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3 Bordador V Luz
3 Bordador V Luz
*
G.R. No. 130148. December 15, 1997.
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* SECOND DIVISION.
375
376
the trial court. Consequently, it was the duty of the two branches
of the Regional Trial Court concerned to independently proceed
with the civil and criminal cases. It will also be observed that a
final judgment rendered in a civil action absolving the defendant
from civil liability is no bar to a criminal action.
377
REGALADO, J.:
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1 Rollo, 86.
2 Ibid., 203.
378
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3 Ibid., 85.
4 Ibid., 78-84.
5 Ibid., 111-112.
379
6 Ibid., 85-97.
7 Ibid., 94.
8 Article 1403 of the Civil Code pertinently provides that the following
contracts are unenforceable unless they are ratified:
1. Those entered into in the name of another person by one who had
been given no authority or legal representation, or who has acted
beyond his power.
2. Those that do not comply with the Statute of Frauds as set forth in
this number. In the following cases, an agreement hereafter made
shall be unenforceable by action, unless the same, or some note or
memorandum thereof, be in writing, and subscribed by the party
charged, or by his agent; evidence, therefore, of the agreement
cannot be received without the writing or a secondary evidence of
its contents:
380
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xxx
(b) A special promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another;
x x x.
9 Rollo, 97.
10 Justice Maximiano C. Asuncion as ponente, with the concurrence of
Justice Jesus M. Elbinias and Justice Ramon A. Barcelona of the Eleventh
Division of the Court of Appeals, affirmed the decision of the trial court in
a decision dated July 9, 1997; Rollo, 9-13.
11 The resolution was dated August 18, 1997; Rollo, 70-A.
381
12
Luz).” In support of this contention, petitioners quoted
several letters sent to them by Brigida D. Luz wherein the
latter acknowledged her obligation to petitioners and
requested for more time to fulfill the same. They likewise
aver that Brigida testified in the trial court that Deganos
took some gold articles from petitioners and delivered the
same to her.
Both the Court of Appeals and the trial court, however,
found as a fact that the aforementioned letters concerned
the previous obligations of Brigida to petitioners, and had
nothing to do with the money sought to be recovered in the
instant case. Such concurrent factual findings are entitled
to great weight, hence, petitioners cannot plausibly claim
in this appellate review that the letters were in the nature
of acknowledgements by Brigida that she was the principal
of Deganos in the subject transactions.
On the other hand, with regard to the testimony of
Brigida admitting delivery of the gold to her, there is no
showing whatsoever that her statement referred to the
items which are the subject matter of this case. It cannot,
therefore, be validly said that she admitted her liability
regarding the same.
Petitioners insist that Deganos was the agent of Brigida
D. Luz as the latter clothed him with apparent authority as
her agent and held him out to the public as such, hence
Brigida can not be permitted to deny said authority to
innocent
13
third parties who dealt with Deganos under such
belief. Petition ers further represent that the Court of
Appeals recognized
14
in its decision that Deganos was an
agent of Brigida.
The evidence does not support the theory of petitioners
that Deganos was an agent of Brigida D. Luz and that the
latter should consequently be held solidarily liable with
Deganos in his obligation to petitioners. While the quoted
statement in the findings of fact of the assailed appellate
decision men-
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12 Rollo, 33-40.
13 Ibid., 40.
14 Ibid., 40-41.
382
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15 Ibid., 12.
16 Toyota Shaw, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 116650, May
23, 1995, 244 SCRA 320.
383
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17 Rollo, 128-131.
18 Ibid., 41.
384
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385
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22 Ibid., 48.
23 Ibid., 9-13.
24 Ibid., 160-167.
25 Ibid., 178-182.
26 Ibid., 70-A.
386
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27 Section 3(m), Rule 131, Rules of Court.
28 Section 3(n), Rule 131, Rules of Court provides that it is presumed
that a court, or judge acting as such, whether in the Philippines or
elsewhere, was acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction.
387
29
thereby. They proceed on the premise that the Statute of
Frauds applies only to executory contracts and not to
executed or to partially executed ones. From there, they
move on to claim that the contract involved in this case was
an executed contract as the items had already been
delivered by petitioners to Brigida D. Luz, hence, such
delivery resulted in the execution of the contract and
removed the same from the coverage of the Statute of
Frauds.
Petitioners’ claim is speciously unmeritorious. It should
be emphasized that neither the trial court nor the appellate
court categorically stated that there was such a contractual
relation between these two respondents. The trial court
merely said that if there was such an agency existing
between them, the same is unenforceable as the contract
would fall under the Statute of Frauds which requires the
presentation of a note or memorandum thereof in order to
be enforceable in court. That was merely a preparatory
statement of a principle of law. What was finally proven as
a matter of fact is that there was no such contract between
Brigida D. Luz and Narciso Deganos, executed or partially
executed, and no delivery of any of the items subject of this
case was ever made to the former.
WHEREFORE, no error having been committed by the
Court of Appeals in affirming the judgment of the court a
quo, its challenged decision and resolution are hereby
AFFIRMED and the instant petition is DENIED, with
double costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
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29 Rollo, 52.
388
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