The Cold War and Third World: The Good Old Days?

Author(s): Immanuel Wallerstein

Source: Economic and Political Weekly , Apr. 27, 1991, Vol. 26, No. 17 (Apr. 27, 1991),
pp. 1103-1106
Published by: Economic and Political Weekly

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4397993

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The Cold War and Third World
The Good Old Days?
A serious and quite open question before us, as we move into .he first half of the 21st century when the capitalist
world economy will be in full and acute crisis is whether new and transformatory movements with new strategies
and agendas will in fact emerge. This is the very concrete challenge for the world Left.
SHALL we be nostalgic so soon? I fear we
must. We have come out of the era of US
hegemony in the world-system (1945-1990)
and into a post-hegemonic era. However dif-
ficult was the position of the erstwhile Third
World in that era, I believe it is in for far
more difficult times. The time just past was
a time of hopes, no doubt of hopes oft
deceived, but of hopes nonetheless. The time
just forward is to be a time of troubles, and
of struggles born more of desperation than
of confidence. To use old Western sym-
bolism, which may under the circumstances
be inappropriate, it will be a time of
purgatory, the outcome always uncertain.
I shall outline my views in two parts: a
brief sketch of the era out of which we have
come; and a projection of what it is I think
we may anticipate along with an argument
as to the historical alternatives we face.
I believe the essential features of the
petiod 1945-1990 may be summed up in four
statements.
(a) The United States was the hegemonic
power in a unipolar world-system. Its power,
based on an overwhelming edge in economic
prdductivity as of 1945 and an alliance
system with Western Europe and Japan,
reached its apogee circa 1967-73.
(b) The United States and the USSR
engaged in a highly structured, carefully
contained, formal (but not substantive) con-
flict, in which the USSR acted as a sub-
imperialist agent of the United States.
(c) The Third World forced itself upon the
unwilling attention of the United States, the
USSR and Western Europe by demanding
rights more fully and earlier than the
countries of the North anticipated or
desired. Both its political strength and its
ultimate weakness was its belief in and
optimism about the twin objectives of self-
determination and national development.
(d) The 1970s and 1980s were a period of
global economic stagnation, resistance by
the United States to its impending decline,
and disillusionment in the Third World with
its own strategy.
Let me elaborate on each of these
statements. I
(a) The overwhelming economic advan-
tage of the United States in 1945-in pro-
duction and productivity-was the conse-
quence of three conjoined factors: the steady
Economic and Political
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Immanuel Wallerstein
concentration of the national energy of the
United States since 1865 on improving its
capacities in both the processes of produc-
tion and technological innovation; the
freedom of the United States from serious
milita'ry expenditures, at least until 1941,
efficacious wartime mobilisation from
1941-1945, and the absence of wartime
destruction of its infrastructure; the
enormous destruction of infrastructure and
human lives over the whole of Eurasia from
1939-1945.
The United States was able quite rapidly
to institutionaliVe this advantage, that is,
create a hegemony which made it able to
control or dominate virtually all significant
decisions in the world political and
economic arenas for some 25 years. Its
hegemony was ideological and even cultural
as well.
The two key pillars on which this system
was consolidated was an alliance system with
the important already industrialised coun-
tries of the world on the one hand and a
nationally-integrating welfare state on the
homefront, on the other. In each case, the
arrangement was economic and ideological,
and nominally political.
The economic carrot was ihe economic
reconstruction of Western Europe and
Japan, and the significant rise in real income
of the middle strata and the skilled working
classes in the United States. This guaranteed
both political satisfaction and a significant
market for the United States'productive
enterprises.
The ideological package was the commit-
ment to implementing fully for the first timeconcentrated its financial resources (vast but
the two-century-old promises of political not unlimited) on Western Europe and
Jiberalism: universal suffrage and a function-
Japan.
ing parliamentary system. This was done This arrangement, as we know, worked
within the framework of a struggle with marvellously well. Peace in Europe was
communist 'totalitarianism' and therefore a
de facto exclusion of communists from
political rights.
The nominal political promise was parti-
cipation of Western Europe and Japan as
countries, and of the working classes as
strata in collective decision-making. In
reality, for some 25 years all major political
decisions in the world-system were made by
a small elite in the United States. This was
called the United States leadership. Western
Europe and Japan were client states. The
working-class movements were for the most
part client movements.
Weekly April
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SPECIAL ARTICLES
(b) The relationship of the United States
and the USSR was similarly one thing on
the surface and another reality underneath.
On the surface, the United States and the
USSR were ideological enemies, locked in
a cold war not merely since 1945 but since
1917. They represented alternate visions of
the social good, based on quite divergent
reading of historical reality. The structures
of the two countries were quite disparate,
and in some aspects fundamentally different.
Furthermore, they both proclaimed quite
loudly the depth of this ideological cleavage
and called on all nations and groups to opt
for one side or the other. Remember the
famous declaration of John Foster Dulles:
"Neutralism is immoral". Equivalent
statements were made by Soviet leaders.
Nonetheless the reality was quite different.
A line was drawn in Europe, more or less
where Soviet and US troops met at the end
of thesecond world war. East of this line
was a zone reserved for Soviet political
dominance. The arrangement between the
United States and the USSR is well known
and quite simple. The USSR could do as it
wished within its East European zone (that
is, create satellite regimes). There were two
working conditions. First, the two zones
would observe absolute interstate peace in
Europe and would abstain from any attempt
to change or subvert the governments in the
other zone. Secondly, the USSR would
neither expect nor obtain aid from the
United States in its economic reconstruction.
The USSR might take what it could from
Eastern Europe while the US government
absolute. There was never a threat of com-
munist insurrection in Western Europe
(except in Greece, where the USSR under-
mined and abandoned the Greek com-
munists). And the United States never gave
any support to the multiple efforts of East
European states to loosen or end Soviet con-
trol (1953, 1956, 1968, 1980-81). The
Marshall Plan was reserved for Western
Europe and the USSR constructed a cocoon
called Comecon.
The USSR may be considered a sub-
imperialist power of the United States
because it functioned to guarantee order and
27, 1991 1103
stability within its zone on conditions that
in fact enhanced the ability of the United
States to maintain its worldwide hegemony.
The very ferocity of the ultimately not very
meaningful ideological struggle was a great
political plus for the US (as it was, to be sure, welcomne their colonial overlords back. The that the United States had constructed,
for the leadership of the USSR). We shall
see that the USSR served as an idelogical
shield for the United States in the Third
World as well.
(c) The Third World was never asked,
either in 1945 or since, whether it liked or
approved the world order established by the
US in collusion with the USSR. It was
certainly not accorded a very desirable posi-
tion in this world order. In 1945, it was
offered very little in the political arena, and
even less in the economic areba. As the years
went by, the offers improved somewhat, but
always grudgingly and only because of Third
World militance and rambunctiousness.
In 1945, no one took the Third World
seriously as a political actor on the world
scene-neither the US nor the USSR nor the
old colonial powers of Western Europe. Any
complaints were received with surprise and
the complainers were counselled patience, on
the basis of a world-level version of the
'trickle down' hypothesis.
To be sure, the US had a programme for
the Third World. It had been proclaimed by
Woodrow Wilson in 1917 and it was called
the self-determination of nations. Eventual-
ly, in the fulness of time, every people was
to receive its collective political rights to
sovereignty in analogy to each citizen receiv-
ing his individual political rights to suffrage. course the USSR did give material and
These political rights would then afford the
opportunity for self-improvement, some-
thing that after 1945 acquired the name of
national development.
Leninism as an ideology was presumably
the antinomy of Wilsonianism. In fact, in
many ways it was its 'avatar. The Wilsonian
prdgramme for the Third World was trans-
lated by Lenin into Marxist jargon. It
emerged as anti-imperialism and the con-
struction of socialism. This obviously
reflected real differences about who would
control the political processes in the
periphery of the world-system, but theequivalent
programme had the identical form: first, a
political change which would establish
sovereignty (for the first time ever in
colonies, for the first time really in already
independent Third World states); then an
economic change involving establishment of
an efficacious state bureaucracy, the
improvement of productive processes
('industrialisation'), and the creation of a
social infrastructure (particularly in educa-
tion and health). The outcome, promised by
both the Wilsonians and the Leninists, was
'catching up', closing the gap between the
rich countries and the poor.
The Third World countries bought this
Wilsonian-Leninist package. But they were
understandably impatient. Since the package
involved two steps, they quite reasonably
took the first step first. This was the path
of anti-colonial struggle in the colonies, andStates had to accede to its own Wilsonian
of analogous political revolutions in what
1104 Economic and
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were once called quite aptly the 'semi- group making the demands but also that the
colonies'. After 1945, the Third World forc-cost of not doing so was weakening the
ed the pace, everywhere. The Chinese com- legitimacy of the United States government
munists marched into Shanghai. The peoples at home. And the world revolution of 1968
of Indochina and Indonesia refused to undermined the entire ideological consensus
Indian sub-continent said independence im- including even its reserve card, the Soviet
mediately. The Egyptians ousted the monar- shield.
chy and nationalised the Suez Canal. The The two decades since have been United
Algerians refused to accept the idea that they
States patchwork. Each patch has been
were part of France. There was a 'downward efficacious in that it slowed down the
sweep' of African liberation starting in the fraying, but eventually the whole framework
1950s. Political revolution was on the march would look tattered. Nixon went to China,
in Latin America, most notably advanced a brilliant stroke, pulling them back into the
by the triumph of the Twenty-Sixth of July world order arrangement. He cut United
Movement in Cuba in 1958. And, of course, States' losses by accepting defeat in Vietnam.
in 1955 there was the Bandung Conference. And another brilliant stroke, the United
The essential element to observe about States connived in (perhaps even arranged)
this whole political push was that it was, the OPEC oil-price rise. Paraded as evidence
from the outset, totally indigenous in origin of Third World militance, the OPEC initia-
and in opposition to the North. The colonial tives served to funnel much of the available
powers were strongly opposed to this forcing world surplus (and surely any that the Third
of the pace and did all they could to stop World had) into Western (largely United
it or slow it down. Of course, they varied in States) banks via the oil-prodiucing states
their tactics, the British being notably more (who no doubt took their rent cut). The
flexible than the others, and the Portuguese money was then sent right back to the Third
dragging up the rear. The United States, World (and the Soviet-bloc states) in the
despite its theoretical Wilsonian anti- form of loans to states which enabled these
colonialism, tended to support this states momentarily to balance'their budgets
European slow-down as long as it could, but and continue to import Western manufac-
eventually called for decolonisation to tures. The bill would come due in the 1980s.
'moderate' leaders at a moderate pace. Nor The United States sought during the 1970s
was the attitude of the USSR very different. to keep everyone calm. It offered the West
Leninism presumably represented a more Europeans and the Japanese Trilateralism,
strenuous and combative form of anti- that is a promise of more consultation in
colonialism than Wilsonianism. And of world policy-making. It offered the Soviet
Union detente, that is a lowering of the
political support to many anti-imperialist ideological decibels which served as balm for
movements. But, at very many crucial the Brezhnevian bureaucracy in the wake of
moments, it too sought to constrain or the shock wave of 1968. It offered the United
restrain the pace. Its role in Greece and its States public a relaxation of cold war
counsel to Mao Zedong are notorious. But tensions as well, a kind of cultural con-
around the world, anyone who has followed sumerism that included more liberal mores
local struggles closely knows that Soviet and affirmative action. And, to the Third
support was never in the lead and often was World, it offered the post-Vietnam
obtained only with difficulty; frequently they syndrome, which concretely meant such
refused to extend it at all. gestures as the Church committee's report
Still, of course, as we also know, the basicon the CIA, the Clark Amendment on
political battle was won by the Third World. Angola, and the withdrawal of support to
By the late 1960s, decolonisation (or its Somoza and the Shah.
actual in already independent states) hadI believe we should see the Nixon, Ford,
been achieved almost everywhere. It was time and Carter administrations as following a
for the second step, national development. single policy which we can term the 'low
In fact, however, just as the moment had posture' and which president Carter spelled
come for the second step, the world-system out in his famous address to the United
entered into a Kondratieff B-phase. The States public on accepting the limitations of
second step was never to be achieved in most United States power. These policies seemed
places. to be working reasonably well until, once
(d) By 1970, the United States had reached again, the Third World pulled the plug. The
the apogee and the limits of its power. Its 'low posture' foundered on the unexpected
declining gold reserves forced it off the fixed rock of the Ayatollah Khomeini. He was not
gold-dollar parity. The economic growth of to be fooled. Low posture or not, the United
Western Europe and Japan had been such States was still the No I Satan (and the
that they now matched and were beginning USSR No 2).
to outstrip the United States levels of pro- Khomeini's strategy was quite simple. He
ductivity, at the very moment that the refused to accept the rules of the game-
Kondratieff B-phase set in. Or rather, their neither the rules of the United States
expansion of global production was itself the post-1945 world order nor the rules of the
major source of the downturn. Vietnam was interstate system of the modern world in
demonstrating not only that the United place for five centuries. The net result was
equally simple. The United States was pro-
credo even when it did not approve of the foundly humiliated, Carter was ousted, and
Political Weekly April 27, 1991
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'Reagan came to power on a platform of re- Kuwaiti accumulated rent. The second was be Japan, the EEC, and the United States.
jecting the 'low posture' in every way pos- Israeli ending of the peace talks with the They will be in sharp competition to gain
sible. The Reagan (-Bush) strategy was to PLO. Had they been ongoing, an invasion the quasi-monopolistic control of the world
substitute fake machismo for the low would have hurt the Palestinian cause, still market for their particular technical version
posture-tough with allies, tough with the the focal issue of Arab popular sentiment. of these products, and they cannot all get it.
Soviet Union, tough at home, and of course, Once they were dead, he would appear as There is much talk these days of a three-
tough with the Third World. the last hope of Palestinians and harness way breakdown of the world market. I do
Economically, the world had to face the Arab popular sentiment, as he seems to have not believe it because, in this kind of acute
bill for the patchwork of the 1970s, the debt done But these two variables were ultimately competition, triads give way to a binary split
crisis-first manifested in Poland in 1980 minor. in the search for dominance. The stakes are
and officially recognised in Mexico in 1982. The collapse of the communisms was far high, and the weakest of the three will seek
The result was a downward economic spirat more important. This had a double mean- an alliance for fear of being squeezed out
throughout the Third World and the Soviet- ing from a Third World perspective; First, altogether. Today, and surely a decade from
bloc countries, with the exception of the East Saddam Hussein knew that the USSR would now, the weakest of the three, in terms of
Asian NICs which managed to corner the not support him, which liberated him from efficiency of production and national
industries being transferred downward from the automatic constraints of United States- financial stability, is the United States. The
core to semi-periphery because of their lower Soviet settlement of all disputes that natural alliance is with Japan. The trade-off
rate of profitability. Now that OPEC pump- threatened nuclear escalation. And secondly, is obvious. Japan is now strong in produc-
priming of the sagging world-economy had the collapse of the communisms was the tion processes and in capital surplus. The
exhausted its possibilities, Reagan substitu- final collapse of the ideology of national United States is strong in R and D capacity
ted United States military Keynesianism and development. If even the USSR could not and potential, the service sector generally,
massive borrowing from its allies, now its make it, with the full Leninist model at its military power, and accumulated wealth for
economic rivals-Japan and Western disposal, surely neither Iraq nor any other consumption. A reunited Korea would join
Europe. It was clear by mid-decade that this Third World state was likely to catch up by the Japan-United States arrangements, as
bill would soon come due, as had the Third a programme of collective self-help within would, of course, Canada. Japan and the
World loans of the 1970s. the framework of the existing world-system. United States would bring into the arrange-
Were there any patches left? The first to The Wilsonians had lost -at last the Leninist ment their links in Latin America and South
decide that there probably weren't was shield, which had channelled Third World East Asia. And they would make a strong
Gorbachev. The USSR was a superpower impatience into ta strategy which was, frombid to find the appropriate niche for China.
primarily because of its special arrangement the point of view of the dominant forces in Europe has seen this coming for a long
with the United States called the cold war. the world-system, the strategy least threaten-time. That is why the 1992 arrangements
If the United States could no longer play the ing to the system they would undertake. have not only never been derailed but are
role of hegemonic power, the cold war served Disabused of all alternatives, and certain surely going to be augmented, now that
no function, and the USSR risked being of.the weakness of the United States Saddam Germany is reunited and Thatcher has been
treated as just one more semi-peripheral Hussein took into account the fourth disposed of (as will Chirac be shortly).
state in the capitalist world-economy., variable. If he invaded, he had a 50-50 Europe has to work out its detailed
Gorbachev has sought to save the possibility chance of succeeding. But the United States strategy-piecemeal expansion of the EEC,
of Russia/the USSR remaining a world had a 100 per cent chance of losing. The or wide-ranging confederation. The key is
power (at the very least, a strong semi- United States would find itself without Russia, which must be included if Europe
peripheral state) by a three-fold programme: viable options. If it acceded, it was a paper is to have any strength vis-a-vis Japan-United
unilateral liquidation of the cold war (highly tiger. And if it resisted, the political fallout
States. Europe will work hard to counter a
successful); unburdening the USSR of its of the carnage had to be negative for the disintegration of the USSR, and since Japan,
now irrelevant and burdensome quasi-empire United States' position-in West Asia, in China, and the United States for other
in Eastern Europe (highly successful); and Europe, at home, and ultimately everywhere. reasons are also fearful of the same process,
restructuring the Soviet state so that it can the USSR will probably weather the storm
function efficaciously in the post-hegemonic II
somehow.
era (thus far, not too successful). Where are we heading now? Since I The second stage will be for each of the
The United States was at first stunned by believe the world-system is moving into an two Norths to develop their main semi-
this 'manoeuvre and then decided to try to even greater North-South polarisation than periphery (China for the one, Russia for the
cover up this conscious dismantlement of the heretofore, I will first present what I believeother) so that it can be an adjunct producer,
United States world order by crying victory. will be the restructuring of the North and a major market, and a supplier of migrant
This last bit of advertising puff might have its consequences for the South, and then pre- labour. At the moment the core zones are
carried the United States for five more years, sent what I believe will be the political terrified of the prospects of Russian and
had not the Third World once again pulled options of the South. Finally I shall try to Chinese outflow. But in 2005, with boom-
the plug, this time in the person of Saddam put this in the context of the future of the ing econmies and continued demogrpahic
Hussein. Saddam Hussein saw the weakness capitalist world-economy as such. decline, gastarbeitern will seem highly
of the United States, particularly as We are presently at the tail end of a desirable, provided it is an 'orderly' process.
manifested in the collapse-of communist Kondratieff B-phase that has been going on What will happen to the erstwhile third
regimes in the Soviet bloc and in its inability since 1967-73. We are entering the final and world? Little that is good. Of course, there
to impose on Israel the process of regional probably the most dramatic dip down. It is will be many enclaves linked to one of the
settlements (in Indochina, Southern Africa, analogous to the 1893-96 dip in the two Norths, but the share of the South
Central Ameria, and the Middle East) that Kondratieff B-phase that ran from 1873-96. overall in world production and world
are part of the liquidation of the cold war. Its impact will vary on different parts of the
wealth will go down, and I believe we will
Saddam Hussein decided that this was the North, but it will probably be very great see an for
actual reversal on the social indicator
moment for boldness. He invaded Kuwait, most parts of the South. However, the world- curves (that is, education and health), the
and was quite possibly preparing to proceed economy, once thoroughly shaken down, one set of curves on which the South has
further south. will come out of it and we shall be in for been doing reasonably well during the
I believe four variables entered into his another big A-phase. It will be fuelled 1945-90 period. Furthermore, the South will
calculation. One was the world debt crisis, initially, as has long been predicted, by a new have been deprived of its major political
from which he knew there would be no product cycle of new .leading industries instrument of the 1945-90 period-the
serious relief for the Third World. He, at (microchips, biogenetics, etc), and of course, national liberation movements. The ANC in
least, had a solution at hand, seize the the thre_~ strong loci of such production willSouth Africa will be the last great movement

Economic and Political Weekly April 27, 1991 1105

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to come to power. They have all served Saddam Hussein may well lose the battle port, but they have not wanted to support
one historical purpose-to achieve self- and bd destroyed. But he has shown the way unconditionally"Northern repression. The
determination-and they have all failed to to a new option-creation of larger states, consequence is that the Northern left has
achieve the other historic purpose-national armament of these states not at the second- been voiceless and irrelevant. They were
development. The current passing fantasy level but at the top-level, willingness to risk quite comfortable in engaging in solidarity
that the 'market' will give them what state- real warfare. If this is an option whose time with national liberation.movements. In 1968
led industrialisation has not will not survive has come, what will be the consequence? they could chant "Ho, Ho, Ho Chi Minh".
the acute downturn of the next five years. Terrible carnage, of course, including But that was because the Vietminh and the
The fall of Mazowiecki presages the wide- doubtless the use of nuclear warfare (and NFL appealed to Wilsonian-Leninist values.
spread impotence regimes will feel. quite possibly chemical and biological). Once both Wilsonianism and Leninism are
What choices are then available? Actually From the point of view of both North and dead, once it is recognised that national
quite a few, though none of them fit in withSouth, the Saddam Hussein option is more development is an illusion (even a pernicious
the weltanschauung that has governed the dreadful than the Khomeini option. Perhaps illusion), once we have given up on the basic
world in the Wilsonian-Leninist era. We may you will think, is this so different from the strategy of transformation pursued for the
start with the one that is the nightmare of wars between North and South that were in- last 150 years, is there anything remaining
the North because they can think of no way tegral to the historic expansion of the boun- for the Northern left other than patchwork?
to respond. This is the Khomeini option. daries of the modern world-system? The Is it any easier for the Southern left? Are
This is usually phrased as the menace of answer is, from a moral point of view, it is they ready to enlist in the ranks of Khomeini
Islamic fundamentalism but that is entirely the same phenomenon. But, from a political or Saddam Hussein, to invest their energies
the wrong emphasis. It is not particularly and military point of view, it is quite dif- in the migration option? I think it is doubt-
an Islamic phenomenon. And it is not par- ferent. The old colonial wars were one-sided ful. They have the same hesitancies as the
ticularly fundamentalist, if by that is meant militarily, and confidence lay on the side of Northern left. They too wish to shake the
some reversion to ancient religious practices. the Northern aggressors. The new set of wars world-system and recognise that these op-
The Khomeini option is primarily the will be two-sided militarily, and confidence tions all do shake the world-system. But they
culmination of the angers at the horrors of is now lacking in the North. It may be that too have doubts that these options lead to
the modern world-system and focuses the the period 1945-1990 will be remembered as the world of equality and democracy for
anger on its chief beneficiaries and in- the period of relative North-South peace which the Southern left stands just as much
stigatots, the Western core of the capitalist (despite Vietnam, despite Algeria, despite as the Northern left.
world-Economy. It is the denunciation of the the multiple anticolonial struggles) between The serious and quite open question
West, including and even especially its the wave of the wars of European expansion before us, as we move into the first half of
Enlightenment values, as the incarnation of and the waye of 21st century North-South the 21st century when the capitalist world-
evil. If these were merely tactics, modes of wars. economy will be in full and acute crisis, is
popular mobilisation, they could be dealt The third option is what I call the option whether new transformatory movements
with. To the extent that they represent a of individual resistance by physical re- with new strategies and agendas will in fact
genuine option, there is no avenue for com- location. In a world of increasing North- emerge. It is quite possible, but far from sure.
munication or for resolution. South polarisation, with Northern demo- The reason is that no one has put forward
How long can such explosions last? How graphic decline and Southern demographic new strategies and agendas to replace the
far can they go? It is hard to say. Khomeini's
expansion, how will it be politically possible now defunct Wilsonian-Leninist strategies
Iran seems to be on the path of passions to stem massive unauthorised South-to- for the Third World, themselves a mere ex-
calming down, of re-entry into the cultural North migration? I believe there will be no tension of the 19th century strategy of
orbit of the world-system. If tomorrow, way to do this, and this South-to-North achieving state power that both the socialist
however, movements erupt in other countries migration will come on top of authorised and the nationalist movements had evolved.
around the South, and more of them and unauthorised migration from Russia This, however, is the very concrete
simultaneously, within a less stable world- and China. Of course, this has been occur- challenge for the world Left. If it does not
system, may they not last longer or go ring already. Still, I think the scale will respond seriously or soon, the collapse of
further? Could they not substantially significantly escalate, and will thereby the capitalist world-economy in the next 50
advance the disintegration of a world- transform the structure of social life in the years will simply lead to its replacement by
system, of which process they are themselvesNorth. It is sufficient to note two things. The something equally bad. In any case, the
the consequence? South within the North may well reach tbe North-South confrontation will be at the
The second option is the Saddam Hussein 30-50 per cent mark by 2025. And there may centre of world political struggle from now
option. Here again we must be clear what well be an attempt to deny them political on. It must, therefore, be at the centre of
it is. This is not total rejection of the values rights, which means that, after 200 years of analyses by historical, social scientists as well
of the modern world-system. The Baath was social integration of the working classes in as by political activists.
a typical national liberation movement and the North, we would be back to the situa-
Note
a thoroughly secular one. I believe the tion of the early nineteenth century-the
Saddam Hussein option is nothing but the disenfranchisement of the bulk of the lower [Presented at the workshop on 'The Cold War
Bismarck option. It is the sense that since occupational strata. This is surely not a and the Third World: Past and Present' spon-
sored by SSRC-CASPIC and the Center for
economic iniquities are the outcome of recipe for social peace.
Latin American Studies, University of Chicago,
political rapport de forces, economic The triple scenario of options for the
December 7-9, 1990.1
transformation requires military strength. South poses political dilemmas for the rul-
I The position set forward here has been spel-
The Iraq-US confrontation is the first ing elites of the world-system no doubt, who
led out in far greater detail in four recent
genuine North-South war. The wars of will react as they will react. But it poses
papers: 'Marx, Marxism Leninism, and
national liberation (say Vietnam) all had a fundamental dilemmas for the world left as
Socialist Experiences in the Modern World-
limited and quite clear objective: self- well, the anti-systemic forces both in the
System', Thesis XI, No 27, 1990, 40-53; 'The
determination. From the South's point of North and in the South.
Lessons of the 1980s', Introduction to
view, all these wars were started by the North We can see the confusion already among
Geopolitics and Geoculture: Essays on the
and could be ended by the North letting thethe left movements in the North. They did Changing World-System (Cambridge:
South alone. In the Persian Gulf crisis, the not know how to react to Khomeini. They Cambridgc University Press, 1991); 'America
war was started by the South with the in- do not know how to react to Saddam and the World: Today, Yesterday, and
tent not of achievirqg self-determination but
Hussein. They have never had a clear posi- Tomorrow' (forthcom,ndg); and 'The Concept
of transforming the world rapport de forces.tion on unauthorised migration. In each of National Development, 1917-1989: Elegy
This is really quite different. case. they have not wanted to off'e .tal sup-and Requiem' (forthcoming).

1106 Economic and Political Weekly April 27, 1991

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