Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

A.M. No. 1625 February 12, 1990 ANGEL L. BAUTISTA, complainant, vs. ATTY. RAMON A. GONZALES, respondent. RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM: In a verified complaint filed by Angel L. Bautista on May 19, 1976, respondent Ramon A. Gonzales was charged with malpractice, deceit, gross misconduct and violation of lawyer's oath. Required by this Court to answer the charges against him, respondent filed on June 19, 1976 a motion for a bill of particulars asking this Court to order complainant to amend his complaint by making his charges more definite. In a resolution dated June 28, 1976, the Court granted respondent's motion and required complainant to file an amended complaint. On July 15, 1976, complainant submitted an amended complaint for disbarment, alleging that respondent committed the following acts: 1. Accepting a case wherein he agreed with his clients, namely, Alfaro Fortunado, Nestor Fortunado and Editha Fortunado [hereinafter referred to as the Fortunados] to pay all expenses, including court fees, for a contingent fee of fifty percent (50%) of the value of the property in litigation. 2. Acting as counsel for the Fortunados in Civil Case No. Q-15143, wherein Eusebio Lopez, Jr. is one of the defendants and, without said case being terminated, acting as counsel for Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case No. Q-15490; 3. Transferring to himself one-half of the properties of the Fortunados, which properties are the subject of the litigation in Civil Case No. Q-15143, while the case was still pending; 4. Inducing complainant, who was his former client, to enter into a contract with him on August 30, 1971 for the development into a residential subdivision of the land involved in Civil Case No. Q-15143, covered by TCT No. T-1929, claiming that he acquired fifty percent (50%) interest thereof as attorney's fees from the Fortunados, while knowing fully well that the said property was already sold at a public auction on June 30, 1971, by the Provincial Sheriff of Lanao del Norte and registered with the Register of Deeds of Iligan City; 5. Submitting to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City falsified documents purporting to be true copies of "Addendum to the Land Development Agreement dated August 30, 1971" and submitting the same document to the Fiscal's Office of Quezon City, in connection with the complaint for estafa filed by respondent against complainant designated as I.S. No. 7512936; 6. Committing acts of treachery and disloyalty to complainant who was his client; 7. Harassing the complainant by filing several complaints without legal basis before the Court of First Instance and the Fiscal's Office of Quezon City;

8. Deliberately misleading the Court of First Instance and the Fiscal's Office by making false assertion of facts in his pleadings; 9. Filing petitions "cleverly prepared (so) that while he does not intentionally tell a he, he does not tell the truth either." Respondent filed an answer on September 29, 1976 and an amended answer on November 18, 1976, denying the accusations against him. Complainant filed a reply to respondent's answer on December 29, 1976 and on March 24, 1977 respondent filed a rejoinder. In a resolution dated March 16, 1983, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. In the investigation conducted by the Solicitor General, complainant presented himself as a witness and submitted Exhibits "A" to "PP", while respondent appeared both as witness and counsel and submitted Exhibits "1" to "11". The parties were required to submit their respective memoranda. On May 16, 1988 respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint against him, claiming that the long delay in the resolution of the complaint against him constitutes a violation of his constitutional right to due process and speedy disposition of cases. Upon order of the Court, the Solicitor General filed a comment to the motion to dismiss on August 8, 1988, explaining that the delay in the investigation of the case was due to the numerous requests for postponement of scheduled hearings filed by both parties and the motions for extension of time to file their respective memoranda." [Comment of the Solicitor General, p. 2; Record, p. 365]. Respondent filed a reply to the Solicitor General's comment on October 26, 1988. In a resolution dated January 16, 1989 the Court required the Solicitor General to submit his report and recommendation within thirty (30) days from notice. On April 11, 1989, the Solicitor General submitted his report with the recommendation that Atty. Ramon A. Gonzales be suspended for six (6) months. The Solicitor General found that respondent committed the following acts of misconduct: a. transferring to himself one-half of the properties of his clients during the pendency of the case where the properties were involved; b. concealing from complainant the fact that the property subject of their land development agreement had already been sold at a public auction prior to the execution of said agreement; and c. misleading the court by submitting alleged true copies of a document where two signatories who had not signed the original (or even the xerox copy) were made to appear as having fixed their signatures [Report and Recommendation of the Solicitor General, pp. 17-18; Rollo, pp. 403-404]. Respondent then filed on April 14, 1989 a motion to refer the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation and disposition pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court. Respondent manifested that he intends to submit more evidence before the IBP. Finally, on November 27, 1989, respondent filed a supplemental motion to refer this case to the IBP, containing additional arguments to bolster his contentions in his previous pleadings. I. Preliminarily, the Court will dispose of the procedural issue raised by respondent. It is respondent's contention that the preliminary investigation conducted by the Solicitor General was limited to the determination of whether or not there is sufficient ground to proceed with the case and that under Rule 139 the Solicitor General still has to file an administrative complaint against him. Respondent claims that the case should be referred to the IBP since Section 20 of Rule 139-B provides that: This Rule shall take effect on June 1, 1988 and shall supersede the present Rule 139 entitled DISBARMENT OR SUSPENSION OF ATTORNEYS. All cases pending investigation by the Office of the Solicitor General shall be transferred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors for investigation and disposition as provided in this Rule except those cases where the investigation has been substantially completed. The above contention of respondent is untenable. In the first place, contrary to respondent's claim, reference to the IBP of complaints against lawyers is not mandatory upon the Court [Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 79690-707; Zaldivar v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 80578, October 7, 1988]. Reference of complaints to the IBP is not an exclusive procedure under

the terms of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court [Ibid]. Under Sections 13 and 14 of Rule 139-B, the Supreme Court may conduct disciplinary proceedings without the intervention of the IBP by referring cases for investigation to the Solicitor General or to any officer of the Supreme Court or judge of a lower court. In such a case, the report and recommendation of the investigating official shall be reviewed directly by the Supreme Court. The Court shall base its final action on the case on the report and recommendation submitted by the investigating official and the evidence presented by the parties during the investigation. Secondly, there is no need to refer the case to the IBP since at the time of the effectivity of Rule 139-B [June 1, 1988] the investigation conducted by the Office of the Solicitor General had been substantially completed. Section 20 of Rule 139-B provides that only pending cases, the investigation of which has not been substantially completed by the Office of the Solicitor General, shall be transferred to the IBP. In this case the investigation by the Solicitor General was terminated even before the effectivity of Rule 139-B. Respondent himself admitted in his motion to dismiss that the Solicitor General terminated the investigation on November 26, 1986, the date when respondent submitted his reply memorandum [Motion to Dismiss, p. 1; Record, p. 353]. Thirdly, there is no need for further investigation since the Office of the Solicitor General already made a thorough and comprehensive investigation of the case. To refer the case to the IBP, as prayed for by the respondent, will result not only in duplication of the proceedings conducted by the Solicitor General but also to further delay in the disposition of the present case which has lasted for more than thirteen (13) years. Respondent's assertion that he still has some evidence to present does not warrant the referral of the case to the IBP. Considering that in the investigation conducted by the Solicitor General respondent was given ample opportunity to present evidence, his failure to adduce additional evidence is entirely his own fault. There was therefore no denial of procedural due process. The record shows that respondent appeared as witness for himself and presented no less than eleven (11) documents to support his contentions. He was also allowed to cross-examine the complainant who appeared as a witness against him. II. The Court will now address the substantive issue of whether or not respondent committed the acts of misconduct alleged by complainant Bautista. After a careful review of the record of the case and the report and recommendation of the Solicitor General, the Court finds that respondent committed acts of misconduct which warrant the exercise by this Court of its disciplinary power. The record shows that respondent prepared a document entitled "Transfer of Rights" which was signed by the Fortunados on August 31, 1971. The document assigned to respondent one-half (1/2) of the properties of the Fortunados covered by TCT No. T-1929, with an area of 239.650 sq. mm., and TCT No. T-3041, with an area of 72.907 sq. m., for and in consideration of his legal services to the latter. At the time the document was executed, respondent knew that the abovementioned properties were the subject of a civil case [Civil Case No. Q-15143] pending before the Court of First Instance of Quezon City since he was acting as counsel for the Fortunados in said case [See Annex "B" of Original Complaint, p. 12; Rollo, p. 16]. In executing the document transferring one-half (1/2) of the subject properties to himself, respondent violated the law expressly prohibiting a lawyer from acquiring his client's property or interest involved in any litigation in which he may take part by virtue of his profession [Article 1491, New Civil Code]. This Court has held that the purchase by a lawyer of his client's property or interest in litigation is a breach of professional ethics and constitutes malpractice [Hernandez v. Villanueva, 40 Phil. 774 (1920); Go Beltran v. Fernandez, 70 Phil. 248 (1940)]. However, respondent notes that Canon 10 of the old Canons of Professional Ethics, which states that "[t]he lawyer should not purchase any interests in the subject matter of the litigation which he is conducting," does not appear anymore in the new Code of Professional Responsibility. He therefore concludes that while a purchase by a lawyer of property in litigation is void under Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, such purchase is no longer a ground for disciplinary action under the new Code of Professional Responsibility. This contention is without merit. The very first Canon of the new Code states that "a lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal process" (Emphasis supplied), Moreover, Rule 138, Sec. 3 of the Revised Rules of Court requires every lawyer to take an oath to 44 obey the laws [of the Republic of the Philippines] as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein." And for any violation of this oath, a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred by the Supreme Court [Rule 138, Sec. 27, Revised Rules of Court]. All of these underscore the role of the lawyer as the vanguard of our legal system. The transgression of any provision of law by a

lawyer is a repulsive and reprehensible act which the Court will not countenance. In the instant case, respondent, having violated Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, must be held accountable both to his client and to society. Parenthetically, it should be noted that the persons mentioned in Art. 1491 of the Civil Code are prohibited from purchasing the property mentioned therein because of their existing trust relationship with the latter. A lawyer is disqualified from acquiring by purchase the property and rights in litigation because of his fiduciary relationship with such property and rights, as well as with the client. And it cannot be claimed that the new Code of Professional Responsibility has failed to emphasize the nature and consequences of such relationship. Canon 17 states that "a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him." On the other hand, Canon 16 provides that "a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession." Hence, notwithstanding the absence of a specific provision on the matter in the new Code, the Court, considering the abovequoted provisions of the new Code in relation to Art. 1491 of the Civil Code, as well as the prevailing jurisprudence, holds that the purchase by a lawyer of his client's property in litigation constitutes a breach of professional ethics for which a disciplinary action may be brought against him. Respondent's next contention that the transfer of the properties was not really implemented, because the land development agreement on which the transfer depended was later rescinded, is untenable. Nowhere is it provided in the Transfer of Rights that the assignment of the properties of the Fortunados to respondent was subject to the implementation of the land development agreement. The last paragraph of the Transfer of Rights provides that: ... for and in consideration of the legal services of ATTY. RAMON A. GONZALES, Filipino, married to Lilia Yusay, and a resident of 23 Sunrise Hill, New Manila, Quezon City, rendered to our entire satisfaction, we hereby, by these presents, do transfer and convey to the said ATTY. RAMON A. GONZALES, his heirs, successor, and assigns, one-half (1/2) of our rights and interests in the abovedescribed property, together with all the improvements found therein [Annex D of the Complaint, Record, p. 28; Emphasis supplied]. It is clear from the foregoing that the parties intended the transfer of the properties to respondent to be absolute and unconditional, and irrespective of whether or not the land development agreement was implemented. Another misconduct committed by respondent was his failure to disclose to complainant, at the time the land development agreement was entered into, that the land covered by TCT No. T-1929 had already been sold at a public auction. The land development agreement was executed on August 31, 1977 while the public auction was held on June 30, 1971. Respondent denies that complainant was his former client, claiming that his appearance for the complainant in an antigraft case filed by the latter against a certain Gilbert Teodoro was upon the request of complainant and was understood to be only provisional. Respondent claims that since complainant was not his client, he had no duty to warn complainant of the fact that the land involved in their land development agreement had been sold at a public auction. Moreover, the sale was duly annotated at the back of TCT No. T-1929 and this, respondent argues, serves as constructive notice to complainant so that there was no concealment on his part. The above contentions are unmeritorious. Even assuming that the certificate of sale was annotated at the back of TCT No. T-1929, the fact remains that respondent failed to inform the complainant of the sale of the land to Samauna during the negotiations for the land development agreement. In so doing, respondent failed to live up to the rigorous standards of ethics of the law profession which place a premium on honesty and condemn duplicitous conduct. The fact that complainant was not a former client of respondent does not exempt respondent from his duty to inform complainant of an important fact pertaining to the land which is subject of their negotiation. Since he was a party to the land development agreement, respondent should have warned the complainant of the sale of the land at a public auction so that the latter could make a proper assessment of the viability of the project they were jointly undertaking. This Court has held that a lawyer should observe honesty and fairness even in his private dealings and failure to do so is a ground for disciplinary action against him [Custodio v. Esto, Adm. Case No. 1113, February 22, 1978, 81 SCRA 517]. Complainant also charges respondent with submitting to the court falsified documents purporting to be true copies of an addendum to the land development agreement. Based on evidence submitted by the parties, the Solicitor General found that in the document filed by respondent with the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, the signatories to the addendum to the land development agreement namely, Ramon A. Gonzales, Alfaro T. Fortunado, Editha T. Fortunado, Nestor T. Fortunado, and Angel L. Bautistawere made to appear as having signed the original document on December 9, 1972, as indicated by the letters (SGD.) before each of their names. However, it was only respondent Alfaro Fortunado and complainant who signed the original and duplicate original (Exh. 2) and the two other parties, Edith Fortunado and Nestor Fortunado, never did. Even respondent himself

admitted that Edith and Nestor Fortunado only signed the xerox copy (Exh. 2-A) after respondent wrote them on May 24, 1973, asking them to sign the said xerox copy attached to the letter and to send it back to him after signing [Rejoinder to Complainant's Reply, pp. 4-6; Rollo, pp. 327-329]. Moreover, respondent acknowledged that Edith and Nestor Fortunado had merely agreed by phone to sign, but had not actually signed, the alleged true copy of the addendum as of May 23, 1973 [Respondent's Supplemental Motion to Refer this Case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, p. 16]. Thus, when respondent submitted the alleged true copy of the addendum on May 23, 1973 as Annex "A" of his Manifestation filed with the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, he knowingly misled the Court into believing that the original addendum was signed by Edith Fortunado and Nestor Fortunado. Such conduct constitutes willful disregard of his solemn duty as a lawyer to act at all times in a manner consistent with the truth. A lawyer should never seek to mislead the court by an artifice or false statement of fact or law [Section 20 (d), Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court; Canon 22, Canons of Professional Ethics; Canon 10, Rule 10.01, Code of Professional Responsibility]. Anent the first charge of complainant, the Solicitor General found that no impropriety was committed by respondent in entering into a contingent fee contract with the Fortunados [Report and Recommendation, p. 8; Record, p. 394]. The Court, however, finds that the agreement between the respondent and the Fortunados, which provides in part that: We the [Fortunados] agree on the 50% contingent fee, provided, you [respondent Ramon Gonzales] defray all expenses, for the suit, including court fees. Alfaro T. Fortunado [signed] Editha T. Fortunado [signed] Nestor T. Fortunado [signed] CONF ORME Ramon A. Gonzales [signed] [Annex A to the Complaint, Record, p. 4]. is contrary to Canon 42 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which provides that a lawyer may not properly agree with a client to pay or bear the expenses of litigation. [See also Rule 16.04, Code of Professional Responsibility]. Although a lawyer may in good faith, advance the expenses of litigation, the same should be subject to reimbursement. The agreement between respondent and the Fortunados, however, does not provide for reimbursement to respondent of litigation expenses paid by him. An agreement whereby an attorney agrees to pay expenses of proceedings to enforce the client's rights is champertous [JBP Holding Corp. v. U.S. 166 F. Supp. 324 (1958)]. Such agreements are against public policy especially where, as in this case, the attorney has agreed to carry on the action at his own expense in consideration of some bargain to have part of the thing in dispute [See Sampliner v. Motion Pictures Patents Co., et al., 255 F. 242 (1918)]. The execution of these contracts violates the fiduciary relationship between the lawyer and his client, for which the former must incur administrative sanctions. The Solicitor General next concludes that respondent cannot be held liable for acting as counsel for Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case No. Q-15490 while acting as counsel for the Fortunados against the same Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in Civil Case No. Q-15143. The Court, after considering the record, agrees with the Solicitor General's findings on the matter. The evidence presented by respondent shows that his acceptance of Civil Case No. Q-15490 was with the knowledge and consent of the Fortunados. The affidavit executed by the Fortunados on June 23, 1976 clearly states that they gave their consent when respondent accepted the case of Eusebio Lopez, Jr. [Affidavit of Fortunados, dated June 23, 1976; Rollo, p. 198]. One of the recognized exceptions to the rule against representation of conflicting interests is where the clients knowingly consent to the dual representation after full disclosure of the facts by counsel [Canon 6, Canons of Professional Ethics; Canon 15, Rule 15.03, Code of Professional Responsibility]. Complainant also claims that respondent filed several complaints against him before the Court of First Instance and the Fiscal's Office of Quezon City for the sole purpose of harassing him. The record shows that at the time of the Solicitor General's investigation of this case, Civil Case No. Q-18060 was still pending before the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, while the complaints for libel (I.S. No. 76-5912) and perjury

(I.S. No. 5913) were already dismissed by the City Fiscal for insufficiency of evidence and lack of interest, respectively [Report and Recommendation, pp. 16-17; Rollo, pp. 402-403]. The Solicitor General found no basis for holding that the complaints for libel and perjury were used by respondent to harass complainant. As to Civil Case No. Q-18060, considering that it was still pending resolution, the Solicitor General made no finding on complainants claim that it was a mere ploy by respondent to harass him. The determination of the validity of the complaint in Civil Case No. Q-18060 was left to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City where the case was pending resolution. The Court agrees with the above findings of the Solicitor General, and accordingly holds that there is no basis for holding that the respondent's sole purpose in filing the aforementioned cases was to harass complainant. Grounds 6, 8 and 9 alleged in the complaint need not be discussed separately since the above discussion on the other grounds sufficiently cover these remaining grounds. The Court finds clearly established in this case that on four counts the respondent violated the law and the rules governing the conduct of a member of the legal profession. Sworn to assist in the administration of justice and to uphold the rule of law, he has "miserably failed to live up to the standards expected of a member of the Bar." [Artiaga v. Villanueva, Adm. Matter No. 1892, July 29, 1988, 163 SCRA 638, 647]. The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that, considering the nature of the offenses committed by respondent and the facts and circumstances of the case, respondent lawyer should be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months. WHEREFORE, finding that respondent Attorney Ramon A. Gonzales committed serious misconduct, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for SIX (6) months effective from the date of his receipt of this Resolution. Let copies of this Resolution be circulated to all courts of the country for their information and guidance, and spread in the personal record of Atty. Gonzales. SO ORDERED. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC A.M. No. 1437 April 25, 1989 HILARIA TANHUECO, complainant, vs. JUSTINIANO G. DE DUMO, respondent. A.M. No. 1683 April 25, 1989 HILARIA TANHUECO, complainant, vs. JUSTINIANO G. DE DUMO, respondent. R E S O L U T I ON - respondent denies PER CURIAM: On 24 February 1975, complainant Hilaria Tanhueco filed before the Court a Petition for Disbarment (docketed as Administrative Case No. 1437) against respondent Justiniano G. de Dumo for having violated the Canons of Professional Ethics by his (a) refusal to remit to her money collected by him from debtors of the complainant; and (b) refusal to return documents entrusted to him as counsel of complainant in certain collection cases. In his Answer and Counter-Petition 1 filed on 3 April 1975, respondent denied the charges. Complainant filed a Rejoinder [should be Reply] to Answer with Counter-Petition, on 18 April 1975. By a Resolution 2 dated 16 June 1975, the Court referred this case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation.

A year later, on 25 June 1976, one Jose Florencio N. Tanhueco claiming to be the nephew and representative of the complainant, addressed a sworn letter complaint to Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos against the respondent for (a) refusal to remit the money collected by respondent from debtors of complainant's aunt, Mrs. Hilaria Tanhueco Vda. de David; (b) refusal to return documents entrusted to him in his capacity as counsel in certain cases; and (c) abandonment of cases in respect of which his professional services had been engaged. On 24 August 1976, the letter complaint was forwarded by the then Public Information Assistance Staff, Department of Public Information, to this Court for appropriate action (and docketed as Administrative Case No. 1683). After respondent had filed his Answer, the Court, by a Resolution 3 dated 9 December 1976, referred this case to then Acting Judicial Consultant Ricardo C. Puno for study, report and recommendation. Since Administrative Case No. 1683 and Administrative Case No. 1437 involved the same parties and the same subject matter, Hon. Ricardo C. Puno referred the former case to the Office of the Solicitor General for consolidation with the latter one. The Office of the Solicitor General held two (2) hearings, one on 3 December 1975 and another on 18 April 1988. In the first hearing, respondent de Dumo was absent although he had been notified thereof. At the end of the first hearing, continuation of the hearing of the case was set for 14 January 1976. The records show that the second hearing took place on 18 April 1988 but do not indicate the reason for the 12-year interregnum. By then, complainant Tanhueco had died. There was no appearance at the second hearing by complainant Jose Florencio Tanhueco but respondent de Dumo was then present. The report of the Solicitor General, dated June 15, 1988 in Administrative Case No. 1437 summarized the evidence for the complainant in the following manner: EVIDENCE FOR COMPLAINANT Complainant Hilaria Tanhueco testified that she secured the legal services of respondent to collect indebtedness from her different debtors. Although she offered to execute a document evidencing their lawyer-client relationship, respondent told her that it was not necessary. She nonetheless offered to give him 15% of what he may be able to collect from the debtors (pp. 4-7. tsn, Dec. 3, 1975). Complainant also declared that respondent borrowed from her P2,000.00, Pl,300.00, and P3,000.00 on three separate occasions, but she could not remember when she gave those amounts. Respondent did not pay those loans (pp. 8-9, tsn, Id.). She confirmed that respondent filed cases against her debtors and that one of them, Constancia Maosca paid P12,500.00 to respondent. Informed of such payment by Maosca herself, complainant confronted respondent but the latter denied having received payment from any of her debtors. Complainant then brought the matter to the attention of Malacaang which referred her to Camp Crame. Notwithstanding subsequent demands of complainant for the money, respondent had refused to give her the amount (pp. 11 -15, tsn, Id.). The Solicitor General then summed up the evidence for the respondent in the following terms: EVIDENCE FOR RESPONDENT Respondent Atty. Justiniano G. de Dumo testified that complainant indeed secured his legal services to collect from her debtors, with the agreement that he gets 50% of what he may be able to collect. He thus filed collection cases against Tipace Maosca Morena, Jr., and others, and was able to obtain favorable judgment in the cases against Maosca, Tipace, and Leonila Mendoza. The initial payments made by these judgment-debtors were all given to complainant. With respect to Maosca respondent obtained a judgment for P19,000.00 although the debt was only P12,000.00 (pp. 3-9, tsn, April 18, 1988). Respondent also declared that complainant, who was then already old and sickly, was influenced by her debtors, who were also her friends into distrusting him. Ultimately, because complainant filed a complaint against him with Malacaang which referred the matter to Camp Crame, he terminated his relationship with complainant and demanded his attorney's fees equivalent to 50% of what he had collected. Complainant refused to pay him, hence, he did not also turn over to her the P12,000.00 initial payment of Maosca which he considered, or applied, as part payment of

his attorney's fee (pp. 9-19, tsn., Id.). Respondent estimated his attorney's fee due from complainant in the amount of P17,000.00 (p. 20, tsn, Id.) Respondent denied having borrowed the amounts of P2,000.00, P1,300.00, P3,000.00 and P1,000.00, pointing out that complainant did not even have money to pay him so that he handled the cases for her on contingent basis (p. 17, tsn, Id.) He also denied having received documentary evidence from complainant. What evidence he had were all gathered by him on his initiative (pp. 4-7, tsn, Id.). The Solicitor General then set out the following: FINDINGS There is in the case at bar clear admissions by both complainant and respondent of an attorneyclient relationship between them, specifically in the collection of debts owing complainant. Respondent also admitted, in his answer to the complaint and in his testimony, having received P12,000.00 from indebtor Constancia Manosca without turning over the amount to his client, complainant herein, and applying it instead as part of his attorney's fees. It has been held that the money collected by a lawyer in pursuance of a judgement in favor of his client held in trust (Aya v. Bigonia,57 Phil.8;Daroy v..Legaspi 65 SCRA 304), and that the attorney should promptly account for all funds and property received or held by him for the client's benefit (Daroy v. Legaspi, supra; In re Bamberger, 49 Phil. 962). The circumstance that an attorney has a lien for his attorney's fees on the money in his hands collected for his client does not relieve him from the obligation to make a prompt accounting (Domingo l v. Doming[o] G.R. No. 30573, Oct. 29, 1971; Daroy v. Legaspi, supra). Undoubtedly, respondent's failure to account for the P12,000.00, representing payment of the judgement debt of Maosca constitutes unprofessional conduct and subjects him to disciplinary action. Nonetheless, it has likewise been recognized that a lawyer is as much entitled to judicial protection against injustice, imposition or fraud on the part of his client; and that the attorney is entitled to be paid his just fees. The attorney should be protected against any attempt on the part of his client to escape payment of his just compensation (Fernandez v. Bello, 107 Phil. 1140; Albano v. Coloma, G.R. Adm. Case No. 528, Oct. 11, 1967). This countervailing rule mitigates the actions of respondent. As regards the charges that respondent received documents evidencing the debts to complainant and had refused to return them to the latter, and that respondent also borrowed some amounts from her, there [is] no competent, conclusive evidence to support them. Perforce, such allegations have no factual basis. (Emphasis supplied) The Solicitor General then recommended that: For failure to turn over the amount of P12,000.00 to the complainant, and applying it as his attorney's fees, respondent Atty. Justiniano G. de Dumo be severely reprimanded and admonished that repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely. We find the findings of fact of the Solicitor General supported by the evidence of record. We are, however, unable to accept his recommendation. Moneys collected by an attorney on a judgment rendered in favor of his client, constitute trust funds and must, be immediately paid over to the client. 4 Canon 11 of the Canons of Professional Ethics 5 then in force, provides as follows: 11. Dealing with trust property. The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain he abuses or takes advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his client. Money of the client or collected for the client or other trust property coming into the possession of the lawyer should be reported and accounted for promptly and should not under any circumstance be comingled with his own or be used by him. (Emphasis supplied)

When respondent withheld and refused to deliver the money received by him for his client, the deceased complainant Hilaria Tanhueco, he breached the trust reposed upon him.The claim of the respondent that complainant had failed to pay his attorney's fees, is not an excuse for respondent's failure to deliver any amount to the complainants. 6 It is of course true that under Section 37 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, an attorney hasa lien upon the funds, documents and papers of his client which have lawfully come into his possession and may retain the same until his lawful fees and disbursements have been paid, and may apply such funds to the satisfaction thereof. He shall also have a lien to the same extent upon all judgments for the payment of money and executions issued in pursuance of such judgments, which he has secured in a litigation of his client, from and after the time when he shall have caused a statement of his claim of such lien to be entered upon the records of the court rendering such judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall have caused written notice thereof to be delivered to his client and to the adverse party; and he shall have the same right and power over such judgments and executions as his client would have to enforce his lien and secure the payment of his just fees and disbursements. The fact that a lawyer has a lien for fees on moneys in his hands collected for his client, does not relieve him from his duty promptly to account for the moneys received; his failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct. 7 In the present case, what respondent could have properly done was to make an account with his client, the complainant, deduct his attorney's fees due in respect of the amount actually collected by him, and turn over the remaining balance to the complainant. The Court notes that the services of respondent de Dumo were engaged by the complainant on a number of cases and that these were on differing stages of completion. Respondent was not entitled to hold on to the entire amount of P12,000.00 collected by him until all his fees for the other cases had also been paid and received by him. There was not enough evidence in the record to show how much money, if any, respondent had in fact previously (i.e., other than the P12,000.00 from Maosca) collected for and turned over to complainant (thereby waiving his lien thereon) without deducting therefrom his claimed contingent fees in respect of such collections. The relationship of attorney and client has always been rightly regarded as one of special trust and confidence. An attorney must exercise the utmost good faith and fairness in all his relationships vis-a-vis his client. Respondent fell far short of this standard when he failed to render an accounting for the amount actually received by him and when he refused to turn over any portion of such amount received by him on behalf of his client upon the pretext that his attorney's fees had not all been paid. Respondent had in fact placed his private and personal interest above that of his client. Respondent's act constitutes a breach of his lawyer's oath and a mere reprimand is not an adequate sanction. There is another aspect to this case which the Court cannot gloss over. Respondent claimed that he charged complainant, his client, a contingent fee of fifty percent (50%) of the amount collected by him, plus interest and whatever attorney's fees may be awarded by the trial court chargeable to the other party. In this jurisdiction, contingent fees are not per se prohibited by law. 8 But when it is shown that a contract for a contingent fee are obtained by undue influence exercised by the attorney upon his client or by any fraud or imposition, or that the compensation is clearly excessive, the Court must and will protect the aggrieved party. 9 From the Answer of respondent de Dumo it appears that in three (3) collection cases filed by him for the complainant and which were decided in favor of the complainant, the awards totalled P31,390.00. Respondent asserted that he was entitled to attorney's fees amounting to Pl8,840. 00 out of the aggregate total of P31,390.00: 7. That the understanding between Hilaria Tanhueco and me was a fifty- fifty on collected principal and interests. The lawyer has the right to charge attorney's fees to the other partydefendant and that Hilaria Tanhueco shall not interfere nor be included in the computation. That of the cases filed, the following made payments: a. Hilaria Tanhueco vs. Constancia Maosca Amount Collectible (principal)........................................ P12,000.00 Interest added from May 1972 o Nov/73 at 1% a month.... P 2,280.00

Attorney's fees charged to the defendant and not to be included in the computation................ P 4,720.00 TOTAL and Amount specified in the Compromise Agreement and Subject of the Decision. P19,000.00 b. Hilaria Tanhueco vs. Melchor Tipace et al. Principal amount collectible...................... P7,100.00 Interest at 1 % per month starting June/71 to Sept./74........................ 2,840.00 Attorney's fees charged to the defendant and not included in the computation.......................... 1,450.00 TOTAL P ll,390.00. c. Hilaria Tanhueco vs. Estimo Principal Amount collectible...... ............... Pl,000.00 SUMMATION OF THE THREE CASES FILED AND AMOUNTS RECEIVABLE BY THE UNDERSIGNED INCLUDING ATTORNEY'S FEES: MAOSCA CASE: Attorney's fees to be paid by Maosca and not to be included in the computation................... P 4,840.00 Fifty per cent on the principal amount collectible plus interests......................................... . P 7,080.00 TOTAL AMOUNT RECEIVABLE P11,920.00 TIPACES CASE: Attorney's fees to be paid by Tipace and not to be included in the computation............................. Pl,450.00 Fifty per cent on the principal amount collectible from Tipace plus interests.................................. 4,970.00 TOTAL AMOUNT RECEIVABLE ............. P6,420.00 8. The total amount which I ought to receive as attorney's fees under paragraph seven, sub-paragraph a, b and c is: Pll,920. 00

P6,420.00 P500. 00 P18,840. 00 TOTAL 10 We note that respondent attorney claimed as his contingent fee the following: 1) fifty percent (50%) of the sum of principal and interest collectible from different debtors; and 2) attorney's fees charged to the defendant (presumably under promissory notes or written agreements) and "not to be included in the computation." Under this scheme, respondent was actually collecting as attorney's fees sixty percent (60%) or more than half of the total amount due from defendant debtors; indeed, he was appropriating for himself more than what he was, according to him, to turn over to his client. We believe and so hold that the contingent fee here claimed was, under the facts obtaining in this case, grossly excessive and unconscionable. 11 Such a fee structure, when considered in conjunction with the circumstances of this case, also shows that an unfair advantage was taken of the client and legal fraud and imposition perpetrated upon her. The complainant was an old and sickly woman and, in respondent's own words, "penniless." She was at the time she filed her complaint in 1976, already seventy-six (76) years old. In her circumstances, and given her understandable desire to realize upon debts owed to her before death overtook her, she would easily succumb to the demands of respondent attorney regarding his attorney's fees. It must be stressed that the mere fact that an agreement had been reached between attorney and client fixing the amount of the attorney's fees, does not insulate such agreement from review and modification by the Court where the fees clearly appear to be excessive or unreasonable. In Mambulao Lumber Company v. Philippine National Bank, et al., 12 this Court stressed: The principle that courts should reduce stipulated attorney's fees whenever it is found under the circumstances of the case that the same is unreasonable, is now deeply rooted in this jurisdiction to entertain any serious objection to it. Thus, this Court has explained: But the principle that it may be lawfully stipulated that the legal expenses involved in the collection of a debt shall be defrayed by the debtor does not imply that such stipulations must be enforced in accordance with the terms, no matter how injurious or oppressive they may be. The lawful purpose to be accomplished by such a stipulation is to permit the creditor to receive the amount due him under his contract without a

deduction of the expenses caused by the delinquency of the debtor. It should not be permitted for him to convert such a stipulation into a source of speculative profit at the expense of the debtor. xxx xxx xxx Since then this Court has invariably fixed counsel fees on a quantum meruit basis whenever the fees stipulated appear excessive, unconscionable, or unreasonable, because a lawyer is primarily a court officer charged with the duty of assisting the court in administering impartial justice between the parties, and hence, the fees should be subject to judicial control. Nor should it be ignored that sound public policy demands that courts disregard stipulations for counsel fees, whenever they appear to be a source of speculative profit at the expense of the debtor or mortgagor (See, Gorospe, et al. v. Gochangco, supra). And it is not material that the present action is between attorney and client. As courts have power to fix the fee as between attorney and client, it must necessarily have the right to say whether a stipulation like this, inserted in a mortgage contract, is valid (Bachrach vs. Golingco, supra). xxx xxx xxx 13 This Court has power to guard a client, 14 especially an aged and necessitous client, 15 against such a contract. We hold that on a quantum meruit basis, no circumstances of special difficulty attending the collection cases having been shown by respondent, respondent attorney's fees should be reduced from sixty percent (60%) to ten percent (15%) of the total amount (including attorney's fees stipulated as chargeable to the debtors) collected by him on behalf of his client. With respect to charges of refusal to return documents entrusted to respondent lawyer and abandonment of cases in which his services had been engaged, we accept the findings of the Solicitor General that the evidence of record is not sufficient to prove these allegations. WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved that: 1. respondent is guilty of violation of the attorneys' oath and of serious professional misconduct and shall be SUSPENDED from the practice law for six (6) months and WARNED that repetition of the same or similar offense will be more severely dealt with; 2. the attorney's fees that respondent is entitled to in respect of the collection cases here involved shall be an amount equivalent to fifteen percent (15%) of the total amount collected by respondent from the debtors in those cases;

3. respondent shall return forthwith to the estate of complainant Hilaria Tanhueco the P12,000.00 respondent received on behalf of his client less attorney's fees due to him in respect of that amount (P l2,000.00 less fifteen percent [15%] thereof) or a net amount of P10,200.00; and 4. respondent shall return to the estate of complainant Hilaria Tanhueco any documents and papers received by him from the deceased complainant in connection with the collection cases for which he was retained. If he has in fact made any other collections from deceased complainant's debtors, he shall promptly account therefor to complainant's estate and shall be entitled to receive in respect thereof the fifteen percent (15%) attorney's fees provided for herein. Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished each to the Bar Confidant and spread on the personal record of respondent attorney, and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

CBD A.C. No. 313 January 30, 1998 ATTY. AUGUSTO G. NAVARRO, for and in behalf of PAN-ASIA INTERNATIONAL COMMODITIES, INC., complainant, vs. ATTY. ROSENDO MENESES III, respondent.

PER CURIAM: This administrative case against respondent Atty. Rosendo Meneses III was initiated by a complaint-affidavit 1 filed by Atty. Augusto G. Navarro on June 7, 1994 before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereinafter, the Commission), for and in behalf of Pan-Asia International Commodities, Inc. Herein complainant charges respondent Meneses with the following offenses, viz.: (1) malpractice and gross misconduct unbecoming a public defender; (2) dereliction of duty, by violating his oath to do everything within his power to protect his client's interest; (3) willful abandonment; and (4) loss of trust and confidence, due to his continued failure to account for the amount of P50,000.00 entrusted to him to be paid to a certain complainant for the amicable settlement of a pending case. 2 The complaint-affidavit alleged that Frankwell Management and Consultant, Inc., a group of companies which includes Pan-Asia International Commodities, Inc., through its Administrative Manager Estrellita Valdez, engaged the legal services of respondent Atty. Meneses. While serving as such counsel, Atty. Meneses handled various cases and was 3 properly compensated by his client in accordance with their retainer agreement. One of the litigations handled by him was the case of "People vs. Lai Chan Kow, a.k.a. Wilson Lai, and Arthur Bretaa," pending before Branch 134, Regional Trial Court of Makati. On December 24, 1993, respondent received the sum of P50,000.00 from Arthur Bretaa, the accused in said case, to be given to therein offended party, a certain Gleason, as consideration for an out-of-court settlement and with the understanding that a motion to dismiss the case would be filed by respondent Meneses.

Despite subsequent repeated requests, respondent failed to present to his client the receipt acknowledging that Gleason received said amount. A verification made with the Regional Trial Court of Makati revealed that no motion to dismiss or any pleading in connection therewith had been filed, and the supposed amicable settlement was not finalized and concluded. Despite repeated demands in writing or by telephone for an explanation, as well as the turnover of all documents pertaining to the aforementioned case, respondent Meneses deliberately ignored the pleas of herein complainant. The case was assigned by the Commission to Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez for investigation. Respondent was thereafter ordered to submit 4 his answer to the complaint pursuant to Section 5, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. Two successive ex parte motions for extension of time to file an answer were filed by respondent and granted by the Commission. 5 On November 14, 1994, respondent filed a motion to dismiss, 6 instead of an answer. In said motion, respondent argued that Atty. Navarro had no legal personality to sue him for and in behalf of Pan-Asia International Commodities, Inc. because his legal services were retained by Frankwell Management and Consultant, Inc.; that Navarro had not represented Pan-Asia International Commodities, Inc. in any case nor had he been authorized by its board of directors to file this disbarment case against respondent; that the retainer agreement between him and Frankwell Management and Consultant, Inc. had been terminated as of December 31, 1993 according to the verbal advice of its Administrative Officer Estrellita Valdez; that the case of Arthur Bretaa was not part of their retainer agreement, and Bretaa was not an employee of Frankwell Management and Consultant, Inc. which retained him as its legal counsel; and that the settlement of said case cannot be concluded because the same was archived and accused Bretaa is presently out of the country. Herein complainant, in his opposition to the motion to dismiss, 7 stresses that respondent Meneses is resorting to technicalities to evade the issue of his failure to account for the amount of P50,000.00 entrusted to him; that respondent's arguments in his motion to dismiss were all designed to mislead the Commission; and that he was fully aware of the interrelationship of the two corporations and always coordinated his legal work with Estrellita Valdez. On November 28, 1994, Investigating Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez resolved to deny said motion to dismiss for lack of merit and directed respondent to file his answer. 8 On January 2, 1995, respondent filed a manifestation that he was adopting the allegations in his motion to dismiss as his answer. 9 When the case was set for hearing on February 9, 1995, respondent failed to attend despite due notice. He thereafter moved to postpone and reset the hearing of the case several times allegedly due to problems with his health. On the scheduled hearing of June 15, 1995, respondent again failed to attend. The commissioner accordingly received ex parte the testimony of complainant's sole witness, Estrellita Valdez, and other documentary evidence. 10 Thereafter, complainant rested its case. Respondent filed a so-called "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to 11 12 Recall Complainant's Witness for Cross-examination" which was granted by the Commission. Estrellita Valdez was directed by the Commission to appear on the scheduled hearing for cross-examination. Several postponements and resetting of hearings were later requested and granted by the Commission. When the case was set for hearing for the last time on May 31, 1996, respondent failed to attend despite due notice and repeated warnings. Consequently, the Commission considered him to have waived his right to present evidence in his defense and declared the case submitted for resolution. 13 On February 4, 1997, the Commission on Bar Discipline, through its Investigating Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez, 14 submitted its Report and Recommendation to the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The Commission ruled that the refusal and/or failure of respondent to account for the sum of P50,000.00 he received from complainant for the settlement of the aforestated case of Lai Chan Kow and Arthur Bretaa proves beyond any shadow of a doubt that he misappropriated the same, hence he deserved to be penalized. The Commission recommended that respondent Meneses he suspended from the practice of the legal profession for a period of three (3) years and directed to return the P50,000.00 he received from the petitioner within fifteen (15) days from notice of the resolution. It further provided that failure on his part to comply with such requirement would result in his disbarment. 15 The Board of Governors adopted and approved the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in its Resolution No. XII-97-133, dated July 26, 1997. 16 On August 15, 1997, the Court received the Notice of Resolution, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and the records of this case through the Office of the Bar Confidant for final action pursuant to Section 12

(b) of Rule 139-B. 17 It appears therefrom that respondent was duly furnished a copy of said resolution, with the investigating commissioner's report and recommendation annexed thereto. The Court agrees with the findings and conclusion of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines that respondent Meneses misappropriated the money entrusted to him and which he has failed and/or refused to account for to his client despite repeated demands therefor. Such conduct on the part of respondent indicating his unfitness for the confidence and trust reposed on him, or showing such lack of personal honesty or of good moral character as to render him unworthy of public confidence, constitutes a ground for disciplinary action extending to disbarment. 18 Respondent Meneses' misconduct constitutes a gross violation of his oath as a lawyer which, inter alia, imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or malice. He blatantly disregarded Rule 16.01 of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from his client. Respondent was merely holding in trust the money he received from his client to be used as consideration for the amicable settlement of a case he was handling. Since the amicable settlement did not materialize, he was necessarily under obligation to immediately return the money, as there is no showing that he has a lien over it. As a lawyer, he should be scrupulously careful in handling money entrusted to him in his professional capacity, because a 19 high degree of fidelity and good faith on his part is exacted. The argument of respondent that complainant has no legal personality to sue him is unavailing. Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides that proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines upon the verified complaint of any person. The right to institute a disbarment proceeding is not confined to clients nor is it necessary that the person complaining suffered injury from the alleged wrongdoing. Disbarment proceedings are matters of public interest and the only basis for judgment is the proof or failure of proof of the charges. The evidence submitted by complainant before the Commission on Bar Discipline sufficed to sustain its resolution and recommended sanctions. It is settled that a lawyer is not obliged to act as counsel for every person who may wish to become his client. He has the right to decline employment 20 subject, however, to the provisions of Canon 14 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 21 Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, he owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him. 22 Respondent Meneses, as counsel, had the obligation to inform his client of the status of the case and to respond within a reasonable time to his client's request for information. Respondent's failure to communicate with his client by deliberately disregarding its requests for an audience or conference is an unjustifiable denial of its right to be fully informed of the developments in and the status of its case. On January 7, 1998, the Bar Confidant submitted to the Court a copy of the letter of Atty. Augusto G. Navarro, dated December 18, 1997, to the effect that although a copy of the aforestated Resolution No. XII-97-133 was personally delivered to respondent's address and received by his wife on October 9, 1997, he has failed to restitute the amount of P50,000.00 to complainant within the 15-day period provided therein. Neither has he filed with this Court any pleading or written indication of his having returned said amount to complainant. In line with the resolution in this case, his disbarment is consequently warranted and exigent. A note and advice on the penalty imposed in the resolution is in order. The dispositive portion thereof provides that: . . . Respondent Atty. Rosendo Meneses is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years and is hereby directed to return the Fifty Thousand Pesos he received from the petitioner within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this resolution. Failure on his part to comply will result (i)n his 23 DISBARMENT. In other words, it effectively purports to impose either a 3-year suspension or disbarment, depending on whether or not respondent duly returns the amount to complainant. Viewed from another angle, it directs that he shall only be suspended, subject to the condition that he should make restitution as prescribed therein. Dispositions of this nature should be avoided. In the imposition of penalties in criminal cases, it has long been the rule that 24 the penalty imposed in a judgment cannot be in the alternative, even if the law provides for alternative penalties, nor 25 can such penalty be subject to a condition. There is no reason why such legal principles in penal law should not apply in administrative disciplinary actions which, as in this case, also involve punitive sanctions. Besides, if the purpose was to extenuate the liability of respondent, the only possible and equivalent rule is in malversation cases holding that the restitution of the peculated funds would be analogous to voluntary surrender if it was

immediately and voluntarily made before the case was instituted. 26 That evidently is not the situation here. Also, the implementation of the penalty provided in the resolution will involve a cumbersome process since, in order to arrive at the final action to be taken by this Court, it will have to wait for a verified report on whether or not respondent complied with the condition subsequent. WHEREFORE, Atty. Rosendo Meneses III is hereby DISBARRED. Let a copy of this decision be attached to respondent's personal records in this Court and furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, together with all courts in the country. SO ORDERED. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC A.C. No. 6424 March 4, 2005

CONSORCIA S. ROLLON, complainant, vs. Atty. CAMILO NARAVAL, respondent. DECISION PANGANIBAN, J.: Lawyers owe fidelity to their clients. The latters money or other property coming into the formers possession should be deemed to be held in trust and should not under any circumstance be commingled with the lawyers own; much less, used by them. Failure to observe these ethical principles constitutes professional misconduct and justifies the imposition of disciplinary sanctions. The Case and the Facts Before us is a letter-complaint against Atty. Camilo Naraval, filed by Consorcia S. Rollon with the Davao City Chapter of 1 the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on November 29, 2001. The Affidavit submitted by complainant alleges the following: "Sometime in October of 2000, I went to the office of Atty. Camilo F. Naraval together with my son, Freddie Rollon, to seek his assistance in a case filed against me before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities Branch 6, Davao City entitled Rosita Julaton vs. Consorcia S. Rollon for Collection of Sum of Money with Prayer for Attachment; "After going over the documents I brought with me pertaining to the said case, Atty. Naraval agreed to be my lawyer and I was required to pay the amount of Eight Thousand Pesos (Php 8,000.00) for the filing and partial service fee, which amount was paid by me on October 18, 2000, a copy of the Official Receipt is hereto attached as Annex A to form part hereof; "As per the instruction of Atty. Naraval, my son, Freddie, returned to his office the following week to make followup on said case. However, I was informed later by my son Freddie that Atty. Naraval was not able to act on my case because the latter was so busy. Even after several follow-ups were made with Atty. Naraval, still there was no action done on our case; "Sometime in November 29, 2001, I decided to withdraw the amount I paid to Atty. Naraval, because of the latters failure to comply with our mutual agreement that he will assist me in the above-mentioned case; "My son Freddie Rollon went to Atty. Naravals office that same day to inform Atty. Naraval of our decision to withdraw the amount I have paid and to retrieve my documents pertaining to said case. Unfortunately, despite our several follow-ups, Atty. Naraval always said that he cannot return the documents because they were in their house, and that he could not give us back the amount we paid him (Php 8,000.00) because he has no money;

"Having failed to obtain any response, I decided to refer the matter to Atty. Ramon Edison Batacan, IBP President of Davao City and to Atty. Pedro Castillo, the Commissioner on Bar D[i]scipline; xxx xxx x x x."

In an Order dated March 12, 2002,2 the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), through Director Victor C. Fernandez, directed respondent to submit his answer to the Complaint. The same directive was reiterated in the CBDs May 31, 2002 Order3 issued through Commissioner Jovy C. Bernabe. Respondent did not file any answer despite his receipt of the Orders.4 Not having heard from him despite adequate notice, the CBD proceeded with the investigation ex parte. Its Order5 dated November 11, 2002, issued through Commissioner Bernabe, required complainant to submit her position paper within ten days from receipt thereof, after which the case was to be deemed submitted for resolution. The CBD received complainants Position Paper6 on December 10, 2002. Report of the Investigating Commissioner In his Report and Recommendation dated October 16, 2003, Investigating Commissioner Acerey C. Pacheco recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year for neglect of duty and/or violation of Canons 15 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Report reads in part as follows: "Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires every lawyer to serve his client with utmost dedication, competence and diligence. He must not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in this regard renders him administratively liable x x x. "In the case at bar, the deplorable conduct of the respondent in misrepresenting to the complainant that he will render legal services to her, and after receiving certain amount from the latter as payment for filing fee and service fee did nothing in return, has caused unnecessary dishonor to the bar. By his own conduct the respect of the community to the legal profession, of which he swore to protect, has been tarnished. xxx xxx xxx

"In fact, complainant claimed to have been shortchanged by the respondent when he failed to properly appraised her of the status of her case which she later on found to have become final and executory. Apparently, the civil suit between Rosita Julaton and the complainant have been decided against the latter and which judgment has long become final and executory. However, despite full knowledge by the respondent of such finality based on the documents furnished to him, respondent withheld such vital information and did not properly appraise the 7 complainant. Thus, respondent violated the mandate in Canon 15 x x x." IBP Board of Governors Resolution On February 27, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2004-64 upholding the above-quoted Report. The Board recommended the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for two (2) years for violation of Rules 15 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the restitution of complainants P8,000. The Courts Ruling We agree with the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors. Respondents Administrative Liability Ordinarily, lawyers are not obliged to act either as advisers or as advocates of any person who may wish to become their 8 client. They may decline employment and refuse to accept representation, if they are not in a position to carry it out 9 effectively or competently. But once they agree to handle a case, attorneys are required by the Canons of Professional Responsibility to undertake the task with zeal, care and utmost devotion.10

Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the 11 clients cause. Every case accepted by a lawyer deserves full attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless of 12 importance. The Code of Professional Responsibility clearly states: CANON 17 A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence. Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep his client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the clients request for information. Hence, practising lawyers may accept only as many cases as they can efficiently handle. Otherwise, their clients would be prejudiced. Once lawyers agree to handle a case, they should undertake the task with dedication and care. If they do any less, then they fail their lawyers oath.14 The circumstances of this case indubitably show that after receiving the amount of P8,000 as filing and partial service fee, respondent failed to render any legal service in relation to the case of complainant. His continuous inaction despite repeated followups from her reveals his cavalier attitude and appalling indifference toward his clients cause, in brazen disregard of his duties as a lawyer. Not only that. Despite her repeated demands, he also unjustifiably failed to return to her the files of the case that had been entrusted to him. To top it all, he kept the money she had likewise entrusted to him. Furthermore, after going through her papers, respondent should have given her a candid, honest opinion on the merits and the status of the case. Apparently, the civil suit between Rosita Julaton and complainant had been decided against the latter. In fact, the judgment had long become final and executory. But he withheld such vital information from complainant. Instead, he demanded P8,000 as "filing and service fee" and thereby gave her hope that her case would be acted upon. Rule 15.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires that lawyers give their candid and best opinion to their clients on the merit or lack of merit of the case, neither overstating nor understating their evaluation thereof. Knowing whether a case would have some prospect of success is not only a function, but also an obligation on the part of lawyers.15 If they find that their clients cause is defenseless, then it is their bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than to traverse the incontrovertible.16 The failure of respondent to fulfill this basic undertaking constitutes a violation of his duty to "observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his 17 clients." Likewise, as earlier pointed out, respondent persistently refused to return the money of complainant despite her repeated demands. His conduct was clearly indicative of lack of integrity and moral soundness; he was clinging to something that did not belong to him, and that he absolutely had no right to keep or use.18 Lawyers are deemed to hold in trust their clients money and property that may come into their possession.19 As respondent obviously did nothing on the case of complainant, the amount she had given -- as evidenced by the receipt issued by his law office -- was never applied to the filing fee. His failure to return her money upon demand gave rise to the presumption that he had converted it to his own use and thereby betrayed the trust she had reposed in him.20 His failure 21 to do so constituted a gross violation of professional ethics and a betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. The Code exacts from lawyers not only a firm respect for law, legal processes and the courts,22 but also mandates the utmost degree of fidelity and good faith in dealing with the moneys entrusted to them pursuant to their fiduciary relationship.23 Respondent clearly fell short of the demands required of him as a member of the bar. His inability to properly discharge his duty to his client makes him answerable not just to her, but also to this Court, to the legal 24 profession, and to the general public. Given the crucial importance of his role in the administration of justice, his misconduct diminished the confidence of the public in the integrity and dignity of the profession.25 WHEREFORE, Atty. Camilo Naraval is found GUILTY of violating Rule 15.05 and Canons 16, 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, effective upon his receipt of this Decision. Furthermore, he is ORDERED TO RESTITUTE, within thirty (30) days from notice of this Decision, complainants eight thousand pesos (P8,000), plus interest thereon, at the rate of six percent per annum, from
13

October 18, 2000, until fully paid. Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of the Bar Confidant, as well as the National Office and the Davao City Chapter of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. SO ORDERED. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 4411 June 10, 1999 JAIME CURIMATMAT, ET AL., complainants, vs. ATTY. FELIPE GOJAR, respondent. RESOLUTION

MELO, J.: On April 25, 1995, respondent Atty. Felipe G. Gojar was administratively charged by his clients, former employees of the Uniwide Sales, Inc., with lack of fidelity to his clients' cause. The alleged prejudicial acts of respondent, as alleged in the letter-complaint, are herein enumerated as follows: 1. We file a petition for review with the Supreme Court under G.R. No. 113201 entitled "Associated Trade Unions, et al. vs. Honorable Bienvenido E. Laguesma, et al. Our lawyer was Atty. Felipe G. Gojar. We had been following it up with our said lawyer since then and up to the start of this year 1995. But, we were advised by our lawyer Atty. Gojar that the petition was still pending with the Honorable Supreme Court. Lately, we discovered that our Lawyer, Atty. Gojar moved for the dismissal of the petition without our consent and authority. Attached is a copy of the Manifestation and Motion" as Annex "A". 2. In the meantime, an "Unfair Labor Practice" case was also filed with the NLRC, Manila entitled "Rex Alfonte, et al. vs. Uniwide Sales Warehouse Club, et al. under NLRC Case No. NCR-00-1207755-93. This case was dismissed. The decision was received by Atty. Gojar on July 14, 1994. He filed an appeal on August 8, 1994 which was beyond the ten (10) day period. However, he stated in his appeal that he received the decision on July 29, 1994, which is not true. Attached is a copy of his receipt of the decision on July 14, 1994. 3. Also, another case was filed with the NLRC involving money claims. The case was dismissed. Atty. Gojar filed an appeal. The appeal was also dismissed. He told us that he will prepare a petition for review with the Supreme Court. We have been going to his office for several times so that the petition for review will be filed. On one occasion, he told us that he cannot yet prepare the petition for varied reasons like: he has volume of professional work; failing health and others but, up to the present, the petition is not filed. 4. Another case is likewise filed with the National Labor Relation Commission, Manila NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-07-04380-93 entitled "Aniceta Salgado et. al. vs. Uniwide Sales Warehouse Club Edsa et. al. We have been following it up with Atty. Gojar but, his response was "The case is still pending. On February 21, 1995, I, Ines Salgado went to the office of the Labor Arbiter. In the said office, it was found out that a decision was already rendered on September 30, 1994 and Atty. Gojar had already received said decision but, he failed to file the necessary appeal. What had been told to us that there was not yet decision. In short, Atty. Gojar deliberately hide to us that a decision was already rendered on September 30, 1994.

(Rollo, pp. 1-4.) On August 31, 1995, respondent filed his Comment vehemently denying all the allegations in the complaint, thusly: 1. Contrary to the false and malicious allegations of complainants in paragraph 1 of the lettercomplaint, the Manifestation and Motion dated July 21, 1994 (Annex "A" of Complaint) in G.R. No. 113201 was filed by respondent after due consultation and with the conformity of the petitioners therein. . . . Respondent never misrepresented to the ATU members anything regarding the proceedings in G.R. No. 113201. As the counsel for the said union and its members, respondent was never remiss in his duties to his clients and promptly informed them of all proceedings not only in G.R. No. 113201 but also in all other cases filed in behalf of ATU members. xxx xxx xxx Respondent therefore is at a loss as to why the complainants brought an administrative complaint against him for alleged violation of his oath as a lawyer. Likewise, it is inconceivable how the withdrawal of the petition "prejudiced" the complainants when the CBA sought to be "discertified" had already expired in April of 1995. 2. It is not true as falsely claimed by the complainants in paragraph 2 of the letter-complaint, that respondent filed an appeal in behalf of complainants beyond the ten-day reglementary period. The truth of the matter is that, in the case being referred to, NLRC Case No. NCR-00-12-0775593 (Alfante, et al. vs. Uniwide Sales Warehouse Club, et al.), the appeal being referred to was not filed by the respondent. The said appeal was filed in behalf of complainants by Francisco Listana, a National Officer of ATU (a copy of the Appeal is attached hereto as Annex "2"). xxx xxx xxx Complainants are making it appear that respondent was remiss in his duties in not appealing on time the decision. Nothing can be farther from the truth. The complainants deliberately did not disclose to this Honorable Court that the respondent, immediately upon receipt of the decision of the Labor Arbiter on July 14, 1994, called the complainants to a meeting to inform them of the decision which was unfavorable to them. Upon being informed of such decision, the complainants discussed among themselves and after some time, they told the respondent of their disappointment of the outcome of the case and that they have decided to get another lawyer to handle their case. Respondent had no choice but to follow the wishes of his clients and so he informed them to come back the next day to get the records from the National Officer of ATU. Respondent gave instructions to the National Officer to arrange the records and give them to the complainants. But the complainants did not come back and respondent was not informed of such fact until sometime in the first week of August 1994, when the National Officer told him. By that time, the reglementary period to appeal had expired. At any rate, the National Officer took it upon himself to file an appeal in behalf of the complainants. Unfortunately, the complainants, instead of being grateful, denied having authorized the National Officer to file the appeal in their behalf. xxx xxx xxx In the case adverted to by the complaints (NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-07-04380-93), it is not true that respondent "deliberately hide" to the complainants the fact that a decision had been rendered in that case on September 30, 1994. How can respondent hide the decision from complainants when they are very diligent in following up the case with the respondent and even with the labor arbiter? Contrary to the utterly perjurious and malicious allegations of complainants in paragraph 4 of their letter, it is not the fault of respondent that no appeal was filed in that case. The complainants

have no one to blame but themselves. Even before respondent informed the complainants that he received a decision adverse to them, the latter had already known from their source at the labor arbiter that such a decision had been issued. The complainants in that case, like those in the first case mentioned in paragraph 2 hereof, felt disappointed at the outcome of the decision and told the respondent that they secured the services of another lawyer to represent them in their appeal. They never contacted the respondent after their last meeting sometime in the first week of October 1994. Respondent cannot therefore be faulted for it was the complainants themselves who led him into believing that their rights were amply protected as their remedy of appeal would be carried on by the new counsel of their choice. (Rollo, pp. 38-43.) In a Resolution dated November 22, 1995, the Court referred the letter-complaint to the Board of Governors of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Hearings were set on October 1, 1996, November 19, 1996, July 14, 1997, March 14, 1997, May 9, 1997, and June 20, 1997. Respondent was duly notified of all the scheduled hearings but he opted not to appear in any of them. Complainants, therefore, presented their evidence ex parte. On November 5, 1998, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines passed a resolution recommending that respondent he suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months for failure to demonstrate the required fidelity to his client's cause. In Gamalinda vs. Alcantara (206 SCRA 468 [1992]), we ruled that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and must be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him. Failure to do so violates Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Legarda vs. Court of Appeals, 209 SCRA 722 [1992]). In the case at bar, respondent is alleged to have been remiss in his duty to appeal on time the adverse Resolution of the DOLE Secretary in Case No. OSMA-A-6-84-93 affirming the dismissal of the union's Petition for Certification Election at the Uniwide Sales Branches; and for having moved for the dismissal of complainants' petition for review with the Court against the decision of DOLE Undersecretary Bienvenido Laguesma, et al. (G.R. No. 113201) without their consent. In his Comment (supra), respondent attempted to refute the allegations against him and explained his side of the controversy. He did not, however, substantiate his self-serving claim that he was not remiss in his duties towards his clients and that he consulted complainants and sought their conformity to the withdrawal of their case before the Court, which case was thereafter rendered moot and academic due to the expiration of the CBA that was sought to be "discertified". Worse, respondent chose to ignore the hearings before the IBP where he could have shed more light on the controversy. We do not, however, believe that respondent's shortcomings warrant his suspension from the practice of law. Considering that this is his first offense, are primand would be in order. At this juncture, we would like to remind litigants that lawyers are not demi-gods or "magicians" who can always win their cases for their clients no matter the utter lack of merit of the same or how passionate the litigants may feel about their cause. While lawyers are expected to serve their clients with competence and diligence, they are not always expected to be victorious. In every litigation, there will always be a "winner" and a "loser", unless the parties agree to settle the controversy between themselves and to work at a "win-win" solution to their problems. WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, respondent Atty. FELIPE GOJAR is hereby REPRIMANDED with a warning that any repetition of the same shall be dealt with more severely.1wphi1.nt SO ORDERED. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

A.C. No. 5135 September 22, 1999 (Formerly A.C. No. CBD 296) ELSIE B. AROMIN, FE B. YABUT, TIBURCIO B. BALLESTEROS, JR., and JULIAN B. BALLESTEROS, complainants, vs. ATTY. VALENTIN O. BONCAVIL, respondent.

MENDOZA, J.: This is a complaint 1 filed by Elsie B. Aromin, Fe B. Yabut, Tiburcio B. Ballesteros, Jr., and Julian B. Ballesteros against Atty. Valentin O. Boncavil for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Complainants allege that their late father, Tiburcio Ballesteros, engaged the services of respondent as counsel in two cadastral cases then pending in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Pagadian City, to wit: Cadastral Case No. N-14, LRC CAD. RMC No. N-475, Lot No. 6576, Pls-119, entitled "The Director of Lands, Petitioner, v. Faustina Calibo, Claimant, v. Tiburcio Ballesteros, Claimant," and Cadastral Case No. N-14, LRC CAD. REG. No. N-475, Lot No. 7098, Pls-119, entitled "The Director of Lands, Petitioner, v. Belinda Tagailo-Bariuan, Claimant, v. Tiburcio Ballesteros, Claimant"; that despite receipt of the adverse decision in the two cases on August 8, 1991, respondent did not inform herein complainants of the same nor file either a motion for reconsideration or a notice of appeal to prevent the decision from becoming final; that respondent did not file either a written offer of evidence despite the trial court's directive for him to do so; and that it took respondent four years from the time complainants' father died before he filed a motion to substitute herein complainants in the trial court. The foregoing acts and omissions of respondent are alleged to be in violation of the following provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility: CANON 15 A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENT. CANON 17 A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM. CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Rule 18.04 A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client's request for information. Complainants pray that such "disciplinary sanctions as may be appropriate be imposed against Atty. Valentin Boncavil." In his answer, 2 respondent alleges that the day before the cadastral court rendered its decision, he met by chance herein complainant Julian Ballesteros, who, after inquiring as to the status of the cadastral cases and learning that the same had already been submitted for resolution, told him "You are too busy to attend to our case, it would be better if somebody else would take over," to which, according to respondent, he replied, "It is all right with me, it is your privilege"; that as a self-respecting legal practitioner, he did not, want to continue rendering unwanted legal services to a client who has lost faith in his counsel; that he thus considered himself discharged as counsel in the two cadastral cases and relieved of the obligation either to move for a reconsideration of the decision or to file a notice of appeal and to notify herein complainants of the decision against them; that, contrary to complainants' assertion, he did make an offer of evidence, although he reserved the right to submit authenticated copies of the documentary evidence from the Bureau of Lands in Manila; that the delay in the substitution of Tiburcio Ballesteros with his heirs was because neither the heirs nor the administrator of the intestate estate of Tiburcio Ballesteros informed him of the latter's death despite the heirs' knowledge that he was the counsel in the two cadastral cases.1wphi1.nt On June 8, 1994, complainants moved for a judgment on the pleadings, alleging that "the facts are not in dispute and the 3 respondent's answer admits the material allegations of the complaint."

On June 13, 1994, IBP Commissioner Plaridel C. Jose required respondent to comment on the foregoing motion within five (5) days from 4 5 notice. On October 12, 1995, he set the case for hearing on November 17, 1995. On November 17, 1995, however, only complainants Tiburcio Ballesteros, Jr. and Fe Yabut and their counsel appeared. This fact, together with respondent's failure to comment on complainants' motion submitting the case for resolution on the 6 basis of the pleadings, prompted Commissioner Jose to grant complainants' motion. On June 21, 1996, Commissioner Jose submitted his report recommending that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six months with warning that repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. On May 17, 1997, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XII-97-16 approving Commissioner Jose's report and recommendation. After due consideration of the records of this case, the Court finds the recommendation of the IBP to be well taken. The facts clearly show that respondent violated Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that "a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence." By abandoning complainants' cases, respondent violated Rule 18.03 of the same Code which requires that "a lawyer not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable." As stated in Santiago v. Fojas: 7 Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and diligence, and champion the latter's cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client's rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession. Nor can we sustain respondent's claim that he did not file either a motion for reconsideration or a notice of appeal from the decision in the two cases because he was under the impression from the remark of Julian Ballesteros that complainants no longer wanted to retrain his services. As a member of the bar, he ought to know that the only way to be relieved as counsel in a case is to have either the written conformity of his client or an order from the court relieving him as counsel. Thus, Rule 138, 26 of the Rules of Court provides: An attorney may retire at any time from any action or special proceeding, by the written consent of his client filed in court. He may also retire at any time from an action or special proceeding, without the consent of his client, should the court, on notice to the client and attorney, and on hearing, determine that he ought to be allowed to retire. In case of substitution, the name of the attorney newly employed shall be entered on the docket of the court in place of the former one, and written notice of the change shall be given to the adverse party. As a matter of fact, Julian Ballesteros, who allegedly made the remarks which became the basis for respondent's inaction, denied ever having made those statements, much less having discharged respondent as counsel. 8 Moreover, Julian Ballesteros is only one of the heirs of Tiburcio Ballesteros, and it has not been shown that he was speaking on behalf of the other heirs when he allegedly relieved respondent of his services. In any case, if respondent had really been discharged as counsel, although not in accordance with the Rules of Court, he should have informed the trial court and asked that he be allowed to withdraw from the cases. 9 Until his dismissal or withdrawal is made of record, any judicial notice sent to him was binding upon his clients even though as between them the professional relationship may have 10 been terminated. He cannot validly claim that, in any case, the decision has not yet become final for want of service on the Solicitor General, for the period within which complainants can file a motion for reconsideration or notice of appeal is counted from receipt of the decision by their counsel of record. Nor is this the first time that respondent is remiss in his professional obligation toward complainants. In his answer, he practically admits that he was late in moving for the substitution of Tiburcio Ballesteros by herein complainant heirs.

Respondent's excuse that he was not immediately informed by complainants of their father's death is without merit. Four years after the death of complainants' father is simply too long a period for him not to have known of his client's death, especially as it appears that he and complainants live in close proximity with each other. During those four years, surely occasions would have arisen where respondent had to confer with Tiburcio Ballesteros regarding the cases. Respondent also, in effect, admits that he failed to file a written offer of evidence as required by the court in its order, dated June 21, 1983. What he actually filed was only "a provisional written offer of evidence" because the documents 11 offered were not certified true copies. What the Court makes of respondent's garbled explanation for this lapse is that he could not bother to go to the Bureau of Lands in Manila to get certified true copies because a check with the Bureau of Lands in Pagadian City "showed the same documentary evidence to be substantially the same true copies." If that were the case, respondent did not explain why he did not then go to the Pagadian City branch of the Bureau of Lands to get the certified true copies of his documentary evidence. The recommended penalty of suspension from the practice of law for six months for respondent's gross negligence in the 12 handling of the two cadastral cases is in accordance with our decisions. WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVED to suspend respondent Atty. Valentin O. Boncavil from the practice of law for six (6) months from notice with a warning that a repetition of a similar offense will be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this decision be attached to Atty. Boncavil's personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and to all the courts in the land.1wphi1.nt SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, GonzagaReyes and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur. Footnotes Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila SECOND DIVISION Adm. Case No. 4982 August 9, 2001

KATRINA JOAQUIN CARIO, petitioner, vs. ATTY. ARTURO DE LOS REYES, respondent. MENDOZA, J.: This is a petition for review of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines' (IBP) Resolution No. XIV-2000-460, dated July 29, 2000, dismissing the complaint for inexcusable negligence filed Katrina Cario against respondent Atty. Arturo de los Reyes. Complainant alleged that on March 3, 1998, she contracted the services of respondent, a former Quezon City prosecutor, to file complaints for slander by deed, threats, and physical injuries against her relatives Faye Lorenz, Godofreditas Lorenz, and Rosario Joaquin, who themselves subsequently filed charges against complainant and her father for maltreatment, physical injuries, and threats with the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office. As agreed, complainant paid respondent the amount of P10,000.00 as acceptance fee. However, despite demands by complainant, respondent never filed the complaint-affidavits with the prosecutor's office for preliminary investigation. On the other hand, with respect to the complaints filed by the Lorenzes and Joaquin, Quezon City Assistant Prosecutor Francisco Soller recommended the filing of informations for maltreatment, threats, and slight physical injuries against complainant and her father. The cases were subsequently filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 41, Quezon City. Complainant alleged that respondent failed to protect their interest, for which reason they were forced to hire the services of another counsel, Atty. Ricardo J.M. Rivera, who promptly filed a motion for reinvestigation, which, however, was denied by the prosecutor's office.1

Respondent denied that he had agreed to represent petitioner in filing criminal complaints against petitioner's aforementioned relatives. He stated that his services were hired in connection with the filing of a case for partition of the lot occupied by petitioner and her father, on one hand, and their relatives in question, on the other hand. It was alleged that petitioner promised to furnish him the certification of the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa for the filing of the case in court as well as the Transfer Certificate of Title of the lot to be partitioned but, as petitioner failed to do so, respondent withdrew from the case and returned the acceptance fee of P10,000.00 paid by petitioner. Respondent added that he is a member of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP investigating complaints against member of the bar, and he is mindful of 2 the duties of members of the bar toward their clients. Petitioner admits the return of the P10,000.00 acceptance fee, but says that the money was paid only after repeated 3 demands made by her to respondent and after she had threatened to charge respondent with estafa. On June 14, 1999, the Court referred the case to the IBP for investigation, report, and recommendation. In its resolution, dated July 29, 2000, the IBP dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. Hence this petition under Rule 139-B, 12(c). We find the petition meritorious.
4 In dismissing petitioner's complaint, the IBP Investigating Commissioner stated:

[C]omplainant's and respondent's version of the incident which gave rise to the present complaint are poles apart. Consequently, the Commission had to weigh very well the evidence adduced by both parties. When juxtaposed against each other, the Commission finds complainant's evidence inadequate to justify the imposition of disciplinary action against the respondent. Certainly, if the intention of the respondent was to wreck havoc on the complainant, he would not even have bothered to return the P10,000.00 acceptance fee, a fact which is not being disputed. All persons are presumed innocent of the charge/s against [them] by reason of constitutional and statutory dicta. To overcome this presumption, strong and convincing evidence must be adduced. In the case at bar, this Commission finds complainant's evidence inadequate or insufficient to overcome said presumption. Accordingly, there is no other option but to deny due course to complainant's complaint.5 The Court cannot subscribe to this finding. In her complaint, petitioner narrated in detail the circumstances of her employment of respondent's legal services. She alleged: [I]n the morning of February 25, 1998, at around 9:00 o'clock, my father, Virgilio S. Joaquin, and I were the unfortunate victims of physical assault, slander by deed and threats committed by our relatives, Rosario M. Joaquin, Faye Maybelle J. Lorenz and Godofreditas Lorenz. Resultantly, we filed with the Barangay a complaint for said crimes against the offenders, who, in turn, filed countercharges against us for maltreatment, physical injuries and threats. On March 3, 1998, while conciliation hearings on the charges and countercharges were being undertaken by the Barangay, I and my father hired the legal services of Atty. Arturo de los Reyes, a former Quezon City Prosecutor, who was referred to us by a family friend and neighbor, Lily Jodloman. After briefing him of our legal problem, Atty. Reyes agreed to be our lawyer in the cases for a fee of P10,000.00 plus P1,000.00 per court appearance. For the purpose of preparing our affidavit-complaint, I furnished Atty. Reyes a xerox copy each of the medical certificate of my father; our joint-statement concerning the incident, and a police blotter. Atty. Reyes assured us that our affidavit-complaint would be prepared by him at the soonest possible time. On March 17, 1998, at 12:00 noon, I paid Atty. Reyes [the] acceptance fee of P10,000.00. [I]n the evening of April 6, 1998, I handed to Atty. Reyes the Certification to File Action issued by the Barangay concerning our criminal complaint for slight physical injuries, slander by deed and threat against our aforementioned tormentors. I informed Atty. De los Reyes that a Certificate to File Action on the countercharges [filed by] our tormentors ha[d] likewise been issued by the Barangay. And [i]n the morning of April 10, 1998, Atty. Reyes informed me that he had already gone over the Certification to File Action. He forewarned and assured me: "Pagnauna silang magfile, kayo ng father mo ang maihahabla. Kayo ang makukulong. Pero huwag kang mag alala itataya ko ang profesyon ko para sayo."

[I]n the morning of April 13, 1998, I telephoned Atty. Reyes and asked him if I and my father could already sign the affidavit-complaint against our tormentors so that it could be filed with the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office, but he told me that he has not yet prepared it. He assured me that he would work on it in the evening of said date. The following day at around 9:00 a.m. I followed up the matter thru his beeper, Atty. Reyes did not respond. At 8:30 p.m. of that date, I received a telephone call from Atty. Reyes. He told me that he had misplaced the Certification to File Action. Forthwith my father rushed to Atty. Reyes' residence and gave him a copy thereof. From April 15 to 19, 1998, I repeatedly followed up the preparation of our affidavit complaint thru beeper messages to Atty. Reyes, but he had inexplicably failed to respond. Finally, [i]n the morning on April 20, 1998, Atty. Reyes called up and informed me that he has not yet finished the affidavit-complaint, because his secretary did not report for work. Extremely disappoint[ed] by the delay in the preparation of our affidavit-complaint and the filing thereof with the Prosecutor's Office of Quezon City, I offered to do the typing for him, but Atty. Reyes said: "Huwag na, nakakahiya naman sa iyo. Pag report ng secretary ko, ipapatype ko at tatawagan ko kayo ng father mo. Pasensiya ka na ha!" On April 21, 1998, at 5:00 p.m., Atty. Reyes met me at the house of my friend, Lily Jodloman, whose house is only across the street from ours. My friend Lily expressed grave concern about the unreasonable delay in the filing of our criminal complaint, and this time, Atty. Reyes gave another reason. He claimed that he was tasked by the IBP to monitor the coming national and local elections." He promised to finish our affidavit-complaint in the evening of that date and to personally file it with the Office of the Prosecutor of Quezon City. The following, (April 22, 1998), at 8:00 o'clock, I called up Atty. Reyes, but I was told by his wife that he had already left. I requested for a return call, which request I repeated several times thru his beeper, but to no avail. Finally at 11:00 p.m., Atty. Reyes called up and said, "Masama ang nangyari." And I retorted, " Ano bang masama ang nangyari? Nagawa na ho ba ninyo ang affidavit namin?" He sounded evasive in his reply and merely said, "a sige, Kit ha, magtawagan na lang tayo bukas kasi kadarating ko tang galing sa election meeting. O bukas tatawagan kita ha." But he did not call me the whole day of April 23, 1998. Neither did he call on April 24, 25, 26 and 27, 1998, despite repeated calls from me by telephone and by beeper messages. On April 28, 1998, at 10:30 p.m., Atty. Reyes at last called up. He said that his secretary did not report for work the previous days and he could not give me a feedback. He further said: " Naku Kit, sigurado na bukas, sasamahan ma ako bukas sa pagfile ha. Maghintay ka ng call ka sa hapon natin ipa-file." Because of this assurance by Atty. Reyes, I cancelled all my appointments on April 29, 1998 and waited the whole day for his call, but he never did. In response to my beeper message, he called up in the evening and explained that there was an emergency meeting called by LAKAS-NUCD that kept him busy the whole day. He again promised to finish our affidavit-complaint and file it in few days. On May 4, 1998, at around 9:30 a.m., I got the surprise of my life when I received a resolution from the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, finding probable cause concerning the supposed countercharges against us that were filed in the Barangay after we had filed ours, by our tormentors, Faye Maybelle J. Lorenz and Rosario M. Joaquin, for maltreatment, physical injuries and threats. I then realized that the countercharges of our tormentors against us were filed with the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office ahead of our complaint, which has yet to be filed with said office by our lawyer6 Respondent was unable to controvert the foregoing account. Instead, he claimed that he was hired by petitioner to file a case for partition, but, because the latter failed to give him the documents to be used in filing of the case, he decided to withdraw his representation. The Court finds respondent's explanation flimsy. His services were hired by petitioner six days after the occurrence of the incident giving rise to the filing of the charges and counter-charges for physical injuries, threats, and slander by deed filed by the parties before the Lupong Tagapamayapa of their barangay. It is improbable, therefore, that petitioner at that time would hire the services of respondent for a purpose other than in connection with petitioner's pressing legal concern, i.e., the filing of the criminal complaints with the prosecutor's office. Moreover, the Court cannot believe that petitioner merely made up a case of evasion of clear duty by respondent to hold the latter liable for professional misconduct. On the other hand, respondent could have easily submitted the affidavits of his wife and/or that of Lily Jodloman to controvert petitioner's claims had he had not taken his professional engagement seriously. Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides -

A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
7 What this Court said in Santiago v. Fojas was totally lost on petitioner, to wit:

It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for every person who may wish to become his client.... [However,] once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and diligence, and champion the latter's cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client's rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied.... If much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession. Respondent's conduct in this case, exacerbated by his attempt to evade responsibility, falls short of what the law requires. The fact that, as claimed by him, he is a member of the IBP commission investigating complaints against members of the bar all the more should have impressed on him his duty of fidelity to his client's cause. That he returned the money paid to him does not diminish his responsibility but only mitigates the penalty. On the other hand, there is no merit in petitioner's claim that, as a result of respondent's failure to file the complaint for threats, prescription set in. Pursuant to Art. 90, in relation to Art. 283 of the Revised Penal Code, the prescriptive period for filing a complaint for threats is five years. In any event, the interests of petitioner and that of her father are not altogether without legal protection as they can controvert the charges against them in the proceedings before the trial court. WHEREFORE, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines' Resolution No. XIV-2000-460, dated July 29, 2000, is SET ASIDE and respondent Atty. Arturo de los Reyes is REPRIMANDED with warning to be henceforth more careful in the performance of his duty to his clients. SO ORDERED.1wphi1.nt