Journal of Statistics Education

ISSN: (Print) 1069-1898 (Online) Journal homepage: https://amstat.tandfonline.com/loi/ujse20

Building on and Challenging Students' Intuitions

About Probability: Can We Improve Undergraduate
Learning?

Pfannkuch Maxine & M. Brown Constance

To cite this article: Pfannkuch Maxine & M. Brown Constance (1996) Building on and Challenging
Students' Intuitions About Probability: Can We Improve Undergraduate Learning?, Journal of
Statistics Education, 4:1, , DOI: 10.1080/10691898.1996.11910502

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/10691898.1996.11910502

Copyright 1996 Maxine Pfannkuch and

Constance M. Brown

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Building on and Challenging Students' Intuitions
About Probability: Can We Improve
Undergraduate Learning?
Maxine Pfannkuch and Constance M. Brown
The University of Auckland, New Zealand

Journal of Statistics Education v.4, n.1 (1996)

Copyright (c) 1996 by Maxine Pfannkuch and Constance M. Brown, all rights reserved. This text may be
freely shared among individuals, but it may not be republished in any medium without express written
consent from the author and advance notification of the editor.

Key Words: Allowing students to experience variation; Fostering students' awareness of their thinking;
Probability as a tool to understand variation.

Abstract
Students of statistics must be allowed to experience the omnipresence of variation and experience the
dual modes of thinking probabilistically and deterministically to explain that variation. A pilot study to
investigate the understanding of variability and probability of a small group of students is described.
These students have a strong tendency to think deterministically (especially in real world settings); they
have little understanding of variability and its relationship to sample size; and they are generally unable to
reconcile their intuitions with the formal probability they have been taught. There were some initial
indications that allowing students to experience variation personally made them more aware of their over-
emphasis on causal explanations of variability. Lastly, it appears that students' awareness about
probabilistic thinking can be raised by actively challenging and discussing their tacit intuitive models
about chance.

1. Introduction
1 The question might be raised: Is it necessary to teach probability to enable students to understand and
interpret data, and if so, what particular aspects of probability should be taught and how? The importance
of finding answers to such questions is highlighted by Garfield and Ahlgren (1988) in their
recommending a research effort that ``explores how useful ideas of statistical inference can be taught
independently of technically correct probability'' (p. 57). This paper describes a pilot investigation into
students' understanding of probability and variation and teaching methods to develop that understanding.
This work is part of a larger study designed to give an insight into what aspects of probability should be
taught in an introductory tertiary statistics course and how they should be taught.

1.1. How Much Understanding of Probability is Necessary to

Understand Statistics?
2 Moore (1992) suggests that too much probability is taught in statistics courses and that only the

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necessary minimum should be taught to further statistical thinking. He argues that for statistical thinking,
the learner should be aware of the omnipresence of variation and how this variation is quantified and
explained (Moore 1990). He suggests that current approaches to teaching statistics do not develop this
awareness in students. He concludes therefore that there is a need to revolutionise our teaching approach
(1992).

3 Towards this reshaping of our teaching of statistics, we might consider the idea of ``cognitive
apprenticeship'' described by Singer and Willett (1993). They claim that ``learning occurs most
effectively when learners engage in authentic activities with community members [statisticians].'' To
engage students in ``cognitive apprenticeship'' they say statistics educators must: (1) select authentic
activities, (2) model practitioner behaviours, and (3) provide practice opportunities. Accepting this
approach implies that our teaching of probability should reflect the ways in which probability is used by
the practising statistician when analysing data (in both the exploratory and confirmatory contexts). This
of course may pose a problem when courses are taught by people who have no experience as practitioners
of statistics. Authentic activities may also be far too complex for first year statistics classes.

4 To analyse and interpret data the statistician requires a mixture of deterministic and non-deterministic
thinking. Biehler (1989) comments, however, that beginning teaching in probability focuses on almost
ideal random situations that do not allow students to practise this dual way of thinking. Any set of data
(apart from the rare extreme case) will contain variation. The statistician will extract or identify
systematic influences, which form the so-called deterministic part of the model that is constructed to
describe the data. But these factors will rarely account for the full variation observed. Because the non-
systematic causes underlying this variation cannot be analysed directly, they are conveniently described
as random. An experienced statistician is able to judge when the search for causes ends and the
acceptance of random variation begins. Thus, an expert data analyst will have a thorough grasp of the role
of variation, and will understand how to describe and quantify this random variation through the language
of probability. A statistician is someone who is comfortable thinking probabilistically as well as
deterministically. Our task is to enable our students to do the same.

1.2. How Can We Enable Students to Understand Probability?

5 Falk and Konold (1992) hold the opinion that probabilistic thinking is an inherently new way of
processing information as the world view shifts from a deterministic view of reality. They state: ``In
learning probability, we believe the student must undergo a similar revolution in his or her own
thinking ... We advocate starting the process of probabilistic education by building on the firm basis of
students' sound intuitions'' (p. 151, 152).

6 Borovcnik and Bentz (1991) suggest that conventional teaching of stochastics (probability and
statistics) establishes too few links between the primary intuitions of the learner and the clear cut codified
theory of the mathematics. They suggest that teaching has to start from the learners' intuitions, attempting
to change and develop them. Borovcnik (1990) indicates that a logical thinking approach and a causal
thinking approach are accessible at the intuitive level, and that teaching must develop secondary
intuitions that clarify how stochastic thinking is related to these approaches. This raises the question as to
whether our current teaching of probability and statistics sets up too few links with students' deterministic
thinking and does not raise their awareness of a probabilistic interpretation.

7 Fischbein (1987) asserts that ``intuitions are always the product of personal experience, of the personal
involvement of the individual in a certain practical or theoretical activity'' (p. 213). He suggests that the
role of the teacher is to make the students aware of the tacit intuitive models present in their thinking and
develop in them the ability to control their intuitive biases while building new intuitions consistent with a
formal structure. He states: ``Primary intuitions are usually so resistant that they may co-exist with new

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superior scientifically acceptable ones. That situation very often generates inconsistencies in the students'
reactions depending on the nature of the problem. A student may understand logically and intuitively that
when tossing a coin several times, each outcome has the same probability. Nevertheless he may still feel
intuitively, that, after getting tails 3-4 times in succession, there is a greater likelihood of getting `heads'
on the next toss'' (p. 213). Fischbein believes that ``one of the fundamental tasks of mathematical
education ... is to develop in students the capacity to distinguish between intuitive beliefs, intuitive
feelings and formally supported convictions'' (p. 209).

2. The Empirical Investigation

8 In our opinion a formal mathematical approach to teaching probability may serve as an obstacle to the
development of statistical thinking. A pilot study was therefore set up to investigate probabilistic learning
in a small group of adult students who were being taught formal probability. In particular, answers were
sought to the following questions: (1) What understanding of variation do students have? (2) How do
they think about probability in various contexts? (3) What can be done to increase their understanding of
variation and probability? It is intended that this study will help in the design of a more comprehensive
investigation of probabilistic learning amongst tertiary students.

9 The pilot study consisted of three phases, each of which was intended to build up a more complete
understanding of some students' thinking. Phase One consisted of individual interviews designed to
provide tentative answers to questions (1) and (2). On the basis of this first interview, a one-day course
(Phase Two) was designed to experiment with some ideas about teaching approaches, towards a possible
answer to question (3). Phase Three was a follow-up interview in which apparent changes to
understanding were investigated.

2.1. Phase One: First Interview

10 Five female students, all majoring in psychology for their degree and currently enrolled in a first year
statistics course, volunteered to take part. Three students were aged over 35, two students were between
30 and 35. The last time they had studied mathematics was at least 15 years ago. The highest level
studied was one student to Year 12 (last year of school), one to Year 11, one to Year 10 and two to Year
Nine. It was not intended that these five students should be a representative sample. The five women
showed a commitment to learning and seemed to be an ideal group with which to gain an insight into
some students' thinking. At the time of the interview they had completed course work on `Tools for
Exploring Data' (includes numerical and graphical summaries) and `Probability' (includes simple
probability, probability rules, conditional probability, and statistical independence). The students were
interviewed individually for about one hour. They were told that the interviewer was interested in their
thinking and reasoning rather than in their getting the `correct' answer. Consequently they were asked to
`think aloud' during the interview. The questions were presented orally and on paper. Unplanned probes
were used to clarify the student's thinking for the interviewer. The interviews were audiotaped.

11 The interview included the following items, among others. When quoting responses to the
interviewer's (I) questions, individual students (S) are not identified.

Roulette Wheel Question (adapted from Lovitt and Lowe 1993): A roulette wheel has 18
black (B) and 18 red (R) numbers. The probability of a ball landing on a red is the same as
landing on a black. A gambler observes the ball to land on red six times in a row, that is
RRRRRR. What do you expect the next colour to be?

12 A typical response to this question was that ``intuitively'' the next one should be black, but thinking

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``probabilistically'' it could be either red or black. Students often experience such a clash between their
intuitions and probabilistic thinking. An effect may be that they rapidly learn to distrust their intuitions
but do not understand why their intuitive response is wrong and hence they return to their intuitions
again. They are also not shown that, with development and refinement, their intuitions can lead them in
the right direction. The paradox is, that in an actual game, they are asked to choose the colour of the next
ball. This paradox can only be resolved by simulating such a situation and understanding a logical
explanation. One student had the following conversation with the interviewer:

S: ``Black.''

I: ``You expect it to be black. Why would you expect it to be black?''

S: ``Well, it could be black or red, 'cause the probability is the same. I think, yeah, it could be
black or red.''

I: ``Black or red ... But initially you said black ... Why did you say black?''

S: ``Because there's all red that have come out so it must be time for a black to come out.''

I: ``So that was your initial thought ... So why did you change your mind?''

S: ``Because the probability is the same, the chances are the same that either a black or red
could come out.''

13 This reaction supports Fischbein (1987) who implies that a student can ascribe to two beliefs. The
above student, on the one hand, knows that the random nature of the roulette wheel means she cannot say
which colour will appear next. Yet, on the other hand, her intuition leads her to suggest that, in order to
balance out the run of reds, a black must appear next. The students' responses affirmed our belief of their
need to discuss and experience this situation fully to both convince themselves of a logical explanation,
and to become more aware of their inappropriate and appropriate intuitive models. From a teaching
perspective it appears that too few links with their primary intuitions have been established (Borovcnik
1990) and hence their intuitive beliefs have not been used or resolved.

Baby Question (adapted from Lovitt and Lowe 1993): The Smith family has had three girls.
What do you expect their next child to be?

14 Apart from one student the standard response was that it was equally likely to be a boy or girl. Based
on typical classroom assumptions that each sex is equally likely, and successive conceptions independent,
the similarity to the roulette wheel was presumably transparent. The student who believed that a girl was
more likely was drawing on her experience as a nurse, giving causal explanations for her answer. She
believed that as more girls were produced by one mother, the likelihood of another girl increased. Later
on (after the interview), she recalled statistics produced in class that showed that the probability did
increase but only very slightly. The student was very surprised as she thought, from her experience, that
the increase was much greater. This experience influenced her thinking every time she was presented
with a medical type problem. She says:

S: ``You are supposed to know that they have an equal chance of having a girl or a boy. I
really dispute that. That's what was in our book, but I felt logically, I know a lot of families
who have four of the same sex and that is put down to the fact that the sperm decide on the
sex of the child and it is not an equal chance ... so when I read the statistics I found it
surprising ... it was .52 and .48 ... Now I remember what we did in class ... they took 40,000

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 births and it was just a slight increase [in the chance of a same sex child following]. So
you're saying at what point do I take from not being half and half ... after two when you get
up to three I do see strong trends to having the fourth child the same gender ... I believe there
is more to this than the game of LOTTO, ... it's actually some real world data.'' [LOTTO is a
state lottery in New Zealand and is fairly common in North America.]

15 Tversky and Kahneman (1982) refer to this availability bias in judgment: ``The lack of an appropriate
code also explains why people usually do not detect biases in their judgments of probability. A person
could conceivably learn whether his judgments are externally calibrated by keeping a tally of the
proportion of events that actually occur among those to which he assigns the same probability. However
it is not natural to group events by their judged probability. In the absence of such grouping it is
impossible for an individual to discover, for example, that only 50 percent of their predictions to which
he has assigned a probability of .9 or higher actually come true'' (p. 19).

16 From the students' responses it appears that such strong beliefs need to be challenged and resolved
satisfactorily, perhaps treating the student as a scientist, as advocated by Konold (1991). It appears also
that mathematical modelling, and assumptions, must be made explicit when real data is explored. These
observations suggest that the complexities within data, such as the female to male birth ratio, should be
discussed openly and fully. Further, students should be aware that their life experiences may cause them
to overestimate a probability, particularly if the consequences have an impact such as the fourth child
being another girl, and may be influencing their interpretation of the data. If students were to become
aware of their own thinking, and experience data that conflict with their prior beliefs, it is possible that
they may modify their intuitions appropriately.

Map Question: Every year in New Zealand approximately seven children are born with a
limb missing. Last year the children born with this abnormality were located in New Zealand
as shown on the map (Figure 1). What do you think? (In New Zealand it is common
knowledge that one-third of the population lives in the top region and one-sixth of the
population in each of the other regions.)

Figure 1. Map Question.

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17 In this context all the students produced deterministic explanations. After repeated probing by the
interviewer, some did suggest the need for further data.

S: `` I would look at what is similar in the environment ... type of farming, or pollution or
families with genetic defects or something like that living in those areas ... there are a very
small number of children, seven, so might have to build up the statistics over a longer period
of time.''

18 This non-gambling problem produced very strong deterministic reasoning. All students had obvious
experience of such controversial data from the news media and their reasons reflected current concerns in
the community. Because their thinking had never been explored or challenged from a statistical point of
view, their rich experience had lead to a causal analysis only. Probabilistic and deterministic thinking
should complement each other in working towards a full explanation of the data. The students seemed
oblivious to the former. From their responses, it was clear that their understanding of variation in small
samples was minimal in this context. The idea of statistically modelling such a situation did not occur to
them.

Die Toss Question: A fair die is tossed 7 times resulting in the outcome 3,3,3,4,4,5,5 (order
is unimportant). What do you think of these results?

19 All students agreed that this outcome was not surprising, and did not necessarily indicate anything
amiss with the die. Note the analogy between this problem and the Map Question. (The top region has
one-third of the population and corresponds to obtaining a 1 or a 2 on the die, and each of the other
regions with one-sixth of the population correspond to obtaining a 3, 4, 5 and 6. There are seven
abnormal births and seven tosses of the die.) When context is removed and the familiar die is introduced,
students are comfortable thinking probabilistically.

Test Results Question: A small class was given a test on arithmetic and the results were
recorded. The same test was given a few weeks later. The box-and-whisker plots for both
sets of results are shown (Figure 2). Have the results changed much? If so, can you give any
possible reasons?

Figure 2. Test Results Question.

20 Again when context was introduced all students produced deterministic explanations. Searching for
causal explanations is a crucial component of any analysis, but it cannot lead to a full explanation of the
data. No one considered thinking probabilistically except for one student who responded when emphasis
was placed on the key word `small' by the interviewer:

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 S: ``I mean it's not a great deal of difference ... so I tend to feel that the difference is possibly
due to chance or those [causal reasons] that I have just mentioned.''

21 Students relied on their experience and sought causal reasons. They were thinking at an individual
level only (e.g., arguing that a particular student may have been tired for the second test), whereas a
statistician can think at both a local and a global level.

Coin Toss Question: A fair coin is tossed 50 times resulting in 27 heads. Two days later it is
tossed again 50 times resulting in 30 heads. What do you think of these results?

22 The coin toss problem was answered correctly and without equivocation. All students appeared
comfortable, in this context, with the notion of long run relative frequency. This concurs with Konold
(1989) who quotes Nisbett as suggesting that ``most adults use formal, probabilistic knowledge when
reasoning about situations that are clearly probabilistic and have a simple sample space'' (p. 88).

2.2. Phase Two: The One-Day Course

23 Based on our reading, and interpretation of these interviews, the decision was made to focus the one-
day course on:

z Deliberately thinking both deterministically and probabilistically about problems,

z Experiencing experiments that reveal small samples are not representative of the population
(representative used in the non-technical sense),
z Experiencing probability based on models and real data, and
z Clarifying variation and chance.

24 Two weeks after the interviews, a one-day, five-hour course was held. Twice during the day, students
were asked to write down what they had learnt. At the same time the interviewer wrote down her
impressions of the course. A decision was made with the group that a tape recorder would be too
intrusive in this context.

25 The course was interactive, involved a lot of discussion, challenging of ideas, practical activities, and
simulations. Students were encouraged to think aloud and clarify their ideas. The instructional approach
was based on these criteria (Konold 1991): Students (1) reveal their own beliefs first and then listen to the
beliefs of others; (2) think about the problem deterministically and probabilistically; (3) observe through
a hands-on simulation the results of a random process and communicate and discuss what they are
thinking; (4) observe through a computer simulation the results of a random process from small to large
samples and communicate and discuss what they are thinking; (5) reflect on and evaluate what they
originally thought in comparison to their observations from the data; (6) reconsider the dual modes of
thinking probabilistically and deterministically for the explanation of variation. It was believed that
simulations would enable students to experience variation and hence strengthen their understanding. The
first criterion was considered to be important because students need to reveal their intuitions and have a
personal involvement in the task, and it is also a base for the teacher to build on.

26 First an overview on deterministic and probabilistic thinking was given including a diagram showing
that it was necessary to do both when presented with a situation. Current research relevant to the students'
learning and Phase One answers were discussed (Borovcnik and Bentz 1991; Falk and Konold 1992;
Fischbein 1987).

27 To enhance their awareness of variation, several situations were presented to the students. Each time

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they were asked to think about the problem both deterministically and probabilistically. The following
quotes illustrate the students' coming to terms with variation and probabilistic thinking. For example they
were asked to measure the length of a page and the results were then plotted on a graph.

S: ``But what if one person measured the paper 1000 times? ... [realisation that there would
be variation] ... oh, so each of us would have our little curve and all our little curves would
make one big curve!''

28 Another situation discussed was the case of a netball (form of basketball) player with an average
success rate of 80% for getting a goal. In an important match she missed three shots in a row.

S: ``[ Different] types of thinking in statistics ... allowed me to firstly think: 'What type of
process I am using?' When examples were discussed, I was aware of thinking intuitively,
deterministically and had to sift mentally quite hard to think in statistical terms. When the
netball example was presented and discussed, I could think and understand statistically that
the scores are due to chance variation. Intuitively I could also say it was because of bad form,
off day etc. I like the ease and variability to have the ability to think a little clearer
concerning each problem presented.''

S: ``The most useful thing was to recognise the underlying 'need' to explain variation by
naming causes, and being able to `reconceptualise' to accept a degree of ever present
variation.''

29 This section ended with a discussion on defining variation according to Falk and Konold (1992). The
idea that many causes exist of which we are ignorant was discussed, and chance or variation was defined
as an ``irreducible part of natural phenomena'' (p. 151).

30 In presenting a probabilistic way of thinking the teacher must be aware of the danger of students now
believing that every situation can be answered with the stock phrase ``random variation.'' Setting up a
model of thinking in diagrammatic form for the explanation of variation should keep students referenced
on the dual modes of thinking. Criterion (6) in the instructional approach is important to avoid this danger
and to give students confidence in listening to their own intuitions.

31 The Test Results Question from the initial interview (Phase One) was discussed, including the original
answers given in the interview. Computer simulations were used to show (via boxplots) how sampling
variation depends on sample size. Samples of size 20, 50, and 500 were generated. The students were
very surprised at the amount of variation for samples of size 20 and 50 and the amount of stability in the
large samples. A typical comment was:

S: ``[I realised] that the sample of a population is never totally representative of a population.
Hence the variation.''

32 The Map Question from Phase One was discussed, including the interview answers given, and again
students were asked to think deterministically and probabilistically. They agreed on the probabilities for
each region (based on the population distribution) and then simulated the problem by tossing a die seven
times repeatedly and recording their results on the maps. They shared their results and then used the
computer to simulate the problem seven times and then 300 and 600 times. The following quotes
illustrate the students' heightened awareness of their thinking in real world contexts:

S: ``The value of realising our bias to use deterministic thinking, especially applied to human
problems, is very useful.''

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 S: ``I can see that it takes a reasonably sized sample to give you a representative picture of
the population. I'm a very visual learner and the computer graphics helped. I think I can now
see how `human' problems have been different for me in the past, from number problems.''

S: ``I tend to think intuitively about human examples allowing emotion to cloud. [I] need to
apply statistical thinking to the problem.''

S: ``I feel more aware of being able to reason statistically across a broader range of concepts
and problems. I also feel I have a greater understanding between the results gained from
small and large samples, small samples giving a greater variation.''

33 The die simulation was perhaps even more powerful in demonstrating variability than the computer
simulation. The students personalised it greatly. They thought of each lot of seven rolls as data from
consecutive years and they declared their concern after getting four abnormalities in Auckland (the
uppermost region, containing one third of the population) three years running. The question they came to
was ``When would you start to get worried and not put the results down simply to variation?'' Below is
part of a conversation amongst the students demonstrating the re-evaluation of their own experiences in
light of the experiments:

S: ``If you had four abnormalities in Auckland you could investigate and find a cause -- you
would be bound to find something in common between the four. When I was pregnant, there
were four of us pregnant in the lab, I was the only one with a normal baby and [even] he had
hepatitis! No one was interested in investigating -- it could have been chance but ... I keep
thinking of those three women in Christchurch who worked for the city council with babies
that had defects. The women were sure it was the pesticides they were handling but after
investigation they came to no conclusion.''

S: ``Now I know why it took so long to conclude that there was a cause for cot deaths and
thalidomide.''

S: ``It takes a while to prove things have a cause statistically when samples are small. It is
hard not to believe there is a reason -- that it is variation -- [but we] can't treat people like
dice -- human lives are at stake.''

34 The next stage in instruction would be to address the concern of the students as to ``When would you
start to get worried?'' The first stage would be to remind students of the two modes of thinking and that an
explanation for the variation should be sought. If no common or systematic cause could be found then a
record of the numbers of abnormal births should be kept over the years. If there is some causal factor it
should show up in increased numbers or a change in trend. To enhance their understanding of seeing
systematic variation through the random variation, a simulation of the situation should be developed by
the teacher. (This was done in a later study.)

35 Another problem discussed (adapted from Lovitt and Lowe 1993) was one that described a situation
where a person had tossed a coin and had obtained four heads (H) in a row. They were then asked what
they would expect in the next 16 tosses. Some thought that there would be a balancing out so they would
expect more tails (T), some thought the results would yield half heads and half tails, and one student said
she didn't know (the word `expect' was interpreted as predict). The students first simulated the experiment
by tossing coins, with the proviso that they must get four heads first before they could start counting.
Next the experiment was simulated on the computer, and then a tree was drawn to help the students think
about the problem logically.

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36 Again the personal tossing of coins was a powerful forerunner to computer simulation -- the students
could understand that many runs (those not starting with HHHH) had been omitted. The computer
simulation reinforced the idea of expected value as they could see that one run had 13 heads after it,
another run three heads. The empirical evidence appeared to be much more powerful than
intellectualising through the tree diagram. The tree diagram served more as a reinforcement of the
simulations and as a model to facilitate the development of a logical explanation. From this experiment
students became aware of the tacit intuitive models that were causing conflict in their thinking. This is
apparent in the following quotes:

S: ``In the coin tossing problem because four heads come up, intuitively I wanted to think it
would be likely a tail would come up. I know though that statistically the next toss could be
equally [likely] heads or tails.''

S: ``Particularly enlightening is the demonstration of the confusion of two concepts with the
problem of `what are the expectations after four heads' example, in that I expected the results
to even out over the long run without recognising the conditional part of `given that four
heads have already occurred'.''

S: ``Seeing the tree really helped me in this area.''

2.3. Phase Three: The Follow-Up Interview

37 Three weeks after the one-day course, a second interview took place to further investigate the students'
statistical thinking, beliefs, and intuitions. The procedure was similar to the first interview. The students
were each interviewed for approximately one hour. The questions were presented orally and/or on paper
depending on the nature of the question. Again the students were asked to `think aloud' and unplanned
probes were used.

38 Some of the items in the interview were:

Coin Question: Your friend tossed a coin five times and got HHHHH. She said that she
expected the next toss to be a tail. Explain to your friend why she thinks that way.

Weather Question (adapted from Konold 1989): On TV3 the weather forecast for rain in
different areas is always expressed as percentages. If the forecast for Auckland tomorrow is a
70% chance of rain, what does the number tell you?

Disastrous Day Question (from Konold 1989): I was told this story about a person's
disastrous day. First his son wrecked the family car and was seriously injured. Next, he was
late for work and nearly got dismissed. In the afternoon he got food poisoning at a fast-food
restaurant. Then in the evening he got word that his father had died. How would you account
for all these things happening on the same day?

Traffic Accident Question: On average there are 600 deaths due to traffic accidents each
year in New Zealand. A person observed the following:

Number of Deaths
February Week 1: 3
Week 2: 12
Week 3: 21
Week 4: 14

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 March Week 5: 2

Assume that none of these weeks contain a holiday weekend. Suppose the headlines in the
newspaper claimed that week three was a `black' week and police reported that speed was a
factor. The next week was described in the papers as more evidence that New Zealand
driving was deteriorating. At the end of week five the police congratulated themselves for the
low death rate -- their extra patrols had succeeded. What would you say to this person?

Error Rate Question: In a firm in Wellington the management was concerned at the number
of errors that office staff were making in transactions. The four office staff were audited
every day over a month and the box-and-whisker plots shown were obtained (Figure 3). If
you were the manager and had been presented with this graph what would you think?

Figure 3. Error Rate Question.

39 From responses to these questions it appears that some students had become more aware of their own
thinking and were prepared to think probabilistically about each situation. This may have been to due to
the nature of the questions in the second interview, but their comments clearly indicate a heightened
awareness of probabilistic thinking, perhaps to the extent of almost rejecting deterministic thinking,
which was not the intention of the intervention. At the end of the second interview a student observed:

S: ``Because this [interview] was a `test' situation I could feel myself reverting to my original
thinking -- deterministic -- this other way, statistical thinking is new. I was aware I was
relying on what was familiar.''

During the interview on the Traffic Accident Question she said:

S: ``I know that you are saying to me: `Discount those things [causes] and look at general
variability'.''

40 Another student, after struggling with the Weather Question, commented in frustration:

S: ``I'm also thinking about it in a more, I guess, general way rather than a statistical way I
suppose.''

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41 Comments from a third student as she went through the interview seemed to indicate that she was
aware of her thinking. On the Coin Question she reported:

S: ``Must say intuitively though I still think she must get it ... it should come out eventually.
If I got 10 heads in 10 tosses I would think that this is very strange ... that is why in that
question I do have a conflict in thinking.''

42 For the Weather Question she got confused about the interpretation of 70% chance of rain each day
and raining 7 days out of 10 days. Eventually through reasoning aloud she clarified her thinking and
correctly interpreted the questions.

I: ``... 70% chance of rain each day did not have that meaning for you before?''

S: ``[It] did initially and then I thought, is that just what I am intuitively thinking or is that
really what they are saying?''

She appeared to be checking out her thinking, aware that she may be holding incorrect tacit
intuitive models.

43 For the Disastrous Day Question she sorted out possible dependent and independent events,
commenting:

S: ``[It is] just by chance [that] the unrelated events happened ... [it is] not outstandingly
unlikely all things happening on the same day.''

44 The Traffic Accident Question, which may have elicited more causal explanations before the course,
was immediately treated probabilistically:

S: ``I think I would have to say it was not due to factors or causes, I would say it was just by
chance that there happened to be those three weeks when it was quite bad. [There is] too
little data to say that there was any cause for those figures on those particular days.''

After expanding on this further she was asked:

I: ``What would be sufficient evidence for you to accept that it was just variation?''

S: ``If I got a longer period of time and the pattern was fairly even ... I guess for the rest of
the year every week was only one or two and those figures really stood out as being really
remarkable. I would probably want to check whether it was rain or [whether] one particular
accident involved a group of cars [or if it was] just normal variation.''

45 For the Error Rate Question this student felt that the variation between the workers was high, and she
expressed interest in examining their working conditions. She was, however, aware that variation would
always be present and explained the error rate for worker D as follows:

S: ``Well I think you have to expect that there will be errors.''

46 These responses were typical for four of the students. Apparently each of these students was able to
think probabilistically except in the Error Rate Question where they appropriately focussed first on
deterministic thinking. The students now appeared to expect variation as a natural part of data.

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47 One student was strongly deterministic in every situation. She wove a rather convoluted story around
the Disastrous Day Question to account for the sequence of events rather than thinking probabilistically.
Often students will find patterns in events where they might not exist; hence, students need to know that
such situations may have many interpretations based on thinking probabilistically and/or
deterministically. For the Traffic Accident Question, causes dominated her explanation:

S: ``I would want to know `Did it rain in week three?' -- traffic always goes insane if there is
one drop of rain especially after a long dry period.''

Repeated probing in other questions produced some probabilistic thinking but she eventually changed
back to causal thinking.

3. Conclusion
48 With coin-based problems, students explained their answers by invoking probabilistic reasoning.
However, being unable to reconcile this probabilistic approach with their fundamental intuitions, they
seemed to be uncomfortable with such thinking. Students were unable to give a logical explanation for
their probabilistic argument. In all real data situations (other than those transparently similar to coin-type
problems) probabilistic thinking rarely entered the students' minds. Situations were resolved with causal
explanations and the students drew on their own experience to explain the `numbers.' Tversky and
Kahneman (1982) note this lack of awareness about variation: ``Statistical principles are not learned from
everyday experience because the relevant instances are not coded appropriately'' (p. 18).

49 Mason (1989) asserts that the ``education of awareness comes from having your attention drawn to
significant details'' (p. 7). He says the role of the teacher is to engage students in activities that are
designed to evoke awareness: ``A teacher cannot shift a student's attention, nor cause them to see in a
new way, but a teacher can attract attention to what is important, and away from what is irrelevant to
current concerns; they can draw attention to multiplicity of perspective and interpretation, and through
their own behaviour, model the sought after way of seeing'' (p. 8).

50 This implies that drawing the students' attention to the omnipresence of variation would enable them
to become more aware of that phenomenon. And perhaps asking them to consider situations from a non-
deterministic perspective would improve their probabilistic thinking. Similarly it may be possible,
through experiment and logical explanation, to raise their awareness of the tacit intuitive models that lead
them astray.

51 Singer and Willett's (1993) idea of ``cognitive apprenticeship'' may work if the teacher knows how the
individual learner thinks. From this knowledge, authentic activities that allow the individual to be
confronted with his/her misconceptions, can be constructed. Our experience in Phase Two is supported
by Konold (1991) who states, ``If instruction in probability is to be effective the teacher will need not
only to be attuned to students' intuitions but to structure activities that encourage students to evaluate
those intuitions'' (p. 152).

52 The first phase of our study revealed all five students had a tendency towards overly deterministic
thinking, reflecting their lack of awareness or understanding of variation. Probabilistic thinking was not
often apparent in their repertoire of problem-solving strategies. Through our being aware of these
students' misconceptions and through studying the literature, it was possible to design activities to
challenge their intuitions in Phase Two. It appeared that the use of experiments and computer simulations
enabled these students to increase their understanding of variation. The third phase showed initial
evidence that it is possible to attract students' attention to a probabilistic perspective.

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53 Both sets of interviews provided valuable insight into the five students' intuitions about probability
and variation, and our intention is to use a similar approach in the follow-up study. Improvement and
analysis of tasks, refining the interview protocol, and analysis of interviewee's thinking will be addressed
through the use of more structured processes (Lesh and Kelly 1994; Scholz 1991). In terms of building on
and challenging students' intuitions about probability, a one-day course was insufficient. More time will
be dedicated to this in the follow-up study and a more refined framework or teaching/learning model for
stochastic instruction will be incorporated.

54 Our future larger study will focus on teaching probabilistic and deterministic ideas in the context of
statistics, with an emphasis on experiencing and explaining random and systematic variation. A key issue
will be developing students' awareness of their thinking.

References
Biehler, R. (1989), ``Educational Perspectives on Exploratory Data Analysis,'' in Studies in Mathematics
Education: The Teaching of Statistics, ed. R. Morris, Vol. 7, France: UNESCO, pp. 185-201.

Borovcnik, M. (1990), ``A Complementarity Between Intuitions and Mathematics,'' in Proceedings of the
Third International Conference on Teaching Statistics, Netherlands: ISI Publications, pp. 363-369.

Borovcnik, M. and Bentz, H.-J. (1991), ``Empirical Research in Understanding Probability,'' in Chance
Encounters: Probability in Education, eds. R. Kapadia and M. Borovcnik, Netherlands: Kluwer
Academic Publishers, pp. 73-105.

Falk, R. and Konold, C. (1992), ``The Psychology of Learning Probability,'' in Statistics for the Twenty-
First Century, eds. Florence Gordon and Sheldon Gordon, MAA Notes No. 26, Washington:
Mathematical Association of America, pp. 151-164.

Fischbein, E. (1987), Intuition in Science and Mathematics, Dordrecht: D. Reidel.

Garfield, J. and Ahlgren, A. (1988), ``Difficulties in Learning Basic Concepts in Probability and
Statistics: Implications for Research,'' Journal for Research in Mathematics Education, 19(1), 44-63.

Konold, C. (1989), ``Informal Conceptions of Probability,'' Cognition and Instruction, 6(1), 59-98.

----- (1991), ``Understanding Students' Beliefs About Probability,'' in Radical Constructivism in

Mathematics Education, ed. E. von Glasersfeld, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 139-156.

Lesh, R., and Kelly, A. (1994), ``Action-Theoretic and Phenomenological Approaches to Research in
Mathematics Education: Studies of Continually Developing Experts,'' in Didactics of Mathematics As A
Scientific Discipline, eds. R. Biehler, R. W. Scholz, R. Strasser, and B. Winkelmann, Netherlands:
Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 277-286.

Lovitt, C. and Lowe, I. (1993), Chance and Data Investigations, Australia: Curriculum Corporation.

Mason, J. (1989), ``What Exactly Can A Teacher Do?,'' unpublished manuscript, Open University.

Moore, D. S. (1990), ``Uncertainty,'' in On the Shoulders of Giants: New Approaches to Numeracy, ed. L.

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A. Steen, Washington: National Academy Press, pp. 95-137.

----- (1992), ``Teaching Statistics as a Respectable Subject,'' in Statistics for the Twenty-First Century,
eds. Florence Gordon and Sheldon Gordon, MAA Notes No. 26, Washington: Mathematical Association
of America, pp. 14-25.

Scholz, R. W. (1991), ``Psychological Research in Probabilistic Understanding,'' in Chance Encounters:

Probability in Education, eds. R. Kapadia and M. Borovcnik, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers,
pp. 213-254.

Singer, J. and Willett, J. (1993), ``Lessons We Can Learn from Recent Research on Teaching: It's Not
Just the Form, It's the Authenticity,'' paper presented at the 1993 Joint Statistical Meetings, San
Francisco, CA.

Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. (1982), ``Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,'' in
Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, eds. D. Kahneman, P. Slovic, and A. Tversky, New
York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 3-20 (originally published in Science (1974), 185, 1124-1131).

Maxine Pfannkuch
m.pfannkuch@math.auckland.ac.nz
Constance M. Brown
c.brown@stat.auckland.ac.nz
Department of Mathematics
The University of Auckland
Private Bag 92019
Auckland, New Zealand

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