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Global Democracy and Earth System Governance

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ECOLEC-03882; No of Pages 10
Ecological Economics xxx (2011) xxx–xxx

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Ecological Economics
j o u r n a l h o m e p a g e : w w w. e l s ev i e r. c o m / l o c a t e / e c o l e c o n

Global democracy and earth system governance

John S. Dryzek, Hayley Stevenson ⁎
Centre for Deliberative Democracy and Global Governance, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, Canberra, ACT 0200, Australia

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: The issue of climate change confirms the global reach of earth system governance, whose legitimacy and
Received 28 July 2010 effectiveness could gain from democratisation. While electoral democracy as practised in states provides no
Received in revised form 26 January 2011 model for global democracy, lessons drawn from the performance and history of states prove helpful in
Accepted 27 January 2011
identifying the elements that a well functioning ecological democracy ought to strive for. We capture these
Available online xxxx
elements through reference to the idea of a deliberative system, and show how the idea of such a system can
Keywords:
be used to analyse, evaluate, and provide prescriptions for the global governance of climate change.
Earth system governance © 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Deliberative democracy
Climate change
Deliberative system

1. Introduction
The relationship between democracy and environmental affairs
now has a long history of study. In both normative and empirical
literatures, the balance of opinion has over the years come down on
the side of the efficacy of democracy. However, in normative thinking,
much turns on what kind of democracy is at issue. In empirical study,
a lot depends too on what indicators of environmental performance
are used, and whether there is much of an effect independent of the
level of economic development (if the environmental Kuznets curve
that links eventually positive performance with the level of economic
development holds).
The rise to political pre-eminence of the climate change issue
creates new challenges because the issue is so clearly global, and so
clearly one that has eluded existing governments of all sorts, as well as
existing transnational and global political processes. The public
opinion that drives democracy may only move decisively in the
direction of action when its effects are large, visible, and immediate;
but by then it may be too late. This is what Giddens (2009) calls
“Giddens's paradox”, though it had of course been common wisdom in
environmental studies for several decades before Lord Giddens so
thoughtfully bestowed its new name.
Losing patience with the seemingly interminable machinations of
polycentric politics, some observers of climate change politics have
called for more authoritarian approaches (for example, Shearman
and Smith, 2007). James Lovelock in a 2010 interview asserted that
“Even the best democracies agree that when a major war approaches,
⁎ Corresponding author. Tel.: +61 2 6125 1723.
E-mail addresses: john.dryzek@anu.edu.au (J.S. Dryzek),
hayley.stevenson@anu.edu.au (H. Stevenson).
democracy must be put on hold for the time being. I have a feeling that
climate change may be an issue as severe as a war. It may be necessary
to put democracy on hold for a while” (Guardian, 2010). Some point
to the likelihood that the East Asian approach to environmental gov-
ernance is likely to be as authoritarian as the East Asian approach
to economic development (Beeson, 2010). These treatments echo
works from the 1970s, when a discourse of limits and survival was
accompanied by calls for authoritarian government by Garrett Hardin
(1977), Robert Heilbroner (1974), William Ophuls (1977), and others.
Even if global authoritarianism were possible (which it is not), it
would still be desirable to think about global democracy first — for the
sake of legitimacy, even before we get to the question of environ-
mental performance. Conventional liberal democracy, stressing
competitive elections and individual rights under a constitution, is a
non-starter at the global level for many reasons, including its close
ties as a model to developed Western states (on this point, see also
Spagnuola, 2011). It is much more fruitful to think in terms of delib-
erative democracy. As Sen (2003) points out, democracy as voting is a
Western construct, democracy as public reason and discussion is more
universal. There is a substantial literature that points to the ecological
efficacy of deliberative democracy (Smith, 2003; Baber and Bartlett,
2005), which can be joined to an emerging literature on global delib-
erative politics (for example, Bohman, 2007).
Many international relations scholars would at this point object
that we have jumped the gun: that international politics lies in a realm
beyond authoritarianism and democracy, where international regimes
are created by negotiations between states (or through imposition by
hegemonic states), but otherwise anarchy reigns. We assume that in
light of contemporary global demands for legitimacy and account-
ability in global governance for climate change in particular (Biermann
and Gupta, 2011), such a response will not do. And it is not as though
negotiations between states have been a resounding success in

0921-8009/$ – see front matter © 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2011.01.021

Please cite this article as: Dryzek, J.S., Stevenson, H., Global democracy and earth system governance, Ecol. Econ. (2011), doi:10.1016/j.
ecolecon.2011.01.021
2 J.S. Dryzek, H. Stevenson / Ecological Economics xxx (2011) xxx–xxx
producing an international climate regime that is either effective or
legitimate.
In this article we show that recent work on the idea of a
deliberative system enables fruitful contemplation of the elements
of global democracy for earth system governance (see Biermann et al.,
2010, for an overview of earth system governance challenges). The
task of identifying the key elements and characteristics of a
deliberative system is aided by a brief review of the comparative
environmental performance of states. Who performs best, and why?
What shortcomings remain? We show in the next section that the
environmental performance of consensual democracies is generally
superior to that of adversarial democracies. However, the close
proximity between the state and civil society in consensual democ-
racies tends to thwart radical critique, which is necessary insofar as
their environmental performance remains inadequate. In a global
deliberative system, then, we should be looking for critical distance
between empowered and public space. The value in thinking
about global democracy in deliberative terms is then illustrated by
the global governance of climate change. A rudimentary deliberative
system already exists in this arena but its shortcomings are significant.
The challenge for democracy and ecologically effective climate gov-
ernance is to find ways to overcome these shortcomings.
2. Lessons from the Environmental Performance of States
To begin with the question of who does best: consensual democ-
racies consistently out-perform other kinds of states. An inspection of
the environmental performance league tables sponsored by the World
Economic Forum shows many of the top positions occupied by
European consensual democracies. (The rankings are online at http://
epi.yale.edu/Countries). Scruggs (2003) finds that there is a strong
positive association between degree of corporatism and environmen-
tal policy performance. Corporatism, a sub-category of consensual
democracy that involves joint policy making by representatives of
peak business and labour organisations and government executives,
blurs the divide between government and opposition, and often
coalition governments incorporate parties representing a broad range
of social interests. While there is little agreement on the compo-
nents of environmental performance indicators, there is a convergent
validity across the findings of studies using different sorts of indi-
cators (for further comparative studies, see Jänicke, 1992; Jahn, 1998).
Poloni-Staudinger (2008) finds that consensual democracies do better
on many pollution control measures. Of course there are other
factors that enter into explanation of cross-national variation in the
environmental performance of states. Our claim is not that consensual
democracy is the only explanatory variable that matters, merely that
it is a particularly robust predictor. When it comes to climate policy in
particular, the adversarial democracy of the UK has recently shown
signs of breaking the mould by taking a leadership position; but we
note that whatever policy commitments the labour government
(defeated in 2010) adopted, UK leadership has yet to be reflected in
outstanding performance.
What is responsible for the relatively good performance of con-
sensual democracies? It could be the efforts they make to integrate
seemingly conflicting values, which is why the discourse of ecological
modernisation, putting environmental and economic values in a
positive–sum relationship, flourishes in these states (Mol et al., 2009).
It could be their economic systems: consensual democracies tend to
have what Hall and Soskice (2001) call cooperative market econo-
mies, while adversarial democracies tend to have competitive market
economies (and so embrace neo-liberal economics).
Another possibility is that consensual systems are more deliber-
ative: that is, politics involves a greater ratio of communicative action
to strategic action than in adversarial democracies. Steiner et al.
(2004) find in their comparative study of parliamentary debates that
consensual democracies such as Switzerland and Germany feature
Please cite this article as: Dryzek, J.S., Stevenson, H., Global democracy and earth system governance, Ecol. Econ. (2011), doi:10.1016/j.
ecolecon.2011.01.021
substantially higher quality deliberation than adversarial democ-
racies such as the United States and United Kingdom. Their finding
is based on the careful application of a ‘discourse quality index’ that
codes all interventions in debates on a number of criteria derived
from Habermas' account of communicative action, and then sums the
scores and divides by the number of interventions to get an average
for the debate as a whole.
Deliberative, communicative action ought in theory to promote
environmental values because in such action, argument is effective to
the degree it proceeds in terms generalisable to all parties concerned
(Dryzek, 1987: 204–5). Ecological values are examples (of course not
the only examples) of such values, so there is every reason to expect
such values to come to the fore to the degree interchange
is deliberative. Evidence from designed deliberative ‘mini-publics’
composed of ordinary citizens on environmental issues frequently
shows that deliberation among participants induces such a green shift
(Niemeyer, 2004). So for example Fishkin (2009: 124) trumpets
the deliberative polls held on energy issues in Texas and Louisiana.
After deliberating on the energy supply issue, the citizen participants
came down decisively on the side of greater investment in renewable
energy and conservation — and the Texas state government adopted
some of the recommendations. Dryzek et al. (2009) show that mini-
publics organised on the issue of genetically modified foods in many
countries almost always come to conclusions that are more precau-
tionary than the Promethean commitments of political elites, who
are much more inclined to favour GM agriculture as an ingredient of
conventional economic growth.
A more subtle analysis of both the ecological effectiveness of
consensual states and its limits is made possible by taking a look at
historical dynamics. Consider the environmental histories of Norway
and (West) Germany, as analysed in Dryzek et al. (2003). Norway
exemplifies the actively inclusive consensual state. Formations that
in other countries inspire and constitute social movements are in
Norway integrated into the state from the very beginning. So from
the early 1970s, environmentalists participated in key policy making
committees, and were funded by government. The membership of
these organisations has always been tiny, as they do not need mem-
bers. While all this may look exemplary, what it means is that
Norway can institutionalise only moderate forms of environmental-
ism and ecological modernisation. In contrast, Germany for a long
time featured a lively green public sphere mobilising large numbers
of activists, organisations, and ecological research institutes at a
distance from the state. Until the mid 1980s, Germany's corporatist
system of government was closed to environmentalists (and other
social movements outside the traditional corporatist triumvirate of
government executives, business, and labour). It was in Germany's
oppositional green public sphere that some of the most profound and
thoroughgoing green critiques of the political economy were gener-
ated. Since the mid-1980s many activists made the long March from
oppositional public sphere to state institutions, as Germany's corporatist
system opened up. But many of these activists carried at least a memory
of radical critique.
If the performance of even the best consensual states is ecologically
inadequate, then such radical critique is a necessity. And if consensual
states cannot generate this kind of critique themselves, they must
import it from elsewhere. Or to put it slightly differently, in a way that
will support some generalisations we will make in a moment, effective
environmental governance benefits from both deliberative empowered
space and deliberative public space at a critical distance. Any consensual
government in empowered space should be linked to contestation in
public space. This insight can be applied to governance of any kind and
level: from the local to the global, from sovereign government to
informal networks.
These generalisations drawn from comparative studies of states
will not automatically apply to the structurally different international
global polity (for which we can have no direct cross-sectional
 J.S. Dryzek, H. Stevenson / Ecological Economics xxx (2011) xxx–xxx
comparative evidence, because there is only one international polity).
We can be confident in making the extrapolation to the interna-
tional polity only to the extent the mechanisms that explain the superior
performance of deliberative processes at national and sub-national
levels can also be found in the international polity. Abstracting from
the prior discussion and the larger literature, the four most important
mechanisms are:
1. Integration of multiple perspectives on complex issues.
2. Prioritisation of public goods and generalisable interests over sectional
interests.
3. Facilitation of positive sum discourses such as ecological
modernization.
4. Co-existence of moments of consensus and contestation.
All four are in fact readily found at the global level. Indeed, precisely
because there is no central executive authority that can impose
solutions and so pre-empt deliberative resolution, they may be more
readily available in international affairs than in many states — especially
when it comes to environmental issues. We stress availability rather
than actuality because existing global climate politics does not feature
full realisation of any of these four mechanisms. In the recent UNFCCC
negotiations, the most problematic of these mechanisms has been (2),
as competing sectional interests have stymied effective global agree-
ment. Yet even here we note that powerful interests often couch their
arguments in generalisable terms. So China and the G77 make appeals
that justify their negotiating position in terms of generalisable notions
of climate justice. Our point is not that the existing global governance is
deliberative and effective, but that it could become more so. To show
how, we now introduce the idea of a deliberative system that would
provide a home for all four mechanisms.
3. The Deliberative System
The notion of a deliberative system was first introduced by
Mansbridge (1999). Hers and subsequent treatments by Parkinson
(2006), Hendriks (2006) and Goodin (2005) were limited by their
close ties to the institutions of a liberal democratic state. A more
generally applicable conceptualisation of a deliberative system
(presented initially in Dryzek, 2009) proceeds with the following
elements. While consistent with the deliberative approaches to global
democracy surveyed by Smith and Brassett (2008), this conceptual-
ization is novel in its use of the system framing.
3.1. Public Space
In public space a diversity of viewpoints and discourses can interact,
ideally without legal restriction. Discourses might be engaged by
activists, social movements, journalists, bloggers, or ordinary citizens.
Spaces might exist or be created in connection with, for example,
physical places (classrooms, bars, and cafés), virtual locations (internet
forums), the media, social movements, public hearings, and designed
citizen forums.
3.2. Empowered Space
Empowered space is where authoritative collective decisions get
produced, and can feature, for example, legislatures, constitutional
courts, corporatist councils, empowered stakeholder dialogues,
international negotiations, governance networks, or international
organisations. Empowered space in some kinds of governance
arrangements may take on a more informal character (for example,
in many of the cases of community-based governance of common
pool resources described by Ostrom (1990)).
Please cite this article as: Dryzek, J.S., Stevenson, H., Global democracy and earth system governance, Ecol. Econ. (2011), doi:10.1016/j.
ecolecon.2011.01.021
3
3.3. Transmission
Public space can influence empowered space through for example
political campaigns, the argument and rhetoric of political activists,
and cultural change initiated by social movements that eventually
changes the outlooks of those in empowered space.
3.4. Accountability
Democratic legitimacy requires that empowered space be held
accountable to public space.1 The most common means within democ-
ratic states is through elections, though these are not necessarily very
deliberative affairs. But accountability means, quite literally, having to
give an account; it does not have to involve the possibility of sanction
through, for example, removal from office.2
3.5. Meta-Deliberation
Meta-deliberation is the reflexive capacity of those in the
deliberative system to contemplate the way that system is itself
organised, and if necessary change its structure. As Thompson (2008:
15) puts it, not all practises and arrangements need to be deliberative
all the time, but they do need to be justifiable in deliberative terms.
3.6. Decisiveness
The deliberative system should be consequential when it comes to
the content of collective outcomes. That is, deliberation should not be
a sideshow that obscures where key decisions actually get made. This
sixth aspect drives home the idea that democratic deliberation should
be consequential as well as authentic and inclusive.
This conceptualization of the deliberative system yields a general
template for the analysis and evaluation of any real-world political
process. Its underpinning is the philosophical claim (which has
empirical support) that deliberative democracy yields legitimate
outcomes. In the context of environmental affairs in particular, the
desirability of its applicability rests in addition on both theoretical and
empirical claims about the efficacy of deliberative democracy in
resolving complex problems and providing public goods. The
conceptualization is not in itself a normative model because there
are many different ways each of the elements could conceivably be
realised.
This kind of thinking can be applied to all kinds of settings,
including ‘post-Westphalian’ ones involving transnational networked
governance (Braithwaite, 2007), whose democratisation turns on a
differentiation of empowered space and public space within the
network, and the presence of contestation within public space. Such
contestation can be impeded by discursive hegemony; so it is
important to have multiple and contesting discourses, engaged by
all those affected by network decisions (or their representatives).
Hegemony characterised global financial networks prior to the crash
of 2008. Such public space as did exist was populated by financial
journalists and other cheerleaders for the dominant discourse.
Criticism of the system that did occur was at an irrelevant distance
with no impact on the production of collective outcomes in the
network.
1
As Mitchell (2011) notes , transparency is essential for accountability because
actors can only be called on to give an account of behaviour that they are known to be
engaged in.
2
Although sanctions are a central element of many accountability models, they are
not a strictly necessary element. As a result of the social justice advocacy carried out by
NGOs, transnational institutions are increasingly forced to justify their actions in terms
of a range of discourses. Little or no sanctioning power is available to these NGOs, but
their actions make the world more democratic than it would otherwise be (Dryzek and
Niemeyer, 2008: 491).
4 J.S. Dryzek, H. Stevenson / Ecological Economics xxx (2011) xxx–xxx

In the following section, we use this theoretical account of a and enacted within the parameters of existing institutions and power
deliberative system to analyse, evaluate, and provide prescriptions for structures. The progressive position is that the existing distribution of
democratising the global governance of climate change. power is inadequate and inappropriate. Authority for designing and
enacting strategies should thus be shared with, or transferred to,
presently disempowered actors at global, national, or local levels.
4. The Global Governance of Climate Change
Bringing together these two analytical dimensions (the economic
and the political) generates a four-cell typology of climate discourses,
4.1. Public Space
as shown in Fig. 1. The discourses captured in this typology are those
that accept the hypothesis of anthropogenic climate change as valid
The public space of global climate governance is populated by a
and thus engage with the debate of how the international community
large and diverse range of civil society and commercial actors, in-
should respond to the problem. In the background there is a persistent
cluding business leaders, entrepreneurs, activists, church groups,
discourse of scepticism of the existence of climate change and denial
youth groups, trade unions, non-government organisations, journal-
of the need to do much about it.
ists, and bloggers (sometimes grouped under the heading of global
civil society). Major inequalities of access to global public space exist
4.1.1. Mainstream Sustainability
(as they of course do nationally). Nevertheless it is plausible to think
The first class of climate discourses is economically reformist and
in terms of representation of the discourses that go some way toward
politically conservative. Action to address climate change can be defined
capturing the diversity of values, interests, and needs of the world's
within the parameters of the existing economic order by actors and
peoples — including (as we will show) the least advantaged and most
institutions already endowed with power and authority. Competition
vulnerable to the effects of climate change. So rather than attempt
and the profit motive are inherent in human relations, but sustainability
to define the contributions of all the various actors, a more fruitful
and material growth prove compatible. When adaptation is recognised
exercise is to identify the set of discourses represented within the
by these discourses it tends to be understood in terms of development
public space. This move is consistent with normative theories of
and risk management. Three distinct discourses within this category
deliberative democracy that emphasise de-centred communication
diverge in terms of how and why climate change ought to be absorbed
within the broad public sphere (Benhabib, 1996; Habermas, 1996;
into existing development.
Dryzek, 2000). The growing range of issues being absorbed into the
climate agenda has been accompanied by a growing number of
4.1.1.1. Climate Marketisation. All aspects of global climate governance
climate discourses. Identifying the character of distinct discourses and
can effectively be brought under the logic of the market. Emissions
their inter-relationships is important for assessing the health of the
can be reduced most efficiently through cap and trade schemes. Carbon
public space itself, as well as the inclusiveness of representation in the
emitted through deforestation can be reduced by creating market
wider deliberative system. The programme of side events that runs
mechanisms that make it more profitable for landowners to keep their
alongside the annual Conference of the Parties to the United Nations
trees in the ground rather than fell them. Emissions-intensive industries
Framework Convention on Climate Change is a good place to examine
and environmentally-conscious individuals can then purchase offsets
empirically the discourses found in public space. A discourse analysis
that negate the impact of their emissions — the environment benefits
of applications for the side event programme of the Conference of
and nobody loses. Global carbon markets would allow impoverished
the Parties (COP-15) in 2009 in Copenhagen points to the following
communities in the global south to profit by auctioning their inac-
patterns.3
cessible allocations of atmospheric space. Development and climate
Climate discourses can be classified on two dimensions: one broadly
change mitigation are thus rendered compatible. The market can also
economic and the other broadly political. The economic orientation can
be extended to adaptation. Vulnerability of life and property can be
be understood as either reformist or radical in relation to the parameters
ameliorated through climate insurance, which transfers the risk to a
of the existing liberal capitalist international economic system.
commercial entity. Businesses are motivated to contribute to mitigation
Reformists accept these basic parameters. From a radical perspective,
due to a desire to profit from new markets, compliance with legislation,
existing economic objectives and values are themselves deeply im-
propagating a responsible image, and genuine concerns about climate
plicated in the problem of climate change and ought to be the focus of
change. While the agency of business is stressed, governments too
more transformative actions.
have a role in creating markets in emissions and offsets.
The political orientation of climate discourses can be understood
Ecological modernisation is based on the premise that economic
as either conservative or progressive. The conservative position
development and climate change mitigation can be mutually support-
envisages that strategies to address climate change will be designed
ive. Reducing greenhouse gas emissions presents an opportunity for
3
efficient and productive economies in which green technologies become
The Secretariat received 560 applications for side events at COP15. The compiled
the motor of economic development. Recognising that “pollution
list of applicants was used to generate a sample for analysis. For the purpose of
identifying discourses in public space, events proposed by government or inter- prevention pays” will spur a shift away from emissions-intensive pro-
governmental agencies were excluded, as were multiple proposals by the same duction towards technologies such as renewable energy, biochar, and
organisation. The remaining 344 applicants were categorised on the basis of their
principal theme (for example, justice, spirituality, adaptation, indigenous peoples,
forests, financing, security, and technology), to ensure that the sample was Economic Orientation
representative of all key topics. From these categorised events, a sample of 120 Reformist Radical
applicants was selected for a discourse analysis. The selection was affected by two
limitations: material for analysis had to be available on the internet, and it had to be
available in a language in which at least one author is proficient (English and Spanish). Mainstream Limits
Conservative Sustainability
Materials were sourced from applicant organisations' websites for analysis. The
majority of these materials were written texts (declarations, information brochures
and publicity, press releases, UNFCCC written submissions, website text, research and Political
Orientation
position briefings, and magazine articles); there were also a few posters and videos in
the sample. These materials provided the basis for identifying and recording the Expansive Green
Progressive
constitutive elements of discourses (ontology; assumptions about natural conditions Sustainability Radicalism
and relationships; agents and their motives; and key metaphors) (see Dryzek, 2005:
17–19). The overall message of each piece of material was also recorded to assist with
identifying patterns across them. The patterns discussed in this article were discerned
from this data. Fig. 1. Classifying climate discourses.

Please cite this article as: Dryzek, J.S., Stevenson, H., Global democracy and earth system governance, Ecol. Econ. (2011), doi:10.1016/j.
ecolecon.2011.01.021
 J.S. Dryzek, H. Stevenson / Ecological Economics xxx (2011) xxx–xxx
carbon sequestration. But market forces alone will not propel this
modernisation process. In the absence of appropriate policy and
regulation, climate-friendly technologies and services will not be able
to compete. Governments thus have a vital role to play in enabling
ecologically as well as economically rational decisions from the private
sector. This requires internationally negotiated GHG stabilisation
targets, voluntary or mandatory sectoral standards, a monetary value
applied to greenhouse gases, publicly-funded research and develop-
ment, and strong intellectual property rights regimes.
Energy security interprets climate change through the prism of
existing energy and security concerns. This discourse, increasingly
salient in the United States during recent years (Schlosberg and
Rinfret, 2008), focuses on opportunities presented by the climate
challenge for promoting changes in the supply and source of energy.
The energy responsible for emitting carbon dioxide is the same energy
imported from politically and economically volatile regions. A safe
climate is thus synonymous with energy independence and domestic
security. Maximising efficiency and domestic renewable energy are
justified for reasons largely unrelated to ecological and climate
concerns. For some, all this lends new legitimacy to nuclear power.
Energy security emphasises the agency of national policy-makers,
whose decisions affect both climate and security. These actors are
primarily motivated by a concern for economic growth and national
security.
4.1.2. Expansive Sustainability
The second class of climate discourses is economically reformist
but politically progressive in its stress on a redistribution of power.
4.1.2.1. Equitable Modernisation. Climate change mitigation is poten-
tially profitable so it can be reconciled with decarbonised economic
development. However, unlike ecological modernisation, the objec-
tive should not be simply decoupling profit and pollution within
industrial economies; instead, modernisation should serve human
rights and needs while evening out inequalities between industria-
lised and developing countries. This may require carefully designed
and monitored market mechanisms, or transfer of mitigation and
adaptation technology from north to south. In contrast to ecological
modernisation, equitable modernisation perceives intellectual prop-
erty rights as an obstacle to modernisation. Wealthy governments
thus have a duty to transfer technology to developing countries so
that future development and trade can occur on a clean and even
playing field. A wider range of actors should be drawn into decision-
making. Thus this discourse recognises the potential agency of (for
example) local communities, indigenous peoples, forest-dependent
populations, youth, and non-government organisations. Mobilising
their agency requires a shift away from traditional decision-making
processes that favour distant authorities in favour of mutual learning
and capacity building among many actors at different levels.
Natural integrity accepts ‘sustainable growth’ but insists that
strategies for addressing climate change while promoting ‘green
capitalism’ should aim as far as possible to maintain the integrity of
the natural world and to empower its advocates. The natural world
provides services that ought to be valued as an alternative to arti-
ficially manufactured strategies and products. Manipulating natural
processes through genetic engineering or the displacement of organic
products for synthetic ones may yield unexpected adverse conse-
quences due to the inherent complexity of ecosystems. The agency of
national policy-makers is highlighted. Recognised but condemned is
the agency of unscrupulous corporate actors that seek to profit by
promoting mitigation strategies involving manipulation of natural
processes.
4.1.3. Limits Discourse
The third class of climate discourses is economically radical yet
politically conservative.
Please cite this article as: Dryzek, J.S., Stevenson, H., Global democracy and earth system governance, Ecol. Econ. (2011), doi:10.1016/j.
ecolecon.2011.01.021
5
Reorienting society questions the viability and/or desirability of
existing neoliberal development, criticising unconstrained economic
growth, population growth, meat consumption, and profligate
material consumption. But although the economy needs to be radically
reorganised, this does not require a redistribution of power. Changes can
be implemented either under the guidance of existing authorities or by
non-authoritative actors voluntarily modifying their own behaviour.
Political leaders should legislate and devise multilateral agreements
against unsustainable practises. Responsibility also lies in the hands
of ordinary individuals who are assumed to have the capacity to
reorganise their behaviour in accordance with the planet's ecological
limits. Religious leaders may also help guide society towards a more
sustainable future. Adaptation is represented not as a mere risk
management, but as coping with destabilisation attending massive
human displacement and conflict over resources. The military may be an
important agent here.
4.1.4. Green Radicalism
A fourth class of discourses is economically radical and politically
progressive, seeking fundamental reorientation of economic develop-
ment. Unconstrained material growth cannot be reconciled with a safe
climate and sustainability. Such changes demand a redistribution of
power away from presently dominant authorities. Concerns relating to
human rights, justice, and equity are prioritised over short-term
economic concerns. Green radicalism focuses on the political and
economic structural causes of climate change.
Ecofeminism connects climate injustice and gender injustice.
Ecofeminists observe that institutions are overwhelmingly dominated
by masculine interests, concerns, and rationality. Government delega-
tions to the UNFCCC are largely composed of men, as are the scientists
and economists advising these negotiators, even NGO representatives
(MacGregor, 2010; Boyd, 2002). Existing governance arrangements
thus tend to marginalise women and their concerns and experiences,
including their increased vulnerability to both climate change and
mitigation measures (MacGregor, 2010). Adequately responding to
climate change requires fundamental transformation of patriarchal
institutions.
Radical decentralisation, “small is beautiful”, identifies the structural
cause of climate change in a model of development that privileges
industrial-scale production, which therefore needs replacing by small
and local scale production. Present global governance arrangements are
dominated by big businesses, state elites, and international institutions.
Community-level development, mitigation, and adaptation can better
respond to human needs and the environment. Carbon markets and
offsetting are rejected because they shift responsibility and account-
ability away from the local level. Decision-making processes also need to
be de-centralised to allow for genuine participation by marginalised and
affected peoples.
New globalism avers that an effective and just response to climate
change will only be possible if the presently unequal international
system is transformed into an equitable global community, featuring a
low-carbon economy that is socially and ecologically sustainable. Basic
human needs should be prioritised over material wealth. In principle,
a per capita allocation basis for greenhouse gas emissions may be
appropriate but global equity may in some instances require preferen-
tial treatment for vulnerable and marginalised people. Governance
within a new global community ought to be democratic and foster
cooperation between individuals, cultures, nations, social movements,
and NGOs. Existing institutions are clearly unable to deliver such a fair
and sustainable economic and political order; instead, citizens and civil
society can drive the transition.
The presence of such a wide range of discourses, some of which
stand at a healthy critical distance from empowered space, is one
indication of vibrant public space. But this in itself is insufficient. A
well-functioning public space should also feature engagement of
discourses in such a way that induces critical reflection on the part of
6 J.S. Dryzek, H. Stevenson / Ecological Economics xxx (2011) xxx–xxx
people articulating different discourses. Diverse groups and indivi-
duals are active in the public space of global climate governance, but
the level of genuine inter-discourse engagement remains quite low.
As we have demonstrated elsewhere (Stevenson and Dryzek, 2010),
enclaves of like-minded individuals are pervasive. For example, the
Klimaforum civil society forum that paralleled the COP-15 negotia-
tions in Copenhagen featured almost exclusively green radical
discourses. Enclave deliberation has its place (Karpowitz et al.,
2009), but in light of the requirements of a deliberative system,
only as a place for creating competence prior to engagement with
other discourses. A further problem is that organised scepticism can
undermine the authenticity of deliberation in public space by seeking
to discredit the climate science that informs many of the discourses
we have highlighted; and scientists have often responded with
dogmatic assertion, rather than admit real uncertainties.
4.2. Empowered Space
Authoritative decisions on climate change are made in a number of
venues. From a deliberative democratic perspective, these decisions
may be considered legitimate to the extent they reflect inclusive and
authentic dialogue responsive to the needs of all affected parties.
There are three principal empowered spaces in global climate
governance: state-based multilateral arrangements; network-based
arrangements that coordinate the activities of private or public and
private actors; and market-based arrangements (see Pattberg and
Stripple, 2008; Andonova et al., 2009). The deliberative legitimacy of
each of these merits close empirical inquiry, which is beyond the
scope of a single article. Given the present space constraints, we
report an empirical analysis of just one empowered space: the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), in
which member states meet (sometimes several times a year) to define
and refine collective agreements for mitigating and adapting to
climate change. The UNFCCC features a lot of bargaining. While
deliberative theorists have traditionally contrasted bargaining and
deliberation, the two might legitimately co-exist (Mansbridge, 2009)
and frequently do so in multilateral negotiations (Risse, 2000).
Mansbridge defines deliberative negotiations as those open to all
potentially affected by a decision, in which all participants speak
truthfully, are treated with mutual respect, protected by basic rights,
and have equal resources and an equal opportunity to influence the
process. Participants should also exchange reasons that are mutually
comprehensible and acceptable, and seek a desired outcome through
mutual justification rather than coercion (threats, sanctions, and
manipulation) (Mansbridge, 2009: 2).
Assessing the authenticity of negotiations against the criteria
identified by Mansbridge is rendered difficult by the closed nature of
much of the UNFCCC negotiation. Such assessments must therefore rely
on the accounts of negotiators and privileged UNFCCC staff.4 Interviews
carried out by the authors with senior negotiators in the two-track
process set out in the Bali Action Plan,5 reveal that deliberative quality is
quite low:
4.2.1. Participation
Among those interviewed there was fairly broad agreement that
although the debates and negotiations are procedurally open, a
4
However, negotiations frequently feature a pre-negotiating phase of open debate
and this may also offer an insight into the authenticity of deliberation. Information on
the methods available for analysing such open debate is provided at bhttp://
deliberativedemocracy.anu.edu.au/ccglobalGovernance.htmlN.
5
Eighteen negotiators were interviewed either in person or by telephone between
September 2009 and July 2010. Anonymity was assured. Interviewees represented
thirteen different parties, however several spoke from the perspective of their
negotiating bloc rather than their individual party. Interviews lasted between fifteen
and forty-five minutes and were structured around six questions pertaining to the
indicators of deliberative quality.
Please cite this article as: Dryzek, J.S., Stevenson, H., Global democracy and earth system governance, Ecol. Econ. (2011), doi:10.1016/j.
ecolecon.2011.01.021
number of factors impact on parties' capacity to participate. Small,
poor, and non-Anglophone parties are at a disadvantage, which is only
partly mitigated by formal rules and provisions. Limits apply to the
number of contact group meetings that may be held simultaneously,
but this rule does not extend to informal meetings. The Secretariat
covers the cost of two delegates from each least developed country to
attend UNFCCC sessions, but there are frequently more than two
formal or informal meetings running simultaneously. The challenges
facing small delegations are not only logistical; large inter-ministerial
delegations obviously have a greater capacity to genuinely participate
in all political, technical, and legal aspects of a debate than do small
specialised delegations. Interpretation between the six languages of
the United Nations is provided, but only in high-level plenary
sessions. Actual negotiations are conducted in English and no formal
interpretation is provided (while it might be assumed that senior
delegates are all adequately proficient in English, this is not so).
Several interviewees commented that parties tend to ‘know their
place’ and understand that when decisions need to be made only a
small number of parties will be actively involved.
4.2.2. Truthfulness
Perceptions of truthfulness in negotiations are affected by the level
of trust that exists between parties, as well as between parties
and chairs. Among those interviewed, none claimed that a high level
of trust exists among participants of UNFCCC negotiations. However,
a couple observed that it is higher than generally assumed. Most
claimed that the level of trust varies across issue areas. Several
observed that trust is low or entirely absent for reasons ranging from
previous broken promises (in the UNFCCC and other fora); suspicions
that some parties seek to abolish existing mandates and agreements;
and perceptions that some negotiators were failing to represent
their states' views by promoting more extreme positions than their
ministers. Lack of trust was cited as an issue between and within the
north and south; within some negotiating blocs; between parties and
chairs6; and between parties and civil society observers. One
interviewee was more sceptical and suggested that parties tend to
use the trust issue as a negotiating tool to resist pressure to increase
their commitments. Beyond the impact of trust, truthfulness in the
UNFCCC is affected by the nuances of negotiation norms. Negotiating
in bad faith is considered a ‘cardinal sin’ but it is expected and
accepted that negotiators will maintain reserved positions until the
final stage of negotiation. Similarly, several interviewees observed
that parties may hide their true positions in the presence of observers
but speak more openly behind closed doors.
4.2.3. Respect
Despite the widely recorded lack of trust, most interviewees
agreed that negotiators generally treat one another with a high level
of respect. Although there are frequently disagreements over
positions, this rarely results in personal disrespect. Many empathised
with their colleagues and recognised that unfavourable positions
could not be associated with the speaker. However, several admitted
that it is difficult to separate the person from the position, and/or
observed rare bad behaviour (pulling faces, making blunt comments
while someone is talking, and temper tantrums). More positively,
many interviewees commented on the collegiality and even friend-
ships that have developed among long-serving negotiators and
diplomats, which is seen to aid the negotiating process.
4.2.4. Justification
Observations of the level and quality of reason-giving in UNFCCC
negotiations were quite mixed. Many claimed that the mutual
exchange of reasons was quite prevalent, citing that diplomats have
6
This observation was not explicitly made in relation to the present chairs.
 J.S. Dryzek, H. Stevenson / Ecological Economics xxx (2011) xxx–xxx
a talent for making compelling cases. However, this claim was often
qualified with observations that reasons were provided ad nauseam
without actually listening and reflecting. Some suggested that the
extent of reason-giving depends on the nature of the underlying
reasons: scientifically or morally legitimate positions tend to be
explained, but not purely strategic positions. Of course, the general
lack of trust impacts on this indicator of deliberative quality: there are
sometimes suspicions that the reasons provided are insincere or
incomplete. One interviewee noted that the culture of mistrust made
it hard to seek explanations because to do so may be perceived as
cruel, harsh, or negative, or even as a lack of one's own political will to
allow progress. While some suggested that informal corridor
conversations were useful for understanding the reasons behind
parties' positions, several observed that time constraints preclude
seeking or exchanging reasons because delegates are constantly
rushing between meetings. According to a couple of interviewees,
delegates sometimes are simply unable to provide reasons because
they do not adequately understand the issue or position; for example,
diplomats cannot express technical reasons, and technical delegates
cannot express political reasons. A few interviewees drew a
distinction between reasoned and rational positions and ideological
ones: open plenary can be a venue for venting ideological statements
(perhaps for domestic audiences), while behind closed doors
delegates will move beyond these given that it is not possible to
reach agreement on the basis of ideology. A couple articulated this
distinction in north/south terms, or associated ideology only with
seemingly unconstructive positions such as the rejection of markets or
the focus on historical responsibility.
4.2.5. Mutual Justification Without Coercion/Threats
Deliberative negotiations are those that seek a desired outcome
through mutual justification rather than coercion (Mansbridge, 2009:
2). According to the observations of interviewees, the UNFCCC does
not perform well on this condition. Several commented that the
process is one of give-and-take in which the best outcome is one in
which everyone is unhappy. Often this results in lowering ambitions
to the lowest common denominator by finding the most flexible
language (or ‘constructive ambiguities’) that all parties can live with.
‘Constructive ambiguities’ may be particularly useful in interim texts
(although they may also be found in final agreements), but one
negotiator observed that there is frequently no scope for compromise
or ambiguous language, for instance when the decision concerns
creating a particular board or a mechanism, or not. Delegates are
reportedly rarely persuaded by the force of the better argument but
rather come into the negotiations knowing their thresholds of
acceptability. Shifts that do occur tend to concern minor details of
mechanisms and procedures. A few were more sanguine noting that
good ideas can get traction; the paradox, according to one interview-
ee, is that good ideas are less likely to prevail later in the process once
suspicion sets in, but if introduced early on there is a larger pool of
competing ideas in which good ones may be lost. The absence of
threats, sanctions, and manipulation is crucial in deliberation, yet such
instances were observed by two interviewees. One cited threats being
issued in corridors (if your party does not pull back on issue x, we will
raise issues z and y that will be very inconvenient for you). Another
claimed that pressure had been externally exerted on the leaders of
small states to vocally support the less ambitious position of a more
powerful state.
On the basis of our interviews, debate and negotiation in the
UNFCCC appear to perform weakly against the standards of authentic
deliberation.
4.3. Transmission, Accountability, and Meta-deliberation
Transmission, accountability, and meta-deliberation features of
the deliberative system will manifest differently in the context of the
Please cite this article as: Dryzek, J.S., Stevenson, H., Global democracy and earth system governance, Ecol. Econ. (2011), doi:10.1016/j.
ecolecon.2011.01.021
7
empowered spaces identified in the previous section. The following
account refers only to the multilateral empowered space of the
UNFCCC.
The means of transmission from the engagement of discourses in
public space to empowered space are many and varied. An inside/
outside distinction can be drawn between the strategies used by
actors in public space to transmit ideas to the empowered space of the
UNFCCC (Fisher, 2010). Those outside the UNFCCC tend to engage in
protest, publicity, and performance outside the venues of actual
negotiations as well as in activists' home countries as they seek to
influence the positions of their governments prior to international
meetings. Insider status is secured through the observer accreditation
process of the UNFCCC secretariat. Close to one thousand organisa-
tions (business and industry groups, environmental organisations,
local governments, research institutions, trade union associations, and
women, youth, and church groups) have taken advantage of this
opportunity to gain access to the venue of UNFCCC meetings
(UNFCCC, 2010). We can think of them as representatives of particular
discourses (though that is not how they think of themselves). Once
inside, their access is confined to open meetings (formal and informal
plenary sessions, workshops, and side events). Influence within these
confines is pursued in a variety of ways. Developing relationships with
governments may eventually yield a coveted ‘pink badge’, which
denotes membership of a government delegation and widens the
scope of access to talks and negotiations. In some cases, NGOs may
also sponsor a delegate for a Least Developed Country delegation to
bolster the inadequate representation assured by the UNFCCC
Secretariat. The Climate Action Network has sought to convey its
ideas by distributing a daily newsletter, Eco, which ridicules, shames,
and occasionally praises, the positions of specific countries. Other
organisations and networks opt to hover outside closed meeting
rooms to present departing delegates with suggested negotiating
texts.
There is some blurring of the inside/outside distinction as actors
on the ‘inside’ do sometimes employ strategies of performance,
publicity, and protest, such as the Fossil of the Day awards ceremony
conducted by the Climate Action Network. Another blurring of the
inside/outside distinction stems from the efforts of some ‘post-
neoliberal’ governments to establish relationships with social move-
ments representing Green Radical discourses. The Bolivian president,
Evo Morales, with the support of Venezuela, Cuba, Ecuador, and
Nicaragua, has been the driving force of this ‘discourse coalition’
(Hajer, 1995). Through public meetings and the commissioning of a
negotiating text drafting group in Copenhagen, as well as the
convening of a World People's Summit on Climate Change and Mother
Earth Rights in the Bolivian city of Cochabamba in 2010, Bolivia has
sought to bring the voice of one version of ‘the people’ to the
empowered space of the UNFCCC (Stevenson, 2010). But the receptive-
ness of this empowered space to marginal discourses remains limited.
Evaluating the observed transmission is not simply a task of applying
categorical criteria from deliberative democratic theory. Thinking in
systemic terms, a systemic test may be more appropriate than a
categorical test. We should ask not only whether transmission
mechanisms are themselves deliberative, but also whether these
mechanisms help create and constitute an effective deliberative system
for governing climate change. Protests may be non-deliberative in
themselves, while at the same time promoting the deliberativeness
of the larger system.
Accountability mechanisms in global climate governance are quite
weak. Within states, the main accountability mechanism is that of
elections, as voters can hold governments to account for their actions.
Elections do not of course exist in global governance. National elec-
tions make very little contribution to transnational accountability,
except at two removes: negotiators are accountable to their own
governments, who in turn are sometimes accountable to voters.
Within the UNFCCC, the principal accountability mechanism is the
8 J.S. Dryzek, H. Stevenson / Ecological Economics xxx (2011) xxx–xxx
Compliance Committee of the Kyoto Protocol, comprising a Facilita-
tive Branch and an Enforcement Branch. The former is designed to
support parties in complying with their commitments, while the
latter branch may impose ‘consequences’ on parties in the second
commitment period of the Protocol in the event of non-compliance in
the first commitment period. Specifically, failure to comply with an
emission reduction or limitation commitment will result in a 30%
deduction from a party's assigned emissions in the second commit-
ment period of the Kyoto Protocol; in addition, the non-complying
party is required to submit a compliance action plan, and will be
rendered ineligible to participate in emissions trading (Stokke et al.,
2005: 1–3; Yamin and Depledge, 2004: chapter 12). As the future of
the Kyoto Protocol remains uncertain, it is unclear whether this
compliance system will be of any consequence.
Opportunities for those in the empowered space of the UNFCCC
to provide a more direct public account of their positions and
decisions are minimal but not absent. At their own discretion, national
delegations may arrange briefing sessions during international
climate talks to update their compatriots within civil society, and
respond to questions about their own position and that of other
parties. In addition, an increasing number of government delegations,
as the well as the UNFCCC Secretariat and observers, arrange press
briefings during the annual conferences of the parties and inter-
conference negotiating sessions. Again, these briefings are at parties'
own discretion but they do allow parties and negotiation groups to
explain their positions and respond to questions from the media.
Access is restricted to accredited journalists so the potential for these
briefings to serve as an accountability mechanism is dependent on
critical and capable media representation. The growing number of
activist media groups enhances the diversity of questions directed at
governments during press briefings, but the exclusive nature of press
and observer briefings, together with the absence of any sanctioning
power, limits accountability.
The style of briefing described here reflects what Mansbridge has
called ‘narrative accountability’ rather than ‘deliberative accountability’.
Narrative accountability is a one-way process in which the represen-
tative provides the represented with an account or explanation of
their actions. Some negotiators are expected by their governments to
remember storylines about the government's positioning: as front-
runner, as vulnerable, as mainstream, or as objector. Deliberative
accountability, by contrast, involves two-way communication between
the representative and the represented in which both ask questions and
give answers (Mansbridge, 2009: 384). In enhancing the deliberative
democratic capacity of global climate governance, special attention will
need to be directed to institutionalising opportunities for deliberative
accountability.
Meta-deliberation is weak. There is no developed reflexive capacity
to work on the deliberative system itself. In one sense this is not
surprising because no important actors explicitly conceive of the
global governance of climate change in the systemic deliberative
terms set out in this article. However, in the aftermath of Copenhagen
much attention has been focused on the perceived deficiencies of the
empowered space of the UNFCCC. Two features in particular have
been the subject of debate: representation and decision-making. In
the now infamous final plenary of the fifteenth Conference of the
Parties, a handful of countries including Tuvalu, Venezuela, Bolivia,
Ecuador, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Sudan rejected the negotiated text not
only on the basis of its contents but also for the exclusive manner in
which it was drafted and presented to the world as a finalised deal
prior to consideration by all parties (UNFCCC, 2009). Although it is not
unusual for negotiations to move to smaller groups of Friends of the
Chair or President, what appears to be crucial is that adequate
representation of positions (and discourses) is assured and that all
parties be provided an opportunity to consider a document before it is
adopted. Both of these requirements were violated in the final days of
the Copenhagen climate meeting. In the first instance, the ALBA
Please cite this article as: Dryzek, J.S., Stevenson, H., Global democracy and earth system governance, Ecol. Econ. (2011), doi:10.1016/j.
ecolecon.2011.01.021
countries,7 many of whom espouse a post-neoliberal and anti-
capitalist position, were not represented in the smaller negotiating
group, which appears to be based on a representation of regions rather
than discourses.8 In the second instance, US President Barack Obama
announced to the world that a deal had been reached before this
document was presented to the parties for consideration.
The impact of this controversy on the outcome of the meeting was
profound given that the Conference of the Parties operates on the
basis of consensus (in that if any party vocally objects to any clause,
that objection must somehow be accommodated). At the beginning of
the Copenhagen meeting, the chief negotiator for Papua New Guinea,
Kevin Conrad, made an impassioned plea to adopt the rule on voting
which had been consistently disallowed since the parties failed to
adopt the Rules of Procedure in 1995 (Yamin and Depledge, 2004:
432). He argued that ‘consensus means that any agreement here can
only aspire to the lowest common denominator amongst us. From our
perspective…making decisions based only on the lowest common
denominator is beyond irresponsible, it's gravely negligent’ (Conrad,
2009). Yet the consensus requirement means that there has to be a lot
of persuasion of actors on points that matter to them. Such persuasion
might be coercive, but it might also involve reason giving that induces
reflection. The problem remains that states (such as Saudi Arabia)
interested only in blocking progress have every incentive to object
frequently. If the rule had been implemented as Conrad proposed, the
Copenhagen Accord would have been adopted rather than merely
‘taken note of’, as it was supported by more than three-quarters of
the parties. Of course, as dissenting parties pointed out in the final
plenary, even if it had been adopted, the Copenhagen Accord would
not achieve its stated objective of keeping global warming to below
2 °C. In fact, scientists estimate that the emission pledges accompa-
nying the accord imply a greater than 50% chance that global
temperatures will exceed 3 °C by 2100 (Rogelj et al., 2010).
What these two controversies over representation and decision-
making ultimately point to is the need for better contemplation of
how global climate governance is organised. Such contemplation has
occurred when it comes to the governance of the global economic and
financial order, ever since the Bretton Woods conference of 1945. By
contrast, the current system for climate governance arose in very
haphazard fashion. As we pointed out earlier, not all arrangements
need be deliberative all the time, but they must be amenable to
deliberative justification.
Even after lapses in transmission, accountability, and meta-deliber-
ation, the global deliberative system for climate change governance
often fails to be decisive when it comes to determining outcomes. Any
agreements reached will have to be implemented by states. Even if they
get to the point of formal acceptance of an agreement, states are quite
capable of failing to enforce its provisions and meet targets — as the
experience of the Kyoto Protocol illustrates. And states are quite capable
of negotiating compliance in such a way as to meet the letter of
agreements while interpreting it in such a way as to promote their own
interests at the expense of global sustainability concerns (Stevenson,
2011). Energy corporations that have failed in public space may exert
power behind the scenes upon states in order to secure the fossil fuel
economy (and their own profits).
7
Bolivia, Venezuela, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, Antigua and Barbuda, Nicaragua, and
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. ALBA is the Spanish acronym for the Bolivarian
Alliance for the Peoples of Our America.
8
Accounts vary on who participated in the Friends of the President. According to
Bodansky (2010), twenty nine parties were present: the United States, the European
Union (represented by Sweden as President and the European Commission), China,
India, Brazil, South Africa, the UK, France, Germany, Denmark, Australia, Canada, Japan,
Russia, Grenada, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Papua New Guinea, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Algeria,
Bangladesh, Colombia, Gabon, Indonesia, the Maldives, Saudi Arabia, the Republic of
Korea, and Mexico.
 J.S. Dryzek, H. Stevenson / Ecological Economics xxx (2011) xxx–xxx
5. Conclusion
We conclude this contemplation of the global governance of
climate change with the following observations.
• Public space, some of whose actors and discourses stand at an
appropriate critical distance from empowered space, is in good shape
in terms of the sheer variety of available discourses — though often
they fail to engage each other as effectively as they might. This might
seem unremarkable, until we contrast with cases where hegemony
of a single discourse prevails — such as in the global financial system
pre-2008.
• Empowered space features a lot of bargaining, but some real
deliberation.
• Means of transmission from public to empowered space, notably the
UNFCCC, do exist, if imperfectly. However, some discourses (for
example green radicalism) do not make it through in very effective
fashion.
• There is some narrative accountability but very little deliberative
accountability in the system.
• Meta-deliberative capacity is currently weak.
• The deliberative system is not as decisive as it should be.
Any lacunae notwithstanding, the elements of a deliberative sys-
tem can be discerned, even if only in putative or compromised form.
Thus it is worthwhile to examine global governance in deliberative
democratic terms. The democratisation of global earth system gover-
nance will need to draw on the lessons of experience, not simple
application of normative reasoning. And to develop lessons, we need
analysis of the sort that our conceptualisation and application of the
deliberative system concept supplies. There is a long way to go before
anything adequate in the way of global governance seems attainable.
But however long and hard the road, in the end the question is one of
‘how’ rather than ‘whether’.
Acknowledgments
Versions of this paper were presented at the conference on Earth
System Governance: People, Places and the Planet, Volendam, 2009;
the Oceanic Conference on International Studies, Auckland, 2010; the
conference on Democratising Climate Governance at Australian
National University, Canberra, 2010; the Conference of the American
Political Science Association, Washington, DC, 2010; and the Confer-
ence of the Standing Group on International Relations of the European
Consortium for Political Research, Stockholm, 2010. A sketch of the
argument was delivered as the 2009 Cunningham Lecture to the
Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia. For comments we thank
Walter Baber, Frank Biermann, Erik Eriksen, Aarti Gupta, Stephen
Healy, Ronald Mitchell, Steve Vanderheiden, and the anonymous
referees. This research was supported by Australian Research Council
Federation Fellowship FF00883522.
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