British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology (1979), 18, 183-190 Printed in Great Britain 183

Individuals and groups in social psychology*

Henri Tajfel

In a recent paper, Taylor & Brown have argued that, although research in social psychology needs to take
into account the social context of social behaviour, the theories should aim at the explanation of individual
behaviour. The present paper argues against this view as it applies to some important issues in social
psychology. First, it is contended that the ‘individualistic’bias of research in social psychology derives from
the nature of the theories dominating the discipline. Second, a theory of inter-group behaviour is briefly
outlined in order to show that its structure and aims are different in some important ways from the
individualistic theories. The bias of these theories which is due to their assumption that social behaviour
takes place inside homogeneous and unstructured social systems is illustrated using as examples the theory
of belief similarity in prejudice and equity theory.

I find much to agree with in the paper by Taylor & Brown (1979) (which will be referred to as
T & B from now on). Their argument goes in three stages. First, they agree with the criticisms
some of us have made of the near-monopoly of the ‘individual’ and ‘inter-individual’ research in
social psychology. This led to the neglect of a broader perspective in which social behaviour
would be seen as a ‘dynamic interaction ’ between psychological processes and the nature of the
social systems inside which this behaviour takes place. T & B provide a summary of some of
these earlier criticisms: (i) too much research on individual and inter-individual behaviour rather
than groups; (ii) ‘naive extrapolations from individual to the groups’; (iii) divorce of the studies
of interpersonal phenomena from their ‘wider societal context ’.
The second stage of the T & B argument is that these criticisms are justified with respect to
social psychological research, but that the theories will have to continue dealing with individuals
in order to remain within the domain of the fundamental interests and preoccupations of
psychology. The third stage of the argument consists of attempting to show, using as examples
two theories formulated by the ‘critics’ (Moscovici, 1976; Tajfel, 1974, 1978; Tajfel & Turner,
1979): (i) that these theories remain essentially ‘individual’; (ii) that their value lies precisely in
the fact that they have remained ‘individual’ while managing to contextualize social behaviour in
its interaction with group phenomena; and (iii) that the sooner this is openly acknowledged, the
easier it will be for these theoretical developments, which T & B consider important, to
influence beneficially the ‘mainstream ’ of social psychology.
In other words, T & B state that social behaviour originates from, and pertains to, individuals.
Whatever ‘non-individual ’ variables may affect it (such as ‘groups ’, ‘social context ’, etc.), useful
social psychological theories must remain at this individual level. The two recent theories
discussed by T & B have done precisely this, despite their protestations to the contrary. Like
M. Jourdain we were speaking prose, but we didn’t know it.
My agreement with T & B stops at the end of the first sentence of the above summary
paragraph. The statement about social behaviour originating from, and being performed by,
individuals is entirely unexceptionable and trivially true. But immediately afterwards the
difficulties begin. The bourgeois-gentilhomme may have been speaking prose without knowing it,
but Molikre never informed us whether the result was good prose or bad prose. To say that in
the last analysis we are concerned with individual social behaviour is as true as it is meaningless
until and unless some useful and interesting statements are made about the characteristics of this

* This paper started offas a brief rejoinder to the article by Taylor & Brown. As the work proceeded, it
became clear that the issues raised by Taylor & Brown were too important to be dismissed or discussed in a
few summary paragraphs. The ‘rejoinder’ became longer.
OOO7-1293/79/0602-0183 $02.00/0 @ 1979 The British Psychological Society
184 Henri Tajfel
behaviour and the kind of theoretical approach which will be needed to understand these
characteristics.

Research and theory in ‘individualistic ’ social psychology

Let us start with the T & B distinction between ‘research’ and ‘theories’. The examples of
research provided by T & B originate from the frustration aggression theory as applied to ‘the
collective discontent of a group ’; gaming approaches to conflict; the theories of attribution, of
dissonance, of interpersonal attraction, of attitude formation and change, of social comparison,
of social influence. For some reasons (unexplained in the T & B paper) all these social
psychological theories have led to research which can be, as T & B agree, justifiably criticized
for its neglect of the social context of social behaviour. An obvious question arises: if this has
really happened because of some (haphazardly determined?) directions of research rather than
the nature of the theories, how come that the above list includes practically all of the
‘mainstream’ of the last 40 years or so, with no more than a few half-forgotten puddles left behind
here and there? As I wrote a few years ago: ‘. . .many of the theories which dominate the
present research output in social psychology are not sociopsychological. It is therefore
unavoidable that most of the experiments designed to test these theories should be equally
impervious to the wider realities of social conduct and share their focus on the strategies of
individual and inter-individual adjustments ’ (Tajfel, 1972 a , p. 94).
In other words, the problem seems to lie not with directions of research, as T & B write, but
with the nature and explanatory targets of the theories from which the research derived. But I
suspect that T & B would agree with this despite the confusing distinction between ‘research’
and ‘theories ’ introduced in their paper. Within their self-imposed limitations these theories have
been extremely useful in helping us to explain some fundamental aspects of human social
behaviour. But it looks as if other theories are needed to do the job not previously done:
namely, to take into account the ‘dynamic interaction’ between individual behaviour and its
wider social scenario. As already stated, T & B see no difference of principle between these
other theories and the earlier ones, since - in the last analysis - they must all be concerned with
‘individuals ’.
It is because of this essential agreement that we must all share about ‘individuals’ that T & B
have led themselves into something which looks like a semantic confusion whirling around a
strawman. As they wrote: ‘Only when social reality is accounted for, not just as it influences
behaviour in a static function but as a truly dynamic and interactive relationship of the individual
and social structure, will social psychological theory be sufficiently comprehensive.’ But also, the
‘basic theoretical building blocks’ of the inter-group theory which they describe (e.g. Tajfel &
Turner, 1979) ‘are individualistic in nature’ and, according to them, should remain so.

Individual processes and collective behaviour in the theory of inter-group behaviour

The ‘individualistic’ description of the inter-group theory in the T & B paper is simply achieved:
of its three important aspects one only is described because, presumably, T & B consider it to
be more fundamental than the other two. In a recent text (Tajfel, 1978) the theory is described as
a ‘conceptual tripod ’ which enables us, because of the convergence of all of its three lines of
thought, to make predictions and achieve more understanding about the social psychological
aspects of inter-group relations. The ‘support ’ of the tripod described by T & B is the sequence
of social categorization - social identity - social comparison. This sequence, as they rightly say,
consists ‘ultimately ’ of individual processes. They admit that ‘group processes are, of course,
fundamental to the theory; however, it is their dynamic and bidirectional interaction with the
individual and his motivations and aspirations which makes it truly a social psychological theory
of intergroup behaviour ’.
If there was no more to it than that, T & B’s argument would have been entirely justified. The
 Individuals and groups in social psychology 185
processes of social categorization, social identity and social comparison, as used in the theory,
cannot be conceived to originate outside of their social contexts. But they can also be shown to
function in some ways which are basically the same in group, inter-individual and even
non-social settings. For social categorization, this is the case, in some conditions, for general
judgement processes (e.g. Tajfel, 1959; Eiser & Stroebe, 1972). The notion of social identity is
based on the simple motivational assumption that individuals (at least in our culture) prefer a
positive to a negative self-image. The idea of social comparison originated with Festinger’s fully
inter-individual theory (1954). In view of these important similarities between the
‘individualistic’ conceptions of social categorization, social identity and social comparison and
those used in the presently discussed theory of inter-group behaviour, what is the nature of the
differencesbetween this kind of theory and others?
A full description of these differences is obviously not possible in this paper (cf. Tajfel, 1978).
It will be useful, however, to outline the general structure which will help to locate the concepts
of social categorization, social identity and social comparison in the total pattern and show that
they cannot be considered, as they are by T & B, to be the core of the whole enterprise. Let me
state that the emphasis chosen here reflects my own views and need not be shared by some of
my colleagues who have contributed in crucial ways to the development of our work - including
amongst others Rupert Brown and Donald Taylor. It is perhaps superfluous to add that our past
and present disagreements are and have been as useful as our agreements in enabling us to
extend our work in new directions.
An important aspect of ‘social reality’ is that most social systems contain collections of
individuals who differ from each other in a variety of ways. Some of these differences can easily
be ascertained to exist by an outside ‘objective’ and uncommitted observer; for example,
differences in sex, age, wealth, power, forms of work, forms of leisure, dress, language, etc.
The observer has certain tools which will enable him to structure these differences in one way or
another, i.e. to establish his own ‘construction ’ of any particular social ‘reality ’. This is often
attempted in an ‘outside ’ stance by sociologists, social anthropologists or social historians. The
individuals inside the system have also tools to do this kind of job; the tools used by both the
outsiders and the insiders are not dissimilar. But the criteria for accepting the validity of one
construction or another may differ vastly between those who engage in the ‘outside’
construction for their professional (‘scientific’) purposes and those inside the system who need
guidelines for their behaviour and thus attempt to construct a coherent system of orientation in
their social environment.
Social categorization is one of these tools (cf. Tajfel, 1969, 1972b). But the fact that this tool
exists (i.e. that it is a part of human cognitive equipment) provides us with no more information
as to whether, when or how it will be used than knowing that a man has bought a do-it-yourself
kit would by itself inform us whether, when, how and for what purposes he will use it. We only
know that there are some things he can do with his kit (there may be some we do not know
about if we underestimate his ingenuity); and we also know that some constructions are
definitely impossible because of the limitations of this particular box of tricks. For example: an
‘outside ’ observer may notice (and check with other outside observers) that in a society he is
looking at some individuals are ‘black’ and some are ‘white ’. This information, however
‘objective’ it is, would not by itself enable him to conclude that his ‘black’- ‘white’ distinction
is one on which the tool kit of social categorizing has been put to use, i.e. that this distinction is
in any way relevant to the social behaviour inside the system.
As I wrote above, the aim of a theory of inter-group behaviour is to help us to understand
certain selected uniformities of social behaviour. In order to do this, we must know (i)
something about the ways ‘groups’ are constructed in a particular social system, (ii) what are the
psychological effects of these constructions; and (iii) how the constructions and their effects
depend upon, and relate to, forms of social reality. These are the primary aims of the theory of
186 Henri Tajfel

inter-group behaviour which was discussed by T & B in their paper, although it would be idle to
pretend that they were not much hazier in the early stages than they are now in hindsight.
The first of the above three questions requires an answer in two stages. We need, first of all, a
definition of a ‘group’ which refers to the way the notion is constructed by those inside the
system. This definition must enable us to make the transition from what we assume is
‘constructed ’ by the individuals involved to data showing whether our assumptions were correct
or incorrect. The notion of social categorization discussed by T & B is undoubtedly and crucially
implied in this process of definition. If we did not know about the human capacity to categorize
the environment in certain ways, we could not even begin to make the assumption that
collections or heaps of individuals in a social system can be cognitively organized into a complex
matrix of overlapping categories. But this by itself tells us nothing about the nature of the
categorizations and their uses or effects in social behaviour.
The second stage of the answer to the question about the ways groups are ‘constructed’
concerns the fact that a theory of inter-group behaviour has for its aim the explanation (or a
better understanding) of certain uniformities of inter-group behaviour. It is therefore necessary
to state what are the basic conditions for ‘groups’ to be constructed in such a way that the
consequent behaviour of members of one group towards another shows uniformities rather than
a random variation from individual to individual. The theory makes two testable and
interdependent propositions about these conditions. They consist of stating that certain
uniformities of inter-group behaviour will appear if (i) members of a group believe that there is
no possibility for them (or at least that there are considerable difficulties) of moving from one
group to another; and that (ii), consequently or in interaction with the former condition, the
boundaries between the groups are fairly sharply drawn. One of the results of the conjunction of
these two conditions is that it may powerfully determine the course of interpersonal interaction
independently of the individual characteristics of the interactants or of the detail of their past or
present personal relations (cf. Tajfel, 1978, ch. 2, for a detailed discussion both of the definition
of ‘groups ’ and of the differences between inter-individual and inter-group behaviour).
The second question above concerned the psychological effects of the above conditions. This
is the aspect of the theory briefly summarized by T & B and presumably considered by them to
be more fundamental than the others. It is the sequence from social categorization to social
identity and social comparison (see Tajfel, 1974; Turner, 1975; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Tajfel,
1978, ch. 3). There is no doubt that T & B are quite correct in stating that the focus of these
psychological effects is in individuals. It could hardly be anywhere else. What is more, as I
wrote earlier, there are some important similarities in these processes as they appear in
individual, inter-individual or inter-group behaviour. There are also some important differences
which have been discussed elsewhere.
The third question formulated earlier concerned the relationships between, on the one hand,
social inter-group constructions and their effects, as just discussed, and, on the other hand,
various forms of social reality. Providing a set of testable answers to it is quite fundamental if
the theory is to have any predictive value at all. There are several reasons for this requirement
being fundamental. All the theoretical considerations summarized so far would not be capable of
making clear-cut and testable distinctions between a multigroup social system which retains its
stability and one which is in the process of change, attempted change or resisted change in the
relations between the groups of which it is composed. The fact that individuals in a social
system perceive the system as having sharply drawn and fairly impassable group boundaries
does not, by itself, lead to the conclusion that they will engage in common action either to
change it or to preserve it. The fact that they are capable of making social comparisons which
are relevant to their self-image does not, by itself, mean that these comparisons will result from
the perceived position of their group as relating to other groups rather than remaining at an
inter-individual level (cf. Turner, 1975, 1978, for a more detailed discussion). The construction of
 Individuals and groups in social psychology 187

a social system in terms of sharply drawn social categories and the capacity to categorize and
compare oneself with others in certain ways and for certain purposes are the necessary
conditions for the appearance of certain forms of inter-group behaviour; they are not suficient
conditions.
The translation from potentiality to actual social behaviour must be sought elsewhere. ‘Social
reality ’ can be described or analysed in terms of socio-economic, historical or political
structures. Such descriptions or analyses are not within the competence of the social
psychologist. But he can ascertain that, for whatever reasons, the system of the relations
between social groups is perceived by the individuals located in the various parts of the system
as being capable or incapable of change, as being based on legitimate or illegitimate principles
of social organization. He can also ascertain whether, as a result, group actions are being
considered or undertaken in common by those who feel that their location (and ‘social identity’
as defined by T & B and elsewhere) in the system is capable or incapable of change, ‘secure’ or
‘insecure ’. A combination of these shared interpretations of social reality with the location of
social groups within the system as perceived by their members provides the possibility of
formulating a number of hypotheses. These hypotheses and some of the research deriving from
them have been described elsewhere (cf. ch. 4 and most of the following chapters in Tajfel,
1978).
It will now be clear, I hope, why I find it difficult to agree with T & B who, after having
summarized in their paper the sequence of social categorization - social identity - social
comparison, and described it as containing the ‘basic postulates’ of the theory, relegate all the
rest to the single following sentence: ‘It is from these basic postulates that a variety of important
concepts emerge including social mobility, social change, cognitive alternatives, legitimacy and
stability’. It is the use of this truncated version of a more complex structure which enables them
to write immediately below that their aim was ‘to point out that the focus of the theory is
ultimately the individual ’, although ‘group processes are of course fundamental to it ’. The focus
of the theory is not the individual but the explanation of uniformities of inter-group behaviour.
No one would deny that ‘ultimately’ we are concerned with ‘individuals ’ who behave in one
way or another. But a clear distinction must be made between theories which are ‘individualistic’
and one which is concerned with socially shared patterns of individual behaviour. An
‘individualistic’ theory contains the (most often) unstated assumption that individuals live and
behave in a homogeneous social medium. This medium consists of a collection of undifferentiated
individual particles which are assumed to relate to each other inter-individually following the
laws of ‘basic’ psychological processes. There is no room in this vision of randomly floating
particles for the cognitive and socially shared organization of the system within which the
particles float. Or if it is admitted that the lines along which the system is structured, both
‘objectively’ and ‘subjectively’, have a great deal to do with the social behaviour of its
individual elements, this is considered to be no more than a set of ‘variables ’ superimposed on
something more ‘fundamental’. It has been the contention of this paper so far that this kind of
approach can get us nowhere very far in understanding those crucial uniformities of social
behaviour which pertain to the psychological aspects of the social systems in which we live, i.e.
it will get us no nearer to an adequate social psychology of social conflict, social stability, social
change, social movements or social unrest. T & B wrote that ‘the individual should and will
remain the ultimate target of understanding’. My view is that if this were really to be the case,
then social psychology ‘should and will remain’ as incapable as it has been until now of
providing any new psychological insights into some of the most important aspects of our
functioning in society. In the next section of this paper, I hope to support this statement using as
examples two theories which were also briefly mentioned by T & B in their paper.
188 Henri Tajjel

Individualistic assumptions in social psychology: Belief similarity and equity

As T & B wrote, Rokeach’s belief similarity theory of prejudice (e.g. Rokeach, 1968) marked the
introduction of a social variable like ‘race ’ into ‘research [my italics] on interpersonal attraction ’.
As they also wrote, ‘nevertheless, even in these studies the emphasis was still predominantly
interpersonal, i.e. subjects rated a black or white individual and the salience of the social
category was minimized’. The patent absurdity of the theory as applied to some social contexts
is acknowledged by T & B when they write that ‘ . . .it would be bordering on the absurd to
suggest . . .that the hostility between blacks and whites in southern Africa today is caused
principally by a perception of belief similarity. To ignore the gross inequities of power and
wealth institutionalized by a long history of colonialism would be truly to do “experiments in a
vacuum ”.’ T & B also add that their ‘point is not that the similarity-attraction relationship is
invalid but rather that its validity is specific to certain contexts ’.
One can think of a few such contexts: for example, a debating society, an arts college with
strongly liberal norms and prescriptions, or any other context which would make it socially
undesirable to show racial ‘prejudice’ in a polite psychological experiment. It is interesting that
when T & B discuss this issue, they refer once more to research and not to the nature of the
theory underlying it. The only thing which, according to them, is missing in this kind of
approach is the introduction of just one more independent variable: an increase in the salience of
a social categorization.
The result is therefore an unchanged theory of interpersonal attraction, one of whose elements
is the perception of belief similarity or dissimilarity. Then, an independent variable of social
categorization is stuck on somewhere or other as a scaffolding which will hopefully prop up the
venerable structure. The homogeneous social medium of freely floating individual particles has
remained unchanged. As in the example of the study by Taylor & Guimond (1978) quoted by
T & B, the induction by the experimenter of a more salient social categorization ‘affected’ the
‘paradigm’, as it was shown in the responses of the individuals concerned (cf. also e.g. Billig &
Tajfel, 1973; Doise & Sinclair, 1973, showing similar effects of the increased salience of social
categorization).
So far so good: we all agree that social categorizations of various kinds may have profound
effects on some interpersonal responses. But unless this is seen in a much wider theoretical
context (see previous section), the underlying assumptions have not changed at all. Our particles
have continued their random floating. It so happens that some of them (for reasons unexplained,
apart from the experimenter’s ‘induction ’ or, perhaps in ‘real life ’, owing to some individual
motivational patterns) are using salient social categorizations which apply to one or another
aspect of their social environment.
The ‘individualistic’counter-argument to this objection is quite simple and it has a short-term
research plausibility: there are undoubtedly some social contexts in which these salient social
categorizations are generally induced in many individuals, for one reason or another; there are
other social contexts in which they are not. But all the rest remains a deep mystery to the social
psychologist. Thus, social categorization is still conceived as a haphazardly floating
‘independent variable’ which strikes at random as the spirit moves it. No links are made, or
attempted, between the conditions determining its presence and mode of operation, and its
outcomes in widely diffused commonalities of social behaviour. Why, when and how is a social
categorization salient or not salient? What kind of shared constructions of social reality,
mediated through social categorizations, lead to a social climate in which large masses of people
feel that they are in long-term conflict with other large masses? What, for example, are the
psychological transitions from a stable to an unstable social system? It is not my contention that
the theoretical approach briefly outlined in the previous section of this paper and described in
detail elsewhere necessarily provides the best answers to these very difficult questions. For all I
 Individuals and groups in social psychology 189
know, most of the hypotheses deriving from it will be disconfirmed in future research. The point
is that we shall never be able to formulate adequate guidelines for research on collective social
behaviour if we do not go beyond constructing sets of independent variables seen as functioning
in a social environment which is assumed to be psychologically unstructured in its homogeneous
and all-embracing ‘inter-individuality ’.
A very similar argument applies to equity theory which has recently come back into fashion.
Its claims are not modest. The subtitle of a recent book on the subject (Berkowitz & Walster,
1976) promises to lead us through equity theory ‘towards a general theory of social interaction’.
This claim is restated in the first chapter of the book in which we are told that its ‘first section
elucidates a general theory of social behaviour - equity theory’ (Walster et al., 1976, p. 1). In a
recent paper Caddick (1977) succinctly summarized the major proposals of the theory, two of
which are particularly relevant here: ‘(i) When individuals find themselves participating in
inequitable relationships they become distressed. (ii) Individuals who discover they are in an
inequitable relationship attempt to eliminate distress by restoring equity. ’ As Caddick wrote,
‘There is a considerable amount of experimental evidence’ to support these proposals. But, as
he added:
The experimental evaluation of equity theory has generally involved face-to-face interactions between
the experimental Ss.It seems fairly obvious that, at this level of interpersonal closeness,
esteem-damaging accusations of inequitable behaviour would be hard to avoid or ignore, the possibility
of retaliation and the difficulty of sustaining equity-producing psychological distortions would increase
and, as a result, the restoration of equity by actual compensation might well become the most attractive
resolution. Furthermore, inequitable relations between experimental Ss are almost invariably created by
the investigator and not by the intentional behaviour of the S who stands to gain from the inequity.
This, of course, places the advantaged S in a situation which he can either exploit or reject but, if we
keep in mind the fact that behaving equitably is a means by which the Scan attain personal regard in his
own and the other person’s eyes, and if we compare this payoff with the usually trivial one which would
result from accepting the E’s manipulations, then the commonly observed tendency to compensate
comes as no real surprise.
These points are not just methodological. Implied in Caddick’s criticisms of the experimental
procedures is the admission that equity theory does work. In many situations there is indeed
‘discomfort ’ due to an inequitable relationship, and attempts are made to eliminate it. The
major problem that arises concerns the conditions when this does not happen. It is, of course,
not difficult to think of innumerable social situations in which the ‘proposals ’ summarized above
seem blatantly wrong. The relationships which are created and observed in the studies on equity
share one characteristic: no social differentiations, apart from being equitably or inequitably
advantaged or disadvantaged as individuals, are supposed to exist between the subjects. Once
again, as in the case of the belief similarity theory, we are inside an unstructured and
homogeneous social environment. As Caddick wrote, ‘equity theory is basically an intragroup
theory in its orientation’. It assumes that ‘equitable treatment of others, as a social value,
extends to cover members of outgroups as well as members of ingroups’. The intra-group
orientation determines the kind of research that is undertaken; and by the same token the data
that are obtained. Its ‘universal ’ stance leads to the kind of extrapolations from interpersonal to
inter-group behaviour about which T & B complained in their paper.
Here again, it would not be enough simply to introduce the independent variable of a salient
social categorization in order to see whether its effect would be to decrease the discomfort
caused by inequity and/or the tendencies to restore equity. Our social history is full of familiar
and horrifying examples of ‘dehumanization’ of out-groups and even fuller of milder forms of
their ‘depersonalization ’. The psychological processes which produce this dehumanization or
depersonalization would require a discussion which is well beyond the scope of this paper. But
the point must be made that, as social psychologists, we have a duty to attend to these
190 Henri Tajfel

processes. And even if many of us who wish to ignore them are entirely free to do so, we do not
have the right to imply through the conclusions we draw from our work that our cosy and
equitable inter-individuality can reach beyond the blinkered vision of social reality which we
have selected for our special consideration. As T & B wrote, the<ipdividual is the target of
understanding for social psychology; but he cannot remain the ody target.

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Requests for reprints should be addressed to Henri Tajfel, Department of Psychology, University of Bristol,
8-10 Berkeley Square, Bristol BS8 IHH, England.