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    GNSS jamming detection of UAV ground control station using random matrix theory

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    7 views5 pages

    GNSS Jamming Detection of UAV Ground Control Station Using Random Matrix Theory

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    Mohamad Farzan Sabahi
    GNSS jamming detection of UAV ground control station using random matrix theory

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    © All Rights Reserved
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    ® ‘Available online at www sciencedirect.com sn, ScienceDirect KICS ‘The Korean Institut of Communications and Tiormenion Sciences ICT Express 7 (2021) 239-243 wow clevircombeatfste GNSS jamming detection of UAV ground control station using random matrix theory Omid Sharifi-Tehrani’, Mohamad F. Sabahi*, M.R. Danaee* Imam Hussein Comprehensive Universi, Tehran Irae Deparment of Electrical Engineering. University of sf, Isfahan, Ian < Bleciricol Engineering Depariment, Imam Hussein Comprehensive Universit, Tehran, frm eccved 6 uly 2020; rvcived in revised frm 20 September 2020; aeepted 6 Oster 2020 Awailable online 22 October 2020, Abstract Global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) are the main navigation and control systems in unmanned serial vehicles (UIAVs) and their {ground control stations, Without the GNSS signals, che UAV and its ground contol stations cannot follow the waypoints of the desired path in jamming environments. In this paper, two new methods for detection of GNSS signal jamming attack for UAV ground control station are proposed based on random matrix theory: By using limiting distribution of mean vector and asymptotic behavior of the defined test statisti 4 hypothesis tes is introduced and evalua significant performance in SR), more than 2.5 dB improvement is achieved od to detect presence of jamming signal. Simulation results show that the proposed methods have rms of detection and false slarm probabilities. Compared to existing methods, at low jamming-to-signal ratio 2021 The Korean Insitute of Communications and Information Sciences (KICS), Publishing servicesby Elsevier B.V. This isan open access article underthe CC BY-NC-ND license (tp/ereativecommons.orylcensesby-ne-nd/. 00, Keyworts: Ground conto station Jamming detection; Random in theory (RMIT): Unmanned ace vehicle 1, Introduction Global navigation satelite systems are widely used in civil~ ian and military applications for navigation and control pur- poses. Passenger aircrafts, cargo aiteralts, helicopters, Fighters and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) use GNSS (global nav- igation satellite system) signals as the main navigation and control system [1]. Although other avionic systems such as inertial navigation systems (INS), Gyros and magnetic com- passes are used as alternative and auxiliary aids when GNSS signals are not present (for example in jamming or spoofing environments), their accuracy degrades gradually and thus, they can be only used for short times [2]. Without GNSS signals, the aerial platform cannot follow the waypoints and the mission might be aborted due to low reliability. Ground control station (GCS) of an UAV is responsible for sending control and command data (0 the UAV, based on the GCS responding autos Email addveses: snidsh\@posiLcom (O. Shari-Tebran ssbahieng i acie (MLE. Sabah), mre @alm shai (4. Danaee), Proce view under esponsibility of The Kexcan lstiute of Communics- tions an lntormation Seinees(KICS), Inipsdoi.on/ 10.1016 ete. 2020.10.01 and UAV position, Jamming attacks can degrade the quality of GNSS signals and produce measurement errors or even completely block them. So, detection of jamming attacks as an early warning can alert the GCS crew to make required decisions, Several algorithms and techniques have been introduced for detection of GNSS jamming signals. Some methods are based ‘on frequeney Doppler shift and have some limitations [3]. Some algorithms are based on direction of arrival estimation which needs additional antennas, more complex. hardware ‘and sometimes high computational power [4]. Signal quality ‘measurement (SQM) methods are accurate but they are usually implemented in GNSS receivers at post correlation stage and thus, they are receiver-hardware dependent. Other methods based on statistical analysis of the received signal are also introduced in [5,6]. These methods are based on the difference between the probability distribution functions (PDF) of the received signal in the case with and without jamming. In [7]. the change in the PDF of the received signal power is used for Jamming and spoofing detection. ‘An important category of jamming detection methods is, subspace methods. They are accurate and sensitive but they reed to estimate the eigenvalues of covariance matrix and thus 2405-95956) 2021 The Korean Insite of Communications aad Laformation Sciences (KICS). Publishing services by Elsevier BV, This isan open access anicle under the CC BY-NC-ND license (htpscativesommoas orgicensesb- cm.) 0. SharifTolani, MLE Sabuhi and MLR. Danace % NIN, a Receiver Front-End Fig, 1. Block diagram of GNSS Chain ‘computationally heavy [8]. For example, in [9 the Karhunen— Loeve transform is used for detection of interference: however, its computational complewity is heavy and thus, isnot efficient in real time applications. Recently, random matrix theory (RMT) has gained attention in engincering applications. By using high dimensional data, RMT tools such as Marchenko-Pastur law, Tracy-Widor law Wigner semicircle law and others are used to analyze the asymptotic and limit behavior of the signal and its related cigen-values/vectors [10] In this paper, we propose two meth- ‘ods based on vectors distribution equality law [11-13], for detection of GNSS jamming attacks on UAV ground conteol stations. We show that by using limiting distribution of large random matrices, ebtained from the samples of the received signal at the input of GNSS receivers, efficient test statistics ‘can be defined. Based on these test statistics, we introduce hypothesis test to detect the presence of jamming attack. The proposed methods are not computationally heavy and can be used as an early warning stage in realtime applications. These methods enable the GCS erew to make decision before any fatal situation. The rest of this article is organized as follows. In Section 2, the signal model is introduced. In Sections 3 and 4, wo proposed methods are introduced. In Section 5, Monte Carlo Simulation results are provided and a comparison is done with existing methods, Finaly, in Section 6, the article ends up with conclusion. 2 ignal model A GNSS receiver has to obtain at least four different satellites’ pseudo range to calculate the position, velocity and time (PVT). For the GPS. in particular there are a family of up to 32 carth-orbiting satellites, Each satelite is assigned with unique pseudo-random noise (PRN) code. The number of acquired PRNs at the GNSS receiver gives the clear indication ‘of the accuracy of PVT solution. As shown in Fig. 1, at the GNSS receiver the satellite signals are amplified by low noise amplifier (LNA), filtered, down converted and sampled 200 ICT Express 7 (2021) 239-248 by an analog-to-digital convertor (ADC). The digital samples are fed to the acquisition stage, where the available satellites ‘are acquired with coarse measurements, In tracking stage, the acquired strong satellites’ signals are tracked to provide precise measurements. In navigation stage, the PVT solutions are provided by extracting the navigation message. ‘The received signal from the jth satellite at the GNSS. receiver is modeled as: nit) Cecile) cosa f+ ADVI) CD) where, A; the desired signal ampli, the ith GPS (hob positioning sytem) signal Doppler roquncy she random phase of signal. isthe carr frequency. Ci he Spreading code, di the aviation message isthe chanel delay and isthe recetver noise Tehas ben shown that GNSS signal samples athe reser a ”,DLrhmrCrCS—CCS IF ao fequency signal athe rector input ean be writen viel = +I 4M) 2 where, P is the number of satellites in view, JO) = Ay cost2a fit + yo) is the jammer signal, f, is the jammer frequency, Ay is the jammer signal amplitude and gis the jammer intial signal phase. Jamming to noise ratio is J/Ny = ‘A3/2n and jamming 10 signal ratio is J/S = A/D? AP where 1) isthe noise power which is obtained as K7B, with K js the Boltzmann constant, 7 is the absolute temperature and Bi is the receiver bandwidth, 3. MYDET! method [As mentioned before, the basis of the proposed methods i vectors distribution equality law, which means thatthe PDF of the received signal samples in battlefield is compared with the PDF of the reference one in clean environment, IF significant deviation occurs (ie. a change in distribution is observed), the decision on the existence of interference is confirmed, Assume that there are four d-dimensional independent random vetors of observations namely A, A’, B and B’ such that A, A’ ~ Sp and B, B'“! G, where F and G are wo different PDFs. Also assume that Dep, Deg and Deg are defined as the PDFs of the [A — A’, [BB], JA BI where | stands for ¢ norm. The mean value of Dpr, Deg and Deg are given by Hore. Kea and ptr. respectively. Maa et al [16] proved that for high dimensional data, Dr, Dag and Dec, are identical if and only if F = 6. Proposition. Suppose that Dy and Dg ave bivariate PDFS of (A= A'] WA = Bl) and (UB ~All. | BB). Let to dnd Yip, are mean vectors of Dp and De, respectively. We Ihave Wop = Mog © MEF = Heo = Hac, and this happens if and only if F T Mean vector disibution equality txt 0. SharifTolani, MLE Sabuhi and MLR. Danace Proof. According to [1,13], in the case of F = Git is already proved. On the other hand, if E(Ay ~ Aa) E(B, — Ball) = EIA, ~ Bul) then 2E(\Ay — Bil) ~ E(IAi ~ Aal) ~ E(B) ~ Bal) = 0 CE is the Expecta- tion operator). It is shown in [11] that in the case of finite expected norms for F and G, we have 2E(IA ~ Bil) — E(\|Ay — Adil) — E(B) — Ball) = 0, with equality oc- curs when F and G are the same. Thus, E(||A; — A2|l) E(\By — Ball) = E(UAu ~ Bull) results in F Following the above proposition, instead of testing the hypothesis Ho: F = G, one may alternately test the null hypothesis Ho: Wop =" Hg and the alternative hypoth- esis Fh Mop #, Mog. Now, assume that from the data AL Ay 2 F and By, Bis... By © G, we obtain the following estimated vectors and parameter, (* stands for estimated version) fioy = [fire fire] fing = lire. ftccl @ (fie « omy LBA 2 (VE y |n-al © A simple and low computational complexity test statist ean be considered as o fin, | fing! Ta exceeds a predefined threshold (), Hy is rejected. Now, assume that F isthe PDF of clean reference GNSS signal with associated random vectors Ay, ..., Am “ P of d-dimensional ‘observations and G is the PDF of the received GNSS signal (cither clean or jammed one), with associated random vectors By... By “ G of d-dimensional observations. Then, fire and fig can be calculated for the received GNSS signal and Try is obtained. The hypothesis test is cared out by comparing Try with a threshold. To oblain an appropriate threshold level, we can introduce a learning phase, where the RF signal samples, received by GNSS antenna in a jamming free environment, are gathered and arranged in mattiees A [Ais eee, Andie and B= [Bisse Belo Assume that, 7 ‘of such matrices (ie. A and B) are available. Tx i calculated forall r matrices and its mean is selected as threshold level. In areal battlefield, the presence of jamming signal is detected by ‘comparing Ty With the Selected threshold. If Trg is below the threshold, Ag is accepted and the incoming signal is assumed to be jamming tree. On the other hand, if itis above the threshold level, Fp is rejected and presence of jamming signal is detected. We call this method MVDET. The method is summarized in Table | ICT Express 7 (2021) 239-248 Table 1 Steps of MVDET Step Opezation Stent Cueulae er «Fie and fg by wsing Gand step2 Oban toy and fing, wconding to (3) steps Calculate Tg securing to (7) Step Using pre-defined threshold level y (obtained in Jeaming phase, utlizing clean reference signal) pesform the hypothesis tet: Tg 2 y 4. GEDET? method Assume that there are two sets of independent observations, Ay, Aa... Am and By, Bo, .... By drawn from the distribu- tion F with finite second moment. As N= (m +1) — 00, > Kand % € (0,1), itis proved that N Ty has limiting distribution as 2 y? and of = VARLE (WIAy ~ Aol |AV} where 2 isa chisquare distibuted random variable with one st based consistent degree of freedom [13]. To define a hypothesis on limiting distribution, itis negessary t0 obtai estimates of band og. Note tat jean be estimated as k= % Also, we have 9% = cov(|Ay — Aall Ai ~ Asli) 6 E (Ay — Aall [Ay — Asll) — E°(At — All) Using the following definitions: Sis (() LD aaa a] = (") real o tclefem S (c ) DL W-3)l inn 3 tat Feken = (0) De (2: a] 0) and acconing 1 the results in [17], a@ can be estimated as 6g = (Sy + nSy)/N ay Therefore, we can introduce the test statistic as NAL =3)T nn Fan = —™ ~ x? «aay 2a Now, by using the same definitions of F, G, A and B as MVDET method, the procedure is cared out for r matrices of consecutive samples and thus, + samples of test stats is obiained. These values follow chi-squared distribution for clean environment. If there isa jamming attack, this distibu- tion is changed and deviated from chi-square. Thus, we use sgoodness-0/-i (GoF) test to compare the calculated empirical Goodnes-ot empirical distribution equa 0. SharifTolani, MLE Sabuhi and MLR. Danace Table 2 Stops of GEDET algoritun, Operation Calculate Sj. Sp and Gj wsing ). 10) and (I), respective rrrCS— Part te Mpa Tor 2 pe ae for probability density of introduced test statistic with the refer- ‘ence one which is obtained in clean environment (ic. authentic GNSS). To this end, the difference between the histogram of Fo (Obtained from calculated samples of Fagin Ny bins) and the histogram of standard Chi-square random variable Is caleulated as Follows (13) where Np isthe number of bins, Also, 7; and O; are the histogram value of Zand 7? in the 1th in, respectively IF there is signiticant deviation in GoF test, is rejected and presence of jamming attack is detected, Otherwise, Hy s accepted and the signal is assumed to be GNSS authentic signal, We eal this method GEDET, which is summarized in Table 2 5. Simulation results and discussion In this section, the performance of the proposed methods is, evaluated using real GPS RF signal dataset and compared t© the Kurtosis (Kurt [6], Chi2GoF method [18] and Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smimov (KS2) [19]. via 1000 Monte-Carlo sim- ulations, The sampling frequeney is 6.4 Msps and the central frequency is 1.57542 GHz. The signal has been recorded by Tektronix RSA3408A real-time spectrum analyzer, Rojone A-GPSA9SNS antenna, Rojone AMA-061B amplifier and DC block. About 16 million samples (equivalent to 2.56 s) are recorded.” Consider a scenario, where the airborne/maritime/ ground-based jammer is arriving at the distance of 10 km from GCS and the jamming strength is such that the JSR is 0 dB at the location of GCS GNSS antenna (Fig. 2). m,1, d. 7 values are chosen as m =n = d = 170 and r = 100, Figs. 3-5 depict the performance of the proposed methods in comparison with above mentioned methods, In Figs, 3 and 4, probabilities of detection (P,) and false alarm (Pra) versus different selected threshold levels are de- picted for the two proposed methods, The threshold level should be selected so that Py, is minimum and Py is maxi- mum. As shown in Figs. 3 and 4, the threshold level can be selected in a relatively wide range. This means that the pro- posed methods can distinguish the two hypotheses effectively. Fig, 5 depicts Py and Py, versus different jamming levels around J/S = 0B for two proposed methods and comparison is made against other existing methods. As shown in Fig. 5, 3 Dataset used inthis paper can be found at hp:erawidodongindex he wo 202 ICT Express 7 (2021) 239-248 Fig. 2. Considered scenario for fiend UAVIGCS and fe jammer UAV, P. and Py, versus Selected Threshold Levels (MonteCarlo) (ee | & ° Selected Threshold Levels Fig. 3. Detcton and false alarm probabilities vers lilferent threshold levels for MVDET meth -n tnd Pp versus Selected Threshhold Levels (MonteCarlo) Ne we ° Probably 4) sees ea ss ‘Selected Threshold Levels Fig. 4. Detection and fase slarm probabilities versus

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