dismissed.
Per
Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, J.
-Judicial Review-Money Bill is being constested- This batch of petitions
seeks a review of the decision of a Constitution Bench of this Court in
Puttaswamy (Aadhaar-5J.) v. Union of India, (2019) 1 SCC 1. Among the
issues which arose for decision, the Court had to answer two critical
questions: (i) whether the decision of the Speaker of the House of People 1
under Article 110(3) of the Constitution, to certify a bill as a 'Money Bill'
under Article 110(1) is final and binding, or can be subject to judicial review;
and (ii) if the decision is subject to judicial review, whether the Aadhaar
(Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services)
Act, 2016 (the "Aadhaar Act") had been correctly certified as a 'Money Bill'
under Article 110(1) of the Constitution.
-Held-
- In the present case, the abovementioned review petitions had all been filed
before the judgment in Rojer Mathew was delivered on
13 November, 2019. The review petitions were pending on the date when a
reference was made to a larger bench in Rojer Mathew. These review
petitions were previously listed before a five-judge bench headed by Justice
Arun Mishra on 25 August, 2020, and were not disposed of. Hence, these
review petitions have continued to remain pending until now, and there is a
strong reason for us not to dismiss them pending the decision of the larger
bench, especially in light of the adverse consequences highlighted above.
-If these review petitions are to be dismissed and the larger bench reference in
Rojer Mathew were to disagree with the analysis of the majority opinion in
Puttaswamy (Aadhaar-5J.), it would have serious consequences - not just for
judicial discipline, but also for the ends of justice. As such, the present batch
of review petitions should be kept pending until the larger bench decides the
questions referred to it in Rojer Mathew. In all humility, I conclude that the
constitutional principles of consistency and the rule of law would require that
1
'House of People' interchangeably referred as 'Lok Sabha'.
(2021) 20 STD ABC 3
a decision on the Review Petitions should await the reference to the Larger
Bench.
Final outcome – Deferred till disposal of petitions before Larger Bench

Relevant Provisions : Article 110 of Constitution of India
Decision Referred/Discussed :
Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, J.:
Kantaru Rajeevaru v. Indian Young Lawyers Assn., (2020) 9 SCC 121 [Refer
Para 13]
Mohd. Saeed Siddiqui v. State of U.P., (2014) 11 SCC 415 [Refer Para 7]
Puttaswamy (Aadhaar-5J.) v. Union of India, (2019) 1 SCC 1 [Refer Para
2, 7]
Rojer Mathew v. South Indian Bank Ltd. (2020) 6 SCC 1 : (2020) 314 CTR
58 [Refer Para 6]
S. Nagaraj v. State of Karnataka, 1993 Supp (4) SCC 595 : 1994 SCC (L&S)
320 [Refer Para 13]
Yogendra Kumar Jaiswal v. State of Bihar, (2016) 3 SCC 183 : (2016) 2 SCC
(Cri) 1 [Refer Para 7]
ORDER
1. Permission to file Review Petition(s) is granted.
2. Delay condoned.
3. Prayer for open Court/personal hearing of Review Petition(s) is rejected.
4. The present review petitions have been filed against the final judgment
and order dated 26.09.2018. We have perused the review petitions as well as
the grounds in support thereof. In our opinion, no case for review of judgment
and order dated 26.09.2018 is made out. We hasten to add that change in the
law or subsequent decision/judgment of a co-ordinate or larger Bench by itself
cannot be regarded as a ground for review. The review petitions are
accordingly dismissed.
5. Consequently, prayer for urging additional grounds in Review Petition
(Civil) No. 22/2019 stands rejected.
JUDGMENT
Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, J.:
1. I regret my inability to agree with the decision of the majority in
dismissing the present batch of review petitions.
2. This batch of petitions seeks a review of the decision of a Constitution
Bench of this Court in Puttaswamy (Aadhaar-5J.) v. Union of India, (2019) 1
SCC 1. Among the issues which arose for decision, the Court had to answer
two critical questions: (i) whether the decision of the Speaker of the House of
People2 under Article 110(3) of the Constitution, to certify a bill as a 'Money
Bill' under Article 110(1) is final and binding, or can be subject to judicial
review; and (ii) if the decision is subject to judicial review, whether the
Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and
Services) Act, 2016 (the "Aadhaar Act") had been correctly certified as a
'Money Bill' under Article 110(1) of the Constitution.
3. On the first question, the majority (speaking through Dr. Justice A.K.
Sikri) stated that "judicial review [of whether a Bill is a 'Money Bill'] would
be admissible under certain circumstances having regard to the law laid down
by this Court"3. While answering the second question, the majority held that
Section 7 of the Aadhaar Act had elements of a 'Money Bill', and the other
provisions were incidental to the 'core' of the Aadhaar Act. Hence, the
majority held that the Aadhaar Act had been correctly certified as a 'Money
Bill' under article 110(1).
4. In his concurring opinion, Justice Ashok Bhushan answered the first
question by holding that the decision of the Speaker of the House of People
under Article 110(1) could be subject to judicial review when it was in breach
of a constitutional provision. Drawing a distinction between an irregularity of
procedure and a substantive illegality, Justice Ashok Bhushan held:
‘901. There is a clear difference between the subject "irregularity of
procedure" and "substantive illegality". When a Bill does not fulfil the
essential constitutional condition under Article 110(1), the said
requirement cannot be said to be evaporated only on certification by
Speaker. Accepting the submission that certification immunes the
challenge on the ground of not fulfilling the constitutional condition, the
Court will be permitting constitutional provisions to be ignored and
bypassed. We, thus, are of the view that decision of the Speaker
certifying the Bill as Money Bill is not only a matter of procedure and in
the event, any illegality has occurred in the decision and the decision is
clearly in breach of the constitutional provisions, the decision is subject
to judicial review.’
However, in answering the second question, Justice Bhushan's concurring
opinion agreed with the majority and held that the Aadhaar Act had been
correctly certified by the Speaker of the House of People as a 'Money Bill'
under Article 110(1).
5. The opinion authored by me, answered the first question by holding that:
‘1080. The obligation placed on the Speaker of the Lok Sabha to certify
whether a Bill is a Money Bill is not a mere matter of "procedure"
contemplated under Article 122. It is a constitutional requirement, which
has to be fulfilled according to the norms set out in Article 110.
Article 122 will not save the action of the Speaker, if it is contrary to
2
'House of People' interchangeably referred as 'Lok Sabha'.
3
Id at paras 455-464.
(2021) 20 STD ABC 5
constitutional norms provided under Article 110. The Court, in the
exercise of its power of judicial review, can adjudicate upon the validity
of the action of the Speaker if it causes constitutional infirmities. Article
122 does not envisage exemption from judicial review, if there has been
a constitutional infirmity. The Constitution does not endorse a complete
prohibition of judicial review under Article 122. It is only limited to an
"irregularity of procedure".’
However, on the second question, my decision dissented with the majority
and Justice Ashok Bhushan, and held that the decision of the Speaker of the
House of People to certify the Aadhaar Act as a 'Money Bill' under
Article 110(1) was unconstitutional.
6. The issue whether judicial review can be exercised over a decision of the
Speaker of the House of People under article 110(3), arose subsequently
before another Constitution Bench in Rojer Mathew v. South Indian Bank Ltd.
(2020) 6 SCC 1 : (2020) 314 CTR 58. This was in the context of whether
some of the provisions of the Finance Act, 2017 (relating to appointments to
Tribunals and the conditions of service of members) could have been certified
as a 'Money Bill' under Article 110.
7. The judgment delivered by the majority (speaking through Chief Justice
Ranjan Gogoi) answered this question by referring to the judgment in
Puttaswamy (Aadhaar-5J.) (supra) in the following terms:
“102. A co-ordinate Bench of this Court in K.S. Puttaswamy
(Aadhaar-5J.) v. Union of India [K.S. Puttaswamy (Aadhaar-5J.) v.
Union of India (2019) 1 SCC 1], was tasked with a similar question of
the certification of "Money Bill" accorded to the Aadhaar (Targeted
Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Act,
2016 by the Speaker of Lok Sabha. The majority opinion after noting the
important role of the Rajya Sabha in a bicameral legislative set-up,
observed that Article 110 being an exceptional provision, must be
interpreted narrowly. Although the majority opinion did not examine the
correctness of the decisions in Mohd. Siddiqui [Mohd. Saeed Siddiqui v.
State of U.P., (2014) 11 SCC 415] and Yogendra Kumar Jaiswal
[Yogendra Kumar Jaiswal v. State of Bihar, (2016) 3 SCC 183 : (2016) 2
SCC (Cri) 1] or conclusively pronounce on the scope of jurisdiction or
power of this Court to judicially review certification by the Speaker
under Article 110(3), yet, it independently reached a conclusion that the
impugned enactment fell within the four corners of Article 110(1) and
hence was a "Money Bill". The minority view rendered, however,
explicitly overruled both Mohd. Siddiqui [Mohd. Saeed Siddiqui v. State
of U.P. (2014) 11 SCC 415] and Yogendra Kumar Jaiswal
[Yogendra Kumar Jaiswal v. State of Bihar (2016) 3 SCC 183 : (2016) 2
SCC (Cri) 1] .
103. The majority opinion in Puttaswamy [K.S. Puttaswamy (Aadhaar-
5J.) v. Union of India (2019) 1 SCC 1] by examining whether or not the
impugned enactment was in fact a "Money Bill" under Article 110
without explicitly dealing with whether or not certification of the
Speaker is subject to judicial review, has kept intact the power of judicial
review under Article 110(3). It was further held therein that the
expression "Money Bill" cannot be construed in a restrictive sense and
that the wisdom of the Speaker of Lok Sabha in this regard must be
valued, save where it is blatantly violative of the scheme of the
Constitution. We respectfully endorse the view in Puttaswamy [K.S.
Puttaswamy (Aadhaar-5J.) v. Union of India (2019) 1 SCC 1] and are in
no doubt that Mohd. Siddiqui [Mohd. Saeed Siddiqui v. State of U.P.
(2014) 11 SCC 415] and Yogendra Kumar Jaiswal [Yogendra Kumar
Jaiswal v. State of Bihar (2016) 3 SCC 183 : (2016) 2 SCC (Cri) 1]
insofar as they put decisions of the Speaker under Article 110(3) beyond
judicial review, cannot be relied upon.”
(Emphasis supplied)
However, the majority opinion noted that the first question was not
adequately answered in the above decision in Puttaswamy (Aadhaar-5J.). It
also noted its doubts on the determination of the second question:
“116. Upon an extensive examination of the matter, we notice that the
majority in K.S. Puttaswamy (Aadhaar-5J.) [K.S. Puttaswamy
(Aadhaar-5J.) v. Union of India, (2019) 1 SCC 1] pronounced the nature
of the impugned enactment without first delineating the scope of
Article 110(1) and principles for interpretation or the repercussions of
such process. It is clear to us that the majority dictum in K.S.
Puttaswamy (Aadhaar-5J.) [K.S. Puttaswamy (Aadhaar-5J.) v. Union of
India (2019) 1 SCC 1] did not substantially discuss the effect of the word
"only" in Article 110(1) and offers little guidance on the repercussions of
a finding when some of the provisions of an enactment passed as a
"Money Bill" do not conform to Articles 110(1)(a) to (g). Its
interpretation of the provisions of the Aadhaar Act was arguably liberal
and the Court's satisfaction of the said provisions being incidental to
Article 110(1)(a) to (f), it has been argued, is not convincingly reasoned,
as might not be in accord with the bicameral parliamentary system
envisaged under our constitutional scheme. Without expressing a firm
and final opinion, it has to be observed that the analysis in K.S.
Puttaswamy (Aadhaar-5J.) [K.S. Puttaswamy (Aadhaar-5J.) v. Union of
India (2019) 1 SCC 1] makes its application difficult to the present case
and raises a potential conflict between the judgments of co-ordinate
Benches.
117. Given the various challenges made to the scope of judicial review
and interpretative principles (or lack thereof), as adumbrated by the
majority in K.S. Puttaswamy (Aadhaar-5J.) [K.S. Puttaswamy
(Aadhaar-5J.) v. Union of India, (2019) 1 SCC 1] and the substantial
precedential impact of its analysis of the Aadhaar Act, 2016, it becomes
(2021) 20 STD ABC 7
essential to determine its correctness. Being a Bench of equal strength as
that in K.S. Puttaswamy (Aadhaar-5J.) [K.S. Puttaswamy (Aadhaar-5J.)
v. Union of India (2019) 1 SCC 1], we accordingly direct that this batch
of matters be placed before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of India, on the
administrative side, for consideration by a larger Bench.”
(Emphasis supplied)
As a consequence, the majority opinion held that "[t]he issue and question of
Money Bill, as defined under Article 110(1) of the Constitution, and
certification accorded by the Speaker of the Lok Sabha in respect of Part XIV
of the Finance Act, 2017 is referred to a larger Bench" 4.
8. In his partly concurring and partly dissenting opinion, Justice Deepak
Gupta agreed with the majority opinion in referring the first question of
'Money Bill' to a larger bench thus:
“365. I am in total agreement with the Chief Justice inasmuch as he has
held that the decision of the Hon'ble Speaker of the House of People
under Article 110(3) of the Constitution is not beyond judicial review. I
also agree with his views that keeping in view the high office of the
Speaker, the scope of judicial review in such matters is extremely
restricted. If two views are possible then there can be no manner of
doubt that the view of the Speaker must prevail. Keeping in view the
lack of clarity as to what constitutes a Money Bill, I agree with the
Hon'ble Chief Justice that the issue as to whether Part XIV of the
Finance Act, 2017, is a Money Bill or not may be referred to a larger
Bench.”
Similarly, another partly concurring and partly dissenting opinion, authored
by me, held thus:
“346. Though the present judgment [referring to the partly concurring
and partly dissenting opinion] analyses the ambit of the word "only" in
Article 110(1) and the interpretation of sub-clauses (a) to (g) of
clause (1) of Article 110 and concludes that Part XIV of the Finance Act,
2017 could not have been validly enacted as a Money Bill, I am in
agreement with the reasons which have been set out by the learned Chief
Justice of India to refer the aspect of Money Bill to a larger Bench and
direct accordingly.”
9. Consequently, the correctness of the judgment in Puttaswamy
(Aadhaar-5J.), in relation to what constitutes a 'Money Bill' under Article 110
of the Constitution, the extent of judicial review over a certification by the
Speaker of the House of People and the interpretation which has been placed
on the provisions of the Aadhaar Act while holding the enactment to be a
'Money Bill', are issues which will be resolved by a larger bench, which is yet
to be constituted.
4
Supra at note 3, at para 223.1.
10. The present batch of review petitions, in challenging the correctness of
the judgment in Puttaswamy (Aadhaar-5J.), assails the reasoning in the
opinion of the majority on whether the Aadhaar Act was a 'Money Bill' under
Article 110. The details of the review petitions, are summarised below:
(i) Review Petition (Civil) Diary No. 45777 of 2018 – This petition was
filed on 6 December, 2018, and its Sub-Ground (e) calls for a review of
Puttaswamy (Aadhaar-5J.) in which the majority opinion upheld the
certification of the Aadhaar Act as a 'Money Bill', which rests on the
erroneous assumption that Section 7 of the Aadhaar Act is its core
provision (Grounds XXIII-XXVII).
(ii) Review Petition (Civil) No. 3948 of 2018 – This petition was filed on
23 October, 2018, and seeks a review of Puttaswamy (Aadhaar-5J.) in
relation to the majority opinion upholding the certification of the
Aadhaar Act as a 'Money Bill' within the meaning of Article 110
(Grounds I-VII).
(iii) Review Petition (Civil) No. 22 of 2019 – This petition was filed on
15 December, 2018, and seeks a review of Puttaswamy (Aadhaar-5J.) in
relation to the majority opinion upholding the certification of the
Aadhaar Act as a 'Money Bill', and its consequence on the
constitutionality of the enactment (Grounds I-VI).
(iv) Review Petition (Civil) No. 31 of 2019 – This petition was filed on
21 December, 2018, and seeks a review of Puttaswamy (Aadhaar-5J.) in
relation to the majority opinion holding that the Aadhaar Act was
correctly certified as a 'Money Bill' by the Speaker of the House of
People by merely relying on Section 7 of the Aadhaar Act (Grounds
GG-II).
(v) Diary No. 48326 of 2018 – This petition was filed on 24 December,
2018, and seeks a review of Puttaswamy (Aadhaar-5J.) in relation to the
majority opinion upholding the Aadhaar Act's certification as a 'Money
Bill', which eliminated the possibility of discussion before the Rajya
Sabha (Grounds V-W).
(vi) Review Petition (Civil) No. 377 of 2019 – This petition was filed on 10
January, 2019, and seeks a review of Puttaswamy (Aadhaar-5J.) in
relation to the majority opinion holding that the Aadhaar Act could have
been certified as a 'Money Bill' at the time of its introduction in the Lok
Sabha (Ground A).
(vii) Review Petition (Civil) No. 924 of 2019 – This petition was filed on
12 January, 2019, and seeks a review of Puttaswamy (Aadhaar-5J.) in
relation to the majority opinion upholding the Aadhaar Act's certification
as a 'Money Bill' in terms of Article 110(1) even though it contained
provisions which affected the fundamental rights under Part III of the
Constitution (Ground A).
(2021) 20 STD ABC 9
11. The analysis of the majority opinion in Puttaswamy (Aadhaar-5J.) in
relation to the second question, i.e., whether the Aadhaar Act was a 'Money
Bill' under Article 110 has been doubted by a co-ordinate bench in Rojer
Mathew, when the first question was referred to a larger bench. The larger
bench has not been constituted, and is yet to make a determination.
Dismissing the present batch of review petitions at this stage - a course of
action adopted by the majority - would place a seal of finality on the issues in
the present case, without the Court having the benefit of the larger bench's
consideration of the very issues which arise before us. The correctness of
Puttaswamy (Aadhaar-5J.) on issues pertaining to, and arising from, the
certification of a Bill as a 'Money Bill' by the Speaker of the House of People
has been doubted by a co-ordinate Constitution Bench in Rojer Mathew. With
the doubt expressed by another Constitution Bench on the correctness of the
very decision which is the subject matter of these review petitions, it is a
constitutional error to hold at this stage that no ground exists to review the
judgment. The larger bench's determination would have an undeniable impact
on the validity of the reasons expressed in Puttaswamy (Aadhaar-5J.), on the
constitutional issues pertaining to and arising out of the certification by the
Speaker of the House of People. The failure to re-contextualize the decision of
the larger bench with regard to the Aadhaar Act being a 'Money Bill' under
Article 110(1) will render it a mere academic exercise.
12. It is important to draw a distinction with a situation where a judgment
attains finality and the view propounded by it is disapproved by a larger bench
subsequently. In the present case, the abovementioned review petitions had all
been filed before the judgment in Rojer Mathew was delivered on
13 November, 2019. The review petitions were pending on the date when a
reference was made to a larger bench in Rojer Mathew. These review
petitions were previously listed before a five-judge bench headed by Justice
Arun Mishra on 25 August, 2020, and were not disposed of. Hence, these
review petitions have continued to remain pending until now, and there is a
strong reason for us not to dismiss them pending the decision of the larger
bench, especially in light of the adverse consequences highlighted above.
13. In Kantaru Rajeevaru v. Indian Young Lawyers Assn., (2020) 9 SCC 121,
a nine-judge bench of this Court had to determine whether a reference could
be made to a larger bench in a pending review petition. Answering this in the
affirmative, the Court held that it need not admit the review petitions before
referring the question to a larger bench. Further, the court noted that such a
question could also be a pure question of law. In explaining the power of this
Court to review its own judgments, Chief Justice S.A. Bobde, speaking for the
Bench, held thus:
“29. Order LV Rule 6 makes it crystal clear that the inherent power of
this Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of
justice shall not be limited by the Rules. In S. Nagaraj v. State of
Karnataka [S. Nagaraj v. State of Karnataka, 1993 Supp (4) SCC 595 :
1994 SCC (L&S) 320], it was observed that even when there was no
statutory provision and no rules were framed by the highest court
indicating the circumstances in which it could rectify its orders, the
courts culled out such power to avoid abuse of process or miscarriage of
justice. It was further held that this Court is not precluded from recalling
or reviewing its own order if it is satisfied that it is necessary to do so for
the sake of justice. The logical extension to the above is that reference of
questions of law can be made in any pending proceeding before this
Court, including the instant review proceedings, to meet the ends of
justice.”
14. If these review petitions are to be dismissed and the larger bench
reference in Rojer Mathew were to disagree with the analysis of the majority
opinion in Puttaswamy (Aadhaar-5J.), it would have serious consequences -
not just for judicial discipline, but also for the ends of justice. As such, the
present batch of review petitions should be kept pending until the larger bench
decides the questions referred to it in Rojer Mathew. In all humility, I
conclude that the constitutional principles of consistency and the rule of law
would require that a decision on the Review Petitions should await the
reference to the Larger Bench.
_____________
[2021] 125 taxmann.com 104 (SC)
(2021) 20 STD ??
Bhullan Mal Gupta (HUF)
v.
Commissioner of Income Tax
Shri Hrishikesh Roy, J.
Civil Appeal No. 2181 of 2012
4th January, 2021
Appeal-Held- Mr. Vinay Garg, learned counsel for the appellant, submits that
the appellant does not wish to pursue this appeal. Accordingly, the Appeal
stands dismissed as not pressed-Dismissed as not pressed
Final outcome – Dismissed as Not Pressed

Relevant Provisions: N/A.
Counsel :
– Vinay Garg, AoR Ms. Deepam Garg, Upendra Mishra and Uday Singh,
Advs. for the Appellant;
– Ms. Anita Sahani, Adv. and B.V. Balaram Das, AOR for the Respondent.
ORDER
(2021) 20 STD ABC 11
1. Mr. Vinay Garg, learned counsel for the appellant, submits that the
appellant does not wish to pursue this appeal. Accordingly, the Appeal stands
dismissed as not pressed.
2. The presence of Ms. Anita Sahani, learned counsel appearing for the
Revenue is noted, for the purpose of record.
________________
(2021) 20 STD ??
In the High Court of Punjab & Haryana
v.
Bhullan Mal Gupta
Shri Adarsh Kumar Goel and Shri Ajay Kumar Mittal, JJ.
ITA No. 58 0f 2008
10th March, 2011
Gift-S.56(2)(x) of Income Tax Act, 1961- Whether on facts and circumstances of
the case, the Hon'ble ITAT has erred in law in allowing the appeal of the
assessee by ignoring the Jurisdictional High Court decision in the case of Sh.
LalChandKalra v. CIT, (1981) 22 CTR 135 (P&H) and Apex Court decision
in the case of McDowell & Co. v. CTO, (1985) 154 ITR 148 (SC)-Held-That
the Tribunal erred in deleting the addition ignoring the finding that the
impugned gift was merely a manipulation. Only reason given by the Tribunal
for accepting the gift to be genuine is that there was no reason not to rely
upon the statement of Umesh Mehndiratta who was representative of the
donor. This observation is perverse, as Umesh Mehndiratta instead of
supporting the case of the assessee has supported the stand of the revenue that
there was no genuine gift. The observation quoted above is also contradictory
as the Tribunal itself has stated that the statement of Umesh Mehndiratta was
not enough to hold that the gift was not genuine-The finding of the Tribunal is
patently perverse. The Tribunal faulted to deal with the reasons given by the
CIT(A). Accordingly, we answer the question in favour of the revenue.
-The impugned proceedings were initiated on 25.05.2001 in respect of the
Assessment Year 1994-95. It is not disputed that initiation of proceedings was
within the time prescribed under section 149 of the Act at the relevant time.
Thus, the Cross Objections are without any merit-As regards service of notice,
the Assessing Officer as well as the CIT(A) have categorically held that there
was due compliance of requirement of issuing notice and the assessee
responded to the said notice. In absence of any error being pointed out in the
said finding, the contention that the notice had not been duly served is without
any basis.
Final outcome – Appeal Allowed

Relevant Provisions : S. 56 (2) (x) of Income Tax Act,1961
Relevant Period: A.Y. 1994-95
McDowell & Co. v. CTO, (1985) 154 ITR 148 (SC) [Refer Para 1]
Sh. Lal Chand Kalra v. CIT, (1981) 22 CTR 135 (P&H) [Refer Para 1]
Counsel :
– Ms. Urvashi Dhugga, Sr. Counsel for the Appellant.
– Pankaj Jain, Adv. for the Respondent.
ORDER
Shri Adarsh Kumar Goel, J.:
1. This appeal has been preferred by the revenue under Section 260-A of
the Income-tax Act, 1961 (for short, "the Act") against the order of the
Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi dated 23.03.2007 in ITA
No. 2790/DEL/ 2004 for the Assessment Year 1994-95 raising following
substantial question of law:–
“Whether on facts and circumstances of the case, the Hon'ble ITAT has
erred in law in allowing the appeal of the assessee by ignoring the
Jurisdictional High Court decision in the case of Sh. Lal Chand
Kalra v. CIT, (1981) 22 CTR 135 (P&H) and Apex Court decision in the
case of McDowell & Co. v. CTO, (1985) 154 ITR 148 (SC) ?”
2. The return of the assessee for the assessment year in question was
initially processed under Section 143(1) of the Act but, thereafter, the
Assessing Officer on formation of opinion that there was escapement of
income, served notice upon the assessee under Section 148 for reassessment,
after obtaining due approval. The assessee responded to the said notice and
stated that the return already filed may be treated to have been filed in
response to the said notice. After due consideration, the Assessing Officer
made addition to the declared income of the assessee, treating the amount
claimed to have been received by way of foreign gift to be undisclosed
income. The assessee was unable to show that the gift was genuine. The donor
had no relationship with the assessee. The assessee had manipulated the gift
by paying commission and by giving cash amount. The CIT(A) upheld the
addition as follows:–
“9.8 In this case, the onus on the assessee was much more as donor was
non-resident and, therefore, the department does not have the means to
examine the books of account of the non-residents donors. It was for the
assessee to prove beyond doubt by producing the donor before the
Assessing Officer and also his complete bank statement/bank account
(and not merely the bank certificate) to prove that gift was actually given
to the assessee.
(2021) 20 STD ABC 13
“9.9 In this case the Assessing Officer had stated in the order that the
donor had denied having given the gift. The relevant extract of the
assessment order is reproduced here:-
“However, Sh. Subhash Sethi alleged donor in his letter dated
25.07.1995 addressed to Sh. N.K. Katyal Enforcement Officer New
Delhi had denied of having executed any gift deed in favour of any
persons at any stage or parted any money through his NRE account,
simply because he had no money in the account and further he did
not remit any money from England.”
9.10 Therefore, even the identity of the donor is not there. The donor had
also categorically stated that he had no money to gift to anyone.
Therefore, even his financial capacity is not proved. The Assessing
Officer has also mentioned in the assessment order that Sh. Subhash
Sethi, apart from giving gift to the assessee HUF, had also given gift to
other members of the family, the question, therefore, which remains
unanswered is what is the financial capacity of the donor to make such
gifts? What are his known sources of income? None of these have been
answered or proved before the Assessing Officer by the assessee.”
The Tribunal deleted the addition as follows:—
“21. We find that similar to the facts of the above case, in the instant case
also, donor Subhash Sethi was not examined by the AO and the donor
never denied the fact of his making the gift to the assessee. The assessee
in support of the genuineness of the gifts has filed declaration duly
signed by the donor. In addition to this affidavit of the donor, bank
account of the donor, bank certificate etc. were also placed by the
assessee before the AO. The AO apart from the statements of Shri
Umesh Mehndiratta, which was given before the FERA authorities,
could not bring any material on record to show that the assessee paid
commission only to receive the said gift. Further, the Revenue could not
give any reason as to why no credence should be placed on the statement
of Shri Mehndiratta, which was obtained at the back of the assessee by
FERA authorities and no opportunity of cross examination was provided
to the assessee and more so when the FERA authorities itself has
absolved all concerned Shri Umesh Mehndiratta in his statement before
the FERA authorities has not denied the fact of gift of Rs. 4.00 lacs made
by Shri Subhash Sethi, N.R.I. to the assessee H.U.F. Thus, we following
the above-cited decision in the case of Shri Kamal Gupta (supra) are of
the view that the addition of Rs. 4,60,000/- made by the lower authorities
in the above facts and circumstances of the case cannot be sustained.
Accordingly, we set aside the order of the AO and the CIT(A) and delete
the addition of Rs. 4,60,000/-. The ground of appeal of the assessee is
allowed.”
3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties.
4. Learned Counsel for the revenue submitted that the Tribunal erred in
deleting the addition ignoring the finding that the impugned gift was merely a
manipulation. Only reason given by the Tribunal for accepting the gift to be
genuine is that there was no reason not to rely upon the statement of Umesh
Mehndiratta who was representative of the donor. This observation is
perverse, as Umesh Mehndiratta instead of supporting the case of the assessee
has supported the stand of the revenue that there was no genuine gift. The
observation quoted above is also contradictory as the Tribunal itself has stated
that the statement of Umesh Mehndiratta was not enough to hold that the gift
was not genuine.
5. Learned Counsel for the assessee has not been able to justify the finding
of the Tribunal.
6. We find merit in the contention raised on behalf of the revenue. The
finding of the Tribunal is patently perverse. The Tribunal faulted to deal with
the reasons given by the CIT(A). Accordingly, we answer the question in
favour of the revenue.
7. Learned Counsel for the assessee points out that he has filed Cross
Objections to the effect that proceedings for reassessment were beyond
limitation and there was no due service of notice.
8. We have considered the submissions. The impugned proceedings were
initiated on 25.05.2001 in respect of the Assessment Year 1994-95. It is not
disputed that initiation of proceedings was within the time prescribed under
section 149 of the Act at the relevant time. Thus, the Cross Objections are
without any merit.
9. As regards service of notice, the Assessing Officer as well as the CIT(A)
have categorically held that there was due compliance of requirement of
issuing notice and the assessee responded to the said notice. In absence of any
error being pointed out in the said finding, the contention that the notice had
not been duly served is without any basis.
10. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed and Cross Objections are dismissed.
_____________
(2021) 20 STD ??
Pr. Commissioner of Income Tax
v.
BPTP Ltd.
Shri Ashok Bhushan, Shri R. Subhash Reddy and Shri M.R. Shah, JJ.
SLP (Civil) Diary No. 21081 of 2020
4th January, 2021
(2021) 20 STD ABC 15
SLP-Article 136 of Constitution of India-Delay Condoned-Held- The special
leave petition is dismissed-Pending application(s), if any, stands disposed of.
Final outcome – In favour of Assessee

Relevant Provisions: A. 136 of Constitution of India
Counsel :
– Balbir Singh, ASG, Rajat Nair, Rupesh Kumar, Shyam Gopal, Advs. and
Mrs. Anil Katiyar, AOR for the Petitioner.
ORDER
1. Delay condoned.
2. The special leave petition is dismissed.
3. Pending application(s), if any, stands disposed of.
_____________
[2021] 125 taxmann.com 167 (SC)
(2021) 20 STD ??
Asstt. Commissioner of Income Tax
v.
Gayatri Microns Ltd.
Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, Mrs. Indira Banerjee and Shri Sanjiv Khanna, JJ.
SLP Appeal (C) No. 13270 of 2020
4th January, 2021
Tax Effect-Threshold limit 25 Lakhs in pursuance of Circular-SLP-Article 136 of
Constitution of India-Held- Mr. Balbir Singh, learned Additional Solicitor
General appearing for the petitioner, states that the tax effect is below the
threshold of Rs. 25 lakhs contained in the relevant circular of the Central
Board of Direct Taxes-The Special Leave Petition is, therefore, not
entertained and it is dismissed accordingly.
Final outcome – SLP dismissed

Relevant Provisions : A. 136 of Constitution of India
Counsel :
– Balbir Singh, K. Radhakrishnan, Sr. Adv., Ms. Rashmi Malhotra, Shyam
Gopal, Advs. and Mrs. Anil Katiyar, AOR for the Petitioner.
ORDER
1. Mr. Balbir Singh, learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for the
petitioner, states that the tax effect is below the threshold of Rs. 25 lakhs
contained in the relevant circular of the Central Board of Direct Taxes.
2. The Special Leave Petition is, therefore, not entertained and it is
dismissed accordingly.
_____________
[2021] 125 taxmann.com 172 (SC)
(2021) 20 STD ??
Commissioner of Income Tax (TDS)
v.
Idea Cellular Ltd.
Shri Rohinton Fali Nariman, Shri Navin Sinha and Shri K.M. Joseph, JJ.
SLP (Civil) Diary No(s). 21870 of 2020
13th January, 2021
SLP-A. 136 of Constitution of India- Leave to annex along- Held-Delay

condoned -Leave granted -Tag with C.A. No. 1202/2011
Final outcome – Request Allowed
Relevant Period: A.Y. 2013-14.
Counsel :
– K.M. Natraj, ASG, Abhishek Attrey, Mukul Singh, Manish Pushkarna,
Advs. and Mrs. Anil Katiyar, AOR for the Petitioner.
ORDER
1. Delay condoned.
2. Leave granted.
3. Tag with C.A. No. 1202/2011.
_____________
(2021) 20 STD ??
In the High Court of Bombay
Commissioner of Income Tax (TDS), Pune
v.
Idea Cellular Ltd.
Shri Nitin Jamdar and Shri M.S. Karnik, JJ.
ITA No. 302 of 2019
13th January, 2020
(2021) 20 STD ABC 17
TDS- S.194H of Income Tax Act,1961- Whether on the facts and circumstances
of the case and in law, the Hon'ble Income Tax Appellate Tribunal erred in
holding the discount given by the assessee to its distributors on prepaid SIM
Cards does not require deduction of tax under Section 194H of the Income-tax
Act
-Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the
Hon'ble Income Tax Appellate Tribunal erred in setting aside the case to the
Assessing Officer
-Held-
-That the Commissioner's order setting aside the order passed under Section 201
was not carried in appeal, had also independently examined the nature of the
transaction and come to the conclusion that when the transaction was between
two persons on principal-to-principal basis, deduction of tax at source as per
Section 194H of the Act, would not be made since the payment was not for
commission or brokerage."
-In view of the finding of fact rendered by the Tribunal which we have noted
above, the same principle would apply in the present case. Therefore, the
questions of law as proposed do not give any rise to substantial question of
law
Final outcome – In favour of Assessee

Relevant Provisions : S.194 of Income Tax Act,1961
Bharti Airtel Ltd. v. Dy. CIT, (2014) 372 ITR 33 (Karn.) [Refer Para 5]
Pr. CIT v. Reliance Communications Infrastructure Ltd. in ITA No. 702 of
2017 [Refer Para 6]
Counsel :
– Sham Walve, for the Appellant;
– Jehangir Mistri, Sr. Counsel and Atul Jasani, for the Respondent.
ORDER
1. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
2. The Appellant-Revenue challenges the order dated 14 May, 2018 passed by
the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal in Income-tax Appeal No. 808/PUN/2016.
3. This Appeal pertains to the Assessment Year is 2013-14.
4. The Appellant-Revenue has raised the following questions as a
substantial questions of law :–
“(a) Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case and in law, the
Hon'ble Income Tax Appellate Tribunal erred in holding the
discount given by the assessee to its distributors on prepaid SIM
Cards does not require deduction of tax under Section 194H of the
Income-tax Act ?
(b) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in
law, the Hon'ble Income Tax Appellate Tribunal erred in setting
aside the case to the Assessing Officer?”
5. The Tribunal noted the observations of the Assessing Officer that the
discount allowed to the distributors by the Respondent - assessee-company is
on account of principal-to-principal relationship and not that of principal to
agent. The Tribunal followed the decision of the Karnataka High Court in the
case of Bharti Airtel Ltd. v. Dy. CIT, (2014) 372 ITR 33 (Karn.) and held that
the sale of SIM cards/recharge coupons at discounted rate to the distributors
was not commission and therefore not liable for deduction of the TDS under
section 194H. The Tribunal noted that there was no decision of this Court on
this issue on that date.
6. Learned Counsel for the parties have tendered the copy of the order
passed in subsequently in the case of Pr. CIT v. Reliance Communications
Infrastructure Ltd., in ITA No. 702 of 2017, where same issue arose for the
consideration of this Court. The Division Bench of this Court while holding
against the Appellant - Revenue observed thus :–
“3. Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties and having perused
the documents on record, we do not find any error in the view of the
Tribunal. The Tribunal, as noted, besides holding that the Commissioner's
order setting aside the order passed under Section 201 was not carried in
appeal, had also independently examined the nature of the transaction
and come to the conclusion that when the transaction was between two
persons on principal-to-principal basis, deduction of tax at source as per
Section 194H of the Act, would not be made since the payment was not
for commission or brokerage."
7. In view of the finding of fact rendered by the Tribunal which we have
noted above, the same principle would apply in the present case. Therefore,
the questions of law as proposed do not give any rise to substantial question
of law. The Appeal is disposed of.
_____________
(2021) 20 STD ??
Karnataka Chamber of Commerce and Industry
v.
Commissioner of Income Tax, Hubli
Civil Appeal Nos. 7664 of 2009 & 1955 of 2015
(2021) 20 STD ABC 19
21st January, 2021
Vivad se Vishwas Scheme- Direct Tax Vivad se Vishwas Act, 2020-Civil Appeals-
Withdrawal of Appeal-Held- The learned counsel for the appellant seeks leave to
withdraw this appeal in view of the fact that the appellant has resolved its
dispute under Vivad Se Vishwas Scheme, 2020.
Final outcome – Appeal Withdrawn

Relevant Provisions : Direct Tax Vivad se Vishwas Act, 2020
Counsel :
– Ms. Kavita Jha, AOR, Anant Mann, Adv., G. Prakash, AOR, Ms. Priyanka
Prakash and Ms. Beena Prakash, Advs. for the Appellant;
– Arijit Prasad, Sr. Adv., Ms. Gargi Khanna, Adv., Mrs. Anil Katiyar,
and B.V. Balaram Das, AORs for the Respondent.
ORDER
C.A. No. 7664 of 2009
1. The learned counsel for the appellant seeks leave to withdraw this appeal
in view of the fact that the appellant has resolved its dispute under Vivad Se
Vishwas Scheme, 2020.
2. The civil appeal is, accordingly, dismissed as withdrawn.
C.A. No. 1955 of 2015
3. We find no ground to interfere with the impugned order passed by the
High Court. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed.
4. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, is/are disposed of.
_____________

(2021) 20 STD ??
v.
Majestic Developers
SLP Appeal (C) No. 14708 of 2020
20th January, 2021
SLP-A.136 of Constitution of India-Held- Having heard Sh. Balbir Singh, learned
Additional Solicitor General, for some time, we are of the view that the
impugned Judgment does not warrant any interference. However, we make it

clear that the observations as to the scope of Section 310(2) of the Income-tax
Act, made in the impugned Judgment are qua the State Karnataka, given the
particular local Act in that case.
Final outcome – Disposed of.

Relevant Provisions : A. 136 COI, 1950 & S. 310 of Income Tax Act, 1961
Counsel :
– Balbir Singh, ASG, Ms. Rekha Pandey, Shyam Gopal, Ms. Rashmi
Malhotra, Advs. and Mrs. Anil Katiyar, AOR for the Petitioner.
ORDER
1. Having heard Sh. Balbir Singh, learned Additional Solicitor General, for
some time, we are of the view that the impugned Judgment does not warrant
any interference. However, we make it clear that the observations as to the
scope of Section 310(2) of the Income-tax Act, made in the impugned
Judgment are qua the State Karnataka, given the particular local Act in that
case.
2. In view of the above, the Special Leave Petition is disposed of.
3. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, is/are disposed of.
_____________
[2021] 124 taxmann.com 566 (SC)
(2021) 20 STD ??
Director of Income Tax (Exemption)
v.
Raunaq Education Foundation
21st January, 2021
Low Tax Effect- Civil Appeal- Held- The civil appeal is dismissed on the ground
of low tax effect-However, the question of law is kept open.
Final outcome – Dismissed.

Relevant Provisions: N/A.
(2021) 20 STD ABC 21
Counsel :
– V. Shekhar, Arijit Prasad, Sr. Advs. Ms. Gargi Khanna, Mrs. Anil Katiyar,
Advs. and B.V. Balaram Das, AOR for the Appellant;
– Rajiv Tyagi, AOR Rohit Gupta, Satymev Sabarn and Rahul Tyagi,
Advs. for the Respondent.
Equivalent Citation : (2021) 431 ITR 52 (SC)
ORDER
1. The civil appeal is dismissed on the ground of low tax effect.
2. However, the question of law is kept open.
_____________
(2019) 7 ITJ Online 296 (SC)
(2021) 20 STD ??
Universal Cables Ltd.
v.
Shri A.M. Khanwilkar and Shri Dinesh Maheshwari, JJ.
12th December, 2019
Refund-S.244A-Interest on Refund-Whether the appellant would be entitled to
interest on the amount refunded by the Department-Held- A “tax refund” is a
refund of taxes when the tax liability is less than the tax paid. As per the old
section an assessee was entitled for payment of interest on the amount of taxes
refunded pursuant to an order passed under the Act, including the order
passed in an appeal. In the present fact scenario, the deductor/assessee had
paid taxes pursuant to a special order passed by the assessing officer/Income
Tax Officer. In the appeal filed against the said order the assessee has
succeeded and a direction is issued by the appellate authority to refund the tax
paid. The amount paid by the resident/deductor was retained by the
Government till a direction was issued by the appellate authority to refund the
same. When the said amount is refunded it should carry interest in the matter
of course. As held by the Courts while awarding interest, it is a kind of
compensation of use and retention of the money collected unauthorizedly by
the Department. When the collection is illegal, there is corresponding
obligation on the Revenue to refund such amount with interest inasmuch as
they have retained and enjoyed the money deposited. Even the Department
has understood the object behind insertion of Section 244-A, as that, an
assessee is entitled to payment of interest for money remaining with the
Government which would be refunded. There is no reason to restrict the same
to an assessee only without extending the similar benefit to a
resident/deductor who has deducted tax at source and deposited the same
before remitting the amount payable to a non-resident/foreign company.”

(emphasis supplied in italics)
-That there is no reason to deny payment of interest to the deductor who had
deducted tax at source and deposited the same with the Treasury. In our
opinion, this observation squarely applies to the appellant.

Relevant Provisions : S. 244 A of Income Tax Act,1961
Union of India v. Tata Chemicals Ltd., (2017) 4 ITJ Online 551 (SC) : (2014)
10 STD 265 : (2014) 363 ITR 658 : (2014) 267 CTR 89 : (2014) 222
Taxman 225 : (2014) 23 ITJ 648 : (2014) 6 SCC 335 [Refer Para 2]
Counsel :
– Akshat Shrivastava, Inderjeet Yadava, Advs. and Manjeet Kirpal, AOR for
the Appellant;;
– K. Radhakrishnan, Sr. Adv., Rupesh Kumar, Ms. Gargi Khanna, Advs.
and Mrs. Anil Katiyar, AOR for the Respondent.
ORDER
1. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
2. The limited issue that needs to be considered in the present appeal is
whether the appellant would be entitled to interest on the amount refunded by
the Department. The appellant relies on the decision of this Court in
the Union of India v. Tata Chemicals Ltd. reported in (2017) 4 ITJ Online
551 (SC) : (2014) 10 STD 265 : (2014) 363 ITR 658 : (2014) 267 CTR 89 :
(2014) 222 Taxman 225 : (2014) 23 ITJ 648 : (2014) 6 SCC 335, in particular,
paragraph 37 of the said decision. The same reads thus: -
“37. A “tax refund” is a refund of taxes when the tax liability is less
than the tax paid. As per the old section an assessee was entitled for
payment of interest on the amount of taxes refunded pursuant to an
order passed under the Act, including the order passed in an appeal. In
the present fact scenario, the deductor/assessee had paid taxes pursuant
to a special order passed by the assessing officer/Income Tax Officer.
In the appeal filed against the said order the assessee has succeeded
and a direction is issued by the appellate authority to refund the tax
paid. The amount paid by the resident/deductor was retained by the
Government till a direction was issued by the appellate authority to
refund the same. When the said amount is refunded it should carry
interest in the matter of course. As held by the Courts while awarding
interest, it is a kind of compensation of use and retention of the money
(2021) 20 STD ABC 23
collected unauthorizedly by the Department. When the collection is
illegal, there is corresponding obligation on the Revenue to refund such
amount with interest inasmuch as they have retained and enjoyed the
money deposited. Even the Department has understood the object
behind insertion of Section 244-A, as that, an assessee is entitled to
payment of interest for money remaining with the Government which
would be refunded. There is no reason to restrict the same to an
assessee only without extending the similar benefit to a
resident/deductor who has deducted tax at source and deposited the
same before remitting the amount payable to a non-resident/foreign
company.” (emphasis supplied in italics)
3. From the dictum in this judgment, it is clear that there is no reason to deny
payment of interest to the deductor who had deducted tax at source and
deposited the same with the Treasury. In our opinion, this observation
squarely applies to the appellant.
4. As a result, we allow this appeal and direct the Department to pay interest
as prescribed under Section 244-A of the Income Tax Act as applicable at the
relevant time at the earliest.
5. The appeal is allowed in the aforesaid terms. No costs. All pending
applications are disposed of.
ORDER
The appeal is allowed in terms of signed order.
Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
_____________
(2019) 7 ITJ Online 297 (SC)
(2021) 20 STD ??
v.
Mphasis Ltd.
Shri R. Banumathi and Shri A.S. Bopanna, JJ.
SLP to Appeal (C) No (S). 766 of 2015
13th November, 2019
SLP- A. 136 of Constitution of India- SC already decided the similar issue in the SLP
with only astute difference of Assessment Year -Held- Hence taking note of the fact
that in respect of common judgment this Court has already dismissed SLP(C)
No. 2373 of 2015 relating to the Assessment Year 2004-2005 and in the
present case except that issue relates to Assessment Year 2003-2004 all other
aspects are on the very same point, we are not inclined to entertain the instant
petition.
Final outcome – Dismissed

Relevant Period: A.Ys. 2003-04
Counsel :
– Vikramjit Banarjee, ASG, Ashok K. Shrivastava, Sr. Adv., Ms. Niranjan
Singh, Adv., Ashok Panigrahi, Adv., Sudhakar kulwant, Adv. and Mrs.
Amit Katyal, AOR for the Appellant;
– Parcy Pardiwala, Sr. Adv., T. Suryanarayan, Adv., Ms. Yugandhara Pawar
Jha, Adv. and Kunal Verma, AOR for the Respondent.
ORDER
1. The instant petition is filed by the petitioner-Revenue assailing the
judgment dated 01.08.2014 passed by the High Court of Karnataka at
Bangalore in I.T.A. No.1075 of 2008.
2. When the petition is taken up for consideration, Mr. Vikramjit Banerjee,
learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for the petitioner-Revenue,
and Mr. Parcy Pardiwala, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent,
are in agreement that SLP (C) No. 2373/2015 preferred by the Revenue in
respect of connected ITA No. 196 of 2009 which was disposed of by the very
same common Order dated 01.08.2014, was dismissed by this Court on
28.01.2019 having taken note similar grounds raised in the special leave
petition.
3. Hence taking note of the fact that in respect of common judgment this
Court has already dismissed SLP(C) No. 2373 of 2015 relating to the
Assessment Year 2004-2005 and in the present case except that issue relates
to Assessment Year 2003-2004 all other aspects are on the very same point,
we are not inclined to entertain the instant petition.
4. Accordingly, the special leave petition shall stand dismissed. Pending
applications, if any, shall also stand disposed of.
_____________
(2019) 7 ITJ Online 313 (SC)
(2021) 20 STD ??
v.
Yodlee Infotech Pvt. Ltd.
Shri Uday Umesh Lalit and Shri Vineet Saran, JJ.
Special Leave Petition (Civil) Diary No. 26876 of 2019 & Others
(2021) 20 STD ABC 25
6th September, 2019
SLP- A. 136 of Constitution of India-Tax Effect- Held- In view of the circular
dated 08.08.2019 issued by the CBDT, the tax effect being less than two
crores, we see no reason to interfere. The special leave petitions are
dismissed.

Counsel :
– Sanjay Jain, ASG, Zoheb Hossain, Debashish Bharukha, Advs. and
Mrs. Anil Katiyar, AOR, for the Petitioner.
ORDER
1. Delay condoned.
2. In view of the circular dated 08.08.2019 issued by the CBDT, the tax effect
being less than two crores, we see no reason to interfere. The special leave
petitions are dismissed.
Pending Applications, if any, shall also stand disposed of.
_____________
(2019) 7 ITJ Online 490 (SC)
(2021) 20 STD ??
v.
Rashtradoot (HUF)
Shri Abhay Manohar Sapre and Shri Dinesh Maheshwari, JJ.
27th February, 2019
Appeal-S.260A of Income Tax Act,1961-Whether the High Court has jurisdiction
to dismiss the appeal filed under Section 260A of the Act on the ground that it
does not involve any substantial question of law. Such dismissal is considered
as a dismissal of the appeal in limine, i.e., dismissal without issuing any
notice of appeal to the respondent and without hearing the respondent-Held-
that the High Court did not dismiss the appeal in limine but dismissed it after
hearing both the parties. In such a situation, the High Court should have
framed the question(s) and answered them by assigning the reasons
accordingly one way or the other by exercising powers under sub-sections (4)
and (5) of Section 260A of the Act-As mentioned above, in the absence of any
discussion or/and the reasoning/ground as to why the order of ITAT does not
suffer from any illegality and why the grounds of Revenue are not acceptable
and why the appeal does not involve any substantial question(s) of law or
though framed cannot be answered in Revenue's favour, the impugned order
suffers from jurisdictional errors and, therefore, legally unsustainable for want
of compliance of the requirements of sub-sections (4) and (5) of Section 260A
of the Act-This Court has consistently laid emphasis that every
order/judgment, which decides thelis between the parties, must contain the
reason(s)/ground(s) for arriving at a particular conclusion-Indeed, what is
decisive for deciding the case is not the conclusion alone but the
reason(s)/ground(s) assigned in support of such conclusion, which results in
reaching to such conclusion

Relevant Provisions : S. 260 A of Income Tax Act,1961
Relevant Period:
Jawahar Lal Singh v. Naresh Singh, (1987) 2 SCC 222 [Refer Para 19]
Raj Kishore Jha v. State of Bihar, (2003) 11 SCC 519 [Refer Para 19]
State of Maharashtra v. Vithal Rao Pritirao Chawan, (1981) 4 SCC
129 [Refer Para 19]
State of Orissa v. Dhaniram Luhar, (2004) 5 SCC 568) [Refer Para 19]
State of U.P. v. Battan, (2001) 10 SCC 607 [Refer Para 19]
Counsel :
– Mrs. Anil Katiyar, AOR, for the Petitioner;
– Bhargava V. Desai, AOR, for the Respondent.
JUDGMENT
Shri Abhay Manohar Sapre, J. :
1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal is filed against the final judgment and order dated 25.10.2016
passed by the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, Bench at Jaipur in D.B.
Income Tax Appeal No. 43 of 2002 whereby the Division Bench of the High
Court dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant herein and affirmed the
order dated 24.05.2001 passed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT),
Jaipur Bench, Jaipur in I.T.S.S.A. No. 29/JP/2000.
3. A few facts need mention infra for the disposal of the appeal.
4. This appeal filed by the Revenue arises out of the income tax proceedings
initiated against the respondent (assessee) on the basis of a search operation
which was carried out by the Income Tax Department in assessee's premises
(2021) 20 STD ABC 27
on 04.09.1997. This gave rise to initiation of assessment proceedings for the
block period from 01.04.1987 to 04.09.1997 (Assessment Years 1987-88 to
1996-97 and 1997-98 up to 04.09.1997) against the assessee to determine
their tax liability as a result of search operations carried in their premises. The
matter, out of the block assessment proceedings, reached to the Income Tax
Appellate Tribunal at the instance of the respondent against the order of the
assessing authorities.
5. The Tribunal (ITAT), however, decided the various issues arising in the
case in favour of the respondent(assessee) by allowing the respondent's
appeal, which gave rise to filing of the appeal by the Revenue before the High
Court under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred
to as “the Act”).
6. The High Court by impugned judgment dismissed the Revenue's appeal,
which gave rise to filing of this appeal by way of special leave by the
Revenue in this Court.
7. Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties and on perusal of the
record of the case, we are constrained to allow the appeal and remand the case
to the High Court for deciding the appeal afresh on merits in accordance with
law.
8. The need to remand the case to the High Court has arisen for the reason
that on perusal of the impugned order, we find that the High Court has set out
the facts in paragraph 2 and the submissions of the counsel for the parties in
paragraphs 3 to 9. In paragraph 10, the High Court mentioned the names of
the counsel who argued the case and then in paragraphs 12 and 13, the High
Court states as under:
“12. The Tribunal while considering the judgment on 24.05.2001 did
not consider the amendments envisaged by the legislature, therefore,
under Section 260-A when we are considering substantial law, we have
to consider whether the Tribunal has committed an error.
13. In view of the above, the issue is answered in favour of the
assessee and against the department. The view taken by this Court in a
case of Relaxo Foorwear will apply in the present case and the view
taken by the Tribunal is liable to be confirmed and the same is
confirmed.”
9. A perusal of the aforementioned two concluding paragraphs would go to
show that the High Court has neither discussed and nor assigned any reason in
support of its conclusion for the dismissal of the appeal.
10. Indeed, the observation made in paragraph 13 that “In view of the above”
does not lead us anywhere because, as mentioned above, in the paragraphs 1
to 12 no reasons are mentioned except the facts and the submissions.
11. That apart, we find that the High Court committed another error. The
High Court while deciding the appeal heard the learned Counsel for the
parties, yet did not frame any substantial question of law arising in the case.
12. Section 260A of the Act is akin to Section 100 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as “the Code”) with addition of sub-
sections (6)(a),6(b) and (7) of Section 260A of the Act.
13. The High Court has jurisdiction to dismiss the appeal filed under Section
260A of the Act on the ground that it does not involve any substantial
question of law. Such dismissal is considered as a dismissal of the appeal
in limine, i.e., dismissal without issuing any notice of appeal to the respondent
and without hearing the respondent.
14. The High Court has also the jurisdiction to dismiss the appeal by
answering the question(s) framed on merits or by dismissing the appeal on the
ground that the question(s) though framed but such question(s) does/do not
arise in the appeal. The High Court, though may not have framed any
particular question at the time of admitting the appeal along with other
question, yet it has the jurisdiction to frame additional question at a later stage
before final hearing of the appeal by assigning reasons as provided in proviso
to Section 260A(4) and Section 260A(5) of the Act and lastly, the High Court
has jurisdiction to allow the appeal but this the High Court can do only after
framing the substantial question(s) of law and hearing the respondent by
answering the question(s) framed in appellant's favour.
15. However, in this case, we find that the High Court did not dismiss the
appeal in limine but dismissed it after hearing both the parties. In such a
situation, the High Court should have framed the question(s) and answered
them by assigning the reasons accordingly one way or the other by exercising
powers under sub-sections (4) and (5) of Section 260A of the Act.
16. As mentioned above, in the absence of any discussion or/and the
reasoning/ground as to why the order of ITAT does not suffer from any
illegality and why the grounds of Revenue are not acceptable and why the
appeal does not involve any substantial question(s) of law or though framed
cannot be answered in Revenue's favour, the impugned order suffers from
jurisdictional errors and, therefore, legally unsustainable for want of
compliance of the requirements of sub-sections (4) and (5) of Section 260A of
the Act.
17. This Court has consistently laid emphasis that every order/judgment,
which decides thelis between the parties, must contain the reason(s)/ground(s)
for arriving at a particular conclusion.
18. Indeed, what is decisive for deciding the case is not the conclusion alone
but the reason(s)/ground(s) assigned in support of such conclusion, which
results in reaching to such conclusion.
19. In order to decide as to whether the impugned order is legally sustainable
or not, the Appellate Court is entitled to know as to what impelled the Court
below to pass such order in favour of one party and against the aggrieved
party. We find that this requirement is missing in the impugned order of this
case and hence the interference is called for. (See- State of
(2021) 20 STD ABC 29
Maharashtra v. Vithal Rao Pritirao Chawan, (1981) 4 SCC 129, Jawahar Lal
Singh v. Naresh Singh, (1987) 2 SCC 222, State of U.P. v. Battan, (2001) 10
SCC 607, Raj Kishore Jha v. State of Bihar, (2003) 11 SCC 519 and State of
Orissa v. Dhaniram Luhar, (2004) 5 SCC 568).
20. In view of the foregoing discussion, we allow the appeal, set aside the
impugned order and remand the case to the High Court with a request to
decide the appeal filed by the Revenue (Commissioner of Income Tax) afresh
on merits in accordance with law.
21. Before parting, we may observe that we have not expressed any opinion
on the merits of the case having formed an opinion to remand the case to the
High Court in the light of our foregoing discussion. The High Court will,
therefore, decide the appeal in accordance with law uninfluenced by any
observations made by this Court.
_____________
(2019) 7 ITJ Online 494 (SC)
(2021) 20 STD ??
v.
Phoenix Lamps Ltd.
Shri Abhay Manohar Sapre and Shri Dinesh Maheshwari, JJ.
Special Leave To Appeal (C) No. (S). 26334 of 2017
22nd April, 2019
SLP-A.136 of Constitution of India- Admittedly, as a result of the impugned
order remanding the case to the Tribunal (ITAT), the Tribunal has passed the
final order in the instant matter pending this special leave petition-Held- If
that be so, the remedy of the aggrieved in our view lies in filing an appeal
under Section 260-A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 before the jurisdictional
High Court against the said order-We, therefore, find no good ground to
interfere with the impugned order passed by the High Court which in our view
stands complied with by the Tribunal-Needless to say, in the event of an
appeal being filed by the aggrieved before the High Court, the same shall be
decided strictly in accordance with law.
Final outcome – Appeal Disposed of

Relevant Provisions : A. 136 of COI, 1950
Counsel :
– Aman Lekhi, ASG Ms. Rekha Pandey, S.A. Haseeb, Advs. and Mrs. Anil
Katiyar, AOR, for the Petitioner;
– Kavin Gulati, Dr. Shashwat Bajpai, Rohit Sthalekar, Advs. and Sunny
Choudhary, AOR, for the Respondent.
ORDER
1. Admittedly, as a result of the impugned order remanding the case to the
Tribunal (ITAT), the Tribunal has passed the final order in the instant matter
pending this special leave petition.
2. If that be so, the remedy of the aggrieved in our view lies in filing an
appeal under Section 260-A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 before the
jurisdictional High Court against the said order.
3. We, therefore, find no good ground to interfere with the impugned order
passed by the High Court which in our view stands complied with by the
Tribunal.
4. Needless to say, in the event of an appeal being filed by the aggrieved
before the High Court, the same shall be decided strictly in accordance with
law.
5. With the aforesaid observation, the special leave petition is disposed of.
Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.
_____________
(2019) 7 ITJ Online 444 (SC)
(2021) 20 STD ??
Honda Siel Cars India Ltd.
v.
Shri A.K. Sikri, Ashok Bhushan and Shri S. Abdul Nazeer, JJ.
M.A. No. 986 of 2017 & Civil Appeal No. 4918 of 2017
14th November, 2018
Depreciation-S. 37 of Income Tax Act,1961-Held- It appears that by our judgment
dated 09.06.2017 lump sum payment as well as continuing royalty both are
treated as capital expenditure for the assessment years in question. Since these
are capital expenditure, needless to mention that the applicant/appellant shall
be entitled to depreciation thereon.
Final outcome – Disposed of.

Relevant Provisions : S. 37 of Income Tax Act,1961
Relevant Period: A.Ys.1999-2000, 2001-02 to 2005-06.
(2021) 20 STD ABC 31
Counsel :
– Parag P. Tripathi, Sr. Adv., Deepak Chopra, Adv., Amit Shrivastava,
Adv., Ankul Goyal, Adv., Kunal Bahri, Adv. and R. Chandrachud, AOR,
for the Petitioner;
– Ms. Nisha Bagchi, Adv., Ms. Gargi Khanna, Adv. and Ms. Anil Katiyar,
AOR, for the Respondent.
ORDER
1. It appears that by our judgment dated 09.06.2017 lump sum payment as
well as continuing royalty both are treated as capital expenditure for the
assessment years in question. Since these are capital expenditure, needless to
mention that the applicant/appellant shall be entitled to depreciation thereon.
2. Miscellaneous Application as well as the I.A. for directions are,
accordingly, disposed of.
_____________
(2018) 5 ITJ Online 710 (SC)
(2021) 20 STD ??
v.
Sunita Dhadda
Shri Adarsh Kumar Goel and Shri Rohinton Fali Nariman, JJ.
Special Leave Petition (CIVIL) Diary No(s). 9432/2018 (Arising out of
impugned final judgment and order dated 31.07.2017 in DBITA No. 197/2012
passed by the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jaipur)
28th March, 2018
SLP-A. 136 of Constitution of India- Held- We do not find any ground to

interfere with the impugned order. The special leave petition is, accordingly,
dismissed-Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.

Counsel :
– Pinky Anand, ASG Yashant Adhyaru, Sr. Adv., S.A. Haseeb, Adv., Vimla
Sinha, Adv., Nikhil Rohtagi, Adv., Anil Katiyar, AOR, for the Petitioner.
ORDER
Heard learned Counsel for the petitioner.
We do not find any ground to interfere with the impugned order. The special
leave petition is, accordingly, dismissed.
Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.
______________
(2017) 3 ITJ Online 778 (SC)
(2021) 20 STD ??
Asstt. Commissioner of Income Tax
v.
Pepsi Foods Pvt. Ltd.
Shri A.K. Sikri and Shri Ashok Bhushan, JJ.
Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 4659/2015
4th December, 2017
SLP- 136 COI, 1950- Held- The special leave petitions are dismissed.

Counsel :
– K. Radhakrishnan, Sr., Adv., Arijit Prasad, Mohan Prasad Gupta, Rupesh
Kumar, Nikhil Rohatgi, Shashank Khurana, Advs., & Anil Katiyar, AOR,
for the Petitioner.
– Rashmi Chopra, Deepak Chopra,Harpreet Ajmani, Sheel Vardhan, Advs.,
R. Chandrachud, AOR, Prerna Mehta, Sudesh Garg, S.S.Shamshery,
Babita Yadav, Advs., Rajesh Singh, AOR, Gautam Jain, Adv., & Rahul
Gupta AOR, for the Respondent.
ORDER
Shri A.K. Sikri and Shri Ashok Bhushan, JJ. :
1. The special leave petitions are dismissed.
_____________
(2017) 3 ITJ Online 629 (SC)
(2021) 20 STD ??
v.
Chet Ram (HUF)
(2021) 20 STD ABC 33
Shri R.K. Agrawal and Shri Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud, JJ.
Civil Appeal Nos. 13053 to 1361 of 2017 & SLP
12th September, 2017
Capital Gains- S. 45 of Income Tax Act, 1961- whether the respondents-assessees
who received some amount of enhanced compensation as also interest thereon
under an interim order passed by the High Court in pending appeals relating
to land acquisition matter are liable to be assessed for income tax in the year
in which it has been received or not-Held- The scheme of Section 45 (5) of
the 1961 Act was inserted w.e.f. 1.4.1988 as an overriding provision. As
stated above, compensation under the LA Act, 1894, arises and is payable in
multiple stages which does not happen in cases of transfers by sale, etc.
Hence, the legislature had to step in and say that as and when the assessee
claimant is in receipt of enhanced compensation it shall be treated as “deemed
income” and taxed on receipt basis. Our above understanding is supported by
insertion of clause (c) in Section 45 (5) w.e.f. 1.4.2004 and Section
155(16) which refers to a situation of a subsequent reduction by the Court,
tribunal or other authority and recomputation/amendment of the assessment
order.
-Section 45(5) read as a whole [including clause (c)] not only deals with
reworking as urged on behalf of the asseess but also with the change in the
full value of the consideration (computation) and since the enhanced
compensation/consideration (including interest under Section 28 of the 1894
Act) becomes payable/paid under the 1894 Act at different stages, the receipt
of such enhanced compensation/ consideration is to be taxed in the year of
receipt subject to adjustment, if any, under Section 155 (16) of the 1961 Act,
later on. Hence, the year in which enhanced compensation is received is the
year of taxability. Consequently, even in cases where pending appeal, the
Court/tribunal/authority before which appeal is pending, permits the claimant
to withdraw against security or otherwise the enhanced compensation (which
is in dispute) the same is liable to be taxed under Section 45(5) of the 1961
Act. This is the scheme of Section 45(5) and Section 155 (16) of the 1961
Act. We may clarify that even before the insertion of Section 45(5)
(c) and Section 155(16) w.e.f. 1.4.2004, the receipt of enhanced compensation
under Section 45(5)(b) was taxable in the year of receipt which is only
reinforced by insertion of clause (c) because the right to receive payment
under the 1894 Act is not in doubt.
-It is important to note that compensation, including enhanced
compensation/consideration under the 1894 Act, is based on the full value of
property as on the date of notification under Section 4 of that Act. When the
court/tribunal directs payment of enhanced compensation under Section 23(I-
A), or Section 23(2) or under Section 28 of the 1894 Act it is on the basis that
award of the Collector or the Court, under reference, has not compensated the
owner for the full value of the property as on date of notification.
-Having settled the controversy going on for the last two decades, we are of
the view that in this batch of cases which relate back to Assessment Years
1991-1992 and 1992-1993, possibly the proceedings under the LA Act, 1894
would have ended. In a number of cases we find that proceedings under the
1894 Act have been concluded and taxes have been paid.”
-Respectfully following the above decision, we allow these Civil Appeals, set
aside the orders of the High Court as also the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal
and hold that the respondents are liable to pay tax on the enhanced amount of
compensation and interest received by them during the year in question.
Final outcome – In favour of Revenue.

Commissioner of Income Tax, Faridabad v. Ghanshyam (HUF), (2017) 3 ITJ
Online 76 (SC) : (2011) 3 STD 295 : (2009) 315 ITR 1 : (2009) 224 CTR
522 : (2009) 182 Taxman 368 : (2009) 26 DTR 129 : (2009) 13 ITJ 537 :
(2009) 8 SCC 412 [Refer Para 3]
Counsel :
– Ms. Pinky Anand, ASG and Mrs. Anil Katiyar, AOR for the Petitioner;
– Dr. Kailash Chand, AOR for the Respondent.
ORDER
1. Leave granted.
2. In the present appeals, the only question that arises for consideration is as
to whether the respondents-assessees who received some amount of enhanced
compensation as also interest thereon under an interim order passed by the
High Court in pending appeals relating to land acquisition matter are liable to
be assessed for income tax in the year in which it has been received or not.
3. We have heard Ms. Pinky Anand, learned Additional Solicitor General
appearing for the appellant herein. She has brought the attention of this Court
to the decision in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax, Faridabad v.
Ghanshyam (HUF) reported in (2017) 3 ITJ Online 76 (SC) : (2011) 3 STD
295 : (2009) 315 ITR 1 : (2009) 224 CTR 522 : (2009) 182 Taxman 368 :
(2009) 26 DTR 129 : (2009) 13 ITJ 537 : (2009) 8 SCC 412 wherein the
provisions of Section 45(5) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 were considered and
this Court in paragraphs 53 to 56 has held that in view of the Amendment in
the Income Tax Act, the person who has received enhanced compensation and
interest thereon even by an interim order passed by the Court would be
assessed to tax for that enhanced compensation.
(2021) 20 STD ABC 35
Paragraphs 53 to 56 of the above judgment read as under:
“53. The scheme of Section 45 (5) of the 1961 Act was inserted w.e.f.
1.4.1988 as an overriding provision. As stated above, compensation
under the LA Act, 1894, arises and is payable in multiple stages which
does not happen in cases of transfers by sale, etc. Hence, the legislature
had to step in and say that as and when the assessee claimant is in receipt
of enhanced compensation it shall be treated as “deemed income” and
taxed on receipt basis. Our above understanding is supported by insertion
of clause (c) in Section 45 (5) w.e.f. 1.4.2004 and Section 155(16) which
refers to a situation of a subsequent reduction by the Court, tribunal or
other authority and recomputation/amendment of the assessment order.
54. Section 45(5) read as a whole [including clause (c)] not only deals
with reworking as urged on behalf of the asseess but also with the change
in the full value of the consideration (computation) and since the
enhanced compensation/consideration (including interest under Section
28 of the 1894 Act) becomes payable/paid under the 1894 Act at
different stages, the receipt of such enhanced compensation/
consideration is to be taxed in the year of receipt subject to adjustment, if
any, under Section 155 (16) of the 1961 Act, later on. Hence, the year in
which enhanced compensation is received is the year of taxability.
Consequently, even in cases where pending appeal, the
Court/tribunal/authority before which appeal is pending, permits the
claimant to withdraw against security or otherwise the enhanced
compensation (which is in dispute) the same is liable to be taxed
under Section 45(5) of the 1961 Act. This is the scheme of Section
45(5) and Section 155 (16) of the 1961 Act. We may clarify that even
before the insertion of Section 45(5)(c) and Section 155(16) w.e.f.
1.4.2004, the receipt of enhanced compensation under Section 45(5)
(b) was taxable in the year of receipt which is only reinforced by
insertion of clause (c) because the right to receive payment under the
1894 Act is not in doubt.
55. It is important to note that compensation, including enhanced
compensation/consideration under the 1894 Act, is based on the full
value of property as on the date of notification under Section 4 of that
Act. When the court/tribunal directs payment of enhanced compensation
under Section 23(I-A), or Section 23(2) or under Section 28 of the 1894
Act it is on the basis that award of the Collector or the Court, under
reference, has not compensated the owner for the full value of the
property as on date of notification.
56. Having settled the controversy going on for the last two decades, we
are of the view that in this batch of cases which relate back to
Assessment Years 1991-1992 and 1992-1993, possibly the proceedings
under the LA Act, 1894 would have ended. In a number of cases we find
that proceedings under the 1894 Act have been concluded and taxes have
been paid.”
4. Respectfully following the above decision, we allow these Civil Appeals,
set aside the orders of the High Court as also the Income Tax Appellate
Tribunal and hold that the respondents are liable to pay tax on the enhanced
amount of compensation and interest received by them during the year in
question.
5. The Civil Appeals are allowed in the above terms.
6. Parties to bear their on costs.
_____________
(2017) 3 ITJ Online 627 (SC)
(2021) 20 STD ??
Paramount Communications Ltd.
v.
Shri A.K. Sikri and Shri Ashok Bhushan, JJ.
Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 16930 of 2017
14th July, 2017
SLP-A. 136 of Constitution of India-Held- The Special Leave Petition is dismissed.

Relevant Period: A.Ys. 2003-04 to 2005-06.
Counsel :
– Arvind Kumar, Adv., Amit Sharma, AOR and Dipesh Sinha, Adv., for the
Petitioner.
ORDER
1. The Special Leave Petition is dismissed.
2. Pending application(s), if any, stands disposed of accordingly.
_____________
(2017) 3 ITJ Online 921 (SC)
(2021) 20 STD ??
M/s Pebble Investment and Finance Ltd.
v.
(2021) 20 STD ABC 37
Income Tax Officer

Shri R.K. Agrawal and Shri Mohan M. Shantanagoudar, JJ.
Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No(s). 11784/2017
5th July, 2017
SLP-A. 136 of Constitution of India-Held- The Special Leave Petition is
dismissed.

Counsel :
– Smt. Meenakshi Arora, Sr. Adv., Anand Landge, Adv., Pulkit Tare, Adv.
for Jay Kishor Singh, AOR for the Petitioner.
ORDER
Heard learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner.
We do not find any merit in this petition. The special leave petition is,
accordingly, dismissed.
Pending application, if any, stands disposed of.
____________
(2017) 3 ITJ Online 630 (SC)
(2021) 20 STD ??
v.
Shri Rama Multi Tech Ltd.
Shri R.K. Agrawal and Shri Abhay Manohar Sapre, JJ.
Civil Appeal Nos. 4072-4073 of 2007
6th April, 2017
Deduction-S.36 of Income Tax Act,1961- Whether the CIT(A) and the Tribunal
were right and justified in allowing the assessee to claim the said expenditure
as revenue expenditure without any just cause-Held-That the Income Tax
Appellate Tribunal was justified in allowing the expenditure of
Rs.3,37,84,348/- towards the interest paid on the loans taken and expenditure
on other items connected herewith for establishment of the unit, while
affirming the order of the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals).
Final outcome – In favour of Assessee.

Relevant Provisions : S. 36 of Income Tax Act, 1961
Dy. CIT v. Core Health Care Ltd., (2016) 2 ITJ Online 476 (SC) : (2008) 11
ITJ 233 : (2012) 6 STD 487 : (2008) 298 ITR 194 : (2008) 215 CTR 1 :
(2008) 167 Taxman 206 : (2008) 3 DTR 49 [Refer Para 8]
Dy. CIT v. Core Health Care, (2001) 251 ITR 61 (Guj) [Refer Para 5]
Counsel :
– Arijit Prasad, Ms. Gargi Khanna and Mrs. Anil Katiyar, Advs. for the
Appellant;
– Amar Dave, Mrs. Nandini Gore, P.S. Sudheer, Rishi Maheshwari, Ms.
Anne Mathew and Ms. Shruti Jose, Advs. for the Respondent.
ORDER
Civil Appeal Nos. 4072-4073/2007
1. The only question on which the leave has been granted by this Court's
order; dated 31st August, 2007 is as follows:
“When the assessee had itself capitalized the interest and other
expenditure incurred towards creation assets. Whether the CIT(A) and
the Tribunal were right and justified in allowing the assessee to claim the
said expenditure as revenue expenditure without any just cause?”
2. Briefly stated, the facts of the present appeals are as follows:
3. The respondent is a public limited company. For the Assessment Year
2000-01 it had incurred an expenditure of Rs. 3,37,84,348/- towards payment
of interest on loans taken and other items for setting up the industry. Even
though it had capitilized the said amount and claimed depreciation before the
Assessing Authority, however, in appeal, the respondent raised additional
ground claiming deduction of the aforesaid amount on interest paid with some
other expenditure on other items connected therewith as revenue expenditure.
4. The Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) vide order dated 05.03.2004
allowed the claim of the respondent-assessee only to the extent of interest
amount of Rs. 2,92,45,670/- paid on loans taken by it for establishing the
industry. He, however, disallowed the other expenditures, namely, financial
charges, professional expenses, upfront fee etc.
5. The Revenue, feeling aggrieved by the said allowance, preferred an appeal
before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal which vide order dated 02.12.2004
upheld the order of the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) insofar as it
related to the allowance of the expenditure claimed towards payment of
interest and also allowed expenditure on other items connected therewith. The
(2021) 20 STD ABC 39
High Court did not interfere in the appeal preferred by the Revenue on the
ground that the Tribunal has followed the decision of the Gujarat High Court
in the case of Dy. CIT v. Core Health Care, (2001) 251 ITR 61 (Guj).
6. Feeling aggrieved, the Commissioner of Income Tax has preferred the
present appeal.
7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties.
8. We find that this Court in the case of Dy. CIT v. Core Health Care
Ltd., (2016) 2 ITJ Online 476 (SC) : (2008) 11 ITJ 233 : (2012) 6 STD 487 :
(2008) 298 ITR 194 : (2008) 215 CTR 1 : (2008) 167 Taxman 206 : (2008) 3
DTR 49 has affirmed the view taken by the Gujarat High Court.
9. In this view of the matter, we are of the considered opinion that the
Income Tax Appellate Tribunal was justified in allowing the expenditure of
Rs.3,37,84,348/- towards the interest paid on the loans taken and expenditure
on other items connected herewith for establishment of the unit, while
affirming the order of the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals).
10. Learned Counsel for the Revenue-appellant submitted that the
respondent cannot claim depreciation on the amount of interest which has
been allowed as revenue expenditure and therefore, the depreciation referable
to such interest expenditure be reversed. Learned counsel for the respondent
however submitted that there is nothing on record that depreciation on this
amount has been taken by the respondent.
11. Be that as it may, if as a fact the respondent has taken any depreciation
on the amount of interest and other items which has been allowed as revenue
expenditure that much depreciation should be reversed by the assessing
authority.
12. Subject to the aforesaid observations, the appeals fail and the same are
dismissed.
_____________
(2017) 3 ITJ Online 633 (SC)
(2021) 20 STD ??
v.
Shree Chowatia Tubes (India) Pvt. Ltd.
Shri R.K. Agrawal and Shri Abhay Manohar Sapre, JJ.
6th April, 2017
Penalty-S. 271(1)(c) of Income Tax Act,1961- The assessed income is loss, as a
result of reduction at the time of final assessment as against the amount of
loss declared in the Income Tax Return, the penalty under Section 271 (1) (c)
of the Income Tax Act, 1961 can be levied or not-Held-The Tribunal was not
right in cancellation of the penalty under Section 271(1)(c) of the Income Tax
Act, 1961 merely on the ground that no penalty can be levied if returned
income and the assessed income is a loss under Section 271(1)(c) of the
Income Tax Act, 1961 in as much as this amendment has been held to be
retrospective in operation-In view of the above, the appeal is allowed and the
impugned judgment passed by the High Court as also the order of the
Tribunal are set aside and the matter is remitted back to the Tribunal to decide
on the quantum of the penalty after giving opportunity of hearing to the
respondent herein.
Final outcome – In favour of Revenue.

CIT v. Gold Coin Health Food (P.) Ltd., (2016) 2 ITJ Online 491 (SC) :
(2012) 5 STD 30 : (2008) 304 ITR 308 : (2008) 218 CTR 259 : (2008) 172
Taxman 386 : (2008) 11 DTR 185 : (2008) 11 ITJ 407 [Refer Para 3]
Counsel :
– K. Radhakrishnan, Sr. Adv. Ms. Rekha Pandey, Adv. Ms. Sadhna Sandhu,
Adv. Mrs. Anil Katiyar, AOR and Arijit Prasad, Adv. for the Appellant.
ORDER
1. Heard learned counsel for the appellant.
2. The question raised in this appeal is when the assessed income is loss, as a
result of reduction at the time of final assessment as against the amount of
loss declared in the Income Tax Return, the penalty under Section 271 (1) (c)
of the Income Tax Act, 1961 can be levied or not?
3. This Court in the case of CIT v. Gold Coin Health Food (P.) Ltd., (2016) 2
ITJ Online 491 (SC) : (2012) 5 STD 30 : (2008) 304 ITR 308 : (2008) 218
CTR 259 : (2008) 172 Taxman 386 : (2008) 11 DTR 185 : (2008) 11 ITJ
407 has held that penalty can be levied even if no tax is payable on the total
income assessed and the court has analysed the nature of the amendment to
come to a conclusion whether it is in reality a clarificatory or declaratory
provision.
4. In view of the law laid down in the aforesaid decision, the Tribunal was
not right in cancellation of the penalty under Section 271(1)(c) of the Income
Tax Act, 1961 merely on the ground that no penalty can be levied if returned
income and the assessed income is a loss under Section 271(1)(c) of the
Income Tax Act, 1961 in as much as this amendment has been held to be
retrospective in operation.
(2021) 20 STD ABC 41
5. In view of the above, the appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment
passed by the High Court as also the order of the Tribunal are set aside and
the matter is remitted back to the Tribunal to decide on the quantum of the
penalty after giving opportunity of hearing to the respondent herein.
_____________
(2017) 3 ITJ Online 632 (SC)
(2021) 20 STD ??
v.
Sunita Mansingha
Shri R.K. Agrawal and Shri Mohan M. Shantanagoudar, JJ.
29th March, 2017
Department Valuation Officer- S. 142A of Income Tax Act, 1961-Whether

the local Public Works Department rates are to be applied and adopted in
place of Central Public Works Department rates-Held- In view of the fact that
Section 142A was inserted by Finance (No.2) Act, 2014 (23 of 2004) w.e.f.
15th November, 1972 and subsequently again substituted by Finance Act,
2010 (14 of 2010) w.e.f. 1st July, 2010 and Finance (No.2) (225 of 2014)
w.e.f. 1st October, 2014, as the proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 142A as it
existed during the relevant period, reference to the Departmental Valuation
Officer can be made because assessment in the present case had not become
final and conclusive because the appeal preferred by the Revenue under
Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 was pending before the Rajasthan
High Court-However, in view of the finding recorded by the Tribunal that the
local Public Works Department rates are to be applied and adopted in place of
Central Public Works Department rates, we do not find any good ground to
interfere in the impugned judgment on this issue on merits. The appeal fails
and is dismissed.

Relevant Provisions : S. 142A of Income Tax Act, 1961
Amiya Bala Paul v. CIT, (2019) 7 ITJ Online 233 (SC) : (2003) 262 ITR
407 : (2003) 182 CTR 489 [Refer Para 2]
Counsel :
– K. Radhakrishnan, Sr. Adv., Arijit Prasad, Ms. Gargi Khanna and Mrs.
Anil Katiyar, Advs. for the Appellant;
– Dr. Manish Singhvi and P.V. Yogeswaran, Advs. for the Respondent.
ORDER
1. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the
impugned judgment and order dated 2 nd March, 2005 passed by the High
Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur in Income Tax Appeal No. 3 of
2005 as also the order passed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal dated
20th May, 2004.
2. From the order of the Tribunal we find that the Tribunal has even though
held that the reference to the Departmental Valuation Officer in question is
not valid, in view of the decision of this Court in the Case of Amiya Bala
Paul v. CIT, (2019) 7 ITJ Online 233 (SC) : (2003) 262 ITR 407 : (2003) 182
CTR 489, but it has also held that it is settled principle of law that in place of
Central Public Works Department rates local Public Works Department rates
are to be applied and adopted to determine the cost of construction. In view of
the fact that Section 142A was inserted by Finance (No.2) Act, 2014 (23 of
2004) w.e.f. 15th November, 1972 and subsequently again substituted by
Finance Act, 2010 (14 of 2010) w.e.f. 1st July, 2010 and Finance (No.2) (225
of 2014) w.e.f. 1st October, 2014, as the proviso to sub-section (3) of Section
142A as it existed during the relevant period, reference to the Departmental
Valuation Officer can be made because assessment in the present case had not
become final and conclusive because the appeal preferred by the Revenue
under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 was pending before the
Rajasthan High Court.
3. However, in view of the finding recorded by the Tribunal that the local
Public Works Department rates are to be applied and adopted in place of
Central Public Works Department rates, we do not find any good ground to
interfere in the impugned judgment on this issue on merits. The appeal fails
and is dismissed.
4. There shall be no order as to costs.
5. Pending application, if any, also stands disposed of.
_____________
(2017) 3 ITJ Online 920 (SC)
(2021) 20 STD ??
Roger Enterprises Pvt. Ltd.
v.
Shri Kurian Joseph and Shri Rohinton Fali Nariman, JJ.
Special Leave to Appeal (C) Nos. 18759 & 18761 of 2016
22nd July, 2016
(2021) 20 STD ABC 43
SLP-A. 136 of Constitution of India-Held- We find no reason to entertain these

Special Leave Petitions, which are, accordingly, dismissed.

Relevant Period: A.Ys. 1981-82 & 1983-84.
Counsel :
– Arvind P. Datar, Sr. Adv. and Ms. Kavita Jha, Adv., for the Petitioner.
ORDER
1. We find no reason to entertain these Special Leave Petitions, which are,
accordingly, dismissed.
2. Pending interlocutory applications, if any, are disposed of.
____________

01 Judgments STD June Latest New For Magazine

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

01 Judgments STD June Latest New For Magazine

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

(2021) 20 STD ABC 1

[2021] 125 taxmann.com 71 (SC)

Final outcome – SLP Dismissed

Final outcome – Deferred till disposal of petitions before Larger Bench

Final outcome – Dismissed as Not Pressed

Final outcome – Appeal Allowed

Final outcome – In favour of Assessee

Final outcome – SLP dismissed

SLP-A. 136 of Constitution of India- Leave to annex along- Held-Delay

Final outcome – In favour of Assessee

Final outcome – Appeal Withdrawn

[2021] 125 taxmann.com 82 (SC)

impugned Judgment does not warrant any interference. However, we make it

Final outcome – Disposed of.

Final outcome – Dismissed.

before remitting the amount payable to a non-resident/foreign company.”

Final outcome – Appeal Allowed

Final outcome – Dismissed

Final outcome – Dismissed

Final outcome – Appeal Allowed

Final outcome – Appeal Disposed of

Final outcome – Disposed of.

SLP-A. 136 of Constitution of India- Held- We do not find any ground to

Final outcome – Dismissed

Final outcome – Dismissed

Final outcome – In favour of Revenue.

Final outcome – Dismissed

Income Tax Officer

Final outcome – Dismissed

Final outcome – In favour of Assessee.

Final outcome – In favour of Revenue.

Department Valuation Officer- S. 142A of Income Tax Act, 1961-Whether

Final outcome – Dismissed

SLP-A. 136 of Constitution of India-Held- We find no reason to entertain these

Final outcome – Dismissed

You might also like