Republic of the Philippines

Municipal Trial Court

Branch 3
Davao City

BONGBONG DUTERTE, Civil Case No. M-DVO-21-72946

Plaintiff,

- versus - FOR: Unlawful Detainer

ISKO TUTUBAN,
Defendant,
x-----------------------------------x

POSITION PAPER FOR THE PLAINTIFF

PLAINTIFF, through counsel, unto the Honorable Court, respectfully submit this
Position Paper in support of the arguments in the complaint and the documentary
evidence attached therewith, thus:

I.
PROPERTY INVOLVED.

The property subject matter of the instant ejectment case is the residential house
and lot located at 123 Brgy. Marapangi, Toril, Davao City, with a lot area of 300 sq. m.
and covered by TCT No. 146-2019011488 registered in the name of Bongbong Duterte,
plaintiff in the instant ejectment case;

Attached as Annex “A” hereof is a certified true copy of the said TCT No. 146-
2019011488 to prove the ownership in fee simple by plaintiff Bongbong Marcos of the
subject property.

II.
EJECTMENT COMPLAINT

The verified complaint for ejectment (unlawful detainer) filed by the herein
plaintiff Bongbong Duterte, thru his former counsel, Atty. Bato Pisiqan, prayed for a
judgment in favor of the said plaintiff and against the defendant Isko Tutuban, directing
the latter to:

a. Vacate the aforesaid residential house and lot and to peacefully surrender the
same to herein plaintiff;
b. Pay the plaintiff in the amount of Three Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php
350,000.00) as way of unpaid rentals;
c. Pay the plaintiff in such amounts representing for the payment of moral and
exemplary damages, as this Honorable Court, in its wise and sound discretion,
may determine;
d. Pay the plaintiff in the amount of Php10,000.00 and Php 2,000.00 per court
appearance as Attorney’s fees; and
e. Pay the cost of the suit.
 III.
THE PARTIES

1. That plaintiff, Bongbong Duterte is of legal age, single, Filipino and a resident of
123 Eden High Ridge Subd., Toril, Davao City where he may be served with summons
and other processes of this Honorable Court;

2. That defendant, Isko Tutuban of legal age, single and is presently unlawfully
residing at 123 Brgy. Marapangi, Toril, Davao City and may be served with summons
and other legal processes therein by this Honorable Court.

IV.
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

1. Plaintiff is the lawful owner of a parcel of land situated in 123 Brgy. Marapangi,
Toril, Davao City evidenced by Transcript of Certificate of Title No. 146-2019011488
issued by the Register of Deeds of Davao City, Davao del Sur.;

2. That on January 1, 2013, it was solely out of the compassion and tolerance of the
plaintiff, which enabled the defendant and his family to temporarily reside at the
plaintiff’s property located at 123 Brgy. Marapangi, Toril, Davao City. The complainant
willingly allowed the defendant to briefly reside therein together with his family;

3. It was their understanding then that they were to reside therein by tolerance and
rent-free, but as soon as the time comes that the plaintiff would need the property for his
personal gain, the defendant and his family would necessarily vacate the premises and
surrender the peaceful possession thereof to the plaintiff;

4. On January 6, 2018, due to business expansion, the plaintiff needs to make use of
his land and demanded for defendant to vacate the premises. Unfortunately, this
infuriated the defendant and maintained that he was allegedly allowed to permanently
reside therein, after having been allowed by the plaintiff to allegedly construct a
commercial space in front of the property, and to allegedly pay the taxes due of the
property;

5. On an effort to settle the matter, plaintiff through the undersigned counsel

transmitted through registered mail with return card a “Final Demand Letter to Vacate”
March 17, 2018 addressed to the defendant to vacate the premises within FIFTEEN (15)
days from receipt of the demand letter which defendant received on March 22,2018.;

6. The matter at issue was referred to the Lupong Tagpamayapa of Marapangi and
that the parties failed to come to an amicable settlement. Thus, on April 30, 2018,
Tanggapan ng Kapitan ng Barangay issued a Certification (Certification to File Action)
authorizing the plaintiff to file the appropriate action unto this Honorable Court stating
that the parties failed to arrive as a settlement or parties failed to conclude a settlement
was reached;

7. Defendant, who have been unlawfully possessing and occupying the subject
parcel of land, and despite due notice and demand to vacate the same, unjustifiably failed
and refused and continue to fail and refuse to vacate the said premises. Thus, due to
defendant’s wanton disregard and deliberate violation of the plaintiff’s right to enjoy the
rightful possession of his property, herein plaintiff has suffered and continuously suffers
sleepless nights, serious anxiety and other similar sufferings from which entitle him to the
recovery of damages in such amount as this Honorable Court, in its wise discretion, may
determine.
8. By reason of the gross and evident bad faith of the defendants when they
deliberately refused to vacate the aforesaid premises and by way of example or correction
for the public good, in addition to the moral damages, plaintiff herein is duly entitled for
the payment of exemplary damages in such amount, as this Honorable Court, in its wise
discretion, may determine;

17. Due to defendants’ refusal to vacate the premises, plaintiff was constrained to
engage the services of a legal counsel to protect his own rights, interests, and for whose
services he agreed to pay the amount of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (Php10,000.00) as
attorney’s fees plus Php 2,000.00 per court appearance;

18. In controverting the instant ejectment complaint, the defendant raised the defense
that plaintiff Bongbong Duterte had allegedly sold the property to defendant Isko
Tutuban, without presenting any proof of the due execution and authenticity of any
written/documented or oral contract or agreement to positively prove and substantiate the
alleged transaction.

For the record, in the said Civil Case No. M-DVO-21-72946, the defendant
alleged in his original Answer filed thru their former counsel, Atty. Leni Pimentel,
the following basic legal and factual defenses:

1. Defendant deny the allegations stated in the complaint. The truth of the matter
being that no written nor oral arrangement was ever reached by the parties with respect to
the sale or transfer of the property;

2. Defendant resolutely maintain that no earnest efforts towards an amicable

settlement were conducted between the parties. He was surprised to find out that the
instant case was filed by the plaintiff and that inappropriate and dishonest measures were
undertaken which evidently showed his ungratefulness and greediness towards the
plaintiff;

3. Plaintiff has no legal right over the property of the defendant. Defendant was
permitted by tolerance to stay at the property of the plaintiff and sooner bought the
property from the plaintiff;

4. Defendant belies the allegation of the plaintiff that it was their understanding then
that they were to reside therein by tolerance and rent-free, but as soon as the time comes
that the plaintiff would need the property for his personal gain, the defendant and his
family would necessarily vacate the premises and surrender the peaceful possession
thereof to the plaintiff;

5. That defendant constructed a commercial space in front of the property after he

bought the property from the plaintiff;

6. This is the primary reason why the tax receipts are issued under the name of the
defendant and significantly not under the name of the plaintiff precisely because these
were in fact paid by the defendant.
 By way of Counter-Claim, the foregoing paragraphs are herein re-pleaded
and reproduced insofar as they are herein relevant, material and significant;

1. As a result of this present controversy, plaintiff was compelled to halt the

renovation and building construction on the subject property;

2. Likewise and as a result of the unlawful possession by the defendant of the

property of the plaintiff, the latter was constrained to rent a commercial unit at 256
Marapangi 1, Toril, Davao City for which the plaintiff was constrained to pay a monthly
rental of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (Php 100,000.00) exclusive of VAT effective
April 1, 2018 for which once again the defendant must be compelled to pay by way of
actual damages;

3. By reason of this baseless complaint, defendant, suffered and continuously suffers

sleepless nights, serious anxiety and other similar sufferings from which entitles her to
the recovery of damages in such amount as this Honorable Court, in its wise and sound
discretion, may determine;

4. Also, by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to the
moral damages, defendants herein are duly entitled for the payment of exemplary
damages in such amount, as this Honorable Court, in its wise discretion, may determine;

5. Lastly and by reason of the baseless and unfounded complaint, plaintiff was
constrained to litigate this case and in order to protect their rights and interests was
constrained to engage the services of counsel whom he was obligated to pay the amount
of Ten Thousand Pesos (Php 10,000.00).

V.
EVIDENCE FOR THE PLAINTIFF
IN THE INSTANT EJECTMENT CASE

In addition to the aforementioned Title of the herein plaintiff TCT No. 146-
2019011488, marked as Annex “A” hereof, supra, the plaintiff respectfully submits to
this Honorable Court the following documentary evidence in support of her ejectment
complaint against the defendants:

1. Annex “B” - First Demand Letter, dated February 20, 2018, addressed to Isko Tutuban
who is claiming possession of the subject property owned by Bongbong Duterte, signed
by Atty. Bato Pisiqan counsel for the plaintiff. It proves the jurisdictional demand made
by the plaintiff to the defendant to vacate the subject property under Rule 70 of the Rules
of Court and the earnest efforts of the plaintiff to exhaust all remedies before
commencing the instant court action.

2. Annex “C”– Letter dated February 28, 2018, addressed to Atty. Bato Pisiqan counsel
for the plaintiff, signed by Atty. Leni Pimentel, counsel for the defendant, denying and
rejecting the demand of plaintiff to vacate the subject property. It proves the recalcitrance
of the defendants in ignoring and rejecting the extrajudicial demands of the plaintiff.

3. Annex “D” - Letter (re: Final Demand Letter to Vacate), dated March 17,2018,
addressed to Isko Tutuban prepared by Atty. Bato Pisiqan.
4. Annex “E” – “Patawag” issued by Barangay Marapangi I, dated April 27, 2018,
addressed to Bongbong Duterte and Isko Tutuban.

5. Annex “F” – Certification to File Action, dated April 30, 2018, issued by the said
Barangay addressed to Bongbong Duterte and Isko Tutuban. It shows the failure of the
defendants to settle with the plaintiff the instant ejectment controversy, thus, compelling
the plaintiff to seek judicial redress.

6. Annex “G” – “Engagement Contract”, dated January 10, 2018, addressed to Bongbong
Duterte, signed by his legal counsel Atty. Bato Pisiqan, showing the expenses for
professional fees incurred by the plaintiff in hiring the services of Atty. Bato Pisiqan to
protect his rights against the unjust acts of the defendants.

7. Annex “H” – “Legal Retainership Agreement”, dated April 27, 2018 signed by
Bongbong Duterte Atty. Bato Pisiqan, showing the litigation expenses incurred by the
plaintiff in hiring the legal services of Atty Bato Pisiqan to protect her rights against the
unjust acts of defendant.

VI.
APPLICABLE LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE

A. Statute of Frauds

The alleged contract of sale between the plaintiff and the defendant is
unenforceable and cannot be raised as a valid legal and factual defense in the instant
ejectment case, that is, assuming that such an agreement actually existed, an allegation
which is vehemently denied by the plaintiff for being false, untrue and fabricated.

Under Art. 1403, Civil Code, the following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are
ratified:

(1) Those entered into in the name of another person by one who has been given no
authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his powers;

(2) Those that do not comply with the Statute of Fraud as set forth in this number. In the
following cases an agreement hereafter made shall be unenforceable by action, unless the
same, or some note or memorandum thereof, be in writing, and subscribed by the party
charge, or by his agent; evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be received without
the writing, or secondary evidence of its contents:

(a) An agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within a year from the
making thereof;

(b) A special promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another;

(c) An agreement made in consideration of marriage, other than a mutual promise

to marry;

(d) An Agreement for the sale of goods, chattels or things in action, at a price not
less than five hundred pesos unless the buyer accept and receive part of such
goods and chattels, or the evidences, or some of them, of such things in action, or
pay at the time some part of the purchase money; but when a sale is made by
auction and entry is made by the auctioneer in his sales book, at the time of the
sale, of the amount and kind of property sold, terms of sale, price, names of the
 purchasers and person on whose account the sale is made, it is a sufficient
memorandum;

(e) An agreement for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale
of real property or of an interest therein;

(f) A representation as to the credit of a third person.

The Statute of Frauds was enacted for the purpose of preventing frauds. Under the
Statute of Frauds, the only formality required is that the contract or agreement “must be
in writing and subscribed by party charged or by his agent”. For example, a telegram
advising a person to whom a verbal promise for the sale of land had been previously
made to come at once in order to complete the purchase, but which telegram neither
describes the property nor states the purchase price, and which is not signed by any
person having authority to bind the seller, is not a sufficient memorandum of sale to
satisfy the requirement of the statue.

Contracts infringing the Statute of Frauds are susceptible of ratification.

According to Art. 1405 of the Civil Code, such contracts may be ratified either (1) by the
failure to object to the presentation of oral evidence to prove the same, or (2) by the
acceptance of benefits under them. Art. 1405 provides that contracts infringing the
Statute of Frauds, referred to in No. 2 of article 1403, are “ratified by the failure to object
to the presentation of oral evidence to prove the same, or by the acceptance of benefits
under them”’ while Art. 1406 provides that when a contract is enforceable under the
Statute of Frauds, and a public document is necessary for its registration in the Registry
of Deeds, the parties may avail themselves of the right under article 1357.

The primordial aim of the provisions is to prevent fraud and perjury in the
enforcement of obligations depending for their evidence upon the unassisted memory of
witnesses (Shoemaker vs. La Tondeña, 68 Phil. 24). Although the said provisions simply
provide for the form or method by which contracts coming within its terms may be
proved, nonetheless, the claimant must first prove the existence and due execution of
such a contract, notwithstanding its formal defects, if any. (Conlu v. Araneta, 15 Phil.
387; Gallemit v. Tabiliran, 20 Phil. 241; Kuenzler & Streff v. Jiongco, 22 Phil. 111;
Gomez v. Salcedo, [26 Phil. 485]; Domalagan v. Bolifer, 33 Phil. 471; Magalona v.
Paratcim 59 Phil. 543).

Although the Supreme Court has held in many cases that no particular form or
language or instrument is necessary to constitute a memorandum or note in writing under
the statute of frauds, nonetheless, such memorandum of note should be in the form of a
document or writing, formal or informal, which had been written either for the purpose of
furnishing evidence of the contract or for another purpose which satisfies all the statute’s
requirements as to contents and signature would be sufficient.

In one case, the Supreme Court held that “a voucher or entry in an accountant’s
book of account” purporting to show payment of a specified amount as consideration for
the sale of leasehold right over a house “was, however, held insufficient where the same
was not signed by the alleged vendor but merely by the accountant who claimed (without
establishing) that he was the vendor’s agent” (Reyes vs. Lopez, 76 Phil. 568).

The settled rule is that the statute applies only to executory (Factoran vs. Laban,
81 Phil. 512; Cocjin vs. Libo, 91 Phil. 777), that is, a contract that has not been
completed or executed yet. Performance, whether total or partial, takes a contact out of
the operation of the statute. (Arroyo v. Azur, 76 Phil. 493; Hernandez v. Adal, 78 Phil.
196; Almirol vs. Monserrat, 48 Phil. 512; Robles vs. Lizarraga Hermanos, 50 Phil. 387;
Diama vs. Macalibo, I74 Phil. 70; Barcelona vs. Barcelona, 53 O.G. 373; Carbonnel v.
Poncio, 55 O.G. 2415). Performance must be duly proved.

Examples of “performance” include: (a) a sale of real property which has been
consummated by the “delivery of the property to the vendee” (Soriano v. Heirs of Magali,
L-15133, July 31, 1963; Diama vs. Macalibo, supra); (b) or which has been “partially
executed by payment of a part of the price” to the vendors “and the delivery” of the land
to the vendees (Almirol vs. Lizarraga Hermanos, 50 Phil. 387).

In one case, it was held that the transaction is not taken out of the coverage of the
statute of frauds by the “mere allegation that plaintiff had taken possession of the land as
a tenant and that he had made substantial improvements thereon”, such allegation being
an “insufficient basis for proving the oral contract had been executed or performed”.
There must be an allegation to the effect that he had taken possession of the land in view
of a supposed verbal contract he had with the defendant to purchase it, or that he has
made improvements thereon because and as a consequence of said supposed contract to
sell (Pascual vs. realty Investment, Inc. 91 Phil. 257).

Partial performance does not of itself exclude the application of the Statute of
Frauds. Firstly, in order that a contract not to be performed within one year may be taken
out of the operation of the statue, it must appear clearly that full or complete performance
has been made by one party; nothing less will suffice, and if anything remains to be done
after the expiration of the year besides the mere payment of money, the statute would
apply (Babao vs. Perez, 54 O.G. 2888).

The doctrine of partial performance “cannot be invoked against the statute where
the contract is vague, ambiguous and uncertain” in its terms and as to subject matter. For,
obviously, there can be no partial performance until there is a “definite and complete
agreement between the parties”. For the doctrine to be availed of, the parol agreement
relied upon must be “certain, definite, clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal” in this terms
and as to subject matter, aside from being fair, reasonable, and just in this provisions.
This is so because “the doctrine is based on equity, and it would be inequitable to enforce
an agreement that does not satisfy the above requirements” (Babao vs. Perez, Babao v.
Perez, 54 OG 2888).

B. Forms of Contracts

The defense of the defendants that plaintiff A had allegedly sold the subject
property to the defendant fails to meet and comply with the strict procedural and
evidentiary requirements set forth in Articles 1358, et. seq. of the Civil Code as to the
forms or formalities of a contract or an agreement.

Under Art. 1358, Civil Code, the following must appear in a public instrument:

(1) Acts and contracts which have for their object the creation, transmission,
modification or extinguishment of real rights over immovable property; sales of
real property or of an interest therein are governed by articles 1403, No. 2, and
1405;

(2) The cession, repudiation or enunciation of hereditary rights or of those of the

conjugal partnership of gains;

(3) The power to administer property, or any other power which has for its object
an act appearing or which should appear in a public document, or should
prejudice a third person;
 (4) The cession of actions or rights proceeding from an act appearing in a public
document.

Although, as a general rule, contracts hall be obligatory, in whatever from they

may have been entered into, yet there are certain contracts falling within the purview or
scope of this rule which, by reason of their importance, should be executed in accordance
with certain formalities in order to insure their efficacy and to protect the interests of the
contracting parties as well as that of third persons. The Civil Code, recognizing this
necessity, enumerates in Art. 1358 the different classes of contracts which must appear
either in a public or in a private document, and grants in Art. 1357 a coercive power to
the contracting parties by which they can reciprocally compel the observance of the
required form.

Under Art. 1359, Civil Code, when, there having been a meeting of the minds of
the parties to a contract, their true intention is not expressed in the instrument purporting
to embody the agreement, by reason of mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct or accident,
one of the parties may ask for the reformation of the instrument to the end that such true
intention may be expressed. If mistake, fraud, inequitable conduct, or accident has
prevented a meeting of the minds of the parties, the proper remedy is not reformation of
the instrument but annulment of the contract.

C. Ejectment Law and Cases

The instant ejectment complaint fully complies with technical and substantive
requirements of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court and with the relevant jurisprudence
applicable thereto.

Thus, considering the summary nature of the instant ejectment suit, the same
should be resolved by the Honorable Court on the merits in favor of the plaintiff
Bongbong Duterte.

The only issue in forcible entry and detainer cases is the physical possession of
real property – possession de facto and not possession de jure (Gutierrez vs. Magat, 67
SCRA 262). The subject matter thereof merely is the material possession or possession de
facto over the real property. The questions to be resolved simply are these: First, who had
actual possession over the piece of real property? Second, was the possessor ousted
therefrom within one year from the filing of the complaint by force, threat, strategy, or
stealth? And lastly, does he ask for the restoration of his possession? Any controversy
over ownership rights should be settled after the party who had the prior, peaceful and
actual possession is returned to the property (Dizon vs. Concina, 30 SCRA 897).

The judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or detainer shall be effective
with respect to the possession only and in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of
the land or building and that such judgment shall not bar an action between the same
parties respecting title to the land or building, nor shall it be held conclusive of the fact
therein found in a case between the same parties upon a different cause of action not
involving possession.

Section 1, Rule 70 provides that a person deprived of the possession of any land
or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee,
or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully
withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of
any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor,
vendor, vendee, or other person may at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful
deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial
Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or
any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession,
together with damages and costs.

Section 2, Rule 70 provides that, unless otherwise stipulated, such action by the
lessor shall be commenced only after demand to pay or comply with the conditions of the
lease and to vacate is made upon the lessee, or by serving written notice of such demand
upon the person found on the premises, or by posting such notice on the premises if no
person be found thereon, and the lessee fails to comply therewith after fifteen (15) days in
the case of land or five (5) days in the case of buildings.

Under Sec. 3 of Rule 70, an ejectment case is a summary procedure, and that all
actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, irrespective of the amount of damages or
unpaid rentals sought to be recovered, shall be governed by the summary procedure
hereunder provided.

Under Sec. 16 of Rule 70, when the defendant raises the defense of ownership in
his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the
issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue
of possession. Under Sec. 18 of the Rule, the judgment rendered in an action for forcible
entry or detainer shall be conclusive with respect to the possession only and shall in no
wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building. Such judgment shall
not bar an action between the same parties respecting title to the land or building.

Sec. 17 of the Rule provides that if after trial the court finds that the allegations of
the complaint are true, it shall render judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the restitution
of the premises, the sum justly due as arrears of rent or as reasonable compensation for
the use and occupation of the premises, attorney’s fees and costs. If it finds that said
allegations are not true, it shall render judgment for the defendant to recover his costs. If
a counterclaim is established, the court shall render judgment for the sum found in arrears
from either party and award costs as justice requires.

In view of the summary nature of an ejectment suit, Sec. 19 of Rule 70 provides

that if judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately
upon motion, unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution
files a sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by the Municipal Trial Court and executed
in favor of the plaintiff to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of
the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits
with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under the contract, if
any, as determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court. In the absence of a
contract, he shall deposit with the Regional Trial Court the reasonable value of the use
and occupation of the premises for the preceding month or period at the rate determined
by the judgment of the lower court on or before the tenth day of each succeeding month
or period. The supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the Municipal Trial Court, with
the other papers, to the clerk of the Regional Trial Court to which the action is appealed.
Under Sec. 21 of the Rule, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court against the
defendant shall be immediately executory, without prejudice to a further appeal that may
be taken therefrom.

The action for unlawful detainer is summary in nature (Devesa vs. Montecillo, 27
SCRA 822; Sarona vs. Villegas, 22 SCRA 1256). As such, it is inadequate for the
ventilation of issues involving title or ownership of controverted real property. In an
unlawful detainer case suit, while the court cannot adjudicate on the issue of ownership, it
may receive evidence on possession de jure to determine the nature of possession
(Consing vs. Jamandre, 64 SCRA 1).
 It is fundamental principle in the law governing unlawful detainer cases that “a
mere plea of title or ownership over the disputed land by the defendant cannot be used as
a sound basis for dismissing an action for recovery of possession” because an action for
recovery of possession can be maintained even against the very owner of the property
(Prado vs. Calpo, et. al., G.R. No. L-19379, April 30, 1964, cited in Spouses medina and
Bernal vs. Valdellon, 63 SCRA 278).

In actions of forcible entry and detainer, the main issue is possession de facto,
independently of any claim of ownership or possession de jure that either party may se
forth in his pleading. As incidents of the main issue of possession de facto, the inferior
court can decide the questions of (a) whether or not the relationship between the parties is
one of landlord and tenant; (b) whether or not there is a lease contract between the
parties, the period of such lease contract and whether or not the lease contract has already
expired; (c) the just and reasonable amount of the rent and the date when it will take
effect; (d) the right of the tenant to keep the premises against the will of the landlord; and
(e) if the defendant has built on the land a substantial and valuable building and there is
no dispute between the parties as to the ownership of the land and the building, their
rights according to the Civil Code. Defendants’ claim of ownership of the property from
which plaintiff seeks to eject him is not sufficient to divest the inferior detainer. (Alvir vs.
Vera, 130 SCRA 357).

An unlawful detainer is the act of unlawfully withholding the possession of the

land or building against or from a landlord, vendor or vendee or other person after the
expiration or termination of the detainer’s right to hold possession by virtue of a contract
express or implied (Section 1, Rule 70, Rules of Court; Pharma Industries, Inc., vs.
Pajarillaga, L-53788, October 17, 1980, 100 SCRA 339; Ching Pue vs. Gonzales, 87 Phil.
81 (1950); Lim Si vs. Lim, 98 Phil 868 (1956); Teodoro vs. Mirasol, 99 Phil. 150 (1956);
Pardo de Tavera vs. Encarnacion, et. al., 22 SCRA 632 (1968).

An unlawful detainer action has an entirely different subject from that of an action
for reconveyance of title. What is involved in unlawful detainer case is merely the issue
of material possession or possession de facto; whereas in an action for reconveyance,
ownership is the issue. So much so that the pendency of an action for reconveyance of
title over the same property does not divest the city or municipal court of its jurisdiction
to try the forcible entry or unlawful detainer case, nor will it preclude or bar execution of
judgment in the ejectment case where the only issue involved is material possession or
possession de facto (Ramirez vs. Bleza, L-45640, July 30, 1981, 106 SCRA 187).

This is so because the judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or

detainer shall be effective with respect to the possession only and in no case bind the title
or affect the ownership of the land or building. Such judgment shall not bar an action
between the same parties respecting title to the land or building nor shall it be held
conclusive of the facts therein found in a case of action not involving possession. The
rationale is that forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are summary proceedings
designed to provide for an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or the right
to possession of the property involved (Republic vs. Guarin, 81 SCRA 269). It does not
admit of a delay in the determination thereof. It is “time procedure” designed to remedy
the situation (Mabalot vs. Madela, Jr. 121 SCRA 347). Procedural technicality is
therefore obviated and reliance thereon to stay eviction from the property should not be
tolerated and cannot override substantial justice (Dakudao vs. Consolacion, 122 SCRA
877). So much so that judgment must be executed immediately when it is in favor of the
plaintiff in order to prevent further damages arising from loss of possession (Salinas vs.
Navarro 126 SCRA 167).
 Well-settled is the rule that inferior courts may not be divested of its jurisdiction
over ejectment cases “simply because the defendant sets up a claim of ownership over the
litigated property” (Alilaya vs. Española, 107 SCRA 564; Dehesa vs. Macalalag, 81
SCRA 543; Castro vs. delos Reyes, 109 Phil. 64). Even where defendant in a detainer or
forcible entry “alleges title to the property” in his answer, it is declared in a great number
of cases that the trial court will not be divested of its jurisdiction by such allegations
alone (Savinada v. Tuason, et. al., G.R. No. L-2132, May 30, 1949; Loo Soo v. Osorio,
R.G. No. L-1364, May 30, 1951; Cruz v. Lunsang, G.R. No. L-2332, October 4, 1959;
De Los Rey7es v. Elepanio, et al., G.R. No. L-3466, October 13, 1950; Mediran V.
Villanueva, 37 Phil. 752).

Where the possession of defendant is “by tolerance” on the part of the plaintiff, or
his predecessor, the possession or detainer becomes illegal from the time that there is a
demand to vacate (Amis vs. Aragon, L-4684, April 28, 1951). It is not necessary that
there be a formal agreement or contract of lease before an unlawful detainer suit may be
filed against a possessor “by tolerance”. Neither is prior physical possession of the
property by plaintiff necessary (Pangilinan vs. Aguilar, 43 SCRA 136; Pharma Industries,
Inc. vs. Pajarillaga, 100 SCRA 339). When consent is withdrawn and owner demands
tenants to leave the property, the owner’s right of possession is deemed asserted.
(Philippine National Bank vs. Animas, 117 SCRA 735).

A person who occupies the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or permission,
without any contract between them, is “necessarily bound by an implied promise that he
will vacate upon demand”, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper
remedy against them. The status of defendant is analogous to that of a lease continued by
tolerance of the owner. In such a case, the unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession is to be counted from the date of the demand to vacate (Calubayan vs.
Pascual, 21 SCRA 146; Canaynay vs. Sarmiento, 79 Phil. 36; Robles vs. San Jose, 52
O.G. 6193; Sarona vs. Villegas, 22 SCRA 1257, citing Montelibano vs. Hingaran Sugar
Plantation, 63 Phil. 797, 802-803).

D. Recent Ejectment Jurisprudence

The plaintiff further cites the following recent ejectment-related jurisprudence in

support of his complaint.

In the case of HEIRS OF JACOBO BOLUS, et. al. vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS and SPOUSES RICARDO and GLICERIA JIMENEZ, Respondents, G. R.
No. 107036, February 9, 1993, it was held that on the issue of jurisdiction, the firmly
settled principle is that a municipal court has jurisdiction over forcible entry or unlawful
detainer cases even if the question of the ownership of the property is raised by the
defendant. The exception is where the question of title is so involved in the ejectment
case that it cannot be decided unless the title to the property is first ascertained.

In the case of CONCEPCION V. AMAGAN, et. al. vs. TEODORICO T.

MARAYAG, respondent [G.R. No. 138377. February 28, 2000], it was held as a general
rule, an ejectment suit cannot be abated or suspended by the mere filing before the
regional trial court (RTC) of another action raising ownership of the property as an issue.
As an exception, however, unlawful detainer actions may be suspended even on appeal,
on considerations of equity, such as when the demolition of petitioners' house would
result from the enforcement of the municipal circuit trial court (MCTC) judgment. Thus:

Unlawful detainer and forcible entry suits under Rule 70 are designed to
summarily restore physical possession of a piece of land or building to one who has been
illegally or forcibly deprived thereof, without prejudice to the settlement of the parties'
opposing claims of juridical possession in appropriate proceedings. It has been held that
these actions "are intended to avoid disruption of public order by those who would take
the law in their hands purportedly to enforce their claimed right of possession." [de
Legaspi v. Avendaño, 79 SCRA 135, September 27, 1977, per Barredo, J.] In these cases,
the issue is pure physical or de facto possession, and pronouncements made on questions
of ownership are provisional in nature.

As a general rule, therefore, a pending civil action involving ownership of the

same property does not justify the suspension of ejectment proceedings. "The underlying
reasons for the above ruling were that the actions in the Regional Trial Court did not
involve physical or de facto possession, and, on not a few occasions, that the case in the
Regional Trial Court was merely a ploy to delay disposition of the ejectment proceeding,
or that the issues presented in the former could quite as easily be set up as defenses in the
ejectment action and there resolved." [Wilson Auto Supply Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 208
SCRA 108, April 10, 1992, per Narvasa, CJ]. In this case, the Court also held:

1. Injunction suits instituted in the RTC by defendants in ejectment actions in the

municipal trial courts or other courts of the first level (Nacorda v. Yatco, 17
SCRA 920 (1966)) do not abate the latter; and neither do proceedings on
consignation of rentals (Lim Si v. Lim, 98 Phil. 868 (1956), citing Pue et al. v.
Gonzales, 87 Phil. 81, (1950)).

2. An "accion publiciana" does not suspend an ejectment suit against the

plaintiff in the former (Ramirez v. Bleza, 106 SCRA 187 (1981)).

3. A "writ of possession case" where ownership is concededly the principal issue

before the Regional Trial Court does not preclude nor bar the execution of the
judgment in an unlawful detainer suit where the only issue involved is the
material possession or possession de facto of the premises (Heirs of F. Guballa Sr.
v. CA et al.; etc., 168 SCRA 518 (1988)).

4. An action for quieting of title to property is not a bar to an ejectment suit

involving the same property (Quimpo v. de la Victoria, 46 SCRA 139 (1972)).

5. Suits for specific performance with damages do not affect ejectment actions
(e.g., to compel renewal of a lease contract) (Desamito v. Cuyegkeng, 18 SCRA
1184 (1966); Pardo de Tavera v. Encarnacion, 22 SCRA 632 (1968); Rosales v.
CFI, 154 SCRA 153 (1987); Commander Realty, Inc. v. CA, 161 SCRA 264
(1988)).

6. An action for reformation of instrument (e.g., from deed of absolute sale to one
of sale with pacto de retro) does not suspend an ejectment suit between the same
parties (Judith v. Abragan, 66 SCRA 600 (1975)).

7. An action for reconveyance of property or "accion reivindicatoria" also has no

effect on ejectment suits regarding the same property (Del Rosario v. Jimenez, 8
SCRA 549 (1963); Salinas v. Navarro, 126 SCRA 167; De la Cruz v. CA, 133
SCRA 520 (1984); Drilon v. Gaurana, 149 SCRA 352 (1987); Ching v. Malaya,
153 SCRA 412 (1987); Philippine Feeds Milling Co., Inc. v. CA, 174 SCRA 108;
Dante v. Sison, 174 SCRA 517 (1989); Guzman v. CA (annulment of sale and
reconveyance), 177 SCRA 604 (1989); Demamay v. CA, 186 SCRA 608 (1990);
Leopoldo Sy v. CA et al., (annulment of sale and reconveyance), GR No. 95818,
Aug. 2, 1991).

8. Neither do suits for annulment of sale, or title, or document affecting property

operate to abate ejectment actions respecting the same property (Salinas v.
Navarro, 126 SCRA 167 (1983) - annulment of deed of sale with assumption of
 mortgage and/or to declare the same an equitable mortgage; Ang Ping v. RTC ,
154 SCRA 153 (1987) - annulment of sale and title; Caparros v. CA, 170 SCRA
758 (1989) - annulment of title; Dante v. Sison, 174 SCRA 517 - annulment of
sale with damages; Galgala v. Benguet Consolidated, Inc. , 177 SCRA 288 (1989)
- annulment of document).

In the case of Tala Realty Services Corporation v. Banco Filipino Savings and
Mortgage Bank [G.R. No. 129887. February 17, 2000], it was held that nothing is more
settled than the rule that ejectment is solely concerned with the issue of physical or
material possession of the subject land or building. However, if the issue of possession
depends on the resolution of the issue of ownership which is sufficiently alleged in the
complaint, the municipal trial court may resolve the latter [Refugia v. Court of Appeals,
258 SCRA 347,366 (1996)] although the resulting judgment would be conclusive only
with respect to the possession but not the ownership of the property [Sec. 18, Rule 70,
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure].

In the caser of Sps. Jimenez v. Patricia, Inc., [G.R. No. 134651. September 18,
2000], it was held that the rule is settled that although a question of jurisdiction may be
raised at any time, even on appeal, the same must not result in a mockery of the tenets of
fair play, such as where the issue was raised by petitioners for the first time only in a
Petition for Review and only after an adverse decision was rendered by the Court of
Appeals; and where petitioners participated actively in the proceedings before the MeTC
[Refugia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118284, 5 July 1996, 258 SCRA 347, citing
Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals, No. L-29264, 29 August 1969, 29 SCRA 419; Navoa v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 59255, 29 December 1995, 251 SCRA 545.] and invoked its
jurisdiction with the filing of their answer, in seeking affirmative relief from it, in
subsequently filing a notice of appeal before the RTC, and later, a Petition for Review
with the Court of Appeals. Thus:

X x x. Be that as it may, we find no error in the MeTC assuming jurisdiction over the
subject matter. A complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges that the
withholding of possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful without necessarily
employing the terminology of the law. [Sumulong v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108817,
10 May 1994, 232 SCRA 372; Pangilinan v. Aguilar, No. L-29275, 31 January 1972, 43
SCRA 136]. As correctly found by the appellate court, to which we agree, the allegations
in the complaint sufficiently established a cause of action for unlawful detainer. The
complaint clearly stated how entry was effected and how and when dispossession started
- petitioners were able to enter the subject premises as sublessees of Purisima Salazar
who, despite the termination of her lease with respondent, continued to occupy the
subject premises without any contract with it; thus, their stay was by tolerance of
respondent.
X x x.

The status of petitioner spouses is akin to that of a lessee or a tenant whose term
of lease has expired but whose occupancy has continued by tolerance of the owner. A
person who occupies the land of another at the latter's forbearance or permission without
any contract between them is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate
upon demand failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against
him. [Vda. De Catchuela v. Francisco, No. L-31985, 25 June 1980, 98 SCRA 172, citing
Calubayan v. Pascual, No. L-22645, 18 September 1967, 21 SCRA 146; Yu v. de Lara,
No. L-16084, 30 November 1962, 6 SCRA 785.]. X x x.

In the case of TERESITA VILLALUZ, CHIT ILAGAN, Spouses ADOR and

TESS TABERNA and MARIO LLAMAS, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS ** and SPOUSES REYNALDO AND ZENAIDA ANZURES,
respondents, [G.R. No. 106214. September 5, 1997], it was held that the one-year
reglamentary period under Section 1, Rule 70 for filing an unlawful detainer case is
counted from the time of the "unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession". Such
unlawful deprivation occurs upon expiration or termination of the right to hold
possession. And such right legally expires or terminates upon receipt of the last demand
to vacate [Sy Oh v. Hon. Garcia and Lim Chi v. Hon Garcia, 138 Phil. 777]. Thus:

X x x. In this case, although possession by petitioners (other than Villaluz) lasted beyond
March 31, 1988 (the date they were supposed to vacate the premises in accordance with
the agreement between petitioner Villaluz and private respondents), nevertheless their
continued possession from April 1, 1988 up to the time they received the demand to
vacate on February 23, 1989, is considered as possession by tolerance. Said petitioners
are not lessees but their status is analogous to that of a lessee or tenant whose term of
lease has expired but whose occupancy continued by tolerance of the owner. Their right
of possession of the said property stems from their being employees of petitioner Villaluz
who only allowed them to occupy the premises for a certain period. As such, their
possession depends upon the possession of petitioner Villaluz. Having merely stepped
into the shoes of the latter, said petitioners cannot acquire superior rights than that of
petitioner Villaluz. It has been ruled, that "the person who occupies the land of another at
the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily
bound by an implied promise that he will vacate the same upon demand," otherwise the
remedy of ejectment may be availed of to oust him from the premises. [ Refugia v. CA,
258 SCRA 347 (1996); Yu v. De Lara, 6 SCRA 785 (1962)]. In such case, the one year
prescriptive period for filing the appropriate action to remedy the unlawful withholding
of possession is to be counted from the date of receipt of the last demand to vacate
[Calubayan v. Pascual, 215 SCRA 146] because it is only from that time that possession
becomes illegal. 28 [ See Vda. de Prieto v. Reyes, 14 SCRA 430; Canaynay v. Sarmiento,
79 Phil. 36]. Accordingly, since the complaint for ejectment was instituted on July 12,
1989, or a mere four (4) months from the time of the last demand to vacate, the same was
timely filed within the prescriptive period. X x x.

In the case of ORO CAM ENTERPRISES, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS, former Fourth Division and ANGEL CHAVES, INC., respondents [G.R. No.
128743. November 29, 1999], it was held that a judgment in an ejectment suit is binding
not only upon the defendants in the suit but also against those not made parties thereto, if
they are:

a) trespassers, squatters or agents of the defendant fraudulently

occupying the property to frustrate the judgment;

b) guests or other occupants of the premises with the permission of the defendant;

c) transferees pendente lite;

d) sublessee;

e) co-lessee; or

f) members of the family, relatives and other privies of the defendant.

[I, Florenz D. Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium 793 (1997)]

The above doctrine expressly and properly applies to co-defendant MARIA xxx,
who is an aunt of the defendants B, et. al. and who lives with them, who is under their
direction, control, supervision, subsidy and assistance, and who had actual and
constructive knowledge of the existence of the mandated Barangay conciliation and
mediation proceedings but nonetheless impliedly waived her appearance thereto by not
voluntarily appearing and participating therein despite such knowledge. The foregoing
facts were not denied (in fact, admitted sub silencio) by the other defendants in their past
pleadings in this case.
VII.
CONCLUSION

It is an established principle in law that one who comes in equity must come with
clean hands. (Tala Realty Services Corporation vs. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage
Bank, G.R. No. 137533, 22 November 2002, 392 SCRA 506). “One who seeks equity
must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come with clean hands”. He or she
who has done inequity shall not have equity. The courts may deny equitable relief on the
ground that the conduct and actions of a party are inequitable, unfair, dishonest, or
fraudulent, or deceitful. (Miller vs. Miller, G.R. No. 149615, 29 August 2006; Abacus
Security vs. Ampil, G.R. No. 160016, 27 February 2006, 483 SCRA 315.)

VIII.
PRAYER

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that instant

ejectment suit be decided in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, ordering the
defendant and his family to VACATE and SURRENDER the de facto/material
possession of the subject property to the plaintiff or her duly authorized legal
representative/s, with awards of damages, litigation expenses, and costs of suit, as duly
proved by the various documentary evidence attached to this Position Paper.

Davao City, Davao del Sur, October 11, 2021.

ATTY. BATU PISIQAN

Counsel for the Plaintiff
Commission Serial No. 87965
Until November 30, 2021
Roll of Attorney No. 854126
IBP No. 18520/Apr. 3, 2019/Davao City
PTR No. 0636/Jul. 16, 2019/Davao City

VERIFICATION
 I, Bongbong Duterte, of legal age, Filipino, and presently residing at Barangay
Historical Workshop, Toril, Davao City, after having been duly sworn to in accordance
with law, hereby depose and state:
1. That I am the plaintiff in the above-entitle case;
2. That I, through counsel, prepared the foregoing Position Paper on this Unlawful
Detainer;
3. That I have read and understood the same and that all the allegations therein are
true, correct and of my personal knowledge and/or based on authentic documents.
4. That I certify under oath, that I have not commenced any other action or
proceeding which is pending in the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or any
other tribunal or agency. To the best of my knowledge, no such action or
proceeding is pending in the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or any other
tribunal or agency.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto affixed my signature this November 17,

2021, in Davao City, Davao Del Sur.

Bongbong Duterte
Affiant

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 17th day of November, 2021 in

Davao City, Davao Del Sur, affiant exhibited to me his Police Clearance with File
Number 964853.
Witness my hand on the date and place above written.

ATTY. SEBASTIAN G. UY
NOTARY PUBLIC
Until December 31, 2021
PTR No: 89915:1-3-21
IBP No: 68522:1-4-21
Turon Plaza Toril, Davao City
Notarial Commission No. 8421679

Doc. No. 85;

Page No. 69;
Book No. I
Series of 2021
ANNEX D

ISKO TUTUBAN
123 Brgy. Marapangi 1
Toril, Davao City
March 17, 2018

Re: Request to vacate the premises

FINAL DEMAND

Mr. Tutuban,

I am writing in behalf of my client, Bongbong Duterte, to vacate aforesaid

residential house and lot and to peacefully surrender the same to herein
plaintiff.
That on January 1, 2013, out of the compassion and tolerance of my client,
you and your family were allowed to temporarily reside at my client’s
property located at 123 Brgy. Marapangi, Toril, Davao City.

It was made clear by my client, which you agreed then that as soon as the
time comes that my client would need the property for his personal gain, you
and your family would necessarily vacate the premises and surrender the
peaceful possession thereof to my client.

This final demand letter serves as an official notice to you and may be
tendered in court as evidence of your failure to comply with my client’s
demands. If legal action is to occur to resolve this matter, it may involve
having you pay attorney’s fees and may impact your credit history.

We hope to resolve this matter as soon as possible.

Sincerely,

Atty. Batu Pisiqan

ANNEX H

DATE: April 27, 2018

OUR REFERENCE: 41. NEW
YOUR REFERENCE:

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Bongbong Duterte

Re: Legal Retainership Agreement

Dear Mr. Duterte:

Upon your request, we have the honor to propose this legal retainer agreement
(“the “Agreement”) for our engagement as your legal counsel.
Upon your acceptance of this propose, the services of my Davao office shall be
available to you, subject to the terms indicated below. We also inform you that
my Firm has offices in Taguig City and Cebu City.

Effectivity Date April 27, 2018

I. Services Covered: The initial fee will cover the legal services
required, such as consultations, advice and preparation of simple
contracts and opinions, including the drafting and/or review of
contracts and/or rendering of opinions which will require extensive
studies or time, or assistance at negotiations with, or representation
before, any governmental instrumentality. In the event in our periodic
review of the engagement indicates that the services rendered under
this paragraph substantially exceed the amount of the initial fees paid,
we reserve the right to send you additional fee billings.

II. Other Services: All services required than those included above, such
as litigation in court or appearance before legislative, quasi-judicial or
administrative bodies or officials, and other extraordinary legal
 services, shall be subject to separate special billing at a rate based
upon per court appearance.

III. Fees, expenses and billing arrangements: Our professional fees are
generally based on the complexity of the work to be performed, the
special skills required to complete the work, the experience level of the
engagement team members and the actual time spent by our staff on
the engagement. Furthermore, it is our policy that the fee billed for any
engagement should bear a true relationship to the value of the service
performed and should be acceptable and fair to the client.

Based on the scope of services outlined above, we proposed

professional fees are as follows:

Based on the scope of services outlined for Part I, we propose a fee of

Php 10,000, exclusive of 12% VAT (if applicable).

Aside from the proposed fee in item I above, the other services shall
be subject to a separate fee which will be based on per court
appearance, with an initial cap of Php 10,000 exclusive of 12% VAT
(if applicable). We will be sending you periodic billings based on
accumulated time charges.

Rate (in PHP)

Per Court Appearance 2,000.00

The said fees are exclusive of the 12% VAT and of out-of-pocket
expenses (OPEs), such as but not limited to, communication (e.g.,
telephone, fax, courier), transportation, documents reproduction,
representation, and other similar expenses. OPEs will be billed to you
separately as actually incurred. On our part, we will endeavor to keep
OPEs to a minimum.

As a matter of policy, we require an acceptance fee of 40% (exclusive

of VAT, if applicable) upon acceptance of this proposal, which shall be
creditable against our engagement fee and advance of OPE (out-of-
pocket expenses) of Php 5,000.00.

We will make progress in the course of the engagement for the

balance of our fees, and any OPEs that we will be incurring.

In case you would want to terminate the engagement before the

completion thereof, we will only bill you for the accumulated charges
for the services rendered. In such a situation, kindly inform us in writing
of your decision so we can act accordingly.

If the foregoing meets your approval, please indicate your conformity on the
space provided below and return to us a signed duplicate original of this letter for
our files.
We look forward to being able to work with you closely and to servicing your legal
requirements.
Very truly yours,

BATU PISIQAN
Resident Partner

CONFORME:

Bongbong Duterte
ANNEX F

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
OFFICE OF THE PUNONG BARANGAY
BARANGAY MARAPANGI, DAVAO CITY
0928 457 2975

OFFICE OF THE LUPONG TAGAPAMAYAPA

BONGBONG DUTERTE Barangay Case No. 2018-04-30

123 Eden High Ridge Subd., For: Unlawful Detainer
Toril, Davao City
Complainant/s

-Against-

ISKO TUTUBAN
123 Brgy. Marapangi
Toril, Davao City
Respondent/s

CERTIFICATE TO FILE ACTION

This is to certify that:
1. The Punong Barangay set the meeting of the parties for the constitution of the
Pangkat.
2. Despite Punong Barangay’s effort to conciliated. The parties failed to arrive as a
settlement.
3. Hence, the Pangkat was constituted.
4. The parties had undergone conciliation proceedings with the Pangkat, but the
parties, likewise, failed to conclude a settlement.
5. Therefore, the corresponding complaint for the dispute may now be filed in
court/government office.

This 30th day of April 2018.

Attested by:

Sheila Mae Logrono Diwani Lucero

Pangkat Chairman Pangkat Secretary

Trishia Dillera Ann Lauder Ayanna Villanueva

Lupong Tagapamayapa Lupong Tagapamayapa Lupong Tagapamayapa