DESCARTES ON ANIMAL LIVES

"Aristotle asserted that only humans had rational souls, while the locomotive souls shared by all animals,
human and nonhuman, endowed animals with instincts suited to their successful reproduction and
survival. Sorabji (1993) argues that the denial of reason to animals created a crisis for Greek thought,
requiring a “wholesale reanalysis” (p. 7) of the nature of mental capacities, and a revision in thinking
about “man and his place in nature above the animals” (ibid.). The argument about what is reasoning,
and whether animals display it, remains with us 25 centuries later, as evidenced by the volume Rational
Animals? (Hurley & Nudds 2006). The Great Chain of Being derived from early Christian interpretation of
Aristotle's scale of nature (Lovejoy 1936) provides another Aristotelian influence on the debate about
animal minds.

Two millennia after Aristotle, Descartes' mechanistic philosophy introduced the idea of a reflex
to explain the behavior of nonhuman animals. Although his conception of animals treated them as
reflex-driven machines, with no intellectual capacities, it is important to recognize that he took
mechanistic explanation to be perfectly adequate for explaining sensation and perception — aspects of
animal behavior that are nowadays often associated with consciousness. He drew the line only at
rational thought and understanding. Given the Aristotelian division between instinct and reason and the
Cartesian distinction between mechanical reflex and rational thought, it's tempting to map the one
distinction onto the other. Nevertheless, it may be a mistake to assimilate the two. First, a number of
authors before and after Darwin have believed that conscious experience can accompany instinctive
and reflexive actions. Second, the dependence of phenomenal consciousness on rational, self-reflective
thought is a particularly strong and contentious claim (although it has current defenders, discussed
below).

Although the roots of careful observation and experimentation of the natural world go back to ancient
times, study of animal behavior remained largely anecdotal until long after the scientific revolution.
Animals were, of course, widely used in pursuit of answers to anatomical, physiological, and
embryological questions. Vivisection was carried out by such ancient luminaries as Galen and there was
a resurgence of the practice in early modern times (Bertoloni Meli 2012). Descartes himself practiced
and advocated vivisection (Descartes, Letter to Plempius, Feb 15 1638), and wrote in correspondence
that the mechanical understanding of animals absolved people of any guilt for killing and eating animals.
Mechanists who followed him (e.g. Malebranche) used Descartes' denial of reason and a soul to animals
as a rationale for their belief that animals were incapable of suffering or emotion, and did not deserve
moral consideration — justifying vivisection and other brutal treatment (see Olson 1990, p. 39–40, for
support of this claim). The idea that animal behavior is purely reflexive may also have served to diminish
interest in treating behavior as a target of careful study in its own right."

Allen, Colin and Michael Trestman, "Animal Consciousness", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(Winter 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2020/entries/consciousness-animal/>.
 DESCARTES ON ANIMAL LIVES

Questions:

1. Aristotle proposes that there are at least two types of souls?

Can you name them? What is the purpose of proposing these
two types of soul?

2. Conduct an online search of "The Great Chain of Being"

(Scala Naturae)? What is it? Is it possible to relate it to Aristotle's
definition of human beings?

3. Why does Descartes believe that nonhuman animals' actions

are reflexes?

4. What are the ethical consequences of thinking about

animals as "automata" (beings that act only through reflexes)?
Which actions may be justified if we think of animals as
mere automata?