Labor Law Review #2

1. Laya, vs. CA, et al., G.R. No.
205813, January 10, 2018
TOPIC: Retirement
DOCTRINE: In the absence of a retirement plan or agreement providing for retirement

benefits of employees in the establishment, an employee upon reaching the age of sixty
(60) years or more, but not beyond sixty-five (65) years which is hereby declared the
compulsory retirement age, who has served at least five (5) years in the said establishment,
may retire and shall be entitled to retirement pay
FACTS: Alfredo F. Laya, Jr. was hired by respondent Philippine Veterans Bank as its Chief
Legal Counsel with a rank of Vice President. The terms and conditions of his appointment
was laid down. On the other hand, private respondent has its Retirement Plan Rules and
Regulations. He was informed thru letter by the private respondent of his retirement
effective on 1 July 2007. On 21 June 2007 petitioner wrote Col. Emmanuel V. De Ocampo,
Chairman of respondent bank, requesting for an extension of his tenure for two (2) more
years pursuant to the Bank’s Retirement Plan (Late Retirement). On 26 June 2008, private
respondent issued a memorandum directing the petitioner to continue to discharge his
official duties and functions as chief legal counsel pending his request. However on 18 July
2007, petitioner was informed thru its president Ricardo A. Balbido Jr. that his request for
an extension of tenure was denied. According to the petitioner, he was made aware of the
retirement plan of respondent Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB) only after he had long been
employed and was shown a photocopy of the Retirement Plan Rules and Regulations, but
PVB’s President Ricardo A. Balbido, Jr. had told him then that his request for extension of
his service would be denied “to avoid precedence.” He sought the reconsideration of the
denial of the request for the extension of his retirement, but PVB certified his retirement
from the service as of July 1, 2007 on March 6, 2008.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner was validly retired by PVB at age 60.
RULING: No. Notwithstanding the rejection of the petitioner’s insistence that PVB was a
public corporation, the Supreme Court find and declare that the petitioner was not validly
retired at age 60. Under Art. 287 of Labor Code - Any employee may be retired upon
reaching the retirement age established in the collective bargaining agreement or other
applicable employment contract. In case of retirement, the employee shall be entitled to
receive such retirement benefits as he may have earned under existing laws and any
collective bargaining agreement and other agreements: Provided, however, That an
employee’s retirement benefits under any collective bargaining and other agreements shall
not be less than those provided therein. Under the provision, the employers and employees
may agree to fix the retirement age for the latter, and to embody their agreement in either
their collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) or their employment contracts. Retirement
plans allowing employers to retire employees who have not yet reached the compulsory
retirement age of 65 years are not per se repugnant to the constitutional guaranty of
security of tenure, provided that the retirement benefits are not lower than those prescribed
by law.
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LABOR LAW REVIEW 2nd Semester 2017-2018 [Assignment #2]

2. Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Arjan T. Hassaram, G.R. No. 217730, June 5,
2017
TOPIC: Retirement Plan vs. Labor Code
DOCTRINE: Art. 287 apply only to a situation where (1) there is no CBA or other applicable
employment contract providing for retirement benefits for an employee, or (2) there is a
CBA or other applicable employment contract providing for retirement benefits for an
employee, but it is below the requirement set by law.
FACTS: The case stemmed from a Complaint filed by Hassaram against PAL for illegal
dismissal and the payment of retirement benefits, damages, and attorney’s fees. He claimed
that he had applied for retirement from PAL in August 2000 after rendering 24 years of
service as a pilot, but that his application was denied. Instead, PAL informed him that he
had lost his employment in the company as of 9 June 1998, in view of his failure to comply
with the Return to Work Order issued by the Secretary of Labor against members of the
Airline Pilots Association of the Philippines (ALPAP) on 7 June 1998. Hassaram argued that
he was not covered by the Secretary’s Return to Work Order; hence, PAL had no valid
ground for his dismissal. He asserted that on 9 June 1998, he was already on his way to
Taipei to report for work at Eva Air, pursuant to a four-year contract approved by PAL itself.
Petitioner further claimed that his arrangement with PAL allowed him to go on leave without
pay while working for Eva Air, with the right to accrue seniority and retire from PAL during
the period of his leave. In its Position Paper, PAL contended that (a) the LA had no
jurisdiction over the case, which was a mere off-shoot of ALPAP’s strike, a matter over
which the Secretary of Labor had already assumed jurisdiction; (b) the Complaint should be
considered barred by res judicata, forum shopping, and prescription; (c) the case should be
suspended while PAL was under receivership; and (d) if at all, Hassaram was entitled only
to retirement benefits of P5,000 for every year of service pursuant to the Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between PAL and ALPAP.
ISSUE: Whether Hassaram is entitled to receive retirement benefits under Article 287 of the
Labor Code.
RULING: Yes. The Supreme Court finds that the sum received by Hassaram from the Plan
formed part of his retirement pay, we now proceed to determine whether his retirement pay
must be computed on the basis of Article 287, or on the retirement plans provided by PAL.
It can be clearly inferred from the language of the foregoing provision that it is applicable
only to a situation where (1) there is no CBA or other applicable employment contract
providing for retirement benefits for an employee, or (2) there is a CBA or other applicable
employment contract providing for retirement benefits for an employee, but it is below the
requirement set by law. The rationale for the first situation is to prevent the absurd
situation where an employee, deserving to receive retirement benefits, is denied them
through the nefarious scheme of employers to deprive employees of the benefits due them
under existing labor laws. On the other hand, the second situation aims to prevent private
contracts from derogating from the public law.
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3. American Power Conversion Corporation vs. Lim, G.R. No. 214291, January
11, 2018
TOPIC: Redundancy
DOCTRINE: Redundancy carried out by persons belonging to related companies; Labor

claims against related companies
FACTS: Respondent Jason Yu Lim was hired to serve as the Country Manager of American
Power Conversion Philippine Sales Office, which was not registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) but whose function then was to act as a liaison office for
American Power Conversion Corporation (APCC). Since American Power Conversion
Philippine Sales Office was unregistered but doing business in the country, respondent was
included in the list of employees and payroll of APCPI. He was also instructed to create a
petty cash fund using his own personal bank account to answer for the day-to-day
operations of American Power Conversion Philippine Sales Office. In November, 2004,
respondent was promoted as Regional Manager for APC North A.SEAN, a division of APC
ASEAN. As Regional Manager for APC North A.SEAN, he handled sales and marketing
operations for Thailand, the Philippines, Vietnam, Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, and Guam,
and reported directly to Larry Truong (Truong), Country General Manager for the
entire A.PC ASEAN and officer of APCC. Truong was not connected in any way with APCP BV
- which, per its SEC registration, is licensed to engage only in the manufacture of computer-
related products. Truong was replaced by petitioner George Kong (Kong). Thereafter, Kong
arrived in the country and met with respondent on October 17, 2005, where he informed
the latter of a supposed company restructuring which rendered his position as Regional
Manager for North ASEAN redundant.
ISSUE: Whether or not redundancy is effective if carried out by persons belonging to

related companies but not the company that hired the employee
RULING: Yes. Redundancy is an authorized cause for the termination of employment, as

provided by Article 283 of the Labor Code. Redundancy exists when the service capability of
the workforce is in excess of what is reasonably needed to meet the demands of the
business enterprise. A reasonably redundant position is one rendered superfluous by any
number of factors, such as overhiring of workers, decreased volume of business, dropping
of a particular product line previously manufactured by the company or phasing out of
service activity priorly undertaken by the business. Among the requisites of a valid
redundancy program arc: (1) the good faith of the employer in abolishing the redundant
position; and (2) fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining what positions are to be
declared redundant and accordingly established. Likewise, settled is the fact that the
declaration of redundant positions is a management prerogative, an exercise of business
judgment by the employer. It is however not enough for a company to merely declare that
positions have become redundant. It must produce adequate proof of such redundancy to
justify the dismissal of the affected employees. In the present case, it appeared from the
records that the redundancy program was not in existence. Circumstances obtaining therein
never [point] to the fact of a restructuring being carried out by the company. The
respondents dismally failed to convince this Court that the organizational chart and self-
serving affidavits presented are sufficient proof of the existence of redundancy.
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4. De Roca vs. Dabuyan, et al., G.R. No. 215281, March 5, 2018
TOPIC: Employment Contract
DOCTRINE: Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except
in case where the lights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by
their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law.
FACTS: Private respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against RAF Mansion Hotel
Old Management and New Management and Victoriano Ewayan. Petitioner filed his motion
to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. He alleged that, while he was the owner of
RA.F Mansion Hotel building, the same was being leased by Victoriano Ewayan., the owner
of Oceanics Travel and Tour Agency. Petitioner claims that Ewayan was the employer of
private respondents; consequently, he asserted that there was no employer-employee
relationship between him and private respondents. The Labor Arbiter rendered finding all
the respondents liable for illegal dismissal. The CA did not consider his arguments because
of his allegation of lack of employer-employee relationship between him and private
respondents. There was no evidence to support his claim because he lost the opportunity to
submit a position paper. Thus, his allegations will remain mere allegations.
ISSUE: Whether CA acted beyond their jurisdiction when they asserted their authorities and
found petitioner DE ROCA solidarily liable with EWAYAN/ OCEANIC TRAVEL AND TOUR
AGENCY to private respondents, despite the patent lack of employer-employee relationship
between the petitioner and private respondents
RULING: Yes, Petitioner likewise attached to the instant Petition copies of: 1) letter of
demand to pay and vacate sent to Ewayan, and 2) a written waiver and acknowledgment
executed by respondents. Thus, it would appear from the fact on record and the evidence
that petitioner's building was an existing hotel called the "RAF Mansion Hotel", which
Oceanic agreed to continue to operate under the same name. There is no connection
between petitioner and Oceanic other than through the lease agreement executed by them;
they are not partners in the operation of RAF Mansion Hotel. It just so happens that Oceanic
decided to continue operating the hotel using the original name "RAF Mansion Hotel". The
contract of employment between respondents, on the one hand, and Oceanic and Ewayan
on the other is effective only between them; it does not extend to petitioner, who is not a
party thereto. His only role is as lessor of the premises which Oceanic leased to operate as a
hotel; he cannot be deemed as respondent's employer - not even under the pretext that he
took over as the "new management" of the hotel operated by Oceanic. There simply is no
truth to such claim.
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5. Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines (FASAP) v.
Philippine Air Lines, Inc, G.R. No. 178083, Oct. 2/A.M. No. 11-10-1-SC,
March 13, 2018
TOPIC: FASAP Case – Retrenchment
DOCTRINE: In determining the validity of a retrenchment, judicial notice may be taken of

the financial losses incurred by an employer undergoing corporate rehabilitation. In such a
case, the presentation of audited financial statements may not be necessary to establish
that the employer is suffering from severe financial losses.
FACTS: Cabin crew personnel were covered by the retrenchment and demotion scheme of
PAL due to financial distress which is evidenced by proof of its claimed losses in a petition
for suspension of payments. PAL decided to cut its fleet of aircraft in order to minimize its
operating losses and rescue itself from “total downfall” As a result, 5,000 PAL employees
(including the herein 1,400 cabin attendants) were retrenched. The Third Division of the
Court promulgated its decision on July 22, 2008 reversing the decision promulgated on
August 23, 2006 by the Court of Appeals and entering a new one finding PAL guilty of
unlawful retrenchment. The Third Division disbelieved the veracity of PAL’s claim of severe
financial losses, and concluded that PAL had not established its severe financial losses
because of its non-presentation of audited financial statements. It further concluded that
PAL had implemented the retrenchment program in bad faith, and had not used fair and
reasonable criteria in selecting the employees to be retrenched.
ISSUE: Whether PAL lawfully retrench the lawfully the 1,400 cabin crew personnel
RULING: Yes, the financial statements for previous years may be material in establishing
the financial trend for an employer; however these are not indispensable in all cases of
retrenchment. The evidence required for each case of retrenchment will still depend on its
particular circumstances. In fact, in Revidad v. National Labor Relations Commission, the
Court declared that "proof of actual financial losses incurred by the company is not a
condition sine qua non for retrenchment," and retrenchment may be undertaken by the
employer to prevent even future losses. Under P.D. No. 902-A, the SEC was empowered
during rehabilitation proceedings to thoroughly review the corporate and financial
documents submitted by PAL. Hence, by the time when the SEC ordered PAL’s
rehabilitation, suspension of payments and receivership, the SEC had already ascertained
PAL’s serious financial condition, and the clear and imminent danger of its losing its
corporate assets. To require PAL in the proceedings below to still prove its financial losses
would only trivialize the SEC’s order and proceedings. That would be unfortunate because
we should not ignore that the SEC was then the competent authority to determine whether
or not a corporation experienced serious financial losses. Hence, the SEC's order -
presented as evidence in the proceedings below - sufficiently established PAL’s grave
financial status.
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6. Nestle Philippines, Inc. vs. Puedan, G.R. No. 220617, January 30, 2017
TOPIC: Employer-Employee Relationship
DOCTRINE: The imposition of minimum standards concerning sales, marketing, finance and
operations is nothing more than an exercise of sound business practice to increase sales
and maximize profits for the benefit of both Principal and its distributors. For as long as
these requirements do not impinge on a distributor's independence, then there is nothing
wrong with placing reasonable expectations on them.
FACTS: Respondents alleged that on various dates, ODSI and NPI hired them to sell various
NPI products in the assigned covered area. After some time, respondents demanded that
they be considered regular employees of NPI, but they were directed to sign contracts of
employment with ODSI instead. When respondents refused to comply with such directives,
NPI and ODSI terminated them from their position. Thus in the complaint filed , (a) ODSI is
a labor-only contractor and, thus, they should be deemed regular employees of NPI;
and (b) there was no just or authorized cause for their dismissal. ODSI averred that it hired
respondents as its employees and assigned them to execute the Distributorship
Agreement it entered with NPI. However, the business relationship between NPI and ODSI
turned sour. Eventually, NPI downsized its marketing and promotional support from ODSI
which resulted to downfall of its business and subsequently, the closure of its Nestle unit
due to the termination of the Distributorship Agreement and the failure of rehabilitation.
Under the foregoing circumstances, ODSI argued that respondents were not dismissed but
merely put in floating status.
ISSUE: Whether ODSI is a labor-only contractor of NPI, and consequently, NPI is

respondents' true employer and, thus, deemed jointly and severally liable with ODSI for
respondents' monetary claims.
RULING: No. The stipulations in the Distributorship Agreement do not operate to control or
fix the methodology on how ODSI should do its business as a distributor of NPI products,
but merely provide rules of conduct or guidelines towards the achievement of a mutually
desired result which in this case is the sale of NPI products to the end consumer. It was only
reasonable for NPI - it being a local arm of one of the largest manufacturers of foods and
grocery products worldwide - to require its distributors, such as ODSI, to meet various
conditions for the grant and continuation of a distributorship agreement for as long as these
conditions do not control the means and methods on how ODSI does its distributorship
business, as shown in this case. This is to ensure the integrity and quality of the products
which will ultimately fall into the hands of the end consumer.
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7. Valencia vs. Classique Vinyl Products Corporation, G.R. No. 206390, January
30, 2017
TOPIC: Employer-Employee Relationship
DOCTRINE: The onus probandi in proving the existence of an employer-employee

relationship is incumbent on the party alleging the existence of the same
FACTS: Petitioner alleged that he applied for work with the Respondent Corporation but was
told by latter to proceed to CMS, a local manpower agency, and submit therein the
requirements for employment. Upon submission, CMS made him sign a contract of
employment but no copy of the same was given to him. He then proceeded to the
Corporation for interview and then stared to work as its fertilizer operator. After five
months, he was made to serve as extruder operator but without increase in salary. He was
neither paid his holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, and 13 th month pay as well as
premiums for SSS and Philhealth and Pag-IBIG Fund were not paid and his contributions for
SSS premiums were not properly remitted.
ISSUE: Whether or not there exists and employer-employee relationship between

Respondent Classique Vinyl Corporation and Petitioner Valencia.
RULING: No. Petitioner Valencia failed to present competent evidence documentary or

otherwise, to support his claimed employer-employee relationship between him and
Classique Vinyl. All he advanced were mere factual assertions unsupported by proof. Further
the Court untenable Valencia’s argument that neither Classique Vinyl nor CMS was unable to
present proof that the latter is a legitimate independent contractor and therefor, unable to
rebut the presumption that a contractor is presumed to be a labor-only contractor.
Generallym the presumption is that the contract is a labor-only contractor unless such
contractor overcomes the burden of proving that it has the substantial capital, investment,
tools, and the like. Valencia here who is claiming to be an employee of Classique Vinyl, it is
thus incumbent upon him to proffer evidence to prove the existence of employer-employee
relationship between them. He "needs to show by substantial evidence that he was indeed
an employee of the company against which he claims illegal dismissal." Corollary, the
burden to prove the elements of an employer-employee relationship, viz.: (1) the selection
and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal;
and (4) the power of control, lies upon Valencia. In labor-only contracting, the statute
creates an employer-employee relationship for a comprehensive purpose: to prevent a
circumvention of labor laws. The contractor is considered merely an agent of the principal
employer and the latter is responsible to the employees of the labor-only contractor as if
such employees had been directly employed by the principal employer. The principal
employer therefore becomes solidarily liable with the labor-only contractor for all the
rightful claims of the employees. The facts of this case, however, failed to establish that
there is any circumvention of labor laws as to call for the creation by the statute of an
employer-employee relationship between Classique Vinyl and Valencia.
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8. Lu vs. Enopia, G.R. No. 197899, March 6, 2017
TOPIC: Employer-Employee Relationship – Element of Control
DOCTRINE: The control test merely calls for the existence of the right to control, and not
necessarily the exercise thereof. It is not essential that the employer actually supervises the
performance of duties by the employee. It is enough that the former has a right to wield the
power.
FACTS: Respondents were hired from January 1994 to March 1996 as crew members of the
fishing mother boat F/B MG-28 owned by Petitioner Lu who is the sole proprietor of Mommy
Gina Tuna Resources (MGTR) based in General Santos City. The Respondents and Lu had an
income-sharing arrangement wherein 55% goes to Lu, 45% to the crew members, with an
additional 4% as “backing incentive”. They also equally share the expenses for the
maintenance and repair of the mother boar, and for the purchase of nets, ropes and payaos.
In August of 1997, Lu proposed the signing of the Joint Venture Fishing Agreement between
then, but respondents refused to sign the same as they opposed the one-year term
provided therein. The respondents alleged that they were terminated in their service right
there and then because of their refusal to sing the agreement. On the other hand, Lu
alleged that the master fisherman informed him that the respondents still refused to sign
the agreement and have decided to return the vessel. The respondents filed for illegal
dismissal stating that their refusal to sign the Joint Venture Fishing Agreement is not a just
cause for their termination. Lu denied having dismissed the them, claiming that their
relationship was one of joint venture where he provided the vessel and other fishing
paraphernalia, while respondents, as industrial partners, provided labor by fishing in the
high seas. Lu alleged that there was no employer-employee relationship as its elements
were not present, viz.: it was the master fisherman who hired petitioners; they were not
paid wages but shares in the catch, which they themselves determine; they were not
subject to his discipline; and respondent had no control over the day-to-day fishing
operations, although they stayed in contact through respondent's radio operator or checker.
Lu also claimed that petitioners should not be reimbursed for their share in the expenses
since it was their joint venture that shouldered these expenses.
ISSUE: Whether or not there exists an employer-employee relationship between Petitioner

Lu and the Respondents
RULING: Yes. It was established that petitioner exercised control over respondents. It
should be remembered that the control test merely calls for the existence of the right to
control, and not necessarily the exercise thereof. It is not essential that the employer
actually supervises the performance of duties by the employee. It is enough that the former
has a right to wield the power. Petitioner admitted in his pleadings that he had contact with
respondents at sea via the former's radio operator and their checker. He claimed that the
use of the radio was only for the purpose of receiving requisitions for the needs of the
fishermen in the high seas and to receive reports of fish catch so that they can then send
service boats to haul the same. However, such communication would establish that he was
constantly monitoring or checking the progress of respondents' fishing operations
throughout the duration thereof, which showed their control and supervision over
respondents' activities.
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9. Lu vs. Enopia, G.R. No. 197899, March 6, 2017
TOPIC: Employer-Employee Relationship – Remittance with SSS as Proof of

Employment
DOCTRINE: Registration by the Petitioner of the Respondents with the SSS is proof that
they were indeed his employees. The coverage of the Social Security Law is predicated on
the existence of an employer-employee relationship
FACTS: Respondents were hired from January 1994 to March 1996 as crew members of the
fishing mother boat F/B MG-28 owned by Petitioner Lu who is the sole proprietor of Mommy
Gina Tuna Resources (MGTR) based in General Santos City. The Respondents and Lu had an
income-sharing arrangement wherein 55% goes to Lu, 45% to the crew members, with an
additional 4% as “backing incentive”. They also equally share the expenses for the
maintenance and repair of the mother boar, and for the purchase of nets, ropes and payaos.
In August of 1997, Lu proposed the signing of the Joint Venture Fishing Agreement between
then, but respondents refused to sign the same as they opposed the one-year term
provided therein. The respondents alleged that they were terminated in their service right
there and then because of their refusal to sing the agreement. On the other hand, Lu
alleged that the master fisherman informed him that the respondents still refused to sign
the agreement and have decided to return the vessel. The respondents filed for illegal
dismissal stating that their refusal to sign the Joint Venture Fishing Agreement is not a just
cause for their termination. Lu denied having dismissed the them, claiming that their
relationship was one of joint venture where he provided the vessel and other fishing
paraphernalia, while respondents, as industrial partners, provided labor by fishing in the
high seas. Lu alleged that there was no employer-employee relationship as its elements
were not present, viz.: it was the master fishman who hired petitioners; they were not paid
wages but shares in the catch, which they themselves determine; they were not subject to
his discipline; and respondent had no control over the day-to-day fishing operations,
although they stayed in contact through respondent's radio operator or checker. Lu also
claimed that petitioners should not be reimbursed for their share in the expenses since it
was their joint venture that shouldered these expenses.
ISSUE: Whether or not there exists an employer-employee relationship between Petitioner

Lu and the Respondents
RULING: Yes. Petitioner contends that it was the master fisherman who hired respondents,
however, it was shown by the latter's evidence that the employer stated in their Social
Security System (SSS) online inquiry system printouts was MGTR, which is owned by
petitioner. We have gone over these printouts and found that the date of the SSS remitted
contributions coincided with the date of respondents' employment with petitioner. Petitioner
failed to rebut such evidence. Thus, the fact that petitioner had registered the respondents
with SSS is proof that they were indeed his employees. The coverage of the Social Security
Law is predicated on the existence of an employer-employee relationship.
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10.Sumifru (Philippines) Corp. vs. Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa Suyapa Farm
(Namasufa-Naflu-Kmu), G.R. No. 202091, June 7, 2017
TOPIC: Employer-Employee Relationship - Imposition of Disciplinary Action;

Company Policy
DOCTRINE: The elements to determine the existence of an employment relationship are:

(a) the selection and engagement of the employee; (b) the payment of wages; (c) the
power of dismissal; and (d) the employer's power to control the employee's conduct. The
most important element is the employer's control of the employee's conduct, not only as to
the result of the work to be done, but also as to the means and methods to accomplish it.
FACTS: Sumifru is a domestic corporation and is the surviving corporation after its merger
with Fresh Banana Agricultural Corporation (FBAC) in 2008.On March 14, 2008, the private
respondent Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa Suyapa Farm (NAMASUFA-NAFLU-KMU), a
legitimate labor organization, filed a Petition for Certification Election before the Department
of Labor and Employment, Regional Office No. XI in Davao City. NAMASUFA sought to
represent all rank-and-file employees, numbering around one hundred forty, of packing
plant 90 (PP 90) of Fresh Banana Agricultural Corporation (FBAC). FBAC argued that there
exists no employer-employee relationship between it and the workers involved. It alleged
that members of NAMASUFA are actually employees of A2Y Contracting Services (A2Y), a
duly licensed independent contractor, as evidenced by the payroll records of the latter.
NAMASUFA, in its Comment to Opposition countered, among others, that its members were
former workers of Stanfilco before FBAC took over its operations sometime in 2002. The
said former employees were then required to join the Compostela Banana Packing Plant
Workers' Cooperative (CBPPWC) before they were hired and allowed to work at the Packing
Plant of FBAC. It further alleged that the members of NAMASUFA were working at PP 90
long before A2Y came.
ISSUE: Whether or not the members of the Union are employees of Sumifru
RULING: Yes. The Court affirmed the ruling of the Med Arbiter granting the Petition for
Certification Election of NAMASUFA and declared that Sumifru was the employer of the
workers concerned. On the first factor, it is apparent that the staff of respondent FBAC
advised those who are interested to be hired in the Packing Plant to become members first
of CBPPWC and get a recommendation from it. On the second factor, while the respondent
tried to impress upon us that workers are paid by A2Y Contracting Services, this at best is
but an administrative arrangement. We agree with petitioner that the payroll summary
submitted does not contain the relevant information such as the employee's rate of pay,
deductions made and the amount actually paid to the employee. On the third factor, it is
very clear that respondent FBAC is the authority that imposes disciplinary measures against
erring workers. This alone proves that it wields disciplinary authority over them. Finally, on
the fourth factor which is the control test, the fact that the respondent FBAC gives
instructions to the workers on how to go about their work is sufficient indication that it
exercises control over their movements. The workers are instructed as to what time they
are supposed to report and what time they are supposed to return. They were required to
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fill up monitoring sheets as they go about their jobs and even the materials which they used
in the packing plant were supplied by FBAC.
11.Valencia vs. Classique Vinyl Products Corporation, G.R. No. 206390, January
30, 2017
TOPIC: Labor-Only Contracting
DOCTRINE: “In labor-only contracting, the statute creates an employer-employee

relationship for a comprehensive purpose: to prevent a circumvention of labor laws. The
contractor is considered merely an agent of the principal employer and the latter is
responsible to the employees of the labor-only contractor as if such employees had been
directly employed by the principal employer. The principal employer therefore becomes
solidarily liable with the labor-only contractor for all the rightful claims of the employees.”
FACTS: Valencia applied for work with Classique Vinyl through the intervention of CMS, a
local manpower agency. The CMS made him sign a contract of employment and thereafter,
he then proceeded to work for Classique Vinyl as a fertilizer operator and extruder
operator. He alleged that he was neither paid his holiday pay, service incentive leave pay,
and 13th month pay and that his benefits were either not paid or not properly remitted. He
further averred that he worked for Classique Vinyl for four years until his dismissal. Hence,
by operation of law, he had already attained the status of a regular employee of Classique
Vinyl. Valencia, therefore, argued that Classique Vinyl should be held guilty of illegal
dismissal for failing to comply with the twin-notice requirement when it dismissed him from
the service and be made to pay for his monetary claims. On the other hand, Classique Vinyl
asserted that there was no employer-employee relationship between it and Valencia, hence,
it could not have illegally dismissed the latter nor can it be held liable for Valencia’s
monetary claims. Classique Vinyl insisted that Valencia’s true employer was CMS. However,
any employer-employee relationship between CMS and Valencia was also being denied by
CMS on the ground that it was Classique Vinyl which exercised full control and supervision
over him.
ISSUE: Whether or not an employer-employee relationship existed between Valencia and

Classique Vinyl
RULING: None. Valencia failed to present competent evidence, documentary or otherwise,

to support his claimed employer employee relationship between him and Classique Vinyl. All
he advanced were mere tactual assertions unsupported by proof. In fact, most of Valencia's
allegations even militate against his claim that Classique Vinyl was his true employer. For
one, Valencia stated in his Sinumpaang Salaysay that his application was actually received
and processed by CMS which required him to submit the necessary requirements for
employment. Upon submission thereof, it was CMS that caused him to sign an employment
contract, which upon perusal, is actually a contract between him and CMS. It was only after
he was engaged as a contractual employee of CMS that he was deployed to Classique Vinyl.
Clearly, Valencia's selection and engagement was undertaken by CMS and conversely, this
negates the existence of such element insofar as Classique Vinyl is concerned. On the other
hand, the employment contract which Valencia signed with CMS categorically states that the
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latter possessed not only the power of control but also of dismissal over him.

12.Maula vs. Ximex Delivery Express, Inc., G.R. No. 207838, January 25, 2017
TOPIC: Serious Misconduct
DOCTRINE: Misconduct is improper or wrong conduct; it is the transgression of some

established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in
character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment. The misconduct, to
be serious within the meaning of the Labor Code, must be of such a grave and aggravated
character and not merely trivial or unimportant. Thus, for misconduct or improper behavior
to be a just cause for dismissal, (a) it must be serious; (b) it must relate to the performance
of the employee’s duties; and (c) it must show that the employee has become unfit to
continue working for the employer.
FACTS: On March 25, 2009, in the evening, a supposed problem cropped up. A misroute of
cargo was reported and the company cast the whole blame on the petitioner. It was alleged
that he erroneously wrote the label on the box – the name and destination, and allegedly
was the one who checked the cargo. The imputation is quite absurd because it was the
client who actually wrote the name and destination, whereas, it was not the petitioner but
his co-employee who checked the cargo. The following day, he received a memorandum
charging him with “negligence in performing duties.” An attempt to serve another
memorandum was made on him. This time he was made to explain by the HR Manager why
he did not perform his former work and not report to his reassignment. It only validated his
apprehension of a set-up. For how could he be at two places at the same time (his former
work is situated in Sucat, Parañaque, whereas, his new assignment is in FTI, Taguig City). It
bears emphasizing that the directive for him to continue discharging his former duties was
merely verbal. At this point, petitioner lost his composure. Exasperated, he refused to
receive the memorandum and thus retorted “Seguro na-abnormal na ang utak mo” as it
dawned on him that they were out looking for every means possible to pin him down. He
was served with the memorandum suspending him from work for 30 days for alleged
“Serious misconduct and willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his
employer or representative in connection with his work.”
ISSUE: Whether or not Maula’s inflammatory language constitutes serious misconduct

which warrants his dismissal.
RULING: NO. Petitioner’s outburst did not constitute serious misconduct. The Court held
that respondent manifestly failed to prove that petitioner’s alleged act constitutes serious
misconduct. While this Court held in past decisions that accusatory and inflammatory
language used by an employee to the employer or superior can be a ground for dismissal or
termination, the circumstances peculiar to this case find the previous rulings inapplicable.
The admittedly insulting and unbecoming language uttered by petitioner to the HR Manager
on April 3, 2009 should be viewed with reasonable leniency in light of the fact that it was
committed under an emotionally charged state. We agree with the labor arbiter and the
3
NLRC that the on-the-spur-of-the-moment outburst of petitioner, he having reached his

breaking point, was due to what he perceived as successive retaliatory and orchestrated
actions of respondent. Indeed, there was only lapse in judgment rather than a premeditated
defiance of authority.
13.Bravo vs. Urios College (Now Father Saturnino Urios University), G.R. No.
198066, June 7, 2017
TOPIC: Serious Misconduct – No Serious Misconduct But There is Loss of Trust
DOCTRINE: The employer must adduce proof of actual involvement in the alleged
misconduct for loss of trust and confidence to warrant the dismissal of fiduciary rank-and-
file employees. However, "mere existence of a basis for believing that [the] employee has
breached the trust [and confidence] of [the] employer" is sufficient for managerial
employees.
FACTS: Bravo was employed as a part-time teacher and designated as school comptroller of
Urios College. Urios College then moved to present a new ranking system to its non-
academic employees. The said new ranking system paved way for the salary adjustments
and were reflected on the employees’ payroll. Concomitantly, Urios College decided to
reorganize their organizational structure. Bravo was made as a full-time teacher and
remained as a hold-over for the comptrollership, a position which is intimately related with
the Vice-President of Finance in the preparation of payroll and other vouchers. Later on, it
was discovered that there are salary adjustment made on the payroll without prior approval
of the Human Resource Department. Bravo received a show-cause order for serious
misconduct or willful breach of trust. A committee was formed to investigate this cause and
later found Bravo guilty thereof. Hence, his services were terminated. Bravo filed a
complaint of illlegal termination before the NLRC and was decided against him. On Appeal,
the decision was reversed. Urios College then sought an appeal before the Court of Appeals
which overturned the decision of the NLRC.
ISSUE: Whether there is just cause (serious misconduct or willful breach of trust) to
terminate the services of Bravo.
RULING: This Court holds that petitioner was validly dismissed based on loss of trust and
confidence. Petitioner was not an ordinary rank-and-file employee. His position of
responsibility on delicate financial matters entailed a substantial amount of trust from
respondent. The entire payroll account depended on the accuracy of the classifications made
by the Comptroller. It was reasonable for the employer to trust that he had basis for his
computations especially with respect to his own compensation. The preparation of the
payroll is a sensitive matter requiring attention to detail. Not only does the payroll involve
the company's finances, it also affects the welfare of all other employees who rely on their
monthly salaries. Petitioner's act in assigning to himself a higher salary rate without proper
authorization is a clear breach of the trust and confidence reposed in him. In addition, there
was no reason for the Comptroller's Office to undertake the preparation of its own summary
table because this was a function that exclusively pertained to the Human Resources
Department. Petitioner offered no explanation about the Comptroller's Office's deviation
from company procedure and the discrepancies in the computation of other employees'
3
salaries. Petitioner's position made him accountable in ensuring that the Comptroller's Office

observed the company's established procedures. It was reasonable that he should be held
liable by respondent on the basis of command responsibility.
14.BDO Unibank, Inc. vs. Nerbes, G.R. No. 208735, July 19, 2017
TOPIC: Serious Misconduct – No Serious Misconduct
DOCTRINE: It is settled that notwithstanding the existence of a just cause, dismissal

should not be imposed, as it is too severe a penalty, if the employee had been employed for
a considerable length of time in the service of his or her employer, and such employment is
untainted by any kind of dishonesty and irregularity.
FACTS: Nerbes and Suravilla were employees of BDO and are members of a legitimate
labor union and the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the rank and file
employees of the bank. Later on, Nerbes and Suravilla won as the President and Vice-
President of the union. Based on the existing CBA both the President and Vice-President are
entitled to a full-time leave for the duration of their term of office in order to maintain
industrial peace. Hence, both of them availed thereof. However, the losing candidates for
the officers of the union filed a protest thus the bank refused to accept the union leave
application of both Nerbes and Suravilla. A return to work order was issued but both Nerbes
and Suravilla failed to comply. Later on, the bank issued a memoranda against the two for
the violation of the bank's policy on attendance and punctuality. Incidentally, the protest of
the losing candidates were given due course thus a special election ensued were Nerbes and
Suravilla's opponents were proclaimed winners. The Labor Arbiter issued a ruling against
BDO Unibank renderering the dismissal of Nerbes and Suravilla invalid. On appeal, the NLRC
reversed the said decision. It was then appeled before the CA which then reinstated the
decision of the Labor Arbiter. Hence this appeal before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a valid ground (serious misconduct or wilfull disobedience)
in terminating the services of Nerbes and Survilla.
RULING: Refusal to return to work was not characterized by a wrongful and perverse
attitude to warrant dismissal. In siding with Nerbes and Suravilla, the LA held that their
refusal to return to work, being anchored on the text of Department Order No. 09, does not
constitute serious misconduct or willful disobedience. The CA, while finding that the bank's
order for Nerbes and Suravilla to return to work was lawful and reasonable and that they
refused to comply with said order, nevertheless found that their refusal to do so was not
characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude to warrant the supreme penalty of
dismissal. Article 282, now Article 296, of the Labor Code enumerates the just causes for
the termination of the employment of an employee. Under Article 282(a), serious
misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or
representative in connection with his work is a just cause for dismissal. Misconduct is
defined as an improper or wrong conduct. It is a transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies
wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment. To be a valid cause for dismissal, such
3
misconduct must be of grave and aggravated character and not merely trivial or

unimportant. The misconduct must also be related to the performance of the employee's
duties showing him to be unfit to continue working for the employer and that the
employee's act or conduct was performed with wrongful intent. So too, the Court finds that
the penalty of dismissal in this case is harsh and severe. Not every case of insubordination
or willful disobedience by an employee reasonably deserves the penalty of dismissal
because the penalty to be imposed on an erring employee must be commensurate with the
gravity of his or her offense. Considering the surrounding facts, termination of Nerbes and
Suravilla's services was a disproportionately heavy penalty.
15.Sterling Paper Products Enterprises, Inc. vs. KMM-Katipunan, G.R. No.

221493, August 2, 2017
TOPIC: Serious Misconduct – Disrespect Towards Superior
DOCTRINE: It is well-settled that accusatory and inflammatory language used by an

employee towards his employer or superior can be a ground for dismissal or termination.
FACTS: Sterling Paper hired the services of Raymond Esponga as its machine operator. On
a certain date, Sterling Paper issued a suspension order against several employees including
Esponga for the conduct of wildcat strike. Furthermore, it was alleged that Esponga was
caught skipping his work during office hours. He likewise bad-mouthed a certain supervisor
as witnessed by his co-employees. In his written explanation, he denied the allegations
against him. However, an administrative hearings were made but Esponga failed to appear.
Hence, he was dismissed. The Labor Arbiter however ruled that Esponga was illegally
dismissed but was then reversed by the NLRC. When it reached the Court of Appeals it the
decision of the Labor Arbiter was reinstated. Consequently, this appeal before the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Esponga can be validly terminated due to misconduct as he

disrespected his superiors.
RULING: To summarize, for misconduct or improper behavior to be a just cause for

dismissal, the following elements must concur: (a) the misconduct must be serious; (b) it
must relate to the performance of the employee's duties showing that the employee has
become unfit to continue working for the employer; and (c) it must have been performed
with wrongful intent. In the case at bench, the charge of serious misconduct is duly
substantiated by the evidence on record. Primarily, in a number of cases, the Court has
consistently ruled that the utterance of obscene, insulting or offensive words against a
superior is not only destructive of the morale of his co-employees and a violation of the
company rules and regulations, but also constitutes gross misconduct. In de La Cruz v.
National Labor Relations Commission, the dismissed employee shouted, "Sayang ang
pagka-professional mo!" and "Putang ina mo" at the company physician when the latter
refused to give him a referral slip. Likewise, in Autobus Workers' Union (AWU) v. National
Labor Relations Commission, the dismissed employee told his supervisor "Gago ka" and
taunted the latter by saying, "Bakit anong gusto mo, tang ina mo." Moreover, in Asian
Design and Manufacturing Corporation v. Deputy Minister of Labor, the dismissed employee
made false and malicious statements against the foreman (his superior) by telling his co-
employees: "If you don't give a goat to the foreman, you will be terminated. If you want to
remain in this company, you have to give a goat." The dismissed employee therein likewise
posted a notice in the comfort room of the company premises, which read: "Notice to all
3
Sander -Those who want to remain in this company, you must give anything to your

foreman." Hence, it is well-settled that accusatory and inflammatory language used by an
Further, Esponga's assailed conduct was related to his work. Vinoya did not prohibit him
from taking a nap. She merely reminded him that he could not do so on the sheeter
machine for safety reasons. Esponga's acts reflect an unwillingness to comply with
reasonable management directives. Finally, contrary to the CA' s pronouncement, the Court
finds that Esponga was motivated by wrongful intent.
TOPIC: Willful Disobedience – Disobedience is Not Willful
DOCTRINE: Disobedience is not wilful; Not every case of insubordination or willful

disobedience by an employee reasonably deserves the penalty of dismissal because the
penalty to be imposed on an erring employee must be commensurate with the gravity of his
or her offense.
FACTS: Respondents Nerbes and Suravilla were employees of Equitable PCI Bank and
members of Equitable PCI Bank Employees Union, a legitimate labor union and the sole and
exclusive bargaining representative of the rank and file employees of the bank.
An election of officers of EPCIBEU was held under the supervision of the Labor Relations
Division of the National Capital Region Regional Office of the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE-NCR). Nerbes and Suravilla won as President and Executive Vice
President, respectively, and were proclaimed as winners. Nerbes and Suravilla notified the
bank of their decision to exercise their privilege under Section 10[d][3], Article IV of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) which allows the President and the Executive Vice
President to be on full-time leave for the duration of their term of office in order to devote
their time in maintaining industrial peace. The bank disapproved Nerbes and Suravilla's
union leaves and were directed to refrain from being absent and to report back to work.
Nerbes and Suravilla failed to comply. Consequently, the bank issued show cause
Memoranda directing Nerbes and Suravilla to explain why no disciplinary action should be
imposed against them for violation of the bank's Code of Conduct on attendance and
punctuality, and obedience and cooperation.
ISSUE: Whether Nerbes and Suravilla's refusal to report to work despite the bank's order
for them to do so constitutes disobedience of such a willful character as to justify their
dismissal from service
RULING: No. Nerbes and Suravilla's failure to report for work despite the disapproval of
their application for leave was clearly intentional. However, though their refusal to do so
may have been intentional, such was not characterized by a wrongful and perverse attitude
or with deliberate disregard of their duties as such. At the time Nerbes and Suravilla notified
the bank of their intent to avail of their union leaves, they were already proclaimed as
winners and in fact took their respective oaths of office. Following the terms of the parties'
CBA, which has the strength of law as between them, Nerbes and Suravilla, as duly-elected
union officers, were entitled to take their union leaves. The Court finds that the penalty of
dismissal in this case is harsh and severe. Not every case of insubordination or willful
3
or her offense. It is settled that notwithstanding the existence of a just cause, dismissal

should not be imposed, as it is too severe a penalty, if the employee had been employed for
a considerable length of time in the service of his or her employer, and such employment is
untainted by any kind of dishonesty and irregularity. We note that aside from the subject
incident, Nerbes and Suravilla were not previously charged with any other offense or
irregularity. Considering the surrounding facts, termination ofNerbes and Suravilla's services
was a disproportionately heavy penalty.
TOPIC: Willful Disobedience – Penalty is Too Harsh
DOCTRINE: Penalty is too harsh; It is settled that notwithstanding the existence of a just
cause, dismissal should not be imposed, as it is too severe a penalty, if the employee had
been employed for a considerable length of time in the service of his or her employer, and
such employment is untainted by any kind of dishonesty and irregularity.
FACTS: Respondents Nerbes and Suravilla were employees of Equitable PCI Bank and
members of Equitable PCI Bank Employees Union, a legitimate labor union and the sole and
exclusive bargaining representative of the rank and file employees of the bank.
An election of officers of EPCIBEU was held under the supervision of the Labor Relations
Division of the National Capital Region Regional Office of the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE-NCR). Nerbes and Suravilla won as President and Executive Vice
President, respectively, and were proclaimed as winners. Nerbes and Suravilla notified the
bank of their decision to exercise their privilege under Section 10[d][3], Article IV of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) which allows the President and the Executive Vice
President to be on full-time leave for the duration of their term of office in order to devote
their time in maintaining industrial peace. The bank disapproved Nerbes and Suravilla's
union leaves and were directed to refrain from being absent and to report back to work.
Nerbes and Suravilla failed to comply. Consequently, the bank issued show cause
Memoranda directing Nerbes and Suravilla to explain why no disciplinary action should be
imposed against them for violation of the bank's Code of Conduct on attendance and
punctuality, and obedience and cooperation.
ISSUE: Whether the penalty of dismissal from service is too harsh
RULING: Yes. Nerbes and Suravilla's belief that they are entitled to immediately assume
their positions as union officers and thereby entitled to union leaves is not completely bereft
of basis. For one, they based the exercise of such privilege on the existing CBA, the terms
of which the bank has not demonstrated to be inapplicable. For another, it was only upon
being proclaimed as winners did they assume their respective positions which, under
Department Order No. 09, take place immediately. The Court finds that the penalty of
dismissal in this case is harsh and severe. Not every case of insubordination or willful
or her offense.
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18.Maula vs. Ximex Delivery Express, Inc., G.R. No. 207838, January 25, 2017
TOPIC: Totality of Infractions
DOCTRINE: Totality of Infractions; The Court held that respondent cannot invoke the
principle of totality of infractions considering that petitioner’s alleged previous acts of
misconduct were not established in accordance with the requirements of procedural due
process. In fact, respondent conceded that he “was not even censured for any infraction in
the past.”
FACTS: Petitioner Maula was hired by respondent as Operation Staff. His duties include, but
are not limited to, documentation, checker, dispatcher or airfreight coordinator. Petitioner,
together with some other concerned employees, requested for a meeting with their
manager together with the manager of the HRD. They questioned the document and aired
their side voicing their apprehensions against the designation “For New Hires” since they
were long time regular employees earning monthly salary/wages and not daily wage
earners. The respondent company’s manager, Amador Cabrera, retorted: “Ay wala yan
walang kwenta yan.” On April 2, 2009 at 4:00 p.m., he received another memorandum of
“reassignment” wherein he was directed to report effective April 2, 2009 to Omalza and
Marzan in another department of the company. The following day, an attempt to serve
another memorandum was made on him. It bears emphasizing that the directive for him to
continue discharging his former duties was merely verbal. At this point, petitioner lost his
composure. Exasperated, he refused to receive the memorandum and thus retorted “Seguro
na-abnormal na ang utak mo” as it dawned on him that they were out looking for every
means possible to pin him down. On May 4, 2009, he reported to the office only to be
refused entry. Instead, a dismissal letter was handed to him.
ISSUE: Whether or not Maula’s inflammatory language constitutes serious misconduct

which warrants his dismissal.
RULING: The Court held that respondent manifestly failed to prove that petitioner’s alleged
act constitutes serious misconduct. For misconduct or improper behavior to be a just cause
for dismissal, (a) it must be serious; (b) it must relate to the performance of the employee’s
duties; and (c) it must show that the employee has become unfit to continue working for
the employer. While this Court held in past decisions that accusatory and inflammatory
language used by an employee to the employer or superior can be a ground for dismissal or
termination, the circumstances peculiar to this case find the previous rulings inapplicable.
The admittedly insulting and unbecoming language uttered by petitioner to the HR Manager
on April 3, 2009 should be viewed with reasonable leniency in light of the fact that it was
3
committed under an emotionally charged state. We agree with the labor arbiter and the

NLRC that the on-the-spur-of-the-moment outburst of petitioner, he having reached his
breaking point, was due to what he perceived as successive retaliatory and orchestrated
actions of respondent. Indeed, there was only lapse in judgment rather than a premeditated
defiance of authority.
19.Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc. Crown Ship Management Inc. vs. De Leon,
G.R. No. 199977, January 25, 2017
TOPIC: Disability Benefits
DOCTRINE: Claimants for disability benefits must first discharge the burden of proving,
with substantial evidence, that their ailment was acquired during the term of their contract.
They must show that they experienced health problems while at sea, the circumstances
under which they developed the illness, as well as the symptoms associated with it. In this
case, respondent adduced insufficient proof that he experienced his injury or its symptoms
during the term of his contract.
FACTS: Wilfredo de Leon, a seafarer under Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc. was repatriated
after completing his 9 month contract, in which, prior to his next deployment, he reported
for medical examination but because he dragged his right leg, the company physician
referred him for consultation, management, and clearance, in which his status was marked
“pending”. Scanmar no longer heard from de Leon until the latter claimed for disability
benefits. He filed a complaint upon denial of the said claim. The Labor Arbiter granted his
claim which was affirmed by the NLRC and the CA.
ISSUE: Whether or not De Leon is entitled to disability benefits.
RULING: No. In the recital of their rulings, none of the tribunals a quo discussed any
particular sickness that De Leon suffered while at sea, which was a factual question that
should have been for the labor tribunals to resolve. As they have failed to do so, this Court
must sift through and reexamine the credibility and probative value of the evidence on
record so as to ultimately decide whether or not it would be just to award disability benefits
to the seafarer. Claimants for disability benefits must first discharge the burden of proving,
with substantial evidence, that their ailment was acquired during the term of their contract.
They must show that they experienced health problems while at sea, the circumstances
under which they developed the illness, as well as the symptoms associated with it. In this
case, respondent adduced insufficient proof that he experienced his injury or its symptoms
during the term of his contract. In his Position Paper before the LA, De Leon allegedly felt
something wrong with his body, experienced lower abdominal pain, and saw blood in his
stool. To support his claim, he attached several laboratory reports, as well as the medical
certifications of Drs. Reyes, Luna, Geslani, and Guevara, indicating that he had been injured
and was unfit for sea service. These pieces of documentary evidence, however, bear dates
well past the disembarkation of respondent. Hence, none of the attachments he has
adduced prove the symptoms of the radiculopathy he allegedly experienced during the term
3
of his contract. Furthermore, this Court observes that the narration of De Leon that he felt

that something was wrong with his body is too general to be worthy of adjudicative
attention. In addition, his claims lack material corroboration.
20.Maersk Filipinas Crewing Inc., and Maersk Co. IOM Ltd. vs. Ramos, G.R. No.
184256, January 18, 2017
TOPIC: Disability Benefits - Compensation for Disability
DOCTRINE: The curability of the injury does not preclude an award for disability because,
in labor laws, disability need not render the seafarer absolutely helpless or feeble to be
compensable; it is enough that it incapacitates him to perform his customary work.
FACTS: Joselito Ramos was hired by Maersk as seaman for 4 months. During the voyage,
his left eye was hit by a screw. He was later repatriated to Manila and examined by a doctor
which diagnosed him with “corneal scar and cystic macula, left, post-traumatic.” Ramos
underwent surgery to his left eye. After being discharged, he was examined again and
underwent an eye examination and glaucoma test, in which was later evaluated that he can
no longer be employed due to lack of good vision. He filed a claim for disability benefits but
it was denied, followed by a complaint with the NLRC. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the
complaint, which was reversed by the NLRC and affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ramos can be compensated for his disability due to his eye injury.
RULING: Yes. Preliminarily, it must be emphasized that this Court is not a trier of facts. It
is not our function to weigh and try the evidence all over again. Findings of fact of quasi-
judicial bodies, especially when affirmed by the CA, are generally accorded finality and
respect. As long as these findings are supported by substantial evidence, they must be
upheld. Disability does not refer to the injury or the pain that it has occasioned, but to the
loss or impairment of earning capacity. There is disability when there is a diminution of
earning power because of actual absence from work. This absence must be due to the injury
or illness arising from, and in the course of, employment. Thus, the basis of compensation is
reduction of earning power. Section 2 of Rule VII of the Amended Rules on Employees’
Compensation provides: “(c) A disability is partial and permanent if as a result of the
injury or sickness the employee suffers a permanent partial loss of the use of any part of his
body.” Permanent partial disability occurs when an employee loses the use of any particular
anatomical part of his body which disables him to continue with his former work. In this
case, while petitioners’ own company-designated physician, Dr. Dolor, certified that
respondent was still fit to work, the former admitted in the same breath that respondent’s
left eye could no longer be improved by medical treatment.
3

184256, January 18, 2017
TOPIC: Disability Benefits - Disability Refers to Loss or Impairment of Earning

Capacity and Not to Pain or Injury
DOCTRINE: Disability does not refer to the injury or the pain that it has occasioned, but to
the loss or impairment of earning capacity. There is disability when there is a diminution of
reduction of earning power.
FACTS: Joselito Ramos was hired by Maersk as seaman for 4 months. During the voyage,
his left eye was hit by a screw. He was later repatriated to Manila and examined by a doctor
which diagnosed him with “corneal scar and cystic macula, left, post-traumatic.” Ramos
underwent surgery to his left eye. After being discharged, he was examined again and
underwent an eye examination and glaucoma test, in which was later evaluated that he can
no longer be employed due to lack of good vision. He filed a claim for disability benefits but
it was denied, followed by a complaint with the NLRC. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the
complaint, which was reversed by the NLRC and affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ramos can be compensated for his disability due to his eye injury.
RULING: Yes. Preliminarily, it must be emphasized that this Court is not a trier of facts. It
is not our function to weigh and try the evidence all over again. Findings of fact of quasi-
judicial bodies, especially when affirmed by the CA, are generally accorded finality and
respect. As long as these findings are supported by substantial evidence, they must be
upheld. Disability does not refer to the injury or the pain that it has occasioned, but to the
loss or impairment of earning capacity. There is disability when there is a diminution of
reduction of earning power. Section 2 of Rule VII of the Amended Rules on Employees’
Compensation provides: “(c) A disability is partial and permanent if as a result of the
injury or sickness the employee suffers a permanent partial loss of the use of any part of his
body.” Permanent partial disability occurs when an employee loses the use of any particular
anatomical part of his body which disables him to continue with his former work. In this
case, while petitioners’ own company-designated physician, Dr. Dolor, certified that
respondent was still fit to work, the former admitted in the same breath that respondent’s
left eye could no longer be improved by medical treatment.
3

22.Hoegh Fleet Services Phils., Inc., vs. Turallo, G.R. No. 230481, July 26, 2017
TOPIC: Disability Benefits - Permanent Total Disability
DOCTRINE: Under Section 32 of the POEA-SEC, only those injuries or disabilities that are
classified as Grade 1 may be considered as total and permanent. However, if those injuries
or disabilities with a disability grading from 2 to 14, hence, partial and permanent, would
incapacitate a seafarer from performing his usual sea duties for a period of more than 120
or 240 days, depending on the need for further medical treatment, then he is, under legal
contemplation, totally and permanently disabled.
FACTS: Bernardo Turallo, worked as a seafarer employed by petitioner Hoegh Fleet

Services. Turallo then felt pain in his back leading him to consult the ship’s doctor, which
then referred him to the company designated-physician. Despite the recommendation by
the company-designated physician, pain still persisted in the back of Turallo, prompting him
to consult for a second opinion. It is only then that it was found that he is now partially and
permanently disabled. He filed a grievance proceeding for claims against petitioner, which
was granted by the Panel and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, except some modification
as to the attorney’s fees.
ISSUE: Whether or not Turallo is covered by the permanent disability benefits, even though
the company-physician was able to assessed him as only a partially disable?
RULING: It cannot be any clearer that the company-designated physician's failure to arrive
at a definite assessment of the seafarer's fitness to work or permanent disability within the
prescribed periods would hold the seafarer's disability total and permanent. The Court does
not wish to disturb the factual findings of the Panel and the CA that indeed the company-
designated physician failed to issue a final assessment of Turallo's disability grading as this
Court is not a trier of facts. Hence, under the contemplation of the law abovementioned,
Turallo is considered as totally and permanently disabled. The Panel, as affirmed by the CA,
is correct in concluding that the Grade 8 disability grading given, as reflected in the 23
December 2013 correspondence, cannot be considered as a final assessment as the said
letter expressly states that it was merely an "interim" assessment. In Fil-Star Maritime
Corporation v. Rosete and Tamin v. Magsaysay Maritime Corporation, We concluded that the
company-designated doctor's certification issued within the prescribed periods must be a
final and definite assessment of the seafarer's fitness to work or disability, not merely
interim, as in this case. Thus, the award of US$90,000, as the maximum disability
compensation stipulated in their Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) is warranted.
3

23.Atienza vs. Orophil Shipping International Co., Inc., et al., G.R. No. 191049,
August 7, 2017
TOPIC: Crystal Shipping Doctrine
DOCTRINE: Pursuant to the ruling in Crystal Shipping, the fact that the assessment was
made beyond the 120-day period prescribed in the Labor Code is sufficient basis to declare
that respondent suffered permanent total disability.
FACTS: Petitioner Tomas Atienza worked as a seafarer for petitioner on board M/V Cape
Apricot. In the course of his employment contract, petitioner complained of severe
headaches, nausea, and double vision which the foreign port doctors diagnosed to be right
cavernous sinus inflammation or Tolosa Hunt Syndrome (THS). Petitioner was repatriated
and was referred to the company physician and was later on declared fit to work. A second
opinion later assessed his illness as a Grade IV disability and declared him unfit for sea
duty. Thus, he then filed a complaint in the NLRC for the payment of disability benefits,
reimbursement of medical expenses and attorney’s fees. The Labor Arbiter granted the
petition for claim, but was later reversed by NLRC and later affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled payment of disability benefits?
RULING: The seafarer is declared to be on temporary total disability during the 120-day
period within which he is unable to work. However, a temporary total disability lasting
continuously for more than 120 days, except as otherwise provided in the Rules, is
considered as a total and permanent disability. This exception pertains to a situation when
the sickness “still requires medical attendance beyond the 120 days but not to exceed 240
days” in which case, the temporary total disability period is extended up to a maximum of
240 days. Records show that it was only on June 28, 2005, that the company-designated
physician issued a Medical Certificate declaring petitioner fit to work, which was 144 days
after petitioner’s repatriation on February 4, 2005. Considering that petitioner’s complaint
was filed on March 29, 2006, during which time the 120-day rule pronounced in Crystal
Shipping was the prevailing doctrine, the failure of the company-designated physician to
issue a final assessment within the 120-day period gave rise to a conclusive presumption
that petitioner’s disability is total and permanent. In this case, the NLRC failed to account
for the foregoing rules on seafarers’ compensation and instead, cavalierly dismissed
petitioner’s claim on the supposition that petitioner failed to show a reasonable connection
between his illness and his work as an Able Seaman, even if the records show otherwise.
More significantly, the NLRC did not account for the employer’s failure to comply with the
120 day-rule, by virtue of which the law conclusively presumes the seafarer’s disability to
3
be total and permanent. Thus, for these reasons, the Court finds that the NLRC’s ruling is

tainted with grave abuse of discretion and hence, should have been corrected by the CA
through certiorari. Accordingly, the CA’s ruling must be reversed and set aside.
24.Status Maritime Corporation and Admibros Shipmanagement Co., Ltd. vs.

Doctolero, G.R. No. 198968, January 18, 2017
TOPIC: Filing Before the Lapse of 120 Days
DOCTRINE: In order for a seafarer's claim for total and permanent disability benefits to prosper,
any of the following conditions should be present: (a) The company-designated physician failed to
issue a declaration as to his fitness to engage in sea duty or disability even after the lapse of the 120-
day period and there is no indication that further medical treatment would address his temporary total
disability, hence, justify an extension of the period to 240 days; (b) 240 days had lapsed without any
certification issued by the company designated physician; (c) The company-designated physician
declared that he is fit for sea duty within the 120-day or 240-day period, as the case may be, but his
physician of choice and the doctor chosen under Section 20-8(3) of the POEA-SEC are of a contrary
opinion; (d) The company-designated physician acknowledged that he is partially permanently
disabled but other doctors who he consulted, on his own and jointly with his employer, believed that
his disability is not only permanent but total as well; (e) The company-designated physician
recognized that he is totally and permanently disabled but there is a dispute on the disability grading;
(f) The company-designated physician determined that his medical condition is not compensable or
work-related under the POEA-SEC but his doctor-of-choice and the third doctor selected under Section
20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC found otherwise and declared him unfit to work; (g) The company-
designated physician declared him totally and permanently disabled but the employer refuses to pay
him the corresponding benefits; and (h) The company-designated physician declared him partially and
permanently disabled within the 120-day or 240-day period but he remains incapacitated to perform
his usual sea duties after the lapse of said periods.
FACTS: Respondent Rodrigo Doctolero was hired as officer of M/V Dimitris Manios, operated
by petitioner Status Maritime Corporation through Adminbros Ship management. Doctolero,
while on voyage, complaint about abdominal pain, and was brought to a hospital in Mexico,
and found no clear diagnosis. He went back to work after. He then suffered extreme pain
again, and brought himself to the hospital, and informed the ship’s agent but provided no
assistance. He incurred expenses while admitted in the hospital, where he was diagnosed
with "Esophago-Gastritis-Duodenitis”. The Company physician further examined respondent,
but again found his condition to be normal. He then filed a complaint demanding payment of
total and permanent disability benefits, which the Labor Arbiter denied, and said decision
was affirmed by the NLRC. The Court of Appeals reversed the said decision by NLRC.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Doctolero is entitled to claim total and permanent
disability benefits, considering the factual issues that the Labor Arbiter and NLRC based on
as to the CA’s finding?
RULING: Although the degree and extent of the seafarer's disability constitute a factual
question that this Court should not re-assess on review, the conflict between the factual
3
findings of the Labor Arbiter and NLRC, on one hand, and those of the CA, on the other

hand, compel the Court to dwell on the factual matters and to re-examine the evidence
adduced by the parties. Upon its re-evaluation of the records, therefore, the Court
concludes that the CA' s findings in favor of entitling Doctolero to permanent and total
disability benefits were erroneous. While the fact that Doctolero suffered the disability
during the term of his contract was undisputed, it was evident that he had filed his
complaint for disability benefits before the company designated physician could determine
the nature and extent of his disability, or before even the lapse of the initial 120-day period.
With Doctolero still undergoing further tests, the company-designated physician had no
occasion to determine the nature and extent of his disability upon which to base Doctolero's
"fit to work" certification or disability grading. Consequently, the petitioners correctly argued
that Doctolero had no cause of action for disability pay and sickness allowance at the time
of the filing of his complaint.
25.Caderao vs. Senator Crewing (Manila), Inc., et al./Senator Crewing

(Manila), Inc., et al. vs. Caderao, G.R. No. 224532/G.R. No. 224565, June
21, 2017
DOCTRINE: Permanent total disability compensation should be granted to seafarers

suffering from hypertensive cardiovascular diseases, who were either under the treatment
of, or issued fit-to-work certifications by company-designated doctors beyond 120 or 240
days from their repatriation.
FACTS: Balatero was initially engaged by the respondents as an able-bodied seaman. On

July 31, 2013, after having been found as ''fit to work' upon compliance with the required
Pre-Employment Medical Examination (PEME), Balatero boarded MV MSC Flaminia 7 for a six-
month contract. Balatero later experienced chest pains, with palpitations and shortness of
breath. He was taken to Odense University Hospital (Odense) in Denmark, diagnosed to
have an elevated blood pressure, prescribed anti-hypertensive medicines, and discharged
thereafter. On January 2, 2014, Balatero suffered from similar symptoms and was again
brought to Odense, where he was advised to continue with the earlier prescribed anti-
hypertensive medicines, and be repatriated for further medical evaluation. Balatero
disembarked from the ship and arrived in Manila and was referred to Metropolitan Medical
Center under the care of company-designated physician and underwent angioplasty and was
subsequently declared fit to work, but with medical maintenance for the rest of his life.
Unconvinced about his fitness to resume sea duties, Balatero consulted Dr. Li-Ann Lara-
Orencia, an occupational doctor which concluded that Balatero cannot return to his
employment as 3rd Officer due to the latter's on and off chest pains, "easy fatigability" and
continuous intake of five maintenance medicines. Balatero filed before the NLRC a complaint
for permanent total disability compensation, sickness allowance, damages and attorney's
fees. He claimed that his sea duties as 2nd and 3rd Officer were strenuous, and had
exposed him to unhealthy working conditions, extreme temperatures and contaminants,
which either directly caused his illnesses or contributed thereto.
ISSUE: Whether temporary total disability shall be deemed permanent and total if it lasts
continuously for more than 120 days?
RULING: Yes. The Court grants Balatero permanent total disability compensation, and set
aside the CA's disquisition that only benefits pertaining to Grade 7 Disability Rating should
be awarded on the basis of the following: (1) Dr. Lara-Orencia's ample explanation on how
she had arrived at a permanent total disability assessment; (2) the recommendations of
3
DOH A.O. No. 2007-0025 on the issuance of fit-to-work certificates; and (3) jurisprudence

granting permanent total disability compensation to seafarers suffering from hypertensive
cardiovascular diseases, who were either under the treatment of, or issued fit-to-work
certifications by company-designated doctors beyond 120 or 240 days from their
repatriation.
26.Hoegh Fleet Services Phils., Inc., vs. Turallo, G.R. No. 230481, July 26, 2017
DOCTRINE: While a seafarer is partially injured or disabled, he is not precluded from

earning doing the same work he had before his injury or disability or that he is accustomed
or trained to do. Otherwise, if his illness or injury prevents him from engaging in gainful
employment for more than 120 or 240 days, as the case may be, he shall be deemed totally
and permanently disabled.
DOCTRINE: The company-designated physician is expected to arrive at a definite

assessment of the seafarer's fitness to work or permanent disability within the period of 120
or 240 days. That should he fail to do so and the seafarer's medical condition remains
unresolved, the seafarer shall be deemed totally and permanently disabled.
FACTS: Petitioners hired Turallo as a Messman on board vessel "Hoegh Tokyo" for nine (9)
months after he was found "fit for sea duty" in the Pre-Employment Medical Examination.
While on board the vessel, Turallo felt pain on the upper back of his body and chest pain
and was discharged from the ship. Upon arrival in Manila, Turallo was referred to the
company-designated physician, who in turn referred him to an orthopedic surgeon and
cardiologist. He underwent medical and laboratory tests and later was undergoing
medical/surgical treatment. Despite Turallo' s continuous rehabilitation treatment, pain in
his left shoulder persisted, hence, he followed up his pending surgery therefor several times
to no avail. This prompted Turallo to seek a second opinion. He consulted with Dr. Manuel
Fidel Magtira, a government physician of the Vizcarra Diagnostic Center who, after x-ray of
his left wrist and shoulder joints, found him to be "partially and permanently disabled with
separate impediments for the different affected parts of his body based on the POEA
contract" but declared him as "permanently unfit in any capacity for further sea duties".
Grievance proceedings were held between the parties but the parties failed to reach an
agreement.
ISSUE: Whether the issuance of a final disability assessment of Grade 8 within the 240-day
period should only be confined to the amount corresponding to the Grade 8 assessment, a
partial disability?
RULING: No. Under Section 32 of the POEA-SEC, only those injuries or disabilities that are
3
classified as Grade 1 may be considered as total and permanent. However, if those injuries

or disabilities with a disability grading from 2 to 14, hence, partial and permanent, would
incapacitate a seafarer from performing his usual sea duties for a period of more than 120
or 240 days, depending on the need for further medical treatment, then he is, under legal
contemplation, totally and permanently disabled.
27.TSM Shipping Phils., Inc. vs. Patino, G.R. No. 210289, March 20, 2017
DOCTRINE: The rule is that a temporary total disability only becomes permanent when the
company-designated physician, within the two hundred forty (240)-day period, declares it
to be so, or when after the lapse of the said period, he fails to make such declaration.
FACTS: TSM, for and in behalf of its foreign principal, DNAS, entered into a Contract of
Employment with respondent for a period of six months and while working on board the
vessel, respondent injured his right hand while securing a mooring rope. He was brought to
a medical facility in Istanbul, Turkey, where X-ray showed a fracture on his 5th metacarpal
bone. Respondent's right hand was placed in a cast and thereafter he was repatriated. Upon
arrival in Manila petitioners referred respondent to the company-designated physician, Dr.
Nicomedes G. Cruz for further treatment. Respondent was also referred to an orthopedic
surgeon who recommended surgical operation to correct the fractured metacarpal bone. He
then went through physical therapy and undergone extensive medical treatments, therapy,
and follow-up examinations. Despite continuing physical therapy sessions with the
company-designated physician, respondent filed a complaint with the NLRC against
petitioners for total and permanent disability benefits damages, and attorney's fees.
Respondent also consulted Dr. Nicanor Escutin who assessed him to have permanent
disability unfit for sea duty in whatever capacity as a seaman.
ISSUE: Whether the sole claim of 'loss of earning capacity' and the '120-day rule' should
equate to an award despite the lack of substantial evidence to support the allegation that he
is actually suffering from a Grade 1 disability and despite the undisputed evidence that he
was actually suffering from a Grade 10 disability?
RULING: No. Respondent is not entitled to total and permanent disability compensation.
The rule is that a temporary total disability only becomes permanent when the company-
designated physician, within the 240-day period, declares it to be so, or when after the
lapse of the said period, he fails to make such declaration." After the initial interim
assessment of Dr. Cruz, respondent continued with his medical treatment. Dr. Cruz then
rendered on September 29, 2010 a final assessment of Grade 10 upon reaching the
maximum medical cure. Counting from the date of repatriation on May 24, 2010 up to
September 29, 2010, this assessment was made within the 240-day period. Clearly, before
3
the maximum 240-day medical treatment period expired, respondent was issued a Grade

10 disability rating which is merely equivalent to a permanent partial disability under the
POEA-SEC. Thus, respondent could not have been suffering from a permanent total
disability as would entitle him to the maximum benefit of US$60,000.00.
28.Aldaba vs. Career Philippines, Shipmanagement, Inc., Columbia

Shipmanagement Ltd., and/or Verlou Carmelito, G.R. No. 218842, June 21,
2017
DOCTRINE: If the 120 days initial period is exceeded and no such declaration is made
because the seafarer requires further medical attention, then the temporary total disability
period may be extended up to a maximum of 240 days.
FACTS: Petitioner Paulino M. Aldaba was hired by respondents Career as Bosun for work on
board the vessel M/V Cape Frio.In the course of the performance of his duties, petitioner
was accidentally hit by twisted chains made of heavy metal causing him to fall and
eventually resulted to a back injury. The company-designated physician, after the
continuing evaluation and medical treatment for 163 days. Petitioner consulted a different
Doctor for an independent assessment of his medical condition and came out with findings
showing that petitioner's injury resulted to his permanent disability, thus, making him unfit
to work as a seafarer in any capacity. As a result, petitioner demanded for total disability
compensation, but respondents did not heed such demand. Respondents, however,
expressed willingness to compensate petitioner the amount corresponding to Grade 8
disability rating based on the medical findings of the company-designated physician.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a complaint for payment of total and permanent disability
benefits, as well as medical expenses, with prayer for damages and attorney's fees against
respondents with the Arbitration Board of the NLRC.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner is entitled to permanent and total disability benefits because of
his inability to perform his job for more than 120 days, which respondents counter as not
being the case since the 240-day rule should govern.
RULING: the current rule provides: (1) that mere inability to work for a period of 120 days
does not entitle a seafarer to permanent and total disability benefits; (2) that the
determination of the fitness of a seafarer for sea duty is within the province of the
company-designated physician, subject to the periods prescribed by law; (3) that the
company-designated physician has an initial 120 days to determine the fitness or disability
of the seafarer; and (4) that the period of treatment may only be extended to 240 days if a
sufficient justification exists such as when further medical treatment is required or when the
seafarer is uncooperative. For as long as the 120-day period under the Labor Code and the
POEA-SEC and the 240-day period under the IRR co-exist, the Court must bend over
3
backwards to harmoniously interpret and give life to both of the stated periods. Ultimately,

the intent of our labor laws and regulations is to strive for social justice over the diverging
interests of the employer and the employee. In the present case, the company-designated
physician was only able to issue a certification declaring respondent to be entitled to a
disability rating of Grade 8 on the 163rd day that petitioner was undergoing continuous
medical treatment, which is beyond the period of 120 days, without justifiable
reason.Therefore, the company-designated physician, failing to give his assessment within
the period of 120 days, without justifiable reason, makes the disability of petitioner
permanent and total.
29.Gomez vs. Crossworld Marine Services, Inc., G.R. No. 220002, August 2,
2017
DOCTRINE: The rule is that a temporary total disability only becomes permanent when the
company-designated physician, within the 240-day period, declares it to be so, or when
after the lapse of the same, he/she fails to make such declaration.
FACTS: Crossworld Marine Services, IncGomez as an Ordinary Seaman.The Chief Officer of

the vessel told petitioner to remove the ice from the lower and upper decks of the ship.
While performing this task, petitioner accidentally slipped and hit his lower back on the steel
deck. Petitioner was immediately in pain, but thought it was just temporary. Later,
petitioner could no longer bear the pain on his back and went to the vessel's master and
requested for medical examination. He was told to go to the hospital the next day.
Petitioner was repatriated to the Philippines. The next day, petitioner reported to
respondents and requested for further medical examination and treatment. Petitioner asked
respondents for payment of his disability benefits, but respondents refused. Efforts toward
an amicable settlement was unsuccessful. Hence, on September 13, 2012, petitioner filed a
complaint22 before the Labor Arbiter, praying that his disability be declared as work-
related, total and permanent, and that respondents be declared solidarily liable to pay him
permanent total disability benefit, moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
ISSUE: Whether Gomez is not entitled to full disability benefits despite his factual medical
condition.
RULING: The Court declared that petitioner Eugenio M. Gomez to have suffered permanent
partial disability with an impediment of Grade 8. A temporary total disability only becomes
permanent when so declared by the company-designated physician within the periods
he/she is allowed to do so, or upon the expiration of the maximum 240-day medical
treatment period without a declaration of either fitness to work or the existence of a
permanent disability. In this case, the treatment of petitioner's injury required spine surgery
and physical therapy which extended beyond the initial 120-day period into the maximum
240-day treatment period. The company-designated doctor's medical report dated
September 11, 2017 (made 195 days from the time petitioner was injured on February 29,
2012) stated that petitioner failed the functional capacity test and recommended that
3
petitioner continue therapy for two to three months. Petitioner filed his complaint on

September 13, 2012 or 197 days from the date he was injured, and, therefore, before the
lapse of the maximum 240-day treatment period within which the company designated
physician should assess the fitness of petitioner to return to work. Since the company-
designated doctor has not declared that petitioner is not fit to work within the 240-day
period, and the 240-day period has not lapsed when petitioner filed his complaint, the
petitioner cannot be legally presumed as permanently and totally disabled to be entitled to
permanent total disability.
30.Jebsens Maritime, Inc., et al. vs. Rapiz, G.R. No. 218871. January 11, 2017
TOPIC: When Findings of Company Physician Prevail
DOCTRINE: For the company-designated physician to avail of the extended 240-day

period, he must first perform some significant act to justify an extension (e.g., that the
illness still requires medical attendance beyond the initial 120 days but not to exceed 240
days); otherwise, the seafarer's disability shall be conclusively presumed to be permanent
and total.
FACTS: Jebsens engaged the services of respondent to work on board the M/V Mercury as a
buffet cook for a period of nine (9) months with a basic monthly salary of US$501.00. On
March 30, 2011, respondent boarded the said vessel. Sometime in September 2011,
respondent experienced excruciating pain and swelling on his right wrist/forearm while
lifting a heavy load of meat. A consultation with the ship doctor revealed that respondent
was suffering from severe "Tendovaginitis DeQuevain" which caused his medical repatriation
since it was not possible for him to work without using his right forearm. On October 14,
2011, respondent was repatriated to the Philippines and underwent consultation,
medication, and therapy with the company-designated physician. After a lengthy treatment,
the company-designated physician issued a 7 th and Final Summary Medical Report and a
Disability Grading both dated January 24, 2012, diagnosing respondent with "FlexorCarpi
Radialis Tendinitis, Right; Sprain, Right thumb; Extensor CarpiUlnaris Tendinitis, Right," and
classifying his condition as a "Grade 11" disability pursuant to the disability grading
provided for in the 2010 Philippine Overseas Employment Association-Standard Employment
Contract (POEA-SEC). Dissatisfied, respondent consulted an independent physician, who
classified his condition as a Grade 10 disability. Thereafter, respondent requested
petitioners to pay him total and permanent disability benefits, which the latter did not heed,
thus, constraining the former to file a Notice to Arbitrate before the NCMB. As the parties
failed to amicably settle the case, the parties submitted the same to the VA for
adjudication.
ISSUE: Whether respondent is entitled to permanent and total disability benefits.
RULING: The disability shall be based solely on the disability gradings provided under
3
Section 32 of this Contract, and shall not be measured or determined by the number of days

a seafarer is under treatment or the number of days in which sickness allowance is paid. In
view of the final disability rating made by the company-designated physician classifying
respondent's disability as merely permanent and partial- which was not refuted by the
independent physician except that respondent's condition was classified as a Grade 10
disability - it is plain error to award permanent and total disability benefits to respondent. It
remains undisputed that respondent suffered an injury while on board the M/V Mercury, a
work-related disability that is clearly compensable as it is a permanent and partial disability,
as classified by both the company-designated and independent physicians. As already
adverted to, there is a slight discrepancy with the classifications of the aforesaid physicians,
as the former rated respondent's disability as Grade 11, while the latter's rating was Grade
10. In this regard, the Court rules that the findings of the company-designated physician
should prevail, considering that he examined, diagnosed, and treated respondent from his
repatriation on October 14, 2011 until he was assessed with a Grade 11 disability rating on
January 24, 2012; whereas the independent physician only examined him sparingly on
March 13, 2012.
31.Espere vs. NFD International Manning Agents, Inc., G.R. No. 212098, July
26, 2017
TOPIC: Findings of Company Physician vs. Private Doctor
DOCTRINE: The doctor who have had a personal knowledge of the actual medical
condition, having closely, meticulously and regularly monitored and actually treated the
seafarer's illness, is more qualified to assess the seafarer's disability. The Court significantly
brushed aside the probative weight of the medical certifications of the private physicians,
which were based merely on vague diagnosis and general impressions.
FACTS: Julio C. Espere was hired as a Bosun by respondent NFD International Manning
Agents, Inc. (NFD). Prior to his employment and embarkation, petitioner underwent a Pre-
Employment Medical Examination where he was pronounced "Fit For Sea Duty." Around five
(5) months into his deployment, petitioner complained that he was feeling dizzy, had body
malaise and chills. The physician who examined him found that he was suffering from
"uncontrolled hypertension", "malaise NYD", and "psychosomatic illness". He was also
declared unfit for duty and was repatriated back to the Philippines. Petitioner was re-
examined in the Philippines, and after several re-evaluation was found suffering from
hypertension, the cause of which is not work related. Julio not satisfied with the findings of
the company-designated physicians, consulted private doctor. After examining petitioner Dr.
Jacinto also concluded that petitioner's illness started from work and his condition did not
improve despite treatment. Dr. Jacinto marked petitioner's condition as "work-related/work-
aggravated." The LA dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. The NLRC reversed the LA.
The CA reversed the NLRC and reinstated the decision of the LA.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in giving weight to the findings of the company-designated
physicians and in totally disregarding the medical assessment of Dr. Jacinto, his appointed
doctor.
RULING: No. Unlike the evaluation made by the company physicians, there is no evidence
to prove that Dr. Jacinto's findings were reached based on an extensive or comprehensive
3
examination of petitioner. Petitioner failed to present competent evidence to prove that he

was thoroughly examined by Dr. Jacinto. No proof was shown that laboratory or diagnostic
tests or procedures were taken. In fact, Dr. Jacinto did not specify the medications he
prescribed and the type of medical management he made to treat petitioner's condition. Dr.
Jacinto did not even explain nor justify his conclusions that petitioner's hypertension started
at work, is essential and work-related and that, by reason of such illness, petitioner is no
longer fit to work. In contrast, the various medical certificates and reports by the company-
designated physicians were issued in a span of five (5) months of closely monitoring
petitioner's medical condition and progress, and after careful analysis of the results of the
diagnostic tests and procedures administered to petitioner while in consultation with his
cardiologist.
32.Perea vs. Elburg Shipmanagement Philippines, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 206178,
August 9, 2017
TOPIC: Findings of Company Physician vs. Private Doctor
DOCTRINE: Medical findings made by the company-designated physicians who conducted

an extensive examination on the seafarer prevail over that of private physician’s who saw
him on only one occasion and did not even order that medical tests be done.
FACTS: Pedro Perea entered into a Contract of Employment with Elburg Shipmanagement
Philippines, Inc. (Elburg) under its principal Augustea Atlantica SRL/Italy. Perea was hired
as a fitter and was deployed to work aboard MV Lemno. While on board, Perea had difficulty
breathing while repairing a pipe. He was seen by a doctor that same afternoon and was
advised to take medication and to rest for three (3) consecutive days. However, he did not
feel any better even after resting and taking medications; thus, he asked to be repatriated.
A few days later, Perea was welding when the oxygen and acetylene torch he was holding
exploded. Perea was sent to a medical facility in Tuzla, Turkey because of continued chest
pains. He was pronounced to have soft tissue trauma and was told to rest, avoid exertion,
and avoid using his right arm. He was transferred to SEMA Hospital where he was declared
to be suffering from “[C]ubital [T]unnel Syndrome (mainly due to swelling and bleeding),
soft tissue injury of the right elbow.” The treatment proposed was to put his right arm in a
sling and to rest for recovery for 10 days. He was soon repatriated to the Philippines. Dr.
Hao-Quan stated that the cause of hypertension was not work-related and opined that
Perea’s estimated length of treatment would be approximately three (3) to four (4) months.
Perea consulted Dr. Antonio C. Pascual who diagnosed him with “Uncontrolled Hypertension
[and] Coronary Artery Dr. Pascual found Perea to be medically unfit to work as a seafarer.
After a series of examinations, Dr. Hao Quan and Dr. Lim certified that Perea was cleared of
the injuries that caused his repatriation. The parties met for mediation proceedings and a
possible compromise agreement but were unsuccessful. The LA dismissed petition for lack of
merit. The NLRC reversed the LA. The CA ruled that his medical opinion, which was
rendered after a single consultation, could not be considered over that of the company-
3

designated physicians, who monitored Perea’s progress and subjected him to extensive
examination.
ISSUE: Whether the medical findings of company-designated physician prevail over private
physician
RULING: Yes. As between the findings made by the company-designated physicians who
conducted an extensive examination on the petitioner and Dr. Pascual who saw petitioner
on only one (1) occasion and did not even order that medical tests be done to support his
declaration that petitioner is unfit to work as [a] seaman, the company-designated
physicians’ findings that petitioner has been cleared for work should prevail. The SC further
held that the doctor who have had a personal knowledge of the actual medical condition,
having closely, meticulously and regularly monitored and actually treated the seafarer’s
illness, is more qualified to assess the seafarer’s disability.
26, 2017
TOPIC: Return of Award
DOCTRINE: To be entitled to compensation and benefits under the governing POEA-SEC, it

is not sufficient to establish that the seafarer's illness or injury has rendered him
permanently or partially disabled; it must also be shown that there is a causal connection
between the seafarer's illness or injury and the work for which he had been contracted. The
"fit to work" declaration in the PEME cannot be a conclusive proof to show that he was free
from any ailment prior to his deployment.
FACTS: Julio C. Espere was hired as a Bosun by respondent NFD International Manning
Agents, Inc. (NFD). Prior to his employment and embarkation, petitioner underwent a Pre-
Employment Medical Examination where he was pronounced "Fit For Sea Duty." Around five
(5) months into his deployment, petitioner complained that he was feeling dizzy, had body
malaise and chills. The physician who examined him found that he was suffering from
"uncontrolled hypertension", "malaise NYD", and "psychosomatic illness". He was also
declared unfit for duty and was repatriated back to the Philippines. The Marine Medical
Services of the Metropolitan Medical Center issued a report stating that the cause of
petitioner's hypertension was not work-related and that the cause of his hypertension is
multifactorial in origin, which includes genetic predisposition, poor lifestyle, high salt intake,
smoking, diabetes mellitus, age, and increased sympathetic activity. Petitioner was re-
examined in the Philippines, and after several re-evaluation was found suffering from
hypertension, the cause of which is not work related. Julio not satisfied with the findings of
the company-designated physicians, consulted private doctor. After examining petitioner Dr.
Jacinto also concluded that petitioner's illness started from work and his condition did not
improve despite treatment. Dr. Jacinto marked petitioner's condition as "work-related/work-
aggravated." Julio filed a complaint claiming permanent disability benefits. The LA dismissed
3

the complaint for lack of merit. The NLRC reversed the LA. The CA reversed the NLRC and
reinstated the decision of the LA.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner is entitled to claim disability benefits.
RULING: No. For disability to be compensable under the above POEA-SEC, two elements
must concur: (1) the injury or illness must be work-related; and (2) the work-related injury
or illness must have existed during the term of the seafarer's employment contract. In this
case, however, petitioner relied on the presumption that his illness is work-related but he
was unable to present substantial evidence to show that his work conditions caused or, at
the least, increased the risk of contracting his illness. Neither was he able to prove that his
illness was preexisting and that it was aggravated by the nature of his employment. Thus,
the LA and the CA correctly ruled that he is not entitled to any disability compensation.
Petitioner argued that since he was found fit for work in his Pre-Employment Medical
Examination (PEME) prior to his deployment, there can be no other conclusion than that his
employment with respondents was the primary cause of his illness, this Court has ruled that
the PEME is not exploratory and does not allow the employer to discover any and all
preexisting medical conditions with which the seafarer is suffering and for which he may be
presently taking medication. The PEME is nothing more than a summary examination of the
seafarer's physiological condition it merely determines whether one is "fit to work" at sea or
"fit for sea service" and it does not state the real state of health of an applicant.
TOPIC: Vergara Doctrine
DOCTRINE: The POEA Standard Employment Contract and the CBA clearly provide that
when a seafarer sustains a work-related illness or injury while on board the vessel, his
fitness or unfitness for work shall be determined by the company-designated physician. If
the physician appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the company-designated physician's
assessment, the opinion of a THIRD Doctor may be agreed jointly between the employer
and the seafarer to be the decision final and binding on them. Thus, while a seafarer had
the right to seek a second and even a third opinion, the final determination of whose
decision must prevail must be done in accordance with an agreed procedure.
FACTS: While working on board the vessel, respondent injured his right hand while securing
a mooring rope. He was brought to a medical facility in Istanbul, Turkey, where X-ray
showed a fracture on his 5th metacarpal bone. Upon arrival in Manila, petitioners referred
respondent to the company-designated physician, Dr. Cruz, for further treatment. After
extensive medical treatments, therapy, and follow-up examinations, Dr. Cruz, on August 17,
2010, rendered an interim assessment of respondent’s disability under the POEA-SEC, at
Grade 10, or loss of grasping power for small objects between the fold of the finger of one
hand. Despite continuing physical therapy sessions with the company-designated physician,
respondent filed on September 8, 2010 a complaint with the NLRC against petitioners for
total and permanent disability benefits, damages, and attorney’s fees. Dr. Cruz declared
respondent to have reached the maximum medical cure after rendering a final disability
rating of Grade 10 on September 29, 2010.
ISSUE: Whether or not Respondent is entitled to total and permanent disability

3
compensation.

RULING: No. Upon respondent’s repatriation, he was given extensive medical attention by
the company-designated physician. On August 17, 2010, an interim assessment of Grade 10
was given by Dr. Cruz as respondent was still undergoing further treatment and physical
therapy. However, on September 8, 2010, or 107 days since repatriation, respondent filed a
complaint for total and permanent disability benefits. During this time, he was considered
under temporary total disability inasmuch as the 120/240-day period had not yet lapsed.
Evidently, the complaint was prematurely filed.
To stress, the rule is that a temporary total disability only becomes permanent when the
company-designated physician, within the 240-day period, declares it to be so, or when
after the lapse of the said period, he fails to make such declaration.” After the initial interim
assessment of Dr. Cruz, respondent continued with his medical treatment. Dr. Cruz then
rendered on September 29, 2010 a final assessment of Grade 10 upon reaching the
maximum medical cure. Counting from the date of repatriation on May 24, 2010 up to
September 29, 2010, this assessment was made within the 240-day period. Clearly, before
the maximum 240-day medical treatment period expired, respondent was issued a Grade
10 disability rating which is merely equivalent to a permanent partial disability under the
POEA-SEC. Thus, respondent could not have been suffering from a permanent total
disability as would entitle him to the maximum benefit of US$60,000.00.
35.Caderao vs. Senator Crewing (Manila), Inc., et al./Senator Crewing

(Manila), Inc., et al. vs. Caderao, G.R. No. 224532/G.R. No. 224565, June
21, 2017
TOPIC: Third Doctor
DOCTRINE: If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment of the
company-designated doctor, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the employer and
the seafarer, and the third doctor's decision shall be final and binding on both parties.
FACTS: Balatero was initially engaged by the respondents as an able-bodied seaman on

April 12, 1997. He had worked his way up to become 2nd Officer and had boarded 18 of the
respondents' ships. While working, Balatero experienced chest pains, with palpitations and
shortness of breath. He was taken to Odense University Hospital (Odense) in Denmark,
diagnosed to have an elevated blood pressure, prescribed anti-hypertensive medicines, and
discharged thereafter. Balatero disembarked from the ship and arrived in Manila. The day
after, he reported to SCMI's office for post-medical examination and was referred to under
the care of company-designated physician, Dr. Olalia. He found Balatero to be suffering
from "Uncontrolled Hypertension; Unstable Angina; To Consider Coronary Artery Disease
[CAD]; Dyslipidemia," the etiologies of which were multi-factorial but not work-related. The
medical expenses were shouldered by the respondents, and Balatero was also paid his
sickness allowance. He was subsequently declared fit to work, but with medical maintenance
for the rest of his life. Unconvinced about his fitness to resume sea duties, Balatero
consulted Dr. Lara-Orencia, who found Balatero to be suffering from "Hypertensive
Cardiovascular Disease," which was ''precipitated by the stressful nature of his work." Dr.
Lara-Orencia then concluded that Balatero cannot return to his employment. Balatero
demanded permanent total disability benefits, which the respondents denied on the ground
that after treatment and rehabilitation, the company-designated doctor had assessed
Balatero with a disability of Grade 7 (Moderate Residuals of Disorders) under the POEA SEC.
3
Balatero filed before the NLRC a complaint for permanent total disability compensation,

sickness allowance, damages and attorney's fees. The LA granted the petition of Balatero.
On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the LA.
ISSUE: Whether or not Balatero is entitled to permanent total disability compensation.
RULING: Yes. The company-designated physician is expected to arrive at a definite

assessment of the seafarer's fitness to work or permanent disability within the period of 120
or 240 days. That should he fail to do so and the seafarer's medical condition remains
unresolved, the seafarer shall be deemed totally and permanently disabled.
In Balatero's case, the company-designated doctor had made a final Grade 7 Disability
Rating beyond 120 days from repatriation. In legal contemplation, such partial disability was
by then already deemed permanent. As a result, thereof, the issue of non-referral to a third
doctor is rendered inconsequential.
It also bears stressing that jurisprudence is replete with doctrines granting permanent total
disability compensation to seafarers, who suffered from either cardiovascular diseases or
hypertension, and were under the treatment of or issued fit-to-work certifications by
company-designated doctors beyond 120 or 240 days from their repatriation.
36.North Sea Marine Services Corporation vs. Enriquez, G.R. No. 201806,
August 14, 2017
TOPIC: Third Doctor
DOCTRINE: In order to claim disability benefits, it is the company-designated physician

who must proclaim that the seafarer suffered a permanent disability, whether total or
partial, due to either injury or illness, during the term of his employment. If the doctor
appointed by the seafarer makes a finding contrary to that of the assessment of the
company-designated physician, a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the employer
and seafarer whose decision shall be binding on both of them. While a seafarer has the right
to seek a second and even a third opinion, the final determination of whose decision must
prevail must be done in accordance with this agreed procedure. Failure to observe this will
make the company-designated physician's assessment final and binding.
FACTS: On September 2, 2008, while in the performance of his duties, respondent

experienced nape pains that radiated to his upper back. The ship doctor diagnosed him to
be suffering from mechanical back pains and prescribed him with medicines. However, due
to the worsening of his back pains, he was medically repatriated on October 5, 2008.
Upon arrival in Manila on October 7, 2008, respondent was immediately referred to the
company-designated physician, Dr. Rabago. Respondent underwent Anterior Disectomy,
Spinal fusion and Anterior Plating. After his discharge from the hospital, respondent
continuously reported to the orthopedic surgeon for medical treatment and evaluation. On
November 28, 2008, he was referred to a physiatrist to undergo physical therapy. He was
thereafter declared fit to resume sea duties, with the conformity of both the orthopedic
surgeon and the physiatrist. Respondent thereafter signed a Certificate of Fitness to Work,
releasing petitioners from all liabilities.
3
Respondent consulted an independent orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Garduce, who certified his

unfitness to work as a seaman. Subsequently, respondent filed a Complaint with the NLRC
seeking to recover permanent disability compensation Respondent claimed that despite the
lapse of 120 days and medical attention given to him by the company-designated physician,
his condition did not improve, as attested by the medical findings of his own physician Dr.
Garduce.
ISSUE: Whether or not Respondent is entitled to disability benefits
RULING: No. Upon repatriation on October 5, 2008, respondent's condition was medically
evaluated and treated by the company-designated physicians. Respondent was subjected to
continuous medical examination by Dr. Rabago, underwent surgery under the care of an
orthopedic specialist, and received physical therapy from a physiatrist. On December 17,
2008, Dr. Rabago, the orthopedic surgeon, and the physiatrist assessed respondent fit to
resume sea duties. On February 25, 2009, respondent sought an independent opinion from
Dr. Garduce who assessed him to be unfit for sea duties. However, respondent did not refer
these conflicting assessments to a third doctor in accordance with the mandated procedure.
In fine, the company-designated physician's assessment was not effectively disputed;
hence, the Court has no option but to declare Dr. Rabago's fit to work declaration as final
and binding.
In fine, we find Dr. Rabago's fit to work assessment a reliable diagnosis of respondent's
condition and should prevail over Dr. Garduce's appraisal of respondent's disability. Dr.
Rabago's timely assessment, rendered within 120 days from respondent's repatriation,
which was not properly disputed in accordance with an agreed procedure, is considered final
and binding.
37.Maunlad Trans Inc., Carnival Cruise Lines vs. Isidro, G.R. No. 222699, July
24, 2017
TOPIC: Ailment Not Complained of at the Time of Repatriation
DOCTRINE: That respondent did not complain of, and was not treated for, the alleged knee
injury is evident from the medical reports submitted by the company-designated physician
detailing the progress of respondent's skin condition. The CA's observations that petitioners
knew of respondent's knee injury and that the company-designated physician, Dr. Cruz-
Balbon, was cognizant of the same are off-tangent as it may very well happen that the
swelling of respondent's knee had been resolved, hence, the absence of further medical
complaint from respondent. Also, the certification issued by Dr. Cruz-Balbon referred to by
the CA does not at all pertain to respondent's alleged knee injury but solely on respondent's
skin condition which was diagnosed to be psoriasis vulgaris.
FACTS: Petitioner Maunlad Trans Inc., (MTI), for and in behalf of its foreign principal,
Carnival Cruise Lines, hired respondent Gabriel Isidro as bartender with a basic salary of
US$350, exclusive of overtime and other benefits, for a period of six (6) months.
Respondent boarded the vessel "M/S Miracle”. He figured in an accident while lifting heavy
food provisions. When his right knee became swollen and he experienced pain, respondent
reported his situation to the ship's physician for medical examination. His condition was
diagnosed as "Right Knee Synovitis, Meniscal, Chondromalacia". He was given medication
and was advised by the physician that he can continue working but treatment failed at
improving his condition. Thus, he was referred to the Jackson North Medical Center where
he underwent a series of examinations and treatment. After his treatment, respondent went
back to work. However, respondent began experiencing skin rashes and later diagnosed by
3
the ship's physician as ''psoriasis". He was given medications and was advised to get

dermatologic consultation upon completion of his contract. He was ordered repatriated to
the Philippines. He failed to mention the knee injury but was later refered to a
dermatologist. During his follow-up examination, respondent's psoriatic lesions on both
lower extremities were noted to still be erythematous. He was advised to continue his
medications and to come back. Still, there was no mention that respondent complained of a
knee injury. While he was still undergoing medical treatment by the company-designated
doctor, he sought the opinion of a private doctor, Dr. Manuel J. Jacinto (Dr. Jacinto) of the
Sta. Teresita General Hospital. Dr. Jacinto assessed him to be suffering from ''psoriasis,
chondromalacia (medial femoral condy/tibial plateaus) right, grade II injury medial
collateral ligament right knee, sprain, medial head of gastrocnemus with
hemarthrosus." Respondent was advised to undergo Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI)
and surgery. Dr. Jacinto also found respondent unfit to go back to work. Respondent filed a
complaint before the Labor Arbiter for full disability benefits. 226 days after the initial
referral to the company-designated doctor, the attending dermatologist, Dr. Mary Belly Gan-
Chao, issued a disability grading of "Grade 12 for slight residual or disorder". Petitioners'
motion for reconsideration was similarly denied by the CA. hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the injury alleged caused for permanent total disability not
mentioned during treatment should be compensated.
RULING: The above observations inescapably lead the Court to favor the medical findings
of the company-designated physician that respondent's disability is equivalent to Grade 12.
Here, the findings of the company-designated doctor, together with a dermatologist,
presumably an expert in skin conditions, who periodically treated respondent for months
and monitored his condition, deserve greater evidentiary weight than the single medical
report of respondent's doctor of choice. Indeed, "the doctor who have had a personal
knowledge of the actual medical condition, having closely, meticulously and regularly
monitored and actually treated the seafarer's illness, is more qualified to assess the
seafarer's disability. "
TOPIC: Temporary Total Disability
DOCTRINE: As these provisions operate, the seafarer, upon sign-off from his vessel, must
report to the company-designated physician within three (3) days from arrival for diagnosis
and treatment. For the duration of the treatment but in no case to exceed 120 days, the
seaman is on temporary total disability as he is totally unable to work. He receives his basic
wage during this period until he is declared fit to work or his temporary disability is
acknowledged by the company to be permanent, either partially or totally, as his condition
is defined under the POEA Standard Employment Contract and by applicable Philippine laws.
If the 120 days initial period is exceeded and no such declaration is made because the
seafarer requires further medical attention, then the temporary total disability period may
be extended up to a maximum of240 days, subject to the right of the employer to declare
within this period that a permanent partial or total disability already exists. The seaman
may of course also be declared fit to work at any time such declaration is justified by his
medical condition. (Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Jnc, 588 Phil. 895)
FACTS: TSM, for and in behalf of its foreign principal, DNAS, entered into a Contract of
Employment6with respondent for a period of six months as General Purpose 2/Ordinary
Seaman for the vessel Nord Nightingale. While working on board the vessel, respondent
injured his right hand while securing a mooring rope. He was brought to a medical facility in
Istanbul for treatment. Respondent's right hand was placed in a cast and thereafter he was
3
repatriated. Upon arrival in Manila, petitioners referred respondent to the company-

designated physician, Dr. Nicomedes G. Cruz for further treatment and rendered an interim
assessment at Grade 10, or Joss of grasping power for small objects between the fold of the
finger of one hand. A complaint with the NLRC against petitioners for total and permanent
disability benefits damages, and attorney's fees. Thereafter, in a Medical Report dated
October 11, 2010, Dr. Cruz declared respondent to have reached the maximum medical
cure after rendering a final disability rating of Grade 10. Respondent consulted Dr. Nicanor
Escutin (Dr. Escutin), who assessed him to have permanent disability unfit for sea duty in
whatever capacity as a seaman. Respondent asked for permanent total disability benefits in
the sum of US$80,000.00 under the Associated Marine Officers and Seamen's Union of the
Philippines Collective Bargaining Agreement (AMOSUP CBA) since he never recovered
completely nor returned to his usual duties and responsibilities, as attested by the medical
findings of Dr. Escutin, his own physician. Respondent asked for permanent total disability
benefits in the sum of US$80,000.00 Collective Bargaining Agreement or AMOSUP CBA. The
Labor Arbiter observed that respondent is indeed suffering from a total and permanent
disability being rehabilitation is more than 120 days and there was no offer on the part of
petitioners to rehire him. The Labor Arbiter found credible Dr. Escutin's finding that
respondent's injury had rendered him inutile. Thus this controversy.
ISSUE: Whether or not filing the disability within the 240 days period and not in accordance
to the POEA-SEC does not entitle the respondent to total disability benefit.
RULING: No, the filing is premature because of lack of proof that respondent is covered by
the AMOS UP CBA, settled is the finding that his entitlement to disability benefits is
governed by the POEA-SEC and relevant labor laws, which are deemed written in the
contract of employment with petitioners. A temporary total disability only becomes
permanent when the company-designated physician, within the 240-day period, declares it
to be so, or when after the lapse of the said period, he fails to make such declaration.
Having not complied with the provisions of the CBA and filed not beyond the period as
confirmed by a third physician agreed by the parties.
39.Gomez vs. Crossworld Marine Services, Inc., G.R. No. 220002, August 2,
2017
TOPIC: Partial Permanent Disability
DOCTRINE: A temporary total disability only becomes permanent when so declared by the
company-designated physician within the periods he/she is allowed to do so, or upon the
expiration of the maximum 240-day medical treatment period without a declaration of
either fitness to work or the existence of a permanent disability.
FACTS: Crossworld Marine Services, Inc., hired petitioner Eugenio M. Gomez as an Ordinary
Seaman in the vessel MN Elena VE for a period of 11 months. At the time of petitioner's
employment, the employees of M/V Elena VE were covered by a special agreement known
as ITF UNIFORM "TCC" Collective Agreement between the ship owner and the union. The
Chief Officer of the vessel told petitioner to remove the ice from the lower and upper decks
of the ship. While performing this task, petitioner accidentally slipped and hit his lower back
on the steel deck. Petitioner was immediately in pain, but thought it was just temporary. He
rested a moment and then continued to work despite the pain. He reported the incident to
his superior when he asked for pain relievers. Petitioner was examined and treated in
Belgium. The doctor-in-charge recommended petitioner's repatriation for further treatment.
Petitioner was repatriated to the Philippines. He was hospitalized at the Medical Center
Manila to undergo two surgical procedures. The company-designated doctor, Dr. Ma.
Dolores Tay, submitted a medical report16 to Captain Eleazar Diaz, president of respondent
Crossworld Marine Services, Inc., stating that petitioner can walk without difficulty, but
3
petitioner complained about a mild pain on the left buttock area on prolonged sitting or

standing. Petitioner asked respondents for payment of his disability benefits, but
respondents refused. The Labor Arbiter held that petitioner was permanently and totally
disabled and that he could no longer resume sea duty. Respondents appealed the Decision
of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC, which affirmed the Decision of the Labor Arbiter. The
Court of Appeals found that the evidence clearly established that petitioner's injury rendered
him permanently disabled, which hindered him from performing the work he was trained for
or accustomed to do.. CA declaring Eugenio M. Gomez to have suffered permanent partial
disability with an impediment of Grade 8 thus the petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Mr. Gomez is entitled to the benefit of Total Permanent Disability.
RULING: No, the treatment of petitioner's injury required spine surgery and physical
therapy which extended beyond the initial 120-day period into the maximum 240-day
treatment period. The company-designated doctor's medical report dated September 11,
2017 (made 195 days from the time petitioner was injured on February 29, 2012) stated
that petitioner failed the functional capacity test and recommended that petitioner continue
therapy for two to three months. Petitioner filed his complaint on September 13, 2012 or
197 days from the date he was injured, and, therefore, before the lapse of the maximum
240-day treatment period within which the company designated physician should assess the
fitness of petitioner to return to work. Since the company-designated doctor has not
declared that petitioner is not fit to work within the 240-day period, and the 240-day period
has not lapsed when petitioner filed his complaint, the petitioner cannot be legally presumed
as permanently and totally disabled to be entitled to permanent total disability. The rule is
that a temporary total disability only becomes permanent when the company-designated
physician, within the 240-day period, declares it to be so, or when after the lapse of the
same, he/she fails to make such declaration.
40.C.I.C.M. Mission Seminaries School of Theology, Inc., Fr. Romeo Nimez,

CICM vs. Perez, G.R. No. 220506, January 18, 2017
TOPIC: Backwages - Computation
DOCTRINE: In the event the aspect of reinstatement is disputed, backwages, including

separation pay, shall be computed from the time of dismissal until the finality of the
decision ordering the separation pay.
FACTS: This controversy is an offshoot of an illegal dismissal case filed by the respondent
against the petitioners. In its June 16, 2008 Decision, the LA recognized respondent's right
to receive from the petitioners backwages and separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. Thus,
it ordered the petitioners to pay respondent the aggregate amount of: P286,670.58. The LA
decision was affirmed by the NLRC, by the CA and by this Court in G.R. No. 200490. The
decision became final and executory on October 4, 2012, as evidenced by the Entry of
Judgment. The Decision dated 16 June 2008 which was affirmed by the Commission, the
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court specifically states that respondent is entitled to
backwages and separation pay until the finality of the Decision. Further, the Resolution of
the Court of Appeals dated February 2, 2012 stressed the need to recompute the monetary
award specifically with regard to the payment of backwages, separation pay and attorney's
fees, so as to update the total monetary award to which respondent is entitled in
accordance with prevailing laws and jurisprudence. This Office therefore ordered the
recomputation of complainant's award of additional backwages from 07 June 2008 until 04
October 2012, the finality of the Supreme Court decision, and additional separation pay also
3
until 04 October 2012. The total award therefore is ₱1,847,088.89. From this amount

should be deducted the amount respondent received at ₱272,337.05. Thus, the additional
backwages and separation pay due is ₱1,575,751.84. Since there is no more legal hindrance
in the enforcement of the judgment; this Office orders the issuance of the writ of execution.
The petitioners, therefore, ask this Court to determine "what should be the legal basis for
the computation of the backwages and separation pay of an illegally dismissed employee in
a case where reinstatement was not ordered despite appeals made by said employee which
[delayed] the final resolution of the issue on reinstatement.”
ISSUE: WON the assailed computation of backwages and separation pay of the illegaly
dismissed employee was correct?
RULING: Yes. It does not matter if the delay caused by an appeal was brought about by
the employer or by the employee. The rule is, if the LA's decision, which granted separation
pay in lieu of reinstatement, is appealed by any party, the employer-employee relationship
subsists and until such time when decision becomes final and executory, the employee is
entitled to all the monetary awards awarded by the LA.
The petitioners, nonetheless, claim that it was not their fault why the amounts due
ballooned to the present level. They are mistaken. Suffice it to state that had they not
illegally dismissed respondent, they will not be where they are today. They took the risk and
must suffer the consequences.
41.United Coconut Chemicals, Inc. vs. Valmores, G.R. No. 201018, July 12,
2017
TOPIC: Backwages - Computation
DOCTRINE: The base figure to be used in reckoning full backwages is the salary rate of the
employee at the time of his dismissal. The amount does not include the increases or
benefits granted during the period of his dismissal because time stood still for him at the
precise moment of his termination, and move forward only upon his reinstatement. Hence,
the employee should only receive backwages that included the amounts being received by
him at the time of his illegal dismissal but not the benefits granted to his co-employees after
his dismissal.
FACTS: UCCI hired the respondent as its Senior Utilities Inspector with a monthly salary of
₱11,194.00. He then became a member of the United Coconut Chemicals, Inc. Employees'
Labor Organization (UELO) until his expulsion sometime in 1995. Due to the expulsion,
UELO formally demanded that UCCI terminate the services of the respondent pursuant to
the union security clause of the CBA. UCCI dismissed him on February 22, 1996. He then
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal in the NLRC. After due proceedings, the Labor Arbiter
dismissed his complaint for lack of merit. On appeal, however, the NLRC reversed the Labor
Arbiter decision.
Consequently, the respondent and UELO separately elevated the matter to the CA on
certiorari, insisting that the NLRC thereby committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
3
to lack or excess of jurisdiction but the CA affirmed in all respect the decision of the NLRC.

Still, UCCI appealed to the Court, which, on November 17, 2003, denied the petition for
review on certiorari. The denial became final and executory on February 26, 2004; hence,
the respondent moved for the execution of the judgment in his favor.
ISSUE: WON the backwages shall include all benefits previously enjoyed by the illegally
dismissed employee at the time of illegal dismissal?
RULING: Yes. The base figure for the computation of backwages should include not only
the basic salary but also the regular allowances being received, such as the emergency
living allowances and the 13th month pay mandated by the law. The purpose for this is to
compensate the worker for what he has lost because of his dismissal, and to set the price or
penalty on the employer for illegally dismissing his employee.
The Court is also aware of the reality that salary increases and benefits are not
automatically given to the worker, but are given subject to conditions. As such, the
respondent's claim for the increases in salary, meal subsidy, safety incentive pay, SOFA,
financial grant and medical assistance for the period from 1997 until 2007, and one-time
CBA increase, should be excluded from his backwages.
198066, June 7, 2017
TOPIC: Backwages - Not due when dismissal is for just cause
DOCTRINE: When there is just cause for terminating an employee from employment, there
is no basis to award him separation pay and backwages.
FACTS: Bravo was employed as a part-time teacher in 1988 by Urios College, now called
Father Saturnino Urios University. In addition to his duties as a part-time teacher, Bravo
was designated as the school's comptroller from June 1, 2002 to May 31, 2002.
Urios College organized a committee to formulate a new "ranking system for non-academic
employees for school year 2001-2002. The proposed ranking system for school year 2001—
2002 was presented to Bravo for comments. Bravo recommended that "the position of
Comptroller should be classified as a middle management position because it was informally
merged with the position of Vice-President for Finance. The committee allegedly agreed with
Bravo and accepted his recommendations.
In October 2004, Urios College organized a committee to review the ranking system
implemented during school year 2001-2002. In its report, the committee found that the
ranking system for school year 2001-2002 caused salary distortions among several
employees. There were also discrepancies in the salary adjustments of Bravo and of two (2)
other employees, namely, Nena A. Turgo and Cherry I. Tabada. The committee discovered
3
that "the Comptroller's Office solely prepared and implemented the salary adjustment

schedule" without prior approval from the Human Resources Department. The committee
recommended, among others, that Bravo be administratively charged for serious
misconduct or willful breach of trust under Article 282[27] of the Labor Code. Bravo
allegedly misclassified several positions and miscomputed his and other employees' salaries.
On July 25, 2005, Urios College notified Bravo of its decision to terminate his services[43]
for serious misconduct and loss of trust and confidence.[44] Upon receipt of the termination
letter, Bravo immediately filed before Executive Labor Arbiter Benjamin E. Pelaez (Executive
Labor Arbiter Pelaez) a complaint for illegal dismissal with a prayer for the payment of
separation pay, damages, and attorney's fees.
ISSUE: WON a valid dismissal of an employee will warrant separation pay, backwages, and
attorney’s fees.
RULING: No. Under Article 294 of the Labor Code, 128 the reliefs of an illegally dismissed
employee are reinstatement and full backwages. "Backwages is a form of relief that restores
the income that was lost by reason of the employee's dismissal" from employment. It is
“computed from the time that the employee's compensation was withheld until his or her
actual reinstatement.” However, when reinstatement is no longer feasible, separation pay is
awarded.
Considering that there was a just cause for terminating petitioner from employment, there
is no basis to award him separation pay and backwages. There are also no factual and legal
bases to award attorney's fees to petitioner.

TOPIC: Affidavit of Service - Effect of Failure to Append
DOCTRINE: Petitioner's failure to append the proof of service to his petition

for certiorari was a fatal defect.
FACTS: During the execution stage in a case for illegal dismissal filed by respondent Maria
Veronica C. Perez against petitioners C.I.C.M. Mission Seminaries School of Theology, Inc.
and Fr. Romeo Nimez, the latter challenged the affirmation by the Court of Appeals (CA)
and National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) of the July 10, 2014 order of the Labor
Arbiter (LA), which computed respondent’s award of additional backwages and separation
pay until Oct. 4, 2012, the finality of the Supreme Court’s decision. They argued that the
computation of backwages and separation pay of respondent should be only up to June 16,
2008, the date when the LA rendered her decision in the main case and which was also the
date when reinstatement was refused. They contended that it was respondent who appealed
the case, thereby delaying the resolution of the illegal dismissal case. Thus, the increase in
the awards should not be shouldered by them.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner failed to append the proof of service to his petition
RULING: Yes.The petitioners failed to append the required affidavit of service. The rule is,
such affidavit is essential to due process and the orderly administration of justice even if it
3
is used merely as proof that service has been made on the other party. The utter disregard

of this requirement as held in a catena of cases cannot be justified by harking to substantial
justice and the policy of liberal construction of the Rules. Indeed, technical rules of
procedure are not meant to frustrate the ends of justice. Rather, they serve to effect the
proper and orderly disposition of cases and, thus, effectively prevent the clogging of court
dockets. Thus, in Ferrer v. Villanueva, the Court held that petitioner's failure to append the
proof of service to his petition for certiorari was a fatal defect.

TOPIC: Immutability of Judgment - Re-computation of Award
DOCTRINE Recomputation of award does not violate the doctrine of immutability of

judgment.
FACTS: During the execution stage in a case for illegal dismissal filed by respondent Maria
Veronica C. Perez against petitioners C.I.C.M. Mission Seminaries School of Theology, Inc.
and Fr. Romeo Nimez, the latter challenged the affirmation by the Court of Appeals (CA)
and National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) of the July 10, 2014 order of the Labor
Arbiter (LA), which computed respondent’s award of additional backwages and separation
pay until Oct. 4, 2012, the finality of the Supreme Court’s decision. They argued that the
computation of backwages and separation pay of respondent should be only up to June 16,
2008, the date when the LA rendered her decision in the main case and which was also the
date when reinstatement was refused. They contended that it was respondent who appealed
the case, thereby delaying the resolution of the illegal dismissal case. Thus, the increase in
the awards should not be shouldered by them.
ISSUE: Whether or not recomputation of award violate the doctrine of immutability of

judgment
RULING: No. The Supreme Court disagrees with the petitioners' assertion that a
recomputation would violate the doctrine of immutability of judgment. It has been settled
3
that no essential change is made by a recomputation as this step is a necessary

consequence that flows from the nature of the illegality of dismissal declared in that
decision. By the nature of an illegal dismissal case, the reliefs continue to add on until full
satisfaction thereof. The recomputation of the awards stemming from an illegal dismissal
case does not constitute an alteration or amendment of the final decision being
implemented. The illegal dismissal ruling stands; only the computation of the monetary
consequences of the dismissal is affected and this is not a violation of the principle of
immutability of final judgments.
45.Turks Shawarma Company vs. Pajaron, G.R. No. 207156. January 16, 2017
TOPIC: Supersedeas Bond - Motion to Reduce Bond
DOCTRINE: Posting of cash or surety bond is therefore mandatory and jurisdictional
FACTS: Petitioners hired Feliciano Z. Pajaron (Pajaron) in May 2007 as service crew and
Larey A. Carbonilla (Carbonilla) in April 2007 as head crew. Both Pajaron and Carbonilla
claimed that there was no just or authorized cause for their dismissal and petitioners also
failed to comply with the requirements of due process. On April 15, 2010, they filed their
respective Complaints for constructive and actual illegal dismissal, non-payment of overtime
pay, holiday pay, holiday premium, rest day premium, service incentive leave pay and 13th
month pay against petitioners. Both Complaints were consolidated. Petitioners denied
having dismissed Pajaron and Carbonilla; they averred that they actually abandoned their
work. They likewise failed to substantiate their claims that they were not paid labor
standards benefits. The Labor Arbiter found credible Pajaron and Carbonilla's version and
held them constructively and illegally dismissed. Then, petitioners appealed before the
NLRC. However, Zefiarosa failed to post in full the required appeal bond. Thus, petitioners'
appeal was dismissed by the NLRC for non-perfection. They filed a motion for
reconsideration but the same was denied. Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari with the
CA. However, the CA rendered a Decision dismissing the Petition for Certiorari. It held that
the NLRC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners' appeal for
non-perfection. Hence, this present petition.
3

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the NLRC's decision in dismissing
petitioners’ appeal for non-perfection
RULING: No. The CA did not erred in affirming the NLRC's decision in dismissing
petitioners’ appeal for non-perfection. The Court has time and again held that “The right to
appeal is neither a natural right nor is it a component of due process. It is a mere statutory
privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of
the law. The party who seeks to avail of the same must comply with the requirements of the
rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost." The posting of cash or surety bond is
therefore mandatory and jurisdictional; failure to comply with this requirement renders the
decision of the Labor Arbiter final and executory. This indispensable requisite for the
perfection of an appeal ''is to assure the workers that if they finally prevail in the case[,] the
monetary award will be given to them upon the dismissal of the employer's appeal [and] is
further meant to discourage employers from using the appeal to delay or evade payment of
their obligations to the employees. Stated otherwise, petitioners' case will still fail on its
merits even if we are to allow their appeal to be given due course. After scrupulously
examining the contracting positions and arguments of the parties, we find that the Labor
Arbiter's decision declaring Pajaron and Carbonilla illegally dismissed was supported by
substantial evidence. All told, we find no error on the part of the CA in ruling that the NLRC
did not gravely abused its discretion in dismissing petitioners' appeal for no perfection due
to noncompliance with the requisites of filing a motion to reduce bond.
46.Barsolo vs. Social Security System, G.R. No. 187950. January 11, 2017
TOPIC: Compensability of Illness - No Automatic Compensability
DOCTRINE: Cardio-vascular disease which cover myocardial infarction may be considered

as compensable occupational disease only when substantial evidence is adduced.
FACTS: Cristina Barsolo's (Cristina) deceased husband, Manuel M. Barsolo (Manuel), "was
employed as a seaman by various companies from 1988 to 2002.” From July 2, 2002 to
December 6, 2002, Manuel served as a Riding Gang/ Able Seaman onboard MT Polaris Star
with Vela International Marine Ltd., (Vela). Vela was his last employer before he died in
2006. After his separation from employment with Vela, Manuel was diagnosed with
hypertensive cardiovascular disease, coronary artery disease, and osteoarthritis. He was
examined and treated at the Philippine Heart Center as an outpatient from April 2, 2003 to
October 22, 2004. When he died on September 24, 2006, the autopsy report listed
myocardial infarction as his cause of death. Believing that the cause of Manuel's death was
work-related, Cristina filed a claim for death benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, as
amended, with the Social Security System. The Social Security System denied her claim on
the ground that there was no longer an employer-employee relationship at the time of
Manuel's death and that "[h]is being a smoker increased his risk of contracting the illness."
The Commission held that Cristina was unable to establish that her husband's case fell
under any of conditions required [under Annex A of the Amended Rules on Employee's
3
Compensation] to warrant the grant of benefits.Moreover, since Manuel was a smoker, the

Commission believed that Manuel's "smoking habits precipitated the manifestation of his
Myocardial Infarction."The Commission added that "the System correctly ruled that the
development of the Myocardial Infarction could not be categorically attributed to the
occupation of [Manuel] as Seaman because of the presence of major causative factor which
is not work-related.
ISSUE: Whether Cristina is entitled to compensation for the death of her husband Manuel.
RULING: No. Section l(h), Rule III of the ECC Amended Rules on Employees Compensation,
now considers cardio-vascular disease as compensable occupational disease. Included in
Annex "A" is cardio-vascular disease, which cover myocardial infarction. However, it may be
considered as compensable occupational disease only when substantial evidence is adduced
to prove any of the following conditions:
a) If the heart disease was known to have been present during employment
there must be proof that an acute exacerbation clearly precipitated by the
unusual strain by reason of the nature of his work;
b) The strain of work that brings about an acute attack must be of sufficient
severity and must be followed within twenty-four (24) hours by the clinical
signs of a cardiac assault to constitute causal relationship.
c) If a person who was apparently asymptomatic before subjecting himself to
strain of work showed signs and symptoms of cardiac injury during the
performance of his work and such symptoms and signs persisted, it is
reasonable to claim a causal relationship.
Since there was no showing that her husband showed any sign or symptom of cardiac injury
during the performance of his functions, petitioner clearly failed to show that her husband's
employment caused the disease or that his working conditions aggravated his existing heart
ailment.
47.Grieg Philippines, Inc. Grieg Shipping Group vs. Gonzales, G.R. No. 228296,
July 26, 2017
TOPIC: Compensability of Illness - No Automatic Compensability
DOCTRINE: For a disability claim to prosper, a seaman only needs to show that his work
and contracted illness have a reasonable linkage that must lead a rational mind to conclude
that the seaman's occupation may have contributed or aggravated the disease.
FACTS: Gonzales was first hired by Grieg, a shipping agent, sometime in 2010. He was
deployed to the general cargo vessel Star Florida. This was his third contract with Grieg.
Gonzales' employment contract was covered by the Associated Marine Officers' and
Seaman's Union of the Philippines Collective Bargaining Agreement. Before being deployed,
Gonzales underwent Pre-Employment Medical Examination and was certified to be fit for sea
duty. In August 2013, while aboard Star Florida, Gonzales was advised to take paracetamol
and to rest after he experienced "shortness of breath, pain in his left leg, fatigue, fever and
headaches.” A week later, Gonzales sought medical attention in South Korea after he
experienced the same symptoms. With his medical tests showing normal results, he was
given medications and sent back to work in Star Florida. The following month, his past
symptoms returned with the added symptom of black tarry stools. Gonzales was confined in
a hospital in Indonesia where he was initially diagnosed with "pancytopenia suspect aplastic
3
anemia." Gonzales was declared unfit for sea duty and was repatriated. He disembarked on

October 8, 2013. Gonzales was admitted at the Metropolitan Medical Center after his
medical repatriation. The company physicians diagnosed him with acute promyelocytic
leukemia. They opined that Gonzales' leukemia was not work-related; although, for
humanitarian reasons, Grieg continued to pay for his treatment. Gonzales sought a second
opinion from an independent physician, Dr. Emmanuel Trinidad, who certified that his
leukemia was work-related.
ISSUE: Whether leukemia is a compensable disease.
RULING: Yes. Settled is the rule that for illness to be compensable, it is not necessary that
the nature of the employment be the sole and only reason for the illness suffered by the
seafarer. It is sufficient that there is a reasonable linkage between the disease suffered by
the employee and his work to lead a rational mind to conclude that his work may have
contributed to the establishment or, at the very least, aggravation of any pre-existing
condition he might have had. Gonzales was able to satisfy the conditions under Section 32-
A, and establish a reasonable linkage between his job as an Ordinary Seaman and his
leukemia. He has submitted his official job description, which involved constant exposure to
chemicals. It is also not disputed that he contracted leukemia only while he was onboard
Star Florida since he was certified to be fit for sea duty prior to boarding and his leukemia
was not genetic in nature.
48.Barsolo vs. Social Security System, G.R. No. 187950. January 11, 2017
TOPIC: Work-related Death
DOCTRINE: For the sickness and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the
sickness must be the result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of the Rules
with the conditions set therein satisfied, otherwise, proof must be shown that the risk of
contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions.
FACTS: Cristina Barsolo's (Cristina) deceased husband, Manuel M. Barsolo (Manuel), "was
employed as a seaman by various companies from 1988 to 2002.” From July 2, 2002 to
December 6, 2002, Manuel served as a Riding Gang/ Able Seaman onboard MT Polaris Star
with Vela International Marine Ltd., (Vela). Vela was his last employer before he died in
2006. After his separation from employment with Vela, Manuel was diagnosed with
hypertensive cardiovascular disease, coronary artery disease, and osteoarthritis. He was
examined and treated at the Philippine Heart Center as an outpatient from April 2, 2003 to
October 22, 2004. When he died on September 24, 2006, the autopsy report listed
myocardial infarction as his cause of death. Believing that the cause of Manuel's death was
work-related, Cristina filed a claim for death benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, as
amended, with the Social Security System. The Social Security System denied her claim on
the ground that there was no longer an employer-employee relationship at the time of
3
Manuel's death and that "[h]is being a smoker increased his risk of contracting the illness."

The Commission held that Cristina was unable to establish that her husband's case fell
under any of conditions required [under Annex A of the Amended Rules on Employee's
Compensation] to warrant the grant of benefits. Moreover, since Manuel was a smoker, the
Commission believed that Manuel's "smoking habits precipitated the manifestation of his
Myocardial Infarction."The Commission added that"the System correctly ruled that the
development of the Myocardial Infarction could not be categorically attributed to the
occupation of [Manuel] as Seaman because of the presence of major causative factor which
is not work-related.
ISSUE: Whether Manuel Barsolo’s death is work-related.
RULING: No. Since there was no showing that her husband showed any sign or symptom of
cardiac injury during the performance of his functions, petitioner clearly failed to show that
her husband's employment caused the disease or that his working conditions aggravated his
existing heart ailment. Moreover, as the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, Manuel died
on September 24, 2006, four years after he disembarked from MV Polaris Star. Other factors
have already played a role in aggravating his illness. Due to the considerable lapse of time,
more convincing evidence must be presented in order to attribute the cause of death to
Manuel's work. In the absence of such evidence and under the circumstances of this case,
this Court cannot assume that the illness that caused Manuel's death was acquired during
his employment with Vela. Furthermore, Manuel was a smoker. The presence of a different
major causative factor, which could explain his illness and eventual death, defeats
petitioner's claim.
49.Marlow Navigation Philippines, Inc. vs. Heirs of Ganal, G.R. No. 220168,
June 7, 2017
TOPIC: Work-related Death – Death Compensation
DOCTRINE: The words "arising out of' refer to the origin or cause of the accident and are
descriptive of its character, while the words "in the course of" refer to the time, place, and
circumstances under which the accident takes place. By the use of these words, it was not
the intention of the legislature to make the employer an insurer against all accidental
injuries which might happen to an employee while in the course of the employment, but
only for such injuries arising from or growing out of the risks peculiar to the nature of work
in the scope of the workmen's employment or incidental to such employment, and accidents
in which it is possible to trace the injury to some risk or hazard to which the employee is
exposed in a special degree by reason of such employment.
FACTS: Petitioners employed Ricardo Ganal as an oiler aboard the vessel MV Stadt
Hamburg. A party was organized for the crewmen of MV Stadt Hamburg while the ship was
anchored. The ship captain noticed that Ganal was already drunk so he directed him to
return to his cabin and take a rest. Ganal ignored the ship captain's order. Thus, a ship
3
officer, a security watchman and a member of the crew were summoned to escort Ganal to

his cabin. The crew members attempted to accompany him back to his cabin but he refused.
They then tried to restrain him but he resisted and, when he found the chance to escape, he
ran towards the ship's railings and, without hesitation, jumped overboard and straight into
the sea. The crew members immediately threw life rings into the water towards the
direction where he jumped and the ship officer sounded a general alarm and several alarms
thereafter. Contact was also made with the coast guard and the crew members searched for
Ganal, to no avail. Ganal was later found dead and floating in the water. The subsequent
medico-legal report issued by the Philippine National Police showed that the cause of his
death was asphyxia by drowning. Subsequently, Ganal's wife filed a claim for death benefits
with petitioners, but the latter denied the claim. Thus Boragay, filed with the NLRC a
complaint for recovery of death and other benefits, unpaid salaries for the remaining period
of Ganal's contract, as well as moral and exemplary damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs of the deceased laborer are entitled to death
compensation.
RULING: No. Under the provisions of the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the
Overseas Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Ships, as amended, the
death of a seafarer by reason of any work-related injury or illness during the term of his
employment is compensable. But it also provides that no compensation and benefits shall
be payable in respect of any injury, incapacity, disability or death of the seafarer resulting
from his willful or criminal act or intentional breach of his duties, provided however, that the
employer can prove that such injury, incapacity, disability or death is directly attributable to
the seafarer. In the present case, Ganal attended the party not because he was performing
his duty as a seaman, but was doing an act for his own personal benefit. His death during
such occasion may not be considered as having arisen out of his employment as it was the
direct consequence of his decision to jump into the water without coercion nor compulsion
from any of the ship officers or crew members. The hazardous nature of this act was not
due specially to the nature of his employment. It was a risk to which any person on board
the MV Stadt Hamburg, such as a passenger thereof or an ordinary visitor, would have been
exposed had he, likewise, jumped into the sea, as Ganal had.
June 7, 2017
TOPIC: Work-related Death – Suicide of Seafarer
DOCTRINE: Petitioners do not carry the burden of establishing that Ganal had the
intention of committing suicide. Petitioners' only burden is to prove that Ganal's acts are
voluntary and willful and, if so, the former are exempt from liability as the latter becomes
responsible for all the consequences of his actions.
FACTS: Petitioners employed Ricardo Ganal as an oiler aboard the vessel MV Stadt
Hamburg. A party was organized for the crewmen of MV Stadt Hamburg while the ship was
anchored. The ship captain noticed that Ganal was already drunk so he directed him to
return to his cabin and take a rest. Ganal ignored the ship captain's order. Thus, a ship
officer, a security watchman and a member of the crew were summoned to escort Ganal to
his cabin. The crew members attempted to accompany him back to his cabin but he refused.
They then tried to restrain him but he resisted and, when he found the chance to escape, he
ran towards the ship's railings and, without hesitation, jumped overboard and straight into
3
the sea. The crew members immediately threw life rings into the water towards the

direction where he jumped and the ship officer sounded a general alarm and several alarms
death was asphyxia by drowning. Subsequently, Ganal's wife filed a claim for death benefits
with petitioners, but the latter denied the claim. Thus Boragay, filed with the NLRC a
complaint for recovery of death and other benefits, unpaid salaries for the remaining period
of Ganal's contract, as well as moral and exemplary damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not the death of Ganal can be considered as a suicidal act.
RULING: No. The evidence presented proves the willfulness of Ganal's acts which led to his
death. The term "willful" means "voluntary and intentional", but not necessarily malicious.
Here, Ganal's act of intentionally jumping overboard, while in a state of intoxication, could
be considered as a deliberate and willful act on his own life which is directly attributable to
him. Petitioners do not carry the burden of establishing that Ganal had the intention of
committing suicide. Petitioners' only burden is to prove that Ganal's acts are voluntary and
willful and, if so, the former are exempt from liability as the latter becomes responsible for
all the consequences of his actions. Indeed, Ganal may have had no intention to end his
own life. For all we know he was just being playful. Nonetheless, he acted with notorious
negligence. Notorious negligence has been defined as something more than mere or simple
negligence or contributory negligence; it signifies a deliberate act of the employee to
disregard his own personal safety. In any case, regardless of Ganal's motives, petitioners
were able to prove that his act of jumping was willful on his part. Thus, petitioners should
not be held responsible for the logical consequence of Ganal's act of jumping overboard.
51.Seapower Shipping, Ent., Inc. vs. Heirs of Warren M. Sabanal, G.R. No.
198544, June 19, 2017
TOPIC: Work-related Death – Burden of proof; Strange behavior
DOCTRINE: In order for insanity to prosper as a counter-defense, the claimant must

substantially prove that the seafarer suffered from complete deprivation of intelligence in
committing the act or complete absence of the power to discern the consequences of his
action. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties does not foreclose willfulness.
FACTS: Seapower hired Sabanal as Third Mate onboard MT Montana. After undergoing the
routine pre-employment medical examination and being declared fit to work, Sabanal
boarded the ship and commenced his duties. During voyage, Sabanal started exhibiting
unusual behavior. When the ship captain checked on him, he responded incoherently,
though it appeared that he had problems with his brother in the Philippines. This prompted
the captain to set double guards on Sabanal. The sailors watching over Sabanal reported
that he wanted to board a life boat, citing danger in the ship's prow. Because of Sabanal 's
condition, the captain relieved him of his shift and allowed him to sleep in the cabin
guarded. The following day, the captain wanted to supervise Sabanal better, so he took
3
him on deck and assigned to him simple tasks, such as correcting maps and collecting and

typing the crew's declarations. The captain observed that Sabanal's condition was "rather
better" and he "did not appear to have any problems." Later that day, Sabanal requested
the sailor-on-guard that he be allowed to return to the deck for some fresh air. Once on
deck, Sabanal suddenly ran to the stem and jumped to the sea. The ship's rescue attempts
proved futile, and Sabanal's body was never recovered.
During the first week of October 1995, Seapower informed Sabanal's wife, Elvira, regarding
the incident. Elvira alleged that Seapower told her that she has to wait for a period of seven
to ten years before Sabanal can be declared dead. Thus, it was only on May 16, 2005 that
Elvira was able to file a complaint for payment of Sabanal' s death benefits. Seapower,
however, denied that it deceived Elvira into believing that she had to wait for seven years
before she could claim death benefits. It claimed that it was forthright with Elvira and told
her early on that her husband committed suicide.
ISSUE: Who between the petitioner and respondent has the burden of proving that the
deceased laborer was of unsound mind prior to his death?
RULING: The respondent. The employer is generally liable for death compensation benefits
when a seafarer dies during the term of employment. This rule, however, is not absolute.
Part II, Section C (6) of the POEA-SEC exempts the employer from liability if it can
successfully prove that the seafarer's death was caused by an injury directly attributable to
his deliberate or willful act. Here, the petitioner employer’s evidence sufficiently establish
that Sabanal indeed jumped into the sea. Hence, the respondent wife who claims that her
husband was insane has the burden of proof. However, Elvira did not present any evidence
to support her claim that Sabanal was already insane when he jumped overboard.
June 7, 2017
TOPIC: Work-related Death – Notorious Negligence; "In The Course Of"
DOCTRINE: Notorious negligence has been defined as something more than mere or
simple negligence or contributory negligence; it signifies a deliberate act of the employee to
disregard his own personal safety.
FACTS: Petitioners employed Ricardo Ganal (Ganal) as an oiler aboard the vessel MV Stadt
Hamburg in accordance with the provisions of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA)-Standard Employment Contract, which was executed by and between
the parties. On September 20, 2011, he commenced his employment. Around 7 o'clock in
the evening of April 15, 2012, a party was organized for the crewmen of MV Stadt Hamburg
while the ship was anchored at Chittagong, Bangladesh. After finishing his shift at 12
midnight, Ganal joined the party. Around 3 o'clock in the morning of April 16, 2012, the ship
captain noticed that Ganal was already drunk so he directed him to return to his cabin and
take a rest. Ganal ignored the ship captain's order. Thus, a ship officer, a security
watchman and a member of the crew were summoned to escort Ganal to his cabin. The
3
crew members attempted to accompany him back to his cabin but he refused. They then

tried to restrain him but he resisted and, when he found the chance to escape, he ran
towards the ship's railings and, without hesitation, jumped overboard and straight into the
sea. The crew members immediately threw life rings into the water towards the direction
where he jumped and the ship officer sounded a general alarm and several alarms
death was asphyxia by drowning.
ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs of Ganal may claim for death benefits from employer when
the formers death was caused by his own notorious negligence.
RULING: No the heirs of Ganal cannot claim for death benefits because of the factual
circumstance in case does not justify the grant. Regardless of Ganal's motives, petitioners
were able to prove that his act of jumping was willful on his part. Thus, petitioners should
not be held responsible for the logical consequence of Ganal's act of jumping overboard.
Indeed, Ganal may have had no intention to end his own life. For all we know he was just
being playful. Nonetheless, he acted with notorious negligence.
August 7, 2017
TOPIC: Work-related Death – Notorious negligence; "in the course of"
DOCTRINE: The presumption is made in the law to signify that the non-inclusion in the list
of occupational diseases does not translate to an absolute exclusion from disability benefits.
The seafarer/claimant nonetheless is burdened to present substantial evidence that his work
conditions caused or at least increased the risk of contracting the disease and only a
reasonable proof of work-connection, not direct causal relation is required to establish its
compensability. The proof of work conditions referred thereto effectively equates with the
conditions for compensability imposed under Section 32-A of the 2000 POEA-SEC.
FACTS: Petitioner was employed as an Able Seaman by respondent Orophil Shipping

International Co., Inc. (Orophil) on behalf of its principal, respondent Hakuho Kisen Co., Ltd.
(Hakuho), and was assigned at the M/V Cape Apricot. In the course of his employment
contract, petitioner complained of severe headaches, nausea, and double vision which the
foreign port doctors diagnosed to be right cavernous sinus inflammation or Tolosa Hunt
3
Syndrome (THS). As a result, petitioner was repatriated on February 4, 2005 and referred

to a company-designated physician, Doctor Nicomedes G. Cruz (Dr. Cruz), who confirmed
the findings and advised him to continue the medication prescribed by the foreign doctors.
On June 28, 2005, Dr. Cruz issued a certification declaring petitioner fit to resume work.
Dissatisfied, petitioner consulted an independent physician, Dr. Paul Matthew D. Pasco (Dr.
Pasco), who, on the other hand, assessed his illness as a Grade IV disability and declared
him unfit for sea duty. Consequently, petitioner filed a complaint against Orophil, Engineer
Tomas N. Orola, and Hakuho (respondents) before the NLRC for payment of disability
benefits, reimbursement of medical expenses, damages, and attorney’s fees, docketed as
NLRC NCR OFW M-06-03-01004-00. For their part, respondents opposed the claim for
disability benefits, asserting that petitioner was declared fit to work by the company-
designated physician and that his illness is not work-related, adding too that he maliciously
concealed the fact that he had previously suffered from THS that effectively barred him
from claiming disability benefits under the 2000 Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration-Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC). They likewise contended that
petitioner had been paid his sickness allowance, while the claims for damages and benefits
are without basis.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to total and permanent disability benefits
pursuant to the 2000 POEA-SEC.
RULING: Yes petitioner is entitled to receive the maximum disability amount of

US$60,000.00 under the 2000 POEA-SEC, or its peso equivalent at the time of payment, as
prayed for in his Position Paper and pursuant to existing jurisprudence:
Pursuant to the ruling in Crystal Shipping, the fact that the assessment was made
beyond the 120-day period prescribed in the Labor Code is sufficient basis to declare
that respondent suffered permanent total disability. This condition entities him to the
maximum disability benefit of USD 60,000 under the POEA-SEC.
54.Grande vs. Philippine Nautical Training College, G.R. No. 213137, March 1,
2017
TOPIC: Resignation – Defense of resignation by employer
DOCTRINE: For the resignation of an employee to be a viable defense in an action for

illegal dismissal, an employer must prove that the resignation was voluntary, and its
evidence thereon must be clear, positive and convincing. The employer cannot rely on the
weakness of the employee's evidence.
FACTS: On or about cited DTPO complainant was called by Ms. Luchi Banaag for meeting by
Mr. Frederick G. Pios (suspect) at the office. Mr. Pios was telling her that there were some
unfounded anomalies discovered and being attributed to her; complainant was shocked
upon hearing the same. With this, he forced the complainant to file resignation from
employment, and in return made her [assurance] to absolve from the said unfounded
anomalies, complainant considering that she was being accused of unfounded anomalies,
she was force (sic) to succumb to the order and execute her resignation letter immediately,
3

and Mr. Pios (suspect) uttered that he was following orders from the President of PNTC
Colleges, Hemani Fabia-President, as narrated by complainant." The next day, March 2,
2011, petitioner accompanied by counsel, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer
for reinstatement with full backwages, money claims, damages, and attorney's fees against
respondent. In her position paper, petitioner alleged that she was forced to resign from her
employment. On the other hand, respondent claimed that petitioner voluntarily resigned to
evade the pending administrative charge against her.
ISSUE: Whether or not the defense of resignation by the employer showed undue force
upon petitioner.
RULING: Yes we agree with the finding of the NLRC that the acts of petitioner before and
after she tendered her resignation would show that undue force was exerted upon
petitioner: (1) the resignation letter of petitioner was terse and curt, giving the impression
that it was hurriedly and grudgingly written; (2) she was in the thick of preparation for an
upcoming visit and inspection from the Maritime Training Council; it was also around that
time that she had just requested for the acquisition of textbooks and teaching aids, a fact
which is incongruent with her sudden resignation from work; (3) in the evening, she filed an
incident report/police blotter before the Intramuros Police Station; and (4) the following day
she filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. By vigorously pursuing the litigation of her action
against respondent, petitioner clearly manifested that she has no intention of relinquishing
her employment, which act is wholly incompatible to respondent's assertion that she
voluntarily resigned.
55.Grande vs. Philippine Nautical Training College, G.R. No. 213137, March 1,
2017
TOPIC: Resignation – Clear and convincing evidence
DOCTRINE: It is axiomatic in labor law that the employer who interposes the defense of
voluntary resignation of the employee in an illegal dismissal case must prove by clear,
positive and convincing evidence that the resignation was voluntary; and that the employer
cannot rely on the weakness of the defense of the employee. The requirement rests on the
need to resolve any doubt in favor of the working man.
FACTS: From 1998 to 2007, Flordeliza LLanes Grande has been employed by PNTC as
Instructor for medical courses. In November 2007, she resigned in order to pursue her
graduate studies. In May 2009, she was invited to resume teaching. In February 2011,
several employees of PNTC’s registration department, including Grande were placed under
preventive suspension in view of anomalies in the enlistment of students. On March 1,
3
2011, Grande received a message for her to tender her registration from the school on the

report that she was involved in the said anomaly. The VP for Corporate Affairs assured her
that she would be absolved from the liabilities due to the anomaly if she would resign.
Grande accomplished her exit clearance. The next day, she filed a case for illegal dismissal
with the Labor Arbiter on the ground of undue influence and pressure exerted upon her that
compelled her to tender her resignation.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a clear and convincing evidence to sustain PNTC’s claim
that Grande resigned voluntarily.
RULING: NONE. If petitioner was being investigated for an administrative charge, she
should not have been cleared from liabilities. The more logical thing to do is to hold her
clearance until all the liabilities have been settled. Indeed, it is very unlikely that petitioner
who was in the thick of preparation for an upcoming visit and inspection from the Maritime
Training Council and who had just requested for the acquisition of textbooks and teaching
aids, and had just submitted a Master Plan to the corporate officer would simply resign
voluntarily. Further, PNTC’s allegation that it was Grande’s abrupt resignation that prompted
the investigation shows that when the petitioner "suddenly" resigned, there was no
discovery yet as to the alleged anomaly involving her, contrary to the statements of PNTC in
its Comment, alleging that Grande resigned to cover up her involvement in the said
anomalies. In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof required is substantial
evidence, which is more than a mere scintilla of evidence, but such amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. In the
case at bar, petitioner's letter of resignation and the circumstances antecedent and
contemporaneous to the filing of the complaint for illegal dismissal are substantial proof of
petitioner's involuntary resignation.
56.Doble vs. ABB, Inc., G.R. No. 215627, June 5, 2017
TOPIC: Resignation – Option to resign
DOCTRINE: Coercion exists when there is a reasonable or well grounded fear of an

imminent evil upon a person or his property or upon the person or property of his spouse,
descendants or ascendants.
FACTS: Luis S. Doble, Jr., a duly licensed engineer, was hired by respondent ABB, Inc. As a
matter of policy, ABB, Inc. conducts the yearly Performance and Development Appraisal of
all its employees. On March 2, 2012, Doble was called by respondent ABB, Inc. Country
Manager and President Nitin Desai, and was informed that his performance rating for 2011
is one (1) which is equivalent to unsatisfactory performance. On March 13, 2012, a meeting
was held. Desai explained to Doble that the Global and Regional Management have
demanded for a change in leadership due to the extent of losses and level of discontent
among the ranks of the PS Division. Desai then raised the option for Doble to resign as
3
Local Division Manager of the PS Division. Thereafter, HR Manager Miranda told Doble that

he would be paid separation pay equivalent to 75% of his monthly salary for every year of
service, provided he would submit a letter of resignation, and gave him until 12:45 p.m.
within which to decide. Shocked by the abrupt decision of the management, Doble asked
why he should be the one made to resign. Miranda said that it was the decision of the
management, and left him alone in the conference room to decide whether or not to resign.
On the other hand, ABB and Miranda alleges that they never gave him any instruction/s to
resign.
ISSUE: Whether or not Doble was forced to resign.
RULING: NO. Doble failed to present substantial documentary or testimonial evidence to

corroborate the same. It is well settled that bare allegations of constructive dismissal, when
uncorroborated by the evidence on record, cannot be given credence. Even if the option to
resign originated from the employer, what is important for resignation to be deemed
voluntary is that the employee's intent to relinquish must concur with the overt act of
relinquishment. There can be no doubt as to the drastic and shocking nature of the abrupt
decision of ABB, Inc. to let Doble resign on March 13, 2012 after almost 19 years of
dedicated and satisfactory service, on account of the extent of losses, the level of discontent
among the ranks of PS Division, and the ABB, Inc. Global and Regional management's
demand for a change in leadership. It bears emphasis, however, that between the start of
the conference at around 11:00 a.m. and about eight (8) hours later in the evening when
he left the company premises, Doble negotiated for a higher separation pay, i.e., from 75%
of the monthly salary for every year of service allowed under the company retirement plan
up to double that amount, or 1.5 month's pay for every year of service. In fact, Doble
tendered a resignation letter only after being offered a better separation benefitt of 1-month
pay for every year of service, and even submitted a separate letter expressing his intent to
buy his service vehicle. After considering the acts of Doble before and after his resignation,
the Court is convinced of Doble's clear intention to sever his employment with ABB, Inc.
57.Cosue vs. Ferritz Integrated Development Corporation, et al., G.R. No.

230664, July 24, 2017
TOPIC: Resignation – Option to Resign
DOCTRINE: It is settled that there is nothing reprehensible or illegal when the employer
grants the employee a chance to resign and save face rather than smear the latter's
employment record.
FACTS: Edward M. Cosue was employed as a construction worker at FIDC. Later on, he
became a a regular employee of FIDC, performing work as janitor/maintenance staff.
Around 5 p.m. of July 10, 2014, respondent Melissa Tanya Germino (Germino), as Head of
FIDC's Property Management Division, asked petitioner to stay in the FIDC's building to
watch over the generator. According to petitioner, around 9 p.m. on July 10, 2014, he saw
two security guards (the Officer-in-Charge and one Gomez), together with an unidentified
man, on their way to the electrical room. Later on, he was convinced that the two guards
3
and their unidentified companion took the electrical wires. At 1 p.m., he was summoned by

Germino who verbally informed him that he was suspended on suspicion that he stole the
electrical wires. Beginning July 16, 2014 until August 13, 2014, he was no longer allowed to
work. Respondents averred that years ago, petitioner petitioner admitted to acting as
messenger and depositing money in the bank for the company accountant, who was later
discovered to have stolen hundreds of thousands of pesos by collecting from tenants and
depositing said collection to her account. He was then given a second chance on condition
that another offense would lead to the termination of his employment. Thus, they argued
that there was an agreement between FIDC and petitioner that the latter would just resign.
ISSUE: Whether or not Cosue was forced to resign.
RULING: NO. Respondents' decision to give petitioner a graceful exit is perfectly within
their discretion. Petitioner's insistence that he had been unjustifiably dismissed for
abandonment of his job, without the benefit of due process, is untenable. Firstly, petitioner
failed to establish that he had been dismissed. Secondly, it was not respondents' position
that petitioner abandoned his job. As they were waiting for petitioner to tender his
resignation conformably with their agreement, they did not consider petitioner's absence as
an abandonment of his job which would necessitate the sending of a notice of abandonment
or an order to return to work.
58.Brown vs. Marswin Marketing, Inc., et al., G.R. No. 206981, March 15, 2017
TOPIC: Abandonment of Work - Immediate Filing of Illegal Dismissal
DOCTRINE: In dismissal cases, the employer bears the burden of proving that the
employee was not terminated, or if dismissed, that the dismissal was legal. Resultantly, the
failure of employer to discharge such burden would mean that the dismissal is unjustified
and thus, illegal. The employer cannot simply discharge such burden by its plain assertion
that it did not dismiss the employee; and it is highly absurd if the employer will escape
liability by its mere claim that the employee abandoned his or her work. In fine, where there
is no clear and valid cause for termination, the law treats it as a case of illegal dismissal.
FACTS: Brown filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal, nonpayment of salary and 13th month
pay as well as claim for moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees against Marswin
Marketing, Inc. and Sany Tan, its owner and President. He prayed for reinstatement with
full backwages and payment of his other monetary claims. Brown alleged that on October 5,
3
2009, Marswin employed, him as building maintenance/ electrician with, a salary of P500.00

per day; he was assigned at Marswin’s warehouse in Valenzuela, and was tasked to
maintain its sanitation and make necessary electrical repairs thereon. Brown further averred
that on May 28,2010, he reported, at the Main Office of Marswin, and was told that it was
already his last day of work. Allegedly, he was made to sign a document that he did not
understand; and, thereafter, he was no longer admitted back to work. Thus, he insisted that
he was terminated without due process of law. Marswin/Tan argued that, a domestic
corporation engaged in wholesale trade of construction materials, employed Brown as
electrician; during his eight-month stay, Marswin received negative reports anent Brown’s
work ethics, competence, and efficiency. On May 28, 2010, they summoned him at its Main
Office to purportedly discuss the complaints of the Warehouse Manager and the Warehouse
Supervisor; during the meeting, they informed Brown of the following charges against him.
The LA declared Brown’s dismissal illegal. The Labor Arbiter held that Brown was a regular
employee of Marswin because Marswin/Tan confirmed hiring him on October 4, 2009; they
paid him salary; they had the power to control his conduct, especially on how he should do
his work; and, they had the power to dismiss him.The NLRC affirmed the LA’s decision. The
CA declared that Brown was legally dismissed, and therefore not entitled to backwages and
13th month pay. According to the CA, aside from his allegation that he was unceremoniously
terminated, Brown presented no evidence supporting such claim. It also held that there was
no showing that Brown was prevented from returning or was deprived of work. It likewise
gave weight to the affidavit of Azucena, which asserted that during the May 28, 2010
meeting, Brown was not dismissed but was only informed of the complaints against him.
ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals gravely erred when it reversed the NLRC’s
Resolutions affirming the labor Arbiter’s Decision that the Petitioner Ernesto Brown was
illegally dismissed by the private respondents
RULING: Thus, in order for the employer to discharge its burden to prove that the
employee committed abandonment, which constitutes neglect of duty, and is a just cause
for dismissal, the employer must prove that the employee 1) failed to report for work or had
been absent without valid reason; and 2) had a clear intention to discontinue his or her
employment. The second requirement must be manifested by overt acts and is more
determinative in concluding that the employee is guilty of abandonment. This is because
abandonment is a matter of intention and cannot be lightly presumed from indefinite acts.
59.Spectrum Security Services, Inc. vs. Grave, G.R. No. 196650, June 7, 2017
TOPIC: Abandonment of Work - Immediate Filing of Illegal Dismissal
DOCTRINE: Security guards, like other employees in the private sector, are entitled to security of
tenure. However, their situation should be differentiated from that of other employees or workers. The
employment of security guards generally depends on their employers' contracts with clients who are
third parties to the employment relationship, and the requirements of the latter for security services
and what will be beneficial to them dictate the posting of the security guards. It is also relevant to
mention that their employers retain the management prerogative to change their assignments and
postings, and to decide to temporarily relieve them of their assignments. Such peculiar conditions of
their employment render inevitable that some of them just have to undergo periods of reserved or off-
detail status that should not by any means equate to their dismissal. Only when the period of their
reserved or off-detail status exceeds the reasonable period of six months without re-assignment
should the affected security guards be regarded as dismissed.
3

FACTS: The petitioner - a domestic corporation engaged in the business of providing
security services - employed and posted the respondents at the premises of Ibiden
Philippines, Inc. The controversy started when the petitioner implemented an action plan as
part of its operational and manpower supervision enhancement program geared towards the
gradual replacement of security guards at Ibiden. Separate "Notice(s) to Return to Unit"
were issued to the respondents directing them to report to its head office and to update
their documents for re-assignment. Respondents filed their complaint against the petitioner
for constructive dismissal, claiming that the implementation of the action plan was a
retaliatory measure against them for bringing several complaints along with other
employees of the petitioner to recover unpaid holiday pay and 13th month pay. The LA
ordered the petitioner to pay to the respondents and their co-employees their unpaid
entitlements. The NLRC and the CA concluded that there was illegal or constructive
dismissal in this case as the private respondents were not given new assignments
immediately after being placed on reserved status; that the lack of any indication from the
"Notices to Return to Unit" of their re-assignments was a badge of bad faith; and that the
timing was off because the action plan was implemented by the petitioner after the
respondents had filed the complaints for their monetary claims against the petitioner and
received a favorable decision thereon. The CA also pointed out that the petitioner's failure to
provide the re-assignments or new posts for the respondents during the proceedings
exceeded the reasonable six-month period of being on reserved status; hence, their off-
detail became permanent.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in finding that the petitioner was guilty of illegally dismissing
the respondents despite the fact that the totality of the circumstances negated such finding.
RULING: Indeed, there should be no indefinite lay-offs. After the period of six months, the
employers should either recall the affected security guards to work or consider them
permanently retrenched pursuant to the requirements of the law; otherwise, the employers
would be held to have dismissed them, and would be liable for such dismissals. The act of
some of the respondents of gaining employment as security guards elsewhere constituted
abandonment of their employment with the petitioner. Abandonment requires the
concurrence of two elements, namely: 1.), the employee must have failed to report for
work or must have been absent without valid or justifiable reason; and, 2.), there must
have been a clear intention on the part of the employee to sever the employer-employee
relationship manifested by some overt act. Although mere absence or failure to report for
work, even after notice to return, does not necessarily amount to abandonment, the law
requires that there be clear proof of deliberate and unjustified intent on the part of the
employee to sever the employer-employee relationship. Abandonment is a matter of
intention and cannot be lightly presumed from certain equivocal acts. In other words, the
operative act is still the employee's ultimate act of putting an end to his employment.
60.Claudia's Kitchen, Inc. vs. Tanguin, G.R. No. 221096, June 28, 2017
TOPIC: Abandonment of Work - Premature Filing of Labor Case
DOCTRINE: Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to

resume his employment. It constitutes neglect of duty and is a just cause for termination of
employment under paragraph (b) of Article 282 [now Article 296] of the Labor Code. To
constitute abandonment, however, there must be a clear and deliberate intent to
discontinue one's employment without any intention of returning. In this regard, two
elements must concur: (1) failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable
reason; and (2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship, with the
second element as the more determinative factor and being manifested by some overt acts.
3

FACTS: Respondent Ma. Realiza S. Tanguin was employed by petitioner Claudia's Kitchen,
Inc. She performed her functions as a billing supervisor in Manila Jockey Club's Turf.
Tanguin averred that she was placed on preventive suspension by Marivic Lucasan, Human
Resources Manager, for allegedly forcing her co-employees to buy silver jewelry from her
during office hours and inside the company premises. On the same date, she was directed
by Lucasan to submit her written explanation on the matter. Tanguin admitted that she was
selling silver jewelry, but she denied that she did so during office hours. On October 30,
2010, she was barred by a security guard from entering the company premises. She was
informed by her co-employees, namely Khena Nama, Jordan Lopez and Rose Marie Esquejo
that they were forced to write letters against her, or else they would be terminated from
their work. Claudia's Kitchen and Enzo Squillantini, its President, countered that in October
2010, they received reports from some employees that Tanguin was allegedly forcing some
of them to buy silver jewelry from her during office hours and inside the company premises,
which the latter admitted. In order to conduct a thorough investigation, she was placed
under preventive suspension on October 26, 2010. On October 27, 2010, the petitioners
sent Tanguin a letter requiring her to submit a written explanation as to why she should not
be charged for conducting business within the company premises and during office hours.
During her suspension, the petitioners discovered her habitual tardiness and gross
negligence in the computation of the total number of hours worked by her co-employees.
Subsequently, they sent letters to her four letters to her. Tanguin, however, failed to act on
these notices.
ISSUE: Whether separation pay in lieu of reinstatement may be awarded to an employee

who was not dismissed from employment
RULING: Respondent was not dismissed from employment. In cases of illegal dismissal, the
employer bears the burden of proof to prove that the termination was for a valid or
authorized cause. But before the employer must bear the burden of proving that the
dismissal was legal, the employees must first establish by substantial evidence that indeed
they were dismissed. If there is no dismissal, then there can be no question as to the
legality or illegality thereof. The rule is that one who alleges a fact has the burden of
proving it; thus, petitioners were burdened to prove their allegation that respondents
dismissed them from their employment. It must be stressed that the evidence to prove this
fact must be clear, positive and convincing. The rule that the employer bears the burden of
proof in illegal dismissal cases finds no application here because the respondents deny
having dismissed the petitioners.
61.Nueva Ecija II Electric Cooperative, Inc., et al. vs. Mapagu, G.R. No. 196084,
February 15, 2017
TOPIC: Petition for Certiorari - Reglementary period vs. Petition for review on
certiorari
DOCTRINE: Petition for Review on Certiorari; The Rules allow only for a maximum period of
forty-five (45) days within which an aggrieved party may file a petition for review on
certiorari. The failure to perfect an appeal within the reglementary period is not a mere
technicality. It raises a jurisdictional problem, as it deprives the appellate court of its
3
jurisdiction over the appeal.

FACTS: Elmer B. Mapagu (Mapagu) was employed with NEEC as a data processor since May
1983. National Electrification Administration (NEA) conducted a special audit on the power
bills and accounts receivables of the consumers, as well as related internal control and
procedure, of NEEC. The audit revealed unaccounted consumption or readings which have
accumulated due to under-reading and under-billing in prior years or months. As a result,
petitioners sent a Notice of Charges dated June 13, 2006 against Mapagu, charging him
with grave violations. Mapagu was informed that the penalty for the charges is dismissal for
the first offense and was directed to submit an answer within 72 hours from receipt of the
Notice of Charges. In his answer, Mapagu denied under oath that his electric meter was
under-read and under-billed. Since the charges have been condoned, pardoned and
disregarded, Mapagu maintains that he cannot be charged with unaccounted consumption.
The IAC found him guilty of the charges against him. On January 2, 2007, however, Mapagu
received a Notice of Dismissal from service. Hence, he filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal
and non-payment of allowances against petitioners. In his November 30, 2007 Decision LA
Jose dismissed Mapagu's Complaint for lack of merit. Mapagu appealed to the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), which reversed and set aside the ruling of the LA.
Petitioners filed their Reply and insist that they have 60 days from March 17, 2011 (or until
May 1 7, 2011) to file the petition for review on certiorari. Mapagu filed his Comment,
claiming that the petition is filed out of time.
ISSUE: Whether the petition for review on certiorari was filed before the CA within the
reglementary period.
RULING: No. Petitioners failed to comply and file within the reglementary period. They
confuse petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 with petitions for certiorari under
Rule 65. It is the latter which is required to be filed within a period of not later than 60 days
from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. There are instances when we have relaxed
the rules governing the periods of appeal to serve substantial justice. None of the foregoing
justifications are, however, present here.
A party litigant wishing to file a petition for review on certiorari must do so within 15 days
from notice of the judgment, final order or resolution sought to be appealed. Here,
petitioners received the Resolution of the CA denying their Motion for Reconsideration on
March 17, 2011. Under the Rules, they have until April 1, 2011 to file the petition. However,
they filed the same only on May 6, 2011. This was 50 days beyond the 15-day period
provided under Section 2, Rule 45 and 30 days beyond the extension asked for.
62.Javines vs. Xlibris a.k.a. Author Solutions, Inc., G.R. No. 214301, June 7,
2017
TOPIC: Petition for Certiorari - Consideration of Errors Not Assigned; Opening

Entire Case for Review
DOCTRINE: While it is true that the appellate court is given broad discretionary power to
waive the lack of proper assignment of errors and to consider errors not assigned, it has
authority to do so in the following instances: (a) when the question affects jurisdiction over
the subject matter; (b) matters that are evidently plain or clerical errors within
3
contemplation of law; (c) matters whose consideration is necessary in arriving at a just

decision and complete resolution of the case, or in serving the interests of justice or
avoiding dispensing piecemeal justice; (d) matters raised in the trial court and are of record
having some bearing on the issue submitted that the parties failed to raise or that the lower
court ignored; (e) matters closely related to an error assigned; and (f) matters upon which
the determination of a question properly assigned is dependent.
FACTS: Javines was hired by respondent Xlibris as Operations Manager on September 1,

2011. Approximately 10 months after, or on July 27, 2012, J a vines was terminated for
falsifying/tampering three meal receipts. The falsification was discovered on July 5, 2012
when Javines submitted the meal receipts for reimbursement to the finance department.
Xlibris terminated Javines' employment through an "end of employment notice.” Javines
then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The complaint was, however, dismissed by the
Labor Arbiter who found that Javines' dismissal was for just cause and with due process.
ISSUE: Whether or not Javines is correct in insisting that the cause was never raised in its
petition for certiorari filed before the CA nor discussed in the CA Decision.
RULING: Javines' insistence that the petition for certiorari filed by Xlibris throws open the
entire case for review such that the issue of whether or not he was dismissed for just cause
ought to have been addressed by the CA is entirely misplaced. While it is true that the
appellate court is given broad discretionary power to waive the lack of proper assignment of
errors and to consider errors not assigned, it has authority to do so in the following
instances: (a) when the question affects jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) matters
that are evidently plain or clerical errors within contemplation of law; (c) matters whose
consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete resolution of the case,
or in serving the interests of justice or avoiding dispensing piecemeal justice; (d) matters
raised in the trial court and are of record having some bearing on the issue submitted that
the parties failed to raise or that the lower court ignored; (e) matters closely related to an
error assigned; and (f) matters upon which the determination of a question properly
assigned is dependent.
None of the aforesaid instances exists in the instant case. Thus, the CA. cannot be faulted
for no longer discussing the issue of whether indeed there exists just cause for his
dismissal.
26, 2017
TOPIC: Petition for Certiorari - Execution Pending Certiorari
DOCTRINE: Where the executed judgment is totally or partially reversed or annulled by the
Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court with finality and restitution is so ordered, the Labor
Arbiter shall, on motion, issue such order of restitution of the executed award, except
3
reinstatement wages paid pending appeal.

FACTS: Julio C. Espere was hired as a Bosun, a ship's officer in charge of equipment and
the crew, by respondent NFD International Manning Agents, Inc. for and in behalf of its
foreign principal Target Ship Management Pte Ltd. on board the vessel M V. Kalpana Prem,
for a period of nine (9) months, with a basic monthly salary of US$730.00. Prior to his
employment and embarkation, petitioner underwent a Pre-Employment Medical Examination
where he was pronounced "Fit For Sea Duty." Around five (5) months into his deployment,
petitioner complained that he was feeling dizzy, had body malaise and chills. In Vancouver,
Canada, he was diagnosed of suffering from "uncontrolled hypertension", "malaise NYD",
and "psychosomatic illness". He was also declared unfit for duty and was repatriated back to
the Philippines. Petitioner filed a Complaint against respondents claiming disability benefits
for permanent disability and damages. LA dismissed the complaint. NLRC favored the
employee. During the pendency of the petition before the CA, the LA, on July 30, 2013,
issued a Writ of Execution. In compliance with the writ, respondents deposited the judgment
award before the NLRC Cashier.
ISSUE: Whether or not the employee should restitute the executed award to the employer.
RULING: Yes. SC held that the employee was unable to present substantial evidence to
show that his work conditions caused or, at the least, increased the risk of contracting his
illness. Neither was he able to prove that his illness was preexisting and that it was
aggravated by the nature of his employment. Thus, the LA and the CA correctly ruled that
he is not entitled to any disability compensation. In view of respondents' prior satisfaction of
the writ of execution issued by the LA while the case was pending with the CA, coupled with
petitioner's admission that he "had already received the full judgment award of this case,"
the latter, having been proven not entitled to such an award, should, thus, return the same
to respondents. This is in consonance with Section 18, Rule XI of the 2011 NLRC Rules of
Procedure, as amended by En Banc Resolution Nos. 11-12, Series of 2012 and 05-14, Series
of 2014, which provides:
RESTITUTION.
- Where the executed judgment is totally or partially reversed or annulled by the

Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court with finality and restitution is so ordered, the
Labor Arbiter shall, on motion, issue such order of restitution of the executed award,
except reinstatement wages paid pending appeal.
64.Genpact Services, Inc. vs. Santosfalceso, G.R. No. 227695, July 31, 2017
TOPIC: Petition for Certiorari - Filing Motion for Reconsideration
DOCTRINE: The general rule is that a motion for reconsideration must first be filed with the
lower court prior to resorting to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, since a motion for
reconsideration may still be considered as a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. The rationale for the prerequisite is to grant an opportunity for the
3

lower court or agency to correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by the re-
examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case.
FACTS: Genpact is engaged in business process outsourcing, particularly servicing various

multinational clients, including Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate). On different dates
spanning the years 2007 to 2011, Genpact hired respondents Maria Katrina Santos-Falceso,
Janice Ann M. Mendoza, and Jeffrey S. Mariano (respondents) to various positions to service
its Allstate account However, on April 19, 2012, Allstate ended its account with
Genpact, resulting in respondents being placed on floating status, and eventually,
terminated from service This prompted respondents to file a complaint before the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for illegal dismissal In their defense, petitioners
justified respondents' termination of employment on the ground of closure or cessation of
Allstate's account with Genpact as part of the former’s "[g]lobal [d]ownsizing due to heavy
losses caused by declining sales in North America.". The Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed
respondents' complaint for lack of merit. The LA found that respondents' termination from
service was due to the untimely cessation of the operations of Genpact's client, Allstate,
wherein respondents were assigned. Aggrieved, respondents appealed to the NLRC the
NLRC affirmed the LA ruling. Dissatisfied, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari26 before
the CA. the CA dismissed outright the petition for certiorari purely on procedural grounds. It
held that petitioners' failure to file a motion for reconsideration before the NLRC prior to
elevating the case to the CA is a fatal infirmity which rendered their petition
for certiorari before the latter court dismissible, further noting that petitioners did not
present any plausible justification nor concrete, compelling, and valid reason for dispensing
with the requirement of a prior motion for reconsideration
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly dismissed outright the certiorari petition filed by

petitioners before it on procedural grounds.
RULING: No, the general rule is that a motion for reconsideration must first be filed with
the lower court prior to resorting to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, since a motion
for reconsideration may still be considered as a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. The dispositive portion of the NLRC's June 30, 2014 Resolution
provided in the last part that “No further motion of similar import shall be entertained.” In
this case, only respondents had filed a motion for reconsideration before the NLRC. Applying
the foregoing provision, petitioners also had an opportunity to file such motion in this case,
should they wish to do so. However, the tenor of such warning effectively deprived
petitioners of such opportunity, thus, constituting a violation of their right to due process.
65.Adtel, Inc. vs. Valdez, G.R. No. 189942, August 9, 2017
TOPIC: Petition for Certiorari - Extension to File - Heavy Workload of Counsel
DOCTRINE: Heavy workload, which is relative and often self serving, ought to be coupled
3
with more compelling reasons such as illness of counsel or other emergencies that could be

substantiated by affidavits of merit. Standing alone, heavy workload is not sufficient reason
to deviate from the 60-day rule.
FACTS: Adtel, Inc. (Adtel) is a domestic corporation engaged in the distribution of

telephone units, gadgets, equipment, and allied products. On 9 September 1996, Adtel
hired Marijoy A. Valdez (respondent) to work as an accountant for the company. Adtel
promoted respondent as the company's purchasing and logistics supervisor. Adtel then
entered into a dealership agreement with respondent's husband, Angel Valdez (Mr. Valdez),
to distribute Adtel's wideband VHF-UHF television antem1as. On 22 May 2006, Adtel issued
a memorandum directing respondent to show cause in writing why she should not be
terminated for conflict of interest and/or serious breach of trust and confidence. The
memorandum stated that the filing of cases by respondent's husband created a conflict of
interest since respondent had access to vital information that can be used against Adtel.
Respondent was placed under preventive suspension by Adtel. On 29 May 2006, Adtel
terminated respondent from the company. Respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
with the Labor Arbiter. Respondent contended that she was illegally dismissed without just
cause. The Labor Arbiter dismissed respondent's complaint for illegal dismissal. he Labor
Arbiter held that the civil and criminal cases initiated by respondent's husband indubitably
created a conflict of interest that was a just cause for her dismissal by Adtel the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. The NLRC
ruled that Adtel illegally dismissed respondent. Adtel filed a Motion for Reconsideration
which was denied by the NLRC the CA denied the motion for extension and dismissed
Adtel's petition for certiorari for being filed beyond the reglementary period.
ISSUE: Whether or not The Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in denying the
petitioners' motion for reconsideration and in dismissing the petition for certiorari on the
sole basis of technicality.
RULING: No, A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC which amended Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
states: Sec. 4. When and where to file the petition. - The petition shall be filed not later
than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for
reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the
petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days counted from the notice of the denial of
the motion. The 60-day period is deemed reasonable and sufficient time for a party to mull
over and to prepare a petition asserting grave abuse of discretion by a lower court. The
period was specifically set to avoid any unreasonable delay that would violate the
constitutional rights of the parties to a speedy disposition of their case.
66.Sta. Ana vs. Manila Jockey Club, Inc., G.R. No. 208459, February 15, 2017
TOPIC: Loss of Trust and Confidence / Willful Breach of Trust - Failure to Establish
Breach of Trust
DOCTRINE: Loss of Trust and Confidence; To legally dismiss an employee on the ground of
3
loss of trust, the employer must establish that a) the employee occupied a position of trust

and confidence, or has been routinely charged with the care and custody of the employer’s
money or property; b) the employee committed a willful breach of trust based on clearly
established facts; and c) such loss of trust relates to the employee’s performance of duties.
FACTS: Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the July 11, 2012
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 114861. The CA affirmed the
February 26, 20102 and April 30, 20103 Resolutions of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), which in turn affirmed the September 28, 2009 Decision4 of the Labor
Arbiter (LA) dismissing the illegal dismissal case against Manila Jockey Club, Inc.
(MJCI)/Atty. Alfonso Reyno (Atty. Reyno). In May 1977, MJCI, a domestic corporation with
legislative franchise to operate horse race betting,6 hired Julieta B. Sta. Ana (Sta. Ana) as
outlet teller of its off-track betting (OTB) station in Tayuman, Manila (OTB Tayuman).
however, MJCI issued a Memorandum9 stating that its Treasury Department was discovered
to have been illegally appropriating funds and lending it out to the employees of MJCI. As a
result, MJCI required its officers and employees to report any loan obtained from said
department or any of its personnel. MJCI, through its Special Disciplinary Committee (SDC),
formally charged Sta. Ana on the ground of DISHONESTY AND OTHER FRAUDULENT ACTS.
MJCI issued a Notice of Termination to Sta. Ana. Sta. Ana filed a Complaint23 for illegal
dismissal. LA dismissed the Complaint for lack of merit. The NLRC affirmed the LA Decision.
It ruled that MJCI validly dismissed Sta. Ana for loss of trust and confidence; the CA
affirmed the NLRC Resolutions.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sta. Ana is validly dismissed
RULING: No, it is settled that the employer has the right to dismiss an employee for just
causes, which include willful breach of trust and confidence. Complementary to such right is
the burden of the employer to prove that the employee’s dismissal is for a just cause, and
the employer afforded the latter due process before termination. In this regard, to legally
dismiss an employee on the ground of loss of trust, the employer must establish that a) the
employee occupied a position of trust and confidence, or has been routinely charged with
the care and custody of the employer’s money or property; b) the employee committed a
willful breach of trust based on clearly established facts; and c) such loss of trust relates to
the employee’s performance of duties. In fine, there must be actual breach of duty on the
part of the employee to justify his or her dismissal on the ground of loss of trust and
confidence.
67.Panaligan vs. Phyvita Enterprises Corporation, G.R. No. 202086, June 21,
2017
TOPIC: Loss of Trust and Confidence / Willful Breach of Trust - Actual and Willful
3
Breach Supported by Substantial Evidence

DOCTRINE: However, even with the lower burden of proof in labor cases, there is a dearth
of substantial evidence to support a finding that PANALIGAN, et al., were indeed guilty of a
willful breach of their employer's trust. We are constrained to conclude that there is no just
and valid cause to terminate the employment of PANALIGAN, et al., for loss of trust and
confidence or even for serious misconduct.
FACTS: Petitioners Norman Panaligan ("Panaligan"), Ireneo Villajin ("Villajin") and Gabriel
Penilla ("Penilla") were the employees of Phyvita assigned as Roomboys at Starfleet.
Sometime on 25 January 2005,it was discovered that the amount of One Hundred Eighty
Thousand Pesos (Php180,000.00) was missing including receipts, payrolls, credit card
receipts and sales invoices. A criminal complaint was filed against the petitioners but was
later on dismissed by theOn Assistant City Prosecutor there being no sufficient evidence
submitted by the parties to warrant the finding of the crime of theft against aforesaid
employees. Phyvita then terminated the services of the petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether the employees were illegally dismissed when they were terminated from
services even if the complaint for theft against them was dismissed.
RULING: We have held that the application of the disputable presumption that a person
found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and
doer of the whole act is limited to cases where such possession is either unexplained or that
the proffered explanation is rendered implausible in view of independent evidence
inconsistent thereto. In the present case, petitioners' possession of the questioned payroll
sheets was explained by the sworn affidavit of former PHYVITA employee Allan Grasparil
(Grasparil) who freely admitted that he was the source of the documents which he allegedly
received from Enriquez. Significantly, PHYVITA proffered no counter-statement from
Enriquez specifically refuting Grasparil's narrative.
There is no question that PANALIGAN, et al., occupied positions that are reposed with trust
and confidence. Jurisprudence states that the job of a roomboy or chambermaid in a hotel is
clearly of such a nature as to require a substantial amount of trust and confidence on the
part of the employer. There is merit as well in PHYVITA's assertion that the dismissal of its
criminal complaint does not necessarily exonerate PANALIGAN, et al., from a charge of loss
of trust and confidence. However, even with the lower burden of proof in labor cases, there
is a dearth of substantial evidence to support a finding that PANALIGAN, et al., were indeed
guilty of a willful breach of their employer's trust. We are constrained to conclude that there
is no just and valid cause to terminate the employment of PANALIGAN, et al., for loss of
trust and confidence or even for serious misconduct.
68.PJ Lhuillier, Inc. vs. Camacho, G.R. No. 223073, February 22, 2017
TOPIC: Loss of Trust and Confidence / Willful Breach of Trust - Managerial Employ
DOCTRINE: Camacho, as AOM, was a managerial employee. As such, he could be

3
terminated on the ground of loss of confidence by mere existence of a basis for believing

that he had breached the trust of his employer. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is not
required. It would already be sufficient that there is some basis for such loss of confidence,
such as when the employer has reasonable ground to believe that the concerned employee
is responsible for the purported misconduct and the nature of his participation therein.
FACTS: Vizcarra, PLJI's Regional Manager for Northern and Central Luzon pawnshop
operations, received several text messages from some personnel, reporting that Camacho
brought along an unauthorized person, a non-employee, during the QTP operation (pull-out
of "rematado" pawned items) from the different branches of Cebuana Lhuillier Pawnshop in
Pangasinan. On May 18, 2012, Vizcarra issued a show cause memorandum directing
Camacho to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against him for violating
PJLI's Code of Conduct and Discipline which prohibited the bringing along of non-employees
during the QTP operations. Camacho, in his Memorandum, apologized and explained that
the violation was an oversight on his part for lack of sleep and rest. With busy official
schedules on the following day, he requested his mother's personal driver, Jose Marasigan
(Marasigan) to drive him back to Pangasinan. He admitted that Marasigan rode with him in
the service vehicle during the QTP operations. On the basis of the June 14, 2012 Report of
Formal Investigation, Vizcarra issued to Camacho the Notice of Disciplinary Action where he
was meted the penalty of Termination.
ISSUE: Whether Camacho’s actions warrants his dismissal from services
RULING: Camacho, as AOM, was a managerial employee. As such, he could be terminated

on the ground of loss of confidence by mere existence of a basis for believing that he had
breached the trust of his employer. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required. It would
already be sufficient that there is some basis for such loss of confidence, such as when the
employer has reasonable ground to believe that the concerned employee is responsible for
the purported misconduct and the nature of his participation therein. Simply put, his act
was without justification. For this transgression, petitioner PJLI was placed in a difficult
position of withdrawing the trust and confidence that it reposed on respondent Camacho
and eventually deciding to end his employment. "Unlike other just causes for dismissal,
trust in an employee, once lost is difficult, if not impossible, to regain." PJLI cannot be
compelled to retain Camacho who committed acts inimical to its interests. A company has
the right to dismiss its employees if only as a measure of self-protection. Finally, although it
may be true that PJLI did not sustain damage or loss on account of Camacho's action, this is
not reason enough to absolve him from the consequence of his misdeed. The fact that an
employer did not suffer pecuniary damage will not obliterate the respondent's betrayal of
trust and confidence reposed on him by his employer.
198066, June 7, 2017
TOPIC: Loss of Trust and Confidence / Willful Breach of Trust - Must be Exercised
Without Abuse of Discretion
3

DOCTRINE: The employer must adduce proof of actual involvement in the alleged
misconduct for loss of trust and confidence to warrant the dismissal of fiduciary rank-and-
file employees. However, "mere existence of a basis for believing that the employee has
breached the trust and confidence of the employer" is sufficient for managerial employees.
FACTS: Bravo was a part-time teacher and school’s comptroller in Urios College. When a
new "ranking system for non-academic employees for school year 2001-2002” was
formulated, Bravo was then directed to arrange a salary adjustment schedule for the new
ranking system. Later, Bravo obtained his employee ranking slip which showed his
evaluation score and the change of his rank "from office head to middle manager-level
IV." In October 2004, the committee that reviewed the ranking system implemented during
school year 2001-2002 found: that the ranking system for school year 2001-2002 caused
salary distortions among several employees; discrepancies in the salary adjustments of
Bravo and of 2 other employees; and "the Comptroller's Office solely prepared and
implemented the salary adjustment schedule" without prior approval from the Human
Resources Department.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bravo should be dismissed for serious misconduct of willful breach
of trust
RULING: A dismissal based on willful breach of trust or loss of trust and confidence entails
the concurrence of 2 conditions. First, the employee whose services are to be terminated
must occupy a position of trust and confidence. There are two (2) types of positions in
which trust and confidence are reposed by the employer, namely, managerial employees
and fiduciary rank-and-file employees. Managerial employees are considered to occupy
positions of trust and confidence because they are "entrusted with confidential and delicate
matters." On the other hand, fiduciary rank-and-file employees refer to those employees,
who, "in the normal and routine exercise of their functions, regularly handle significant
amounts of the employer's money or property." The second condition is the presence of
some basis for the loss of trust and confidence, "the employer must establish the existence
of an act justifying the loss of trust and confidence." In Caoile v. National Labor Relations
Commission: “Although a less stringent degree of proof is required in termination cases
involving managerial employees, employers may not invoke the ground of loss of trust and
confidence arbitrarily. The prerogative of employers in dismissing a managerial employee
"must be exercised without abuse of discretion." Set against these parameters, this Court
holds that petitioner was validly dismissed based on loss of trust and confidence. Petitioner
was not an ordinary rank-and-file employee. His position of responsibility on delicate
financial matters entailed a substantial amount of trust from respondent. The entire payroll
account depended on the accuracy of the classifications made by the Comptroller. It was
reasonable for the employer to trust that he had basis for his computations especially with
respect to his own compensation.
70.E. Ganzon, Inc. (EGI) vs. Ando, G.R. No. 214183, February 20, 2017
TOPIC: Project Employment - Usually Necessary and Desirable

3

DOCTRINE: The activities of project employees may or may not be usually necessary or
desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. Also, the length of service through
repeated and successive rehiring is not the controlling determinant of the employment
tenure of a project employee.
FACTS: Respondent Fortunato B. Ando, Jr. (Ando) filed a complaint against petitioner E.
Ganzon, Inc. (EGI) and its President, Eulalio Ganzon, for illegal dismissal and money claims.
He alleged that he was a regular employee working as a finishing carpenter in the
construction business of EGI; he was repeatedly hired from January 21, 2010 until April 30,
2011 when he was terminated without prior notice and hearing. EGI countered that, as
proven by the three (3) project employment contract, Ando was engaged as a project
worker. The Labor Arbiter declared Ando a project employee of EGI but granted some of his
money claims. The NLRC dismissed the appeals filed and affirmed in toto the Decision of the
Labor Arbiter. Ando filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied. Still aggrieved, he
filed a Rule 65 petition before the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA declared Ando, Jr. illegally
dismissed from work.
ISSUES: Whether or not respondent is a project worker.
RULING: Yes, respondent is a project worker. Under Art. 280, project employment is one
which "has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of
which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee." To be
considered as project-based, the employer has the burden of proof to show that: (a) the
employee was assigned to carry out a specific project or undertaking and (b) the duration
and scope of which were specified at the time the employee was engaged for such project
or undertaking. It must be proved that the particular work/service to be performed as well
as its duration are defined in the employment agreement and made clear to the employee
who was informed thereof at the time of hiring.The activities of project employees may or
may not be usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer.
Also, the fact that Ando was required to render services necessary or desirable in the
operation of EGI's business for more than a year does not in any way impair the validity of
his project employment contracts. Time and again, We have held that the length of service
through repeated and successive rehiring is not the controlling determinant of the
employment tenure of a project employee. The rehiring of construction workers on a
project-to-project basis does not confer upon them regular employment status as it is only
dictated by the practical consideration that experienced construction workers are more
preferred. Indeed, in Filsystems, Inc. v. Puente, We even ruled that an employment
contract that does not mention particular dates that establish the specific duration of the
project does not preclude one's classification as a project employee. The rehiring of
construction workers on a project-to-project basis does not confer upon them regular
employment status as it is only dictated by the practical consideration that experienced
construction workers are more preferred. In Ando's case, he was rehired precisely because
of his previous experience working with the other phases of the project. EGI took into
account similarity of working environment.
3
71.Herma Shipyard, Inc. vs. Oliveros, G.R. No. 208936, April 17, 2017

TOPIC: Project Employment - Length of Service
DOCTRINE: Project-based employees may or may not be performing tasks usually

necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. The fact that the job
is usually necessary or desirable in the business operation of the employer does not
automatically imply regular employment
FACTS: Herma Shipyard is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of shipbuilding

and repair. The respondents were its employees. Respondents filed a Complaint for illegal
dismissal, regularization, and non-payment of service incentive leave pay. They alleged that
they are Herma Shipyard's regular employees who have been continuously performing tasks
usually necessary and desirable in its business. On various dates, however, petitioners
dismissed them from employment. For their defense, petitioners argued that respondents
were its project-based employees in its shipbuilding projects and that the specific project for
which they were hired had already been completed. The Laborer Arbiter held that
respondents were project-based employees. The National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) affirmed in toto the Decision of the Labor Arbiter. Respondents filed a Petition for
Certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA rendered its assailed Decision granting
respondents’ Petitions for Certiorari and setting aside the labor tribunals’ Decision. It held
that even if the contracts of employment indicated that respondents were hired as project-
based workers, their employment status have become regular since: they were performing
tasks that are necessary, desirable, and vital to the operation of petitioners’ business.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents are project-based employees.
RULING: Yes, respondents are project-based employees. A project employee under Article
280 (now Article 294) of the Labor Code, as amended, is one whose employment has been
fixed for a specific project or undertaking, the completion or termination of which has been
determined at the time of the engagement of the employee. Thus: “Art. 280. Regular and
Casual Employment. –The provisions of written agreement for the contrary notwithstanding
and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be
regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually
necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the
employment has been fixed for a specific Project or undertaking the completion or
termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee
or where the work or service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is
for the duration of the season.”
It is settled, however, that project-based employees may or may not be performing tasks
usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. The fact that
the job is usually necessary or desirable in the business operation of the employer does not
automatically imply regular employment; neither does it impair the validity of the project
employment contract stipulating a fixed duration of employment. Here, a meticulous
examination of the contracts of employment reveals that while the tasks assigned to the
respondents were indeed necessary and desirable in the usual business of Herma Shipyard,
the same were distinct, separate, and identifiable from the other projects or contracts
services.
3

TOPIC: Project Employment - Repeated and Successive Re-hiring
DOCTRINE: Time and again, We have held that the length of service through repeated and
successive rehiring is not the controlling determinant of the employment tenure of a project
employee. The rehiring of construction workers on a project-to-project basis does not confer
upon them regular employment status as it is only dictated by the practical consideration
that experienced construction workers are more preferred
FACTS: Respondent Fortunato B. Ando, Jr. (Ando) filed a complaint against petitioner E.
Ganzon, Inc. (EGI) and its President, Eulalio Ganzon, for illegal dismissal and money claims.
He alleged that he was a regular employee working as a finishing carpenter in the
construction business of EGI; he was repeatedly hired from January 21, 2010 until April 30,
2011 when he was terminated without prior notice and hearing. EGI countered that, as
proven by the three (3) project employment contract, Ando was engaged as a project
worker. The Labor Arbiter declared Ando a project employee of EGI but granted some of his
money claims. The NLRC dismissed the appeals filed and affirmed in toto the Decision of the
Labor Arbiter. Ando filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied. Still aggrieved, he
filed a Rule 65 petition before the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA declared Ando, Jr. illegally
dismissed from work.
ISSUES: Whether or not respondent is a project worker.
RULING: Yes, respondent is a project worker. Under Art. 280, project employment is one
which "has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of
which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee." To be
considered as project-based, the employer has the burden of proof to show that: (a) the
employee was assigned to carry out a specific project or undertaking and (b) the duration
and scope of which were specified at the time the employee was engaged for such project
or undertaking. It must be proved that the particular work/service to be performed as well
as its duration are defined in the employment agreement and made clear to the employee
who was informed thereof at the time of hiring.The activities of project employees may or
may not be usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer.
Also, the fact that Ando was required to render services necessary or desirable in the
operation of EGI's business for more than a year does not in any way impair the validity of
his project employment contracts.. Indeed, in Filsystems, Inc. v. Puente, We even ruled that
an employment contract that does not mention particular dates that establish the specific
duration of the project does not preclude one's classification as a project employee. The
rehiring of construction workers on a project-to-project basis does not confer upon them
regular employment status as it is only dictated by the practical consideration that
experienced construction workers are more preferred. In Ando's case, he was rehired
precisely because of his previous experience working with the other phases of the project.
EGI took into account similarity of working environment.
3

TOPIC: Project Employment - Repeated and Successive Re-hiring
DOCTRINE: The length of service through repeated and successive rehiring is not the
controlling determinant of the employment tenure of a project employee. The rehiring of
construction workers on a project-to-project basis does not confer upon them regular
employment status as it is only dictated by the practical consideration that experienced
construction workers are more preferred.
FACTS: Ando filed a complaint against E. Ganzon, Inc., and its President, Eulalio Ganzon,
for illegal dismissal and money claims. He alleged that he was a regular employee working
as a finishing carpenter in the construction business of EGI; he was repeatedly hired from
January 21, 2010 until April 30, 2011 when he was terminated without prior notice and
hearing. EGI countered that, as proven by the three (3) project employment contract, Ando
was engaged as a project worker (Formworker-2) from June 1, 2010 to September 30,
20107 and from January 3, 2011 to February 28, 20118 as well as in EGI West Insula
Project from February 22, 2011 to March 31,2011; he was paid the correct salary based on
the Wage Order applicable in the region; he already received the 13th month pay for 2010
but the claim for 2011 was not yet processed at the time the complaint was filed. The Labor
Arbiter declared Ando a project employee of EGI but granted some of his money claims.
NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Ando filed a motion for reconsideration, but
it was denied. Still aggrieved, he filed a Rule 65 petition before the CA, which granted the
same.
ISSUE: Whether the repeated and successive rehiring of Ando conferred upon him the
status of a regular employee.
RULING: No. The fact that Ando was required to render services necessary or desirable in
the operation of EGI’s business for more than a year does not in any way impair the validity
of his project employment contracts. The length of service through repeated and successive
rehiring is not the controlling determinant of the employment tenure of a project employee.
The rehiring of construction workers on a project-to-project basis does not confer upon
them regular employment status as it is only dictated by the practical consideration that
experienced construction workers are more preferred. In Ando’s case, he was rehired
precisely because of his previous experience working with the other phases of the project.
EGI took into account similarity of working environment. In the the construction industry, a
project employee’s work depends on the availability of projects, necessarily the duration of
his employment. It is not permanent but coterminous with the work to which he is assigned.
It would be extremely burdensome for the employer, who depends on the availability of
projects, to carry him as a permanent employee and pay him wages even if there are no
projects for him to work on. The rationale behind this is that once the project is completed it
would be unjust to require the employer to maintain these employees in their payroll. To do
so would make the employee a privileged retainer who collects payment from his employer
for work not done. This is extremely unfair to the employers and amounts to labor coddling
at the expense of management. The second paragraph of Article 280, stating that an
employee who has rendered service for at least one (1) year shall be considered a regular
employee, is applicable only to a casual employee and not to a project or a regular
employee referred to in paragraph one thereof. The foregoing considered, EGI did not
violate any requirement of procedural due process by failing to give Ando advance notice of
his termination. Prior notice of termination is not part of procedural due process if the
termination is brought about by the completion of the contract or phase thereof for which
the project employee was engaged. Such completion automatically terminates the
3

employment and the employer is, under the law, only required to render a report to the
Department of Labor and Employment on the termination of employment.
74.De La Salle Araneta University vs. Bernardom, G.R. No. 190809, February
13, 2017
TOPIC: Retirement - Continued Engagement After Retirement
DOCTRINE: For the availment of the retirement benefits under Article 302 [287] of the Labor Code,
as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 7641, the following requisites must concur: (1) the employee
has reached the age of sixty (60) years for optional retirement or sixty-five (65) years for compulsory
retirement; (2) the employee has served at least five (5) years in the establishment; and (3) there is
no retirement plan or other applicable agreement providing for retirement benefits of employees in the
establishment.
FACTS: Bernardo filed a complaint against DLSAU and its owner/manager, Dr. Oscar Bautista for the
payment of retirement benefits. Bernardo alleged that he started working as a part-time professional
lecturer at DLS-AU on June 1, 1974. Bernardo taught for two semesters and the summer for the
school year 1974-1975. Bernardo then took a leave of absence from June 1, 1975 to October 31, 1977
when he was assigned by the Philippine Government to work in Papua New Guinea. When Bernardo
came back in 1977, he resumed teaching at DLS-AU until October 12, 2003, the end of the first
semester for school year 2003-2004. Bernardo’s teaching contract was renewed at the start of every
semester and summer. However, on November 8, 2003, DLS-AU informed Bernardo through a
telephone call that he could not teach at the school anymore as the school was implementing the
retirement age limit for its faculty members. As he was already 75 years old, Bernardo had no choice
but to retire. Bernardo immediately sought advice from the Department of Labor and Employment
regarding his entitlement to retirement benefits after 27 years of employment. DLS-AU and Dr.
Bautista maintained that Bernardo, as a part-time employee, was not entitled to retirement benefits.
Bernardo was effectively separated from the service upon reaching the age of 65 years old. DLS-AU
merely granted Bernardo the privilege to teach by engaging his services for several more years after
reaching the compulsory retirement age. Assuming arguendo that Bernardo was entitled to retirement
benefits, he should have claimed the same upon reaching the age of 65 years old. The Labor Arbiter
dismissed Bernardo’s complaint on the ground of prescription. The NLRC reversed the decision of the
LA and the CA affirmed the NLRC’s decision.
ISSUE: Whether Bernardo’s employment was extended beyond the compulsory retirement
age and the cause of action for his retirement benefits accrued only upon the termination of
his extended employment with DLS-AU.
RULING: Yes. Bernardo’s right to retirement benefits and the obligation of DLS-AU to pay
such benefits are already established under Article 302 [287] of the Labor Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7641. However, there was a violation of Bernardo’s right only
after DLS-AU informed him that the university no longer intended to offer him another
contract of employment, and already accepting his separation from service, Bernardo
sought his retirement benefits, but was denied by DLS-AU. Therefore, the cause of action
for Bernardo’s retirement benefits only accrued after the refusal of DLS-AU to pay him the
same, clearly expressed in Dr. Bautista’s letter. Hence, Bernardo’s complaint, filed with the
NLRC, was filed within the three-year prescriptive period. Even granting arguendo that
Bernardo’s cause of action already accrued when he reached 65 years old, we cannot simply
overlook the fact that DLS-AU had repeatedly extended Bernardo’s employment even when
he already reached 65 years old. DLS-AU still knowingly offered Bernardo, and Bernardo
willingly accepted, contracts of employment to teach for semesters and summers in the
succeeding 10 years. Since DLS-AU was still continuously engaging his services even
beyond his retirement age, Bernardo deemed himself still employed and deferred his claim
for retirement benefits, under the impression that he could avail himself of the same upon
the actual termination of his employment. The equitable doctrine of estoppel is thus
3
applicable against DLS-AU.

75.De La Salle Araneta University vs. Bernardom, G.R. No. 190809, February
13, 2017
TOPIC: Retirement - Estoppel
DOCTRINE: Estoppel; The concurrence of the following requisites is necessary for the
principle of equitable estoppel to apply: (a) conduct amounting to false representation or
concealment of material facts or at least calculated to convey the impression that the facts
are otherwise than, and inconsistent with, those which the party subsequently attempts to
assert; (b) intent, or at least expectation that this conduct shall be acted upon, or at least
influenced by the other party; and (c) knowledge, actual or constructive, of the actual facts.
FACTS: In 2004, Bernardo filed a complaint against DLS-AU and Dr. Bautista, for the
payment of retirement benefits. He alleged that he started working as a part-time
professional lecturer at DLS-AU in 1974 and took a LOA from 1975 to 1977. When he came
back in 1977, he resumed teaching at DLS-AU until 2003. Bernardo's teaching contract was
renewed at the start of every semester and summer. Subsequently, DLS-AU informed him
that he could not teach at the school anymore as the school was implementing the
retirement age limit for its faculty members. As he was already 75 years old, Bernardo had
no choice but to retire. The DOLE, through its Public Assistance Center and Legal Service
Office, opined that Bernardo was entitled to receive benefits under RA 7641. Yet, Dr.
Bautista stated that Bernardo was not entitled to any kind of separation pay or benefits,
explaining to Bernardo that as mandated by the DLS-AU's policy and CBA, only full-time
permanent faculty of DLS-AU for at least 5 years immediately preceding the termination of
their employment could avail themselves of the post-employment benefits. As part-time
faculty member, Bernardo did not acquire permanent employment, regardless of his length
of service. Bernardo filed before the NLRC, a complaint for non-payment of retirement
benefits and damages against DLS-AU and Dr. Bautista.
ISSUE: Whether or not a claim for retirement benefits filed beyond the period provided for
under Art. 291 of the Labor Code has prescribed
RULING: NO. Bernardo's employment was extended beyond the compulsory retirement
age and the cause of action for his retirement benefits accrued only upon the termination of
his extended employment with DLS-AU. However, there was a violation of Bernardo's right
only after DLS-AU informed him that the university no longer intended to offer him another
contract of employment, and already accepting his separation from service, Bernardo
sought his retirement benefits, but was denied by DLS AU. Therefore, the cause of action for
Bernardo's retirement benefits only accrued after the refusal of DLS-AU to pay him the
same, Hence, Bernardo's complaint was filed within the 3-year prescriptive period. We also
cannot simply overlook the fact that DLS-AU had repeatedly extended Bernardo's
employment even when he already reached 65 years old. Since DLS-AU was still
continuously engaging his services even beyond his retirement age, Bernardo deemed
himself still employed and deferred his claim for retirement benefits, under the impression
that he could avail himself of the same upon the actual termination of his employment. The
equitable doctrine of estoppel is thus applicable against DLS-AU. Inaction or silence may
under some circumstances amount to a misrepresentation, so as to raise an equitable
estoppel. This doctrine rests on the principle that if one maintains silence, when in
conscience he ought to speak, equity will debar him from speaking when in conscience he
3
ought to remain silent. DLS-AU, not only kept its silence that Bernardo had already reached

the compulsory retirement age, but even continuously offered him contracts of employment
for the next 10 years. It should not be allowed to escape its obligation to pay Bernardo's
retirement benefits by putting entirely the blame for the deferred claim on Bernardo's
shoulders.
76.Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs. Arjan T. Hassaram, G.R. No. 217730, June 5,
2017
TOPIC: Retirement - Retirement Plan vs. Labor Code
DOCTRINE: Retirement Plan vs. Labor Code; The determining factor in choosing which
retirement scheme to apply is still superiority in terms of benefits provided. Thus, even if
there is an existing CBA (under a retirement plan) but the same does not provide for
retirement benefits equal or superior to that which is provided under Article 287, LC, the
latter will apply. In this manner, the employee can be assured of a reasonable amount of
retirement pay for his sustenance.
FACTS: This stemmed from a complaint filed by Hassaram against PAL for illegal dismissal
and the payment of retirement benefits, damages, and attorney's fees. He claimed that he
had applied for retirement from PAL in 2000 after rendering 24 years of service as a pilot,
but that his application was denied. Instead, PAL informed him that he had lost his
employment in the company as of 1998, in view of his failure to comply with the Return to
Work Order issued by the Secretary of Labor against members of the ALPAP in 1998. He
argued that he was not covered by the Secretary's Return to Work Order; hence, PAL had
no valid ground for his dismissal. He asserted that he was already on his way to Taipei to
report for work at Eva Air, pursuant to a 4-year contract approved by PAL itself. He further
claimed that his arrangement with PAL allowed him to go on leave without pay while
working for Eva Air, with the right to accrue seniority and retire from PAL during the period
of his leave.
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not the amount received by Hassaram under the Plan should be
deemed part of his retirement pay; (2) Whether or not Hassaram is entitled to receive
retirement benefits under Art. 287 of the Labor Code
RULING: (1) YES. The amount received by Hassaram under the PAL Pilots' Retirement
Benefit Plan must be considered part of his retirement pay. It is clear from the provisions of
the Plan that it is the company that contributes to a "retirement fund" for the account of the
pilots. These contributions comprise the benefits received by the latter upon retirement,
separation from service, or disability. Based on jurisprudence, petitioner is entitled to the
equity of the retirement fund under PAL Pilots' Retirement Benefit Plan, which pertains to
the retirement fund raised from contributions exclusively from PAL of amounts equivalent to
20% of each pilot's gross monthly pay. Each pilot stands to receive the full amount of the
contribution upon his retirement which is equivalent to 240% of his gross monthly income
for every year of service he rendered to PAL. This is in addition to the amount of not less
than ₱l00,000.00 that he shall receive under the PAL-ALP AP Retirement Plan. We therefore
rule that the amount received by him from the PAL Plan formed part of his retirement pay.
(2) NO. Hassaram's retirement pay should be computed on the basis of the retirement
plans provided by PAL. Interpreting the language of Art. 287, it is applicable only to a
situation where (l) there is no CBA or other applicable employment contract providing for
retirement benefits for an employee, or (2) there is a CBA or other applicable employment
contract providing for retirement benefits for an employee, but it is below the requirement
3
set by law. The provisions of the CBA are therefore applicable as they would allow Hassaram

to claim the 22.5 days’ worth of salary for every year of service provided under Article 287
cannot match the 240% of salary or almost 2 ½ worth of monthly salary per year of service
provided under the PAL Pilots' Retirement Benefit Plan. Clearly then, it is to the petitioner's
advantage that PAL's retirement plans were applied in the computation of his retirement
benefits. Following the above pronouncement, we therefore declare that Hassaram's
retirement benefits must be computed based on the retirement plans of PAL, and not on
Article 287 of the Labor Code.
TOPIC: MCLE Compliance of Counsel
DOCTRINE: The failure of a lawyer to indicate in his or her pleadings the number and date
of issue of his or her MCLE Certificate of Compliance will no longer result in the dismissal of
the case.
FACTS: Petitioner Luis S. Doble, Jr., a duly licensed engineer, was hired by respondent
ABB, Inc. as Junior Design Engineer on March 29, 1993. During almost nineteen (19) years
of his employment with the respondent ABB, Inc. prior to his disputed termination, Doble
rose through the ranks and was promoted as follows: Design Engineer, Sales Engineer,
Manager for Sales, Officer-In-Charge of the Power Technology Utility Business Unit, Senior
Manager and Head of the Power Technology Utility Automation, Local Division Manager and
Vice-President and Local Division Manager of Power System Division. Doble was called by
respondent ABB, Inc. Country Manager and President Nitin Desai, and was informed that his
performance rating for 2011 is one (1) which is equivalent to unsatisfactory performance.
During the meeting, ABB, Inc. President Desai explained to Doble that the Global and
Regional Management have demanded for a change in leadership due to the extent of losses
and level of discontent among the ranks of the PS Division. Then he was forced to resign
and paid separation pay. But as claimed by the management, he voluntarily resigned. The
Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of Doble. On appeal, the 2 NLRC Commissioners
decided in favor of ABB Inc. Doble filed a petition for certiorari with CA. The CA dismissed
outright the Petition for Certiorari because (1) "the assailed National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) Decision and Resolution attached are mere 'CERTIFIED
PHOTOCOP(IES)' and not duplicate originals or certified true copies;" and (2) "petitioner's
counsel's MCLE Compliance No. III- 0006542' xxx does not appear to have complied with
the Fourth (IV) MCLE compliance period."
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA gravely erred in dismissing the petition on the ground that
the assailed NLRC Decision and Resolution attached thereto are mere "certified photocopies"
and not duplicate originals or certified true copies
RULING: Yes. The submission of the duplicate original or certified true copy of judgment,
order, resolution or ruling subject of a petition for certiorari is essential to determine
whether the court, body or tribunal, which rendered the same, indeed, committed grave
abuse of discretion. The provision states that either a legible duplicate original or certified
true copy thereof shall be submitted. If what is submitted is a copy, then it is required that
the same is certified by the proper officer of the court, tribunal, agency or office involved or
his duly-authorized representative. The purpose for this requirement is not difficult to see. It
is to assure that such copy is a faithful reproduction of the judgment, order, resolution or
ruling subject of the petition. In this case, a perusal of the attached NLRC Decision and
Resolution shows that they are indeed certified photocopies of the said decision and
resolution.1âwphi1 Each page of the NLRC Decision and the Resolution has been certified by
3

the NLRC Sixth Division's Deputy Clerk of Court, Atty. Cherry P. Sarmiento, who is
undisputedly the proper officer to make such certification
TOPIC: Certified True Copy vs. Certified Photocopy
DOCTRINE: The submission of the duplicate original or certified true copy of judgment,
order, resolution or ruling subject of a petition for certiorari is essential to determine
whether the court, body or tribunal, which rendered the same, indeed, committed grave
abuse of discretion. The provision states that either a legible duplicate original or certified
true copy thereof shall be submitted. If what is submitted is a copy, then it is required that
the same is certified by the proper officer of the court, tribunal, agency or office involved or
his duly-authorized representative.
rose through the ranks and was promoted as follows: Design Engineer, Sales Engineer,
Manager for Sales, Officer-In-Charge of the Power Technology Utility Business Unit, Senior
Manager and Head of the Power Technology Utility Automation, Local Division Manager and
Vice-President and Local Division Manager of Power System Division. Doble was called by
respondent ABB, Inc. Country Manager and President Nitin Desai, and was informed that his
performance rating for 2011 is one (1) which is equivalent to unsatisfactory performance.
During the meeting, ABB, Inc. President Desai explained to Doble that the Global and
Regional Management have demanded for a change in leadership due to the extent of losses
and level of discontent among the ranks of the PS Division. Then he was forced to resign
and paid separation pay. But as claimed by the management, he voluntarily resigned. The
Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of Doble. On appeal, the 2 NLRC Commissioners
decided in favor of ABB Inc. Doble filed a petition for certiorari with CA. The CA dismissed
outright the Petition for Certiorari because (1) "the assailed National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) Decision and Resolution attached are mere 'CERTIFIED
PHOTOCOP(IES)' and not duplicate originals or certified true copies;" and (2) "petitioner's
counsel's MCLE Compliance No. III- 0006542' xxx does not appear to have complied with
the Fourth (IV) MCLE compliance period."
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA also gravely erred in denying the Motion for
Reconsideration on the ground that petitioner's counsel had conceded his inability to comply
with the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) requirement
RULING: Yes. The failure of a lawyer to indicate in his or her pleadings the number and
date of issue of his or her MCLE Certificate of Compliance will no longer result in the
dismissal of the case. this Court issued an En Banc Resolution, dated January 14, 2014
which amended B.M. No. 1922 by repealing the phrase "Failure to disclose the required
information would cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings from
3
the records" and replacing it with "Failure to disclose the required information would subject

the counsel to appropriate penalty and disciplinary action." Thus, under the amendatory
Resolution, the failure of a lawyer to indicate in his or her pleadings the number and date of
issue of his or her MCLE Certificate of Compliance will no longer result in the dismissal of the
case and expunction of the pleadings from the records. Nonetheless, such failure will
subject the lawyer to the prescribed fine and/or disciplinary action.
79.Madridejos vs. Nyk-Fil Ship Management, Inc., G.R. No. 204262, June 7,
2017
TOPIC: Work-related Illness - No Automatic Compensability
DOCTRINE: The guidelines expressly provided under the 2000 Philippine Overseas
Employment Agency Standard Employment Contract provide that those illnesses not listed
in the law are disputably presumed as work-related. However, the disputable presumption
does not signify an automatic grant of compensation and/or benefits claim. There is still a
need for the claimant to establish, through substantial evidence, that his illness is work-
related.
FACTS: The Petitioner, Madridejos, was a seafarer hired by the respondent, NYK-FIL Ship
Management, Inc. On March 25, 2010, the petitioner signed an employment contract with
the respondent as a Demi Chef for a vessel. While working aboard the vessel, he claims to
jave suddenly slipped on a metal stairway and fell down, hitting his abdomen and chest on a
metal pipe. According to him, he was brought to the ship doctor and was diagnosed to have
a “sebaceous cyst” to the right of the umbilicus. The following day, Madridejos was treated
in England by having the cyst removed and the lesion closed with three stitches. After two
months, NYK-FIL terminated Madridejos services through its foreign principal citing the
contract of employment signed by him allowing his abrupt termination. Upon arrival in
Manila, he allegedly reported to the respondent for a medical referral to the company
doctor. However, the respondent refused on the ground that the illness is not work-related.
For further treatment, he went to two hospitals, both stating that such an illness is work-
related entitling him to Grade 1 Disability Benefits. The petitioner then sought for disability
benefits, medical expenses, damages and attorney’s fees against NYK-FIL. As his demands
were unheeded, he filed a complaint before the labor ariter. The LA ruled that Madridejos is
entitled only to a Disability Grade of 7 and not 1 because there is no evidence proving the
severity of his illnes. On appeal to the NLRC, the Comission ruled in favor of NYK-FIL stating
that his allegation that the illness was work-related was not sufficiently ruling. Thus, it
dismissed the appeal. Petitoner then went up to the CA but the latter dismissed the
petiotion stating that the dismissal by the NLRC was judicious. Hence, this resort to the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner’s illness is a work-related, so as to entitle him to disability

benefits.
RULING: No. Petitioner cannot claim disability benefits because he failed to establish by
substantial evidence that his acquisition of the sebaceous cyst is work-related. For an illness
to be compensable, it is not necessary that the nature of the employment be the sole and
only reason for the illness suffered by the seafarer. It is enough that there is a “reasonable
linkage” between the disease suffered by the employee and his work to lead a rational mind
3
to conclude that his work may have contributed to the establishment or, at the very least,

aggravation of any pre-existing condition he might have had. The disputable presumption
under the law implies that the non-inclusion in the list of compensable diseases/illnesses
does not translate to an absolute exclusion from disability benefits. Similarly, the disputable
presumption does not signify an automatic grant of compensation and/or benefits claim.
There is still a need for the claimant to establish, through substantial evidence, that his
illness is work-related. For his failure to substantiate his claim that his cyst was either work-
related or work-aggravated, this Court cannot grant him relief. Accordingly, the disputable
resumption does not allow him to just sit down and wait for respondent company to present
evidence to overcome the disputable presumption of work-relatedness of the illness.
Concomitantly, there is still a need for him to corroborate his claim for disability benefits.
26, 2017
TOPIC: Work-related Illness - Reasonable Connection
DOCTRINE: While the law recognizes that an illness may be disputably presumed to be
work-related, the seafarer or the claimant must still show a “reasonable connection”
between the nature of work on board the vessel and the illness contracted or aggravated.
Thus, the burden is placed upon the claimant to present substantial evidence that his work
conditions caused or at least increased the risk of contracting the disease.
FACTS: Espere, the petitioner, was hired by NFD International Manning Agents Inc. as a
Bosun on board the vessel V. Kalpana Krem. While aboard during his employment, he
complained of dizziness, body malaise and chills. Upon seeking medical examination in
Canada, the physician fount him to be suffering from “uncontrolled hypertension”, “malaise
NYD”, and “psychosomatic illness”. Thus, he was repatriated to the Philippines. Upon his
return, Espere underwent examination by the company-designated physicians. It was again
found to be suffering from hypertension. His medication continued and was advised to
perform more examinations; the same diagnosis surfaces—that he is suffering from
hypertension. Metropolitan Medical Center issued a report stating that the cause of
petitioner’s illness is nor work-related and he may be fit to work as long as his medication
continues. Unsatisfied, he sought the services of another doctor, with whom he got a
medical certificate stating that such illness is work-related/ work-aggravated. Thus, he filed
a complaint claiming disability benefits against the respondents. The LA dismissed the
complaint stating that the petitoner failed to prove by substantial evidence that his illness id
work related. Aggrieved, he went to the NLRC. The NLRC set aside the decision of the LA
stating that his stressful work on board the vessel was a factor in the aggravation of his
hypertension. Respondents then appealed to the CA, and, the latter granted the petiton
thereby reinstating the ruling of the LA. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: WON Espere established that that the illness contracted by him is work-related.
RULING: No. The Supreme Court held that the respondent failed to prove that his illness is
work-related. The Supreme Court ruled that although the law recognizes that an illness
contracted may be disputably presumed to be work-related, the claimant must still show
that a “reasonable connection” exists between the nature of work on board the vessel and
the illness contracted or aggravated. Thus, the burden of proving is placed upon the
claimant to present substantial evidence that he contracted the disease, or his work
3
increased the risk of contracting the disease because of his work. For the disability to be

compensable under the above POEA-SEC, two elements must concur: (1) the injury or
illness must be work-related; and (2) the work-related injury or illness must have existed
during the term of the seafarer's employment contract. To be entitled to compensation and
benefits under the governing POEA-SEC, it is not sufficient to establish that the seafarer's
illness or injury has rendered him permanently or partially disabled; it must also be shown
that there is a causal connection between the seafarer's illness or injury and the work for
which he had been contracted. In this case, the petitioner merely relied on such
presumption but was unable to present substantial evidence to show a reasonable
connection between the illness, or at the very least, the increased risk of contracting the
illness, and the nature of his work. The petitoner, having already received the award due to
the execution of the LA’s decision, while not being entitle thereto, should, thus, return the
same to the respondents.
August 7, 2017
TOPIC: Work-related Illness - Presumption of Work-relatedness; Presumption of

Compensability
DOCTRINE: The legal presumption of work-relatedness sickness is made in the law to

signify that the non-inclusion in the list of occupational diseases does not relate to an
absolute exclusion from disability benefits.
FACTS: Petitioner was employed as an Able Seaman by respondent Orphil Shipping

International Co., Inc. (Orphil) on behalf of its principal, respondent Hakuho Kisen Co., Ltd.
(Hakuho), and was assigned as the M/V Cape Apricot. In the course of his employment,
petitioner complained of severe headaches, nausea and double vision, which the foreign
port doctors diagnosed to be right cavernous sinus inflammation or Tolosa Hunt Syndrome
(THS). As a result, petitioner was repatriated and referred to the company physician, Dr.
Nicomedes Cruz. He confirmed the findings and eventually issued a fit to resume work
certification. Unsatisfied, petitioner consulted an independent physician and assessed his
illness as Grade IV disability and declared him unfit for sea duty. Petiole then filed for
disability benefits. Respondent opposed asserting the fit to work certification issued by Dr.
Cruz and that his illness is not work-related and that he concealed the fact that he had
previously suffered from THS. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner, while the NLRC
dismissed the complaint.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to total and permanent disability benefits.
RULING: The presumption is made in the law to signify that the non-inclusion in the list of
occupational diseases does not translate to an absolute exclusion from disability benefits.
Given the legal presumption in favor of the seafarer, he may rely on and invoke such legal
presumption to establish a fact in issue. The work-relatedness of an illness is presumed;
hence, the seafarer does not bear the initial burden of proving the same. Rather, it is the
employer who bears the burden of disputing this presumption. If the employer successfully
proves that the illness suffered by the seafarer was contracted outside of his work
(meaning, the illness is pre-existing), or that although the illness is pre-existing, none of the
conditions of his work affected the risk of contracting or aggravating such illness, then there
is no need to go into the matter of whether or not said illness is compensable. As the name
itself implies, work-relatedness means that the seafarer's illness has a possible connection
3

to one's work, and thus, allows the seafarer to claim disability benefits therefor, albeit the
same is not listed as an occupational disease.
82.Romana vs. Magsaysay Maritime Corporation, G.R. No. 192442, August 9,

2017
TOPIC: Work-related Illness - Presumption of Work-relatedness; Presumption of

Compensability
DOCTRINE: The legal presumption of work-relatedness of a non-listed illness should be

overturned only when the employer's refutation is found to be supported by substantial
evidence.
FACTS: Petitioner was employed by respondents Magsaysay Maritime Corporation, Eduardo

Manese and/or Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd. (respondents) as a Mechanical Fitter and boarded
the vessel M/V Golden Princess. He claimed that while he and fellow shipmates Alexander
Mapa and Rogelio Acdal were walking along the ship alley the metal ceiling fell and wounded
his head. He thereafter experienced persisting headaches and blurring vision and consulted
the ship's doctor who prescribed him medicines. As his condition did not improve, he was
referred to a specialist and was found to have a tumor (or hemangioblastoma) at the left
side of his brain, for which he underwent surgery. He was repatriated and the company-
designated physician, in a medical reportpetitioner's illness is not work-relatedgrowth of
tissues in the brain's blood vessels. He was later cleared. Then, petitioner consulted an
independent physician, who on the other hand, declared his illness to be work-related and
gave him a Grade 1 impediment after finding him unfit to resume work as seaman.
Petitioner filed a complaint for disability benefits. Respondents denied his claim contending
that brain tumor is not listed as an occupational disease under Section 32-A of the 2000
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Standard Employment Contract (2000
POEA-SEC), and that the company-designated physician declared said illness to be not
work-related, hence, not compensable. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint, which
the NLRC affirmed.
ISSUE: Whether or not, petitioner is entitled to disability benefits.
RULING: No, petitioner's claim for disability benefits should be denied, considering that
respondents were able to successfully debunk the presumption of work-relatedness and
concomitantly, petitioner failed to prove by substantial evidence his compliance with the
conditions for compensability set forth under Section 32-A of the 2000 POEA-SEC The
3
disputable presumption does not signify an automatic grant of compensation and/or benefits

claim, and that while the law disputably presumes an illness not found in Section 32-A to be
also work- related, the seafarer/claimant nonetheless is burdened to present substantial
evidence that his work conditions caused or at least increased the risk of contracting the
disease and only a reasonable proof of work-connection, not direct causal relation is
required to establish its compensability. There is a need to satisfactorily show the four (4)
conditions under Section 32-A of the 2000 POEA-SEC in order for the disputably presumed
disease resulting in disability to be compensable.
83.Ambassador Hotel, Inc. vs. Social Security System, G.R. No. 194137, June
21, 2017
TOPIC: SSS Contributions - Acquittal from Criminal Case and Extinguishment of

Civil Liability
DOCTRINE: The soundness and viability of the funds of the SSS in turn depend on the
contributions of its covered employee and employer members, which it invests in order to
deliver the basic social benefits and privileges to its members. The payment of SSS
contributions is mandatory and its non-payment results in criminal prosecution.
FACTS: In the course of De Ocampo’s investigation, she discovered that the hotel was
delinquent in its payment of contributions for the period from June 1999 to March 2001, as
an examination of the hotel's records revealed that its last payment was made in May 1999.
Thereafter, De Ocampo prepared a delinquency assessment and a billing letter for
Ambassador Hotel. She visited Ambassador Hotel, where a certain Guillermo Ciriaco
(Ciriaco) assisted her. De Ocampo then informed Ciriaco of the hotel's delinquency. She
showed him the assessment, billing letter, and letter of authority. De Ocampo also
requested for the records of previous SSS payments, but the same could not be produced.
Thus, she told Ciriaco that Ambassador Hotel had to comply with the said request within
fifteen (15) days. On May 23, 2001, she prepared an investigation report stating that
Ambassador Hotel failed to present the required reports and to fully pay their outstanding
delinquency. In turn, the Cluster Legal Unit issued a final demand letter to Ambassador
Hotel. De Ocampo sent the final demand letter to Ambassador Hotel via registered mail. She
also returned to the hotel to personally serve the said letter, which was received by Norman
Cordon, Chief Operating Officer of Ambassador Hotel. Pilar Barzanilla of Ambassador Hotel
went to the SSS office and submitted a list of unpaid contributions from June 1999 to March
2001.On September 14, 2001, De Ocampo went back to the hotel to seek compliance with
the demand letter. The representatives of the hotel requested that the delinquency be
settled by installment. They also submitted a collection list, the audited financial settlement
and the request of installment to the SSS. Ambassador Hotel, however, did not tender any
postdated checks for the installment payments. On September 2001, the SSS filed a
complaint with the City Prosecutor's Office of Quezon City against Ambassador Hotel, Inc.
(Ambassador Hotel) and its officers for non-remittance of SSS contributions and penalty
liabilities for the period from June 1999 to March 2001 in the aggregate amount of
₱769,575.48.
3

ISSUE: Whether or not the decision rendered by the lower court declaring petitioner liable
to SSS for alleged unremitted SSS contribution is valid.
RULING: Yes, Ambassador Hotel's evidence simply focused on establishing that Yolanda
was not acting as its President from June 1999 to March 2001 because of an internal
dispute. Although this may be sufficient to eliminate the criminal liability of Yolanda, it does
not justify the nonpayment of SSS contributions. Ambassador Hotel did not squarely
address the issue on its obligations because there was dearth of evidence that it remitted
the said contributions. The hotel never proved that it had already paid its contributions or, if
not, who should have been accountable for its non-payment. Glaringly, even though
Ambassador Hotel was given sufficient leeway to explain its obligations, it did not take
advantage of the said opportunity. Consequently, it had nothing else to blame for its
predicament but itself. Verily, prompt remittance of SSS contributions under the aforesaid
provision is mandatory. Any divergence from this rule subjects the employer not only to
monetary sanctions, that is, the payment of penalty of three percent (3%) per month, but
also to criminal prosecution if the employer fails to: (a) register its employees with the SSS;
(b) deduct monthly contributions from the salaries/wages of its employees; or (c) remit to
the SSS its employees' SSS contributions and/or loan payments after deducting the same
from their respective salaries/wages.
84.Zambrano vs. Philippine Carpet Manufacturing Corporation/Pacific Carpet
Manufacturing Corporation, et al., G.R. No. 224099, June 21, 2017
TOPIC: Closure of Business - Piercing the Veil; Alter Ego Doctrine
DOCTRINE: Termination due to closure must be based on bona fide reason. The fact that
the employees do not believe the losses does not invalidate said termination. The Doctrine
of Piercing the corporate veil applies only in 3 basic areas: 1, Defeat of public convenience
as when the corporate fiction is used as a vehicle for the evasion of an existing obligation;
2. Fraud cases; 3. Alter ego cases
FACTS: On January 3, 2011, petitioners, who were employees of private respondent

Philippine Carpet Manufacturing Corporation, were notified of the termination of their
employment effective February 3, 2011 on the ground of cessation of operation due to
serious business losses. They were of the belief that their dismissal was without just cause
and in violation of due process because the closure of Phil Carpet was a mere pretense to
transfer its operations to its wholly owned and controlled corporation, Pacific Carpet
Manufacturing Corporation (Pacific Carpet). They asserted that their dismissal constituted
unfair labor practice as it involved the mass dismissal of all union officers and members of
the Philippine Carpet Manufacturing Employees Association (PHILCEA). In its defense, Phil
Carpet countered that it permanently closed and totally ceased its operations because there
had been a steady decline in the demand for its products due to global recession, stiffer
competition, and the effects of a changing market. Thus, in order to stem the bleeding, the
company implemented several cost-cutting measures, including voluntary redundancy and
early retirement programs. Phil Carpet likewise faithfully complied with the requisites for
closure or cessation of business under the Labor Code. The petitioners and the Department
of Labor and Employment were served written notices one (1) month before the intended
closure of the company. The petitioners were also paid their separation pay and they
voluntarily executed their respective Release and Quitclaim before the DOLE officials.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners were dismissed from employment for a lawful cause.
RULING: Yes. The petitioners were terminated from employment for an authorized cause.
In this case, the LA's findings that Phil Carpet suffered from serious business losses which
3
resulted in its closure were affirmed in toto by the NLRC, and subsequently by the CA. It is a

rule that absent any showing that the findings of fact of the labor tribunals and the
appellate court are not supported by evidence on record or the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts, the Court shall not examine anew the evidence submitted by the
parties. Further, even if the petitioners refuse to consider these losses as serious enough to
warrant Phil Carpet's total and permanent closure, it was a business judgment on the part
of the company's owners and stockholders to cease operations, a judgment which the Court
has no business interfering with. The only limitation provided by law is that the closure must
be "bonafide in character and not impelled by a motive to defeat or circumvent the tenurial
rights of employees. Thus, when an employer complies with the foregoing conditions, the
Court cannot prohibit closure "just because the business is not suffering from any loss or
because of the desire to provide the workers continued employment.
85.Philippine National Bank vs. Dalmacio/ Dalmacio vs. Philippine National

Bank, G.R. No. 202308/G.R. No. 202357, July 5, 2017
TOPIC: Redundancy
DOCTRINE: One of the authorized causes for the dismissal of an employee is

redundancy. It exists when the service capability of the workforce is in excess of what is
reasonably needed to meet the demands of the business enterprise. A position is redundant
when it is superfluous, and superfluity of a position or positions could be the result of a
number of factors, such as the over hiring of workers, a decrease in the volume of business
or the dropping of a particular line or service previously manufactured or undertaken by the
enterprise.
FACTS: The case sprung from a Complaint foiled by Jumelito Dalmacio and Emma Martinez
for illegal dismissal, underpayment of separation pay and retirement benefits, illegal
deduction, non-payment of provident fund with prayer for damages and attorney fees. The
two were separated from their employment from PNB on September 15, 2005 to PNB’s
implementation of its redundancy program. Martinez and Dalmacio was hired as utility
worker and communication equipment operator, respectfully by National Service Corp.
Dalmacio became an IT officer of PNB, while Martinez became Jr. IT Field Analyst. LA
Rioflorido ruled in favor of PNB stating that it complied with law and jurisprudence in
terminating the two. NLRC affirmed LA’s decision Ca affirmed in part in part on March 30,
Resolution. Both applied and appealed the decision of CA but were denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not PNB validly implemented its redundancy program?
RULING: Yes. PNB's redundancy program was neither unfair nor unreasonable considering
that it was within the ambit of its management prerogative. As the CA observed: PNB's
action is within the ambit of "management prerogative" to upgrade and enhance the
computer system of the bank. Petitioner, being an IT officer whose job is to maintain the
computer system of PNB, his position has become patently redundant upon PNB's
engagement of the contract service with Technopaq. x x x he was appositely informed of
PNB's move to contract the services of Technopaq and as a result thereof, there were
positions that were declared redundant including that of herein petitioner. x x x PNB
conducted series of meetings with herein petitioner and other affected employees to
purposely look for placement of the displaced employees to other positions suited for them.
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Finding no other alternative, PNB was constrained to terminate herein petitioner who

thereafter posed no objection thereto, consented to and willingly received the hefty
separation pay given to him.

230664, July 24, 2017
TOPIC: Graceful Exit
DOCTRINE: Respondents' decision to give petitioner a graceful exit is perfectly within their
discretion. It is settled that there is nothing reprehensible or illegal when the employer
grants the employee a chance to resign and save face rather than smear the latter's
employment record.
FACTS: Petitioner is a regular employee of Ferritz as Janitor. He was then asked by Melissa
Geronimo to watch over the generator and assists the guards to which he agreed. According
to petitioner, around 9 p.m. on July 10, 2014, he saw two security guards (the Officer-in-
Charge and one Gomez), together with an unidentified man, on their way to the electrical
room. They had a knapsack which did not look heavy. When they left the room, petitioner
saw Gomez carrying the knapsack which, by this time, appeared to contain something
heavy. In the next morning when they checked, the wires were already missing. At 1 p.m.,
he was summoned by Germino who verbally informed him that he was suspended from July
16, 2014 to August 13, 2014 on suspicion that he stole the electrical wires. Beginning July
16, 2014 until August 13, 2014, he was no longer allowed to work. Thus, on October 9,
2014, he filed a Complaint against FIDC, Germino and FIDC President Antonio Fernando
(collectively, respondents), for actual illegal dismissal and underpayment of salaries, with
prayer for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
ISSUE: Whether or not the act of the employer in allowing a Graceful exit is illegal?
RULING: No. Petitioner's claim of constructive dismissal fails. Bare allegations of

constructive dismissal, when uncorroborated by the evidence on record, as in this case,
cannot be given credence.
In Jomar S. Verdadero v. Barney Autolines Group of Companies Transport, Inc., et al., the
Court held: “Constructive dismissal exists where there is cessation of work, because
"continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as an offer
involving a demotion in rank or a diminution in pay" and other benefits. Aptly called a
dismissal in disguise or an act amounting to dismissal but made to appear as if it were not,
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constructive dismissal may, likewise, exist if an act of clear discrimination, insensibility, or

disdain by an employer becomes so unbearable on the part of the employee that it could
foreclose any choice by him except to forego his continued employment.” In this case,
records do not show any demotion in rank or a diminution in pay made against petitioner.
Neither was there any act of clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain committed by
respondents against petitioner which would justify or force him to terminate his employment
from the company. Respondents' decision to give petitioner a graceful exit is perfectly
within their discretion. It is settled that there is nothing reprehensible or illegal when the
employer grants the employee a chance to resign and save face rather than smear the
latter's employment record.

230664, July 24, 2017
TOPIC: Burden of Proof in Illegal Dismissal Case
Doctrine: The rule is that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it; thus,
petitioner was burdened to prove his allegation that respondents dismissed him from his
employment. It must be stressed that the evidence to prove this fact must be clear, positive
and convincing. The rule that the employer bears the burden of proof in illegal dismissal
cases finds no application here because the respondents deny having dismissed the
petitioner. In illegal dismissal cases, while the employer bears the burden to prove that the
termination was for a valid or authorized cause, the employee must first establish by
substantial evidence the fact of dismissal from service.
FACTS: Petitioner started working for respondent FIDC on August 23, 1993. He
subsequently became a regular employee of FIDC, performing work as janitor/maintenance
staff. According to petitioner, around 9 p.m. on July 10, 2014, he saw two security guards,
together with an unidentified man, on their way to the electrical room. They had a knapsack
which did not look heavy. When they left the room, petitioner saw Gomez carrying the
knapsack which, by this time, appeared to contain something heavy. The next morning,
petitioner borrowed the key to the electrical room and together with fellow maintenance
personnel, Alcallaga, looked for the electrical wires that were stored therein. Unfortunately,
the wires were no longer there. He was summoned by Germino who verbally informed him
that he was suspended from July 16, 2014 to August 13, 2014 on suspicion that he stole
the electrical wires. Beginning July 16, 2014 until August 13, 2014, he was no longer
allowed to work. Thus, on October 9, 2014, he filed a Complaint against FIDC, respondents,
for actual illegal dismissal and underpayment of salaries, with prayer for moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
ISSUE: Whether Cosue was constructively dismissed.
RULING: No. In this case, records do not show any demotion in rank or a diminution in pay
made against petitioner. Neither was there any act of clear discrimination, insensibility or
disdain committed by respondents against petitioner which would justify or force him to
terminate his employment from the company. Respondents' decision to give petitioner a
graceful exit is perfectly within their discretion. It is settled that there is nothing
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reprehensible or illegal when the employer grants the employee a chance to resign and save

face rather than smear the latter's employment record. The rule is that one who alleges a
fact has the burden of proving it; thus, petitioner was burdened to prove his allegation that
respondents dismissed him from his employment. It must be stressed that the evidence to
prove this fact must be clear, positive and convincing. The rule that the employer bears the
burden of proof in illegal dismissal cases finds no application here because the respondents
deny having dismissed the petitioner. In illegal dismissal cases, while the employer bears
the burden to prove that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause, the employee
must first establish by substantial evidence the fact of dismissal from service. In the instant
case, other than petitioner's bare allegation of having been dismissed, there was no
evidence presented to show that his employment was indeed terminated by respondents. In
the absence of any showing of an overt or positive act proving that respondents had
dismissed petitioner, the latter's claim of illegal dismissal cannot be sustained - as the same
would be self-serving, conjectural and of no probative value.
88.United Polyresins, Inc. vs. Pinuela, G.R. No. 209555, July 31, 2017
TOPIC: Expulsion or Impeachment of Union Officer - No Loss of Union Membership
FACTS: Petitioner United Polyresins, Inc. is a registered domestic corporation doing

business in San Pedro, Laguna, while petitioners Ernesto Uy Soon, Jr. and Julito Uy Soon
are its corporate officers. Pinuela was employed by UPI in 1987. He became a member of
the labor union, PORFA, and was elected President thereof in May, 2005 and slated to serve
until the end of 2007. March 29, 2008, the union's new set of officers conducted an
investigation into the fact that the union had little or no funds remaining in its bank
account. Respondent attended the investigation, and admitted that the union had no more
funds as they were "utilized in the prosecution of cases during his incumbency." He likewise
failed to make a formal turnover of documents to the new President. Respondent was
required to surrender union documents in his possession on the next scheduled meeting. On
April 8, 2008, another inquiry was held where respondent was present. The investigation
centered on respondent's continued failure to account for the union's bank accounts,
documents, and deposits made during his incumbency, and his failure to formally turn over
union's papers to the new officers. After the meeting, respondent and the new officers
proceeded to the bank, where they discovered that the PORFA account had already been
closed. On April 10, 2008, the new set of union officers issued a Resolution expelling
respondent from PORF A for being guilty of certain violations. The officers held that these
violations constituted an infringement of the union's Constitution, particularly Article XV,
Section 1, paragraphs (e) and (f) thereof, which specifically prohibit the misappropriation of
union funds and property and give ground for the impeachment and recall of union officers.
In an April 11, 2008 letter to petitioners, PORF A communicated respondent's expulsion
from the union.
ISSUE: Whether the expulsion was valid.
RULING: No. His failure to account for certain funds was not one of the grounds for
expelling a member. Provisions refer to impeachment and recall of union officers, and not
expulsion from union membership. This is made clear by Section 2(e) of Article XV, which
provides that "(t)he union officers impeached shall 'IPSO FACTO' to be considered resigned
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or ousted from office and shall no longer be elected nor appointed to any position in the

union." In short, any officer found guilty of violating these provisions shall simply be
removed, impeached or recalled, from office, but not expelled or stripped of union
membership. It was therefore error on the part of PORFA and petitioners to terminate
respondent's employment based on Article XV, Section 1, paragraphs (e) and (f) of the
union's Constitution. Such a ground does not constitute just cause for termination. A review
of the PORFA Constitution itself reveals that the only provision authorizing removal from the
union is found in Article X, Section 6, that is, on the ground of failure to pay union dues,
special assessments, fines, and other mandatory charges. On the other hand, grounds for
disqualification from membership may be found in Article IV, which states that- Section 3.
The following are not eligible neither [sic] for membership nor to election or appointment to
any position in the union: a. subversive or persons who profess subversive ideas. b. Persons
who have been convicted of crime involving moral turpitude. c. Persons who are not
employees of the company. These provisions do not apply in respondent's case. Although he
was eventually charged with estafa, a crime involving moral turpitude, still, he has not been
convicted of the crime. For this reason, he may not be disqualified as union member. Thus,
for what he is charged with, respondent may not be penalized with expulsion from the
union, since this is not authorized and provided for under PORFA's Constitution. The matter
of respondent's alleged failure to return petitioners' ₱300,000.00 which was lent to PORFA is
immaterial as well. It may not be used as a ground to terminate respondent's employment;
under the Labor Code, such a contribution by petitioners to PORFA is illegal and constitutes
unfair labor practice.
89.Sterling Paper Products Enterprises, Inc. vs. KMM-Katipunan, G.R. No.

221493, August 2, 2017
TOPIC: Testimony - Recantation
DOCTRINE: For misconduct or improper behavior to be a just cause for dismissal, the following
elements must concur: (a) the misconduct must be serious; (b) it must relate to the performance of
the employee's duties showing that the employee has become unfit to continue working for the
employer; and (c) it must have been performed with wrongful intent. It is consistently held by the
Court that utterance of obscene, insulting or offensive words against a superior are not only
destructive of the morale of his co-employees and a violation of the company rules and regulations,
but also constitutes gross misconduct. It is well-settled that accusatory and inflammatory language
used by an employee towards his employer or superior can be a ground for dismissal or termination.
FACTS: Having found Esponga guilty of gross and serious misconduct, gross disrespect to
superior and habitual negligence, Sterling sent a termination notice to Esponga. This
prompted Esponga and KMMKatipunan to file a complaint for illegal dismissal, unfair labor
practice, damages, and attorney's fees against Sterling. Sterling averred that on June 26,
2010, their supervisor Mercy Vinoya called the attention of Esponga and his co-employees
about to take a nap on the sheeter machine and prohibited them from taking a nap thereon
for safety reasons. When Vinoya passed by the staff house, she heard Esponga utter,
"Huwag maingay, puro bawal." She then confronted Esponga, who responded in a loud and
disrespectful tone, "Pura kayo bawal, bakit bawal ba magpahinga?” and gave her the "dirty
finger" sign in front of his co-employees and said "Wala ka pala eh, puro ka dakdak. Baka
pag ako nagsalita hindi mo kayanin." Later that day, Esponga was found to have been not
working as the machine assigned to him was not running from 2:20 to 4:30 in the
afternoon. The Labor Arbiter ruled that Esponga was illegally dismissed It held that Sterling
failed to discharge the burden of proof for failure to submit in evidence the company's code
of conduct, which was used as basis to dismiss Esponga. The NLRC reversed and set aside
the LA ruling, declaring that the dismissal was valid. The NLRC observed that as a result of
the June 26, 2010 incident, Esponga no longer performed his duties and simply spent the
3
remaining working hours talking with his co-workers. The CA reinstated the LA ruling. It

held that the utterances and gesture did not constitute serious misconduct. It adjudged that
Esponga's utterances and gesture sprung from the earlier incident which he perceived as
unfairly preventing him from taking a rest from work
ISSUE: Whether the cause of Esponga's dismissal amounts to serious misconduct?
RULING: Yes. Under Article 282 (a) of the Labor Code, serious misconduct by the employee
justifies the employer in terminating his or her employment. To constitute a valid cause for
the dismissal within the text and meaning of Article 282 of the Labor Code, the employee's
misconduct must be serious, i.e., of such grave and aggravated character and not merely
trivial or unimportant. Additionally, the misconduct must be related to the performance of
the employee's duties showing him to be unfit to continue working for the employer.
Further, and equally important and required, the act or conduct must have been performed
with wrongful intent. To summarize, for misconduct or improper behavior to be a just cause
for dismissal, the following elements must concur: (a) the misconduct must be serious; (b)
it must relate to the performance of the employee's duties showing that the employee has
become unfit to continue working for the employer; and (c) it must have been performed
with wrongful intent. The Court has consistently ruled that the utterance of obscene,
insulting or offensive words against a superior is not only destructive of the morale of his
co-employees and a violation of the company rules and regulations, but also constitutes
gross misconduct. It is well-settled that accusatory and inflammatory language used by an
90.Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc. Crown Shipmanagement Inc. vs. De Leon,
G.R. No. 199977, January 25, 2017
TOPIC: Post-Employment Medical Examination
DOCTRINE: The three-day rule must be observed by all those claiming disability benefits,
including seafarers who disembarked upon the completion of contract. The rationale for the
rule is that reporting the illness or injury within three days from repatriation fairly makes it
easier for a physician to determine the cause of the illness or injury. Ascertaining the real
cause of the illness or injury beyond the period may prove difficult. To ignore the rule might
set a precedent with negative repercussions, like opening floodgates to a limitless number
of seafarers claiming disability benefits, or causing unfairness to the employer who would
have difficulty determining the cause of a claimant's illness because of the passage of time.
The employer would then have no protection against unrelated disability claims.
FACTS: Wilfredo T. de Leon worked for Scanmar as a seafarer aboard the vessels. To his
next deployment, the company physician referred him to a neurologist for consultation,
management, and clearance. In the meantime, the status of respondent in his Medical
Examination Certificate was marked "pending." Thereafter, Scanmar no longer heard from
De Leon. Two years later, in December 2007, it received a letter from him asking for
disability benefits amounting to USD60,000. It did not reply to the letter, prompting him to
file a Complaint with the LA for disability benefits and attorney's fees. Petitioners belied the
claim of respondent that he experienced an illness aboard M/V Thule land, given the
absence of any such entry in the vessel's logbook; that when he disembarked, De Leon did
not complain of any illness, request medical assistance, or submit himself to a post-
employment medical examination within three days from his disembarkation, as required by
his POEA Contract; and that he had failed to address his "pending" status and to follow the
company physician's advice for him to consult a neurologist. The LA ruled in favor of De
Leon. The LA declared that the three-day post-employment medical examination
requirement did not apply, as respondent had not been medically repatriated. NLRC and CA
agreed with the LA’s decision.
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ISSUE: Whether or not the rule on three-day post-employment medical examination
requirement does not apply in this case?
RULING: No. The rule applies in this case. To be entitled to disability benefits, the
provisions of the POEA Contract, setting forth minimum rights of a seafarer and the
concomitant obligations of an employer must be complied. Under Section 20 (B) thereof,
these are the requirements for compensability: (1) the seafarer must have submitted to a
mandatory post-employment medical examination within three working days upon return;
(2) the injury must have existed during the term of the seafarer's employment contract;
and (3) the injury must be work-related. It is not disputed that De Leon failed to submit to
a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician within three
working days from disembarkation. The excuse given by the LA, the NLRC, and the CA does
not hold water. The rationale for the rule is that reporting the illness or injury within three
days from repatriation fairly makes it easier for a physician to determine the cause of the
illness or injury. Ascertaining the real cause of the illness or injury beyond the period may
prove difficult. To ignore the rule might set a precedent with negative repercussions, like
opening floodgates to a limitless number of seafarers claiming disability benefits, or causing
unfairness to the employer who would have difficulty determining the cause of a claimant's
illness because of the passage of time. The employer would then have no protection against
unrelated disability claims. Since De Leon failed to prove all the requirements for
compensability, this Court deletes the grant of USD 60,000 for permanent and total
disability benefits.
91.Asian Institute of Management vs. Asian Institute of Management Faculty

Association, G.R. No. 207971, January 23, 2017
TOPIC: Cancellation of Union Registration
DOCTRINE: Based on Holy Child Catholic School vs. Hon. Sto Tomas, in case of alleged
inclusion of disqualified employees in a union, the proper procedure for employer is to
directly file a petition for cancellation of the union’s certificate of registration due to
misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under Art. 239 of the Labor Code.
FACTS: AFA filed a petition for certification election seeking to represent a bargaining unit
at AIM, consisting of 40 faculty members. However, AIM opposed the petition claiming that
the members are neither rank-and-file nor supervisory but managerial employees. AIM filed
a petition for cancellation of AFA’s certificate of registration. Misrepresentation in
registration and that they composed of managerial employees who are prohibited from
organizing as union. The Med-Arbiter issued an order denying the petition for certification
election. Order was appealed by AFA before the Labor Secretary who reversed the order. In
another order, the DOLE-NCR RD granted the petition of AIM for cancellation of the
certificate of registration of AFA and ordered the delisting from the roster of legitimate labor
organizations. The same was appealed before the Bureau of Labor Relations who reversed
the same and ordered retention of AFA in the roster. AIM appealed both order to the CA
reversing the order with regard to petition for election and affirming petition for cancellation
of certificate of registration.
ISSUE: Whether or not certificate of registration of AFA should be cancelled.
RULING: YES. Petitioner was correct in filing a petition for cancellation of respondent's
certificate of registration. Petitioner's sole ground for seeking cancellation of respondent's
certificate of registration - that its members are managerial employees and for this reason,
3
its registration is thus a patent nullity for being an absolute violation of Article 245 of the

Labor Code which declares that managerial employees are ineligible to join any labor
organization --- is, in a sense, an accusation that respondent is guilty of misrepresentation
for registering under the claim that its members are not managerial employees.
However, the issue of whether respondent's members are managerial employees is still
pending resolution by way of petition for review on certiorari in G.R. No. 197089, which is
the culmination of all proceedings in DOLE Case No. NCR-OD-M-0705-007 -- where the
issue relative to the nature of respondent's membership was first raised by petitioner itself
and is there fiercely contested. The resolution of this issue cannot be pre-empted; until it is
determined with finality in G.R. No. l 97089, the petition for cancellation of respondent's
certificate of registration on the grounds alleged by petitioner cannot be resolved. As a
matter of courtesy and in order to avoid conflicting decisions, We must await the resolution
of the petition in G.R. No. 197089.
92.De Ocampo Memorial Schools, Inc. vs. Bigkis Manggagawa sa De Ocampo

Memorial School, Inc., G.R. No. 192648, March 15, 2017
TOPIC: Security of Tenure
DOCTRINE: Thus, for purposes of de-certifying a union, it is not enough to establish that
the rank-and-file union includes ineligible employees in its membership. Pursuant to
paragraphs (a) and (b) of Article 247 of the Labor Code, it must be shown that there was
misrepresentation, false statement or fraud in connection with: (1) the adoption or
ratification of the constitution and by-laws or amendments thereto; (2) the minutes of
ratification; (3) the election of officers; (4) the minutes of the election of officers; and (5)
the list of voters. Failure to submit these documents together with the list of the newly
elected-appointed officers and their postal addresses to the BLR may also constitute
grounds for cancellation, lack of mutuality of interests, however, is not among said grounds.
FACTS: De Ocampo Memorial Schools, Inc. (De Ocampo) is a domestic corporation that has
two main divisions, namely: De Ocampo Memorial Medical Center (DOMMC), its hospital
entity, and the De Ocampo Memorial Colleges (DOMC), its school entity. Union Registration
No. NCR-UR-9-3858-2002 was issued in favor of Bigkis Manggagawa sa De Ocampo
Memorial Medical Center - LAKAS (BMDOMMC). Later, on December 5, 2003, Bigkis
Manggagawa sa De Ocampo Memorial School, Inc. (BMDOMSI) was issued a Union
Registration/Certificate of Creation of Local Chapter No. NCR-12-CC-002-2003 and declared
a legitimate labor organization. It sought to cancel the Certificate of Registration of
BMDOMSI on the following grounds: 1) misrepresentation, false statement and fraud in
connection with its creation and registration as a labor union as it shared the same set of
officers and members with BMDOMMC; 2) mixed membership of rank-and-file and
managerial/supervisory employees; and 3) inappropriate bargaining unit. BMDOMSI filed its
Comment-Opposition to Petition for Cancellation of Certificate of Registration and
Supplemental Petition, denying De Ocampo's allegations and claiming that the latter only
wants to impede the formation of the union. BLR reversed the Regional Director's finding of
3
misrepresentation, false statement or fraud in BMDOMSI's application for registration.

ISSUE: Whether or not BMDOMSI has committed misrepresentation and fraud in connection
with its application, creation and registration, thus shall be cancelled.
RULING: NO. While the CA may have ruled that there is no mutuality or commonality of
interests among the members of BMDOMSI, this is not enough reason to cancel its
registration. The only grounds on which the cancellation of a union's registration may be
sought are those found in Article 247 of the Labor Code. In Tagaytay Highlands
International Golf Club Incorporated v. Tagaytay Highlands Employees Union-PTGWO, we
ruled that "[t]he inclusion in a union of disqualified employees is not among the grounds for
cancellation, unless such inclusion is due to misrepresentation, false statement or fraud
under the circumstances enumerated in Sections (a) and (c) of Article [247] x x x of the
Labor Code."
93.Chateau Royale Sports and Country Club, Inc. vs. Balba, G.R. No. 197492,
January 18, 2017
TOPIC: Management Prerogative - Transfer of Employee
DOCTRINE: The management had the prerogative to determine the place where the
employee is best qualified to serve the interests of the business given the qualifications,
training and performance of the affected employee.
FACTS: Chateau Royale Sports and Country Club is a domestic corporation operating a
resort complex in Nasugbu, Batangas. The Corporation hired Balba and Constante as
Account Executives on probationary status and were eventually promoted as Account
Managers. As part of their duties, they are instructed to forward all proposals, event orders
and contracts for an orderly and systematic bookings in the operation of the corporation’s
business. However, the managers failed to comply. Notices were served to the managers to
explain and notices of administrative hearings were sent. The managers were suspended
and in return they filed a complaint for illegal suspension and non-payment of allowances
and commissions. They further amended the complaint indicating the presence of
constructive dismissal based on the information that they received notices of transfer from
Nasugbu to Manila office despite the refusal due to the fact that their families live in
Nasugbu. The failure of the managers to comply with the transfer prompted to request for
another incident report and sanctioned them of written reprimand for failure to abide by the
order of transfer.
ISSUE: Whether the managers’ failure to comply to the order of transfer is valid ground for
constructive dismissal.
RULING: No, the transfer could not be validly assailed as a form of constructive dismissal,
for, as held in Benguet Electric Cooperative v. Fianza, 425 SCRA 41 (2004), management
had the prerogative to determine the place where the employee is best qualified to serve
the interests of the business given the qualifications, training and performance of the
3
affected employee. To start with, the resignations of the account managers and the director

of sales and marketing in the Manila office brought about the immediate need for their
replacements with personnel having commensurate experiences and skills. With the
positions held by the resigned sales personnel being undoubtedly crucial to the operations
and business of the petitioner, the resignations gave rise to an urgent and genuine business
necessity that fully warranted the transfer from the Nasugbu, Batangas office to the main
office in Manila of the respondents, undoubtedly the best suited to perform the tasks
assigned to the resigned employees because of their being themselves account managers
who had recently attended seminars and trainings as such. Although the respondents’
transfer to Manila might be potentially inconvenient for them because it would entail
additional expenses on their part aside from their being forced to be away from their
families, it was neither unreasonable nor oppressive. The petitioner rightly points out that
the transfer would be without demotion in rank, or without diminution of benefits and
salaries. Instead, the transfer would open the way for their eventual career growth, with the
corresponding increases in pay. It is noted that their prompt and repeated opposition to the
transfer effectively stalled the possibility of any agreement between the parties regarding
benefits or salary adjustments.
94.Dagasdas vs. Grand Placement and General Services Corporation, G.R. No.
205727, January 18, 2017
TOPIC: Termination of Employment - Stipulation to Terminate is Void
DOCTRINE: Parties may stipulate in their contracts such terms and conditions as they
may deem convenient, these terms and conditions must not be contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order or policy. Our Constitution guarantees that employees, local or
overseas, are entitled to security of tenure. To allow employers to reserve a right to
terminate employees without cause is violative of this guarantee of security of tenure.
FACTS: Grand Placement and General Services Corporation is a licensed recruitment or

placement agency in the Philippines having Industrial & Management Technology Methods
Co. Ltd. As its principal while Saudi Aramco is its counterpart in Saudi Arabia. Grand
Placement, on behalf of Industrial & Management employed Dagasdas as Network
Technician. Dagasdas underwent trainings as Network Technician but his job offer states
that he was accepted as Supt. Of Aramco and Industrial & Management. Dagasdas went to
Saudi Arabia wherein he signed a new employment contract with Industrial & Management
which provides that Dagasdas shall be placed under a three-month probationary period.
Industrial & Management served termination notice to Dagasdas indicating his last day of
work and was dismissed pursuant to clause 17.4.3 of his contract, which provided that
Industrial & Management reserved the right to terminate any employee within the three-
month probationary period without need of any notice to the employee.
ISSUE: Whether the contract clause is valid.
RULING: No, the contract clause is not valid. Based on the foregoing, there is no clear
justification for the dismissal of Dagasdas other than the exercise of ITM's right to terminate
him within the probationary period. While our Civil Code recognizes that parties may
stipulate in their contracts such terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, these
3
terms and conditions must not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or

policy. The above-cited clause is contrary to law because as discussed, our Constitution
guarantees that employees, local or overseas, are entitled to security of tenure. To allow
employers to reserve a right to terminate employees without cause is violative of this
guarantee of security of tenure. Moreover, even assuming that Dagasdas was still a
probationary employee when he was terminated, his dismissal must still be with a valid
cause. As regards a probationary employee, his or her dismissal may be allowed only if
there is just cause or such reason to conclude that the employee fails to qualify as regular
employee pursuant to reasonable standards made known to the employee at the time of
engagement.
205727, January 18, 2017
TOPIC: Employment Contract - Lex Loci Contractus
DOCTRINE: Employment contracts of OFWs are perfected in the Philippines. With the
principle of lex loci contractus (the law of the place where the contract is made), these
contracts are governed by our laws—the Labor Code of the Philippines and its implementing
rules and regulations.
FACTS: GPGS employed Dagasdas as Network Technician under a one-year contract but his
Job Offer indicated a position of Superintendent. Dagasdas actually applied for and was
engaged as a Civil Engineer. The Network Technician position was only for the purpose of
securing a visa. In Saudi, Dagasdas was made to sign a new employment contract with ITM
which stipulated that ITM contracted him as Superintendent or in any capacity within the
scope of his abilities, that he will be under a three-month probationary period and that the
new contract cancels all prior contracts. Dagasdas was given tasks suited for a Mechanical
Engineer and was temporarily transferred to Civil Engineering Department but was later on
directed to exit the worksite. ITM dismissed him and he signed a Quitclaim stating that ITM
paid him all salaries and benefits due him and was relieved from all financial obligations due
to him. Dagasdas then filed an illegal dismissal case against GPGS, ITM, and Aramco. He
accused them of misrepresentation, which resulted in the work mismatch. He supported his
claim with e-mail exchanges establishing that the company knew of the job mismatch. The
employers countered that Dagasdas was legally dismissed. Dagasdas could not perform his
work within the standards of the employer. He was informed of his poor performance and
agreed to his termination as evidenced by the quitclaim. He was also only a probationary
employee.The Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed the case but the NLRC reversed it saying that
the dismissal was illegal. The Court of Appeals set aside the NLRC resolution and reinstated
the LA decision.
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ISSUE: Whether the new employment contract, that ITM made Dagasdas sign, was valid.

RULING: No, it was not valid. The new contract breached Dagasdas' original contract,
therefore, it cannot supersede the original contract; its terms and conditions are void.
Security of tenure remains even if employees, particularly OFWs, work in a different
jurisdiction. Since OFW employment contracts are perfected in the Philippines, following the
principle of lex loci contractus, these contracts are governed by our laws, the Labor Code
and its implementing rules and regulations. Our Constitution explicitly provides that the
State shall afford full protection to labor, whether local or overseas. Thus, even if a Filipino
is employed abroad, he or she is entitled to security of tenure. While in the Philippines and
prior to deployment, Dagasdas signed a POEA-approved contract with GPGS, on behalf of
ITM; in Saudi Arabia, ITM made him sign a new employment contract. The new contract,
which was used as basis for dismissing Dagasdas, is void and is in violation of his right to
security of tenure. Under our Labor Code, unless processed through the POEA, the OFW’s
employment contract does not bind him or her, like the new contract signed by Dagasdas.
205727, January 18, 2017
TOPIC: Release, Waiver and Quitclaim
DOCTRINE: An employee's waiver or quitclaim shall not prevent him or her from
demanding benefits to which he or she is entitled and from filing an illegal dismissal case. A
waiver or quitclaim is looked upon with disfavor for being contrary to public policy.
FACTS: GPGS employed Dagasdas as Network Technician under a one-year contract but his
Job Offer indicated a position of Superintendent. Dagasdas actually applied for and was
engaged as a Civil Engineer. The Network Technician position was only for the purpose of
securing a visa. In Saudi, Dagasdas was made to sign a new employment contract with ITM
which stipulated that ITM contracted him as Superintendent or in any capacity within the
scope of his abilities, that he will be under a three-month probationary period and that the
new contract cancels all prior contracts. Dagasdas was given tasks suited for a Mechanical
Engineer and was temporarily transferred to Civil Engineering Department but was later on
directed to exit the worksite. ITM dismissed him and he signed a Quitclaim stating that ITM
paid him all salaries and benefits due him and was relieved from all financial obligations due
to him. Dagasdas then filed an illegal dismissal case against GPGS, ITM, and Aramco. He
accused them of misrepresentation, which resulted in the work mismatch. He supported his
claim with e-mail exchanges establishing that the company knew of the job mismatch. The
employers countered that Dagasdas was legally dismissed. Dagasdas could not perform his
work within the standards of the employer. He was informed of his poor performance and
agreed to his termination as evidenced by the quitclaim. He was also only a probationary
employee.The Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed the case but the NLRC reversed it saying that
the dismissal was illegal. The Court of Appeals set aside the NLRC resolution and reinstated
the LA decision.
ISSUE: Whether the Quitclaim signed by Dagasdas prevented him from filing an illegal
dismissal case against his employers.
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RULING: No. While it is shown that Dagasdas executed a waiver in favor of his employer, it
does not necessarily follow that he freely and voluntarily agreed to waive all his claims and
the same does not preclude him from filing a suit. An employee's waiver or quitclaim cannot
prevent him or her from demanding benefits to which he or she is entitled and from filing an
illegal dismissal case. A waiver or quitclaim is regarded with disfavor and frowned upon for
being contrary to public policy. Unless it can be established that the person executing the
waiver voluntarily did so, with full understanding of its contents, and with reasonable and
credible consideration, the same is not valid and binding. The burden to prove that a waiver
or quitclaim is voluntarily executed lies with the employer. GPGS and ITM failed to show
that Dagasdas indeed voluntarily waived his claims against them.
TOPIC: Release, Waiver and Quitclaim - Improperly Notarized Release and

Quitclaim; Effects
DOCTRINE: Not all quitclaims are invalid and against public policy. "If the agreement was
voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the parties
and may not later be disowned simply because of a change of mind. It is only where there is
a clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or the
terms of settlement are unconscionable on its face, that the law will step in to annul the
questionable transaction.
rose through the ranks and was promoted and held the position of Vice-President during his
separation. After 19 years of service, petitioner was separated from service. Petitioner
contends that his resignation was not voluntary and was done under duress and all
quitclaims he signed were void as all were done under duress, petitioner then filed a case of
illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement and payment of backwages, other monetary
claims and damages. The Labor Arbiter held that Doble was illegally dismissed because his
resignation was involuntary, and ordered ABB, Inc. and Desai to pay his backwages and
separation pay, since reinstatement is no longer feasible. Aggrieved by the Decision of the
Labor Arbiter, ABB, Inc. and Desai filed an appeal, whereas Doble filed a partial appeal from
the dismissal of his monetary claims. The NLRC Sixth Division voted to grant the appeal
filed by ABB, Inc. and Desai, and to dismiss the partial appeal of Doble. They found that the
resignation of Doble being voluntary, there can be no illegal dismissal and no basis for the
award of other monetary claims, damages and attorney's fees.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was illegal dismissal and whether or not the quitclaims signed
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by petitioner are valid.

RULING: In illegal dismissal cases, the fundamental rule is that when an employer
interposes the defense of resignation, the burden to prove that the employee indeed
voluntarily resigned necessarily rests upon the employer. The Court agrees with the NLRC
that ABB, Inc. and Desai were able to prove by substantial evidence that Doble voluntarily
resigned. A deed of release of quitclaim does not bar an employee from demanding benefits
to which he is legally entitled. Employees who received their separation pay are not barred
from contesting the legality of their dismissal, and the acceptance of such benefits would
not amount to estoppel. The basic reason for this is that such quitclaims and/or complete
releases are null and void for being contrary to public policy. Not all quitclaims are invalid
and against public policy. "If the agreement was voluntarily entered into and represents a
reasonable settlement, it is binding on the parties and may not later be disowned simply
because of a change of mind. It is only where there is a clear proof that the waiver was
wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of settlement are
unconscionable on its face, that the law will step in to annul the questionable transaction.
98.Philippine National Bank vs. Dalmacio/ Dalmacio vs. Philippine National

Bank, G.R. No. 202308/G.R. No. 202357, July 5, 2017
TOPIC: Release, Waiver and Quitclaim - Allegation of "Forced to Sign"
DOCTRINE: The requisites for a valid quitclaim are: (1) that there was no fraud or deceit
on the part of any of the parties; (2) that the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and
reasonable; and (3) that the contract is not contrary to law, public order, public policy,
morals or good customs or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.
FACTS: The case stemmed from a complaint for illegal dismissal, underpayment of
separation pay and retirement benefits, illegal deduction, nonpayment of provident fund
with prayer for damages and attorney's fees filed by Jumelito T. Dalmacio (Dalmacio) and
Emma R. Martinez (Martinez) as a result of their separation from PNB way back September
15, 2005 due to PNB's implemention of its redundancy program. Dalmacio and Martinez
were hired as utility worker and communication equipment operator, respectively, by the
National Service Corporation, a subsidiary of PNB. Years later, Dalmacio became an
Information Technology (IT) officer of PNB, while Martinez became a Junior IT Field Analyst.
Dalmacio was made to sign a Deed of Quitclaim and Release with his termination. Dalmacio
contends that the quitclaim is void as it was done under duress and he was not fully
apprised of the consequences of his signature. The LA ruled that PNB complied with the law
and jurisprudence in terminating the services of the complainants on the ground of
redundancy. The NLRC upheld the decision of the LA on appeal. Petitioners then filed a
petition for certiorari with the CA. The CA then affirmed the decision of the NLRC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Deed of Quitcalim is valid.
RULING: Generally, deeds of release, waiver or quitclaims cannot bar employees from
demanding benefits to which they are legally entitled or from contesting the legality of their
dismissal since quitclaims are looked upon with disfavor and are frowned upon as contrary
to public policy. Where, however, the person making the waiver has done so voluntarily,
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with a full understanding thereof, and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and

reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as being a valid and binding undertaking.
The requisites for a valid quitclaim are: (1) that there was no fraud or deceit on the part of
any of the parties; (2) that the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable;
and (3) that the contract is not contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good
customs or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. Not having
sufficiently proved that he was forced to sign said Deed of Quitclaim and Release, Dalmacio
cannot expediently argue that quitclaims are looked upon with disfavor and considered
ineffective to bar claims for the full measure of a worker's legal rights. Indeed, it cannot
even be said that Dalmacio did not fully understand the consequences of signing the Deed
of Quitclaim and Release. He is not an illiterate person who needs special protection. He
held a responsible position at PNB as an IT officer. It is thus safe to say that he understood
the contents of the Deed of Quitclaim and Release. There is also no showing that the
execution thereof was tainted with deceit or coercion. Although he claims that he was
"forced to sign"28 the quitclaim, he nonetheless signed it. In doing so, Dalmacio was
compelled by his own personal circumstances, not by an act attributable to PNB.
184256, January 18, 2017
TOPIC: Appeal - One-day late due to unforeseen events; Perfection
DOCTRINE: Courts have the prerogative to relax procedural rules of even the most
mandatory character, mindful of the duty to reconcile both the need to speedily put an end
to litigation and the parties' right to due process.
FACTS: Maersk ltd., employed Joselito Ramos as able-seaman of M/V NKOSSA II for a
period of four (4) months. Within the contract period and while on board the vessel, Ramosˊ
left eye was hit by a screw. He was repatriated to Manila on November 21, 2001 and was
referred to Dr. Salvador Salceda, the company-designated physician, for check-up. Ramosˊ
was then examined by Dr. Anthony Martin S. Dolor at the Medical Center Manila and was
diagnosed with "corneal scar and cystic macula, left, post-traumatic." On November 29,
2001, he underwent several treatment for his left eye. On May 22, 2002, he was examined
by Dr. Angel C. Aliwalas, Jr. at the Ospital ng Muntinlupa and was diagnosed with "corneal
scar with post-traumatic cataract formation, left eye." Because of this, private respondent's
demand for disability benefits but it was rejected by petitioners. He then filed with the NLRC
a complaint for total permanent disability, illness allowance, moral and exemplary damages
and attorney's fees. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the Complaint for being prematurely filed.
On Appeal, NLRC found that it was not respondent's fault that he was not able to perfect his
appeal on July 21, 2003, the latter part of said day having been declared non-working by
NLRC NCR, itself. It is only just and fair, therefore, that Complainant should be given until
the next working day to perfect his appeal. CA affirmed all the findings of the NLRC on both
procedural and substantive issues, but deleted the award of moral and exemplary damages,
because there was no "sufficient factual legal basis for the awards.
ISSUE: Whether respondent perfected his appeal to the NLRC;
RULING: Yes. The court ruled that the Respondent perfected his appeal before the NLRC.
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The failure of respondent to file his appeal before the NLRC must be contextualized. There is

no question that July 21, 2003 was supposed to be the last day for the filing by Complainant
of his appeal from the Labor Arbiter's Decision. Incidentally, a working "day" at the NLRC
NCR consists of eight (8) hours of work from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Complainant,
therefore, had until 5:00 p.m. of July 21, 2003 to perfect his appeal. Notably, his counsel's
messenger reached the NLRC NCR at 4:00 p.m. of that day for the sole purpose of
perfecting Complainant's appeal. Unfortunately, however, the NLRC NCR closed its Office at
3:30 p.m., earlier than the normal closing time of 5:00 p.m., because of a jeepney strike.
Clearly, it was not Complainant's fault that he was not able to perfect his appeal on July 21,
2003, the latter part of said day having been declared non-working by NLRC NCR, itself. It
is only just and fair, therefore, that Complainant should be given until the next working day
to perfect his appeal. In any case, we have always held that the "[c]ourts have the
prerogative to relax procedural rules of even the most mandatory character, mindful of the
duty to reconcile both the need to speedily put an end to litigation and the parties' right to
due process."
100. Javines vs. Xlibris a.k.a. Author Solutions, Inc., G.R. No. 214301, June
7, 2017
TOPIC: Appeal - Finality of decision for failure to appeal
DOCTRINE: Although appeal is an essential part of judicial process, the right thereto is not
a natural right or a part of due process but is merely a statutory privilege. Settled are the
rules that a decision becomes final as against a party who does not appeal the same and an
appellee who has not himself appealed cannot obtain from the appellate court any
affirmative relief other than those granted in the decision of the court below.
FACTS: Javines was hired by Xlibris as Operations Manager on September 1, 2011.

Approximately 10 months after, or on July 27, 2012, Javines was terminated for
falsifying/tampering three meal receipts. Javines then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.
The complaint was, however, dismissed by the Labor Arbiter who found that Javines'
dismissal was for just cause and with due process. On appeal, NLRC modified the decision of
the Labor Arbiter, finding that, while Javines was dismissed for just cause, he was not
afforded procedural due process. The CA partially granted the petition. it observed that
while Javines was given a chance to explain his side and adduce evidence in his defense
through his written explanation and through the administrative hearing, he was
nevertheless not given the opportunity to rebut the additional pieces of evidence secured by
Xlibris thereafter and considered by Xlibris in arriving at the decision to terminate him.
ISSUE: Whether or not NLRCˊs decision became final. Hence, non-appealable.
RULING: Yes. The Court ruled that it is undisputed that from the unanimous finding of LA
and NLRC that Javines' employment was terminated for just cause under Article 297
(formerly Article 282) of the Labor Code, Javines failed to move for reconsideration nor
challenged said ruling before the CA. Consequently, the NLRC decision finding Javines to
have been dismissed for just cause became final. For failure to file the requisite petition
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before the CA, the NLRC decision had attained finality and had been placed beyond the

appellate court's power of review. Although appeal is an essential part of judicial process,
the right thereto is not a natural right or a part of due process but is merely a statutory
privilege. Settled are the rules that a decision becomes final as against a party who does
not appeal the same and an appellee who has not himself appealed cannot obtain from the
appellate court any affirmative relief other than those granted in the decision of the court
below. Hence, the finding that Javines was dismissed for just cause must be upheld.
101. Javines vs. Xlibris a.k.a. Author Solutions, Inc., G.R. No. 214301, June
7, 2017
TOPIC: Appeal - Consideration of errors not assigned on appeal
DOCTRINE: Proper assignment of errors and to consider errors not assigned, it has
authority to do so in the following instances: a) when the question affects jurisdiction over
the subject matter;(b) matters that are evidently plain or clerical errors within
contemplation of law; (c) matters whose consideration is necessary in arriving at a just
avoiding dispensing piecemeal justice; (d) matters raised in the trial court and are of record
the determination of a question properly assigned is dependent.
FACTS: Javines was hired by respondent Xlibris as Operations Manager. Javines was
terminated for falsifying/tampering three meal receipts. Javines submitted his written
explanation, denying having tampered the receipts but failed to explain why and how the
incident transpired. Xlibris terminated Javines' employment through an "end of employment
notice.” Javines then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The complaint was dismissed by
the Labor Arbiter for just cause and with due process. On appeal, the NLRC modified the
decision of the Labor Arbiter, while Javines was dismissed for just cause, he was not
afforded procedural due process. The NLRC noted that after the administrative hearing,
notices to explain were immediately sent to the supervisors who denied participation in the
falsification of the receipts. The NLRC noticed that no other hearing was called thereafter so
as to afford Javines the opportunity to confront the witnesses against him before he was
dismissed. Javines failed to move for reconsideration of the NLRC's decision while Xlibris'
motion for partial reconsideration was denied. Thus, only Xlibris elevated the case to the CA
on certiorari on the issue that it failed to comply with the requirements of procedural due
process. The CA partially granted the petition. Javines moved for reconsideration. The CA
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denied Javines motion.

ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in affirming the NLRC'S finding that Javines was dismissed for
just cause.
RULING: No. The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC uniformly held that Javines' employment was
terminated for just cause under Article 297 (formerly Article 282) of the Labor Code. It is
undisputed that from this unanimous finding, Javines failed to move for reconsideration nor
challenged said ruling before the CA. Consequently, the NLRC decision finding Javines to
have been dismissed for just cause became final. For failure to file the requisite petition
before the CA, the NLRC decision had attained finality and had been placed beyond the
appellate court's power of review. Although appeal is an essential part of judicial process,
the right thereto is not a natural right or a part of due process but is merely a statutory
privilege. While it is true that the appellate court is given broad discretionary power to
waive the lack of proper assignment of errors and to consider errors not assigned, it has
authority to do so in the following instances: (a) when the question affects jurisdiction over
the subject matter;(b) matters that are evidently plain or clerical errors within
contemplation of law; c) matters whose consideration is necessary in arriving at a just
avoiding dispensing piecemeal justice;(d) matters raised in the trial court and are of record
the determination of a question properly assigned is dependent.None of the aforesaid
instances exists in the instant case. Thus, the CA cannot be faulted for no longer discussing
the issue of whether indeed there exists just cause for his dismissal.
102. Maersk Filipinas Crewing Inc., and Maersk Co. IOM Ltd. vs. Ramos,
G.R. No. 184256, January 18, 2017
TOPIC: Authority of Counsel - Presumed Authorized
DOCTRINE: Section. 21. An attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to represent

any cause in which he appears, and no written power of attorney is required to authorize
him to appear in court for his client, but the presiding judge may, on motion of either party
and on reasonable grounds therefor being shown, require any attorney who assumes the
right to appear in a case to produce or prove the authority under which he appears, and to
disclose, whenever pertinent to any issue, the name of the person who employed him, and
may thereupon make such order as justice requires. An attorney wilfully appearing in court
for a person without being employed, unless by leave of the court, may be punished for
contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official transactions.
FACTS: Maersk ltd., through its local manning agent Maersk Inc., employed respondent as
able-seaman of M/V NKOSSA II for a period of 4 months. Within the contract period and
while on board the vessel, respondent’s left eye was hit by a screw. He was repatriated to
Manila and was referred to Dr. Salceda, the company-designated physician, for a check-up.
He was examined at the Medical Center Manila and was diagnosed with "corneal scar with
post-traumatic cataract formation, left eye." He underwent an eye examination and
glaucoma test. Since respondent's demand for disability benefits was rejected by
petitioners, he then filed with the NLRC a complaint for total permanent disability, illness
allowance, moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. Meanwhile, in his medical
report, it stated that although respondent's left eye cannot be improved by medical
treatment, he can return to duty and is still fit to work. His normal right eye can
compensate for the discrepancy with the use of correctional glasses. In his letter, Dr. Dolor
answered that the evaluation of the physician could not have progressed in such a short
period of time, which is approximately one month after he issued the medical report and a
review of the medical reports from PGH and the findings on the left and right eye showed
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that they were within normal range, hence, could not be labeled as glaucoma. On 15 May

2003, the labor arbiter rendered a Decision dismissing the Complaint. The CA held that
respondent did not present any proof in support of his Manifestation that the SVBB had no
authority to represent him before the NLRC or in the continuation of the case in court. It
ruled that the "presumption that SVBB is authorized to represent him before the NLRC and
in the case at bar stands.
ISSUE: Whether counsel of respondent was authorized to represent the latter after the LA
had rendered its Decision on 15 May 2003.
RULING: No. Aside from the presumption of authority to represent a client in all stages of
litigation, an attorney's appearance is also presumed to be with the previous knowledge and
consent of the litigant until the contrary is shown. This presumption is strong, as the "mere
denial by a party that he has authorized an attorney to appear for him, in the absence of a
compelling reason, is insufficient to overcome the presumption, especially when denial
comes after the rendition of an adverse judgment.” Respondent averred that he ceased
communications with the SVBB after 15 May 2003; that he did not cause the re-filing of his
case; and that he did not sign any document for the continuation of his case. However, he
gave no cogent reason for this disavowal. He presented no evidence other than the denial in
his Manifestation. Moreover, respondent only sent his Manifestation disclaiming the SVBB's
authority on 1 February 2007. It was submitted almost four years after the LA had
dismissed his complaint for having been prematurely filed. By that time, through the SVBB's
efforts, the NLRC had already rendered a Decision favorable to respondent. It puzzles us
why respondent would renounce the authority of his supposed counsel at this late stage.
The attempt of petitioners to use this circumstance to their advantage - in order to avoid
payment of liability - should not be given any weight by this Court.
103. Doble vs. ABB, Inc., G.R. No. 215627, June 5, 2017
TOPIC: Separation Benefits - Acceptance; Estoppel
DOCTRINE: Under prevailing jurisprudence, a deed of release of quitclaim does not bar an
employee from demanding benefits to which he is legally entitled. Employees who received
their separation pay are not barred from contesting the legality of their dismissal, and the
acceptance of such benefits would not amount to estoppel. The basic reason for this is that
such quitclaims and/or complete releases are null and void for being contrary to public
policy.
FACTS: Petitioner Luis S. Doble, Jr. was hired as an engineer by ABB, Inc. In his 19 years
of service, he was consistently given Strong or Superior Performance Results, pursuant to
the company policy of conducting a yearly Performance and Development Appraisal for all of
its employees. However, he was informed by the Country Manager and President Nitin Desai
that in 2011, his performance rating was unsatisfactory. Desai and HR Manager Marivic
Miranda explained to Doble that a change in leadership has been demanded and that he was
asked to resign as Local Division Manager. He was also told that he would be paid a
separation pay equivalent to 75% of his monthly salary for every year of service, provided
he would submit a letter of resignation within the day. Dan filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal, asserting that he was constructively dismissed. Miranda avers, however, that
Doble voluntarily resigned. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Doble and ordered the
payment of his backwages and separation pay, since reinstatement is no longer feasible.
Both parties appealed, Doble only partially appealing as to the amount of his monetary
claims. Two of the Commissioners of the NLRC Sixth Division voted to grant the appeal by
ABB, Inc. and Desai, and to dismiss Doble’s claim. They found that the resignation of Doble
being voluntary, there can be no illegal dismissal and no basis for the award of other
monetary claims, damages and attorney's fees. Doble filed a motion for reconsideration but
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the NLRC denied the same.

ISSUE: Whether a deed of release of quitclaim serves to bar an employee from demanding
benefits to which he is legally entitled.
RULING: NO. Be that as it may, not all quitclaims are invalid and against public policy. "If
the agreement was voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable settlement, it is
binding on the parties and may not later be disowned simply because of a change of mind.
It is only where there is a clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or
gullible person, or the terms of settlement are unconscionable on its face, that the law will
step in to annul the questionable transaction." Cases abound where the Court gave effect to
quitclaims executed by the employees when the employer is able to prove the following
requisites: (1) the employee executes a deed of quitclaim voluntarily; (2) there is no fraud
or deceit on the part of any of the parties; (3) the consideration of the quitclaim is credible
and reasonable; and (4) the contract is not contrary to law, public order, public policy,
morals or goods customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.
ABB, Inc. and Desai proved by substantial evidence the presence of all these requisites.
Doble can hardly claim that he was forced to execute the Receipt, Release and Quitclaim,
nor can he also claim that there was fraud or deceit nor that the consideration for the
waiver and quitclaim was unjust and unreasonable. That no portion of his retirement pay
will be released or his urgent need for funds does not constitute the pressure or coercion
contemplated by law as a valid reason to nullify a quitclaim.
104. Doble vs. ABB, Inc., G.R. No. 215627, June 5, 2017
TOPIC: Constructive Dismissal
DOCTRINE: To begin with, constructive dismissal is defined as quitting or cessation of work because
continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; when there is a demotion in
rank or a diminution of pay and other benefits. It exists if an act of clear discrimination, insensibility,
or disdain by an employer becomes so unbearable on the part of the employee that it could foreclose
any choice by him except to forego his continued employment. There is involuntary resignation due to
the harsh, hostile, and unfavorable conditions set by the employer. The test of constructive dismissal
is whether a reasonable person in the employee's position would have felt compelled to give up his
employment/position under the circumstances. On the other hand, "[r]esignation is the voluntary act
of an employee who is in a situation where one believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in
favor of the exigency of the service, and one has no other choice but to dissociate oneself from
employment. It is a formal pronouncement or relinquishment of an office, with the intention of
relinquishing the office accompanied by the act of relinquishment. As the intent to relinquish must
concur with the overt act of relinquishment, the acts of the employee before and after the alleged
resignation must be considered in determining whether he or she, in fact, intended to sever his or her
employment. (Gan v. Galderma Philippines, Inc., 701 Phil. 612 [2013])
FACTS: Petitioner Luis S. Doble, Jr. was hired as an engineer by ABB, Inc. In his 19 years
of service, he was consistently given Strong or Superior Performance Results, pursuant to
the company policy of conducting a yearly Performance and Development Appraisal for all of
its employees. However, he was informed by the Country Manager and President Nitin Desai
that in 2011, his performance rating was unsatisfactory. Desai and HR Manager Marivic
Miranda explained to Doble that a change in leadership has been demanded and that he was
3
asked to resign as Local Division Manager. He was also told that he would be paid a

separation pay equivalent to 75% of his monthly salary for every year of service, provided
he would submit a letter of resignation within the day. Dan filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal, asserting that he was constructively dismissed. Miranda avers, however, that
Doble voluntarily resigned. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Doble and ordered the
payment of his backwages and separation pay, since reinstatement is no longer feasible.
Both parties appealed, Doble only partially appealing as to the amount of his monetary
claims. Two of the Commissioners of the NLRC Sixth Division voted to grant the appeal by
ABB, Inc. and Desai, and to dismiss Doble’s claim. They found that the resignation of Doble
being voluntary, there can be no illegal dismissal and no basis for the award of other
monetary claims, damages and attorney's fees. Doble filed a motion for reconsideration but
the NLRC denied the same.
ISSUE: Whether Doble was illegally dismissed
RULING: NO. Even if the option to resign originated from the employer, what is important
for resignation to be deemed voluntary is that the employee's intent to relinquish must
concur with the overt act of relinquishment. There can be no doubt as to the drastic and
shocking nature of the abrupt decision of ABB, Inc. to let Doble resign after almost 19 years
of dedicated and satisfactory service, on account of the extent of losses, the level of
discontent among the ranks of PS Division, and the ABB, Inc. Global and Regional
management's demand for a change in leadership. Despite being aware of the illegality of
his dismissal, Doble submitted a resignation letter and a letter of intent to purchase his
service vehicle, allowed Miranda to process his resignation papers, met her outside company
premises to sign a waiver and quitclaim and to receive his separation benefits. In view of
the lapse of considerable period between his resignation until the execution of a quitclaim
and receipt of his separation benefits about ten (10) days later, the Court is inclined to rule
that the filing of his complaint for illegal dismissal on March 26, 2012 is a mere
afterthought, if not a mere pretention.
105. Spectrum Security Services, Inc. vs. Grave, G.R. No. 196650, June 7,
2017
TOPIC: Constructive Dismissal - Constructive Dismissal in Relation to Off-Detail

Period
DOCTRINE: Security guards, like other employees in the private sector, are entitled to security of
tenure. However, their situation should be differentiated from that of other employees or workers. The
employment of security guards generally depends on their employers' contracts with clients who are
third parties to the employment relationship, and the requirements of the latter for security services
and what will be beneficial to them dictate the posting of the security guards. It is also relevant to
mention that their employers retain the management prerogative to change their assignments and
postings, and to decide to temporarily relieve them of their assignments. In other words, their security
of tenure, though it shields them from demotions in rank or diminutions of salaries, benefits and other
privileges, does not vest them with the right to their positions or assignments that will prevent their
transfers or re-assignments (unless the transfers or re-assignments are motivated by discrimination or
bad faith, or effected as a form of punishment or demotion without sufficient cause). Such peculiar
conditions of their employment render inevitable that some of them just have to undergo periods of
reserved or off-detail status that should not by any means equate to their dismissal. Only when the
period of their reserved or off-detail status exceeds the reasonable period of six months without re-
assignment should the affected security guards be regarded as dismissed. There should be no
indefinite lay-offs. After the period of six months, the employers should either recall the affected
security guards to work or consider them permanently retrenched pursuant to the requirements of the
law; otherwise, the employers would be held to have dismissed them, and would be liable for such
dismissals.
3

FACTS: The petitioner is engaged in the business of providing security services - employed and
posted the respondents at the premises of Ibiden Philippines, Inc. (Ibiden in Sto. Tomas, Batangas.
Petitioner implemented an action plan as part of its operational and manpower supervision
enhancement program geared towards the gradual replacement of security guards at Ibiden. Pursuant
to this, it issued separate "Notice(s) to Return to Unit" to the respondents, directing them to report to
its head office and to update their documents for re-assignment. Respondents filed their complaint
against the petitioner for constructive dismissal, which the Labor Arbiter dismissed. He declared that
the return to work notices issued by the petitioner belied the respondents' charge of illegal dismissal,
opining that a security guard could be considered as having been constructively dismissed only when
he had been placed on floating status for a period of more than six months. On appeal, the NLRC
reversed the Labor Arbiter's dismissal. It noted that had the petitioner really intended to re-assign the
respondents to new posts, the petitioner should have indicated in the notices the new postings or re-
assignments. The CA concluded that although the complaint for illegal dismissal was prematurely filed
because six months had not yet elapsed to warrant considering the dismissal as constructive
dismissal, and in chief, that abandonment was a just ground for dismissal required clear, willful,
deliberate and unjustified refusal on the part of the employees to resume their employment; hence,
their mere absence from work or failure to report for work even after the notice to return was not
tantamount to abandonment.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner was guilty of illegally dismissing the respondents
RULING: We can only uphold the Labor Arbiter's conclusion that the respondents had
actually abandoned their employment and had severed their employment relationship with
the petitioner themselves. Despite having been notified of the need for them to appear
before the petitioner's head office to update their documents for purposes of reposting, the
respondents, except Lucito P. Samarita, and Saidomar M. Marohom, refused to receive the
notices, and did not sign the same, without first knowing the contents of the memo. The
petitioner sufficiently established, too, that it did not ignore the respondents, contrary to
their claims. As the records bear out, one of the respondents reported to the head office but
only to claim his salary and to avail himself of a loan from the Social Security System
(SSS); and that another respondent, Oliver Martin, albeit notified of his endorsement to a
new posting with a different client company, did not report to the new posting.
106. Ibon vs. Genghis Khan Security Services and/or Marietta Vallespin,
G.R. No. 221085, June 19, 2017
TOPIC: Off-Detail status - Return to Work Order Should Indicate Specific

Assignment
DOCTRINE: A holistic analysis of the Court's disposition in JFLP Investigation reveals that:

[1] an employer must assign the security guard to another posting within six (6) months
from his last deployment, otherwise, he would be considered constructively dismissed; and
[2] the security guard must be assigned to a specific or particular client. A general return-
to-work order does not suffice.
FACTS: Petitioner was employed as a security guard by respondent sometime in June 2008.

Petitioner was last deployed on October 4, 2010. On 2011, petitioner filed a
Complaint against respondent for illegal dismissal, with other claims. Respondent denied
that petitioner was placed on a floating status for more than six (6) months. It claimed that
he was suspended on October 4, 2010 for sleeping on the job. Respondent added that
petitioner was endorsed to another client for re-assignment, which the latter refused
because his license was due for renewal. Since then, petitioner failed to report for
work. Petitioner argues that he did not receive the letters requiring him to report back to
3
work; that a perusal of the letters revealed that the same did not indicate a specific

assignment; that respondent had no intention to reinstate him considering that he was
placed on a floating status for a long period of time.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner’s argument that the letters requiring him to return to
work should indicate a specific assignment.
RULING: YES. A holistic analysis of the Court's disposition in JFLP Investigation reveals

that: [1] an employer must assign the security guard to another posting within six (6)
months from his last deployment, otherwise, he would be considered constructively
dismissed; and [2] the security guard must be assigned to a specific or particular client. A
general return-to-work order does not suffice.
Applying the foregoing to the present controversy, respondent should have deployed
petitioner to a specific client within six (6) months from his last assignment. The
correspondences allegedly sent to petitioner merely required him to explain why he did not
report to work. He was never assigned to a particular client. Thus, even if petitioner actually
received the letters of respondent, he was still constructively dismissed because none of
these letters indicated his reassignment to another client. Unlike in Ecoxet
Security and JFLP Investigation, respondent is guilty of constructive dismissal because it
never attempted to redeploy petitioner to a definite assignment or security detail. Further,
petitioner's refusal to accept the offer of reinstatement could not have the effect of
validating an otherwise constructive dismissal considering the that same was made only
after petitioner had filed a case for illegal dismissal. Further, at the time the offer for
reinstatement was made, petitioner's constructive dismissal had long been consummated.
107. Claudia's Kitchen, Inc. vs. Tanguin, G.R. No. 221096, June 28, 2017
TOPIC: Separation Pay - Separation Pay Where There is No Dismissal
DOCTRINE: In sum, separation pay is only awarded to a dismissed employee in the

following instances: 1) in case of closure of establishment under Article 298 [formerly Article
283] of the Labor Code; 2) in case of termination due to disease or sickness under Article
299 [formerly Article 284] of the Labor Code; 3) as a measure of social justice in those
instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than serious misconduct
or those reflecting on his moral character; 4) where the dismissed employee's position is no
longer available; 5) when the continued relationship between the employer and the
employee is no longer viable due to the strained relations between them; or 6) when the
dismissed employee opted not to be reinstated, or the payment of separation benefits would
be for the best interest of the parties involved. In all of these cases, the grant of separation
pay presupposes that the employee to whom it was given was dismissed from employment,
whether legally or illegally. In fine, as a general rule, separation pay in lieu of reinstatement
could not be awarded to an employee whose employment was not terminated by his
employer.
3

FACTS: In 2001, respondent was employed by petitioner. She performed her functions as a
billing supervisor in Manila Jockey Club's Turf. On 2010, she was placed on preventive
suspension by Human Resources Manager for allegedly forcing her co-employees to buy
silver jewelry from her during office hours and inside the company premises. During her
suspension, the petitioners discovered her habitual tardiness and gross negligence in the
computation of the total number of hours worked by her co-employees. Subsequently, they
sent letters to her. Tanguin, however, failed to act on these notices.The NLRC, however,
found that Tanguin did not abandon her work when she failed to report for work despite
notice. It stated that the filing of the complaint for illegal dismissal negated the claim of
abandonment. The NLRC concluded that there was neither dismissal nor abandonment.
Thus, she should be reinstated to her former position, but without backwages. The CA,
however, applied the doctrine of strained relations and ordered the payment of separation
pay to Tanguin instead of compelling the petitioners to accept her in their employ.
ISSUE: Whether separation pay in lieu of reinstatement may be awarded to an employee

who was not dismissed from employment.
RULING: The grant of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement has no legal basis. Separation
is pay warranted when the cause for termination is not attributable to the employee's fault,
such as those provided in Articles 298 and 299 of the Labor Code, as well as in cases of
illegal dismissal where reinstatement is no longer feasible. On the other hand, an employee
dismissed for any of the just causes enumerated under Article 297 of the same Code, being
causes attributable to the employee's fault, is not, as a general rule, entitled to separation
pay. The non-grant of such right to separation is pay premised on the reason that an erring
employee should not benefit from their wrongful acts. Under Section 7, Rule I, Book VI of
the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, such dismissed employee is nonetheless
entitled to whatever rights, benefits, and privileges he may have under the applicable
individual or collective agreement with the employer or voluntary employer policy or
practice. As an exception, case law allows the grant of separation pay or financial assistance
to a legally-dismissed employee as a measure of social justice or on grounds of equity. The
circumstances in this case, however, does not warrant an application of the exception. Thus,
the general rule that no separation pay may be awarded to an employee who was not
dismissed obtains in this case. In this regard, it is only proper for Tanguin to report back to
work and for the petitioners to accept her, without prejudice to the on-going investigation
against her.
108. Andres vs. Diamon H Marine Services & Shipping Agency, Inc., et al.,
G.R. No. 217345, July 12, 2017
TOPIC: Post Employment Medical Examination for Seafarers - Mandatory Reporting upon
Repatriation
DOCTRINE: A seafarer claiming disability benefits is required to submit himself to a post-employment

medical examination by a company-designated physician within three (3) working days from
repatriation. Failure to comply with such requirement results in the forfeiture of the seafarer's claim
for disability benefits. There are, however, exceptions to the rule: (1) when the seafarer is
incapacitated to report to the employer upon his repatriation; and (2) when the employer
inadvertently or deliberately refused to submit the seafarer to a post-employment medical
examination by a company-designated physician.
FACTS: Petitioner Wilmer O. De Andres (De Andres) entered into an Employment Contract with
Diamond H Marine Services & Shipping Agency, Inc. (Diamond H) for and in behalf of its Taiwanese
principal, Wu Chun Hua. At the vessel, he was tasked to work as a wiper, messman and bosun, and
was also required to throw the fishnet, dive in the sea, and repair the nets. De Andres added that he
3
and his Filipino crewmates were made to work for almost twenty-four hours a day. They later

discovered that the document they signed before leaving for Taiwan set aside the POEA-approved
contract. He averred that this agreement reduced their salaries, increased their workload, and showed
that the Filipino crewmates were abused and taken advantage of. While he was lowering the nets, he
was accidentally hit by big waves. As a consequence, he sustained an open fracture of the distal tibia
and fibula. De Andres was brought to a hospital and underwent surgical operation. After twenty (20)
days of confinement, he was transferred to the nearest lodge. De Andres averred that after the
operation, he was placed in a dormitory, instead of a hospital. There, he was left alone with no one to
assist him in his recovery. De Andres underwent another operation. He said that he repeatedly asked
for repatriation as no one would attend to his needs in Taiwan, but his plea fell on deaf ears. Almost a
year after his accident, De Andres was informed by the respondents that he was free to go home. He
was surprised by this decision. De Andres was informed by the respondents that he was free to go
home. He was surprised by this decision because he had been requesting for his repatriation since his
injury. De Andres later discovered that his repatriation was not due to his medical condition, but due
to the expiration of his employment contract. Before he was repatriated, De Andres was made to sign
a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), stipulating that the respondents agreed to pay him
NT$40,000.00 and gave him a plane ticket back to the Philippines, and that, in return, he would not
file any complaint against the respondents in the future. De Andres claimed, however, that he was
forced to sign the agreement as he would not be able to return to the Philippines if he would not sign
it. Before he was repatriated, De Andres was made to sign a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA),
stipulating that the respondents agreed to pay him NT $40,000.00 and gave him a plane ticket back to
the Philippines, and that in return, he would not file any complaint against the respondents in the
future. De Andres claimed, however, that he was forced to sign the agreement as he would not be
able to return to the Philippines if he would not sign it.
ISSUE: Whether De Andres sufficiently complied with the reportorial requirement under Section 20
(B)(3).
RULING: Recently, in Apines v. Elburg Shipmanagement Philippines, Inc. 25 (Apines), the repatriated

seafarer reported to the employer. He was, however, not referred to the company-designated
physician. The Court emphasized that the employer, and not the seafarer, has the burden to prove
that the seafarer was referred to a company-designated doctor. It was also stated that without the
assessment of the said doctor, there was nothing for the seafarer's own physician to contest,
rendering the requirement of referral to a third doctor superfluous. The seafarer therein was granted
total and permanent disability benefits. In this case, De Andres' accident, instead of immediately
repatriating him when his condition permitted, the respondents kept him in Taiwan for almost a year
and they waited for his contract to expire. Obviously, the delayed repatriation was intended to show
that he returned due to his expired contract, and not for medical reasons. Nonetheless, even if a
seafarer's contract expired, it does not release the employer from its obligations under the POEA-SEC
when there is a claim for disability benefits due to an injury suffered during the term of the
employment contract. Accordingly, Section 20 (B) (3) must still be complied with.
109. Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc., et al. vs. Cual, G.R. No. 207684,
July 17, 2017
TOPIC: Res Judicata - Issue Preclusion Rule; Collateral Estoppel; Law of the Case Doctrine;
Supervening Event
DOCTRINE: The law of the case doctrine not applicable in the cases under consideration. The doctrine
has been defined as "that principle under which determinations of questions of law will generally be
held to govern a case throughout all its subsequent stages where such determination has already been
made on a prior appeal to a court of last resort. It is merely a rule of procedure and does not go to the
power of the court, and will not be adhered to where its application will result in an unjust decision.
It relates entirely to questions of law, and is confined in its operation to subsequent proceedings in the
same case." Res judicata literally means "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided;
a thing or matter settled by judgment." It also refers to the "rule that a final judgment or decree on
the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies
in all later suits on points and matters determined in the former suit. It rests on the principle that
3
parties should not to be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once; that, when a right or

fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or an opportunity
for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, so long as it remains unreversed, should be
conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate.
FACTS: Respondents were all member of Philtranco Workers Union-Association of Genuin Labor
Organization (PWU_AGLO). They were all included in a retrenchment program embarked on by
Philtranco in the years 2006 to 2007, on the ground that Philtranco was suffering business losses.
Consequently, PWU-AGLO filed a Notice of Strike with the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE), claiming that Philtranco engaged in unfair labor practices. Unable to settle their differences,
they referred the case to the DOLE Secretary. DOLE Secretary issued a decision ordering to reinstate
them to their former positions, without loss of seniority rights and pay them backwages; maintain the
status quo and continue in full force the CBA terms and conditions; and remit the withheld union dues
to PWU-AGLO without unnecessary delay. The respondents alleged that they were not absorbed by
Philtranco despite the fact that the company was hiring new employees; thus, the respondents, filed a
labor compliant for illegal dismissal and prayed for reinstatement, backwages and wage differentials.
The compliant essentially assailed the employees’ inclusion in the retrenchment program of Philtranco.
In the second case, on the belief that the dismissal of their claims due to a technicality was without
prejudice to their refiling of the same complaint, the respondents filed NLRC-NCR. This time,
Philtranco submitted its audited financial statements for the years 2006 and 2007. Labor Arbiter
rendered a decision finding respondents to have been illegally dismissed and applied the law of the
case principle, stating that the first NLRC case is binding upon Philtranco. When Philtranco appealed,
NLRC reversed the LA’s decision. Unlike LA Cueto, the commission gave weight to the audited financial
statements for the years 2006 and 2007 submitted by Philtranco in the refiled case, but which was not
presented in the prior case.The NLRC also disagreed with LA Cueto's application of the law of the
case in the refiled complaint, stating that the principle applies only to Olivar. The CA reinstated the
LA’s decision. The CA reasoned that the supervening event is inapplicable in the present case and
agreed with the LA that it is inappropriate to consider the belatedly filed audited financial statements
for the years 2006 and 2007.
ISSUE: The CA committed reversible error when it ruled that the “law of the case” applied to
respondents” “refilled” labor claim in 2010
RULING: No. The law of the case doctrine not applicable in the cases under consideration. The
doctrine has been defined as "that principle under which determinations of questions of law will
generally be held to govern a case throughout all its subsequent stages where such determination has
already been made on a prior appeal to a court of last resort. It is merely a rule of procedure and does
not go to the power of the court, and will not be adhered to where its application will result in an
unjust decision. It relates entirely to questions of law, and is confined in its operation to subsequent
proceedings in the same case."

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1. Laya, vs. CA, et al., G.R. No.

205813, January 10, 2018

DOCTRINE: In the absence of a retirement plan or agreement providing for retirement

LABOR LAW REVIEW 2nd Semester 2017-2018 [Assignment #2]

TOPIC: Retirement Plan vs. Labor Code

LABOR LAW REVIEW 2nd Semester 2017-2018 [Assignment #2]

DOCTRINE: Redundancy carried out by persons belonging to related companies; Labor

ISSUE: Whether or not redundancy is effective if carried out by persons belonging to

RULING: Yes. Redundancy is an authorized cause for the termination of employment, as

LABOR LAW REVIEW 2nd Semester 2017-2018 [Assignment #2]

TOPIC: Employment Contract

LABOR LAW REVIEW 2nd Semester 2017-2018 [Assignment #2]

TOPIC: FASAP Case – Retrenchment

DOCTRINE: In determining the validity of a retrenchment, judicial notice may be taken of

LABOR LAW REVIEW 2nd Semester 2017-2018 [Assignment #2]

TOPIC: Employer-Employee Relationship

ISSUE: Whether ODSI is a labor-only contractor of NPI, and consequently, NPI is

LABOR LAW REVIEW 2nd Semester 2017-2018 [Assignment #2]

TOPIC: Employer-Employee Relationship

DOCTRINE: The onus probandi in proving the existence of an employer-employee

ISSUE: Whether or not there exists and employer-employee relationship between

RULING: No. Petitioner Valencia failed to present competent evidence documentary or

LABOR LAW REVIEW 2nd Semester 2017-2018 [Assignment #2]

TOPIC: Employer-Employee Relationship – Element of Control

ISSUE: Whether or not there exists an employer-employee relationship between Petitioner

LABOR LAW REVIEW 2nd Semester 2017-2018 [Assignment #2]

TOPIC: Employer-Employee Relationship – Remittance with SSS as Proof of

ISSUE: Whether or not there exists an employer-employee relationship between Petitioner

LABOR LAW REVIEW 2nd Semester 2017-2018 [Assignment #2]

TOPIC: Employer-Employee Relationship - Imposition of Disciplinary Action;

DOCTRINE: The elements to determine the existence of an employment relationship are:

LABOR LAW REVIEW 2nd Semester 2017-2018 [Assignment #2]

TOPIC: Labor-Only Contracting

DOCTRINE: “In labor-only contracting, the statute creates an employer-employee

ISSUE: Whether or not an employer-employee relationship existed between Valencia and

RULING: None. Valencia failed to present competent evidence, documentary or otherwise,

LABOR LAW REVIEW 2nd Semester 2017-2018 [Assignment #2]

TOPIC: Serious Misconduct

DOCTRINE: Misconduct is improper or wrong conduct; it is the transgression of some

ISSUE: Whether or not Maula’s inflammatory language constitutes serious misconduct

NLRC that the on-the-spur-of-the-moment outburst of petitioner, he having reached his

LABOR LAW REVIEW 2nd Semester 2017-2018 [Assignment #2]

TOPIC: Serious Misconduct – No Serious Misconduct But There is Loss of Trust

LABOR LAW REVIEW 2nd Semester 2017-2018 [Assignment #2]

TOPIC: Serious Misconduct – No Serious Misconduct

DOCTRINE: It is settled that notwithstanding the existence of a just cause, dismissal

LABOR LAW REVIEW 2nd Semester 2017-2018 [Assignment #2]

15.Sterling Paper Products Enterprises, Inc. vs. KMM-Katipunan, G.R. No.

TOPIC: Serious Misconduct – Disrespect Towards Superior

DOCTRINE: It is well-settled that accusatory and inflammatory language used by an

ISSUE: Whether or not Esponga can be validly terminated due to misconduct as he

RULING: To summarize, for misconduct or improper behavior to be a just cause for

LABOR LAW REVIEW 2nd Semester 2017-2018 [Assignment #2]

TOPIC: Willful Disobedience – Disobedience is Not Willful

DOCTRINE: Disobedience is not wilful; Not every case of insubordination or willful

LABOR LAW REVIEW 2nd Semester 2017-2018 [Assignment #2]

TOPIC: Willful Disobedience – Penalty is Too Harsh

ISSUE: Whether the penalty of dismissal from service is too harsh

LABOR LAW REVIEW 2nd Semester 2017-2018 [Assignment #2]

TOPIC: Totality of Infractions

ISSUE: Whether or not Maula’s inflammatory language constitutes serious misconduct

LABOR LAW REVIEW 2nd Semester 2017-2018 [Assignment #2]

TOPIC: Disability Benefits

ISSUE: Whether or not De Leon is entitled to disability benefits.