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A Weberian Theory of Time

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Time Society 2000 9: 147
DOI: 10.1177/0961463X00009002001
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02_TAS 9/2 articles 8/8/00 10:14 am Page 147
A Weberian Theory of Time

Sandro Segre
ABSTRACT. This article formulates a Weberian general theory of

time. The theory is Weberian, in the sense that it is drawn from
Weber’s epistemological and sociological work. After a short
presentation of Weber’s epistemological writings, concerning how
social scientists may investigate present and past events, and a brief
digression on Husserl’s possible influence on Weber, it focuses on
Weber’s sociological analysis of time in interactional and social
contexts, and especially – on the interactions between formal and
informal contexts. A unitary theoretical framework is then
developed and analyzed in the light of classical and contemporary
sociological work, concerning time as a social construction and a
social constraint. KEY WORDS • institutional time regulation • non-
institutional time regulation • social time
Time as a socially constructed and shared experience has been the object of a
number of sociological investigations. They have examined the structures and
meanings of social time (Lewis and Weigert, 1981) and, more particularly,
the interactional context of time perception (Denzin, 1987), the language of
time considered at both microsocial and macrosocial levels of analysis
(Zerubavel, 1987) and the matching of the personal experience of time with
its social and cultural definition (Flaherty, 1987). The sociology of time as a
theoretical discipline, endowed with a subject matter of its own (Jaworski,
1991; Maines, 1987), and the conceptualization of temporality by classical
authors such as Simmel (Molseed, 1987) and Durkheim (Katovich, 1987; Watts
Miller, 2000), have also received attention.
Still, the potential contribution of Max Weber to this area of inquiry has so far
been neglected. Since Weber did not explicitly produce a sociological theory of
time, this article sets out to reconstruct his contribution as a unitary theorical
framework that is consistently derived from some Weberian statements bearing
on temporality. As will be shown, this Weberian theory is constituted by one set
TIME & SOCIETY copyright © 2000 SAGE (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi), VOL.
9(2/3): 147–170 [0961-463X; 2000/09;9:2/3;147–170; 014747]

148 TIME & SOCIETY 9(2/3)
of epistemological statements and one set of theoretical propositions. The first

section of the article attempts to develop a unitary epistemological framework,
and focuses on Weber’s epistemological works stating how social scientists,
and especially historians, should proceed in order to investigate other people’s
past experiences, and past events in general. Weber’s references to the analysis,
by the German philosopher Edmund Husserl (1859–1938), of the forms of lived
experiences (Erlebnisse) – that is, of the forms of consciousness – necessitate
digression concerning Husserl’s possible influence on Weber, since the
relationship between the original experience and its subsequent conceptualiza-
tion was relevant to both authors. The second section of the article considers
Weber’s writings concerning time as a social construction performed both in
interactional and social, and in particular institutional, contexts, in order to
develop a unitary theoretical framework. Finally, Weber’s contribution is
analyzed in the light of classical and contemporary sociological research and
theorization of time.
Weber on the Interpretation of Past Events by Historians and Other

Social Scientists: A Unitary Epistemological Framework
Weber stated his epistemological position, concerning the problem of inter-

pretation of people’s meaningful conduct, in the context of polemical evalua-
tions of other authors’ writings. This problem must be faced by any social
actor interacting with others, but Weber focused on how historians, and social
scientists in general, go about when they perform research on the causes of
courses of action that took place in the past. Two opposite contentions provided
a specific target for his negative assessments.
According to one contention, historians should strive to perform the task of
formulating general concepts and establishing ‘objective’ rules that allegedly
determine the course of events. Weber observed that real human conduct is, first
of all, inspired by motives that historians, and social scientists in general, must
interpret in order to explain such conduct; second, that establishing general rules
of causation is not the research goal of the social sciences, but is rather merely
instrumental to the purpose of imputing specific consequences to specific
causes; third, that the ways in which concepts are formulated by social scientists
are historically determined by the values prevalent in their own time; and
finally, that conduct is influenced (rather than determined) by a multiplicity of
causes varying in their combination and importance. Therefore, only a limited
number of historical events may be investigated, the cultural relevance of which
depends on the historians’ interest, and ultimately on their own values (Weber,
1973a: 66–70, 120–5, 136–7, 1973b: 177–84, 1973c: 261–2, 271–5).
A second and opposite point of view maintains that historical investigations

SEGRE : A WEBERIAN THEORY OF TIME 149
should involve the effort of reproducing our own, or others’, past experiences
through an irrational process of empathetic intuition that defies causal explana-
tion. Weber’s objections were as follows: first, the validity of the results of this
process cannot be proved; second, the elaboration of past experiences by means
of ideal types implies – even if these experiences were our own – a new,
inherently different experience drawn from general, conceptually formulated
knowledge. Ordinary people, and social scientists as well, rely on general rules
of experience (rather than on empathetic intuition) to link specific courses of
action – whether past or present – with the actors’ motives. More generally,
historians and other social scientists make use of wider knowledge concerning
objectively possible causal relations. This knowledge has been made available
to them by their professional expertise or their conceptually reformulated life
experience. Specific effects are thereby attributed to specific events that have
been meaningfully construed as causes. Historians have selected them from the
vantage point of their values, apart from the significance of these events for their
discipline (Weber, 1973a: 102–3, 110–26, 136, 1973b: 192–5, 1973c: 268–87).
In his epistemological work Weber made some points that were apparently
formulated under the influence of Husserl, whom he cited a few times in this
connection. Husserl was in fact the only author on whom Weber relied without
reservation, whereas he took issue in his epistemological essays with a number
of other authors. Much of Husserl’s work came out after Weber’s death in 1920,
and should therefore be referred to only for the purpose of clarification of some
passages contained in his Logical Investigations, for the second volume of this
book, published in 1901, is the only work by Husserl that Weber ever quoted
(for an introduction to Husserl that focuses on this early work, see Civita, 1982:
307–74).
In contrast to later work (Husserl, 1952a, appendices XII, XIII, XIV to the
third section), in this early and foundational work Husserl was not yet
concerned with the epistemological distinction between the social and natural
sciences, nor did he yet argue, in concordance with Weber (1973a: 67–70,
100–17, 127–31, 1973c: 278–90), for: (a) the explanatory goal of all sciences,
including the social sciences; (b) the objective character of their conclusions;
and (c) the necessity for social scientists of understanding the Erlebnisse of
other subjects. Moreover, the phenomenological analysis of consciousness, as a
stream of Erlebnisse, and in particular, of the consciousness of time and of the
problem of intersubjective experience, was either first developed or greatly
extended in subsequent works (Husserl, 1950a, 1950b, 1952a, 1952b, appendix
1, 1966). Husserl’s in-depth analysis of some epistemological and cognitive
questions, which were relevant to Weber, therefore came out too late to be
considered by him.
Rather than dwelling on Husserl’s texts, which are not directly relevant here,
it seems preferable to indicate the reasons for Weber’s interest in these texts. As

Weber maintained, it was not the lived experiences (Erlebnisse) as such, which
cannot be the object of empirical knowledge in the moment they occur to the
subject, but rather the conceptual categories obtained through their elaboration,
that are necessary for causal reasoning in everyday life, as well as in history and
the social sciences in general (Weber, 1973c: 260, 280). There is a disjuncture,
according to Weber, between experiences and their conceptual elaboration.
Time is therefore relevant for Weber’s epistemology, not only because of
the temporal succession of different and influential viewpoints guiding social
scientists (Weber, 1973c: 213–14, 260), but also because of the temporal
interval between a given experience and its subsequent conceptualization, by
ordinary people and social scientists alike (Weber, 1973a: 104, 1973c: 260).
The points, which Weber discussed with specific reference to Husserl, concern
the acquisition of knowledge through lived experiences (Erlebnisse). These
points may be presented as follows:
1. Inner experiences should not be considered more evident, and their know-
ledge more valid, than the experience of the outer world. Thereby, Weber
raised the epistemological question of the objective validity of human
experience, and therefore of the knowledge produced by the social sciences
that rely on the comprehension of such an experience. His position was, as
mentioned, that the empathetic process of understanding any experience is a
necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the attainment of valid knowledge
(Husserl, 1901: 703–5; Weber, 1973a: 102–5);
2. The conceptualization of lived experiences (Erlebnisse) – inner perceptions
or perceptions of the outer world – by means of categories is inherently dif-
ferent from having these perceptions. Only categories may be apprehended
intellectually and become accordingly an object of reflection. Denominating
a proposition, which connects different psychic perceptions, involves a new
act whose meaning is inherently different from that of the original proposi-
tion, for this denomination may also refer to other propositions. By referring
to these passages of Husserl’s, Logical Investigations, Weber wished to
distinguish between perceptions and their conceptual elaboration, on which
the acquisition of valid knowledge is contingent (Husserl, 1901: 332–44,
600–52; Weber, 1973a: 77, 109–10). The following epistemological state-
ments may then be formulated.
Epistemological statement I: empathetic processes cannot be subjectively
re-experienced by the same person or others without modification, nor can they
become the object of valid knowledge. Empathetic processes, to the extent
that they can be understood or interpreted by means of general knowledge of
plausible motives, are a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the attain-
ment of valid knowledge concerning the causes of specific historical or social
events.

Epistemological statement II: there is a temporal interval between a given

experience and its subsequent conceptualization, by ordinary people and by
social scientists. Concepts, formulated through the mental elaboration of lived
experiences, are necessary for causal reasoning in everyday life, as well as in
history and the social sciences in general.
The former statement indicates the relevance of lived experiences. The latter
statement points to the relevance of concepts formation and presupposes the
former, since the formulation of concepts is premised on understanding or
interpreting lived experiences. Both statements, jointly considered, apply to
the (epistemological) conditions for the obtainment of intersubjectively valid
knowledge, and ultimately for constructing a sociological theory of time, for
‘theories are built on concepts’ (Turner, 1982: 2), and sociological theories of
time, in particular, involve the conceptual elaboration of the social actors’ sub-
jective experience of time, and of its constraints by social factors.
Weber on Time as a Social Construction:

A Unitary Theoretical Framework
Weber was perfectly consistent in subjecting the statements, which he made as

a social scientist, to the constraints of his own epistemology. Not lived experi-
ences (Erlebnisse), whether our own or others’, past or present, but ideal types
constitute the basis of causal imputation in history and the other social sciences.
The formulation of ideal types calls for general knowledge of plausible motives,
rather than for the empathetic penetration of other people’s mental processes in
specific circumstances. As a social scientist, Weber dealt with the subjective
experience of time, and with how this experience is constrained by the objective
– social and institutional – definition of time. In this connection, he contrasted –
on the one hand – the semiconscious experience of time, characterizing indi-
viduals and collectivities whenever traditional habits, mentalities, and ways of
life prevail, with – on the other hand – its highly conscious individual experi-
ence and its strict social and institutional regulation in specific circumstances.
Among such circumstances, Weber dwelled on those characteristics of a
culture imbued with the Protestant ethic, and of modern industrial capitalism.
The formulation of ideal types applies, as he pointed out, in particular to reli-
gious doctrines that were influential in producing, with capitalism, the modern
business firm. Of special relevance to him was the doctrine of predestination in
Calvinism or Methodism, whose inner, private experience cannot be – as Weber
maintained – re-experienced as such by scholars, but may be rather analyzed
only by means of ‘objective’ ideal types (Weber, 1973b: 194–98).
Weber empirically reconstructed the effects of this doctrine upon the faithful

by using a variety of tools: (a) the analysis of historical documents on the

diffusion of the predestination doctrine (Weber, 1910: 586, 592); (b) informal
meetings with members of contemporary Protestant sects in the United States
(Weber, 1922b: 208–13); and (c) a sociological investigation concerning the
factors, including faith in Pietism, that influence work performance (Weber,
1924b: 161–2, 1995: 278–81). By the same token, the image of traditional
entrepreneurs, whose leisurely pace of life was not yet permeated by the new
capitalist spirit, was explicitly formulated by Weber as an ideal type based on
historical information (Weber, 1922a: 51, note 1). Likewise, it was possible to
understand and explain, by means of general knowledge and the empirical
evidence that he gathered, that factory workers modify the amount and tempo of
their output when some new conditions affecting their work – such as different
working hours or rules for computing hourly wages – set in (Weber, 1924b:
132–3, 1995: 246–8).
Weber dealt at some length with the individual and social experiences of
time both in traditional and modern social and cultural contexts. In traditional
contexts, Weber pointed out that habitual, half-conscious or unconscious
behavior and attitudes are taken for granted in everyday life. Time is not con-
sciously regulated by those individuals – for example, farmers in precapitalistic
societies – who enact habitual practices. Traditional action, in both contempo-
rary and past societies, may consist in the inadvertent and unthinking repetition
of conduct, already enacted by the same persons or others in conformity to uses,
customs, and conventions. Tradition, in this sense, involves habituation (Weber,
1956: 12, 15, 286, 1973d: 325, 330, 1973e: 460, 473).
Tradition, however, may also involve the conscious repetition of practices
for the sake of conformity to norms. There has been a purely social (non-
institutionalized) regulation of traditional conduct in those societies, past and
present, in which tradition itself has upheld the social and political order. In
such circumstances, the duration of this order has become a value for many,
who behave accordingly. Customs and conventions, often in addition to col-
lective beliefs and memories, do not just hold together, but also stabilize, the
conduct of the members of communities formed by status or ethnic groups, and
by nations (Weber, 1956: 234–44, 527–31, 534–8).
The social and political order is further stabilized when traditional conduct is
regulated not merely by purely social factors such as uses, customs, and con-
ventions, but also by institutions. This is the case of monarchies and, under
modern circumstances, of parliamentary monarchs, whose charismatic authority
is inherited and pertains to the office, rather than to the person. Parliamentary
monarchs may exert their political talents not in spite, but rather by means, of
the existence of democratic, representative institutions, whose consolidation
they may promote with their hereditary charisma (Weber, 1956: 130, 144,
688–9, 1971: 337, 405, 1984: 470, 551).

These statements, concerning the regulation of time in traditional cultural and

social contexts, may be condensed in the following proposition:
Theoretical proposition I: tradition, whether it consists in semiconscious and
unconscious or in norm-oriented patterns of conduct, stabilizes conduct. This is
more so if monarchies institutionalize tradition.
Parliamentary monarchs in contemporary democracies provide the only
instance of the institutionalization of traditional rule, and thus social conduct,
in concomitance with the prevailing formal rationality, as embodied in the
conduct of the public administration and the modern business firms. Otherwise,
stabilization of conduct, both at work and in everyday life, results not from
tradition, but from the prevalence of these modern institutions, which need
stability for their normal functioning. Often habitual patterns of behavior are no
longer spontaneous, and do not show any connection with tradition as a value.
Modern capitalism has done away with the customary, easy-going and un-
organized modes of working and having leisure that were once characteristic of
entrepreneurs and factory workers. In their stead, a very different attitude and
life conduct have prevailed. The unreserved dedication to work, conceived as a
profession, has been prescribed, enforced and, occasionally, spontaneously
offered, while the principle that ‘time is money’ has continued to hold sway
over many entrepreneurs even after the Protestant ethic lost its grip on most
souls and conduct (Weber, 1922a: 30–60, 204, 1922b: 210–11).
The foregoing statements may be epitomized as follows:
Theoretical proposition II: after institutionalized traditional conduct was done
away with by capitalism (parliamentary monarchies being the only exception),
stability of conducts has resulted from previously non-existing, formally
rational, institutions, such as the business firm and the public administration.
In modern social and cultural contexts – those in which the individual and
social experiences of time are mostly no longer bound by tradition – firms have
to socialize their workers to the required work habit, performance, and pace. In
Weber’s own empirical research, workers basically adapted the continuity and
intensity of their work flow to the firm’s requirements, since they were under
the constraint of a piecework payment system, but their performance varied
considerably within the same day, and from day to day during the week
(Monday, following Sunday binges, being the worst day in terms of output),
according to individual dispositions, collective habits, business cycles, and
other unexplained conditions.
Moreover, the intensity of their performance, and therefore its rhythm, is
influenced in one way or the other by specific social circumstances on which the
firm exerts no control. On the one hand, out of a sense of solidarity with their
fellow-workers, workers deliberately slow down the pace of their work when-

ever their performance is measured. On the other hand, some workers perform
better than average, presumably because of their strong normative orientation. It
is worth noting, in this connection, that Pietist workers’ upholding of traditional
norms of conduct contributes to their professional attitude toward their working
obligations, and therefore to the orderly functioning of the formally rational
factory organization (Weber, 1922a: 47, 1924: 136–63, 1995: 251–81).
Workers have been forced basically to comply with the institutional regula-
tion of time by business firms, but their own social norms and individual dis-
positions modify the intensity and pace of their work performance. Regulation
is most effective when social norms support it, as is the case for many entrepre-
neurs and some workers.
The following proposition summarizes the previous discussion:
Theoretical proposition III: the effects on individuals of the constraints exerted
by the institutional regulation of time, on the part of and within the firm, may be
stronger or weaker according to the individuals’ specific normative orientation.
A further source of time regulation is provided by another modern institution,
the formally rational public administration. This institution, as Weber con-
tended, subjects all those who depend on it – the civil servants and indirectly the
general public – to its authoritative power, exerted by impersonal rules. The
celerity of its functioning, as compared to other, less formal rational organiza-
tions, results from the needs of large-scale corporations – themselves endowed
with formally rational administrative structures – for the speedy and accurate
diffusion of information and exchange of goods (Weber, 1956: 129, 570–1).
The pace of activities in large-scale organizations, whether public or private,
provides therefore a direct or indirect constraint on much of modern everyday
life, whose tempo is set or regulated by administrative rules. Socialism, itself
requiring a formal large-scale administration, would not alter this state of affairs.
Since bureaucratic structures are indispensable for the livelihood of people
under modern economic conditions, and political rulers are neither able, nor in
general willing to do without them, they are self-perpetuating, enduring institu-
tions. They stabilize the existence of ordinary people by means of binding rules,
but to an even greater extent shape and order the lives of all those who work for
them, during working hours and in the course of time. This is especially the case
for civil servants, whose employment is meant to be full-time and permanent.
Spontaneous, willing consent to such a strict and enforced regulation of time,
and in general to bureaucratic rules, cannot be taken for granted. In fact, the
impersonality of these rules may not be in line with individual exigencies.
However, the effectiveness of bureaucratic domination, its aversion to formal
status discriminations notwithstanding, presupposes an educated personnel
that is recruited from privileged social strata, and who uses its high school and
university diplomas to uphold invidious status distinctions against the less

educated populace. The privilege of education provides accordingly a further

source of legitimacy to bureaucratic domination, in addition to its legal-rational
legitimacy, for the members of the educated community (Weber, 1956: 127–9,
563–4, 570, 575–8, 1971: 248, 266, 1984: 350–1, 370).
The preceding text may be thus summarized:
Theoretical proposition IV: white-collar employees of large-scale organiza-
tions, especially civil servants, experience the greatest amount of time regula-
tion, because they work in these institutions and their employment is par-
ticularly stable, but – ceteris paribus – a lesser amount of subjective constraint
than factory workers or non-members of large-scale organizations, because the
educational degrees, which are formally required for admission, qualify them as
belonging to the privileged status groups.
These four theoretical propositions are interconnected as follows: (1) the
first two propositions indicate the conditions of conduct stabilization in the
temporally disjunct contexts of tradition and modernity; (2) propositions II and
III, jointly considered, point to the interplay between the institutional and non-
institutional normative regulation of time in modern contexts; (3) propositions
III and IV, jointly considered, specify the various amounts of objective and
subjective constraints on time in modern contexts, according to the particular
institutions in which individuals operate.
Weber on Time, as Compared to Other Classical Authors
In his analysis of time, both as subjectively experienced and objectively

defined, Weber dealt with themes that were also touched upon, or even elabo-
rated, by other classical authors such as Marx, Durkheim, and Simmel. A brief
comparison between Weber and these authors may cast light on the uniqueness
of his contribution.
Weber and Marx

Marx shared with Weber a profound interest in the embeddedness of social time
in the institutional context provided by profit-seeking firms that severely con-
strain the lives of all those who are subject to their rules while producing for
impersonal markets. In other respects, however, their sociological consideration
of time differed considerably. Marx contended that, under capitalistic relations
of production, working time is regulated by the necessity for the firm to produce
merchandise, that is, goods having both a use value (in so far as they possess a
utility for the individual user that is realized in the moment of their con-
sumption) and an exchange value (in so far as their usefulness is social, to the

effect that it is generalized to the collectivity of the consumers). Any collective

production of goods (irrespective of how intrinsically different) by means of
the social division of labor aims at obtaining an exchange value. This value, in
contrast to use value, is determined by the labor time that is on average
necessary to produce any commodity, and in the case of capitalistic production,
to reproduce the workers’ labor power. Accordingly, exchange value is not
determined by the amount of labor time involved in the production of any
particular merchandise.
Capitalistic production also aims, however, at obtaining a surplus value,
namely, the (exchange) value produced in addition to the value of the workers’
subsistence means, and determined by the amount of surplus labor time spent in
addition to the necessary labor time. The proportion between the surplus and the
necessary labor time indicates the degree of the workers’ exploitation. The total
amount of labor time belongs to the capitalist employer, and its partition between
necessary and surplus labor time is accordingly the expression of the capitalistic
relations of production: capitalism constantly endeavors to extract ever greater
surplus value by extending working hours, intensifying the pace of work, or
improving work productivity through technological innovations (Marx, 1867,
Vol. I, ch. 1 para 1; ch. 7 paras 1, 2, 4; ch. 10; Vol. III, chs 37, 48 section III, 51).
Untrammelled by any concern with traditional values and pre-existing modes
of production, capitalism, and with it the pursuit of ‘naked self-interest’ and free
competition, have done away not only with the ‘idiocy of rural life’, but also
(allowing for transitional forms) with handwork, and therefore with the very
possibility of autonomous regulation of the labor activity, of its daily amount
and rhythm. The workshop system replacing the putting-out system completed
the expropriation of workers from the control of the instruments of production
they use, while regulating the pace of their activity more strictly and effectively
(Marx, 1867, Vol. I, chs 13, 3, 8, 9, 1959: 8–15; 1966, 1st manuscript, section
XXV). Socialism, in turn, will do away with this regulation, and of labor time in
particular, by external, impersonal forces of labor. Necessary labor time will
remain, as its existence does not depend on a particular mode of production, but
will be rationally regulated and controlled by the collectivity of the producers.
Any additional time, which the productivity of labor will make available, will be
instrumental to the development of human abilities and, accordingly, to the con-
stitution of a ‘kingdom of freedom’ (Marx, 1867, Vol. III, ch. 48, section III).
Weber, as mentioned, developed an implicit sociology of time that concurred
with Marx’s in emphasizing the rationalization of work, and in particular of
working time, brought about by the capitalist firm. In agreement with Marx,
Weber maintained that the capitalistic division of labor and discipline, backed
by the threat of dismissal, are characteristic of the workshop, which requires
free labor, and of the subsequent modern factory based on the extensive use of
machinery. Like Marx, moreover, he laid stress on the gradualness of the transi-

tion from the craft work or the putting-out system to the factory system (Weber,
1956: 88, 1981: ch. XII). However, he differed from Marx in some important
ways:
1. As for tradition, Weber did not fully subscribe to Marx’s thesis, that tradi-
tional practices and values have been made irrelevant by capitalistic relations
of production. Rather, he distinguished between institutionalized and non-
institutionalized traditional patterns of practices and norms, and pointed out
that the rational conduct, which characterizes the firm as an institution, may
in some specific circumstances be compatible with, and even strengthened
by, traditional norms and values. In such circumstances, the overlapping of
labor-time regulation by the firm with the employees’ own norms and values
makes such a regulation especially successful.
2. As for the relevance of the institutional regulation of time in modern times,
Weber argued that the firm, and in particular the industrial firm, is but
one regulative source beside the public administration. The hierarchy of
authoritative power accounts for the employees’ inability to control their own
labor time. Capitalistic control of the means of production, and therefore
of authoritative power, is accordingly a particular case of a general process
that characterizes modernity, and that socialism would in no way alter.
Simmel and Weber

Like Weber, Simmel developed his sociological consideration of time with
reference to the cultural and social context of modernity, of which – as Simmel
maintained – money is both the expression and the cause (Simmel, 1922: 585).
Money, and therefore capitalism, have modified the previous perception of
time, to the effect that it has become something valuable, and accordingly use-
ful and scarce (Simmel, 1922: 577). Money has also greatly increased, with the
frequency of monetary transactions, the pace of life. The money economy has
done away with previous divisions of time according to natural events – the
cycles of seasons, or of days and nights – while imposing a rhythm of its own
on modern individuals, their high level of refinement and cultivation notwith-
standing. Indeed, refinement and cultivation may strengthen the social norms
regulating the modes of satisfying natural instincts, and the proper timing for
such activities (Simmel, 1922: 553–4, 1984: 205–11). Simmel’s dualism
between objective and subjective culture (Frisby, 1992: 162–74; Molseed,
1987: 360–1; Weinstein and Weinstein, 1989: 53–9) is represented and epito-
mized by the dualism between, on the one hand, the impersonal, objective
constraints originating from modern institutions, and ultimately from the money
economy, and on the other hand, the desultoriness and fragmentation of indi-
vidual existence. The capitalistic firm, and the factory in particular, imposed a

rhythm on the employees’ daily work, while making very uncertain the stability
of their occupation and therefore the continuity of their work.
Not only in business and mass industrial production, but also in the scientific,
political, artistic spheres of social relations, the activities characteristic of
modernity have been rationalized from the point of view of their time con-
sumption, and have been subject accordingly to a rhythm geared to their
efficient performance. The pace of social life increases or decreases according to
the amount of circulating money, and to the degree of stability of prices. The
current tendency toward a great acceleration of the pace of life is evidenced by
the speed of transactions yearly performed in the major stock exchanges, in the
modern business world in general, and in the contemporary large cities, which
are the seat of the monetary economy. Money, as the mobile exchange medium
between economic goods, is the stable form of modern social life (Simmel,
1922: 552–84, 1984: 196–7, 1991: 26–30). The adventure – namely, a brief,
unusual, and meaningful experience set against the normalcy and calculability
of everyday life (Simmel, 1983: 13–22) – is then of particular significance for
individuals whose existence takes place in the objectified context of modern life.
Weber and Simmel shared some fundamental theses that concern the social
regulation of time in the context provided by modernity in general, and capital-
ism in particular. More specifically, they subscribed to the following theoretical
propositions: (a) the capitalistic firm is a major factor of regulation and stability
of the pace and timing of daily work; and (b) education, to the extent that it suits
the needs of capitalism, reinforces a coercive regulation of time. Though the
two authors do not seem to have conflicting views, in so far as their sociology of
time is concerned, their implicit theories have a different object: (a) while
Simmel was interested in describing the effects of the money economy (which
he identified with capitalism) on the existential condition – including the social
regulation of time – of modern individuals, Weber focused more narrowly on
the institutional regulation of working time; (b) while Simmel – to the extent
that he considered institutions – analyzed time regulation, as performed within
the factory, Weber included in his analysis administrative organizations as an
important source of time regulation. At least in the case of the public adminis-
tration, the relevance of the money economy on the social construction of time
is not immediately apparent, nor was it emphasized by Weber; (c) more than
Simmel, Weber was interested in how specific categories of people, and of
factory workers in particular, react to the institutionally enforced constraints on
the pace of their activities, and in the motives of their specific reactions.
Durkheim and Weber

In keeping with Durkheim’s epistemological position, causal reasoning applies
not only to the natural or experimental sciences, but to sociology (and im-

plicitly, history) as well (Durkheim, 1979: 126). This position led the author to
investigate the social (rather than psychological) causes of social phenomena,
such as the division of labor (Durkheim, 1979: 113). According to Durkheim, in
the course of time an evolutionary social change has taken place from simple,
undifferentiated, segmentary to complex and functionally differentiated
societies. This evolutionary process may be conceptualized – to quote a com-
mentator – as ‘normally slow, gradual, and small scale in character’ (Hinkle,
1976: 343).
In particular moments or circumstances, however, social change may come
about abruptly. Such transitory ‘moments of effervescence’ or ‘periods of
creation or revitalization’ (Durkheim, 1978: 204–5, 214–15), are characterized
by ‘some great collective crisis, upheaval, or shock’ (Hinkle, 1976: 343). As a
consequence, ‘a sharp qualitative and quantitative upgrading in the nature of
social interaction’ (Tiryakian, 1978: 221) occurs, in which collective repre-
sentations and society and individual consciousness interpenetrate (Isambert,
1992: 459). Participants perceive this time as sacred and contrast it with
profane, or everyday, time. ‘The capacity of social actors to symbolically recon-
struct and/or socially structure the past’, and the ‘interpersonal and negotiated
transactions’ that sustain the ‘macrofoundations of temporality’, are under-
emphasized by Durkheim, thereby foreclosing the possibility of a phenomeno-
logical sociology of time (Katovich, 1987: 374–8). Sacred time is endowed with
rhythms, long-term social dynamics, collective memories, and visions of its
own. The origin of sacred time, and time in general, is exclusively social
(Durkheim, 1978: 218–19; see also Bergmann, 1992: 83; Watts Miller, 2000).
The transition from segmentary to differentiated societies, while caused by
the ever increasing division of labor, has been concomitant with the transition
(in Durkheimian terms) from mechanical to organic solidarity (Durkheim,
1999: 143–47, 180–5). Organic solidarity is stronger, as a rule, than mechanical
solidarity (Durkheim, 1999: 165). The strength of organic solidarity has been
impaired in modern times by the growing importance of economic progress, in
conjunction with the shrunken relevance of religion and government as sources
of discipline and moral regulation for the individuals’ avarice (Durkheim, 1978:
152–4). The very same effect – an anomic condition of society – has also ensued
from the division of labor. Under normal circumstances the division of labor
would engender solidarity by producing an ever greater number of individuals
living in society (its ‘volume’), their ever denser concentration in the society’s
territory (its ‘material density’), and ever more frequent interactions among
them (society’s ‘moral density’). Moral density, in particular, has been pro-
moted by the number of communication channels and the speed with which
communication is transmitted (Durkheim, 1979: 108–9, 1999: 256–63).
However, modern times have been characterized by an extremely pronounced
division of labor, the concomitant development of a world market and, as a con-

sequence, the inability on the part of the individual producers to grasp the social
function of their own activities. A widespread anomic condition may follow
from such circumstances (Durkheim, 1999: 350–64; see also Willis, 1982).
Weber and Durkheim shared a belief in the validity of causal reasoning in
sociology and history, and an interest in the social construction and regulation
of time, but their views and research objects in this area of inquiry differed in
other important respects. First, as a major source of time regulation in the social
and cultural context of modernity, Weber pointed to large-scale institutionalized
organizations, whereas Durkheim laid stress on the division of labor on the one
hand, and the volume and density of individuals, in conjunction with the speed
of communications and frequency of interactions, on the other. Second, in con-
trast with Durkheim’s emphasis on the ‘macrofoundations of temporality’ – to
use Katovich’s (1987) apt expression – Weber considered the social regulation
of time as the result of the encounter between institutional norms, those
of particular groups, and individual preferences or habits. Considerations of
power and shared meaning are accordingly relevant in ascertaining how time is
socially regulated and employed in specific circumstances, such as – for
instance – daily or weekly cycles of work and leisure. The road is thus open to a
phenomenological sociology of time that does not leave macrosociological
(namely, institutional) constraints out of account.
Third, Weber would not have concurred with the Durkheimian thesis of
impending anomie as a consequence of the pronounced division of labor. The
norms of status groups, as well as traditional or modern ideological orientations,
may be, in his view, strong enough to guide individuals in their lifestyles and, in
particular, in their use of working and leisure time. These norms and orienta-
tions may be in agreement or in conflict with general social norms, such as
the institutional norms controlling the division of labor. Finally, Weber – unlike
Durkheim – does not focus on norms that, in the context provided by modernity,
are so encompassing to embrace society as a whole, and does not therefore
raise the question of their origins, and their sources of strength or weakness.
Accordingly, integration or solidarity – to the extent that they obtain in par-
ticular milieux – flow from more specific sources, whether macrosociological
(institutions) or microsociological (subcultures of particular groups).
An Assessment of Contemporary Theoretical Developments in the

Light of Weber’s Reconstructed Sociology of Time
Weber’s reconstructed theory of time, and especially the last two theoretical
propositions (III and IV), share with some contemporary formulations a concern
for the institutional regulation of time in modern societies, but do not conform
entirely to the positions held in this regard by post-Weberian scholars. Since

‘the problem of time in sociology’ (Bergmann, 1992) has been tackled by a

considerable and growing number of sociologists and students of related
disciplines, only a limited number of contributions by prominent authors will be
considered here and compared with Weber’s.
Weber would not concur, in particular, with the unqualified statement that
‘generally speaking, organizational time demands precedence over interaction
time’ (Lewis and Weigert, 1981: 444, 446, 454), since the norms governing
interaction time may turn out to be more binding on conduct than the institu-
tional norms. Rather than unilaterally stressing either ‘time’s tyranny’ as a
functional requisite of modern societies, or individuals’ opposition to it for the
sake of personal autonomy and control of their own destinies (Jaworski, 1991),
Weber preferred to dwell on the interactions between the non-institutionalized
normative context, and the institutionally defined and enforced regulation of
time. For instance, within educated civil servants or specific groups of factory
workers informal social norms reinforce, generally speaking, the organization’s
formal regulation of working time, but formal norms cannot prevent the same or
other groups of factory workers from deliberately slowing down the pace of
their work, out of consideration for their fellow workers, when the criteria
for measuring the work output are established. Nor can formal norms prevent
workers from condoning, when not openly accepting, the informal social
practice of ‘taking it easy’ on Mondays after having indulged in liquor con-
sumption on Sundays. Though some time sociologists have, like Weber, paid
attention to so-called ‘blue Mondays’ and to the symbolic place of individual
weekdays in the weekly routine, in their effort to develop ‘a stratification of
social times’ they have contended, unlike Weber, that cyclic time receives a
higher social priority than institutional-organizational time (Lewis and Weigert,
1981: 440–1, 454).
However, since cyclic time – as for example weekends versus workdays – is
institutionalized, as they themselves point out (Lewis and Weigert, 1981:
440–1), conferring higher priority to cyclic time does not seem to make much
sense. In keeping with this Weberian theory of time, the relevant distinction
would rather be between formal (institutionalized) and informal (non-
institutionalized) social time. The object of inquiry would then be how these
two categories of social time interact in specific contexts. Other sociologists
of time have focused on the symbolic dimension of temporality. Zerubavel, in
particular, has analyzed the meanings individuals impute to the idea of time,
that is, ‘the symbolic relations between the temporal and the social within the
contexts of both interpersonal relations and the societal politics’ (1985: 12,
1987: 344). The two dimensions of social time, formal versus informal time,
have not been sufficiently distinguished, however, nor has its reciprocal con-
ditioning been the object of particular consideration. This may be accounted for
by Zerubavel’s focus on the rational elements of temporal organization (1985:

13), as opposed to the spontaneous, non-routinized elements. Temporal regular-

ities, which confer the perception of order and normalcy to social life (as shown
by Zerubavel, 1985: ch. 1), characterize institutional as well non-institutional
social time. Both Weber and Zerubavel have analyzed the practices and norms
of those professionals who operate in bureaucratic settings. Still, Zerubavel
emphasized how the distinction between working and non-working time is
enforced by formal and informal rules guiding the professionals’ conducts,
while Weber’s sociological interest was directed toward the interplay between
these two sets of rules (Ritzer, 1975: 632–3; Zerubavel, 1985: 210–32).
The symbolic interactionist perspective shares with Zerubavel the emphasis
on symbols through which the common experience of temporality is conveyed
and maintained. This perspective focuses, however, on the construction of
social life, and of temporality in particular, as a common achievement. Alfred
Schutz, who was equally conversant with the works of Husserl and Weber, and
a follower of both, developed a sociological theory of time that in many ways
resembled the Weberian theory that has been reconstructed here. Schutz not
only shared with Weber (and Husserl) the epistemological assumptions that
have been formulated as the first part of the Weberian theory, but also main-
tained, like Weber, that valid knowledge of other people’s experiences, whether
present or past, is possible only by means of ideal types (Schutz, 1976). Like
Weber, he asserted that the very possibility of constructing ideal types depends
on the available stock of general knowledge (Schutz, 1976: 48–9). Still, Schutz
did not show any particular interest in the social regulation of time within the
contexts of, respectively, tradition and modern capitalism, or for the interplay
between informal norms and formal rules in a capitalist context.
The importance of traditions and institutions for the normative, and in par-
ticular, the coercive regulation of social time was, by way of contrast, under-
lined by Berger and Luckmann (1966) in their celebrated work on the social
construction of reality. In fact, this work delineates a sociological theory of time
that most closely approximates the one exclusively drawn from Weber, that has
been formulated here. Berger and Luckmann were, nonetheless, not concerned
– at least, not in that work – with the regulation of social time by specific
capitalist institutions, nor did they in particular indicate how the norms of
specific collectivities interfere with this regulation. More recent contributions
by other authors, who have followed Schutz, and Berger and Luckmann in the
analysis of time as an intersubjective experience, have focused on particular
questions, such as ‘how does the transition from one sphere to another of social
reality shape the individual sense of duration?’ (Flaherty, 1987: 320) or ‘how
the interpretation of social events change, thicken, and take on new meanings as
they are reread and examined’ (Denzin, 1987: 327). Accordingly, the theoretical
objectives of their research have been more limited.
Like Berger and Luckmann’s, Nowotny’s (1994) sociological work on time

is in line with Weber’s contribution (which is, however, never quoted), in so far
as it reiterates, and often extends and articulates, some Weberian theses. In
Nowotny’s formulation, they are stated as follows: (1) capitalism has done away
with the ‘traditional space of experience and the horizon of expectation – pre-
viously – derived from it’ (Nowotny, 1994: 48); (2) capitalistic, formal rational-
ity (in the Weberian sense), as embedded in the market, the factory, and large-
scale private and public organizations, has coordinated the individuals’ time and
established a coercive control over it (Nowotny, 1994: 23, 50, 93–7, 107, 118,
130–1, 147–8), so that ‘time in social facilities and institutions becomes rela-
tively independent of individuals’ (Nowotny, 1994: 147); (3) the institutional
regulation of time, which is necessary for the orderly functioning of modern
capitalism, has been premised on the widespread acceptance of the values of
punctuality and, in general, of time discipline (Nowotny, 1994: 63, 93); (4) a
condition of tension and conflict has ensued between public time, which is
institutionally determined and controlled by the state and the firm, and private
time, namely, ‘the temporal perspectives of the citizens and the employees’
(Nowotny, 1994: 103); and (5) institutional time, especially working time, has
been met with resistance on the part of employees seeking more free time and
autonomy (Nowotny, 1994: 107–8, 112, 125–7).
Despite their agreement on all these points, Weber’s analysis may com-
plement Nowotny’s in some respects. Weber stressed the distinctive responses
to the institutional regulation of, and control over, time according to the
employees’ individual and collective (cultural and social) characteristics.
Further, he called attention to the distinctive amounts of time regulation and
control required by the specific sector and size of the organization in which
employees work. A comparison between Weber’s theoretical statements
and Luhmann’s, who stressed the coercive regulation of time from a neo-
functionalist perspective, would also indicate the existence of only partial
agreement between these two authors. Luhmann’s well-known essay on the
scarcity of time and the urgency of deadlines points to the ‘high inter-
dependence of structures and processes that has come into existence in the
course of the development of civilization’, for an explanation for the accelera-
tion of the pace of activities, the specification of their appropriate times, and the
institutionalized expectation of longer waiting times (Luhmann, 1971: 145).
As Luhmann maintains, scarcity of time is due to problems with coordination
of experiences, communications and other actions. The single component parts
of the social system advance their own claims on time, disrupting time planning
by other parts. In order to keep costs and performance under control, it is
necessary to spend more time on the task of coordinating time schedules and to
establish deadlines as a way to achieve an adequate amount of coordination.
Setting deadlines, however, creates a prioritized order that does not conform to
other preferences and values. As a consequence of such deadlines, moreover, it

becomes impossible to obtain relevant information and evaluate alternatives, so

that only less than fully rational decisions may be made. Finally, deadlines are
difficult to observe in modern bureaucratic administrations, in which specialist
knowledge, and the distinction between knowledge obtained by formal training
and by practical experience, prevent coordination among different administra-
tive sectors. Rather than logical congruence, negotiated and politically valued
consensus is then pursued through the administration by means of time-costly
coordination of its different branch activities (Luhmann, 1971: 144–6, 150–2).
Temporal coordination is pursued through a variety of means: setting strict
deadlines, even though real time commitments cannot be calculated; encourag-
ing cooperative actions, rather than individual ones, although the latter may be
more functional for the organization; establishing distant deadlines in order to
grant sufficient time for compromises, so that distinct and incompatible values
may be pursued with institutionalized opportunism; establishing time scarcity as
an ideological principle, and therefore fastness as the accepted way of con-
ducting institutional activities (Luhmann, 1971: 152–6). The pressure of time
scarcity may be relieved, to prevent it becoming dysfunctional for the social
system, by means of some specific institutional devices, such as the establish-
ment of status differences, whereby those who enjoy a privileged status are able
to have greater leeway in arranging their own time and to impose deadlines on
others, in such a way that they can cope with stronger time pressure ensuing
from their privileged position. Alternatively, it is often possible to manipulate
deadlines for decisions, to suit specific bureaucratic or political exigencies, or
those of specific actors. Finally, one can resist deadlines by counterpoising
other deadlines that are endowed with a legitimacy of their own (Luhmann,
1971: 156–9).
In the context of his sociological analysis of deadlines, and time in general,
Luhmann objects to Weber’s ideal-typical description of the social regulation of
time on the part of bureaucratic organizations, especially public administration.
Luhmann argues that distinctive, special knowledge pertains to a number
of such organizations, the legitimacy of whose decisions is not purely legal-
rational, but also stems from administrative and political consensus and com-
promise. Decisions by single administrative departments are thus made possible
through time-demanding, temporal coordination of higher-order decisions
(Luhmann, 1971: 151–2, see also p. 107). Weber himself, however, showed a
keen interest in the need for compromises between both political parties and the
representatives of private interest organizations in the institutional framework
of modern parliamentary democracies. The legitimacy of these compromises is
therefore grounded in the legitimacy of these institutions, and ultimately in the
electoral preferences expressed by the electorate. The members of the public
administration, he maintained, share economic and social privileges with the
members of interest groups. In the absence of effective parliamentary institu-

tions, compromises between these privileged groups would be reached at the

expense of the unprivileged strata (Weber, 1971: 261–8, 1984: 366–72).
From a Weberian viewpoint, the legitimacy of time regulation through
administrative and political decisions – backed by whatever consensus and com-
promise – rests accordingly upon the combined legitimacy of formal rules and
democratic institutions. Weber’s connection between the legitimacy of time
regulation and that of democratic institutions may then be considered a dis-
tinctive theoretical achievement, provided that Luhmann’s contention, that the
political system draws from itself its own legitimacy, is not accepted (Segre,
1984).
A non-functionalist sociology of time in the context of modernity has also
been formulated by Anthony Giddens. In order to develop his own sociological
theory, and set it apart from Weber’s and that of other classical or contemporary
authors, Giddens has analyzed – as one of the most noteworthy consequences of
modernity – the relationship between time and space. Time measurement by
means of calendars and mechanical instruments has standardized time world-
wide, making coordination across time possible, which in turn has been a con-
dition of the control of space. Space, in contrast with place, does not imply
interactions in contexts of copresence (Giddens, 1984: 142–4, 376–7, 1990:
18–22, 53). As Giddens has argued, in contrast with the overlapping of time and
space, and therefore the predominance of such contexts until the late 19th
century, with the advent of modernity space no longer coincides with place.
Rather, it is increasingly ‘disembedded’ – that is, ‘lifted out’ or torn away –
from place. The process of disembedding is promoted by ‘fostering relations
between “absent” others, locationally distant from any given situation of face-
to-face interaction’. The coordination of activities and social relations across
time and space, which is not hindered by the physical absence of the actors,
relies on this process (Giddens, 1984: 143, 183–5, 1990: 18–20). Disembedding
mechanisms, and money in particular, depend on trust, which is vested ‘not in
individuals, but in abstract capacities’ (Giddens, 1990: 26), and is accordingly
institutionalized.
Like Weber, Giddens has maintained that ‘the rational capitalistic enterprise
is one that is able to operate in a stable, orderly fashion’, and that ‘control of
time is characteristic of bureaucracy in general, not just of capitalistic enter-
prises’ (Giddens, 1984: 152). Weber, moreover, also stressed the relevance for
modern capitalism of spatially distant financial and commercial relations
(Weber, 1924a: 261, 263–5). In contrast to Giddens, Weber did not hold how-
ever that proximate, face-to-face, economic contacts have lost relevance, but
rather that they are instrumental in promoting distant contacts. Market relations
– even more so, financial relations – presuppose trust among the partners, since
they are in principle accessible to anybody. Trust is institutionalized, as Weber
maintains in agreement with Giddens, but at the same time is best established

by means of not fully institutionalized, personal contacts among the business

partners, who may thereby be assured of their partners’ honesty and trustworthi-
ness. In turn, personal contacts are facilitated by, and even contingent on, inclu-
sion in highly privileged status groups (Weber, 1924: 285, 287, 1956: 282–3).
Weber’s thesis, that modern capitalism, and modernity in general, have resulted
in the establishment of connections between both proximate and distant actors,
has been proposed in more recent times by students of financial relations and
ethnic networks in globalized capitalism (Albrow et al., 1994: 374–6; Brugger
and Knorr Cetina, 1999; Light and Karageorgis, 1994: 659–62).
At the very end of this presentation of some especially noteworthy contribu-
tions to the sociology of time, Barbara Adam’s should be mentioned, for it
seeks to encompass a plurality of conceptualizations, both sociological and
non-sociological, some of which have been dealt with already in this essay. A
‘conceptualization in terms of levels’, such as the times of nature and society, is
suggested in order to reach ‘a full understanding of time’ (Adam, 1990: 46–7,
see also pp. 164–5). All time is ‘irreducibly social’, including natural and bio-
logical time, since it is rooted in human culture and belongs to human existential
experience (Adam, 1990: 89, 1995: 144–6). Not only must human time be
studied in conjunction with the time of nature, but also, as Adam argues, its
meanings and modes of conceptualization in different societies are worth
investigating. In contemporary industrial and capitalistic societies time, includ-
ing that for education and leisure, is ‘highly structured’ and ‘conceptualized as
a resource’. ‘Structural relations of power, normative structure, and the nego-
tiated interactions of social life’ must be accordingly understood (Adam, 1990:
109, 120, see also 1995: chs 3 and 4).
Human time in general, and industrial time in particular, is transcended, to the
effect that the past is selectively preserved and recorded for the management
of the present and for future action. Transcendence and power relations are
concepts whereby the social character of time is illuminated. Time is then ‘a
fundamentally transdisciplinary subject’ that must be tackled by considering
‘the theories, studies, and implicit utilization of time in the social and natural
sciences’ (Adam, 1990: 147–9). This argument is further pursued in more
recent works, in which some undesirable consequences of modernity, such as
‘environmental degradation and hazards production’, are accounted for in terms
of the dualism between nature and culture, that she contends is characteristic of
western industrial societies (Adam, 1998: 12, 1995: 126, 142–7).
There can be little doubt that Adam would classify Weber (whom she quotes
especially with reference to the Protestant and modern-industrial concept of
time; 1990: 113, 1995: 87–8) among those sociologists whose conception of
time is incomplete and outdated, still rooted in the above-mentioned dualism
and, more generally in the ‘materialistic/empiricist conception of the past and
future’ (1995: 168, see in general pp. 165–71). She would probably concur,

though, with Weber’s description of how time is structured by modern large-

scale organizations. As for Weber, he would probably point out that the use of
time as a collective resource is constrained by a plurality of norms, not neces-
sarily institutionalized nor agreed upon by all the actors. Nor are such norms
necessarily ‘embedded in the taken-for-granted realm of non-discursive know-
ledge’ (Adam, 1995: 51), since they may be explicitly articulated by conscious
actors, striving to be consistent with ultimate values of their own (religious,
social, or otherwise).
Social time is accordingly negotiated, in local settings and specific circum-
stances, by actors who are not always fully socialized to accept the institution-
ally defined and enforced regulation of time. Nor are they always able or even
willing – like the school teachers mentioned by the author – to impose on
other people, without any negotiation both with them and with other powerful
subjects, a ‘common schedule within which their respective activities are
structured’ (Adam, 1995: 61). Other authors have emphasized ‘the dialectic of
control within the school setting’ (Giddens, 1984: 292, see in general pp.
289–310). Environmental social movements, in particular, may then be con-
sidered – much in line with contemporary research and theory (see, for example,
Flacks, 1994: 343–4) – as relevant social actors, able to successfully challenge
existing power relations.
Conclusion
This article has formulated a Weberian general theory of time. The theory is
Weberian, in the sense that it is drawn from Weber’s epistemological and socio-
logical work. After a short presentation of Weber’s epistemological writings,
concerning how social scientists may investigate present and past events, and a
brief digression on Husserl’s possible influence on Weber, it has focused on
Weber’s sociological analysis of time in interactional and social contexts, and
especially on the interactions between formal and informal contexts. A unitary
theoretical framework has then been developed and analyzed in the light of
classical and contemporary sociological work, concerning time as a social con-
struction and a social constraint. Weber’s contribution, if compared to that of
other classical authors, differed in that: (1) it stressed the compatibility in some
specific circumstances of traditional norms and values with capitalism, and the
relevance of the institutional regulation of time by such norms and values (in
contrast with Marx); (2) it focused narrowly on the institutional regulation of
working time, rather than on the effects of the money economy on humankind’s
existential condition (as with Simmel); and (3) it emphasized both the macro-
and the micro-foundations of temporality (as opposed to Durkheim’s con-
sistently macrosociological perspective).

Weber’s potential contribution to some contemporary theoretical develop-

ments in the sociology of time may be summarized by means of the following
points: (1) institutional and non-institutional norms interact. Moreover, the
subordinate members react to the regulation of social time by specific capitalis-
tic institutions according to their individual, cultural, and social characteristics;
(2) the legitimacy of time regulation through administrative and political
decisions rests on the combined legitimacy of formal rules and democratic
institutions; (3) modern capitalism is premised on instantaneous connections
between proximate and distant actors; and (4) social time is always negotiated
in local settings and specific circumstances.
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SANDRO SEGRE, MSc in Sociology in 1972 (New York University),

PhD in Sociology (New York University), is currently Assistant Professor
of Sociology at the State University of Genoa (courses in Economic
Sociology and History of Sociological Theory) and at the Università
Bocconi of Milan (course in Introductory Sociology). His publications
are mainly in the fields of history of sociological theory, with reference
especially to the work of Weber and Simmel, deviance and social policy.
ADDRESS: Istituto di Scienza Politica, Università di Genova, Largo Zecca
8/18, 16124 Genova, Italy. [email: segre@csb-scpo.unige.it]

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Time & Society

A Weberian Theory of Time

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A Weberian Theory of Time

ABSTRACT. This article formulates a Weberian general theory of

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148 TIME & SOCIETY 9(2/3)

of epistemological statements and one set of theoretical propositions. The first

Weber on the Interpretation of Past Events by Historians and Other

Weber stated his epistemological position, concerning the problem of inter-

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SEGRE : A WEBERIAN THEORY OF TIME 149

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150 TIME & SOCIETY 9(2/3)

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SEGRE : A WEBERIAN THEORY OF TIME 151

Epistemological statement II: there is a temporal interval between a given

Weber on Time as a Social Construction:

Weber was perfectly consistent in subjecting the statements, which he made as

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152 TIME & SOCIETY 9(2/3)

by using a variety of tools: (a) the analysis of historical documents on the

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SEGRE : A WEBERIAN THEORY OF TIME 153

These statements, concerning the regulation of time in traditional cultural and

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154 TIME & SOCIETY 9(2/3)

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SEGRE : A WEBERIAN THEORY OF TIME 155

educated populace. The privilege of education provides accordingly a further

Weber on Time, as Compared to Other Classical Authors

In his analysis of time, both as subjectively experienced and objectively

Weber and Marx

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156 TIME & SOCIETY 9(2/3)

effect that it is generalized to the collectivity of the consumers). Any collective

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SEGRE : A WEBERIAN THEORY OF TIME 157

Simmel and Weber

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158 TIME & SOCIETY 9(2/3)

Durkheim and Weber

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SEGRE : A WEBERIAN THEORY OF TIME 159

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160 TIME & SOCIETY 9(2/3)

An Assessment of Contemporary Theoretical Developments in the

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SEGRE : A WEBERIAN THEORY OF TIME 161

‘the problem of time in sociology’ (Bergmann, 1992) has been tackled by a

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162 TIME & SOCIETY 9(2/3)

13), as opposed to the spontaneous, non-routinized elements. Temporal regular-

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SEGRE : A WEBERIAN THEORY OF TIME 163

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164 TIME & SOCIETY 9(2/3)

becomes impossible to obtain relevant information and evaluate alternatives, so

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SEGRE : A WEBERIAN THEORY OF TIME 165

tions, compromises between these privileged groups would be reached at the