Dr.

SHAKUNTALA MISRA NATIONAL REHABILITATION

UNIVERSITY
Lucknow
Faculty of Law

PROJECT ON

HELLP{JUDICIAL APPOINTMENT AND

HELLONNNINDEPENDENCE OF JUDICIARY

For

COURSE – JUDICIAL PROCESS

CLASS: L.L.M. 1st Year, 2nd

Semester

Submitted by
[PRATEEK SINGH]
[L.L.M. 1stYEAR]
[Roll no.: 214150012]

Academic Session: 2021-22

Under the Supervision of

Prof. (Dr.) SHEPHALI YADAV

Faculty of Law

Dr. Shakuntala Misra National Rehabilitation University

 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to express my special thanks of gratitude to my assignment supervisor, Prof.

(Dr.) Shephali Yadav (Faculty of Law), Dr. Shakuntala Misra National Rehabilitation
University, for giving me the Opportunity to do the assignment of Judicial Process on the
Topic ‘JUDICIAL APPOINMENT AND INDEPENDENCE OF JUDICIARY’ and
providing invaluable guidance throughout this assignment.

Her dynamism, vision, sincerity and motivation have deeply inspired me. She has taught
me the methodology to carry out the assignment and to present the assignment works as
clearly as possible. It was a great privilege and honor to work and study under her guidance.
I am extremely grateful for what she has offered me.

Secondly, I would also like to thank my parents and friends who helped me a lot in finalizing
this assignment within the limited time frame.

PRATEEK SINGH
 TABLE OF CONTENT

S. No. Content Pg. No.

I ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 2
II TABLE OF CONTENT 3-4
III KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS 5
IV LIST OF CASES 6
V RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 7-8

Chapter.01 Introduction 9

Chapter.02 Judicial Appointment 10-11

2.1. Introduction to Collegium System 10
2.2. Indian Constitution & Judicial Appointment 11

Chapter.03 Evolution of Collegium System 12 – 16

(Three Judges Cases)
3.1. Evolution 12 – 13
3.1.1. First Judge case 12
3.1.2. Second Judge case 12
3.1.3. Third Judge case 13
3.2. Reason for criticism of Collegium System 14
3.3. Efforts made to address these concerns 14
3.4. Memorandum of Madras Bar Associations 15
3.5. How are appointments being made now 16

Chapter.04 Independence of Judiciary 17 – 22

4.1. Introduction 17

Page 3 of 25
 4.2. Meaning 18
4.3. Need for Independent Judiciary 19
4.4. Components of Independent Judiciary 20
4.5. Constitutional Provisions 20-22

Chapter.05 Conclusion 23

VIII BIBLIOGRAPHY 24 – 25

Page 4 of 25
 KEY TO ABBRIVIATIONS

Abbreviation Full-form

AIR All India Reports

Ibid ibidem

u/s. Under section

u/a. Under Article

Vs Versus

Page 5 of 25
 LIST OF CASES

1998, President K R Narayanan’s Presidential Reference to the Supreme Court

S P Gupta Vs Union of India, 1981

The Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association Vs Union of India, 1993

Page 6 of 25
 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

RESEARCH KEY

Judicial appointment and Independent Judiciary

METHODOLOGY ADAPTED

The method adopted for the research by the researcher is content analysis and
interpretation of available secondary data.

The methodology of content analysis is used in this report for analyzing the available
data from various sources comprising of various Articles, reports of various institutions,
persons etc. and books on the relevant topic to bring forth useful and appropriate information
for the reader of this research-report.

LITERATURE USED

ARTICLES: -

How judges appoint judges, the debate around it, by Utkarsh Anand
Judicial appointments: Centre begins consultation on new legislation, by A Subramani|
Judicial appointments in India: judicial approach, by Soham Bajpai
Independence of Judiciary in India: a Critical Analysis, by Aatin Kumar Das

JOURNALS: -

LAW MANTRA THINK BEYOND OTHERS

STATUTES-

Constitution of India

Page 7 of 25
OBJECTIVES

The objective of this research is to provide the reader ability to: -

To study the collegiums system

To study the history of appointment of higher judiciary

To study the three judges’ cases

To study the independence of judiciary

Page 8 of 25
 CHAPTER – 1

INTRODUCTION

The reading of this research paper will enable the reader to Understand the
procedure, history and debate regarding the appointment of judges of Supreme court and
high court. Then the reader will also be able to understand about the three judges’ case
which was a very crucial stage in the evolution of the present system of appointment of
judges.

The reader will also be able to understand about the concept of independent
judiciary with the help of several notes and cases.

Page 9 of 25
 CHAPTER – 2

JUDICIAL APPOINTMENT

2.1 Introduction to collegium system

It is the system of appointment and transfer of judges that has evolved through
judgments of the Supreme Court, and not by an Act of Parliament or by a provision of the
Constitution. The Supreme Court collegium is headed by the Chief Justice of India and
comprises four other senior most judges of the court. A High Court collegium is led by its Chief
Justice and four other senior most judges of that court. Names recommended for appointment
by a High Court collegium reaches the government only after approval by the CJI and the
Supreme Court collegium. Judges of the higher judiciary are appointed only through the
collegium system — and the government has a role only after names have been decided by the
collegium. The government’s role is limited to getting an inquiry conducted by the Intelligence
Bureau (IB) if a lawyer is to be elevated as a judge in a High Court or the Supreme Court. It
can also raise objections and seek clarifications regarding the collegium’s choices, but if the
collegium reiterates the same names, the government is bound, under Constitution Bench
judgments, to appoint them as judges.
The collegium system was created by two judgements of the Supreme Court in 1990s
in which a body of senior apex court judges headed by the Chief Justice of India selected
persons and recommended their names for appointment as judges.
Under the 22-year-old court-framed collegium system of appointment and transfer of
judges of high courts and the Supreme Court, the chief justice of the respective high courts and
two other senior-most judges of the court comprise a collegium empowered by virtue of a 1993
judgment of the Supreme Court to identify suitable candidates, do due diligence and
recommend for appointment as judges of the court. 1

1
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/What-is-the-collegium-system/articleshow/49404698.cms, accessed
on 15/02/2017, 21:29

Page 10 of 25
2.2. India constitution regarding appointments of judges

Judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts are appointed by the President under
Articles 124(2) and 217 of the Constitution. The President is required to hold consultations
with such of the judges of the Supreme Court and of the High Courts as he may deem necessary.
Article 124(2) says: “Every Judge of the Supreme Court shall be appointed by the
President by warrant under his hand and seal after consultation with such of the Judges of the
Supreme Court and of the High Courts in the States as the President may deem necessary for
the purpose and shall hold office until he attains the age of sixty-five years.
Provided that in the case of appointment of a Judge other than the Chief Justice, the
Chief Justice of India shall always be consulted.”
And Article 217: “Every Judge of a High Court shall be appointed by the President by
warrant under his hand and seal after consultation with the Chief Justice of India, the Governor
of the State, and, in the case of appointment of a Judge other than the Chief Justice, the Chief
Justice of the High Court.” 2

2
http://www.realityviews.in/2014/04/facts-history-about-collegium-system-sc.html, accessed on 15/02/2017,
20:34

Page 11 of 25
 CHAPTER – 3

EVOLUTION OF COLLEGIUM SYSTEM

(THE THREE JUDGES CASES)

3.1. Evolution of Collegium system when the Constitution is silent on it?

The collegium system has its genesis in a series of judgments called “Judges Cases”.
The collegium came into being through interpretations of pertinent constitutional provisions
by the Supreme Court in the Judges Cases.

3.1.1. First Judges Case:

In S P Gupta Vs Union of India, 1981, the Supreme Court by a majority judgment held
that the concept of primacy of the Chief Justice of India was not really to be found in the
Constitution. It held that the proposal for appointment to a High Court can emanate from any
of the constitutional functionaries mentioned in Article 217 and not necessarily from the Chief
Justice of the High Court. The Constitution Bench also held that the term “consultation” used
in Articles 124 and 217 was not “concurrence” — meaning that although the President will
consult these functionaries, his decision was not bound to be in concurrence with all of them.
The judgment tilted the balance of power in appointments of judges of High Courts in favour
of the executive. This situation prevailed for the next 12 years.3

3.1.2. Second Judges Case:

In The Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association Vs Union of India, 1993, a

nine-judge Constitution Bench overruled the decision in S P Gupta and devised a specific
procedure called ‘Collegium System’ for the appointment and transfer of judges in the higher
judiciary. Underlining that the top court must act in “protecting the integrity and guarding the

3
https://www.gnlu.ac.in/bc/JUDICIAL%20APPOINTMENTS%20IN%20INDIA-
%20JUDICIAL%20APPROACH.pdf, accessed on 15/02/2017, 21:44

Page 12 of 25
independence of the judiciary”, the majority verdict accorded primacy to the CJI in matters of
appointment and transfers while also ruling that term “consultation” would not diminish the
primary role of the CJI in judicial appointments.

“The role of the CJI is primal in nature because this being a topic within the judicial
family, the executive cannot have an equal say in the matter. Here the word ‘consultation’
would shrink in a mini form. Should the executive have an equal role and be in divergence of
many a proposal, germs of indiscipline would grow in the judiciary,” it held.

Ushering in the collegium system, the court said that the recommendation should be
made by the CJI in consultation with his two senior most colleagues, and that such
recommendation should normally be given effect to by the executive. It added that although it
was open to the executive to ask the collegium to reconsider the matter if it had an objection to
the name recommended, if, on reconsideration, the collegium reiterated the recommendation,
the executive was bound to make the appointment. 4

3.1.3. Third Judges Case:

In 1998, President K R Narayanan issued a Presidential Reference to the Supreme Court

over the meaning of the term “consultation” under Article 143 of the Constitution (advisory
jurisdiction). The question was whether “consultation” required consultation with a number of
judges in forming the CJI’s opinion, or whether the sole opinion of CJI could by itself constitute
a “consultation”. In response, the Supreme Court laid down 9 guidelines for the functioning of
the coram for appointments and transfers — this has come to be the present form of the
collegium, and has been prevalent ever since. This opinion laid down that the recommendation
should be made by the CJI and his four senior most colleagues, instead of two. It also held that
Supreme Court judges who hailed from the High Court for which the proposed name came,
should also be consulted. It was also held that even if two judges gave an adverse opinion, the
CJI should not send the recommendation to the government. 5

4
Judicial appointments in India: judicial approach, by Soham Bajpai
5
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Judicial-appointments-Centre-begins-consultation-on-new-
legislation/articleshow/55090547.cms, accessed on 15/02/2017, 21:47

Page 13 of 25
3.2. Reason for criticism of the collegium system
Critics argue that the system is non-transparent, since it does not involve any official
mechanism or secretariat. It is seen as a closed-door affair with no prescribed norms regarding
eligibility criteria or even the selection procedure. There is no public knowledge of how and
when a collegium meets, and how it takes its decisions. Lawyers too are usually in the dark on
whether their names have been considered for elevation as a judge.

3.3.Efforts made to address these concerns

The NDA government has tried twice, unsuccessfully both times, to replace the
collegium system with a National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC). The BJP-led
government of 1998-2003 had appointed the Justice M N Venkatachaliah Commission to opine
whether there was need to change the collegium system. The Commission favoured change,
and prescribed an NJAC consisting of the CJI and two senior most judges, the Law Minister,
and an eminent person from the public, to be chosen by the President in consultation with the
CJI. The NDA 2 regime had NJAC as one of its priorities, and the constitutional amendment
and NJAC Act were cleared swiftly. A clutch of petitions were subsequently filed in the
Supreme Court, arguing that the law undermined the independence of the judiciary, and the
basic structure of the Constitution.
Last year, a five-judge Constitution Bench declared as unconstitutional the
constitutional amendment that sought to create the NJAC, which had envisioned a significant
role for the executive in appointing judges in the higher judiciary. The Bench sealed the fate of
the proposed system with a 4:1 majority verdict that held that judges’ appointments shall
5continue to be made by the collegium system in w5hich the CJI will have “the last word”.
“There is no question of accepting an alternative procedure, which does not ensure primacy of
the judiciary in the matter of selection and appointment of judges to the higher judiciary,” said
the majority opinion. Justice J Chelameswar wrote a dissenting verdict, criticising the
collegium system by holding that “proceedings of the collegium were absolutely opaque and
inaccessible both to public and history, barring occasional leaks”. 6

6
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Judicial_Appointments_Commission#SC_declares_NJAC_unconstituti
onal, accessed on 15/02/2017, 21:52

Page 14 of 25
3.4. Memorandum of Madras Bar Associates?
It was on October 11, 2015 that the Supreme Court quashed the National Judicial
Appointments Commission (NJAC) Act, 2014. Now, the parliamentary standing committee on
law and justice has written to top Bar associations across the country, seeking their views and
suggestions to cut out inordinate delay in filling vacancies in the higher judiciary.

Response to the October 19 letter has been phenomenal. The Madras Bar Association
(MBA) has submitted a 14-point charter of suggestions and deputed senior advocate Vijay
Narayan and advocate S Manuraj to appear before the parliamentary committee on November
2 and explain the nuances of the memorandum.

The MBA, headed by senior advocate R Shanmugasundaram, has adopted a resolution

asking the Centre to ensure that there was a specific time limit at every stage of the judges
selection process.

The selection process for anticipated vacancies caused by retirements should be started
by the high court at least nine months in advance, it said. Name should be recommended seven
months in advance.

The state government should convey their views on the proposed named of candidates
within 60 days from the date of receipt of the names. The Supreme Court should forward their
recommendation to the government of India within 60 days from the date of receipt of state
government views.

The central government should forward its recommendations to the President within 60
days from the date of receipt of recommendation of the Supreme Court. The President, on his
part, may issue warrants of appointment giving priority to judges’ appointment.

In case all the three senior most judges who constitute the Collegium are from other
states, two senior most judges, one elevated from the Bar and other from the subordinate
judiciary, should be co-opted into the collegium, it said.

If a collegium member could not attend three consecutive meetings held at reasonable
intervals, the collegiums should co-opt next senior most judge and transact business, it said,
adding that it would avoid delay in holding collegium meetings.
The practice of returning the list of names under consideration for appointment as judges, due
to change of chief minister or chief justice, should be discontinued, the memorandum said.

Page 15 of 25
 If an acting chief holds office for 60 days or more, he should be permitted to commence
the process of selection and to make recommendations of names for appointment as judges of
the high court, it said.

Noting that steps should be taken to cut out delay in appointment of judges for high
courts and the Supreme Court, it said the Constitution should be amended by fixing a time limit
to fill vacancy of judges.

In this regard, the memorandum pointed out that in the case of the President, Article
62(1) says election to fill the vacancy caused by the expiration of the term of the office of the
President shall be completed before the expiration of the term. Similar time limit is in place for
the vice-president, state legislatures and the local bodies. 78

3.5.How are appointments being made now?

The collegium has been making recommendations for appointments and transfer of
judges. However, the 2015 ruling, in the end, had also paved the way for a new Memorandum
of Procedure (MoP) to guide future appointments so that concerns regarding lack of eligibility
criteria and transparency could be redressed. The Bench had asked the government to draft a
new MoP after consultation with the CJI. But more than a year later, the MoP is still to be
finalised owing to lack of consensus on several fronts between the judiciary and the
government. Since the new MoP is not in place, the government has been slow in clearing the
appointments, which has also become a matter of judicial decision after a clutch of petitions
were filed in the Supreme Court against the delay in making appointments. 910

7
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Judicial-appointments-Centre-begins-consultation-on-new-
legislation/articleshow/55090547.cms, accessed on 15/02/2017, 21:47
8
Judicial appointments: Centre begins consultation on new legislation, by A Subramani| TNN, Oct 27, 2016,
13:55
9
http://indianexpress.com/article/explained/collegium-system-supreme-court-how-judges-are-appointed-and-
transferred-the-debate-around-it-4375719/,
10
How judges appoint judges, the debate around it, by Utkarsh Anand, Published: November 15, 2016 12:28
am

Page 16 of 25
 CHAPTER – 4

INDEPENDENCE OF JUDICIARY

4.1 INTRODUCTION

The framers of the Indian Constitution at the time of framing of our constitution were
concerned about the kind of judiciary our country should have. This concern of the members
of the constituent assembly was responded by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar in the following words:

“There can be no difference of opinion in the House that our judiciary must be both
independent of the executive and must also be competent in itself. And the question is how
these two objects can be secured ”.11

The question that arises at first instance in our minds is that what made the framers of
our constitution to be so much concerned about providing the separate entity to the judiciary
and making it self-competent.

The answer to this question lies in the very basic understanding that so as to secure the
stability and prosperity of the society, the framers at that time understood that such a society
could be created only by guaranteeing the fundamental rights and the independence of the
judiciary to guard and enforce those fundamental rights. Also, in a country like India, the
independence of the judiciary is of utmost importance in upholding the pillars of the democratic
system hence ensuring a free society.

It is a well-known fact that the independence of the judiciary is the basic requisite for
ensuring a free and fair society under the rule of law. Rule of law that is responsible for good
governance of the country can be secured through unbiased judiciary.

The doctrine of Separation of Powers which was brought into existence to draw upon
the boundaries for the functioning of all the three organs of the state: Legislature, Executive
and the Judiciary, provides for a responsibility to the judiciary to act as a watchdog and to

11
Independence of Judiciary in India: A Critical Analysis, by Aatin Kumar Das

Page 17 of 25
check whether the executive and the legislature are functioning within their limits under the
constitution and not interfering in each other’s functioning. This task given to the judiciary to
supervise the doctrine of separation of powers cannot be carried on in true spirit if the judiciary
is not independent in itself. An independent judiciary supports the base of doctrine of separation
of powers to a large extent.

It is theoretically very easy to talk about the independence of the judiciary as for which
the provisions are provided for in our constitution but these provisions introduced by the
framers of our constitution can only initiate towards the independence of the judiciary. The
major task lies in creating a favourable environment for the functioning of the judiciary in
which all the other state organs functions in cooperation so that the independence of the
judiciary can be achieved practically. The independence of the judiciary has also to be guarded
against the changing economic, political and social scenario.

Whenever there is a talk regarding the independence of the judiciary, there is also a talk
of the restrictions that must be imposed on the judiciary as an institution and on the individual
judges that forms a part of the judiciary. In order to ensure smooth functioning of the system
there must be a right blend of the two.

4.2. MEANING

The meaning of the independence of the judiciary is still not clear after years of its
existence. Our constitution by the way of the provisions just talks of the independence of the
judiciary but it is nowhere defined what actually is the independence of the judiciary.

The primary talk on the independence of the judiciary is based on the doctrine of separation
of powers which holds its existence from several years. The doctrine of separation of powers
talks of the independence of the judiciary as an institution from the executive and the
legislature.

The other meaning of the judicial independence can be found out by looking at the writings
of the scholars who have researched on the topic. Scholars have followed the “constituent
mechanism” (i.e., what constitutes the judiciary) to define the independence of the judiciary.
Scholars try to define judiciary by talking about the independence of the judges which

Page 18 of 25
constitutes judiciary. Therefore, the independence of the judiciary is the independence of the
exercise of the functions by the judges in an unbiased manner i.e., free from any external factor.

So, the independence of the judiciary can be understood as the independence of the
institution of the judiciary and also the independence of the judges which forms a part of the
judiciary.

Shetreet in his work tries to explain the words “Independence” and “Judiciary” separately,
and says that the judiciary is “the organ of the government not forming a part of the executive
or the legislative, which is not subject to personal, substantive and collective control, and which
performs the primary function of adjudication”.

The final outcome that can be derived from Shetreet’s writings is that the independence of
the judiciary as an institution and the independence of the individual judges both have to go
hand in hand as the independence of the judiciary as an institution is not possible without the
independence of the individual judges and is the institution of the judiciary is not independent,
there is no question of the independence of the individual judges.

4.3. NEED FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY

The basic need for the independence of the judiciary rests upon the following points:

4.3.1. To check the functioning of the organs:

Judiciary acts as a watchdog by ensuring that all the organs of the state function within
their respective areas and according to the provisions of the constitution. Judiciary acts as a
guardian of the constitution and also aids in securing the doctrine of separation of powers.

4.3.2. Interpreting the provisions of the constitution:

It was well known to the framers of the constitution that in future the ambiguity will arise
with the provisions of the constitution so they ensured that the judiciary must be independent
and self-competent to interpret the provision of the constitution in such a way to clear the
ambiguity but such an interpretation must be unbiased i.e., free from any pressure from any
organs like executive. If the judiciary is not independent, the other organs may pressurize the

Page 19 of 25
judiciary to interpret the provision of the constitution according to them. Judiciary is given the
job to interpret the constitution according to the constitutional philosophy and the constitutional
norms.12

4.3.3. Disputes referred to the judiciary:

It is expected of the Judiciary to deliver judicial justice and not partial or committed justice.
By committed justice we mean to say that when a judge emphasizes on a particular aspect while
giving justice and not considering all the aspects involved in a particular situation. Similarly,
judiciary must act in an unbiased manner.

4.4. COMPONENTS – THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY

The components of the independence of the judiciary as talked of here refers to some of
the requisite terms and conditions which are so necessary that if they are absent, the
independence of the judiciary also cannot exist.

It is very difficult to lay down certain set conditions as law is dynamic in itself and of the
changing economic, political and social scenario.

4.5. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Many provisions are provided in our constitution to ensure the independence of the
judiciary. The constitutional provisions are discussed below:

4.5.1. Security of Tenure:

The judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts have been given the security of the
tenure. Once appointed, they continue to remain in office till they reach the age of retirement
which is 65 years in the case of judges of Supreme Court (Art. 124(2)) and 62 years in the case
of judges of the High Courts (Art. 217(1)). They cannot be removed from the office except by
an order of the President and that too on the ground of proven misbehaviour and incapacity. A
resolution has also to be accepted to that effect by a majority of total membership of each House
of Parliament and also by a majority of no less than two third of the members of the house

12
http://www.yourarticlelibrary.com/india-2/independence-of-judiciary-in-india/49299/, accessed on
17/02/2017, 20;49

Page 20 of 25
present and voting. Procedure is so complicated that there has been no case of the removal of
a Judge of Supreme Court or High Court under this provision.

4.5.2. Salaries and Allowances:

The salaries and allowances of the judges is also a factor which makes the judges
independent as their salaries and allowances are fixed and are not subject to a vote of the
legislature. They are charged on the Consolidated Fund of India in case of Supreme Court
judges and the Consolidated Fund of state in the case of High Court judges. Their emoluments
cannot be altered to their disadvantage (Art. 125(2)) except in the event of grave financial
emergency.

4.5.3. Powers and Jurisdiction of Supreme Court:

Parliament can only add to the powers and jurisdiction of the Supreme Court but cannot
curtail them. In the civil cases, Parliament may change the pecuniary limit for the appeals to
the Supreme Court. Parliament may enhance the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
It may confer the supplementary powers on the Supreme Court to enable it work more
effectively. It may confer power to issue directions, orders or writs for any purpose other than
those mentioned in Art. 32. Powers of the Supreme Court cannot be taken away. Making
judiciary independent.

4.5.4. No discussion on conduct of Judge in State Legislature / Parliament:

Art. 211 provides that there shall be no discussion in the legislature of the state with respect
to the conduct of any judge of Supreme Court or of a High Court in the discharge of his duties.
A similar provision is made in Art. 121 which lays down that no discussion shall take place in
Parliament with respect to the conduct of the judge of Supreme Court or High Court in the
discharge of his duties except upon a motion for presenting an address to the President praying
for the removal of the judge.

4.5.5. Power to punish for contempt:

Both the Supreme Court and the High Court have the power to punish any person for their
contempt. Art. 129 provides that the Supreme Court shall have the power to punish for

Page 21 of 25
contempt of itself. Likewise, Art. 215 lays down that every High Court shall have the power to
punish for contempt of itself.

4.5.6. Separation of the Judiciary from the Executive:

Art. 50 contains one of the Directive Principles of State Policy and lays down that the state
shall take steps to separate the judiciary from the executive in the public services of the state.
The object behind the Directive Principle is to secure the independence of the judiciary from
the executive. Art. 50 says that there shall be a separate judicial service free from executive
control.13

13
http://mulnivasiorganiser.bamcef.org/?p=482, accessed on 17/02/2017, 20:47

Page 22 of 25
 CHAPTER – 5

CONCLUSION

This chapter deals with the concluding analysis of the concept of the independent
judiciary. The points which are noted by the researcher are: -

Judiciary of India is an independent body

It is separate from the Executive and Legislative bodies of the Indian Government
The Executive and Legislative bodies, i.e., the centre and the state govt. cannot interfere in
the work of the judiciary
The higher judiciary is appointed with very little interference from the govt.
It is very difficult to remove the judge from his post
There are courts to ensure that there should not be any misuse of the powers.
The courts ensure the enforcement of the fundamental rights.

Page 23 of 25
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

ARTICLES: -

How judges appoint judges, the debate around it, by Utkarsh Anand
Judicial appointments: Centre begins consultation on new legislation, by A Subramani|
Judicial appointments in India: judicial approach, by Soham Bajpai
Independence of Judiciary in India: A Critical Analysis, by Aatin Kumar Das

CASES: -

1998, President K R Narayanan’s Presidential Reference to the Supreme Court

S P Gupta Vs Union of India, 1981
The Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association Vs Union of India, 1993

DICTIONARIES: -

MyMemoryTranslated.net
Thefreedictionary.net
Abbreviation.com
Dictionary.com
Merriam Webster
Oxford Dictionaries Online

JOURNALS: -

LAW MANTRA THINK BEYOND OTHERS

STATUTES-

Constitution of India

WEBSITES-

http://indianexpress.com/article/explained/collegium-system-supreme-court-how-
judges-are-appointed-and-transferred-the-debate-around-it-4375719/
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Judicial-appointments-Centre-begins-
consultation-on-new-legislation/articleshow/55090547.cms

Page 24 of 25
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/What-is-the-collegium-
system/articleshow/49404698.cms
http://www.realityviews.in/2014/04/facts-history-about-collegium-system-sc.html
https://www.gnlu.ac.in/bc/JUDICIAL%20APPOINTMENTS%20IN%20INDIA-
%20JUDICIAL%20APPROACH.pdf
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Judicial_Appointments_Commission#SC_
declares_NJAC_unconstitutional
http://mulnivasiorganiser.bamcef.org/?p=482
http://www.yourarticlelibrary.com/india-2/independence-of-judiciary-in-
india/49299/

Page 25 of 25