Coordinates: 51°25′04″N 12°22′40″E

Battle of Breitenfeld (1631)

The Battle of Breitenfeld (German: Schlacht bei
Battle of Breitenfeld
Breitenfeld; Swedish: Slaget vid Breitenfeld) or
First Battle of Breitenfeld (in older texts Part of the Thirty Years' War
sometimes known as Battle of Leipzig), was
fought at a crossroads near Breitenfeld
approximately 8 km north-west of the walled city
of Leipzig on 17 September (Gregorian calendar),
or 7 September (Julian calendar, in wide use at the
time), 1631.[b][a] It was the Protestants' first major
victory of the Thirty Years War.

The victory confirmed Sweden's Gustavus

Adolphus of the House of Vasa as a great tactical
leader and induced many Protestant German states
to ally with Sweden against the German Catholic Gustavus Adolphus at the battle of Breitenfeld,
League, led by Maximilian I, Elector of Bavaria, painting by J. J. Walther, 1632

and the Holy Roman Emperor Ferdinand II. painting in the Musée historique de Strasbourg.
Date 17 September 1631
Location Breitenfeld,[a] Electorate of Saxony
Contents (today part of Leipzig, Saxony,
Preliminaries Germany)
Creating alliances Result Protestant Swedish/Saxon victory
Strategic importance of Saxony
Belligerents
Tactical overview Sweden

Forces deployed  Electorate of   Holy Roman

Force assessment Saxony Empire

Disposition of forces
Catholic League
Battle
Commanders and leaders
Opening moves
Thwarting the Imperial attack Gustavus Count of Tilly

Annihilation of the Imperial force Adolphus Gottfried zu

Gustav Horn
Pappenheim
Aftermath
Johan Banér

Short-term effect
Lennart Torstensson

Long-term consequences
Robert Munro

Battlefield today John George I

See also Hans Georg von

Arnim-Boitzenburg
Notes
Strength
References
35,000 men
Bibliography 24,000 Swedes
18,000 Saxons
 28,750 men present at
Preliminaries Breitenfield[1]
The Swedish phase of the Thirty Years War began 11,319 Musketeers
when Gustavus Adolphus and his force of
13,000  landed at Peenemünde in 1630. Initially, 4,812 Pikemen
Sweden's entrance into the war was considered a 8,700 Horsemen
minor annoyance to the Catholic League and its 3,928 officers
allies; his only battles to this point had been
inconclusive ones, or fought against generals of Casualties and losses
modest military ability.[2][3] Total: 5,550
3,550 Swedes dead Total: 27,000

Consequently, the Imperial Commander of the 7,600 dead

2,000 Saxons dead

German Catholic League, Tilly, did not 6,000 captured

immediately respond to the arrival of the Swedes, 3,000 wounded

being engaged in northern Italy.[4] However, the 3,400 missing

effective end of the Mantuan War in 1631 ensured

that the large Imperial army previously tied up (includes 4,000
there was now free to move into the German deserters as well as
states.[2][3] 3,000 men captured on
19 September by the
pursuit at Merseburg)
Creating alliances
Breitenfeld

Contemporary etching of troop disposition

at the beginning of the Battle of Location within Saxony
Breitenfeld (1631).

When the Protestant princes showed little interest

in attaching themselves to the Swedish cause,
Gustavus opted for “rough wooing.”[5] His troops
moved south into Brandenburg, taking and
sacking the towns of Küstrin and Frankfurt an der Breitenfeld
Oder. It was too late and too far to save one of
Gustav's “occupied” allies, Magdeburg, from a
horrific sack by Imperial troops, beginning on 20
May, in which a major portion of the population
was murdered and the city burned. The Swedes
turned the sack of Magdeburg to good use:
broadsides and pamphlets distributed throughout
Europe ensured that prince and pauper alike Breitenfeld (Germany)
understood how the Emperor, or at least his troops,
treated his Protestant subjects.[6][7]
Over the next few months, Gustavus consolidated his bridgehead and expanded across northern Germany,
attracting support from German princes and building his army from mercenary forces along the way. By the
time he reached the Saxon border, his force had grown to over 23,000 men.

Strategic importance of Saxony

In order for Swedes to attack the Imperial troops in the south, they needed to pass through Saxony. In order
for Tilly's forces to attack Gustav's army, they too needed to pass through Saxony. The Electorate of
Saxony had not been affected by war and had large quantities of resources that each army could utilise. In
midsummer, General Tilly asked John George I for permission to pass through the territory; the elector
declined permission, noting that Saxony had not been ravaged by war yet. Later Tilly invaded the
Electorate of Saxony due to the fact that it was the shortest distance between his army and Gustav's and it
possibly annulled the chance of a potential alliance between Saxony and the Imperials.[4][8]

His plan was to avoid contact with the Swedes, and ultimately the Saxons, until his troops could unite with
the units near Jena (about 5,000 seasoned professionals), and the larger force of Count Otto von Fugger, en
route from Hesse.[8] Gustav and John George united their forces, planning to meet Tilly somewhere near
Leipzig.

Tactical overview
The battle was overall a meeting engagement with both
combatants agreeing to battle on the field. The forces all had
different structural organization. The level of technology was
roughly equivalent, with newer, lighter cannon and matchlocks
giving the Swedes a slight advantage. Both armies were well
supplied, and the terrain gave neither a distinct advantage.

Forces deployed
In this contemporary drawing, the Imperial The forces deployed were roughly equal in strength with the
formations (to the left) are deployed two Swedes being slightly outnumbered. The Protestant coalition
companies deep (two layers of flags fielded about 42,000 troops (18,000 of them German), and the
among pike and shot formations), while Imperial army about 35,000. The Protestants had a
the Swedish (to the right) are deployed considerable edge in cavalry numbers, about 13,000 (5,000
just one company deep (only one layer of from Allies) to 9,000. Strength of heavy artillery was
flag among pike and shot formations). comparable, with the Swedes having a slight edge in quality
and Imperial forces a marginal advantage in quantity. The
Swedes had additional small artillery pieces (3 and 6
pounders) integrated into their infantry brigades and regiments, giving them a larger number of tubes
overall and a huge firepower advantage in an infantry clash.

The Imperials had a considerable advantage in the number of trained infantry deployed, about 25,000 to the
Swedes 15,000. The Saxons (Swedish allies) fielded about 9,000 untrained conscripts and militiamen, and
had very few muskets. The Swedish brigade had more muskets and fewer pikemen than the Imperial
tercios (who still retained large numbers of lighter firearms known as the arquebus or caliver); overall, the
Protestants fielded about the same number of muskets as Imperial troops.

Force assessment
The overall balance was relatively even. The disparity in overall numbers resulted from large levies of
untrained soldiers. The number of heavy cannons was relatively close, with the Swedish having newer
models and light cannon compensating for the disparity in heavy field pieces. The Swedes had a
considerable advantage in cavalry numbers, although the Imperialist cavalry were better armored and better
mounted. This balance would be tilted however by the Swedish practice of supporting their cavalry with
detachment of musketeers.

Tilly also had a considerable numerical advantage in the number of veteran, trained infantry. Gustavus had
a considerable advantage in his artillery arm; he had moved away from heavy siege artillery into more
mobile field pieces, which because of its mobility and rate of fire were pound by pound much more
effective than the latter. The Swedes also fielded considerably more powerful muskets by ratio, had far
more advanced equipment, and better drills to increase their rate of fire. More important, the Linear
Formation [9] allowed most Swedish musketeers to fire at the same time, and allowed the Swedish infantry
to match the Imperialist frontage with a smaller number of men, which would be crucial in the later phase
of the battle. Finally, the Swedish aggressive assault method of firing by triple-ranked salvos at point blank
range, compared to the Imperialist's more traditional way of firing by volley would prove to be a nasty
shock to Tilly's tercios.

Disposition of forces
The Swedes deployed their 15,000 infantry in brigades and
two lines. The imperial army deployed 25,500 infantry in a
single line of 17 tercios (1,500 infantrymen in each). The
German allies extended the Swedish-Saxon front to be overall
slightly longer than the Imperial. The imperial line had its
cavalry evenly distributed on its flanks. The Swedes had their
cavalry weighted to their right. The Saxon allies fielded their
infantry in wedge formation with units in squares, and cavalry
on their flanks. With their Saxon allies extending the Swedes'
line, the Protestants had cavalry at the centre and their flanks.
Battle of Breitenfeld – Initial dispositions,
Battle 17 September 1631
Swedish-Saxon forces in Blue
Catholic army in Red
The battle started in the middle of the day and lasted over six
hours. The first two hours consisted of an exchange of artillery
fire. This was followed by an Imperial attack with cavalry from both wings to both ends of the Protestant
line. The cavalry attack routed the Saxon troops on the Swedish left flank. The Imperial army then
conducted a general attack to exploit the exposed left flank. The Swedes repositioned their second line to
cover the left flank and counterattacked with their cavalry to both imperial flanks.

The attack on the Imperial left was led personally by Gustavus Adolphus, capturing the Imperial artillery
and enveloping the Imperial left flank. The Swedes now had much greater weight of fire from their artillery,
infantry, and the captured Imperial artillery. The Imperial line became disorganized under the heavy fire and
was enveloped. The Imperial line collapsed and over 80% of Imperial forces were killed or captured.

Opening moves

The combined Swedish-Saxon forces were to the north of Leipzig centred around hamlet of Podelwitz,
facing southwest toward Breitenfeld and Leipzig. The battle began around mid-day, with a two-hour
exchange of artillery fire, during which the Swedes demonstrated firepower in a rate of fire of three to five
volleys to one Imperial volley.[10] Gustavus had lightened his
artillery park, and each colonel had four highly mobile, rapid
firing, bronze-cast three pounders, the cream of Sweden's
metallurgical industry.[11] When the artillery fire ceased,
Pappenheim's Black Cuirassiers charged without orders from
Tilly, attempting to turn the Swedish right. Instead, their attack
fell between Johan Banér's line and the Swedish reserves.[12]
They attacked six times to little effect;[13] the small companies
of musketeers dispersed between the squadrons of Swedish
horse fired salvos at point blank range, disrupting the charge of
the Imperial cuirassier and allowing the Swedish cavalry to
Battle of Breitenfeld – Opening moves,
counterattack at an advantage. The same tactics worked an
17 September 1631
hour or so later when the Imperial cavalry charged the
Swedish-Saxon forces in Blue
Swedish left flank. Following the rebuff of the seventh assault,
Catholic army in Red
General Banér sallied forth with both his light (Finnish and
West Gaetlanders) and heavy cavalry (Smalanders and East
Gaetlanders), forcing Pappenheim and his cavalry to quit the field in disarray, retreating 15 miles northwest
to Halle.

During the charges of the Imperial cuirassiers, Tilly's infantry had remained stationary, but then the cavalry
on his right charged the Saxon cavalry and routed it towards Eilenburg. There may have been confusion in
the Imperial command at seeing Pappenheim's charge; in their assessment of the battle, military historians
have wondered if Pappenheim precipitated an attempted double envelopment, or if he followed Tilly's
preconceived plan.[14] At any rate, recognizing an opportunity, Tilly sent the majority of his infantry against
the remaining Saxon forces in an oblique march diagonally across his front.

Thwarting the Imperial attack

Tilly ordered his infantry to march ahead diagonally to the

right, concentrating his forces on the weaker Saxon flank. The
entire Saxon force was routed, leaving the Swedish left flank
exposed. Before the Imperial forces could regroup and change
face towards the Swedes, the commander of the Swedish Left,
Marshal Gustav Horn, refused his line and counter-attacked
before the tercios could regroup and change face.[15]

The Imperial tercios then faced the full brunt of the new
Swedish firepower for the first time:
Battle of Breitenfeld – Thwarting the
Imperial attack, 17 September 1631
"...[Tilly] received a horrible, uninterrupted Swedish forces in Blue
pounding from the king's light pieces and was Catholic army in Red
prevented from coming to grips with the latter's
forces." – Raimondo Montecuccoli, Imperial
officer.
[16]

"First (saith he), giving fire unto three little Field-pieces that I had before me, I suffered not my
muskettiers to give their volleyes till I came within Pistollshot of the enemy, at which time I
gave order to the first rancks to discharge at once, and after them the other three: which done
 we fell pell mell into their ranckes, knocking them downe with the stocke of the Musket and
our swords." – Lt. Colonel Muschamp[17]

Annihilation of the Imperial force

With the Imperial forces engaged, the Swedish right and centre
pivoted on the refused angle, bringing them in line with Horn.
Banér's cavalry, under the direct command of Gustavus
Adolphus, attacked across the former front to strike the
Imperial left and capture their artillery. As Tilly's men came
under fire from their own captured batteries, the Swedish
cannon, under Lennart Torstensson, rotated, catching the
tercios in a crossfire.[18]

After several hours of punishment, nearing sunset, the Catholic

line finally broke. Tilly and Pappenheim were both wounded, Battle of Breitenfeld – Annihilation,
though they escaped. 7,600 Imperial soldiers were killed, and 17 September 1631
6,000 were captured. The Saxon artillery was recaptured, Swedish forces in Blue
along with all the Imperial guns and 120 regimental flags.[19] Catholic army in Red

Aftermath
The outcome of the battle had a significant impact in both the short and long terms.

Short-term effect

In the short term, the Catholic and Imperial forces were significantly hampered by the loss of most of the
force. One hundred and twenty standards of the Imperial and Bavarian armies were taken (and are still on
display in the Riddarholm church in Stockholm).[14] After the battle, Gustavus moved on Halle, following
the same track that Tilly had taken coming east to enforce the Edict of Restitution on the Electorate of
Saxony. Two days later Gustav's forces captured another 3,000  men after a brief skirmish at Merseburg,
and took Halle two days after that.

After the battle, the Catholic League or Imperial army under Tilly could field an army of only 7,000 men.
The army had to be rebuilt. Gustavus Adolphus, on the other hand, had a larger army after the battle than
before. The battle's outcome had the political effect of convincing Protestant German states to join his
cause. Finally, with the seventy-two-year-old Tilly's recovery far from certain (and he did indeed die within
six months while crossing the Lech river), and with no alternative commander at hand, Emperor Ferdinand
II had no choice but to rehire Wallenstein.

Long-term consequences

The totality of the victory confirmed Gustav's military innovations and guaranteed that the Swedes would
remain engaged in the war for the foreseeable future. In the long term, the significant loss of forces and the
creation of a strong Protestant anti-Imperial force required the Emperor and the Protestant and Catholic
princes to rethink on the operational conduct of the war, and the diplomatic avenues they would pursue
with it.
Gustav's success encouraged several other princes to join the cause of the Swedish king and his few allies.
By the month's end, Hanover, the Hessian dukes, Brandenburg and Saxony were officially aligned against
the empire, and France had agreed to provide substantially greater funding for Gustavus' armies. Although
Gustavus was killed a year later at the Battle of Lützen, the military strength of the alliance had been
secured through the addition of new armies. Even when Swedish leadership faltered it did not fail, and the
influx of French gold ensured that the hostilities could continue.[20]

Battlefield today
The battlefield today is bisected by the A14 autobahn, which slices through
the fields where the majority of the action occurred, between the original
position of Tilly, at Breitenfeld, and the original positions of the Swedes and
Saxons, around Podelwitz.

In the eastern portion of the village of Breitenfeld stands a monument to

Gustav Adolf and the victory his army accomplished there in 1631. It was Monument
erected in 1831 on the two hundredth anniversary of the battle and bears the commemorating Battle of
following inscription: Breitenfeld

Glaubensfreiheit für die Freedom of belief for the world,

Welt, saved at Breitenfeld,
rettete bei Breitenfeld Gustavus Adolphus, christian and
Gustav Adolf, Christ und hero.
Held.

See also
Breitenfeld (1631) order of battle
Hakkapeliitta
Björneborgarnas marsch

Notes
a. The battle was fought at the crossroads villages of Breitenfeld 51°24′N 12°20′E, Podelwitz
51°24′N 12°23′E, and Seehausen 51°24′N 12°25′E
b. 7 September (old style or pre-acceptance of the Gregorian calendar in the Protestant region)
17 September (new style, or Gregorian dating), 1631.

References
1. Mankell 1861. 8. Meade 1976, p. 174.
2. Parker 1997, pp. 111–113. 9. Jones 2001, p. 245.
3. Meade 1976, pp. 13–16. 10. Jones 2001, p. 235.
4. Parker 1997, p. 130. 11. Meade 1976, p. 175.
5. Parker 1997, p. 112. 12. Tucker 2010, p. 194.
6. Parker 1997, p. 110. 13. Davis 2013, p. 292.
7. Meade 1976, p. 14. 14. Meade 1976, p. 179.
15. Davis 2013, p. 292-293. 18. Dodge 2012.
16. Barker 1975, p. 141. 19. Davis 2013, p. 294.
17. Roberts 2010, p. 18. 20. Parker 1997, Chapter Conclusion.

Bibliography
Barker, Thomas (1975). The Military Intellectual and Battle. Albany, NY: State University of
New York Press. ISBN 978-0-87395-251-4.
Davis, Paul (2013). Masters of the Battlefield: Great Commanders from the Classical Age to
the Napoleonic Era. New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-534235-2.
Dodge, Theodore A (2012). Gustavus Adolphus: A History of the Art of War from Its Revival
After the Middle Ages to the End of the Spanish Succession War. Kirkland: Tales End Press.
ASIN B0092XQLHM (https://www.amazon.com/dp/B0092XQLHM).
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1871 (https://books.google.com/books?id=LuUKAQAAMAAJ). Lexington, Mass: D.C. Heath.
ISBN 0-669-20939-2. Retrieved 2011-01-19.
Jones, Archer (1987). The Art of War in the Western World (https://books.google.com/books?
id=Ic0tSwAACAAJ). New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-252-01380-8. Retrieved
2011-01-19.
Jones, Archer (2001). The Art of War in the Western World (https://books.google.com/books?
id=z2FRzcz2W0oC&pg=PP1). Urbana: University of Illinois Press. ISBN 0-252-06966-8.
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Mankell, Julius (1861). Arkiv till Upplysning om Svenska Krigens och Krigsinstrattningarnes
Historia: Tidskiftet 1630-1632 (https://archive.org/stream/arkivtillupplys02kriggoog/arkivtillup
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Parker, Geoffrey (1997). The Thirty Years' War (https://books.google.com/books?id=W6qCG
NPb2AcC&pg=PP1) (2nd ed.). New York: Routledge. ISBN 0-415-12883-8. Retrieved
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Roberts, Keith (2010). Pike and Shot Tactics, 1590–1660. Osprey. ISBN 978-1-84603-469-5.
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Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO. ISBN 978-1-59884-429-0.
Wedgwood, C.V. (1995) [1938]. The Thirty Years War. New York: Book of the Month Club.
OCLC 935482413 (https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/935482413).

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