1008 $.€. - Bharat Barrel and Drum Manufacturing Co. v. Amin Chand Payrelal
has a force of law, whether still the appellant
would be entitled for any relief under it? Learned
counsel for the appellant while challenging the
High Court finding that since there existed Sec-
tion 51 in the aforesaid 1932-Act dealing with
the unoccupied land, hence the appellant case
would only be governed under it and not under
the Notification No. 71, he further submitted this,
to be erroneous and illegal as the said land was
never unoccupied in spite of the declaration (de-
claring) it to be Talugdeh, as the appellant con-
tinued in possession over the said land and was
never dispossessed. Thus Section 51 of the 1932
‘Act would not apply.
13. We feel in either case the appellant can-
not succeed. In case, after the declaration of the
said land as Talugdeh (meaning declared as un-
occupied by eviction) if the appellant continued
in possession and the land was never unoccu-
pied then it may be true that Section 51 of the
1932 Act would not apply but then for the same
reason the appellant cannot take advantage of the
Proclamation/Notification No. 71 also. Benefit
under it was only given to such holders of land
who were dispossessed from their land holding.
If the appellant was never dispossessed and con-
tinued to enjoy the land, the essential ingredient
of that Notification that such holder must have
been dispossessed, would be lacking. Thus, un-
less the appellant was dispossessed from his hold-
ing question of preferential right for reallotment
would never arise. When the appellant’s case
even before us is that he was never dispossessed
from his holding and continued in possession, in
our considered opinion, he would not qualify for
such preferential right even in terms of the said
notification.
14. Normally, when the High Court has not
gone into other points, though raised to which
we satisfied ourself, we would have remanded
the case back for the consideration of those other
points. As the life of this case has already taken
long number of years, we felt it appropriate in
the interest of the parties, to which parties agreed,
to dispose of these other points by this Court it-
self as all relevant findings and the records are
before this Court which we have considered.
Lastly, we further find, from the perusal of the
various orders passed by the Tehsildar, Sub-Di-
visional Officer, Additional Collector, Board of
Revenue, etc. that these authorities further did
ALR,
not grant this relief to the appellant for another
reason to which we find merit as the dispute per.
tain to the joint khata in which the appellant hag
only 1/Sth share and as none of the other share.
holders applied for such preferential right which
js also not in dispute. That is why so far as the
individual holding of the appellant for which he
applied, he has succeeded for which there is no
dispute.
15. Hence we do not find any merit in any of
the grounds raised by the appellant for the rea-
sons recorded above. Accordingly, the claim of
the appellant fails though on different grounds
than what was held by the High Court. The ap-
peal is dismissed. Costs on the parties.
Appeal dismissed,
AIR 1999 SUPREME COURT 1008
(From : 1996 (2) Cal HN 327)
V.N. KHARE AND R. P. SETHI, JJ.
Civil Appeal No. 4576 of 1997, D/- 18-2-
1999.
Bharat Barrel and Drum Manufacturing Com-
pany, Appellant v. Amin Chand Payrelal, Re-
spondent.
Negotiable Instruments Act (26 of 1881),
S. 118 — Promissory note — Presumption as
to consideration — Burden of proof — Prom-
issory note alleged to have been executed asa
collateral security and not for “value received”
as mentioned therein — Failure of defendant
to prove non-existence of consideration —
Onus cannot be shifted on plaintiff — Claim
made by plaintiff has to be allowed even if
evidence adduced by plaintiff is found to be
unbelievable in rebuttal of defendant's case
(1996) 2 Cal HN 327, Reversed.
Once execution of the promissory note is ad-
mitted, the presumption under Section 118(@)
would arise that it is supported by consideration.
Such a presumption is rebuttable. The defendant
can prove the non-existence of consideration by
raising a probable defence. If the defendant is
Proved to have discharged the initial onus of
proof showing that the existence of considera
tion was improbable or doubtful or the same Was
illegal, the onus would shift to the plaintiff who
Will be obliged to prove it as a matter of fact and
BQ/BQ/S 100067/99/BNG/CSL
_ S
as a la1999
gponits failure Prove would dis-
vant of relief on the basis of the nee
mame The burden upon the defendant ag
ievng the non-existence of the consideration
be either direct or by bringing on record th
feponserance of probabilities by reference to
geeircumstances Upon Which he relies In such
vent the plaintiff is entitled under law to rel
mall the evidence led in the case includiay
Werf the plaintiff as well. In case, where the
defendant fails to discharge the initial onus of
roof by showing the non-existence of the con
eration, the plaintiff would invariably be held
snitled t0 the benefit of presumption arising
tinder Section 118 (a) in his favour, The Couct
may not insist upon the defendant to disprove
the existence of consideration by leading direct
as existence of negative evidence is
reither possible nor contemplated and even if led
isto be seen with a doubt. The bare denial of the
qassing of the consideration apparently does not
appear to be any defence. Something which is
probable has to be brought on record for getting
the benefit of shifting the onus of proving to the
plaintiff. To disprove the presumption the defend-
anthas to bring on record such facts and circum-
stances, upon consideration of which the Court
may either believe that the consideration did not
exist or ils non-existence was so probable that 2
prudent man would, under the circumstances of
the case, shall act upon the plea that it did not
exist.
(1996) 2 Cal HN 327, Reversed.
entitle him to
(Para 12)
In instant case, the defendant alleged that the
Promissory Note had not been executed for the
Value received as mentioned therein but was ex-
écuted by way of collateral security. A perusal
of the written statement of the defendant would