People vs.

Vera- Delegation of Powers

G.R. No. L-45685, November 16, 1937

People of the Philippines & Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation- Petitioners
Jose O. Vera, Judge of the Courts of First Instance of Manila and Mariano Cu Unjieng-
Respondents

FACTS
Respondent Unjieng was convicted in a criminal case entitled “The People of the
Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al.", in which herein petitioner Hongkong and
Shanghai Banking Corporation is the offended party and acted as the private prosecutor.
Respondent Unjieng filed an application for probation under the provisions of Act No. 4221
otherwise known as the “Probation Law” in the Court of First Instance in Manila where
Respondent Vera is the Judge ad interim. The Fiscal City of Manila filed an opposition to the
granting of probation of respondent, stating that Act No. 4221 is violative of equal protection
under Sec 1 (1), Article 3 of the Constitution because its applicability is not uniform among the
provinces in the Philippines, particularly, the Section 11 of the Act gives the power among the
provinces to determine whether to implement the said law in their province or not. Petitioner
corporation filed a supplementary opposition arguing that the Act is a undue delegation of
legislative power. Herein petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition questioning the
constitutionality of Act No. 4221 and alleging that respondent judge has acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of his jurisdiction in granting the probation. On the other hand, the
respondents contend that: the act is constitutional, that the private may not intervene in
probation proceedings, that the City Fiscal and the Solicitor General are estopped form
questioning the validity of the Act, that its validity cannot be questioned for the first time before
the Supreme court, and that the section in question of the act is inseparable from the entire Act.

ISSUES
1. Whether or not whether or not the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 has been properly raised
in these proceedings
2. Whether or not the said Act is constitutional
RULING
1. Yes. Although the general rule is that only those who are parties to a suit may question the
constitutionality of a statute involved in a judicial decision, it has been held that since the decree
pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, where the jurisdiction of the court depends on
the validity of the statute in question, the issue of the constitutionality will be considered on its
being brought to the attention
of the court by persons interested in the effect to be given the statute. In the case at bar, the trial
court in granting the probation derived its jurisdiction in the assailed Act therefore the petitioner
have standing in the raising the issue. With regard to the Solicitor General acting as a
representing the People of the Philippines, if indeed the Act is violative of the constitution, then
the People has substantial interest on the issue. The well-settled rule is, the State can challenge
its own laws.
In raising constitutionality questions, it must be raised at the earliest possible time. However,
this rule has exception, wherein courts has jurisdiction to determine the time when question of
constitutionality of a statute may be presented. It can be raised even for the first time, if its
resolution is necessary for the decision of a case, which is the situation of the present case.

2. No. The constitutionality of the act is questioned on three grounds, namely: a) That
said Act encroaches upon the pardoning power of the Executive
Pardon and probation are vested on different branches, the former to the executive and
the latter to the judiciary. The two are distinct acts, pardon removes the penalties, disabilities
and restores civil rights of the accused, on the other hand, probation, is a suspension of
sentence temporarily or indefinitely but the conviction, liability and civil disabilities remains
and become operative after the suspension of when the judgement is rendered. Thus, the
court ruled that there is no encroachment in the pardoning power of the President since the
two are very different acts.

b) That it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power

The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows:
This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards
have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now
provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the
Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office.

The court rules that the section above constitute an improper and unlawful delegation of
the legislative power to the provincial board because of its insufficiency. It does not does not
lay down any rule or definite standard by which the administrative officer or board may be
guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it. It does specify facts or
conditions which therefore gives the provincial board unlimited absolute power in
implementing the Act.

c) That it denies the equal protection of the laws

To implement the Act, the condition specified is the provision of the provincial boards for
the salary of a probation officer. Therefore, if a province do not comply with it, the Act will not be
enforceable in that province which means not all
provinces will be able to enforce it. These different situations is clearly a manifestation of
discrimination and inequality.
Considering that the Act particularly Section 11 is an undue delegation of legislative
authority that denies equal protection of laws, the court ruled it unconstitutional. And since the
said section is inseparable with the entire Act that its elimination will render the law ineffective,
the court further ruled Act No. 4221 as
unconstitutional and void and the writ of prohibition is granted.