Lindley v Rutter 1978.

Facts: Miss Lindley was seen by a police officer staggering in an Exeter Street. She smelt of liquor and
the officer rightly concluded that she was drunk. Consequently, she was arrest and in late convicted
of disorderly behaviour whilst drunk. After the arrest the defendant was invited to enter a police car
in order that she might be taken to the police station. At the police station the defendant refused to
be searched. As W.P.C attempted to search the defendant and to remove her brassiere for her own
protection the defendant scratched the policewoman’s hand and kicked her knee, causing her to fall
to the floor. The search was carried out with the assistance of another constable and the
defendant’s brassiere was removed. The defendant was further charged with unlawfully assaulting.

Reasoning:

Police constables of all ranks derive their authority from the law and only from the law. If they
exceed that authority, however slightly, technically they cease to be acting in the execution of their
duty and have no more rights than any other citizen.

Question: When are the limits of the authority of a constable to search a person who is in custody
and to remove parts of their clothing for their own safety?

It is often the duty of an officer to search a prisoner. If, for instance, a man is taken in the
commission of a felony, he may be searched to see whether the stolen articles ae in his
possession, or whether he has any instruments of violence about him, and, in like manner, if he be
taken on a charge of arson, he may be searched to whether he has any fire-boxes or matches
about his person.

Police officers have a right to search a person lawfully in their custody and to take possession of
property, but it is a very limited one.

There is no general common law right to search a person who has been arrested, but such a
person may be searched if there are reasonable grounds for believing (1) that he has on his person
any weapon with which he might do himself or others an injury or any implement with which he
might effect an escape, or (2) that he has in his possession evidence which is material to offence
with which he is charged.”

What measures are reasonable in the discharge of this duty will depend upon the likelihood that the
particular prisoner will do any of these things unless prevented. That in turn will involve the
constable in considering the known or apparent disposition and sobriety of the prisoner. What can
never be justified is the adoption of any particular measures without regard to all the circumstances
of the particular case.

But, of course, there was no reason whatsoever to believe that Miss Lindley’s condition was
attributable to anything other than intoxication.

The forcible removal of her brassiere was understandably regarded by Miss Lindley as peculiarly
offensive. Such conduct would require considerable justification. It was inherently unlikely that
possession of the brassiere could lead to accidental injury. If it was to used intentionally for this
purpose, other clothing would probably have served as well.

They have made no finding that the constable gave any consideration to whether the search was
necessary for any lawful purpose or whether the removal of the brassiere was in fact necessary for
Miss Lindley’s own protection.
Adair v McGarry 1933

Rule: At common law, the police were entitled, without a warrant, to take the finger-prints of a
person apprehended on a criminal charge but not yet committed to prison; and that their right to do
so was unaffected by the statute and regulations referred to.

It is essential to bear in mind the distinction between the position of a person detained on suspicion
of having committed a crime, and the position of a person who has been committed to prison on a
charge of crime. The police may arrest a suspect and may interrogate him; but the person may only
be committed if a prima facie case against him is made out, and no interrogation is permitted after
committal.

The suggestion that the police can, without any warrant, arrest a person suspected by them of
having at sometime previous to his arrest committed an offences which the police have not
witnessed, and take him to the police office- that he may be stripped and search made of his person
for any incriminating material and artificial mark is in my opinion extravagant and might well lead to
actions of damages for assault against the members of the force indulging in such practices.

The officer is not entitled to overstep the necessity or reasonable requirements of the particular
case.

The powers of the police before committal are wider than their powers after committal.

There the accused had been liberated on bail; he was not under detention by the police; but after
release on bail, he was haled by the police to a cell and his fingerprints were taken. For such
procedure there was neither excuse nor justification. The police had, in the circumstances, no right
to lay hands upon him, and, on my opinion, the whole procedure illegal.

Lennox Gayle v Regina – Bar Spirit Licence and Noise Abatement Act

whether his arrest or attempt to arrest was lawful, is whether the superintendent honestly believed
on reasonable grounds that an offence was in progress, or had been or was about to be committed,
and that the accused was the perpetrator.

That is precisely why if a police officer responds to a reported breach of the peace, conducts
reasonable enquiry and acts on information reasonably believed to be credible, the question
whether he had an honest belief supported by reasonable cause must be looked at through the lens
of the reasonable police officer faced with that situation.

a constable has power at common law to arrest without warrant on reasonable suspicion of a
felony having been committed, but has no power to arrest for a misdemeanour, unless a breach of
the peace has been committed in his presence or there is reasonable ground for supposing that a
breach of the peace is about to be committed or renewed in his presence.

If the constables had reasonable cause to arrest the Appellant, he was not entitled to assault the
constable or resist during the process of the arrest. It matters not that the offence for which the
Appellant was arrested was not the one for which he was ultimately charged.
Lavin v Albert – Train case

Issue: whether a constable who reasonably believed that a breach of the peace was about to take
place was entitled to detain any person without arrest to prevent that breach of the peace in
circumstances which appeared to him to be proper.

A constable who reasonably believes that a breach of the peace is about to take place is entitled
to restrain a person without arrest if such is necessary to prevent a breach of the peace. In
answering that question, I have intentionally used the word "restrain" rather than "detain." In the
circumstances of this case the two words mean the same. I have used "restrain" to make it clear that
I look upon the restraint as being a step which the officer was entitled to take to prevent a breach of
the peace not as a detention primarily aimed at depriving a man of his liberty. (2) A person being
restrained in the circumstances found by the justices to exist who does not accept that the person
restraining him is a constable may be convicted of assault on a constable in the execution of his
duty if he uses no more force than is reasonably necessary to protect himself from what he
mistakenly and without reasonable grounds believes to be an unjustified assault and false
imprisonment.

that every citizen in whose presence a breach of the peace is being, or reasonably appears to be
about to be, committed has the right to take reasonable steps to make the person who is breaking or
threatening to break the peace refrain from doing so; and those reasonable steps in appropriate
cases will include detaining him against his will. At common law this is not only the right of every
citizen, it is also his duty, although, except in the case of a citizen who is a constable, it is a duty of
imperfect obligation